

# International Relations Class 04

11th January, 2024 at 1:00 PM

## BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS CLASS (1:09 PM)

### INDO-PAK RELATIONS (1:17 PM)

- **China angle:**
- **The Sino-Pak axis** in geopolitics is often described by the metaphor '**higher than the mountains' and 'deeper than the oceans'**'.
- The Chinese angle had created a potential challenge for India in the South Asian Region (SAR).
- **China's interest in Pakistan:**
- The involvement of any power with India and Pakistan has been a situation of a **zero-sum game**.
- China has taken these **zero-sum game dynamics** to achieve its **strategic goals**
- The US however have now avoided its previous zero-sum character of **US** policy towards India and Pakistan by adopting a **dehyphenated** approach.
- Pakistan is crucial for China, being a **zipper** state and a **doorway to Afghanistan** and the **Middle East**. -> Through Pakistan China gets direct entry to Indian ocean through Gwadar port.
- Pakistan is crucial in terms of **preventing radical Islamic forces** from entering the Xinjiang province.
- Both China and Pakistan have a mutual interest in **undercutting** India.
- **Why China is important for Pakistan?**
- 1. China fits in Pakistan's concepts of **borrowed power**.
- 2. For constraining India (both regionally and globally) **for example**, by blocking India in **NSG**.
- 3. China in this regard, has also been providing **Pakistan with conventional and non-conventional nuclear weapons**.
- **Pakistan-India-China triangle:**
- Because of the above reason a very strong **nexus is created between Pakistan and China** to counter India's attempt at regional assertions.
- This axis can be manifested in terms of CPEC and other conventional and non-conventional weapon sales. from China to Pakistan.
- This has created ground for **India's rapprochement** with global powers like the US, UK, Russia and the EU.
- **CPEC:**
- CPEC is a **3000 km**. infrastructural project connecting China's **Xinjiang** province with **Gwadar Port** in the Baluchistan area of Pakistan.
- It is a **network of railways, highways and pipelines** involving energy and infrastructural developmental projects under China's ambitious BRI project
- **Implication of CPEC for India:**
- 1. It is an attack on India's **territorial sovereignty** since the corridor passes through Indian claimed ~~passes through~~ **Gilgit Baltistan region**.
- 2. If CPEC turns out to be a success, it will consolidate Pakistan's **claims on the disputed Gilgit Baltistan region**.
- 3. Once CPEC becomes functional it will offer **economic trade** routes for **Pakistan to the Middle East through Gwadar port**. This would impact India's economic presence in the Middle East.
- 4. CPEC will enable Pakistan to stand in competition with India especially in the **textile** and **construction** sector in areas of the **Middle East**.
- 5. CPEC could be considered as a **manifestation of China's string of pearl diplomacy** since Gwadar port in this project is right now under a 40-year lease to China due to a debt trap. The Gwadar port also provides **China access to Indian Ocean Regions (IOR)** and helps China overcome the great **Malacca dilemma**.

- **Way forward:** could be able
- India should continue following its **Neighbourhood First policy** so that it ~~can~~ establish its own strategic ~~clout~~ in the region.
- India should make **efforts to increase its presence in its neighbourhood to challenge Chinese outreach in these regions.**
- **For example:** In South East Asia through the **Act East Policy**, in Central Asia through the **Connect Central Asia Policy** and in West Asia through the **look-west policy**.
- At the same time, we need to increase our collaboration with great powers like the US, UK, EU, Japan, Russia and other **like-minded countries through forums** like G7, G20 BRICS, QUAD, ASEAN, etc. (i.e. we adopted the policy of Deterrence by Denial.)
- **Major achievements:** (Military CBMs)
- 1965 - A **hotline between DGMOs** of both countries. (between India and Pakistan)
- 1971
- The agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities was signed in 1988 and ratified in 1990.
- 1991 - The Agreement on Advance Notification on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements was brought into effect in 1991.
- The communication link between the Pakistan Maritime Security Agency and the Indian Coast Guard was established in 2005 to facilitate the early exchange of information.
- **Non-Military CBM:**
- **1. Delhi-Lahore Bus Service:**
- It was **initiated in 1999**. It was **suspended in the aftermath of the 2001 Indian Parliament Attack**.
- The bus service was later **resumed in 2003** when bilateral relations had improved.
- This service was recently suspended in **2019** in the aftermath of the **abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A** of the Indian Constitution and continues to be suspended.
- **2. Samjhauta Express:** (passenger train service between India and Pakistan launched in 1976 under 1972 Shimla agreement)
- It was launched following the signing of the Shimla Agreement connecting the Pakistani city of Lahore and the Indian town of Attari.
- In 2019, it was suspended after the revocation of the special status of Kashmir.
- **3. Efforts of repatriation of Indians from Pakistan's custody and vice versa.**
- **4. Kartarpur Sahib Gurudwara corridor:**
- The corridor linking **Dera Baba Sahib** in **India's Gurdaspur** with the **gurdwara in Pakistan's Kartarpur** was thrown open in November 2019 in a historic people-to-people initiative.
- It was shut down due to the Coronavirus pandemic.
- The corridor – often dubbed the “Road to Peace” – will connect Gurdwara Darbar Sahib in Pakistan's Kartarpur with Dera Baba Nanak shrine in India's Gurdaspur district.



