

# Evaluating the transmissibility of the coronavirus in the 2019-20 Wuhan Outbreak: Exploring initial point-source exposure sizes and durations using scenario analysis

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## Introduction

The ongoing pneumonia outbreak appears to have originated from an initial point-source exposure event at Huanan seafood wholesale market in Wuhan, China which was closed on the 31st of December 2019 [1,2]. As of the 26th of January 2020 there have been over 2000 confirmed cases with the majority in China [3]. Globally, countries are on high alert with wide implementation of airport checks and contact tracing. In China, officials have restricted travel across a wide area. There is still uncertainty around the precise scale and duration of the initial exposure event [4]. This has implications for the likely transmissibility of coronavirus and as such it is important that these potential scenarios are further explored.

We used a stochastic branching process model - parameterised with available data where possible and otherwise informed by the 2002-2003 SARS outbreak - to simulate the Wuhan outbreak. We considered a range of parameters where data were not available, quantifying how likely these scenarios were to occur using reported cases. We focused on the size and duration of the initial exposure event in particular, and the impact this has on the estimated level of human-to-human transmission. We aimed to provide decision makers, and researchers, with probability estimates for each scenario considered, along with estimates of the reproduction number ( $R_0$ ) across all scenarios.

## Methods

### Branching process model

We modelled the outbreak using a stochastic branching comparable to those used elsewhere [4]. We assumed that cases from the initial transmission event were uniformly distributed over the duration of the event. Each case then resulted in a subsequent generation of cases with the number that each case generated being drawn from a negative binomial distribution - to account for overdispersion - with a dispersion parameter  $k$  of 0.16 (assuming SARS-like dispersion) [5]. The mean number of cases generated by each case ( $R_0$ ) was sampled from a uniform distribution once per model simulation with a lower bound of 0 and an upper bound determined by the scenario being evaluated. Generations were then sampled iteratively until the maximum simulation time was reached. The serial interval between each generation was assumed to be normal with a mean varied during the scenario analysis and a standard deviation of 3.8 (assumed SARS-like) [5]. After the simulation of the branching process reporting delays were added as reported in a line-list of cases compiled from media and other reports [6]. We fitted a geometric, Poisson, and a negative binomial distribution to these observed delays and selected the best fit using the Chi-squared statistic. If no good fit was determined

- a threshold of p-value 0.05 - then the reporting delay was instead sampled from the empirical delays in the line-list.

## Scenario analysis

We simulated the branching process model 10,000 times for all combinations of the following parameters: number of confirmed cases resulting from the initial exposure (20, 40, 60, 80, 200), initial exposure event duration (7 days, 14 days, 21 days, and 28 days), the mean of the serial interval (4 days, 8.4 days [5], 12)), and the upper bound of  $R_0$  (1, 2, 3, 4). Parameter values used in the scenario analysis were either assumptions based on the current knowledge of the Wuhan outbreak or based on those used previously for SARS [5]. We ran the model from the beginning of the outbreak for each scenario until the 25th of January 2020. The start date was determined by combining the duration of the transmission event with the date the fish market in Wuhan - the source of the outbreak - closed (31st of December 2019). Outbreak simulation was stopped if a sample exceeded 5000 cases by the end of the simulation period.

## Conditioning on available case numbers

We evaluated each scenario sample based on the cases observed on the 3rd of January (41 observed cases with an assumed upper bound of 400 cases), the 18th of January (200 cases with an assumed upper bound of 2000 cases), and the 25th of January (1975 cases with an assumed upper bound of 5000 cases). Samples were rejected if their simulated cumulative cases were not consistent with these data. Uncertainty in the observed number of cases was assumed to be 10 times the number of observed cases for the 3rd and 18th of January and the number of observed plus the number of potential cases reported on the 25th of January.

## Analysis

We compared the percentage of samples that were accepted stratified by the transmission event size and transmission event duration for every combination of upper  $R_0$  bounds and mean serial intervals. We then used heat maps to identify which scenarios were more likely to represent the underlying outbreak. We then reported the median, maximum, and minimum  $R_0$ s of samples accepted after conditioning on the observed data, stratified by the transmission event size, transmission event duration and the assumed mean serial interval.

## Implementation

All analysis was carried out using R version 3.6.2 [7]. The branching process model was implemented using the `bpmodels` package [8]. The analysis is available as an open-source R package (*need reference - zenodo doi*). A dockerfile has been made available with the code to ensure reproducibility [9].

