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A Standardized Metadata Schema for Cross-Domain Telemetry: Aligning Spectral-Objects with OpenTelemetry, HAR, and Forensic Vocabularies

Defining the Spectral-Object: Core Identity, Origin, and Signature

The foundational principle guiding the development of the spectral-object schema is the strategic imperative of semantic alignment with pre-existing, mature industry standards [31]. This approach is not merely a matter of convenience but a critical enabler of interoperability, ensuring that the resulting schema can be immediately understood and utilized by the vast ecosystem of tools built upon OpenTelemetry, HTTP Archive (HAR), and memory forensics frameworks [3] [26]. By reusing established conventions for naming attributes and structuring data, the schema avoids reinventing the wheel and leverages a globally recognized vocabulary to describe system behavior, thereby unlocking value quickly and facilitating adoption [9] [21]. The design prioritizes this tight integration for trace-derived, HTTP-derived, and memory-derived objects, while simultaneously incorporating explicit, forward-compatible extension points to accommodate future modalities without introducing breaking changes [11]. This dual focus on present-day alignment and future extensibility forms the bedrock of the proposed v0.1 schema.

For spectral-objects derived from distributed traces, such as those with a `kind` of `"trace_pattern"`, the schema must directly adopt the attribute naming conventions defined by the OpenTelemetry project [31]. This involves using standardized keys like `http.method`, `url.path`, and `service.name` within the object's structure. This alignment is paramount because it allows these objects to be natively processed by any tool compliant with the OpenTelemetry standard, including exporters, collectors, backends like Jaeger, and analytics platforms like Prometheus [8] [24]. For instance, the `signature.trace.attributes` property would contain key-value pairs where the keys are OpenTelemetry semantic conventions, providing a direct mapping to the rich, structured data already generated by observability systems [22]. This ensures that patterns

discovered through trace analysis are described in a language that the entire observability stack speaks fluently, eliminating ambiguity and enabling seamless correlation across different layers of a distributed application [15].

Similarly, for objects originating from web traffic, typically represented by a `kind` of `"api_shape"` and an `origin.modality` of `"har"`, the schema must mirror the terminology of the official HAR specification [3] [4]. This means adopting top-level keys such as `request`, `response`, and `timings` within the `signature.http` object. Within these containers, specific fields should follow the HAR format precisely, including `method`, `status`, and timing buckets like `send`, `wait`, and `receive`. This direct correspondence ensures frictionless integration with web performance monitoring tools, browser developer tools that export HAR files, and any pipeline designed to process them [37] [38]. It also implicitly acknowledges the inherent sensitivity of this data, which often contains personally identifiable information (PII), authentication cookies, and session tokens [5]. Adhering to the well-defined structure of the HAR format provides a clear path toward implementing secure handling procedures from the outset.

For objects extracted from volatile memory images, corresponding to a `kind` of `"vm_artifact"`, the vocabulary should be borrowed from established memory forensics frameworks like Volatility [26] [27]. Using terms such as `process`, `pid`, `module`, and `symbol_file` provides a consistent and unambiguous lexicon for describing the transient state of a running system. Adopting this specialized terminology ensures that analysts familiar with memory forensics workflows can immediately interpret the data without requiring extensive retraining. This common language is crucial for enabling cross-domain correlation, allowing a security analyst to connect a pattern observed in a memory dump—a suspicious process loading a non-standard module—to a related activity seen in a network trace or an application log, thus forming a more complete picture of an incident [22] [23]. This practice aligns with how forensic communities manage and share complex artifact data, leveraging standardized terminologies to maintain clarity and precision in their investigations [26].

While semantic alignment with current standards is the primary focus, the schema must also be engineered for long-term viability through extensibility. The proposed design addresses this by including reserved slots explicitly marked for future use. The `signature.extra` object serves as a modality-independent container for any additional, generic metadata that does not fit into the predefined categories. More importantly, the `signature.modality_specific` object acts as a dedicated hook for new data modalities that may emerge in the future, such as kernel-level artifacts, IoT bus traffic, or side-channel metrics [11]. By defining these as separate, optional properties

within the schema, the design prevents conflicts and allows new types of spectral-objects to be added without altering the core structure of the schema or breaking existing parsers and consumers. This disciplined approach to versioning and evolution is a hallmark of robust schema design, ensuring that the standard remains relevant and adaptable over time. The table below outlines the core components of a spectral-object, detailing its identity, origin, and signature, and illustrating how they are informed by external standards.

