### Development of IT-Standards

# --An Integrated View of Standardization Processes--

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#### Question

 How to theoretically describe standardization processes from negotiation to adoption?

# **Empirical Puzzles**

- Plethora of standardization initiatives
  - → Inconsistency with collective action theory
- Colliding standardization initiatives
  - Example: EDI-Experiences in Europe
    - Retail initiatives in Italy, Spain, Germany and Denmark compared
    - Role of institutional structure important
  - → Inconsistency with concept of positive network externalities

# Leveraging an Institutional Perspective

- Standards as generalized cost-/benefit-sharing agreements regarding interconnecting systems/components
- Benefits of standards: Saving transaction costs of bilateral negotiations
  - → (Negative) network externalities as transaction costs
- Costs of standardisation:
  - Negotiating generalized interface specifications
  - Evaluating published interface specifications

## Predicting Costs/Benefits

- Competition intensity as main determinant of transaction costs of bilateral interface specification
- Number of competitors involved in standards negotiation main influence on negotiation costs
- Benefits of standards increase with the number of competitors who adopt a standard
- => Both costs and benefits of standardization are driven by the number of competitors

#### An Idealized Standardization Process

BN: Costs of bilateral (vertical) negotiations

MN: Costs of multilateral (horizontal) negotiations


AD: Costs of adoption decision

NB: Net benefit of multilateral negotiations

A: Point of maximum net benefit of multilateral negotiations

B: Threshold value of adoption

F: Costs caused by internal requirements of business partners



### Three Archetypical Problems

- Negotiation phase
  - Initiation of a standard process => free-riding
  - Negotiating a standard candidate => negotiation complexity
- Diffusion phase
  - Adoption of a standard candidate => critical mass
- Linking both negotiation and diffusion phase
  - Smaller negotiation group => easier initiation and agreement
  - Larger negotiation group => adoption more likely

# Strengths and Limitations of the Model

- Ignoring the impact of
  - Powerful business partners
  - Switching costs
  - Characteristics of individual competitors
- Integrating
  - Negotiation and diffusion phase
  - Role of institutional structures
- Conditions for useful application
  - If competition is an important factor
  - If market power is shared equally among several competitors

# Difference between the "Physical" and the Institutional View

#### Physical View

- Vertical linkages matter
- Positive network externalities
- Number of (vertically linked) business partners relevant
- Benefit realized during use of good
- Choice: participate in network or not
- Standards adoption: physical implementation of interface specification

#### Institutional View

- Horizontal linkages matter
- Negative network externalities
- Number of (horizontally linked) competitors relevant
- Benefit realized during transaction of good
- Choice: unilateral vs. multilateral interface specification
- Standards adoption: adherence to a specification in business negotiations

#### References

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