Verification of Implementations of Distributed Systems under Churn


Ryan Doenges, James R. Wilcox, Doug Woos, Zachary Tatlock, and Karl Palmskog





We should verify implementations of distributed systems...





...and we have!

Framework	Prover	Verified system
Verdi	Coq	Raft consensus
IronFleet	Dafny	Paxos consensus
EventML	NuPRL	Paxos consensus
Chapar	Coq	Key-value stores

...and we have!

Framework	Prover	Verified system
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Chapar	Coq	Key-value stores

Framework Prover

Verified system


Assumption: each node has a list of all nodes in the system

EventML NuPRL Paxos consensus


Chapar

Key-value stores


Churn = nodes joining & leaving a system at run time




Existing frameworks don't distinguish between knowing an address




and knowing a node's address.




Under churn, systems depend on a "routing table"



But it can't be correct all of the time!



It can only be correct given enough time without churn: punctuated safety




Our contributions

- 1. First-class support for churn in Verdi
- 2. An approach to verifying punctuated safety
- 3. Ongoing case studies
 - Tree-aggregation protocol
 - Chord distributed hash table

Today

- The tree-aggregation protocol
- Churn in Verdi
- Proving punctuated safety











Tree-aggregation: the idea

Combine distributed data into a single global measurement

Why not just ping every computer involved?


- No fixed list of nodes under churn
- The network may not be fully connected
- Can't handle large networks efficiently

Tree-aggregation: 2 protocols


- Tree building: constructing a tree in the network
- 2. Data aggregation: moving data towards the root of the tree

Counting Pis is a very simple example. The protocol can aggregate more interesting data.


A network of nodes




Tree building: a root




Tree building: broadcasting levels




Tree building: broadcasting levels




Tree building: broadcasting levels




Aggregation: pending counts




Aggregation: send pending to parent





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



The root gets the total count

















Handling churn: joins




Handling churn: joins




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
Handling churn: joins




We can't finish counting during churn



We can't finish counting during churn



We can't finish counting during churn



Correctness (punctuated safety): Beginning from a state reachable under churn, given enough time without churn, the count at the root node becomes and remains correct

Roadmap

- The tree-aggregation protocol
- Churn in Verdi
- Proving punctuated safety

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Verdi workflow

- I. Write your system as event handlers
- 2. Verify it using our network semantics
- 3. Run it with the corresponding shim

Handlers change local state and send messages.

```
Definition result := state * list (addr * msg).

new state

what to send it
```

Existing event: delivery

```
Definition result :=
 state * list (addr * msg).
Definition recv handler
 (dst:addr)
 (st:state)
 (src: addr)
 (m : msg)
 : result := ...
```

New event: node start-up

```
Definition result :=
state * list (addr * msg).

Definition init_handler
(h : addr)
(knowns : list addr)
: result := ...
```

Semantics: fixed networks

```
Record net :=
{I failed_nodes : list addr;
    packets : addr -> addr -> list msg;
    state : addr -> state I}.

Inductive step : net -> net -> Prop :=
I Step_deliver : ...
I Step_fail : ...
```

Semantics: fixed networks

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Record net :=
{I failed_nodes : list addr;
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```


probably Fin n

Semantics with churn


```
Record net :=
 {I failed_nodes : list addr;
   nodes: list addr;
   packets: addr -> addr -> list msg;
   state: addr -> option state I).
Inductive step: net -> net -> Prop :=
I Step_deliver:
I Step_fail: ...
I Step_init: ...
```

Now we can start verifying some properties of tree-aggregation!

The shim lets us run a system



We trust that the semantics describe the behavior of the shim and the network



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Churn forces safety violations

- Routing information can't be right all the time, and this typically violates toplevel guarantees
- In the case of tree aggregation, any churn invalidates a correct total count

Detour: safety and liveness properties

Safety: nothing bad ever happens

Liveness: something good eventually happens


Safety and liveness properties

Define execution = infinite sequence of system states, ordered by step relation.

Then a safety property can be proved by examining only finite prefixes of an execution.


A liveness property cannot be disproved by examining finite prefixes of an execution.

We can prove safety properties with inductive invariants



A predicate P on states is an inductive invariant when


Inductive invariants



A predicate P on states is an inductive invariant when

P holds for the initial state


Inductive invariants



A predicate P on states is an inductive invariant when


- P holds for the initial state
- P is preserved by the step


Inductive invariants



If P implies our safety property, we've shown safety for all reachable states without needing to describe infinite executions in our Coq code!

..but "the root node eventually has a correct count" isn't a safety property!






Reachable

under churn

Safety

after churn stops




Reachable

under churn (——)

Safety

after churn stops (——)




Reachable

under churn (→→)

Safety


after churn stops (——)

We don't know how to prove this yet



Safety after churn stops (-----)

We don't know how to prove this yet




We need a way to talk about infinite executions: liveness can't be proved with only finite traces.

Representing infinite executions in Coq

```
(* Infinite stream of terms in T *)
CoInductive infseq (T: Type) :=
 Cons: T-> infseq -> infseq.
(* Stream of system states connected by step *)
CoInductive execution
: infseq (net * label) -> Prop :=
 Cons_exec : forall n n',
  step n n' ->
  execution (Cons n's) ->
  lb_execution (Cons n (Cons n's)).
```

Reasoning about executions: linear temporal logic (LTL)



LTL in Coq

```
I E0 : forall s,
   Ps -> eventually Ps
IE next: forall x s,
   eventually Ps->
   eventually P (Cons x s).
CoInductive always P: infseq T-> Prop :=
I Always: forall s,
   P s ->
   always P (tl s) ->
   always Ps.
```

Inductive eventually P: infseq T-> Prop :=

InfSeqExt: LTL in Coq

- Extensions to a library by Deng & Monin for doing LTL over infinite (coinductive) streams of events
- Coq source code is on GitHub at DistributedComponents/ InfSeqExt

We still can't prove correctness


What if messages from one node are indefinitely delayed while messages from another are still delivered?

Intuitively such an execution is "unfair" to the first node.


We have to assume a fairness hypothesis.

Weak fairness: If an action is eventually always enabled, then it is always eventually taken.


Labels: turning steps into actions



SetCount h c is enabled at this state



SetCount h c is not taken in this execution, but SendCount h c is taken.



Note: fairness has to be implemented and assumed

The shim could fail to handle messages fairly and prevent liveness

The network could delay packets and schedule delivery events unfairly

We can now state correctness for tree aggregation!

```
\forall ex r,
 reachable_under_churn (hd ex) ->
 execution churn_free_step ex ->
 connected (hd ex) ->
 weakly_fair ex ->
 eventually (always
  (\lambda ex' =>
   correct_sum_at_root (hd ex')))
  ex
```

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Thanks!

We're on GitHub:

- uwplse/verdi
- DistributedComponents/verdi-aggregation
- DistributedComponents/InfSeqExt

Acknowledgements

Partially supported by the US National Science Foundation under grant CCF-1438982

- Churn happens, and the system arrives at some state st reachable under churn
- Churn stops
- In a sequence of churn-free steps starting at st, we eventually reach the punctuated safety property.


If a node fails, subtract its contribution.




Infinite executions



Safety properties




Safety properties





Reachable


Safety properties



Reachable Safety








Reachable

under churn

Safety

after churn stops



Reachable


under churn (→→)

Safety


after churn stops (——)

We extend Verdi with support for proving punctuated safety under churn


These frameworks do account for crashes.



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But what about new nodes?



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