




A TALE OF TWO CITIES

2010



CIVIC HEALTH IN MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST.PAUL



K John S. and James L.
Knight Foundation
Writing the Story of Transformation

LOU
FELIX
INSTITUTE
of POLITICS & GOVERNMENT
at the University of Central Florida

UF UNIVERSITY OF
FLORIDA
College of Liberal Arts & Sciences
Bob Graham Center for Public Service

The Florida Joint
Center for Citizenship
A Partnership for Florida's Civic Health

CENTER for
DEMOCRACY
and CITIZENSHIP

AUGSBURG
COLLEGE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2	PREFACE
4	SUMMARY:WHY MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL IS THE MOST ENGAGED AMERICAN CITY AND MIAMI IS THE LEAST
4	A SNAPSHOT OF MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL
8	CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL
13	DOES DEMOGRAPHY EXPLAIN THE CIVIC GAP?
13	DOES THE PERFORMANCE OF INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN THE CIVIC GAP?
15	A DIFFERENT EXPLANATION:A SPIRIT OF ADVENTUROUS EXPERIMENT: CIVIC LIFE IN THE TWIN CITIES
19	APPENDIX:THE DEMOGRAPHY OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL AND MIAMI
34	ENDNOTES

CONTRIBUTORS

Harry C. Boyte

Center for Democracy and Citizenship

Augsburg College

L. Douglas Dobson

Lou Frey Institute of Politics and Government

Florida Joint Center for Citizenship

University of Central Florida

Kei Kawashama-Ginsburg

CIRCLE

Tisch College of Citizenship Tufts University

Jonathan Knuckey

Department of Political Science

University of Central Florida

Peter Levine

CIRCLE

Tisch College of Citizenship Tufts University

We wish to express sincere appreciation to the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation for their support, without which this project would not have been possible.

PREFACE

Minneapolis-St. Paul and their suburbs have the highest level of civic engagement of any major metropolitan area, as measured by national surveys. The Miami area has the lowest level. This report explores the reasons for that gap and draws implications for civic organizations, leaders, and activists in the two metropolitan areas and elsewhere in the United States. It is the result of a collaboration among three partners: the National Conference on Citizenship, The Florida Joint Center for Citizenship, and the Center for Democracy and Citizenship at Augsburg College in Minneapolis. We have been assisted by CIRCLE (The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement) at Tufts University, whose support was made possible, in part, by a separate grant from the Corporation for National and Community Service.

The National Conference on Citizenship (NCoC) was founded in 1946 to sustain the spirit of cooperation that marked what is sometimes called “America’s greatest generation,” the generation that met the challenges of the Great Depression, built a national park system, and joined with allies to defeat fascism. In 1953 Congress granted NCoC a formal charter and charged it with the responsibility of promoting more effective citizenship in partnership with other organizations. Throughout its rich history, NCoC has worked to achieve these goals in a variety of ways, including an annual conference that brings together the leading public and private initiatives to strengthen citizenship in America.

In 2006, NCoC launched an ambitious effort to establish national indices to measure the state of America’s civic health. Developmental work on the *Civic Health Index* has been undertaken in partnership with CIRCLE, Harvard’s Saguaro Seminar: Civic Engagement in America, Civic Enterprises, and a wide range of distinguished scholars and practitioners. The *Civic Health Index* is intended to help the nation chart its progress toward building and maintaining engaged, effective, and responsible citizens.

In the 2009 Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act, Congress recognized the importance of measuring the nation’s civic condition by requiring the Corporation for Community and National Service (CNCS), in partnership with NCoC, to annually conduct a national Civic Health Assessment.¹ The Act charges the Bureau of the Census

and the Bureau of Labor Statistics with the responsibility to annually collect data to support the Assessment. Those data are collected as part of the Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey (CPS), which regularly surveys about 50,000 households and produces a national sample of more than 100,000 respondents.

In 2008, The Florida Joint Center for Citizenship—a partnership between the Lou Frey Institute of Politics and Government at the University of Central Florida and the Bob Graham Center for Public Service at the University of Florida—joined with NCoC and organizations in Ohio and California to begin the development of state-level civic monitoring systems. The first result of that partnership was *Florida’s Civic Health Index 2008*. Florida’s 2009 report continued the 2008 work and also provided a first look at the civic condition of Florida’s major metropolitan areas.² In 2009, the Center for Democracy and Citizenship at Augsburg College joined the partnership and produced Minnesota’s first *Civic Health Index* report.³

Findings from both the Minnesota and Florida reports were consistent with the CNCS reports on volunteering. They all documented the relative strength of Minnesota’s civic health and the relative weakness of Florida’s. On most indicators Minnesota ranked at or near the top while Florida ranked near the bottom.

