Cryptography and Architectures for Computer Security - Cheat Sheet

Information Theory

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\begin{array}{l} Pr(C=c) = \sum_{k:c \in \{\mathbb{E}_k(m), \forall m \in \mathcal{M}\}} Pr(K=k) Pr(P=\mathbb{D}_k(c)) \\ \textbf{Perfect secrecy} \ Pr(P=m|C=c) = Pr(P=m) \implies |\mathcal{K}| = |\mathcal{C}| = |\mathcal{P}| \\ \textbf{Entropy} \ H(X) = -\sum_{i=1}^n p_i \log_2 p_i \quad (p_i \log_2 p_i = 0 \text{ for } p_i = 0) \\ H(X,Y) = -\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m Pr(X=x_i,Y=y_j) \log_2 Pr(X=x_i,Y=y_j) \\ H(X|Y=y) = -\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m Pr(X=x_i|Y=y) \log_2 Pr(X=x_i|Y=y) \\ H(X|Y) = -\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^m Pr(Y=y_j) Pr(X=x_i,Y=y_j) \log_2 Pr(X=x_i|Y=y_j) \\ H(X) + H(Y) \geqslant H(X,Y); \ H(X,Y) = H(Y) + H(X|Y); \ H(X|Y) \leqslant H(X) \\ \textbf{Key equivocation} \ H(K|C) = H(P) + H(K) - H(C) \\ \textbf{Language redundancy} \ R_L = 1 - \frac{H_L}{\log_2 |\mathcal{M}|} \\ \textbf{Spurious keys} \ \bar{s_n} \geqslant \frac{|\mathcal{K}|}{|\mathcal{M}|^{nR_L}} - 1 \\ \textbf{Unicity distance} \ n_0 \approx \frac{\log_2 |\mathcal{K}|}{R_L \log_2 |\mathcal{M}|} \end{array}
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Symmetric Ciphers

Modes of Operation

ECB
$$c_i = \mathbb{E}_k(m_i)$$

CBC $c_0 = IV$, $c_i = \mathbb{E}_k(m_i \oplus c_{i-1})$
CFB/OFB $ISR_0 = IV$, $OSR_i = \mathbb{E}_k(ISR_{i-1})$, $c_i = m_i \oplus \text{ j-th leftmost bits of } OSR_i$
CTR $ctr_i = IV + i$, $t_i = \mathbb{E}_k(ctr_i)$, $c_i = t_i \oplus m_i$

Cryptanalysis

Pile-up lemma
$$Pr(Z_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus Z_n = 0) = \frac{1}{2} + 2^{n-1} \prod_{i=1}^n \varepsilon_i$$

Hash Functions

First preimage
$$Pr(m_i|d=h(m_i)) \approx \frac{q}{|D|}$$

Second preimage $Pr(h(m_i)=h(m)) = \frac{q-1}{|D|}$
Collision $Pr(\text{no collisions}) = e^{-\frac{q(q-1)}{2|D|}} \implies q \leqslant 1.774\sqrt{|D|}$

Algebraic Structures

$$\varphi(n) = |\{x \in \mathbb{N} : 1 \leqslant x \leqslant n - 1, gcd(n, x) = 1\}|$$

$$\varphi(nm) = \varphi(n)\varphi(m) \text{ for } gcd(n, m) = 1, \ \varphi(p^k) = p^k - p^{k-1}$$

$$\forall x \in \mathbb{Z}_n^* \quad x^{\varphi(n)} \equiv_n 1, \ x^{-1} \equiv_n x^{\varphi(n)-1}$$

$$\mathbf{CRT} \ X = (\sum M_i M_i' x_i) \mod N, \ M_i = \frac{N}{n_i}, \ M_i' = M_i^{-1} \mod n_i$$

$$\sum_{d:d|n} N_d(p)d = p^n = \deg(x^{p^n} - x)$$

$$M_d(p) = \frac{\varphi(p^n - 1)}{d}$$

Irreducibility $gcd(f(x), x^{p^h} - x), h \leq \lfloor \frac{\deg(f(x))}{2} \rfloor$

