



National Forensic
Sciences University

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An Institution of National Importance
(Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India)

Email-based Data Exfiltration Through Insider Threat Detection

MINOR PROJECT

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240103002014
9th May 2025

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01 : INTRODUCTION

MOTIVATION

The Reasons :

- Complicated IT Environment
- Inadequate Security Measures
- Lack of Employee Training and Awareness
- Weak Enforcement Policies

The Numbers :

- 83% of Organizations reported at least one Insider Threat. (IBM)
- 67% of insiders are likely to email sensitive data externally. (Teramind)
- 36% organizations only had effective access control solutions in place. (IBM)
- 54% of insiders already have credentialed access. (StationX)
- 44% insiders use applications that can leak data eg Email (StationX)

SCOPE OF THE PROJECT




Figure 01 : A PERT chart created to organize the scope and roadmap of the project.

02 : THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

RESEARCH FINDINGS

Detection Approach	Signature Based VS Anomaly Based
Suitability	Static Analysis VS Behavioral Analysis
Customization & Extensibility	Small-scale VS Large-scale
Alerting & Logging	CLI VS GUI

Table 01 : Findings From Literature Review

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Feature	Snort	OSSEC	Security Onion
Detection Type	Signature-based	Log-based + Rule-based	Hybrid (Signature, Anomaly, Log)
Real-time Monitoring	Yes	Yes	Yes
Alerting Mechanism	Real-time alerts via syslog/snmp	Email, Syslog, Custom Scripts	GUI alerts, ELK Stack integration
Type of Data Monitored	Network packets	System logs, file integrity, registry	Network traffic, logs, full packet capture
Custom Rule Support	Strong (custom Snort rules)	Custom rules and decoders	Supports Snort/Suricata rule customization
Ease of Setup	Moderate (requires configuration)	Easy to moderate	Complex (multiple tools, VMs, config)

Table 02 : Comparative Analysis of Existing Tools

03 : PROPOSED MODEL

PROBLEM STATEMENT

This project aims to develop a custom, real time threat detection system tailored for small and medium sized organizations, enhancing security visibility against email-based insider threads.

Keywords : Email Communication, Intent Classification, Rule-based model, Real-time alerting




Figure 02 : Motivation Behind Malicious Attackers

FRAMEWORK

Email Monitoring Schedule

Gmail API, Email Headers, Drafts, Forwarded Emails, Signature Attachments

Content & Attachment Analyzer

Static rules engine, File tagging and hashing module, NLP Engine

Behavioral Analysis

Frequency, User Roles, User History, Repeated Actions

Threat Classification

Careless Insider, Malicious Insider, Normal Communication, Severity - High, Medium, Low

Alert & Logging System

CLI, Centralized logging, Real-time

Dashboard/Interface

Incident History, User Activity, Real-time Alerts and Logs




Figure 03 : System Model

METHODOLOGY

Email Monitoring

Sender/Recipient Analysis
Timestamp
Subject
Email Body Attachments

Rule-Based

Static Detection
Phishing Attempts
Misaddressed Emails
Unauthorized File Uploads

File Tagging

Confidentiality
Cross References
Access Control
Signature Protection

Content Matching

Fuzzy Hashing
Hash Database
NLP Based

Classification

Intention - Accidental or
Intentional
Severity - High, Medium,
Low
User Behavior Analysis




Figure 04 : Gantt Chart

04 : EMPIRICAL RESULT ANALYSIS

EXPERIMENTAL SETUP




Figure 05 : Authorizing Users




Figure 07 : Confidential Attachments

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Figure 06 : Zerotracer Acceptable Usage Policy

EVALUATION METRICS

Metric	Value (Sample Output)
Detection Accuracy	92%
False Positive Rate	6%
False Negative Rate	2%
Classification Precision	90%
Average Response Time	1.5 seconds
Severity Scoring Accuracy	95%

Table 03 : Evaluation Criteria and Results

EDGE CASE #1




Figure 08 : Phishing Email




Figure 09: Alert Detected

Why? - To detect accidental or incidental phishing attempts. External Email, Internal Forwards (repeated), Obfuscation, Encoding

EDGE CASE #2




Figure 10 : Misaddressed Email




Figure 11: Alert Detected

Why? - To detect misaddressed emails (accidental), personal email uploads (intentional), Confidential Attachments, ZIP Attachments

EDGE CASE #3




Figure 12 : Normal Email




Figure 13: Alert Detected

Why? - To distinguish normal emails from suspicious ones, False Positives

FINAL THOUGHTS

- Distinguishes and Classifies Intention
- Customizable according to Organization's needs
- Lightweight and Resource Intensive

FUTURE SCOPE

- Machine Learning Integration
- Behavioral Baseline Profiling
- Advanced NLP Techniques
- Multi-Channel Monitoring
- SIEM Integration
- Macro Parsing
- Automated Response

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
Thank you!

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