

# Cryptography and Architectures for Computer Security - Cheat Sheet

## Information Theory

$$Pr(C = c) = \sum_{k: c \in \{\mathbb{E}_k(m), \forall m \in \mathcal{M}\}} Pr(K = k) Pr(P = \mathbb{D}_k(c))$$

$$\textbf{Perfect secrecy } Pr(P = m | C = c) = Pr(P = m) \implies |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}| = |\mathcal{P}|$$

$$\textbf{Entropy } H(X) = - \sum_{i=1}^n p_i \log_2 p_i \quad (p_i \log_2 p_i = 0 \text{ for } p_i = 0)$$

$$H(X, Y) = - \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m Pr(X = x_i, Y = y_j) \log_2 Pr(X = x_i, Y = y_j)$$

$$H(X|Y = y) = - \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m Pr(X = x_i | Y = y) \log_2 Pr(X = x_i | Y = y)$$

$$H(X|Y) = - \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m Pr(Y = y_j) Pr(X = x_i, Y = y_j) \log_2 Pr(X = x_i | Y = y_j)$$

$$H(X) + H(Y) \geq H(X, Y); H(X, Y) = H(Y) + H(X|Y); H(X|Y) \leq H(X)$$

$$\textbf{Key equivocation } H(K|C) = H(P) + H(K) - H(C)$$

$$\textbf{Language redundancy } R_L = 1 - \frac{H_L}{\log_2 |\mathcal{M}|}$$

$$\textbf{Spurious keys } \bar{s}_n \geq \frac{|\mathcal{K}|}{|\mathcal{M}|^{nR_L}} - 1$$

$$\textbf{Unicity distance } n_0 \approx \frac{\log_2 |\mathcal{K}|}{R_L \log_2 |\mathcal{M}|}$$

## Symmetric Ciphers

### Modes of Operation

$$\textbf{ECB } c_i = \mathbb{E}_k(m_i)$$

$$\textbf{CBC } c_0 = IV, c_i = \mathbb{E}_k(m_i \oplus c_{i-1})$$

$$\textbf{CFB/OFB } ISR_0 = IV, OSR_i = \mathbb{E}_k(ISR_{i-1}), c_i = m_i \oplus \text{j-th leftmost bits of } OSR_i$$

$$\textbf{CTR } ctr_i = IV + i, t_i = \mathbb{E}_k(ctr_i), c_i = t_i \oplus m_i$$

## Cryptanalysis

$$\textbf{Pile-up lemma } Pr(Z_1 \oplus \dots \oplus Z_n = 0) = \frac{1}{2} + 2^{n-1} \prod_{i=1}^n \varepsilon_i$$

## Hash Functions

$$\textbf{First preimage } Pr(m_i | d = h(m_i)) \approx \frac{q}{|D|}$$

$$\textbf{Second preimage } Pr(h(m_i) = h(m)) = \frac{q-1}{|D|}$$

$$\textbf{Collision } Pr(\text{no collisions}) = e^{-\frac{q(q-1)}{2|D|}} \implies q \leq 1.774 \sqrt{|D|}$$

## Algebraic Structures

### Elliptic Curves

### Public Key Cryptosystems

#### RSA

$$\textbf{Keys } k_{pub} = (n, e), k_{priv} = (p, q, \varphi(n), d)$$

$$n = p \cdot q, \gcd(e, \varphi(n)) = 1, d = e^{-1} \pmod{\varphi(n)}$$

$$c = m^{e \bmod \varphi(n)} \bmod n, m = c^{d \bmod \varphi(n)} \bmod n$$

$$\textbf{CRT } m_p \equiv_p c^{d \bmod p-1}, m_q \equiv_q c^{d \bmod q-1}, m \equiv_n m_p q(q^{-1} \bmod p) + m_q p(p^{-1} \bmod p)$$

## Montgomery Multiplication

## Number Theoretical Cryptanalysis

### Primality test

**Fermat**  $n$  is composite  $\implies a^{n-1} \not\equiv_n 1$  with probability  $> \frac{1}{2}$

**Miller-Rabin**  $n-1 = d2^s : a^d \not\equiv_n \pm 1$  and  $a^{d2^r} \not\equiv -1 \implies n$  is composite

### Factoring

**Fermat**  $x = \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil, y = x^2 - n$ , until  $y$  is a perfect square  $y = y + 2x + 1, x = x + 1$ , then the factors are  $x \pm \sqrt{y}$

**Pollard's  $\rho$**  pick  $a, b$  at random (e.g  $x_0 = 2, x_i = x_{i-1}^2 + 1 \bmod n$ ), if  $\gcd(a - b, n) \neq 1$  the result is a factor

**Pollard's p-1**  $p$  B-power-smooth,  $a = 2^{B!}$ , so  $p = \gcd(a - 1, n)$

### DLog

**Polig-Hellman** for each prime factor  $\eta = g^{\frac{n}{p}}, \gamma_i = \gamma_{i-1} g^{l_{i-1} p^{i-1}}, \delta_i = (\beta \gamma_i^{-1})^{\frac{n}{p^{i+1}}}, l_i = \log_\eta \delta_i$

### Misc