## **FALLOUT OF LIMITED ENGAGEMENTS (2:39 PM)** (i.e. what would happen if we do not engage.)

- Unresolved **border** disputes
- Limited economic **engagements**
- **Reduced people-people contact** leads to increased trust deficits
- Unresolved social issues such as **drug trafficking, illegal migrations, fishing men** issues etc.
- It leads to an **arms race**, increasing the defence expenditure which is leading to low socio-economic development.
- Limited engagement provides China with an opportunity to create access to Pakistan thereby challenging India.
- It has led to limited **regional integrations, dysfunctionality of SAARC** and **non-working of SAFTA**.

## **INDIA'S POSITION W.R.T. PAKISTAN (3:06 PM)** or present Indian policy towards Pakistan.

- After the 2014 regime change, **India adopted the neighbourhood-first policy** in the swearing-in ceremony of our PM in 2014. the Pakistani counterpart was also invited. <sup>. In</sup>
- ~~The Pakistani counterpart was also invited in~~ <sup>In</sup> 2015, Indian PM made a reciprocal visit to Pakistan and these two occasions brought the **Shawl-Sari diplomacy** between India and Pakistan into the limelight.
- Traditionally, India and Pakistan have witnessed a slew of diplomacy such as **mango diplomacy, cricket diplomacy, soft diplomacy** initiatives like student exchange programmes cross-border visits of artist, CBM etc.
- However, **after the Uri attack (2016) and the Pulwama attack (2019), India's policy towards Pakistan witnessed a strategic shift.**
- The position from the **engagement was changed to that of isolation.**
- Post Uri attack, **surgical strikes were conducted from the Indian side which helped India emerge as a hard power at the same time created a dent in Indo-Pak engagements.**
- **With regards to Pakistan,** <sup>but</sup> **we are currently following the Doval doctrine:**
- It emphasises a **proactive stance** against **state-sponsored terrorism** and other security threats emanating from Pakistan and **other sources.**
- The doctrine aims to protect **India's national security** by adopting a **defensive-offensive strategy** which means defending ourselves by attacking the place from where the offence is coming.
- **For example**, surgical strike post Uri attack.
- India had tried a strategy to work on the vulnerabilities of Pakistan.
- **For example**, Baluchistan, IWT, and Gilgit Baltistan. All these pressure tac-tic that India is using signifies the stand -"**respond in the language what your adversary understands**"
- As far as Pakistan is concerned it cannot be ignored altogether.
- Since it is <sup>a zipper state in</sup> ~~an~~ SAR and our immediate neighbour, therefore, India needs to adopt **strategic patience** and **measured response** especially keeping in mind that coercive diplomacy will not always work due to Pakistan's tremendous enduring capacity.
- Also, options regarding **soft diplomacy** cannot be completely ignored in future.
- **For example**, hydro-diplomacy within IWT could be used <sup>in India</sup> ~~in India~~ creating an off-water grid to address the issue of water scarcity. <sup>as an idea of</sup>
- Cultural diplomacy <sup>should</sup> ~~could~~ be encouraged through greater **people-people interaction.**
- The use of **track II & III diplomacy** such as the opening of the Kartarpur corridor and **even track IV diplomacy for resolving complex issues** needs to be adopted.

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**Note:**

**Track Diplomacy:**

**Track I Diplomacy:**

Track 1 diplomacy refers to official government-to-government <sup>or formal diplomacy it includes</sup> ~~negotiations~~ <sup>engagement</sup>, involving high-level officials.

It is the formal and official channel of diplomacy

**Track II Diplomacy:**

It is also called backchannel diplomacy.

It includes engagement between non-official members or non-government members.

**For example-** NGOs, Religious groups and Business houses etc

**Track 1.5 Diplomacy:**

Engagement involves official and non-official members.

**Track III Diplomacy:**

This includes people-to-people contact.

**For example** - Cricket diplomacy, exchange between artists, cultural exchange, student exchange etc.

**Track 4 Diplomacy:**

It is a **multi-track** diplomacy. <sup>which includes all the above</sup>

It is useful for resolving complex issues.

- **Way Forward:**
- At the same time, India should also maintain **deterrence by denial** which means enhancing our military capabilities to deter the adversary from achieving their aims.
- India should strengthen itself in existing regional organisations like ASEAN, and **BIMSTEC** to isolate Pakistan diplomatically.
- India is advocating the creation of an <sup>open rule based</sup> ~~open-based~~ order in the Indo-Pacific and is part of the democratic axis within QUAD (US, Japan, Australia and India).
- India should not consider Pakistan as the only important country in South Asia, only when India becomes less Pakistan-centric can reemerge as an Asian leader.
- **With reference to Pakistan, there are two options:**
- 1. **War**- which is not a rational option.
- 2. **Peacebuilding**- which appears to be a rational option.
- Therefore, the **ultimate solution should be peacebuilding through dialogue and diplomacy** since the former option of war is extremely disastrous.
- Faculty discussed how to extract Prelims and Mains-related facts from Newspapers.
- Faculty gave a background to Indo-Bangladesh relations.

**THE TOPICS FOR THE NEXT CLASS: INDO-BANGLADESH RELATIONS**