The result of Florida’s 2009 examination of metro areas within the state was, once again, consistent with CNCS findings on volunteering rates. Communities in Florida were found to be consistently among the least engaged in the nation. In fact, the Miami metropolitan area generally ranked at or near the bottom on all indicators of citizen involvement. Metropolitan Minneapolis-St. Paul, in sharp contrast, ranked at or near the top.

This report is a continuation of our collective efforts to document and understand the civic condition of our nation and its communities. Our goal is straightforward: to provide a comparative analysis of the factors that shape citizen involvement in the most and least engaged large urban communities in the nation. We are hopeful that our work will contribute to community discussions about citizen engagement and ways in which it might be strengthened.

DATA RESOURCES


Data reported here derive from two primary resources: the Current Population Survey (CPS), collected by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, and data from the Knight Foundation's three-year study, "The Soul of the Community." Knight Foundation data were collected by the Gallup Organization.

The CPS collects primarily labor force data about the civilian non-institutional population living in the United States. Interviews are generally obtained from more than 50,000 households producing an unweighted sample size in excess of 100,000 respondents. Volunteer Supplement questions are asked in September of each year and Voting Supplement questions are asked in November. The sample universe includes persons aged 15 years or older.

In this report, subsamples for the Miami and Minneapolis Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) are utilized. Data on volunteering, community engagement, charitable giving, group participation, and connections to social networks are based on pooled 2008 and 2009 samples of more than 2,500 respondents in the Miami MSA and more than 3,000 respondents in the Minneapolis MSA. Data on voting, non-electoral participation, and attending to politics are based on the 2008 sample only. The 2008 Miami sample included just over 1,700 respondents. The Minneapolis sample included just over 2,000 respondents. The Census Bureau weights sample data to match estimated population totals.

Knight Foundation data used in this report included probability samples of Miami and Palm Beach, Florida, and St. Paul, Minnesota. Sample sizes are 1007, 411, and 1035, respectively.

Unless otherwise noted, data reported here are for the three-county Miami MSA and the 11-county Minneapolis MSA.



SUMMARY:

WHY MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL IS THE MOST ENGAGED AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND MIAMI IS THE LEAST

The annual Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics, represents the most ambitious effort in the history of the United States to measure “civic engagement.” It provides data on volunteering, voting, membership in voluntary groups and associations, exchanging favors with neighbors, use of the news media, discussion of current events, and everyday forms of sociability, such as entertaining friends. These are measures of civic health, social capital, or the strength of civil society. In much previous research, they have been found to predict the performance of public institutions, the economic success of communities, and even individuals’ health and well-being.⁴

According to these measures, Minneapolis-St. Paul is the most civically engaged metropolitan area in the United States; Miami is the least engaged. The two metropolitan areas differ in many other ways, too: in the demographics of their populations, the history of their development, and even their climate and location. But this study will show that demographics cannot explain the differences in their civic engagement. For example, in both communities (as elsewhere in the United States), people with more education and income tend to engage more in civic affairs. But individuals in Minneapolis-St. Paul who are in the lowest income group are more likely to volunteer, attend public meetings, work with neighbors, participate in politics outside of elections, and participate in associations than are people in the wealthiest tier in Miami. An individual with a high school education in Minneapolis-St. Paul is about as likely to be engaged as an individual with a college education in Miami. That means that the somewhat higher levels of income and educational attainment in the Twin Cities cannot explain why that community is so much more civically engaged.

The CPS does not measure everything. It is not designed to tell us about the content of civic experiences: what people do when they volunteer or join groups. Nor does it reveal their values, motivations, and goals. Finally, it measures only unpaid, voluntary acts, from voting to volunteering. People can also be active citizens as part of their paid work. To name just one example, the Minneapolis Police Department won the 2009 International Association of Chiefs of Police/CISCO Community Policing Award for large cities. Its prize citation noted Minneapolis’ 30 years of experience with community policing. In community policing, police officers work with civic groups and citizens to develop local strategies to prevent crime.⁵ Police officers



collaborating with citizens as part of their jobs is not measured as “civic engagement” by surveys (such as the CPS) that focus only on unpaid efforts.

