

(Reverse Engineering the Firmware Binary)

Manual-Extraction, Analysis, Modification and Packing of Router Firmware

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Background: In the world of ever-increasing interconnection of computing, mobile and embedded devices, their security has become critical. The security of embedded devices and their firmwares is the new trend in the embedded market. The security requirements and expectations for computing devices are being constantly raised as the world moves towards the Internet of Things. This is especially true for embedded devices and their software counterpart – firmwares – which is also their weakest point.

IoT device Firmware Reverse Engineering: It is a process to understand the device architecture, functionality and vulnerabilities present in the device incorporating different methods.

Firmware: Piece of code written for specific hardware to perform different operations and control the device.

Manual-Extraction and Packing means (in context of our article): By manual-extraction and packing we mean to extract and pack the target firmware by using command line tool like “dd” or through some program like python script that is without using any automated tools like “binwalk” and “Firmware-mod-kit” because sometimes these automated tools fail or we have some specific requirement. In such type of situations, it is very handy to build or write your own tools/scripts as per your specific need and requirement.

Problem statement: We have to modify the router firmware binary. We used the automated tool “Firmware-Mod-Kit” for its extraction, analyse it, modify as per our need (Bricking) and again try to pack it through the same tool “fmk” but it fails, even if we simply extract the firmware through “fmk” and again pack it without doing any change, “fmk” still fails. So here at this point there was a requirement that how we can extract & pack this target firmware successfully which leads us towards manual extraction of firmware.

Objective: Our objective is to modify/customise the router firmware binary. The target device is a router which is running an embedded Linux OS. Routers are the main incoming and outgoing points to the outside world on a computer network, and as such are a prime location for sniffing traffic and performing man in the middle (MITM) attacks. If we control the router then we control the network traffic.

We reverse engineer targeted firmware binary of the Router and modified it so that when upload to the router, the router becomes unusable (Bricked):

Strategy Followed:


- The firmware for the device can be downloaded from the vendor's website.
- Get as much information about the firmware by using tools like file, readelf, binwalk etc. and from online sources regarding file type, Boot Loader and its version, file system, Architecture, Version, Kernel version, compression used or any encryption used etc.
- File system, header and kernel are extracted by using a python script.
- Analyse the file system as the file system includes default settings and binaries from the device which then can then be reverse engineered for potential exploits. The purpose of this is to identify the architecture information of the device, as well as finding vulnerabilities and other potential avenues of attack.
- Modify or change the firmware's file system as per our requirement.
- Again pack the firmware manually by using our python script.

Tools Used:

- File tool
- Binwalk
- Readelf
- Python Script (maual_extract.py) for extraction and packing of firmware.
- Unsquashfs
- mksquashfs
- Firmware-analysis-Tool-Kit

Demonstration of extracting, analysing and modifying the firmware binary manually:

Figure: 1



```

iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/$ file firmwarebinaryname.bin
firmwarebinaryname.bin : data
iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/$

```

Figure 1 above shows the output of a tool called file, this tool attempts to classify a file and tests if the file is in a certain format. Here it simply tells that the file type is data. We also ran the file tool on an extracted executable from the bin directory in the filesystem later on.

Figure2:

```

iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares
iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/0303 Tenda Router 173x39
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/$ binwalk firmwarebinaryname.bin

```

DECIMAL	HEXADECIMAL	DESCRIPTION
0	0x0	Broadcom 96345 firmware header, header size: 256, firmware version: "8", board id: "6318REF", ~CRC32 header checksum: 0x88043C1E, ~CRC32 data c
256	0x100	Squashfs filesystem, little endian, non-standard signature, version 4.0, compression: gzip, size: 6393924 bytes, 1362 inodes, blocksize: 65536 b
6398220	0x61A10C	LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x6D, dictionary size: 4194304 bytes, uncompressed size: 3943600 bytes

In Figure2 above, we have used “Binwalk” which is an open-source tool for analyzing, reverse engineering and extracting firmware images. Binwalk is able to scan a firmware image and search for file signatures to identify and extract filesystem images, executable code, compressed archives, bootloader and kernel images, file formats like JPEGs and PDFs, and many more!