Component	Property Name	Type	Description
Identity	`spectral_id`	String	A globally unique, stable identifier for the object (e.g., `checkout_latency_spike#1`). [3]
	`kind`	String (Enum)	A categorical label describing the object's nature (e.g., `"dom_motif"`, `"api_shape"`, `"trace_pattern"`, `"vm_artifact"`, `"state_machine"`). [4]
Origin	`origin.domain`	String	The host or namespace associated with the object (e.g., `"app.example.com"`). [38]
	`origin.system`	String	The subsystem or service name where the pattern was observed (e.g., `"checkout_service"`). [10]
	`origin.run_id`	String	An identifier for the acquisition session or snapshot from which the object was derived. [9]
	`origin.modality`	String (Enum)	The source data type of the observation (e.g., `"dom"`, `"har"`, `"trace"`, `"vm"`). [12]
Signature	`signature.summary`	String	A lightweight hash or feature vector representing the object's shape, suitable for real-time streams. [6]
	`signature.full`	Object	A detailed, structured representation of the object's signature, intended for deep analysis. [22]
	`signature.http`	Object	Contains fields aligned with the HAR specification for HTTP-derived objects. [37]
			- `request`: Object containing `method`, `url`, `headers`, `queryString`. [38]
			- `response`: Object containing `status`, `headers`. [31]
			- `timings`: Object containing `send`, `wait`, `receive`. [37]
	`signature.trace`	Object	Contains fields aligned with OpenTelemetry Semantic Conventions for trace-derived objects. [31]
			- `service_name`: String (e.g., `span.attributes.service.name`). [9]
			- `span_names`: Array of Strings. [31]
			- `attributes`: Object with keys like `http.method`, `url.path`. [12]
	`signature.vm`	Object	Contains fields aligned with memory forensics vocabularies for VM/memory-derived objects. [26]
			- `process`: String (e.g., `chrome.exe`). [27]
			- `pid`: Integer. [11]
			- `module`: String (e.g., `kernel32.dll`). [26]
			- `symbol_file`: String. [27]

This comprehensive definition ensures that every spectral-object carries a rich set of contextual metadata. The `identity` block provides a stable anchor for tracking the object over time, while the `origin` block situates the pattern within the broader architecture of the system under observation. The `signature` block is the heart of the

object, capturing its structural essence in a way that is both human-readable and machine-parsable, thanks to the deliberate choice of standard-compliant terminology. Finally, the inclusion of `provenance` data—listing the source files and tools used to create the object—is critical for auditability and reproducibility, allowing an analyst to trace an object's lineage back to its raw data sources [19]. Together, these elements form a holistic representation of a recurring pattern, making it a valuable asset for observability, security analysis, and performance tuning.

Operational Architecture: Dual-View Storage for Sniffing and Excavation

The operational architecture for spectral-objects is predicated on a dual-view model that supports two distinct but complementary modes of interaction: "sniffing" for real-time ingestion and triage, and "excavation" for deep, offline analysis. This duality is addressed through a carefully chosen pair of storage technologies: NDJSON (newline-delimited JSON) for the lightweight sniffing view and an embedded relational database like SQLite for the rich excavation view [22] [23]. This architectural decision is not arbitrary; it is a pragmatic response to the divergent requirements of these two use cases. The sniffing view demands a low-overhead, streaming-friendly format that can be efficiently pushed through pipelines and collected by log shippers, while the excavation view requires a structured, queryable format capable of supporting complex analytical workloads, time-series analysis, and cross-correlation of artifacts [9] [12]. The connection between these two views is managed through a "one-way promotion path," where objects are first captured in a minimal form and then periodically compacted into a richer, more permanent catalog, creating a scalable and cost-effective workflow.

