# **Lecture 4: The Bellman Operator**

Dynamic Programming

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## Infinite horizon, $t \to \infty$

We know

$$V^0(M_t) = ext{whatever}$$
 $V^1(M_t) = \max_{C_t \in \mathcal{C}(M_t)} \left\{ u(M_t, C_t) + \beta V^0(M_{t+1}) \right\}$ 
 $V^2(M_t) = \max_{C_t \in \mathcal{C}(M_t)} \left\{ u(M_t, C_t) + \beta V^1(M_{t+1}) \right\}$ 
 $V^3(M_t) = \max_{C_t \in \mathcal{C}(M_t)} \left\{ u(M_t, C_t) + \beta V^2(M_{t+1}) \right\}$ 
 $\dots$ 
 $\lim_{n \to \infty} V^n(M_t) = \max_{C_t \in \mathcal{C}(M_t)} \left\{ u(M_t, C_t) + \beta V^{n-1}(M_{t+1}) \right\}$ ?

where  $M_{t+1} = \Gamma(M_t, C_t)$ 

Does the limit exist?



Value function iteration

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Projection metho

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## Operator notation

• Write the **Bellman equation** on the following general form

$$V^{n}(M_{t}) = \max_{C_{t} \in \mathcal{C}(M_{t})} u(M_{t}, C_{t}) + V^{n-1}(\Gamma(M_{t}, C_{t})) \text{ for all } M_{t} \in \mathcal{M}$$

Alternatively in operator form

$$V^n(M_t) = J(V^{n-1})(M_t)$$
 for all  $M_t \in \mathcal{M}$ 

• A **fixed point** is a *function V* such that

$$V(M_t) = J(V)(M_t)$$
 for all  $M_t \in \mathcal{M}$ 

Is there always a fixed point, and is it unique?



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# Contraction mapping requirement

• Let  $\mathcal{F}(\mathcal{M})$  be the space of bounded continuous functions

#### Theorem

Assume  $u(M_t, C_t)$  is real-valued, continuous and bounded,  $0 < \beta < 1$  and the constraint set,  $\mathcal{C}(M_t)$  is non-empty, compact-valued and continuous, then J has a unique fixed point  $V \in \mathcal{F}(\mathcal{M})$ , and for all  $V_0 \in \mathcal{F}(\mathcal{M})$ 

$$|J^n(V_0) - V| \le \beta^n |V_0 - V|, \quad n = 0, 1, 2, 3, \dots$$

- Full proof: Lucas and Stokey (1989), theorem 4.6
- **Main idea:** Apply *Blackwell's contraction mapping theorem* requiring that *J* is
  - Monotone
  - 2 Discounted



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## Monotone (requirement 1)

$$V(M_t) \geq Q(M_t), \forall M_t \in \mathcal{M} \Rightarrow J(V)(M_t) \geq J(Q)(M_t), \forall M_t \in \mathcal{M}$$

$$C_V^{\star}(M_t) \equiv \arg \max_{C_t \in \mathcal{C}(M_t)} u(M_t, C_t) + \beta V(\Gamma(M_t, C_t))$$
  
$$C_Q^{\star}(M_t) \equiv \arg \max_{C_t \in \mathcal{C}(M_t)} u(M_t, C_t) + \beta Q(\Gamma(M_t, C_t))$$

• **Insert into**  $J(V)(M_t)$ 

$$J(V)(M_{t}) = \max_{C_{t} \in C(M_{t})} u(M_{t}, C_{t}) + \beta V(\Gamma(M_{t}, C_{t}))$$

$$= u(M_{t}, C_{V}^{\star}(M_{t})) + \beta V(\Gamma(M_{t}, C_{V}^{\star}(M_{t}))$$

$$\geq u(M_{t}, C_{Q}^{\star}(M_{t})) + \beta V(\Gamma(M_{t}, C_{Q}^{\star}(M_{t}))$$

$$\geq u(M_{t}, C_{Q}^{\star}(M_{t})) + \beta Q(\Gamma(M_{t}, C_{Q}^{\star}(M_{t}))$$

$$= J(Q)(M_{t})$$



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### Discounted (requirement 2)

$$\exists \gamma \in (0,1) : J(V+k)(M_t) \leq J(V)(M_t) + \gamma k.$$

• We have

$$J(V+k)(M_t) = \max_{C_t \in \mathcal{C}(M_t)} u(M_t, C_t) + \beta(V(\Gamma(M_t, C_t)) + k)$$

$$= \max_{C_t \in \mathcal{C}(M_t)} u(M_t, C_t) + \beta V(\Gamma(M_t, C_t)) + \beta k$$

$$= J(V)(M_t) + \beta k$$

$$\leq J(V)(M_t) + \gamma k \text{ for } \gamma = \beta \in (0,1)$$

• What could break down here?