Both *file* and *binwalk* tools use the *libmagic* library to identify file signatures. But binwalk additionally supports a list of custom magic signatures to find compressed/archived files, firmware headers, Linux kernels, bootloaders, filesystems, and so on!

Binwalk has several options you can use but here we only simply use binwalk without any option to get useful information about our target firmware image. Binwalk structure has three sections:

1. File location or offset in decimal format
2. File location or offset in hexadecimal format
3. Description of what was found at that location

Points to be noted from above information: The image mentions that the firmware belongs to chipset Broadcom 96345 and also firmware version 8 in first line. And based on the image found at the address 0x100, we can see that the rootfs is a squashfs filesystem in little endian format. Other useful information like gzip compression and size is also shown. Further in last line at address 0x61A10C shows that lzma compressed data and is most probably be the kernel.

The information provided above is very useful, especially the offset/addresses information regarding each part because we will going to use these offsets in our python script for manual extraction to tell the script that from which offset to extract these different parts.

Figure 3:

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3

import sys

class FirmwarePart:
    def __init__(self, name, offset, size):
        self.name = name
        self.offset = offset
        self.size = size

firmware_parts = [
    FirmwarePart("broadcom_header", 0x0, 0x100),
    FirmwarePart("squashfs", 0x100, 0x61A00C),
    FirmwarePart("kernel.lzma", 0x61A10C, 7,734,505-0x61A10C),
]

if sys.argv[1] == "unpack":
    f = open(sys.argv[2], "rb")
    for part in firmware_parts:
        outfile = open(part.name, "wb")
        f.seek(part.offset, 0)
        data = f.read(part.size)
        outfile.write(data)
        outfile.close()
        print(f"Wrote {part.name} - {hex(len(data))} bytes")
elif sys.argv[1] == "pack":
    f = open(sys.argv[2], "wb")
    for part in firmware_parts[0:]:
        i = open(part.name, "rb")
        data = i.read()
        f.write(data)
        padding = (part.size - len(data))
        print(f"Wrote {part.name} - {hex(len(data))} bytes")
```

Starting address or offset

Total size of the part

Above is the code for our python script which we used to extract and pack the firmware. In the script above we have defined a list “firmware parts” under class FirmwarePart, in which we mention the part name, its offset and total size of particular part name to pack or unpack each part as per the argument (“pack or “unpack”) we passed at run time to run the script as mentioned below:

python3 ourscripname.py argument(pack or unpack) firmwarefilename

Example:

To unpack or extract the firmware

Python3 **manual-script.py unpack OriginalFirmwareBinary.bin**


To pack the firmware:

Python3 manual-script.py pack NewFirmware.bin

Manual Extraction and Packing:

Step1: Extraction of firmware through python script “manual-script.py”

Python3 manual-script.py unpack OriginalFirmwareBinary.bin



```


iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares
iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares$ python3 manual-script.py 173x39
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript$ sudo python3 manual-extract.py unpack OriginalFirmwareBinary.bin
Wrote broadcom_header - 0x100 bytes
Wrote squashfs - 0x61a10c bytes
Wrote kernel.lzma - 0x1463dd bytes
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript$ ls
broadcom_header  kernel.lzma  manual-extract.py  squashfs  OriginalFirmwareBinary.bin

```

After extraction as shown in above figure, three parts of our firmware image is extracted with name as Broadcom_header, squashfs, kernel.lzma. Currently our interest is in file system, so we unpack squashfs with “unsquashfs” utility to get complete file system as shown below in Figure4:

Step2: Unpack squashfs with “unsquashfs” utility to get complete file system

Figure 4:



```

iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares
iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares$ python3 manual-script.py 173x39
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript$ sudo unsquashfs -d squashfs_out squashfs
Parallel unsquashfs: Using 1 processor
1282 inodes (1544 blocks) to write

