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Pure Science, Applied Science, Technology, Engineering: An Attempt at Definitions

JAMES K. FEIBLEMAN*

1. The Theory of Practice

IT IS NOT the business of scientists to investigate just what the business of science is. Yet the business of science is in need of investigation. If we are to consider the relations between science and engineering, the relation between pure and applied science will have first to be made very clear; and for this purpose we shall need working definitions. Once stated, these definitions may seem an elaboration of the obvious and an oversimplification. But the elaboration often seems obvious only *after* it has been stated, and the definitions may have to be simple in order to bring out the necessary distinctions.

By “pure science” or “basic research” is meant a method of investigating nature by the experimental method in an attempt to satisfy the need to know. Many activities in pure science are not experimental, as, for instance, biological taxonomy; but it can always be shown that in such cases the activities are ancillary to experiment. In the case of biological taxonomy the classifications are of experimental material. Taxonomy is practiced in other areas where it is not scientific, such as in the operation of libraries.

By “applied science” is meant the use of pure science for some practical human purpose.

Thus science serves two human purposes: to know and to do. The former is a matter of understanding, the latter a matter of action. Technology, which began as the attempt to satisfy a practical need without the use of science, will receive a fuller treatment in a later section.

Applied science, then, is simply pure science applied. But scientific method has more than one end; it leads to explanation and application. It achieves explanation in the discovery of laws, and the laws can be applied. Thus both pure science and applied science have aims and results. Pure science has as its aim the understanding of nature; it

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seeks explanation. Applied science has as its aim the control of nature; it has the task of employing the findings of pure science to get practical tasks done. Pure science has as a result the furnishing of laws for application in applied science. And, as we shall learn later in this essay, applied science has as a result the stimulation of discovery in pure science.

Applied science puts to practical human uses the discoveries made in pure science. Whether there would be such a thing as pure science alone is hard to say; there are reasons for thinking that there would be, for pure science has a long history and, as we have noted, another justification. There could be technology without science; for millenia, in fact, there was. But surely there could be no applied science without pure science: applied science means just what it says, namely, the application of science, and so without pure science there would be nothing to apply.

Logically, pure science pursued in disregard of applied science seems to be the *sine qua non* of applied science, while historically the problems toward which applied science is directed came before pure science.

It has been asserted, for instance, that Greek geometry, which is certainly pure, arose out of the interest in land surveying problems in Egypt, where the annual overflow of the Nile obliterated all conventional boundaries. Certainly it is true that the same concept of infinity is necessary for the understanding of Euclidean geometry and for the division of farms. Be that as it may, it yet remains true that the relations between pure and applied science are often varied and subtle, and will require exploration.

Let us propose the hypothesis that all pure science is applicable.

No proof exists for such an hypothesis; all that can be offered is evidence in favor of it. This evidence consists of two parts, the first logical and the second historical.

The logical evidence in favor of the hypothesis is contained in the very nature of pure science itself. Any discovery in pure science that gets itself established will have gained the support of experimental data. Thus there must be a connection between the world of fact, the actual world, in other words, which corresponds to sense experience, and the laws of pure science. It is not too difficult to take the next step, and so to suppose that the laws, which were suggested by facts in the world corresponding to sense experience, could be applied back to that world.

The second part of the evidence for the applicability of all of the laws of pure science is contained in the record of those laws which have been applied. The modern western cultures have been altered

by applied science, and now Soviet Russia and China are following their lead. Indeed, so prevalent are the effects of applied science, and so concealed the leadership of pure science, that those whose understanding of science is limited are apt to identify all of science with applied science and even to assume that science itself means technology or heavy industry.

