Environment Variable and Set-UID Program Lab

Task 1


```
Terminal File Edit View Search Terminal Help

[02/07/19]seed@VM:~$ printenv PWD
/home/seed
[02/07/19]seed@VM:~$ env | grep PWD
PWD=/home/seed
[02/07/19]seed@VM:~$ unset PWD
[02/07/19]seed@VM:~$ env | grep PWD
[02/07/19]seed@VM:~$ env | grep PWD
[02/07/19]seed@VM:~$ export PWD="/home/seed"
[02/07/19]seed@VM:~$ printenv PWD
/home/seed
[02/07/19]seed@VM:~$

[02/07/19]seed@VM:~$

[02/07/19]seed@VM:~$
```


Task 2



The program prints all environment variables in the parent or the child process depending on which branch you comment out.


From the screenshot above, we can find that the parent process and child process have the same environment variables since they have the same output.

Task 3



The program compiled in step 1 (a.out) prints nothing, whereas the program in step 2 (a2.out) prints all environment variables. Therefore we know the environment variables are not inherited in the program. Instead, the program get them by external pointer environ.

Task 4




From the screenshot, the program prints all environment variables under /usr/bin/env. Therefore the system() function has passed environment variables to /bin/sh.

Task 5


I run the following command at step 3

```
export PATH="/bin:/home/bin:/usr/bin"
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=""
export ELIXIR_PATH=""
```




As shown in the screenshot, the Path is set to /bin:/home/bin:/usr/bin, but LD_LIBRARY_PATH is not printed, which means it didn't enter the child process.

Task 6



The program can gain root privilege if we copy \bin\sh to current directory and add current directory to PATH.

Task 7



1. Make myprog a regular program, and run it as a normal user.

The program will use the environment variable set by user and call the sleep() in libmylib.so.1.0.1.

2. Make myprog a Set-UID root program, and run it as a normal user.

In this case, the program will ignore LD_PRELOAD set by user and use the default sleep() function.

3. Make myprog a Set-UID root program, export the LD_PRELOAD environment variable again in the root account and run it.

In this case, exported LD_PRELOAD dominants. The program will use the sleep() in libmylib.so.1.0.1.


4. Make myprog a Set-UID user1 program (i.e., the owner is user1, which is another user account), export the LD_PRELOAD environment variable again in a different user's account (not-root user) and run it.


```
user1@vM: ~/envLab $ export LD_PRELOAD=./libmylib.so.1.0.1
user1@vM: ~/envLab $ gcc -o myprog myprog.c
user1@vM: ~/envLab $ chmod u+s myprog
user1@vM: ~/envLab $ su user2
user2@vM: ~/envLab $ ./myprog
user2@vM: ~/envLab $
```

In this case, LD_PRELOAD is not overwritten.

In conclusion, only the program owner can run the program with overwritten environment variables.

Task 8





In the first scenario, we can insert a command after; to modify protected file. However, in second scenario, execve() sees the argument as a whole name so we cannot make exploit on that.

Task 9

```
task9.c:21:1: warning: implicit declaration of function
 'close' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
 close (fd);
task9.c:27:1: warning: implicit declaration of function
 'write' [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
write (fd, "Malicious Data\n", 15);
[02/08/19]seed@VM:~/envlab$ sudo chown root task9
[02/08/19]seed@VM:~/envlab$ sudo chmod 4755 task9
[02/08/19]seed@VM:~/envlab$ ./task9
[02/08/19]seed@VM:~/envlab$ cat /etc/zzz
important message
Malicious Data
[02/08/19]seed@VM:~/envlab$ su user1
Password:
user1@VM:/home/seed/envlab$ ./task9
user1@VM:/home/seed/envlab$ cat /etc/zzz
important message
Malicious Data
Malicious Data
user1@VM:/home/seed/envlab$
```

From the screenshot above, we can see that the file has been modified. This is because zzz is opened before setuid() and has root privilege.