In this report, we argue that the civic gap between Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami cannot be explained simply in terms of economic or demographic differences, but reflects divergent attitudes toward citizenship and public work that permeate these metropolitan areas’ institutions (public, nonprofit, and private) and that cause them to use different strategies and practices on a daily basis. In short, the civic culture of Minneapolis-St. Paul is oriented toward enlisting and empowering diverse people—paid employees as well as volunteers—in the common work of shaping the area’s future without abandoning their own cultural backgrounds and values. This culture of civic empowerment generates a widespread sense of optimism that people *can* shape their common future. Those norms are less evident in the Miami area, which appears to be more balkanized and less reliant on citizens to create a common future.


A SNAPSHOT OF MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL

Miami grew out of the Great Freeze of 1894–1895. While crops across the state succumbed to the temperature, citrus groves in Miami survived. After the freeze, Julia Tuttle, an Ohio-born citrus farmer, was able to convince Henry Flagler to extend the terminus of his Florida East Coast Railroad to Miami. With Flagler’s support, Miami was officially incorporated in 1896 with population of just over 300 people. By the time that incorporation took place, St. Paul was already nearly a half-century old and Minneapolis was a 30-year-old Midwestern metropolis. The region that is now the Twin Cities

metro area already had a population of almost 600,000 (Figure 1). Today, Miami is the eighth largest metropolitan region in the nation with a population in excess of 5.5 million and Minneapolis-St. Paul is the 17th largest with a population of 3.2 million.

The Twin Cities experienced a relatively constant growth throughout the 20th Century. Miami's growth was relatively modest for the first 50 years following its founding. In the post-World War II era, fueled by retirees in search of a warmer climate and lower taxes, entrepreneurs in search of opportunities and, ultimately, refugees seeking safe haven, Miami's growth was nothing short of explosive. During the last half of the 20th Century, Miami grew from a southern tourist and retiree destination into an international city that is one of the most diverse in the nation.


FIGURE 1: MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST.PAUL POPULATION 1900-2009



Source: U. S. Census Bureau, Historic Population Counts. 2009 estimates are from U. S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2009

Immigration has made an important contribution to the growth and development of both Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami. In Minneapolis-St. Paul, much of that immigration occurred in the last half of the 19th Century. Spurred by the need for settlers and workers, the state and the railroad companies created immigration recruitment offices to bring new settlers from Europe. By the time of the 1900 census, 29% of Minnesotans were foreign born and a majority of the remainder had at least one, and in most cases, two foreign-born parents.⁶ Minnesota ranked seventh among the states in the percentage of its population that was foreign born. By the turn of the century, the large waves of immigration from Germany, Sweden, and Norway were substantially complete and the process of acculturation was well underway; more than three-quarters of the state's immigrants had been naturalized and most spoke English. In recent years, Minnesota has experienced a modest increase in immigration, most notably from Asia and Latin America. In 2009, about two-thirds (64.5%) of Minneapolis residents were native born and another quarter had relocated to the area from another state. Fewer than one out of ten (8.8%) were foreign born (Figure 2).

FIGURE 2: MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST.PAUL PLACE OF BIRTH



Source: U. S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2006-2009.

The immigration experience in Miami has been more recent and, in many ways, more complex than in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Until the 1960s, Miami looked very much like a traditional southern city that did not necessarily welcome minorities with open arms. It was a city "... in which blacks were denied most basic rights: whites, including the police and the Klu Klux Klan, could harass and even kill blacks with impunity. Blacks could not swim in the ocean or in the public parks. They could not eat at the downtown lunch counters."⁷


Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, the large-scale influx of Cuban immigrants, many of whom were well-educated land and business owners in Cuba, began a process that would transform Miami. A first wave of Cuban immigration brought about 250,000 refugees to the United States by 1964. Beginning in 1965, Freedom flights transported an additional 300,000 Cubans to the United States by the early 1970's. These first two waves "... laid the foundation for a viable economic enclave in South Florida. The economic enclave founded by middle class Cubans in these two cohorts accommodated all subsequent arrivals from Cuba and served as a magnet for immigrants from all over Latin America."⁸ In 1980, the opening of the Port of Mariel provided an opportunity for another 125,000 to seek refuge. Cubans in this last wave of immigration had grown up in post-revolutionary Cuba and generally were not of the same middle- and upper-class status as earlier waves. The resulting South Florida Hispanic community served as a haven for refugees fleeing conflicts throughout the Caribbean, including Haitians, Columbians, and Nicaraguans.

