

# Headlines

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**Join me on Telegram :- Prashant Tiwari**

**Username:- UPSCwithPrashant**

CIVIL SERVICES (MAIN) EXAMINATION,2024

S.NO.	ROLL NO	NAME
1	0240782	SHAKTI DUBEY
2	0101571	HARSHITA GOYAL
3	0867282	DONGRE ARCHIT PARAG
4	0108110	SHAH MARGI CHIRAG
5	0833621	AAKASH GARG
6	0818290	KOMAL PUNIA
7	6902167	AAYUSHI BANSAL
8	6613295	RAJ KRISHNA JHA
9	0849449	ADITYA VIKRAM AGARWAL
10	5400180	MAYANK TRIPATHI
11	8200949	ETTABOYINA SAI SHIVANI
12	5809367	ASHI SHARMA
13	5912548	HEMANT
14	0818331	ABHISHEK VASHISHTHA
15	1010403	BANNA VENKATESH
16	6907627	MADHAV AGARWAL
17	0810414	SANSKRITI TRIVEDY
18	2604936	SAUMYA MISHRA
19	0833456	VIBHOR BHARDWAJ
20	2200688	TRILOK SINGH
21	0859649	DIVYANK GUPTA
22	0865358	RIYA SAINI
23	1214507	B SIVACHANDRAN
24	0334811	R RANGAMANJU
25	1202909	GEE GEE A S
26	6618486	SHIVANSH SUBHASH JAGADE
27	0410502	ROMIL DWIVEDI
28	7809511	RISHABH CHOUDHARY
29	1203512	SUBASHIKARTHIK S
30	0109558	PANCHAL SMIT HASMUKHBHAI
31	0510887	SHREYA TYAGI
32	1126194	UTKARSH YADAV
33	0816777	ALFRED THOMAS
34	0413837	ABHI JAIN
35	0840850	SHREYAK GARG
36	2613856	MUSKAN SRIVASTAVA
37	0801201	SHOBHIKA PATHAK
38	6319367	ABHISHEK SHARMA
39	1204543	MONICA R
40	3405835	IRAM CHOUDHARY
41	0815285	SACHIN BASAVARAJ GUTTUR
42	1221566	PAVITHRA P
43	6616032	AVDHIIA GUPTA
44	0869198	MUDITA BANSAL
45	1907228	MALAVIKA G NAIR
46	8203187	RAVULA JAYASIMHA REDDY
47	1902150	NANDANAA G P
48	0705455	RITIKA RATH
49	4108641	SOURAV SINHA
50	0823200	ANKUR TRIPATHI
51	0850412	RUCHIKA JHA
52	4002135	R SRI RUSAT
53	0815109	SHIVANI PANCHAL
54	1910898	SONNET JOSE

**Prashant Tiwari**

Mere Khyal se Upsc 2024 Prelims ki  
cut off 85 Se 90 ke beech me honi  
chahiye

Maine 2 din liye analysis karne me 😊



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30.8K Prashant, 6:24 PM



Leave a Comment



#### Civil Services Examination, 2024 – minimum qualifying marks

In the Civil Services Examination 2024, the minimum qualifying standards/marks secured by the last recommended candidate in various categories at various stages are as under:-

Examination	General	EWS	OBC	SC	ST	PwBD-1	PwBD-2	PwBD-3	PwBD-5
CS (Prelim)*	87.98	85.92	87.28	79.03	74.23	69.42	65.30	40.56	40.56
CS (Main) <sup>#</sup>	729	696	702	685	684	663	696	307	361
CS (Final)	947	917	910	880	884	876	913	701	461

\*Cut off marks on the basis of GS Paper-I only. GS Paper-II was of qualifying nature with 33% marks as per Rule-15 of Civil Services Examination, 2024.

<sup>#</sup> Subject to 10% marks in each of the seven competitive papers i.e. Essay, GS-I, GS-II, GS-III, GS-IV, Optional-I and Optional-II.

# 26 killed in J&K terrorist attack

Militants open fire at tourists visiting Baisaran in Pahalgam

**Peerzada As hijq**  
SRINAGAR

At least 26 people, including two foreign tourists, were killed by a group of terrorists who emerged from the dense forests around the trekking paradise of the Baisaran meadows in the upper reaches of Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir on Tuesday afternoon.