One argument against the position advocated here would be based upon the number of pure theories in science for which no application has yet been found. But this is no argument at all; for to have any weight, it would have to show not only that there had been no application but also why there could be none. Yet a time lag between the discovery of a theory and its application to practice is not uncommon. How many years elapsed between Faraday's discovery of the dynamo and its general manufacture and use in industry? Conic sections were discovered by Apollonius of Perga in the third century B. C., when they were of intellectual interest only, and they were applied to the problems of engineering only in the seventeenth century. Non-Euclidean geometry, worked out by Riemann as an essay in pure mathematics early in the nineteenth century, was used by Einstein in his theory of relativity in the twentieth century. The coordinate geometry of Descartes made possible the study of curves by means of quadratic equations. It was in Descartes' time that the application of conic sections to the orbit of planets was first noticed; later the same curves were used in the analysis of the paths of projectiles, in searchlight reflectors, and in the cables of suspension bridges. Chlorinated diphenylethane was synthesized in 1874. Its value as insecticide (DDT) was not recognized until 1939 when a systematic search for moth repellants was undertaken for the military. The photoelectric cell was used in pure science, notably by George E. Hale on observations of the sun's corona in 1894. Twenty-five years later it was found employed in making motion pictures. It often happens that the discovery of a useful material is not sufficient; it is necessary also to discover a use, to connect the material to some function in which it could prove advantageous. Paracelsus discovered ether and even observed its anaesthetic properties, and Valerius Cordus gave the formula for its preparation as early as the sixteenth century. But it was many centuries before ether was used as an anesthetic.

Presumably, then, pure scientific formulations which have not been applied are merely those for which as yet no applications have been found. In the effort to extend knowledge it is not strategically wise to hamper investigation with antecedent assurances of utility. Many of the scientific discoveries which later proved most advantageous in

industry had not been self-evidently applicable. This is certainly true of Gibbs' phase rule in chemistry, for instance. It often happens that for the most abstract theories new acts of discovery are necessary in order to put them to practical use.

2. *From Theory to Practice*

It should be observed at the outset that applications are matters of relevance. The line between pure and applied science is a thin one; they are distinct in their differences, but one fades into the other. For instance, the use of crystallography in the packing industry is an application, but so is the use of the mathematical theory of groups in pure crystallography and in quantum mechanics. The employment of mathematics in pure science means application from the point of view of mathematics but remoteness from application from the point of view of experiment. Some branches of mathematics have been so widely employed that we have come to think of them as practical affairs. This is the case with probability or differential equations. Both branches, however, considered in their mathematical aspects and not at all in relation to the various experimental sciences in which they have proved so useful, are theoretical disciplines with a status of their own which in no wise depends upon the uses to which they may be put.

Procedurally, the practitioner introduces into his problem the facilitation afforded by some abstract but relevant theory from either mathematics or pure science. The statistical theory of extreme values is a branch of mathematics, yet it has application to studies of metal fatigue and to such meteorological phenomena as annual droughts, atmospheric pressure and temperature, snowfalls, and rainfalls. The discovery of the Salk vaccine against polio virus was an achievement of applied science. Yet Pasteur's principle of pure science, that dead or attenuated organisms could induce the production of antibodies within blood serum, was assumed by Salk; so the immensely important practical applications would not have been possible without the previous theoretical work.

It is clear, then that we need three separate and distinct kinds of pursuits, and, perforce, three types of interest to accompany them. The first is pure science. Pure theoretical sciences are concerned with the discovery of natural law and the description of nature, and with nothing else. These sciences are conducted by men whose chief desire is to know, and this requires a detached inquiry—which Einstein has somewhere called “the holy curiosity of inquiry” and which Emerson declared to be perpetual. Such a detachment and such a pursuit are

comparable in their high seriousness of purpose only to religion and art.

The second type is applied science, in which are included all applications of the experimental pure sciences. These are concerned with the improvement of human means and ends and with nothing else. They are conducted by men whose chief desires are practical: either the improvement of human conditions or profit, or both. Temperamentally, the applied scientists are not the same as the pure scientists: their sights while valid are lower; they are apt to be men of greater skill but of lesser imagination; what they lack in loftiness they gain in humanity. It would be a poor view which in all respects held either variety secondary. Yet there is a scale of order to human enterprises, even when we are sure we could dispense with none of them; and so we turn with some measure of dependence to the type of leadership which a preoccupation with detached inquiry is able to provide.

The third type is the intermediate or *modus operandi* level, which is represented by the scientist with an interest in the solution of the problems presented by the task of getting from theory to practice. As Whitehead said, a short but concentrated interval for the development of imaginative design lies between them. Consider for example the role of the discovery of Hertzian waves, which not only led to the development of radio but also brilliantly confirmed Maxwell's model of an electromagnetic field, specifically the existence of electromagnetic waves, with a constant representing the velocity of light in two of the four equations.

