```
Android - linux Os; Java & Kotlin; smartphones & tables; OHA led by Google
       2007 - Android SDK
                                      2012 - Android 4.1 Jelly Bean
                                                                       2020 - Androld 11.0
       2008 - Android 1.0 (Alpha)
                                      2014 - Android 5.0 Lollipop 2024 - Android 15.0
    Operating System - manage resource; interface blu hardware & software; process mgmt;
             memory mgmt; nlw mgmt; entorcing security
    The stack of layers -
    1) Linux Kernel - abstraction; drivers for hardwate instruction; os functions
                  wifi, Bluetooth, USB, audio, display etc.
   2) Libraries - native; handle different types of data; clett
                 media tramework, webkit, libe etc.
   -> Android Run Time:
           Java Source code → Java compiler → Java Byk code → Dex compiler → Dalvik Byle code
                                                                          (idex)
                                         ( · class)
                                                                                       DVM
                                                    JVBM
                                          many
  -> Dalvik Byte code : optimized; low mem, low processing env; class > dex
  * Application Sandboxing happens at kernel level for both native & os applications
  3) Application Framework - Activity Manager, Content Provider, Notification Manager etc.
  4) Applications - Home, Contacts, Phone, Browser ete.
                                                                     Android Manifest. Xml
  Android Application Components -
                                                                   · root of project source set
                                                                    · Androld build book; 05; 4P
  1) Activity - UI; user interaction
                                                                    · opp components; permissions;
                                                     Alarm Clock
 2) Service - background processing
                                                                    hardware software features
                                                       Example
 3) Content Provider - comm blw OS & app
                                                         Resources - additional files; static conten;
 4) Broadcast Receiver - data & dbms operations
                                                            bitmaps; layout; strings; menu; values
 Main Activity, Java: Kinkent-filter); MAIN action & LAUNCHER calegory
 Intent - a messaging object you can use to receive request on action from another app component
       start Activity; broadcoast Intent; start Service bind Service
                                                                      - Action - mandatory
                                                                       Category - ophonal (B,A,4,H,L)
 Explicit Intent - specity app to satisfy intent; stort component in
                                                                       Data
                                                                                Kinkent-filter>
         own app; class name known; download a file in bg.
                                                                           comp name, extras, flags
Implicit Intent - general action to perform; class name unknown;
      Start component in another app; location on google maps.
Intent Resolution - figuring out which activity handles the intent.
                   EXPLICIT
                                                                 IMPLICIT
Intent intent = new Intent (get Application Context),
                                                  Intent intent = new Intenti);
                       Act2. class)
                                                  intent. set Action = (Intent. AcTION-DIAL))
(this, hello dass)
                     ("unique name")
                                                                              VIEW, LALL
```

Service - by processes; no UI; IPC; long-running Foreground - visible Background - no UI Started Bound Bound - as long as atteast one app com. is Start Service() unbind service() stopservice stopsey · Unbounded Services - start Service(); on Creak(); on Start(); on Destroy(); "Bounded Services - bindservices; on creaters; on Bindes; on Rebinder; onUnbinder; on Destroy (); (Content Provider - provide content/data to app from systapp; content resolver; central repository; hides database details; text, img, vdo, doe etc. CR URI Normal Signature response Permissions - protect the privacy of user; Andrord Manifest. Xml; Kuses-permission> 5-111 (20) -> install time 6.0(28) > runtime checkself Permission () -> request Permissions () -> on Request Permission Resulte); € SIPC - sandboxing; org data & signals blu processer; Binder; client > Proxy > BD > Stub > Service (dev/binder; context manager; token. 1) Boot Rom Code Execution - device hardware; boot media; boot sear; boot loader to internal RAM 2) Boot booder - IPL (external RAM); SPL (Android OS; boot modes); SPL > kernel 3) Linux Kernel - root file system (motts); system & user data; userspace - init; caches [MMU] 4) Init Process - first looot process; init.re; Kandroid-Source > Isystwore linit; Logo 5) Zygote & Dalvik - first init proc; DVM; shared wide 6) System Sewer - telephony, nlw, other functions. @ Adb commands - devices, connect, kill-server, start-server, shew, push, pull, logical, install Android Partitions of File System Hierarchy - Bootloader, Boot, recowny, userdata, system, Ls -al /dev/block/platform/msm_sdee.1/by-name cat proc/pautition cat/proc/mounts cat Iproclemme cot (proc) dumchar_info 04 cat Ideal block / plateform / dw-mme busybox fdisk - L /devlbrock/sda 18-1 Lulham