Many others were wounded, some with critical injuries, and the toll is likely to rise, official sources told *The Hindu*. However, there was no official casualty data from the government.

The attack in Anantnag district came on a day when United States Vice-President J.D. Vance is in the country on a four-day visit. Mr. Vance shared



**Valley stunned:** Security personnel rush to the spot after terrorists attacked a group of tourists at Pahalgam in Anantnag district of J&K on Tuesday. IMRAN NISSAR

condolences with the victims of the attack. “Our thoughts and prayers are with them as they mourn this horrific attack,” he posted on X.

Prime Minister Narendra

Modi “strongly condemned the terror attack in Pahalgam”. He added: “Those behind this heinous act will be brought to justice... They will not be spared! Their evil agenda will never succeed. Our resolve to fight terrorism is

unshakable and it will get even stronger.”

Mr. Modi, who is touring Saudi Arabia, skipped an official dinner on Tuesday and decided to return to India. He will arrive on Wednesday morning.

The Resistance Front,

Two foreigners among those killed; PM cuts short visit to Saudi Arabia

LeT offshoot The Resistance Front claims responsibility for the attack

**Page No. I, GS 2**

an offshoot of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, claimed responsibility for the attack. However, the security agencies did not confirm the veracity of the claim. The outfit alleged that 85,000 domicile certificates have been issued to non-locals, “creating a pathway for demographic change” in J&K. “Violence will be directed toward those attempting to settle illegally,” it said in a statement.

At least 16 people were killed on the spot, while others died on the way to the hospital.

Syed Hussain Shah, a resident of Anantnag, was among those killed. Among those who were injured was an 83-year-old tourist from Tamil Nadu and a 65-year-old woman from Odisha.

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**SHAH RUSHES TO SRINAGAR**

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## **Content.**

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- The attack in Anantnag district came on a day when United States Vice-President J.D. Vance is in the country on a four-day visit. Mr. Vance shared condolences with the victims of the attack. “Our thoughts and prayers are with them as they mourn this horrific attack,” he posted on X.
- Mr. Modi, who is touring Saudi Arabia, skipped an official dinner on Tuesday and decided to return to India. He will arrive on Wednesday morning.

# A move that endangers the right to vote

The Election Commission of India (ECI)'s renewed push to link Aadhaar with voter ID endangers the right to vote. It is being justified as a measure to clean electoral rolls, eliminate bogus voters, and improve electoral integrity. Yet, experience and data show that Aadhaar linkage has resulted in mass disenfranchisement, systemic errors, exclusions, arbitrary welfare disentitlements, and far-reaching infringements on the fundamental right to privacy of citizens.

## Questionable claims

The claim that Aadhaar-voter ID linkage is voluntary is questionable. Presently, Form 6B offers no meaningful opt-out – voters must either submit their Aadhaar number or declare they do not have one, coercing even those unwilling to share it into compliance. Unsurprisingly, by September 2023, over 66 crore Aadhaar numbers had already been seeded. This was enabled not only by a coercive legal framework but also by data-sharing practices of questionable legality and constitutional, ethical propriety. These included the use of the DBT Seeding Data Viewer, which permits third-party access to non-biometric identity data held by UIDAI, as well as the repurposing of data collected for the National Population Register and by other government departments for unrelated administrative purposes.

The ECI's latest proposal fails to rectify this position. On the contrary, it makes the process more restrictive by requiring citizen-voters who do not provide Aadhaar to physically appear before an Electoral Registration Officer to justify their decision. In 2023, in *G. Niranjan v. Election Commission of India*, the ECI had assured the Supreme Court that Aadhaar-voter ID linkage is not mandatory and that appropriate clarifications would be introduced for that purpose; its latest proposal walks back on this commitment.

The new proposal also erodes the commitment to universal and equal suffrage by imposing barriers on those unwilling or unable to furnish Aadhaar. It places a disproportionate burden on the elderly, persons with disabilities, migrant workers, and individuals in remote areas for whom attending an in-person hearing before the Electoral Registration Officer is often neither practical nor reasonable. This not only compromises individual dignity but also diminishes the trust that is foundational to democratic participation.

