

# GAN-Leaks: A Taxonomy of Membership Inference Attacks against Generative Models

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## Motivation

- Generative adversarial Networks (GANs) have been largely used on privacy sensitive datasets, e.g., face images and medical records
- However, existing works mainly focus on attacks against discriminative models and the privacy risk of generative models have not yet been investigated systematically
- Our work:** Membership Inference Attack against GANs (whether a query sample has been used to train a GAN model?)
- Crucial to understand and control privacy leakage; provides insights for privacy-preserving data sharing

## Contributions

- Taxonomy**
  - Categorize attack scenarios against generative models
  - Benchmark future research
- Novel attack models**
  - Generic; easy-to-implement; effective; theoretically grounded
- Extensive evaluation**
  - 3 datasets with diverse data modalities, 5 victim models, 4 attack scenarios ...

## Taxonomy

- What information does the attacker know?
    - White-box □/black-box ■?
    - Which GANs' components are accessible? ( $z$ : latent code; **Gen**: Generator; **Dis**: Discriminator)
- (1) Full black-box generator  
(2) Partial black-box generator  
(3) White-box generator  
(4) Accessible discriminator (full model)<sup>1</sup>
- |  | Latent code | Generator | Discriminator |
|--|-------------|-----------|---------------|
| (1) Full black-box generator <sup>1,2</sup>            | X           | ■         | X             |
| (2) Partial black-box generator                        | ✓           | ■         | X             |
| (3) White-box generator                                | ✓           | □         | X             |
| (4) Accessible discriminator (full model) <sup>1</sup> | ✓           | □         | ✓             |

## Generic Attack Model


Attacker finds the **best reconstruction** of a query sample given **different types of access** to the victim generator.

- Insight:**  
Smaller reconstruction error for training data.

- Generic Model:**  
Optimization problem

$$\mathcal{R}(x|\mathcal{G}_v) = \mathcal{G}_v(z^*)$$

$$z^* = \underset{z}{\operatorname{argmin}} L(x, \mathcal{G}_v(z))$$



- Objective:**

$$\underset{z}{\operatorname{minimize}} \quad L(x, \mathcal{G}_v(z)) = \lambda_1 L_2(x, \mathcal{G}_v(z)) + \lambda_2 L_{\text{lips}}(x, \mathcal{G}_v(z)) + \lambda_3 L_{\text{reg}}(z)$$

$$\text{where } L_2(x, \mathcal{G}_v(z)) = \|x - \mathcal{G}_v(z)\|_2^2$$

$$L_{\text{reg}}(z) = (\|z\|_2^2 - \dim(z))^2$$


- Different types of access:**

- (1) Full black-box generator  
(2) Partial black-box generator  
(3) White-box generator

KNN search  
Powell's conjugate direction method  
L-BFGS quasi-Newton method

## Attack Calibration

- Problem:**  
the reconstruction error is query-dependent ('hard' samples, underrepresented samples)




- Solution:** **Attack Calibration**

$$L_{\text{cal}}(x, \mathcal{R}(x|\mathcal{G}_v)) = L(x, \mathcal{R}(x|\mathcal{G}_v)) - L(x, \mathcal{R}(x|\mathcal{G}_r))$$

victim model      reference model


- Train a **reference model** with:
  - relevant but disjoint** dataset
  - irrelevant** network architecture to victim model

- Theory:** near-optimal under a Bayesian perspective<sup>3</sup>




## Experiment results

### (2) MIMIC III, Instagram (non-image dataset)




### Defense: (DP-SGD)



## Summary

- 3 Datasets:**  
CelebA (face), MIMIC III (medical), Instagram (location)
- 5 GAN Models:**  
PGGAN, WGANGP, DCGAN, VAEGAN, MedGAN
- 2 Baselines:**  
LOGAN<sup>1</sup>, MC<sup>2</sup>
- Results:**
  - Attack (1) CelebA**



<sup>1</sup> Hayes et al., "LOGAN: Evaluating Privacy Leakage of Generative Models Using Generative Adversarial Networks", PoPETs 2019

<sup>2</sup> Hilprecht et al., "Monte Carlo and Reconstruction Membership Inference Attacks against Generative Models", PoPETs 2019

<sup>3</sup> Sablayrolles et al., "White-box vs Black-box: Bayes Optimal Strategies for Membership Inference", ICML 2019

- A simple learning-free attack model works sufficiently well
- Attack performance highly depends on:
  - The size of the dataset
  - Model structure
  - Amount of knowledge about the victim model
- Differential privacy defense is effective against real-world MI attack but compromises utility and efficiency
- Code and models are available on Github: <https://github.com/DingfanChen/GAN-Leaks>