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Hell

UNIT 1: Introduction to Android Security

Android Forensics:

- · extracting, recovering 4 analyzing data on a mobile device; 2010 Times Square car bombings, Boston marathon bombings; forensic soundness.
- · Investigation & Preperation -> Seizure & Isolation (screen lock, USB debugging, screen worke-up, screen Rimeout, static bags, airplane mode, ADM, MOM, Faraday bags / tents, RF isolation box).
- -> Acquistion (manual, logical, filesystem, physical) -> Examination & Analysis -> Reporting.
- · Preventing data alteration; Wide range of 05 & models; Inherent security features; legal issues

Introduction to Android:

· Open-source; Linux DS; Java/Kotlin; OHA-Google

- · Oct 2003 Android Ine → 2005 Google → 2007 Android SDK → 2008 Android U.O) (upcake
- → 2012 Android 4.1 (Jellybean) → 2014 Android 5.0 (lollipop) → 2021 Android 12 → 2025 15.0
- · Andy Rubin, Rich Miner, Chris White, Nick Sears; Google Bouncer Google App Verifier
- · Android also provides a hardware extraction layer for the developers to creak software hooks bloo A why is android so Android platform stack of the hardwore they want to port.

Android Architecture:

- · OS manages resource, enforces scumby, hardware abstraction; stack of layers; Apache 2.0 liscence.
- Ilinux Kernel abstraction; drivers > instruction; Ostunctions; USB, audio, display; ex-camera.
- 2) Libraries diff types of data; c/c++; Linux-libc, Android bionic; surface manager, media 74.4/5.0
- 3) DVM/ART DVM-register, JVM-stack; DVM-JIT, ART-ADT; DVM-LOCO proc, performance baled
- 4) Application Framework run/manage applications; Activity manager, viewsystem; Pkg Manager;
- Telephony manager ; Resource Manager, Weathor Manager, Notif. Manager
- 5) Applications system apps (/system & /system/priv-app/); user installed (/data)
- · Folder structure Android Manifest. xml, MainActivity. java, res (activity-main.xml), build.gradle #Android Application Framework:
- · Android Manifest.xml root, build tools, components, pkg name, permissions, requirements Hactivity, service, broadcast rec, content provider
- · Activity Single screen + UI ; MAIN action & LAUNCHER category
- · Intent messaging object; stort Activity, broadcast Intent, start service / bind service
 - > Explict & Implicit.

#Application Sandboxing: · Linux based protection model; UID; permissions & priviledges; native + 0s apps. · SE Linux - Android 4.3, DAC -> MAC, permissive made, entercing mode (Android 5.0), void I net dete. · Andwid uses a fine grained permission model which requires the application to predupine the permission before compiling the final application package. # Sewe Inter-Process Communication: · to organize signals blu processes; binder framework; world readable/writable; Idev/binder) · client -> proxy -> binder driver -> stub -> service · Register service with context manager -> CM (name > handle) -> token assigned to service (32-bit) client rec. token -> start comms #Application Permissions: · manifest file Luses-permission >; Normal, Dangerous, Signature. · delate permission in manifest file -> check if perm is granted (check-self-permission) -> request permissions() -> on request permission he suit () · GID > UID; platform.xmu @ /system/etc/permissions. Application Signing - cA, sey; Google Bouncer, keystox, j'arsigner, estipse # Android Boot Process: 1) Boot ROM code execution - boot media, boot sequence, boot loader - internal RAM 2) Boot Wader - IPL > external RAM, SPL > Android OS (fastboot/rec), SPL > kernel 3) Linux Kerner - Os functions, rootes, MMU/cache -> rootes -> init process. 4) Init - first process, init re Kand-srey/system/wre/init, sysservice process 5) Zygote & Dalvik - First init proc, animalion, stated code, Zygoklnit class > regisky Zygote Sockete) 7 preload Classes () > preload Resources () 6) System server - power manger, AM, telephony reg, pkg mgr, context mgz