The problem is further exacerbated by the lack of a clear, accessible, and time-bound appellate



John Simte

Lawyer and legal researcher

mechanism for the citizen-voter, if their justification for not submitting Aadhaar is arbitrarily rejected. The Supreme Court, in *Lal Babu Hussein and Others v. Electoral Registration Officer* (1995), unequivocally held that any decision to delete a name from the electoral roll must comply with the principles of procedural fairness and natural justice.

The Union government and the ECI argue that Aadhaar-voter ID linkage will eliminate duplicate voters and electoral fraud. However, this claim does not withstand scrutiny. Aadhaar was never designed to serve as proof of citizenship. Section 9 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, explicitly states that Aadhaar is a residency-based identification system, which means that an Aadhaar holder may not necessarily be an Indian citizen. Multiple High Courts have ruled that Aadhaar is not proof of Indian citizenship. The UIDAI itself has affirmed that even non-citizens residing in India for 182 days are eligible for Aadhaar. Importantly, the Supreme Court in *Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India* (2018) had limited the use of Aadhaar for welfare programmes paid out of the Consolidated Fund of India per Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016.

By linking Aadhaar with the voter ID, the ECI is creating a mechanism that introduces an unreliable filter into the electoral process, risks mass disenfranchisement of citizen-voters, and eroding the sanctity of universal suffrage and democratic participation guaranteed by the Constitution. These dangers are not hypothetical; they have been documented. In 2015, the ECI attempted a similar Aadhaar-voter ID linkage under the National Electoral Roll Purification and Authentication Programme. As a result, in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh alone, 55 lakh voters were arbitrarily removed from electoral rolls due to Aadhaar mismatches. Voters discovered their names missing only when they arrived at polling stations on election day. The ECI was forced to abandon the exercise after the Supreme Court issued a stay through its August 11, 2015 order.

Aadhaar-voter ID linkage also poses a severe risk of dragnet surveillance and voter profiling. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, contains sweeping exemptions for government entities, raising the possibility that voter data could be accessed and exploited for political purposes. Once Aadhaar is linked to voter IDs, it becomes possible to cross-reference electoral data with other databases, allowing ruling parties to monitor voter demographics. The implications are concerning. Political actors could use this

data to micro-target voters, suppress opposition strongholds, or even manipulate electoral rolls to achieve predetermined electoral outcomes.

Seeding Aadhaar with electoral roll data subverts core principles of constitutional design. The ECI, vested with the powers of "superintendence, direction and control" over elections, is a constitutionally independent authority. In contrast, the UIDAI is a statutory body operating under executive control – bound by government directives under Section 50 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, and subject to supersession under Section 48. Entrusting it with electoral data undermines the separation of powers, jeopardising the integrity of the electoral process and the democratic ideal of free and fair polls.

A further defect lies in the inherent unreliability of the Aadhaar database. The 2022 Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) Performance Audit Report No. 24 of 2021 identified major deficiencies, including the cancellation of over 4.75 lakh Aadhaar numbers due to their duplication and issuance based on faulty biometric data. The CAG also found no assurance that all Aadhaar holders qualify as 'residents' under the Aadhaar Act, as UIDAI had not prescribed any specific proof, document, or process to verify an applicant's period of residence in India. Relying on such an error-prone database for de-duplicating the electoral rolls would lead to wrongful deletions and exclusions.

## Methods of electoral verification

Instead of pushing a technological fix and infringing on the right to privacy of citizens, the ECI must focus on strengthening traditional, time-tested methods of voter verification. Regular door-to-door verification by booth level officers; comprehensive, independent audits of electoral rolls; and functional public grievance redressal frameworks are more effective and constitutionally sound approaches to addressing concerns about alleged duplicate or fraudulent entries. Introducing independent oversight through social audits would further enhance accountability and prevent politically motivated manipulations of electoral rolls.

The right to vote is a constitutional guarantee. Any policy that imposes unreasonable burdens on citizen-voters, introduces unreliable verification mechanisms, or enables political profiling must be abandoned. The Aadhaar-voter ID linkage does all three. That such a constitutionally fraught scheme has found support across the political spectrum is troubling.