[=====] 1544/1544 100%

created 975 files
created 80 directories
created 103 symlinks
created 203 devices
created 1 fifos
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript$ ls
broadcom_header  kernel.lzma  manual-extract.py  squashfs  squashfs_out  OriginalFirmwareBinary.bin
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript$ cd squashfs_out/
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript$ ls
bin  data  dev  etc  etc_ro  lib  linuxrc  mnt  opt  proc  sbin  sys  tmp  usr  var  webs

```

As shown above in figure 4, squashfs_out directory contains the complete filesystem of our firmware image which we can further analyse to find vulnerabilities and how we can modify it in our best interest.

Step3: Analysis of file system and modification.

Figure 5:

```

iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript/squashfs_out$ ls
bin data dev etc etc_ro lib linuxrc mnt opt proc sbin sys tmp usr var webs
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript/squashfs_out$ cd etc
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript/squashfs_out/etc$ ls
adsl dhcp6s.conf.sample fstab HP_P1008.img ipsec.conf passwd racoon.conf smb.conf udhcpd.leases
arl dns.conf gateway.conf inetd.conf ipv6_start.sample radvd.conf.sample snmp vlan
default.cfg dyndsc.sh group initrd.img mdm pppmsg resolv.conf soft_bridge wlan
ethertypes hotplug_add_usbled_and_hp_p1008 inittab modules_install profile samba sysmsg wrt54g.large.ico
dhcp6c.conf.sample filesystems hotplug_for_usbled iproute2 ntab psk.txt services udhcpd.conf wrt54g.small.ico
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript/squashfs_out/etc$ cd init.d
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript/squashfs_out/etc/init.d$ ls
rcS

```

Now as shown in Figure 5, we traverse various directories like bin, etc and webs which contains important files which we further analyse to find any loopholes which either helps us in creating any backdoor or we can modify to brick the device. For example, there are some start-up scripts present in some directories which runs on start-up of the router and do various work like initialization and setting various parameters. We modify such files to achieve our objective.(The name and location of such files is not mentioned here intentionally).

Figure 6:

```

iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript/squashfs_out/etc/init.d$ ls
rcS
iot@attifyos:~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript/squashfs_out/etc/init.d$ leafpad startupscriptfilename
(leafpad:14357): GLib-GIO-CRITICAL **: 04:23:38.192: g_dbus_proxy_new: assertion 'G_IS_DBUS_CONNECTION (connection)' failed

```



As shown above in Figure 6, we simply accessing the file and open it with leafpad. The contents of file are also shown below in Figure 7 also.


Figure 7:



As we know from above discussion that start-up script file is important and runs on router start-up and we also knew that the system is a linux system. We further analyse busybox file present in /bin directory to know its version, commands it supports by using file and emulation software qemu. We can as per our requirement can write our customised code or script and can run through it on system start-up. It is just one method, there are number of files available and we further explore them as per our need. Our malicious process will run in background.

Step4: Packing of squashfs file system using “mksquashfs” utility after modification.

Figure 8:



After modifying the required files in our extracted file system, we simply again pack the unpacked squashfs (squashfs_out) by using “mksquashfs” utility as shown above in Figure8.

Step5: Packing of or creating new-firmware image using our python script manual-extract.py.

Python3 manual-script.py pack NewFirmware.bin

Figure 9:

```

iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extract0303manualscript$ sudo python3 manual-extract.py NewFirmware.bin
[sudo] password for iot:
iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extract0303manualscript$ ls
broadcom header  kernel.lzma  manual-extract.py  squashfs  squashfsnew  OriginalFirmwareBinary.bin
iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extract0303manualscript$ sudo python3 manual-extract.py pack NewFirmwareTenda0303.bin
Wrote broadcom header - 0x100 bytes
Wrote squashfsnew - 0x607000 bytes
Wrote kernel.lzma - 0x1463dd bytes
iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extract0303manualscript$ ls
broadcom header  kernel.lzma  manual-extract.py  NewFirmware.bin  squashfs  squashfsnew  OriginalFirmwareBinary.bin
iot@attifyos: ~/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extract0303manualscript$ binwalk NewFirmware.bin