The "sniffing" view is optimized for speed and efficiency during real-time data ingestion. Its purpose is to perform quick, preliminary analysis to identify promising patterns or anomalies as data flows through a system, akin to how performance tools sample a small subset of requests to estimate variance before generating a full report [29]. To facilitate this, the sniffing view is serialized into NDJSON, a format where each line represents a single, self-contained JSON object [6]. This append-only structure is exceptionally well-suited for streaming pipelines involving message brokers like Kafka, log aggregators like Fluentd, or OTel collectors configured to emit JSON-formatted logs . The payload of each NDJSON line is deliberately minimal, containing only the essential fields required for immediate processing. These typically include `spectral_id`, `kind`, `origin` (with

coarse-grained system information), `signature.summary` (a lightweight hash or feature vector instead of a full signature), a bucketed or coarse `stability_score`, and a timestamp like `last_seen_at` [3]. This minimalist approach ensures that the overhead of producing and consuming these objects is negligible, allowing them to be handled at scale without burdening the underlying infrastructure. This view acts as a high-speed triage mechanism, filtering the signal from the noise and routing high-value candidates for further investigation.

In contrast, the "deep excavation" view is designed for comprehensive offline analysis. When a candidate pattern from the sniffing view demonstrates sufficient stability and confidence, it is promoted to the excavation view, which is persisted in a local SQLite database [22]. This format is chosen for several reasons. First, its embedded nature makes it easy to deploy alongside analysis tools without needing a separate database server. Second, its support for SQL queries provides a powerful interface for analysts to explore relationships, filter by temporal metrics, and correlate findings across different data modalities. The SQLite schema is designed to support these advanced queries, mirroring the structure used by memory forensics tools that export complex artifacts for timeline analysis [26] [27]. A typical schema would consist of multiple tables:

- **`objects`**: This main table stores the core metadata for each spectral-object, including `spectral_id`, `kind`, `origin`, and the full `signature` (which can be stored as a JSON blob). It would also hold the fine-grained scores (`stability_score`, `drift_score`, `confidence_score`) and other annotations like `relations` and `tags`.
- **`observations`**: This table maintains a time-series history of each object's behavior. Each row would link to an object via its `spectral_id` and record metrics for a specific time window, such as `frequency`, `mean_latency_ms`, `error_rate`, and the detailed `signature` for that window. This structure is essential for computing the temporal scores and understanding how an object's behavior evolves.
- **`relations`**: This table models the typed edges between different spectral-objects, allowing for graph-based queries. Each row would define a relationship, such as `"refines:auth_flow#1"`, linking one object to another, thereby building a knowledge graph of interconnected patterns.
- **`provenance`**: This table links each object to its source material, storing lists of input files (e.g., HAR files, trace dumps, memory images) and the versions of the tools used to generate the object [19]. This is critical for auditability and reproducibility.

This dual-storage architecture creates a highly efficient and scalable data lifecycle. The initial ingestion of all potential patterns is cheap and fast, leveraging the simplicity of

NDJSON streams. Subsequently, computational resources are invested to build a persistent, analyzable catalog in SQLite for the most interesting findings. This mirrors modern data engineering best practices, where raw logs are stored cost-effectively before being processed into more structured, queryable formats for business intelligence and analysis [9] [12]. The exporter component of the system would be responsible for writing the sniffing-view objects to an `.ndjson` file for ingestion into the telemetry pipeline, while a separate, periodic job would aggregate these objects and their richer excavation outputs, compacting them into the SQLite `spectral_catalog.sqlite` database. This separation of concerns ensures that the real-time pipeline remains performant while enabling deep, complex analysis on a curated set of artifacts.

Automated Scoring and Promotion Logic for Temporal Analysis

A core operational requirement for spectral-objects is the ability to automatically assess their temporal characteristics, specifically their stability, drift, and confidence. This capability transforms static patterns into dynamic entities whose behavior can be monitored over time, providing crucial context for determining their significance. The implementation of this functionality relies on a combination of time-series data aggregation and threshold-based logic, all orchestrated within the "excavation" environment provided by the SQLite database. This automated scoring and promotion pipeline is what unlocks the true value of the spectral-objects, moving them from simple descriptions of a pattern to actionable insights about system behavior. The process begins by populating the `observations` table in the SQLite schema with metrics from each time window where an object was observed, which then serves as the raw material for the scoring algorithms [3] [14].