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- It is being justified as a measure to clean electoral rolls, eliminate bogus voters, and improve electoral integrity.
- Yet, experience and data show that Aadhaar linkage has resulted in mass disenfranchisement, systemic errors, exclusions, arbitrary welfare disentitlements, and far-reaching infringements on the fundamental right to privacy of citizens.
- The claim that Aadhaar-voter ID linkage is voluntary is questionable. Presently, Form 6B offers no meaningful opt-out — voters must either submit their Aadhaar number or declare they do not have one, coercing even those unwilling to share it into compliance.

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- The new proposal also erodes the commitment to universal and equal suffrage by imposing barriers on those unwilling or unable to furnish Aadhaar.
- It places a disproportionate burden on the elderly, persons with disabilities, migrant workers, and individuals in remote areas for whom attending an in-person hearing before the Electoral Registration Officer is often neither practical nor reasonable.
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- The implications are concerning. Political actors could use this data to micro-target voters, suppress opposition strongholds, or even manipulate electoral rolls to achieve predetermined electoral outcomes.
- Seeding Aadhaar with electoral roll data subverts core principles of constitutional design. The ECI, vested with the powers of “superintendence, direction and control” over elections, is a constitutionally independent authority. In contrast, the UIDAI is a statutory body operating under executive control — bound by government directives under Section 50 of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, and subject to supersession under Section 48.

## **Content.**

- The right to vote is constitutional under Article 326 of IC.
- By the Sixty-first constitutional amendment act of 1988, the voting age of elections to the LS and legislative assemblies of States has been lowered from 21 to 18 years.
- To exercise this right, the country's citizens must attain the age of 18.
- The legal character of the right to vote has been debatable since the time of the inception of IC.
- In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (March 2023):
  - The majority judgement held that the right to vote is constitutional.
  - In his separate opinion, Justice Ajay Rastogi said that the right to vote is a fundamental right.
- New NCERT, Std. 11, Introduction to Indian Constitution Chapter 3, Page 66 and 67 mentioned that

# Exploring India's potential in the Arctic region

Page No. 8, GS 3

**G**lobal trade is swinging like a pendulum, with potential headwinds from the U.S. nudging each nation to start doubling down on alternate trade strategies. In such a scenario, partnerships around supply chains and trade routes are expanding based not only on the current fracturing of regional blocs, but also on climate change.

The frozen frontier of the Arctic serves as a canary in the coal mines for the impending climate catastrophe. It also serves as the source of great geopolitical leverage as sea levels continue to rise and new trade routes emerge. The Arctic reflects a critical energy source for the Global South in the years to come. While not recklessly exploiting the Arctic reserves, India should also get a say in the commercial opportunity for the unseen future.

**The dying canary signals new trade routes**  
The September Arctic sea-ice is now shrinking at a rate of 12.2% per decade compared to its average extent during the period from 1981 to 2010 (NASA). This melting ice is also opening up access to a new trade route called the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in the Arctic, linking the Atlantic and the Pacific. This will exponentially transform global trade by shifting the flow of cargo and saving time and freight costs. The NSR is being hailed as the shortest route between Europe and Asia. India's long-term approach to exploring new mega ports and new routes – not just from an economic lens, but also from a strategic and geopolitical lens – makes the NSR crucial.

The number of Observers at the Arctic Council outnumbers the number of Arctic states. This indicates the growing recognition of the vulnerability of existing trade routes to geopolitical tensions.

India began its engagement with the Arctic early by signing the Svalbard Treaty in 1920 and is the only developing nation besides China that has an Arctic research base (Himadri). Last year, the Institute for Governance and Sustainable



**Manash K. Neog**

Managing Director of Chase APAC, a public policy and research consulting firm



**Swati Sudhakaran**

Senior Manager at Chase

While not recklessly exploiting the Arctic reserves, India should also get a say in the commercial opportunity for the unseen future

Development and the National Council of Applied Economic Research partnered to model how changes in the Arctic, specifically the loss of sea ice, could influence India's monsoon patterns and agricultural outputs.

But to begin a timely action plan for the NSR, India's Arctic policy released in 2022 needs to be streamlined towards achieving its goals. India will need shipbuilding muscle to sail through the NSR's turbulent waters. The 2025-26 Budget set up a \$3 billion Maritime Development Fund for the Shipping Ministry along with promoting shipbuilding clusters to increase the range, categories, and capacity of ships. Shipbuilding suited to Arctic requirements is key given that travel conditions would be quite harsh in the short-term. This means India needs to make adequate investments in ice-breaking fleets and other structural upgrades.