DECIMAL      HEXADECIMAL  DESCRIPTION
-----
0             0x0          Broadcom 96345 firmware header, header size: 256, firmware version: "8", board id: "6318REF", -CRC32 header checksum: 0x88043C1E, -CRC32 data c
checksum: 0x180B135F
256          0x100        Squashfs filesystem, little endian, version 4.0, compression:lzma, size: 6317240 bytes, 1362 inodes, blocksize: 65536 bytes, created: 2020-11-1
0 13:03:02
6320384      0x607100     LZMA compressed data, properties: 0x60, dictionary size: 4194304 bytes, uncompressed size: 3943600 bytes
  
```

Now at last step, we simply build our new modified firmware again by using our python script manual-extract.py as shown in figure 9 above. It successfully created and same as original firmware (check binwalk output above for new firmware file). We can now upload it on our target router and brick it.

Demonstration of our modified new-firmware through emulation.

To demonstrate that after modifying the firmware it does not work after uploading on router we emulate it through firmware-analysis-tool kit which is based on qemu and automate the whole process.

First we emulate our original firmware file as shown in Figure 10 and Figure 11 and finds that it works fine. We able to emulate it and also accessing its file system (Figure 11). This confirms us that the original firmware is working fine.

Figure 12:

```

iot@attifyos: ~/tools/firmware-analysis-toolkit 173x39
iot@attifyos:~/tools/firmware-analysis-toolkit$ sudo ./fat.py /home/iot/Desktop/RoutersFirmwares/Extractmanualscript/NewFirmware.bin

      fat

Welcome to the Firmware Analysis Toolkit - v0.3
Offensive IoT Exploitation Training http://bit.do/offensivelotexploitation
By Attify - https://attify.com | @attifyme

[+] Firmware: NewFirmware.bin
[+] Extracting the firmware...
[+] Image ID: 4
[+] Identifying architecture...
[+] Architecture: mips64
[+] Building QEMU disk image...
[+] Setting up the network connection, please standby...
[+] Network interfaces: []
[+] All set! Press ENTER to run the firmware...
[+] When running, press Ctrl + A X to terminate qemu

```

As shown in Figure 12, we are now emulating our modified new-firmware file with firmware-mod-kit. As shown in Figure 13 below that emulation is failed and router is restarting again and again. Our purpose and objective is fulfilled.

Figure 13:

```

iot@attifyos: ~/tools/firmware-analysis-toolkit 173x39

can't open /dev/tty3: No such file or directory
starting pid 46, tty '': '/bin/sh'

BusyBox v1.17.2 (2015-08-06 17:12:56 CST) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.

process '/bin/sh' (pid 47) exited. Scheduling for restart.
process '/bin/sh' (pid 48) exited. Scheduling for restart.
process '/bin/sh' (pid 49) exited. Scheduling for restart.
can't open /dev/tty4: No such file or directory
can't open /dev/tty3: No such file or directory
can't open /dev/tty2: No such file or directory
process '/bin/sh' (pid 50) exited. Scheduling for restart.
process '/bin/sh' (pid 51) exited. Scheduling for restart.
process '/bin/sh' (pid 52) exited. Scheduling for restart.
can't open /dev/tty3: No such file or directory
can't open /dev/tty4: No such file or directory
can't open /dev/tty2: No such file or directory
process '/bin/sh' (pid 54) exited. Scheduling for restart.
process '/bin/sh' (pid 55) exited. Scheduling for restart.
process '/bin/sh' (pid 56) exited. Scheduling for restart.
can't open /dev/tty4: No such file or directory
can't open /dev/tty3: No such file or directory
can't open /dev/tty2: No such file or directory
process '/bin/sh' (pid 57) exited. Scheduling for restart.
process '/bin/sh' (pid 58) exited. Scheduling for restart.
process '/bin/sh' (pid 59) exited. Scheduling for restart.
can't open /dev/tty4: No such file or directory
can't open /dev/tty3: No such file or directory
can't open /dev/tty2: No such file or directory

```

Conclusion:

Here, we have analysed, extracted the entire filesystem of the target Firmware by using python script. We further modified the firmware and check through emulation that it did not work after modification.

Note: Here in the report, the name of firmware binary, its version, firmware vendor name and start-up scripts files name and location are not mentioned intentionally for the purpose.

BAJWA Academy