The conception of science as exclusively pure or utterly applied is erroneous; the situation is no longer so absolute. When scientific theories were not too abstract, it was possible for practical-minded men to address themselves both to a knowledge of the theory and to the business of applying it in practice. The nineteenth century saw the rise of the "inventor," the technologist who employed the results of the theoretical scientist in the discovery of devices, or instruments, of new techniques in electromagnetics, in chemistry, and in many other fields. Earlier scientists like Maxwell had prepared the way for inventors like Edison. In some sciences, notably physics, however, this simple situation no longer prevails. The theories discovered there are of such a degree of mathematical abstraction that an intermediate type of interest and activity is now required. The theories which are discovered in the physicists' laboratories and published as journal articles take some time to make their way into engineering handbooks and contract practices. Some intermediate theory is necessary for getting from theory to practice.

A good example of the *modus operandi* level is furnished by the activities and the scientists concerned with making the first atomic bombs. Hahn and Strassmann discovered in 1938 that neutrons could split the nuclei of uranium. Einstein and Planck had earlier produced the requisite theories, but it was Enrico Fermi, Lise Meitner, and others who worked out the method of getting from relativity and quantum mechanics to bombs which could be made to explode by atomic fission.

3. *Technology*

There has been some misunderstanding of the distinction between applied science and technology; and understandably so, for the terms have not been clearly distinguished. Primarily the difference is one of type of approach. The applied scientist as such is concerned with the task of discovering applications for pure theory. The technologist has a problem which lies a little nearer to practice. Both applied scientist and technologist employ experiment; but in the former case guided by hypotheses deduced from theory, while in the latter case employing trial-and-error or skilled approaches derived from concrete experience. The theoretical biochemist is a pure scientist, working for the most part with the carbon compounds. The biochemist is an applied scientist when he explores the physiological effects of some new drug, perhaps trying it out to begin with on laboratory animals, then perhaps on himself or on volunteers from his laboratory or from the charity ward of some hospital. The doctor or practicing physician is a technologist when he prescribes it for some of his patients.

Speaking historically, the achievements of technology are those which developed without benefit of science; they arose empirically either by accident or as a matter of common experience. The use of certain biochemicals in the practice of medicine antedates the development of science: notably, ephedrine, cocaine, curare, and quinine. This is true also of the pre-scientific forms of certain industrial processes, such as cheese-making, fermentation, and tanning.

The applied scientist fits a case under a class; the technologist takes it from there and works it out, so to speak, *in situ*. Applied science consists in a system of concrete interpretations of scientific propositions directed to some end useful for human life. Technology might now be described as a further step in applied science by means of the improvement of instruments. In this last sense, technology has always been with us; it was vastly accelerated in efficiency by having been brought under applied science as a branch.

Technology is more apt to develop empirical laws than theoretical

laws, laws which are generalizations from practice rather than laws which are intuited and then applied to practice. Empirical procedures like empirical laws are often the product of technological practice without benefit of theory. Since 1938, when Cerletti and Bini began to use electrically induced convulsions in the treatment of schizophrenia, the technique of electroshock therapy has been widespread in psychiatric practice. Yet there is no agreement as to what precisely occurs or how the improvement is produced; a theory to explain the practice is entirely wanting.

Like applied science, technology has its ideals. Let us consider the technological problem of improving the airplane, for instance. For a number of decades now, the problem to which airplane designers have addressed themselves is how to increase the speed and the pay load of airplanes. This means cutting down on the weight of the empty airplane in proportion to its carrying capacity while increasing its effective speed. If we look back at what has been accomplished in this direction, then extrapolate our findings into the future in order to discern the outlines of the ideal, we shall be surprised to discover that what the designers have been working toward is an airplane that will carry an infinite amount of pay load at an infinite speed while itself weighing nothing at all! This of course is a limit, and like all such limits, is an ideal intended to be increasingly approached without ever being absolutely reached.