#Android Partitions:

· Bootloader, Boot, Rewvery, User Data, System, Cache, Radio cat /proc/partitions cat /proc/mounts of windows > FAT32, NTFS Linux > EXT2, EXT4

#Android Flesyslems:

· Flash-memory Fs, Media-based Fs, Pseudo Fs

ANDROID SECURITY UNIT 5

Request Interception & Traffic Analysis

· Insufficient transport layer protection is the third biggest risk in mobile devices

according to ownsp Top 10. HTTP -> Login credentials & HTTPS -> authentication cookics Types of NIO Traffic Analysis

Passive Analysis

no active interception is done cophere & open using now analyzon ex: Wireshork

Active Analysis actively intercept all now comm. analyze lassess (modify data ex: burpsuite proxy.

Passive Analysis

Det 1: topdamp - save all network information to a specific file.

-S: Snarf few byke of data from each packet instead of 65535 default.

- V: Verbose output

-w: filename to write raw packets to.

Commands | steps: adb push topdump-arm /data/local/tmp/topdump chmod 777 topdump ·/tcpdump -v -s 0 -w output. Plap adb pull Idata/local/tmp/output.peap output.peap

adb shell Idotal local 1 tmp / topdump -i any -p -s 0 -w /mnt/sdeard/output. peap emwater - and Android-Pentesting -- topdump trafficapture . peap

Active Analysis . emulator - and Android-Penksting - http-proxy 127.0.0.1:8080 works for HTTP but HTTPs will give an evener due to certificate mismatch and thus we wont be use to interest maffic.

adb push portswiggerca.crt /mont/sdeard/portswiggerca.cut

Page (2)

· Other ways to Intercept SSL Traffic - pulling cacerts bas file from /system/etc/security; Bouny Castle; Charles Proxy; MITMPROXY

Extracting sensitive files via packet capture: (wireshark)

load . peap file > search for "multipart" string > Follow TCP stream 7 - Select RAW save with extension

> (Java) (Smali) Assembly Code Source code compiler disassemble (baksmali) Byte Code (JBL/ DBC)

·java -> · dass -> · dex -> · jar -> · smali

Frida 10 Marker - Dynamic Instrument Toolkit Scriptuble, Portable, Free, Battle Hescel Python, C, birdirchinal, Js; commands, Frida Tools - have, ps, 1s-devices, discoure, kill

Flgs - - U - Va - Vai - D - j

API - Java Enumerate Coaded Classes 11, Java android Verei'm, Java available

Hooking - ontwatell, autom, exitl, ret variate

Static analysis, permi chem , exp activities, code vuln, Intent vuln, webview, 3rd party # OARK - Quick Android Review Ki'+ appark -- apk <path > limitations - android, not perfect

Greport gumesian

Static, dynamic, API teeling, BCR, Integration, automation Repart - perm, ach, service, CP, BR, locatine etc.