Today, Miami is truly a global city and, in many ways, it looks more like mid-21st Century America than anywhere else in the country.⁹ More than a third (36.9%) of Miami's residents are foreign born and fewer than a third (30.5%) are native to the state (Figure 3). The vast majority (85.2%) of Miami's 2 million foreign-born citizens were, of course, born in Latin America and not quite half (47.5%) have been through the naturalization process. That means that more than a million Miami residents (about 20%) are not citizens. In Minneapolis-St. Paul, about 150,000 of the 280,000 foreign born are not U. S. citizens—just under 5% of the metro area.

As will be true for the U. S. at mid-century, non-Hispanic whites are no longer a majority in Miami. At about 38% each, the metro area is evenly divided between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites. At 19.2%, there is also a substantial minority of blacks from throughout the Caribbean and African Americans. This picture stands in sharp contrast to Minneapolis-St. Paul, where eight out of ten (81.6%) residents are non-Hispanic white, and African Americans are the largest minority group at 6.3% of the population.


The Cuban and Haitian enclaves in Miami, along with other Hispanic communities, have important implications for the acculturation process. As Perez (1992) notes, the Cuban enclave is institutionally complete. "Cubans in Miami can, if they wish, literally live out their lives within the ethnic community. . . . The existence of the enclave also has evident implications for the process of acculturation. The completeness of the enclave has the effect of slowing down that process, for it tends to insulate the immigrant from the 'dominant' society and culture, allowing for the retention of the culture of origin."¹⁰ At the same time, the Cuban enclave, in particular, has provided significant economic opportunities for newly arriving immigrants and it has served as the core of the political success that the Cuban community has enjoyed in South Florida. One indicator of the strength and completeness of the Hispanic enclave is language. More than 2.6 million (48.7%) of the metro-area's residents speak a language other than English at home. More than a million (23.3%) do not speak English very well (Figure 4). In contrast, 12%—about 380,000—of Minneapolis-St. Paul residents speak a language other than English at home and 5.2%—about 160,000—do not speak it very well.

FIGURE 3: MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST.PAUL RACE



Source: U. S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2006-2009.

FIGURE 4: MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST.PAUL LANGUAGE SPOKEN AT HOME



Differences in patterns of immigration and ethnicity in Miami and Minneapolis-St. Paul are reflected in the income and educational characteristics of the two communities. As Figure 5 shows, Minneapolis-St. Paul residents have higher levels of educational attainment than Miami residents. In Miami, 8.4% have less than a 9th grade education and almost one out of five (17.6%) do not have a high school diploma. Only 3% of Minneapolis-St. Paul residents have less than a 9th grade education and only 7.4% have less than a high school degree. At the other end of the educational spectrum, more than a third (37%) of Minneapolis-St. Paul residents have a college degree while only just over a quarter (28.8%) of Miami residents are college graduates.

Since education provides opportunities for income, it is not surprising that incomes are higher in Minneapolis-St. Paul than in Miami. In fact, the annual median family income in Minneapolis-St. Paul (\$82,448) is more than \$20,000 higher than that of Miami (\$59,104). It is also worth noting there is greater income disparity in Miami than in Minneapolis-St. Paul. According to a study published by the DC Fiscal Policy Institute, out of 40 large U.S. metropolitan areas examined, Miami ranks third highest in terms of income inequality, behind Washington, D.C. and Atlanta, GA.¹¹ The U.S. Census Bureau's 2007 American Community Survey shows Miami has a higher level of income inequality than the nation as a whole and Minneapolis-St. Paul has less inequality than both Miami and the nation. Poverty

FIGURE 5: MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST.PAUL EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT





FIGURE 6: MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST.PAUL POVERTY RATE



levels also are considerably higher in Miami than in Minneapolis-St. Paul (Figure 6). About 13% of Miami residents had earnings below the poverty level in 2009, compared with 8.6% in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Children under five years of age and seniors over 65 in Miami had poverty rates that were on the order of double those in Minnesota.