The `stability_score` is a quantitative measure of how consistently a pattern appears with its expected signature over time. It is computed as a ratio, reflecting the fraction of observation windows in which the object's signature matched a predefined baseline [3]. The formula can be expressed as:

$$\text{stability_score} = \frac{\text{number of windows where signature matches basel}$$

The determination of a "match" depends on the nature of the signature. For sequence-based patterns, it might involve calculating an edit distance, while for feature-based

signatures, it could use a cosine distance metric on normalized feature vectors . A high stability score (e.g., close to 1.0) indicates a reliable, recurring pattern, whereas a low score suggests it is ephemeral or inconsistent. This metric is fundamental for distinguishing between genuine system behaviors and random noise.

Complementing stability is the `drift_score`, which quantifies the rate of change in an object's signature or associated metrics over time. A high drift score signifies that the pattern is evolving, which could indicate a benign update or a more serious issue like a regression or a targeted attack. The drift score can be calculated as the normalized average of the distance between successive time-window observations. For example, if `S_t` is the signature vector at time `t`, the drift over a period could be the average of `distance(S_t, S_{t-1})` across all windows, normalized by the total time elapsed. This metric is crucial for anomaly detection; a sudden spike in drift for a previously stable pattern warrants immediate investigation .

Finally, the `confidence_score` represents the strength of evidence that a detected pattern is real and not a statistical fluke. This score is typically derived from the analytical methods used to discover the pattern, such as clustering algorithms, frequent sequence mining, or anomaly detectors . For instance, a pattern identified through a robust k-means clustering algorithm with a high silhouette score would receive a higher confidence rating than one found by a simple frequency count. This score helps prioritize which patterns require deeper manual review or which should be automatically promoted to a production-level catalog.

These three scores feed into a crucial piece of operational logic: the promotion policy. This policy dictates when a spectral-object, initially captured in the lightweight NDJSON stream, should be "promoted" to the rich SQLite catalog for deep excavation. The promotion is governed by a set of configurable thresholds, which can be adjusted based on the desired sensitivity of the system. A simple yet effective policy could be implemented as a scheduled job that runs against the SQLite database. This job would query for objects that meet criteria such as: `stability_score` $\geqslant$ 0.8 AND `confidence_score` $\geqslant$ 0.9 Once an object meets these conditions, it is considered "stable enough" and "confident enough" to warrant permanent storage and deeper analysis. At this point, the job would trigger the creation of a full record in the SQLite `objects` table, complete with its `signature.full`, and begin populating the `observations` table with detailed time-series data. This automated promotion logic is what creates the "one-way promotion path" from the transient sniffing view to the persistent excavation view. It ensures that the expensive and resource-intensive SQLite database is populated only with the most significant and reliable patterns, preventing it from becoming bloated with noise and keeping the analysis workload focused and

manageable. This systematic approach to managing the lifecycle of spectral-objects is central to scaling the analysis of complex, dynamic systems.

Integrated Security Model: From Field-Level Redaction to Access Control

Security is not treated as an afterthought in the design of the spectral-object schema; rather, it is woven into the fabric of its structure and operational workflow. This proactive, defense-in-depth approach is essential given that spectral-objects can encapsulate highly sensitive information inherited from their source modalities. Data derived from HAR files may contain URLs with PII in query parameters, authentication tokens, and cookies [5]. Traces can reveal the internal topology of a service mesh, exposing communication paths between microservices. Memory forensics artifacts can hold secrets, private keys, and other confidential data residing in volatile memory [23]. The integrated security model addresses these risks through a multi-layered strategy encompassing field-level sensitivity classification, automated redaction, robust access control, and optional cryptographic signing for data integrity verification.