Elliptic Curves

For
$$\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}_p, p \geq 3$$
: $\Delta = 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$
 $\mathbb{E}(\mathbb{F}_p) : y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ for $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p, p \geq 3$
 $x_3 = (\frac{y_1 - y_2}{x_1 - x_2})^2 - x_1 - x_2, y_3 = (\frac{y_1 - y_2}{x_1 - x_2})(x_1 - x_3) - y_1$
 $x_4 = (\frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1})^2 - 2x_1, y_4 = -y_1 + (\frac{3x_1^2 + a}{2y_1})(x_1 - x_4)$
 $-P_1 = (x_{1, -y_1})$
 $\mathbb{E}(\mathbb{F}_{2^m}) : y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$ for $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}, \Delta = b \neq 0$
 $x_3 = (\frac{y_1 + y_2}{x_1 + x_2})^2 + (\frac{y_1 + y_2}{x_1 + x_2}) + x_1 + x_2 + a, y_3 = (\frac{y_1 + y_2}{x_1 + x_2})(x_1 + x_3) + x_3 + y_1$
 $x_4 = x_1^2 + \frac{b}{x_1^2}, y_4 = x_1^2 + (x_1 + \frac{y_1}{x_1})x_3 + x_3$
 $-P_1 = (x_1, x_1 + y_1)$

Public Key Cryptosystems

RSA

Keys
$$k_{pub} = \langle n, e \rangle$$
, $k_{priv} = \langle p, q, \varphi(n), d \rangle$
 $n = p \cdot q$, $gcd(e, \varphi(n)) = 1$, $d = e^{-1} \mod \varphi(n)$
 $c = m^{e \mod \varphi(n)} \mod n$, $m = c^{d \mod \varphi(n)} \mod n$
CRT $m_p \equiv_p c^{d \mod p-1}$, $m_q \equiv_q c^{d \mod q-1}$, $m \equiv_n m_p q(q^{-1} \mod p) + m_q p(p^{-1} \mod p)$

ElGamal

Keys
$$k_{pub} = \langle n, g, g^s \rangle$$
, $k_{priv} = \langle s \rangle$
 $ctx = \langle \gamma, \delta \rangle = \langle g^l, ptx(g^s)^l \rangle$, $ptx = \gamma^{n-s}\delta$
 $sign = \langle ptx, \langle \gamma, \delta \rangle \rangle = \langle ptx, g^l, l^{-1}(h(m) - s \cdot h(\gamma)) \mod n \rangle$
signature is valid iff $(g^s)^{h(\gamma)} \cdot \gamma^{\delta} = g^{h(ptx)}$

ECC-ElGamal

Keys
$$k_{pub} = \langle n, P, [k_{priv}]P \rangle$$
, $k_{priv} \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ $ctx = \langle \gamma, \delta \rangle = \langle [r]P, M + [r]k_{pub,B} \rangle$, $[r]k_{pub,B} = [k_{priv,B}]\gamma = [k_{priv,B}]([r]P) \rightarrow ptx = \delta - [k_{priv,B}]\gamma$

DSS-DSA

Keys
$$k_{pub} = \langle p, q, g, g^s \rangle$$
, $k_{priv} = (s)$; $q | (p-1), q = | \langle g \rangle |$

Montgomery Multiplication

$$\begin{array}{l} R^{'} \equiv R^{-1} \mod N, \ N^{'} \equiv -N^{-1} \mod R \\ \tilde{x} = \mu(x) = xR \mod N, \ n = \mu^{-1}(\tilde{x}) = \tilde{x}R^{'} \mod N \\ t^{'} = tN, \ t \equiv_b (-N_0)^{-1}x_0 \equiv_b N_0^{'}x_0 \end{array}$$

Number Theoretical Cryptanalysis

Primality test

Fermat n is composite $\implies a^{n-1} \not\equiv_n 1$ with probability $> \frac{1}{2}$ Miller-Rabin $n-1=d2^r: a^d \not\equiv_n \pm 1$ and $a^{d2^r} \not\equiv -1 \implies n$ is composite $(r \leqslant s-1)$

Factoring

Fermat $x = \lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil$, $y = x^2 - n$, until y is a perfect square y = y + 2x + 1, x = x + 1, then the factors are $x \pm \sqrt{y}$ Pollard's ρ pick a, b at random (e.g $x_0 = 2, x_i = x_{i-1}^2 + 1 \mod n$), if $gcd(a - b, n) \neq 1$ the result is a factor Pollard's p-1 p B-power-smooth, $a = 2^{B!}$, so p = gcd(a - 1, n)

DLog

BSGS
$$b=g^x \to \beta(g^{-\lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil})^i=g^j, \ x=i\lceil \sqrt{n} \rceil+j$$

Polig-Hellman for each prime factor $\eta=g^{\frac{n}{p}}, \ \gamma_i=\gamma_{i-1}g^{l_{i-1}p^{i-1}}$, $\delta_i=(\beta\gamma_i^{-1})^{\frac{n}{p^{i+1}}}, \ l_i=\log_\eta\delta_i$

Misc

Convert to power of 2 $x = 2^n \Leftrightarrow n = \frac{\ln(x)}{\ln(2)}$