There is an urgent need for India to engage in multilateral dialogue on capacity building, training requisites, and knowledge sharing. Could 2025 be the year of action?

This year, the Arctic Circle India Forum is taking place on May 3 and 4 in New Delhi. This should help contextualise the dialogue from an Asia- and India-focused lens. The forum should serve as an impetus to move the needle forward on India's well-thought-out Arctic policy with stakeholder consultations, the forging of partnerships, and perhaps the appointment of a 'polar ambassador' to present India's case internationally.

As international cargo shipment on the NSR increased exponentially from 41,000 tonnes in 2010 to almost 37.9 million tonnes in 2024, India also needs to be cognisant of studies surfacing, such as in the scientific journal *Nature Climate Change*, showing that global temperatures in 2024 breached the 1.5°C mark above pre-industrial levels. This suggests that even a single month or year at 1.5°C global warming may signify that Earth is entering a long-term breach of the vital Paris Agreement threshold. How close


to the sun should we fly so that we do not lose our commercial vantage point but also do not call for an expedited disaster in one of the most fragile ecosystems on the planet? This presents a pressing policy issue for India and echoes the need for like-minded allies.

## Playing with ice and fire

With its vast Arctic coastline, extensive experience in Arctic navigation, and training of personnel, Russia is an obvious partner for India to explore the NSR. The decision to establish a working group on the NSR under the bilateral intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation was made during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow in July last year. Also, the Chennai-Vladivostok Maritime Corridor emerges as a potential bridge to the NSR ports such as Pevek, Tiksi, and Sabetta.

However, if India inclines towards the Russian bloc, then it would be implying support to Chinese efforts, such as the Polar Silk Road which China is building as a northern extension of its Belt and Road Initiative. Not only would the NSR help China bypass the Malacca Strait chokepoint completely, but it would also give it much more control over the Arctic route.

If India supports the Western bloc and partners with the U.S., it could lose its perceived potential stake in the massive resources that currently fall under Russian control in the area. The ideal but obviously challenging solution would be to find a way to work with both the U.S. and Russia. Other partners should include Japan and South Korea. Both countries share India's concerns about the growing cooperation between China and Russia in the Arctic and about their businesses losing out on Arctic opportunities to Chinese competitors. The trio should advocate the rectification of disparities within the Arctic Council and promote a more inclusive and equitable Council.



## **Content.**

- **Global trade is swinging like a pendulum, with potential headwinds from the U.S. nudging each nation to start doubling down on alternate trade strategies.**
- **The frozen frontier of the Arctic serves as a canary in the coal mines for the impending climate catastrophe. It also serves as the source of great geopolitical leverage as sea levels continue to rise and new trade routes emerge.**
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- The Arctic Council is the leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction among the Arctic States, Arctic Indigenous Peoples, and other Arctic inhabitants.
  - It addresses the concerns related to the Arctic region, including sustainable development and safeguarding the environment in the Arctic region.
  - It was formally established in 1996 through the Ottawa Declaration.
  - The establishment was preceded by the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (June 1991), a declaration on protecting the Arctic environment.
- 
- The eight Arctic States (whose territories fall in the Arctic region) are members of the Arctic Council.
  - These are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the US.
- 
- All Arctic Council decisions:
  - Require consensus of the eight Arctic States.
  - Happens in consultation with the permanent participants.

- The Observer status is granted to entities that support the objectives of the Arctic Council and have demonstrated capabilities, including the ability to make financial contributions.
  - Observers of the Arctic Council are:
  - Thirteen Countries, including India.
  - Thirteen intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organisations
  - Twelve Non-governmental organisations.
  - India had been given the Observer status in 2013.
- 
- The Arctic Council cannot implement/enforce its guidelines, assessments, or recommendations. The responsibility belongs to individual Arctic States or international bodies.
  - The Arctic Council's mandate excludes military security.
  - It has no programming budget. Arctic States sponsors all projects or initiatives. Some projects also receive support from other entities.