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### Summarize

- **1** The **uniqueness** of the value function can be proven
- **2 Iteration** on the value function can be proven to converge at a rate of  $\beta$
- **3** Further properties:
  - **1** Monotonicity in states expanding the choice set
  - **2 Concavity** if choice set is convex and *u* is concave
  - **3 Differentiability** (e.g. Benvenste and Scheinkman (1979), Clausen and Strub (2016))
- **4 Unique policy function** typically requires that the choice set is convex and *u* is strictly concave
- **6** Boyd's Weighted Contraction Mapping Theorem can be used if returns are unbounded (see Carroll (2012))



Value function iteration

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## Value function iteration (VFI)

#### **Algorithm 11:** Find the fixed point V

```
\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{input}: \mathbf{tol} = 1.0e - 10 \\ \mathbf{output}: V[\bullet] \\ C^{\star}[\bullet] \\ \\ \mathbf{1} \ \ \mathbf{for} \ i_M = 1 \ \mathbf{to} \ \#_M \ \mathbf{do} \\ \mathbf{2} \quad \bigsqcup V[i_M] = 0 \ (\mathbf{initialize}) \\ \mathbf{3} \ \ \mathbf{while} \ \ ? \qquad \mathbf{do} \\ \mathbf{4} \quad \bigsqcup V_{-}[\bullet] = V[\bullet] \\ \mathbf{5} \quad \mathbf{for} \ i_M = 1 \ \mathbf{to} \ \#_M \ \mathbf{do} \\ \bigsqcup V[i_M], C^{\star}[i_M] = \mathbf{find}\_V(V[\bullet]) \\ \mathbf{7} \quad \bigsqcup \delta = \max(|V_{-}[:] - V[:]|) \end{array}
```



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#### Relation to Finite Horizon: Simulation

 Solution to *infinite* horizon is basically the solution to the first-period finite horizon problem with very large T

$$\frac{T < \infty}{\{V_t^{\star}, C_t^{\star}\}_{t=1}^T : \#_M \times T \quad \{V^{\star}, C^{\star}\} : \#_M \times 1}$$

• Simulating is similar. Start with  $M_1$  resources:

$$T < \infty$$

$$M_1 \rightarrow C_1^{\star}(M_1) = C_1$$

$$M_2 = \Gamma(M_1, C_1) \rightarrow C_2^{\star}(M_2) = C_2$$

$$\vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots \qquad \vdots$$

$$\begin{array}{ccccc} T = \infty \\ \hline M_1 & \rightarrow & C^{\star}(M_1) & = & C_1 \\ M_2 = \Gamma(M_1, C_1) & \rightarrow & C^{\star}(M_2) & = & C_2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \end{array}$$



Bellman opera

#### Policy Iteration

Bellman equatio

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# Policy iteration

• Think of **step** n in VFI where we for all  $M_t \in \mathcal{M}$  set

$$V^{n}(M_{t}) = u(M_{t}, C^{\star n}(M_{t})) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ V^{n-1}(\Gamma(M_{t}, C^{\star n}(M_{t}))) \right]$$

$$C^{\star n}(M_{t}) = \arg \max_{C_{t}} u(M_{t}, C_{t}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ V^{n-1}(\Gamma(M_{t}, C_{t})) \right]$$

• Alternative: *Simulate* forward for *k* periods using  $C^{*n}(\bullet)$  as decision rule, and update by

$$V^{n}(M_{t}) = \sum_{j=0}^{k} \beta^{j} u(M_{t+j}, C^{*n}(M_{t+j}))$$

$$+ \beta^{k+1} V^{n-1}(\Gamma(M_{t+k+1}, C^{*}_{t+k+1}))$$

$$C^{*n+1}(M_{t}) = \arg \max_{C_{t}} u(M_{t}, C_{t}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_{t} \left[ V^{n}(\Gamma(M_{t}, C_{t})) \right]$$

- **Better convergence?** *Yes,* in terms of speed. *No,* in terms of pool of attraction (VFI i *globally* convergent)
- Everything is discrete: The simulation can be replaced by inversion of a matrix! [Bertel will show you]



iteration

Policy Iteration

#### Projection methods

Bellman equation

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# Guess and verify

• Consider the neoclassical growth model

$$V(K_t) = \max_{C_t} \log C_t + \beta V(K_{t+1})$$
s.t.
$$K_{t+1} = AK_t^{\alpha} - C_t$$

• **Assume** that  $V(K_t) = a + b \log K_t$  such that

$$a + b \log K_t = \max_{K_{t+1}} \log(AK_t^{\alpha} - K_{t+1}) + \beta(a + b \log K_{t+1})$$

• The **FOC** then is

$$\frac{1}{AK_t^{\alpha} - K_{t+1}} = \frac{\beta b}{K_{t+1}} \leftrightarrow K_{t+1} = \frac{\beta b}{1 + \beta b} AK_t^{\alpha}$$

• **Insert FOC** and **solve for** a **and** b (independent of  $K_t$ )

$$a + b \log K_t = \log(AK_t^{\alpha} - \frac{\beta b}{1 + \beta b}AK_t^{\alpha}) + \beta(a + b \log(\frac{\beta b}{1 + \beta b}AK_t^{\alpha}))$$



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Projection methods

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# Projection methods

- Guess and verify is only possible for very special models
- Value and policy functions might, however, be well approximated by parametric functions (typically polynomials, Weierstrass theorem)
- Solve for the parameters numerically instead of solving the maximization problems (relying on the first-order conditions instead)



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Bellman equation

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## The Bellman equation

#### • The model:

- A household gets utility from consumption and disutility from labor
- 2 The household's income dependent on whether it works or not
- 3 The household accumulates human capital by working
- **4** It can save in an account with an interest rate of *r*
- Task: Write up the Bellman equation on a post-it for your choice of utility function, wage process and human capital accumulation equation. Put it on the white board.



Policy Itoration

Projection metho

Bellman equation

Until next

### Until next

- Ensure that you understand:
  - Algorithm 11
  - How to set up a Bellman equation
- Go to PadLet and ask or answer a question (https://padlet.com/thomas\_jorgensen1/DP)
- Think about: What is the problem with having respectively:
  - Multiple states
  - Multiple choices
  - **3** Multiple shocks

