BEVERIDGEAN UNEMPLOYMENT GAP

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RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Does the labor market operate efficiently?

If not, how far from efficiency is it?

- sufficient statistics for the unemployment gap
 - elasticity of Beveridge curve
 - social cost of unemployment
 - cost of recruiting

MOTIVATION


Existing measures of the unemployment gap:


- Difference between the unemployment rate and its trend
- Difference between the unemployment rate and the non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU)

Neither of this measures efficient unemployment


Main idea of this paper: to solve the problem of a social planner who allocates labor between production, recruiting, and unemployment subject to the Beveridge curve. Then express the efficient unemployment rate as a function of three sufficient statistics.

DIAGRAM ILLUSTRATION





A. Compensated increase in Beveridge elasticity



C. Increase in recruiting cost

THREE SUFFICIENT STATISTICS

Beveridge Elasticity

$$\epsilon = -\frac{dln(v(u))}{dln(u)} = -\frac{u}{v} \cdot v'(u)$$

Social welfare

$$\omega(n, u, v) = p(n + zu - cv)L$$

Recruiting cost

$$\kappa = -\frac{\frac{\partial \omega}{\partial v}}{\frac{\partial \omega}{\partial w}}$$

Efficient unemployment

$$\theta = \frac{1-\zeta}{\kappa \epsilon}, \; u^* = (\frac{\kappa \epsilon}{1-\zeta} \cdot \frac{v}{u^{-\epsilon}})^{1/(1+\epsilon)}$$

DMP MODEL APPLICATION

Unemployment dynamics

$$u(t) = \lambda[1 - u(t)] - m(u(t), v(t))$$

Beveridge elasticity

$$\epsilon = \frac{1}{1 - \eta} (\eta + \frac{u}{1 - u})$$

Social value of nonwork and recruiting cost

$$\zeta = z$$
, $\kappa = c$

 Efficient tightness (derived from efficient condition in terms of parameters of the DMP model

$$\eta \theta^* + \frac{\lambda}{q(\theta^*)} = (1 - \eta) \frac{1 - z}{c}$$

UNEMPLOYMENT GAP IN THE UNITED STATES, 1951-2019

$$u^* = (\frac{\kappa \epsilon}{1 - \zeta} \cdot \frac{v}{u^{-\epsilon}})^{1/(1+\epsilon)}$$

Beveridge elasticity

$$ln(v(t) = ln(\alpha_j - \epsilon_j \cdot ln(u(t)) + z(t), t = T_{j-1} + 1, \dots, T_j$$

Social value of nonwork: Revealed preference estimates

$$\eta = 0.26$$

Recruiting costs: As in matching models, the recruiting cost is usually assumed to be constant over time remained at its 1997 value, from 1951 to 2019: κ = 0.92

PROPOSED EFFICIENT UNEMPLOYMENT AND ALTERNATIVE UNEMPLOYMENT