## **Opposing imposition**

Hindi can be promoted without making it mandatory

The announcement of the BJP-led government in Maharashtra that English and Marathi medium schools will begin teaching Hindi as a third language from Class 1, as part of the implementation of the National Education Policy 2020, is running into significant political opposition. Previously, Hindi was introduced as a third language only from Class 6 onwards. Schools with other mediums of instruction have already been following the three-language formula from Class 1. While some view the announcement as an instance of Hindi imposition, others fear its potential in undermining Marathi. Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis defended the move, stating that Hindi serves as an acceptable language of communication across India. But there are concerns about the practical challenges of this mandate: the extensive logistics involved in teacher recruitment and training, besides salary costs. Media reports and social media chatter have pointed to an emerging hostility towards Hindi, which could be a response to the perceived imposition. There is resentment that the move is an effort to appease the sizeable population of native Hindi speakers settled in Maharashtra. Historically, the State has witnessed a strong regional political identity, epitomised by the Shiv Sena since the 1960s. This identity has emphasised Marathi pride, cultural assertion, and prioritisation of local employment. Yet, unlike Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra has not exhibited overt hostility towards Hindi. Even the Shiv Sena, which has targeted various groups – south Indians, Muslims, and north Indian migrant workers – at different times, did not cultivate animosity towards Hindi. The current resentment, therefore, seems less organic and more a product of the BJP's centralising agenda, which seeks uniformity in a culturally and linguistically diverse nation.

While the Constitution is unitary in structure, it recognises and accommodates diversity in numerous ways. Previous centralising efforts by Congress governments included the promotion of Hindi, but there was enough institutional flexibility to balance divergent interests. Though the BJP now governs with a reduced mandate, it has managed to secure support from allies for its centralising vision, provoking resistance in States such as Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra. Meanwhile, the educational landscape is undergoing a radical transformation with developments in AI and neuroscience. Instead of creating divisions, the Fadnavis government would do well to build consensus to address the evolving demands of school and higher education.

**Page No. 8, GS 2**

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- Previously, Hindi was introduced as a third language only from Class 6 onwards. Schools with other mediums of instruction have already been following the three-language formula from Class 1.
- While the Constitution is unitary in structure, it recognises and accommodates diversity in numerous ways.

## **Content.**

- The Constituent Assembly of India adopted Hindi written in Devnagari Script along with English as the official language of the country on September 14, 1949, under Article 343(1).
- Article 351 gives power to the Union Government to issue a directive for the development of the Hindi language.
- The Hindi language is one of the 22 languages of the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India.
- The imposition of Hindi was contested in many non-Hindi states, especially in the southern state of Tamil Nadu. Violent protests broke out in southern India leading the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, to introduce the ‘Official Languages Act’ in 1963, which assured the continuation of English along with Hindi as the official language of the Union of India.

## **Content.**

- Anti-Hindi protests of 1965 marked an important turn in India's official language policy. The 'Official Languages Act' was amended in 1967 guaranteeing the "virtual indefinite policy of bilingualism" for all official purposes of the Union.
- Given the linguistic diversity of India, there is no national language as all the states are free to decide their own official languages.
- Article 344: Article 344(1) provides for the constitution of a Commission by the President on expiration of five years from the commencement of the Constitution.
- However, It can be noted that there is no fixed criteria for any language to be considered for inclusion in the Eighth Schedule.

## **Content.**

- **The Eighth Schedule to the Constitution consists of the following 22 languages:**
- **Assamese, Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Konkani, Malayalam, Manipuri, Marathi, Nepali, Oriya, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Sindhi, Tamil, Telugu, Urdu, Bodo, Santhali, Maithili and Dogri.**
- **Of these languages, 14 were initially included in the Constitution.**
- **Sindhi language was added by the 21st Amendment Act of 1967.**
- **Konkani, Manipuri, and Nepali were included by the 71st Amendment Act of 1992.**
- **Bodo, Dogri, Maithili, and Santhali were added by the 92nd Amendment Act of 2003 which came into force in 2004.**

## **Content.**

- **NEP 2020 Policy:** Requires students to learn three languages, with at least two being Indian.
- **Changes from Past Policies:** Unlike the NEP 1968, which mandated Hindi, English, and a regional language, NEP 2020 allows flexibility in language selection.
- **Regional Flexibility:** States and students can choose languages, promoting multilingualism while respecting cultural and regional diversity.