The first and most granular layer of protection is field-level sensitivity classification. The proposed JSON schema includes a `sensitivity` object within the spectral-objects, equipped with boolean flags such as `pii` (Personally Identifiable Information) and `secrets` [13] [18]. This provides a formal mechanism for annotating data at its source, signaling to downstream processors and consumers which fields contain sensitive content. However, the true power of this feature is realized when it is paired with an automated redaction engine. Before any spectral-object is written to its final storage location—whether it's a streaming NDJSON file or the SQLite database—a preprocessing step inspects the `sensitivity` flag. If the flag is set, the engine applies a predefined set of redaction rules to mask, anonymize, or drop the sensitive data. For example, URL query parameters containing PII could be hashed or replaced with a placeholder, headers carrying credentials could be scrubbed entirely, and memory offsets containing secret strings could be zeroed out [6] [23]. This ensures that even if a storage medium is compromised, the risk of exfiltrating sensitive data is significantly mitigated. This practice of data masking is a cornerstone of privacy-preserving data handling and is mandated by regulations like GDPR [13].

The second layer of defense is access control. While data-at-rest encryption is a standard practice, the architecture specifies applying role-based access controls (RBAC) to the SQLite catalog itself. This restricts read and write permissions based on user roles, ensuring that individuals can only access the data necessary for their function, in line with the principle of least privilege [28]. For example, a junior analyst might have read-only access to a curated set of non-sensitive objects, while a senior security investigator might have elevated privileges to access the full catalog, including objects flagged with `secrets: true`. This model mirrors how sensitive datasets, such as forensic timelines, are managed within security operations centers [26]. By controlling who can see what, the system prevents unauthorized disclosure of sensitive patterns, reducing the risk of de-anonymization through correlation attacks, where seemingly benign objects are combined to reconstruct a more complete and revealing picture of a user's activity or system configuration [5].

The third and final layer of the security model involves data integrity. To protect against tampering, especially when spectral-objects are shared between different systems or teams, the design includes the option to cryptographically sign batch exports [23]. When an analyst exports a set of objects from the SQLite catalog, the export process can generate a digital signature for the entire dataset using a private key. Downstream consumers can then verify this signature using the corresponding public key before ingesting the data. This process authenticates the source of the data and ensures that it has not been altered in transit, preventing malicious actors from injecting false patterns or modifying existing ones to mislead analysis [11]. This practice of signed data exchanges is common in security-conscious communities and is a critical component of building trust in the integrity of the spectral-objects themselves [23]. Together, these three layers—data masking via redaction, controlled access via RBAC, and verified integrity via signing—create a comprehensive security posture that protects the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the valuable insights contained within spectral-objects.

A Proposed v0.1 JSON Schema and Recommended Implementation Path

Synthesizing the principles of semantic alignment, operational efficiency, and integrated security, we can formulate a concrete v0.1 JSON Schema for spectral-objects. This draft schema serves as a practical blueprint for implementation, balancing adherence to established standards with the flexibility needed for future growth. Alongside the

schema, a clear and impactful implementation path has been identified, centered on building a targeted data pipeline that delivers immediate value. This section provides the finalized schema sketch and outlines the most strategic next steps to bring the concept of spectral-objects to life.