Conception of the ideal is evidently of the utmost practicality and cannot be escaped in applied formulations. Yet the existence of such a thing as a technical ideal is fairly recent and is peculiar to western culture. The ideal of a general character envisaged in this connection is that of fitness of purpose and of economy; no material or energy is to be wasted. Roman engineers built bridges designed to support loads far in excess of anything that might be carried over them; their procedures would be regarded as bad engineering today. The modern engineer builds his bridge to carry exactly the load that will be put upon it plus a small margin for safety, but no more; he must not waste structural steel nor use more rivets than necessary, and labor must be held to minimum. The ideal of technology is efficiency.

Although technologists work in terms of ideals, they are nevertheless more bound down to materials than is the applied scientist, just as the applied scientist in his turn is more bound down to materials than is the pure scientist. Since the technologist is limited by what is available, when he increases the going availability it is usually at the material level. The environment with which a society reacts is the available environment, not the entire or total environment; and the

available environment is that part of the environment which is placed within reach of the society by its knowledge and techniques. These are laid out for it and increased by the pure and the applied sciences. Only when these limits are set can the technologist go to work. For example, discovery of the internal combustion engine which required gasoline as fuel turned men's attention to possible sources of oil. The applied scientist found ways of locating oil in the ground, while the petroleum technologist made the actual discoveries. In the hundred years since Edwin Drake drilled the world's first oil well near Titusville, Pennsylvania, in 1859, the technologists have taken this discovery very far. Oil is now a natural resource, a part of the available environment; but it can hardly be said to have been so a hundred years ago, although it was just as much in the ground then as now.

Another kind of technologist is the engineer; engineering is the most down-to-earth of all scientific work that can justify the name of science at all. In engineering the solutions of the technologists are applied to particular cases. The building of bridges, the medical treatment of patients, the designing of instruments, all improvements in model constructions of already existing tools—these are the work of the engineer. But the theories upon which such work rests, such as studies in the flow or “creep” of metals, the physics of lubrication, the characteristics of surface tensions of liquids—these belong to the applied scientist.

The industrial scientific laboratory is devoted to the range of applied science, from “fundamental research,” by which is meant long range work designed to produce or improve practical technology, to immediate technological gains from which manufacturing returns are expected, for instance, the testing of materials and of manufactured products. Technological laboratories have been established in the most important of the giant industrial companies, such as DuPont, General Electric, Eastman Kodak, and Bell Telephone. The work of such laboratories is cumulative and convergent; applied science in such an institution is directed toward eventual technological improvement, the range of applied science and technology being employed as a series of connecting links to tie up pure science with manufacturing. University and foundation laboratories often serve the same purpose, but with the emphasis shifted toward the theoretical end of the scientific spectrum.

The development of technology has a strong bearing on its situation today and may be traced briefly. In the Middle Ages, there was natural philosophy and craftsmanship. Such science as existed was in the hands of the natural philosophers, and such technology as existed

was in the hands of the craftsmen. There was precious little of either, for the exploration of the natural world was conducted by speculative philosophers, while the practical tasks were carried out by handicrafts employing comparatively simple tools, although there were exceptions: the windmill, for instance. There was little commerce between them, however, for their aims were quite different, and the effort to understand the existence of God took precedence over lesser pursuits.

Gradually, however, natural philosophy was replaced by experimental science, and handicraft by the power tool. The separation continued to be maintained, and for the same reasons; and this situation did not change until the end of the eighteenth century. At that time, the foundations of technology shifted from craft to science. Technology and applied science ran together into the same powerful channels at the same time that the applications of pure science became more abundant. A craft is learned by the apprentice method; a science must be learned from the study of principles as well as from the practices of the laboratory, and while the practice may come from applied science the principles are those of pure science.

There is now only the smallest distinction between applied science, the application of the principles of pure science, and technology. The methods peculiar to technology: trial-and-error, invention aided by intuition, have merged with those of applied science: adopting the findings of pure science to the purposes of obtaining desirable practical consequences. Special training is required, as well as some understanding of applied and even of pure science. In general, industries are based on manufacturing processes which merely reproduce on a large scale effects first learned and practiced in a scientific laboratory. The manufacture of gasoline, penicillin, electricity, oxygen were never developed from technological procedures, but depended upon work first done by pure scientists. Science played a predominant role in such physical industries as steel, aluminum, and petroleum; in such chemical industries as pharmaceuticals and potash; in such biological industries as medicine and husbandry.