## Results

### Percentage of outbreak simulations accepted

Overall, the highest acceptance rate was for scenarios with a large event size (200), short duration (7 days), an upper bound on the  $R_0$  of 3 and a SARS-like mean serial interval (8.4 days) (Figure 1). Scenarios with a longer event duration (14 days), a higher  $R_0$  bound (4), and a longer mean serial interval (12 days) also had a high acceptance rate compared to other scenarios. In scenarios with a SARS-like mean serial interval (8.4 days), and a longer serial interval (12 days), the acceptance rate decreased as the event size decreased and the event duration increased.

There were very few scenarios in which an upper bound on the reproduction of 1 resulted in scenarios that were accepted after conditioning on observed data, regardless of the mean serial interval, event size, or event duration. There were few scenarios that were accepted after conditioning on data for scenarios with an upper bound of 2 on the  $R_0$  with this scenario being most likely if the transmission event was large (200), 14 days in duration, and had a SARS-like serial interval (8.4 days). For a short serial interval (4 days) the percentage of accepted samples was low for all scenarios with the highest accepted proportion for scenarios with an upper bound on the  $R_0$  of 2. Across all  $R_0$  bounds this scenario was most likely if the transmission event was of a medium size (40 - 80 cases) and a short duration (7-14 days).

### Estimated reproduction numbers




Figure 1: Heatmaps of the percentage of samples accepted by scenario. The figure is stratified by the upper bound on the  $R_0$  (columns) and the mean of the serial interval (rows).

The estimated  $R_0$  decreased as the event size and duration increased for both mean serial interval scenarios (Table 1 and Table 2). Assuming a longer serial interval (12 days) resulted in an approximate increase of 1 to the  $R_0$  estimates across all scenarios when compared to the SARS-like (8.4 days) serial interval. For the SARS-like interval the most likely scenario - with an event size of 200 and a duration of a week (Figure 1) - resulted in an estimated  $R_0$  of 1.7 - 2.3 (Table 1). Decreasing the event size increased the  $R_0$  to 2.2 - 3.2 for a transmission event with 100 cases. A longer transmission event resulted in a decrease in  $R_0$  to 1.8 - 2.7. The most likely scenario with a mean serial interval of 12 days - with an outbreak size of 200 and a duration of 14 days - resulted in an estimated  $R_0$  of 2.2 - 3.2 (Table 2). For the longer mean serial interval assumption (12 days) varying the transmission event size and duration had a similar impact on estimates of the  $R_0$ .

Table 1: Median, minimum, and maximum reproduction numbers of the Wuhan outbreak conditioned on case data from the 3rd, 18th and 25th of January - for scenarios with a mean serial interval of 8.4 (SARS-like). Stratified by initial transmission event size and duration.

Transmission event size vs. Transmission event duration	7	14	21	28
20	3 - 4	2.7 - 3.9	2.3 - 3.9	2.1 - 3.8
40	2.8 - 3.9	2.3 - 3.8	2 - 3.4	1.8 - 3.2
60	2.5 - 3.8	2.1 - 3.4	1.8 - 3	1.7 - 2.7
80	2.3 - 3.5	1.9 - 3	1.7 - 2.6	1.5 - 2.3
100	2.2 - 3.2	1.8 - 2.7	1.6 - 2.4	1.5 - 2.2
200	1.7 - 2.3	1.5 - 2	1.3 - 1.8	1.2 - 1.6
400	1.2 - 1.6	1.1 - 1.4	1 - 1.3	0.9 - 1.2

Table 2: Median, minimum, and maximum reproduction numbers of the Wuhan outbreak conditioned on case data from the 3rd, 18th and 25th of January - for scenarios with a mean serial interval of 12. Stratified by initial transmission event size and duration.

Transmission event size vs. Transmission event duration	7	14	21	28
20	-	3.6 - 3.6	3.2 - 4	2.8 - 4
40	-	3.5 - 4	3 - 4	2.7 - 3.9
60	3.5 - 4	3.2 - 4	2.8 - 3.9	2.4 - 3.9
80	3.4 - 4	3.1 - 4	2.7 - 3.9	2.2 - 3.7
100	3.5 - 4	3 - 3.9	2.5 - 3.8	2.1 - 3.4
200	2.8 - 3.9	2.2 - 3.2	1.9 - 2.7	1.7 - 2.4
400	1.8 - 2.5	1.5 - 2	1.3 - 1.7	1.2 - 1.6