# Section 69 of the BNS is redundant

Cases of rape registered on the premise of false promise of marriage have been in the eye of the storm for a long time. It is often alleged that despite the consent of some women to a physical relationship, the men in those relationships are accused of rape. It was expected that the Central government would do away with the provision of the law which undermines the agency of women in giving their free and informed consent before entering into a sexual relationship. Instead, it introduced a new provision in the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023. Section 69 (presumably) solely addresses cases involving sexual intercourse based on false promise of marriage. This stand-alone offence did not exist in the Indian Penal Code (IPC).

**Limitations set by the Court**  
Section 69 has ostensibly reduced the gravity of cases of sexual intercourse registered on the false promise of marriage by reducing punishment, compared to the offence of rape defined under Section 32 BNS (or Section 375 of the IPC). Before discussing the redundancy of Section 69 BNS, it will be appropriate to see how the Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of such cases by imposing some restrictions.

First, differentiating between giving a false promise of marriage and committing breach of promise by the accused, the Court in a number of cases, including *Anurag Soni v. The State of Chhattisgarh* (2019), has held that unless the accused has no intention to fulfil the promise of marriage right from the beginning, it would not amount to rape. There could be cases when the accused might have made a promise with all seriousness to marry a woman, but subsequently encountered unforeseen circumstances.

In the second category of cases, when a woman knowingly maintains physical relations for a prolonged period, it cannot be said with certainty that this was



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purely because of the alleged promise made by the accused to marry her. In other words, the physical relationship must be traceable directly to the false promise made, and it must not be qualified by other circumstances or considerations (such as love or passion for the accused). In *Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P.* (2025), the Court quashed the FIR and all the proceedings against the accused. The complainant had maintained a sexual relationship for about 15 years with the accused and alleged sexual abuse only on learning that the appellant had married another woman. She had also on many occasions portrayed herself to be the wife of the appellant. The Court held that the relationship was consensual and with no element of deceit or misconception.

Third, if on the date of developing a physical relationship, the prosecutrix was already a married woman, surrendering before the man on a false promise of marriage will not fall within the definition of consent obtained on misconception of fact. After quoting many precedents set by the Supreme Court, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in *Abhishek Arjariya v. The State of Madhya Pradesh* (2025) quashed the FIR and further proceedings based on similar facts.

**Examining Section 69**  
Section 69 states that “whosoever, by deceitful means or by making promise to marry to a woman without any intention of fulfilling the same, has sexual intercourse with her, such sexual intercourse not amounting to rape, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.” The explanation says “deceitful means” include “inducement for or false promise of employment or promotion or marrying by suppressing identity”.

Section 69 of the BNS was introduced as a separate offence; there were no changes to the

definition of rape and consent. A man is said to commit rape under Section 63 of the BNS under circumstances falling under seven descriptions, out of which six are concerned with consent. While under five descriptions, the consent is vitiated under given conditions, such as fear or death or intoxication, other cases of “without consent” fall under “misconception of fact” as provided in Section 28 of the BNS. Consent defined under Section 28 of the BNS is vitiated if given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, or under 12 years of age. It therefore implies that false promise of marriage is covered under the generic term “misconception of fact” given in Section 28 of the BNS.

Since the definition of rape and consent given in the BNS are *pari materia* to their definitions given in the IPC, the offence of sexual intercourse committed consequent to the false promise of marriage, i.e., misconception of fact, will still fall under the scope of the offence of rape. Once an offence is justified to be covered under the scope of rape, it cannot hold ground as another offence of lesser gravity as defined under Section 69 of the BNS. Thus Section 69 appears to be redundant. Further, unless an “exception” is carved out in Section 63 to exclude cases falling under Section 69, Section 69 cannot be held constitutionality valid. Also, Section 69 does not have a non-obstante clause. It is therefore, likely to be hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.

When Courts are quashing FIRs based on the precedents described above, it would be better for the police not to charge-sheet such cases. A preliminary inquiry should be conducted to establish whether a cognisable offence was committed or not. Such action will prevent unnecessary hardship to the accused person and also save time for our constitutional courts.


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## Fact

- In **Rajnish Singh @ Soni v. State of U.P. (2025)**, the Court quashed the FIR and all the proceedings against the accused. The complainant had maintained a sexual relationship for about 15 years with the accused and alleged sexual abuse only on learning that the appellant had married another woman.
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
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
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