· ADB Dumpsys - running senvices status; ado sheel senvice list

	TopicDate		
	Book Information		
The state of the s	the second of th		
1	→ Learning Android Forensies:		
100000	· 2010 Times Square Care Bombing, Boston Manathon bombings.		
-	· "forensically sound" evidence in mobile follensie.		
	. Need for mobile forensis - personal info., online activity, wimes		
	· Mobile Forensics Process - Investigation Resperation, Selzuere of Isolation,		
	Acquisinon, Examination & Analysis, Repoliting.		
and and	chain of euclody, anti-static bags, USB debugging, Android Device Manager (ADM),		
-	Mobile Device Management (MDM), favaday bags/tents, RF Isolation box.		
La La Fille	Acquisinou Techniques - manual, togical, filesystem, physical		
	chavenges in Mobile Forensies - data alkeration, voide range of OS 4 models,		
Married Married	inherent security features, legal issues.		
	why is Android so popular? - Apache 2.0 liscence.		
	Each Android application muns its own instance of the DVM. [DVM-register based]		
	DVM -> JIT ; ART -> 4-4/5.0, AOT		
	System installed apps > /system; /system/ priv-app/ user installed - /data.		
	Android security - app permissions, sandboxing, securce IPC.		
-	SELINUX - Android 5.0, MAC > DAC, peumissive/enforcing modes.		
	Application signing - CA or self, app developer -> pvt. Key, certificates		
	init-rc -> <android-source>/system/ wre/init; PID 1</android-source>		
	Zygote - loadZygote Initchase; register zygote Socket(); preload Classes ();		
-	pueload Resources () -> android. R file		
	ADB -> 40 Kedk path > /platform - took; adbd; port + 5555 - 5585 / 505+.		
	adb devices - offine, device, no device.		
	Types of cogs - ventouse, evenor, information, debug, warning, cuince, fatal, sitent		
	Rooting Android - superwell not; jaibneaking; UID -> /data/system / packages.xme		
/proc/partitions	Boolwader - enovery boot & factboot prefice paulinone on your device.		
	Partitions - bootloader, boot, revovery, userdata, system, cache, radio		
	Fle Hierarchy - act, cache (lost+found), d, data, dalvik-cache, dev, init, mnt		
pmc/kiteou (lem)	proc, root, spin, misc, sdeard, Deim, system, build. prop, app, framework.		
proc/filesystems - flashmemory, media based, pseudo Teacher's Sign.			
· ADB Dumpsys - running services status; adb sheet service list.			

-> Learning Pentesting for Android Devices: · Android provides a Handwane abstraction layer for the developers to create software hooks blu the Andword platform stack and the handwork they want it to poet. · Surface Manager, Media Framework, socite, webkit, Openul Linux (libe) -> Android (bionie); radio q app-processes (adb) The core of Android security model is priviledge seperation. Isystem /bin , Isystem /xbin , Idata Idata I , Idata I app-priv · Android uses a fine quained permission model which bequired the app to predefine the permissions begold compiling the final application package. · Group IDs - group gid = "net-bt" / "inet" / " camera" · Google Bouncer, Google App Venifich. (jausigner) · A workspace is a location where all your Andewid application development projects of their files will be stored. ; AVD -> ARM architecture. · adb: -d (dumps of full log file), -f cwite to file) -> loge at · Should Performer are used by an application in order to save small sets of data for the application · reverse engineering: · dex -> · small (syntax similar to Jasmine) · The main advantage of APKTool over ID-4VI is that it is bidirectional. · All content peroviders have a uniform susounce identifier (URI) in order to be identificed and quewed -> content: 11 adb shed content query -- uni · Content provider leakage - android: exported = false · OWASP Top 10 - week server side controls, inserve data strage, insufficient transpolat layer pustection, unintended data leakage, power authorization & author hication,

broken augprography, dient side injection, security decisions via unfrusted inputs,