## Discussion

In this study, we explored a range of scenarios for the initial event size and duration of the animal-to-human crossover event which initiated the 2019-20 Wuhan coronavirus outbreak. We conditioned on observed cases to establish the probability of each scenario, given our model, and then estimated the  $R_0$  of coronavirus. We found that there was a very low probability that the reproduction numbers was less than 1 for any scenario considered. For scenarios with a SARS-like serial interval, large transmission events over a short duration were most plausible. For scenarios with a longer serial interval (12 days), large transmission events with a slightly increased duration were most plausible. The most probable SARS-like serial interval scenarios resulted in an estimated  $R_0$  of 1.7 - 2.3, whilst the most probable longer serial interval scenarios resulted in an estimated  $R_0$  of 2.2 - 3.2. Reducing the event size led to estimates of the  $R_0$  increasing but also reduced the proportion of samples accepted. Similarly, increasing the event duration reduced the estimated  $R_0$  whilst

decreasing the proportion of accepted samples.

Our study used a stochastic model to capture the transmission dynamics of the outbreak with parameters informed from data were possible or assumed to be similar to those estimated for SARS [5]. As the outbreak progresses direct simulation may become too computationally demanding to be practical so other approaches may be required. More data is likely to become available, in particular disease specific estimates for the serial interval, during the course of the outbreak. This will make it possible to estimate the  $R_0$  with greater precision with less risk of bias due to unknown parameters. The number of scenarios that need to be evaluated may also be reduced as additional information about cases connected to the initial exposure event becomes available. Though our estimates had wide credible intervals it is possible that we could not fully account for the numerous sources of bias and uncertainty present in the available data. This means that our model estimates may be both spuriously precise and potentially biased. There is some evidence of this in our results as the scenarios with the highest acceptance rate were on the edge of our scenario grid both for event size and  $R_0$ . However, until more is known about the outbreak this cannot be easily assessed and our scenarios represent our understanding of the current state of knowledge. A previous study also looked at varying the event size and the impact that this had on  $R_0$  estimates using a branching process [4]. Our work builds on this by also looking at event duration, including reporting delays, and conditioning across multiple time points. For comparable scenarios our results were similar to those previously published but we found that  $R_0$  estimates were highly sensitive to variation in the assumed serial interval, event size, and event duration. We made use of a highly reproducible framework (an R package) and have released all of our code as open-source. This means that this analysis may be repeated - both by the authors and others - as more data becomes available. In addition, subject area experts may be able to adapt our analysis using this open-source code to reduce the potential for bias using their expert knowledge or privately held data.

As the outbreak progress more data will become available on the number of cases, and the duration of the serial interval. These data are likely to improve our estimates of the  $R_0$  and also alter the likelihood of scenarios. Additional data may also lead to a reevaluation of the suitability of the negative binomial distribution for generating new cases - or at least provide an outbreak specific estimate of the dispersion. Our analysis did not include interventions, such as case isolation, doing so may improve our estimates. The R package we have developed alongside our analysis may be generalisable to other point source outbreaks. Additional work is needed to ensure the robustness of this tool but this may allow this analysis to be repeated during future outbreaks with little additional overhead.

This analysis use a stochastic branching process to explore scenarios around the duration and size of the initial exposure event at the Huanan seafood wholesale market in Wuhan. Despite the scarcity of data currently available our estimates may be used to rule out some scenarios and to assess the likelihood of others. Our results indicate that it is very unlikely that the infectious agent responsible for the Wuhan outbreak has a  $R_0$  of less than 1, unless the size of the transmission event was much greater than currently reported. We also found that a large initial exposure event was likely with a relatively short duration. This corresponds with the evidence of rapid detection by Public Health Officials in Wuhan. These scenarios resulted in  $R_0$  estimates that are comparable to those estimated during the 2002-2003 SARS outbreak. Unfortunately, we could not identify whether scenarios with a SARS-like or longer serial interval were more likely. As more information becomes available it may be possible to further refine our results and establish the  $R_0$  of the outbreak more firmly. Providing clear quantitative information for decision makers on the transmissibility of coronavirus is of clear public health importance. Our work to make this process reproducible may reduce the time these estimates take to be made available in future outbreaks and increase knowledge sharing across response teams.

## Contributors

All authors conceived and designed the work. SA undertook the analysis with advice from all other authors. SF developed the branching process model. SA wrote the first draft of the paper and all authors contributed to subsequent drafts. *placeholder* reviewed the analysis code. All authors approve the work for publication and agree to be accountable for the work.

## Funding

*Need funding statement*

## Competing interests

There are no competing interests.

## Accessibility of data and programming code

The code for this analysis, interim results, and final results can be found at: *need zenodo DOI link*

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