A concomitant development, in which the triumph of pure science over technology shows clear, is in the design and manufacture of instruments. The goniometer, for the determination of the refractive index of fluids (used in the chemical industries); the sugar refractometer, for the reading of the percentages by weight of sugar (used in sugar manufacture); the pyrometer, for the measurement of high temperatures (used in the making of electric light bulbs and of gold and silver utensils); the polarimeter, for ascertaining the amount of sugar in urine (used by the medical profession); these and many others,

such as for instance the focometer for studies in the length of objectives, the anomaloscope for color blindness, and the spectroscope for the measurement of wave lengths, are precision instruments embodying principles not available to the technologist working unaided by a knowledge of pure science.

4. *From Practice to Theory*

In the course of pursuing practical ends abstract principles of science hitherto unsuspected are often discovered. The mathematical theory of probability was developed because some professional gamblers wished to know the odds in games of chance. Electromagnetics stimulated the development of differential equations, and hydrodynamics function theory. Carnot founded the pure science of thermodynamics as a result of the effort to improve the efficiency of steam and other heat engines. Aerodynamics and atomic physics were certainly advanced more swiftly because of the requirements of war. Air pollution, which accompanies big city "smog," has led a number of physical chemists to investigate the properties of extreme dilution. Hence it is not surprising that many advances in pure science have been made in industrial laboratories: from the Bell Telephone laboratories alone have come the discoveries by Davisson and Germer of the diffraction of electrons, by Jansky of radio astronomy, and by Shannon of information theory.

Technology has long been an aid and has furnished an impetus to experimental science. The development of the delicate mechanisms requisite for the carrying out of certain experiments calls on all the professional abilities of the instrument maker. Such a relation is not a new one; it has long existed. The skill of the Venetian glass-blowers made possible many of Torricelli's experiments on gases. Indeed, glass can be followed through a single chain of development for several centuries, from the early microscopes to interferometers. The study of electromagnetics was responsible for the later commerce in electric power and the vast industries founded on it. But, contrariwise, thermodynamics grew up as a result of the problems arising from the use of steam in industry. We cannot afford to neglect in our considerations the economic support as well as the social justification which industry has furnished, and continues to be prepared to furnish, to research. The extraordinary rise of pure chemistry in Germany was not unrelated to the industry constructed on the basis of the aniline dyes, as well as cosmetics and explosives, during the nineteenth century.

The harm to practice of neglecting the development of pure theoretic

science will not be felt until the limits of installing industries by means of applied science and technology, and of spreading its results, have been reached. Science can to some extent continue to progress on its own momentum together with such aid as the accidental or adventitious discoveries of pure science in technological laboratories can furnish it. But there are limits to this sort of progress. Thus far the communist countries of the east have taken every advantage of the scientific developments achieved in the capitalist countries of the west. But after all, the applied science which the west has been able to furnish has been the result of its own preoccupations with pure science and with theoretic considerations which lay outside the purview of any practice. Industrial laboratories may occasionally contribute to pure science, but that is not their chief aim; and it is apt to be forgotten that such industries would not exist were it not for the fact that some centuries ago a handful of scientists with no thought of personal gain or even of social benefit tried to satisfy their curiosity about the nature of things. The restless spirit of science, never content with findings, hardly concerned with the applications of findings, is always actively engaged in pursuing methods in terms of assumptions, and must have some corner of the culture in which it can hope to be protected in its isolation. A wise culture will always provide it elbow room, with the understanding that in the future some amortized inquiry is bound to pay dividends. The ivory tower can be, and sometimes is, the most productive building in the market place.

Of course, applied science and technology cannot be independent of pure science, nor can pure science be independent of applied science and technology. The two developments work together and are interwoven. Gilbert discovered that the freely suspended magnetic needle (i. e., the compass) could be a practical aid to navigation at the same time he proposed that perhaps the earth was a gigantic magnet.

