


Post Independence India Class 05


22nd January, 2024 at 9:00 AM

1962 WAR (CONTINUATION FROM THE PREVIOUS CLASS) (09:06 AM):

- **Panchsheel Principals:**
- **Mutual non-interference** in internal affairs [* for China (members of UNSC) Kashmir issue pending before UNSC, therefore not **100%** internal affair].
- **Peaceful coexistence:** (Since India is good in service sector and China in manufacturing sector)
- (* Example China says - There is enough space in the world for India and China to grow and coexist peacefully).
- **Mistake** = Treaty gave no clarity on borders + India accepted Tibet as part of China.
- Therefore India lost potential **bargaining power**.
- Another mistake - **1956** India rejected asylum to **Dalai Lama**, for good India - China relations.
- **1957** report - China has constructed a road in Aksai Chin.
- This created **uproar** in Indian politics.
- China did not reply for a month and then proposed that **Aksai Chin** be accepted as part of China and **NEFA** as part of India.
- This is proposed by Nehru in parliament + He argued that Aksai Chin has barren lands. so give it to China.
- Huge opposition, therefore Nehru had to pull out from negotiations.
- (* **Mahavir Tyagi** - If I'm bald ^{then} should ^{the} ~~be~~ head be removed from the body).
- **1959 - Dalai Lama** was given asylum but not allowed political activities (*because of non-interference of the **1954** treaty and Tibet accepted by India as internal to China).
- **1960-62 - Forward policy** was the Indian response to the road in Aksai Chin.
- Here Indian troops moved forward across **Macmohan Line 1914** and now **skirmishes** began.
- China also responded with a forward policy.
- (Refer to the diagram on the smart board).



- **Reasons for October 1962 war (09:29 am):**
- Unsettled border dispute and increased tensions due to road in **Aksai Chin** and **forward policy**.
- Since **1953**, **USSR- China** relations began turning bad as **Nikita Khrushchev (1953-64)** implemented **destalinization**. (Stalin 1928-53 had good relation with China)
- For example, in foreign policy, he talked about peaceful coexistence with the capitalist West and in the domestic economy brought some capitalist features.
- This led to similar demands in China.
- **Mao (1949-76)** criticized Nikita publicly and the USSR decreased **aid** to China + since **1958** there was a border dispute.
- Russia took over all Chinese territory above river Amur (Solved in the **2000s**) + China wanted to be a leader of the communist world instead of the USSR.
- On the other hand, India - USSR relations were rising which made China anxious.
- Therefore, China wanted to show strength with war.
- (* Fear in the heart leads to aggression as a defense mechanism).
- In **1958**, Mao adopted **agrarian communism** via **Great Leap Forward (GLF - 1958/Maoism)** to keep China strictly on the path of communism because USSR industrial communism leads to the power to engineers and managers i.e. the middle class. like
- In **GLF 1958**, China focussed on the agriculture sector with only gradual industrialization.
- This hurt industrial GDP + due to draughts even agrarian GDP suffered (* bad luck).
- Therefore Mao faced domestic opposition. (so he declared war to divert the focus of people)
- With the **1962 war**, Mao wanted war victory for his political stability and to divert attention away from the failures of **GLF 1958**.
- **20 October 1962 Cuban Missile Crises** - The US, USSR, and other major powers busy in this crisis, therefore the opportunity for China, as less chance of foreign intervention.
- **Result:**
- **Reason for loss:**
- Poor political leadership, and planning, and there was political interference in the conduct of war.
- India underestimated China, Nehru opined that China won't go to war as it may lead to **WW III** + **Defence Minister V.K. Menon** argued that Pakistan is a bigger threat than China.
- Neglect of military since **1947** due to shortage of resources, challenges of development, and idealistic ideology.
- Ex: (* President **Rajendra Prasad** opined - India should decrease military strength if we can't abolish military as per MG ideology).
- Also, foreign powers were busy in Cuban Missile Crises + India followed NAM policy and, therefore had no advanced promise of military help which increased Chinese confidence.
- (* NAM policy is good but one negative aspect).
- War for one month followed by a **unilateral ceasefire** by China on **29th November 1962**.
- China captured both Aksai Chin and NEFA.
- China withdrew from NEFA but stayed in Aksai Chin therefore claiming that it achieved only that much by war which it proposed diplomatically.
- Therefore not an empire builder.
- **LAC 1962** came to exist.
- China used the forward policy of India to call India an aggressor.
- Huge loss of military prestige.
- First time Nehru faced a no-confidence motion and blamed for failing to protect the national interest.
- Unexpected high war expenditure, therefore **3rd five-year plan (1961-66)** failed.
- **1962, 63 = Drought** years, therefore economy suffered. (these two years were in draught)



INDIA - CHINA BORDER TALKS (10:50 AM):