The following is a proposed v0.1 JSON Schema for a spectral-object, adhering to the principles of reusing OpenTelemetry and HAR vocabularies and reserving extension points for future modalities.

```
{
  "$id": "https://example.org/spectral-object.schema.json",
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
  "title": "SpectralObject",
  "type": "object",
  "required": [
    "spectral_id",
    "kind",
    "origin",
    "signature",
    "stability_score",
    "drift_score",
    "confidence_score"
  ],
  "properties": {
    "spectral_id": {
      "type": "string",
      "description": "Globally unique, stable identifier for the object."
    },
    "kind": {
      "type": "string",
      "enum": [
        "dom_motif",
        "api_shape",
        "trace_pattern",
        "vm_artifact",
        "state_machine"
      ],
      "description": "Categorical label describing the object's nature."
    },
    "origin": {
```

```
  "type": "object",
  "required": ["domain", "system", "run_id", "modality"],
  "properties": {
    "domain": { "type": "string" },
    "system": { "type": "string" },
    "run_id": { "type": "string" },
    "modality": {
      "type": "string",
      "enum": ["dom", "har", "trace", "vm", "other"]
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
},
"signature": {
  "type": "object",
  "properties": {
    "summary": { "type": "string" },
    "full": { "type": "object" },
    "http": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "request": {
          "type": "object",
          "properties": {
            "method": { "type": "string" },
            "url": { "type": "string" },
            "url_path": { "type": "string" },
            "headers": { "type": "object" },
            "queryString": { "type": "object" }
          }
        },
        "response": {
          "type": "object",
          "properties": {
            "status": { "type": "integer" },
            "headers": { "type": "object" }
          }
        },
        "timings": {
          "type": "object",
```

```
          "properties": {
            "send": { "type": "number" },
            "wait": { "type": "number" },
            "receive": { "type": "number" }
          }
        }
      }
    },
    "trace": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "service_name": { "type": "string" },
        "span_names": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }
        "attributes": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": { "a
      }
    },
    "vm": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "process": { "type": "string" },
        "pid": { "type": "integer" },
        "module": { "type": "string" },
        "symbol_file": { "type": "string" }
      }
    },
    "extra": {
      "type": "object",
      "description": "Modality-independent extensions"
    },
    "modality_specific": {
      "type": "object",
      "description": "Future modality-specific data"
    }
  },
  "additionalProperties": false
},
"stability_score": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0.0, "maximum": 1.0
"drift_score": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0.0, "maximum": 1.0 },
"confidence_score": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0.0, "maximum": 1.0
"kps": {
```

```
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "K": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 10 },
        "P": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 10 },
        "S": { "type": "number", "minimum": 0, "maximum": 10 }
      }
    },
    "relations": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
    "tags": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
    "provenance": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "har_files": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
        "trace_dumps": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } },
        "memory_images": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" }
        "tools": { "type": "array", "items": { "type": "string" } }
      }
    },
    "sensitivity": {
      "type": "object",
      "properties": {
        "pii": { "type": "boolean" },
        "secrets": { "type": "boolean" }
      }
    }
  }
}
```

With the schema defined, the most impactful and strategically sound next step is to implement a targeted data pipeline that produces tangible results on real-world data. The recommended path is to build a **HAR → OTel → Spectral pipeline**. This focused effort will immediately demonstrate the utility of the schema and its associated tooling. The pipeline would operate as follows: 1. **Ingestion and Conversion:** The pipeline ingests `.har` files, which are ubiquitous in web performance testing and debugging. It uses existing open-source tools, such as `HarSharp` , to convert the HAR data into a standardized OpenTelemetry trace format. 2. **Spectral-Object Generation:** As part of this conversion process, the pipeline derives `spectral_objects` from the converted traces and the original HAR entries. It generates a lightweight "sniffing" view of these objects, containing only the minimal fields required for real-time processing. 3. **Streaming and Export:** The pipeline writes these lightweight objects to a `.ndjson` file. This file can

then be ingested by any standard logging or telemetry collection system (e.g., Fluentd, OpenTelemetry Collector) for real-time alerting and monitoring. 4. **Cataloging and Deep Analysis:** A separate, periodic job (e.g., run nightly via a scheduler like cron) reads from the NDJSON stream and the raw HAR/trace data. It compacts the objects into a full "excavation" view and inserts them into a local `spectral_catalog.sqlite` database. During this process, it executes the automated scoring logic to compute `stability_score`, `drift_score`, and `confidence_score` for each object based on historical data in the database. Objects that meet the predefined promotion thresholds are permanently stored. 5. **Security Enforcement:** Throughout this entire process, a redaction engine is applied. Any object with a `sensitivity.pii` or `sensitivity.secrets` flag set is processed according to a predefined policy to mask or remove sensitive information before it is ever written to the NDJSON file or the SQLite database.

By pursuing this concrete implementation path, the project can deliver a v0.1 release that is not just a theoretical construct but a functional toolset. It leverages existing open-source components to minimize development overhead and focuses innovation on the novel aspects of pattern discovery, scoring, and secure storage. This initial success will provide a solid foundation upon which to build support for other data modalities (DOM, memory forensics) and more advanced analytical features, ensuring that the spectral-object standard grows in a sustainable and interoperable manner.

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