improper session handling, tack of binary pewtechious

· webvior Vulnerability - file: 11, data: 11

	Topic	Date	
	Commands/code Syntax		
		and make A 1x	
#	Traffic Analysis:		
	Passive Analysis	-> Active Analysis HTTP	
	adb push < tepdump bin > /clata/local	emulator - and Android_ Test	
	adb sheu	http-proxy 127.0.0.1:8080	
	ed Idata I weal	wifi Settings in AVD	
	chmod 777 tepdump	Burp > Options > Invisible proxy 7 chk.	
	topdump -s 0 -v -w out-peap	proxy in browser > N/w tab HTTPS	
	adb pull Idata/local/tepdump/out-peap <path< th=""><th></th></path<>		
	open out. Plap in wireshork.	adb push ps.crt 1mnt/sdeord 1	
	A STATE OF A STATE OF THE STATE	AVD> setting> Rousee> Personal>SD	
	The state of the s	check; @ AVD Isys lete / courts. bks	
4: 11 3		Bouncy Castle -> mnt -> mks-yaffs 2	
		Charles Proxy, MITM proxy.	
	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
#	Android Application Security Auditing & Pentesting:		
\longrightarrow	Drozer		
	adb connect adb forward top: 31415 top: 31415 drozer console connect		
	run app. package. list <module name=""> -f <search></search></module>		
17 6	run app. package. into -a <pkg> run app. package. attackswiface <pkg></pkg></pkg>		
	run app. package debuggable <pkg> 5 run app. provider finduci <pkg> ></pkg></pkg>		
484.32	CP leakage / Projection (Trun app. provider. query 2 wei >		
	run scanner. provider. injection -a <pkg> projection projection g</pkg>		
	divination of the Plant		
- 井	Android Application Components.		
BR:	Kreceiver 7, Context. register Receiver (), android: priority , send Broadcast ()		
CP:	conkent Resolver resolver = get Content Resolver (); (wisor winter = resolver query to ;		
5.	StortService(); oncreate(); on Start (); on Destroy(); stop Service(); stop Service();		
	bind service(); on beetell; on bind(); on rebind(); on unbind; on Destroy()		
A FURNISH	The state of the s		
Teacher's Sign			

ADB Commands. adb connect <ip> adb shell adb install < file > adb push xlocal > < remote > adb devices adb uninstall <apt > adb pull Kremote > Llogal > adb kill-senuer of, ps, mount adb togeat -b-c-d-f-v adb start-some # Android Boot Process. adb sheel ps ps I grep "init" # Mobile Application Sewrity Pen Testing 2) Hardcoding Issues: 1) Insewer logging . 3) Insecure Data Storage. private SOLIKe Database n DB; · equals ("vskey") logicat | grep " diva" creak Temphile (); log, e pidcat 5) Access control. Idata/data/shared_prefs > am start -a kintent filter> chapin = false --ez get external storage directory is -4) Input Vaudan on of = 11' or 1 file:// # Android Manifest.xmL Kuses-permission android: name = "android. permission. SEND_SMS" /> Check Sey Pourission (); request Pourissions (); on Request Permissions Result (); build-gradle - location of wide entities when building project. Kaitiving android : name = "Main Activity"/> res > drawable, layout, menu, values action = MAIN caregon = LAUNCHER # Reverse Engineering. appetool d < the appe > dexdump <apk file> jd-qui classes_dextjari; jan apphool b stolder> -1, -d, -0 J hexdump hd -b-c-d m -0 · java -> . doss -> . dex -> . apk dej -dex2jar -d <apk> jadx -> dex in qui # Frida frida-ps -U -ua -vai -D -j frida-trace trida-discover -15-devices trida - kill frida - U - e xpkg name > -f # Intent android. Intent. action, BOOT_ LOMPLETED (4) android intent action. REBOOT Exp: Intent intent = new Intent (get App Context (), Act. class); Stort Activity (intent): <intent-Riller> start Service (Intent); Kathon android name = " (8) 4/>

< category android: name = B, A, 4, H, L />

< data android: scheme = 11 https 11 />

< /intent-filter >

context . send Broadcast (intent):

inkent-set Action = (Intent-Action-Dial);

Imp: Intent intent = new Intent ();