- **1976** +: Relations improved after Mao, therefore **1981 high-level border talks** but then **1987**, the **Sumdo Rong Chu** incident in **Arunachal** (*Like Galwan).
- This led to the failure of talks. ↓ 1986
- **1988**: Rajiv Gandhi's visit led to the **JWG** (Joint Working Group) where bureaucrats meet regularly.
- **1993**: Agreement on maintenance of peace and tranquility along LAC.
- **1986** agreements on **CBMs** (Confidence Building Measures) in military fields along LAC.
- CBMs, prevent misunderstandings, For example, regular flag meetings of commanders on borders + **advanced intimation of border patrols** + joint patrols along ~~the~~ border + Sports, Cultural activity, etc)
- **2003**: After the **14th** round of JWG talks **2 special representatives** (SRs) appointed to find political solutions and a **three-stage peace process** agreed upon (NSA is SR from India) + The political solution involves give and take and may be different from technically and legally right solutions suggested by bureaucrats and is decided by executive/parliament.
- **Three stages** = Principles (general) - framework (specific) - Border on maps and lands (exact).
- **2005**: **First stage** completed with **agreement on:** → Agreement
- **Political parameters and guiding principles:**
- Solve peacefully and don't affect other bilateral areas (*therefore boycotting Chinese imports after Galwan against this). (Since it was decided in 2005 that Solve border disputes peacefully and don't affect other bilateral areas but after Galwan incidence China broken this agreement's parameter that's why India is not cooperating in other bilateral talks also.)
- (* My answer = Make In India campaign).
- **Must be a mutually accepted solution.**
- (* we have neutralized China's influence on account of being a UNSC member ie China can't use UNSC on this issue).
- **Must be a final and whole solution.**
- (* To aim high).
- **Be flexible and respect each other's strategic interests and national sentiments.**
- (* so practically solution may be parts of Aksai Chin and Arunachal with both India and China).
- **Consider Historical evidence.**
- (*Maps, treaties, history, etc).
- **No exchange of populated areas.** (Haha Awesome)
- (* **Aksai Chin** - Barren, therefore can be given to India; **Arunachal** - Populated, therefore won't be given to China; China's strategy of renaming villages in Arunachal, giving stapled visa and building settlements - to claim that its not Indian population but Chinese population and therefore territory of China).
- **Pending final agreements**, maintain peace, continue CBMs, and respect LAC.
- (*That's why hand-to-hand combats and not guns).
- **Must be a geographically sensible border.**
- **SRs to develop 2nd stage framework.**
- **2nd stage** = Development of a framework for boundary settlement.
- [*** Example of 2nd stage @ geographically sensible borders:**
- China Proposes the border to be along a mountain range (c), river (c), lake (c), etc.
- India proposes the border to be along a mountain range (l), river (l), lake (l), etc.
- **Solution**: Border to be along mountain range (l), river (c), lake (l)].
- **3rd stage** = Finalise borders on maps and grounds on the basis of the **2nd stage framework**.

Ex: I want to be a civil servant. -> General
I want to be an IAS. -> Specific
I want Rajasthan Cadre. -> Exact

SHASTRI ERA (1964-66) (11:45 PM):

- After the death of Nehru in **1964**, a new PM had to be chosen by Congress.
- **Syndicates** were groups of powerful Congress leaders from **non-Hindi-speaking regions**.
- **Eg:** Kamraj, Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, S.K. Patil, etc.
- They wanted a puppet PM who follows party directions and, therefore chose **LBS** (Lal Bahadur Shastri) who had a polite personality, and was hard working and honest.
- **Challenges before LBS/Causes of 1965 War/Why Pakistan confident of attacking India (11:49 pm):**
- **Economic:**
- The third FYP (**1961-66**) badly affected due to high war expenditure + **droughts** in **1962, 63**, therefore India economically weak with issues of food shortages and economic slowdown which also contributed to law and order instability.
- **Political:**
- LBS not viewed as a strong PM like Nehru, therefore a perception of weak Indian leadership.
- LBS faced pressures of factionalism.
- In **J&K**, **Sheikh Abdulla** and other leaders had begun protests.
- For example demanded autonomy greater than **Art 370** like his own army for J&K and even plebiscite and he came under US influence.
- Therefore Pakistan expected support from Kashmiris if attacked J&K.
- LBS also faced political issues like the **Punjabi Suba Civil Movement** by **Akalis** for Sikh majority Punjab. (Punjab was reorganized on 1 November 1966 and Indira Gandhi was PM.)
- **Military:**
- Pak felt militarily confident due to the **1962** war defeat which was a big and recent defeat, with high war expenditures.
- Therefore the perception of a weak Indian military + Sale of high-tech weapons by the US, for example, **Patton tanks** (the US refused to sell to India) + In **1963** Pak gave **Shaksgam track** from POK to China, therefore expected Chinese help.
- Also expected US support being a military ally of the US.
- No military treaty between India and the USSR as the Indian policy of **NAM**, therefore PAK confident of **quick victory in a short local war** in Kashmir.
- (*Pak economy also weak that's why short and local).
- **Events (12:09 pm):**
- Pak attacked **Rann of Kutchh** (RoK) to check Indian military preparedness and found India unprepared.
- RoK is a **marshy** area therefore India was not expecting an attack on this front and was not ready. (Pak attacked at RoK in April 1965 but after intervention of UK ceasefire agreed in June 1965 and Pak got 10% area and India got 90% area and then Pak launched attack on J&K in Sep-Oct 1965)
- Pak demanded **9100 sqkms** in RoK.
- UK mediated leading to a ceasefire and a tribunal which in **1968** rejected **90%** of demand and gave **910 sqkms** to Pakistan.
- (* **Indian policy** = No third party unless mutually agreed to, therefore if confident of positive result then open to third party intervention).

TOPIC FOR THE NEXT CLASS: Continuation of Shastri era.