Problems which arise in the midst of practical tasks often suggest lines of theoretical inquiry. But there is more. Pragmatic evidence has always been held by logicians to have little standing. A scientific hypothesis needs more support than can be obtained from the practical fact that "it works." For who knows how long it will work or how well? What works best today may not work best tomorrow. A kind of practice which supports one theory may be supplanted by a more efficient kind of practice which supports quite a different theory. Relativity mechanics gives more accurate measurements than Newtonian mechanics. That use does not determine theory can be easily shown. Despite the theoretical success of the Copernican

theory as refined and advanced by Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, we have never ceased to use the Ptolemaic conception in guiding our ships or in regulating our clocks. However, if the practical success achieved by the application of certain theories in pure science cannot be construed as a proof of their truth, neither can it be evidence of the contradictory: workability is no evidence of falsity, either. Newton is still correct within limits. Practicality suggests truth and supports the evidence in its favor even if offering no final proof. The practical uses of atomic energy do not prove that matter is transformable into energy, but they offer powerful support. Hence, the use of a scientific law in the control of nature constitutes the check of prediction and control.

5. Cross-field Applications

We have treated all too briefly the relations of theory to practice and of practice to theory in a given science. We have also mentioned the productive nature of cross-field research. It remains now to discuss a last dimension of relations between science and practice, and this is what we may call cross-field applications: the employment of the practical effects of one science in those of another.

The applications of science have been greatly aided by the cross-fertilization of techniques. Radio astronomy, which has proved so useful in basic research, being already responsible for the discovery of "radio stars," and for adding to our knowledge of meteor streams and the solar corona, owes its inception to a borrowed instrument. Cross-field application has a long history, dating at least to the early half of the eighteenth century when distilleries in England brought together the results of techniques of producing gin acquired from both chemistry and theories of heat energy. Perhaps the most prominent instance of this is the way in which medicine has drawn upon the physical technologies. The use of the vacuum tube amplifier and the cathode ray oscillograph in determining the electrical potential accompanying events in the nervous system, the entire areas covered by encephalography and by roentgenology show the enormous benefits which have accrued to medical studies and procedures. Scintillation counters, developed and used in physical research, have been employed to measure the rate at which the thyroid gland in a given individual removes iodine from the blood stream; to measure the natural radioactivity of the body; to determine the extent of ingested radioactive compounds in the body; to assay the radioactive iron in blood samples. Chemistry has been an equally potent aid to pharma-

cology, which would have hardly existed in any important sense without it.

Other instances abound, and indeed multiply every day. In 1948 the Armour Research Foundation sponsored a Crystallographic Center, of interest to pharmaceutical corporations because of the crystalline nature of some of the vitamins. The invention of automatic sequence controlled calculators and other types of computing machines has seen their immediate application to atomic research and to military problems of a technical nature. Medical knowledge is being placed at the service of airplane designers, who must estimate just what strains their aircraft will demand of pilots. Perhaps the most graphic illustration of cross-field application is in scientific agriculture. Here hardly a single science can be omitted: physics, chemistry, biology—all contribute enormously to the joint knowledge which it is necessary to have if soils are to respond to management.

The cross-field applications of science usually work upward in fields corresponding to the integrative levels of the sciences. Applications found in physics will be employed in chemistry or biology, those found in chemistry will be employed in biology or psychology, those found in biology will be employed in psychology or sociology, and so on. The use of physics in biology has in fact brought into existence the science of biophysics, in which are studied the physics of biological systems, the biological effects of physical agents, and the application of physical methods to biological problems.

The cross-fertilization of applied science, the use of techniques, skills, devices, acquired in one science to achieve gains in another, has effects which tend to go beyond either. They add up to a considerable acceleration in the speed with which the applied sciences affect the culture as a whole. In the brief space of some several hundred years, western culture has been altered out of all recognition by the employment of applied science and technology to purposes of industry, health, government, and war. Much of the alteration has been accomplished by means of the cooperation between the sciences. We now know that the shortest route to an effective practice lies indirectly through the understanding of nature. If there exists a human purpose of a practical kind, then the quickest as well as the most efficient method of achieving it is to apply the relevant natural laws of science to it.