

UConn, School of Computing  
Fall 2024  
CSE 3400/CSE 5850: Introduction to Computer and Network Security  
/ Introduction to Cybersecurity  
Assignment 2

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Posted: 9/18/2024

Submission deadline: 9/26/2024, 11:59 pm

**Note:** Solutions **must be typed** (using latex or any other text editor) and must be submitted as a pdf (not word or source latex files).

**Problem 1 [45 points]**

Let  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a secure PRF, state whether the following constructions are secure PRFs (in all parts  $k$  is a long random secret key).

1.  $F'_k(x) = F_k(\bar{x}) \parallel F_k(x)$ , where each of  $k$  and  $x$  is of length  $n$  bits, and  $\bar{x}$  is the bitwise negation of  $x$ .
2.  $F''_k(x) = (F_{k_1}(x) \oplus F_{k_2}(x)) \parallel x$ , where  $k = k_1 \parallel k_2$ , and each of  $k_1, k_2, x$  is of length  $n$  bits.
3.  $F'''_k(x) = \text{lsb}(F_{k_1}(x)) \parallel F_{k_2}(x)$ , where  $k = k_1 \parallel k_2$ , each of  $k_1, k_2, x$  is of length  $n$  bits, and  $\text{lsb}$  is the least significant bit.

**Note:** if the scheme is not a PRF then provide an attack against it and analyze/justify its success probability. If the scheme is a PRF, just provide a convincing argument (formal proofs are not required) and state why the attacker advantage is negligible.

**Problem 2 [45 points]**

Let  $G : \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a secure PRG, and  $F : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a secure PRF. For each of the following encryption constructions, state the decryption algorithm, and then state whether it is a secure encryption scheme against a CPA attacker. (All the following are block ciphers; we encrypt  $m$  all at once, and in all parts  $k$  is a long random secret key.)

1. Given message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , choose random string  $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , and form an encryption as: let  $y = F_k(r)$ ,  $E_k(m) = (RH(y), G(RH(y)) \oplus m)$ , where  $RH$  is the right half of the string.
2. Given message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , choose a random string  $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$  and encrypt  $m$  as  $E_k(m) = (r, F_k(F_k(r)) \oplus m)$ .
3. Given message  $m \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ , parse  $m$  as  $m = m_1 \parallel m_2 \parallel m_3$  where  $|m_1| = |m_2| = |m_3| = n$ , then choose a random  $r \in \{0, 1\}^n$  and a random  $r' \in \{0, 1\}^n$  and encrypt  $m$  as:  $E_k(m) = (r, r', F_k(1^n) \oplus m_1, F_k(r) \oplus m_2, F_k(r') \oplus m_3)$ .

**Note:** If the scheme is insecure then provide an attack against it and analyze its success probability. If the scheme is secure, just provide a convincing argument (formal security proofs are not required) and state why the attacker advantage is negligible.

**Problem 3 [15 points]**

- Alice claims that OTP is a deterministic encryption scheme (so it cannot be secure against a CPA attacker) since there is no randomness generation in OTP. Is her claim true? Justify your answer.
- Show how to decrypt (or basically invert) using the Feistel network shown in Slide 10, Lecture 4. So given an input  $g_k(m)$  that is described in that slide, can you get  $m$  back using the same network structure? If yes, how?

**Note:** This problem has 5 points bonus.