It is important to note that there are significant differences between communities that comprise the Miami metropolitan area. The region is not homogeneous. Community differences arise from at least two important factors. The first is the concentration of Hispanic immigrants and African Americans within the city of Miami. The second is a large-scale, “class-selective” white-flight that took place in the city of Miami and outlying Dade County beginning in the 1980s. White-flight was a reaction to multiple race riots that broke out in response to police shootings in the 1980s as well as continued immigration following the exodus from Haiti and the Mariel boatlift. During the 1980s, Miami-Dade County lost almost a third of its native white population. This, of course, contributed to income disparity in the city. “Non-Hispanic white laborers and production workers left in great numbers, while higher-class workers, notably executives and managers, remained or moved into Dade County.”¹²

As a result of these dynamics, population characteristics within the region are sharply different. For example, more than half of Miami-Dade County is foreign born compared with about 30% in adjacent Broward County and only 22% in Palm Beach. The vast majority (70%) of Miami-Dade County residents speak a language other than English and more than a third (35%) do not speak English very well. In Broward County, half that number (35%) speaks a language other than English at home and in Palm Beach only about 26% do so. Income and education are sharply different as well; Miami-Dade County families earned about \$51,000 in 2009, compared with about \$65,000 in Broward County and almost \$66,000 in Palm Beach. In Miami-Dade County, almost one out of every four residents (23.2%) does not have a high school degree. These differences are an important part of understanding patterns of civic engagement within the metropolitan region.

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL

Prior to the passage of the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act, the U.S. Bureau of Census collected information on a rather limited range of civic engagement indicators. Beginning in 2008, a number of new indicators were piloted in the Current Population Survey and, in 2009, several of those indicators were retained. Thus, we are able to report here on several aspects of civic engagement including registration and voting, non-electoral political participation, volunteering, community participation and charitable giving, attending to politics and public affairs, and the extent to which people connect to social networks that surround them. Specific indicators included in this report are as follows:

REGISTRATION AND VOTING

- Registered to vote in 2008
- Voted in the 2008 Presidential election

NON-ELECTORAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

- Took part in a march, rally, or demonstration
- Attended a meeting where political issues were discussed
- Bought or boycotted a product or service because of the company’s social or political values
- Contacted or visited a public official
- Donated to or worked for a party or candidate

VOLUNTEERING, COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, AND CHARITABLE GIVING

- Volunteered
- Worked with neighbors to fix a problem in the community
- Attended a meeting in which there was a discussion of community affairs
- Participated in at least one community group
- Donated at least \$25 to a charitable cause

ATTENDING TO POLITICS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS

- Discussed politics with family and friends
- Extent to which news was followed through
 - Television
 - Newspapers
 - Radio
 - Magazines
 - Other internet resources

CONNECTING TO SOCIAL NETWORKS

- Eating dinner with household members
- Communicating with family and friends using the internet
- Talking with neighbors
- Exchanging favors with neighbors

Results for Miami and Minneapolis-St. Paul as well as national results are shown in Figures 7 through 11. The Twin Cities are ahead of Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach on virtually all measures of civic engagement, often by a large margin. Minneapolis-St. Paul residents, for example, contacted public officials at rates more than three times higher than did residents of Miami (Figure 8). They worked with neighbors on community issues, attended community meetings, and volunteered at rates that were more than double the engagement rates in Miami (Figure 9). On all measures of direct citizen involvement, the Twin Cities are well above the United States average, whereas Miami is well below.

Voting and registration shows a somewhat different pattern (Figure 7). While South Florida citizens register and vote at rates that are lower than the Twin Cities, they reach the U. S. average in voter registration and, in 2008, they slightly exceeded the U. S. voter-turnout rate. This result is very likely indicative of Hispanic – particularly Cuban – engagement in the electoral process in South Florida. Solidly Republican, the Cuban vote has helped to elect a Cuban majority on the Miami city council, a significant number of Cuban representatives in the state legislature, Cuban members of the U.S. House of Representatives, and two Cuban U. S. Senators. Once again, while South Florida electoral participation levels remain below those of Minneapolis-St. Paul and other measures of civic engagement are quite low relative to both Minneapolis-St. Paul and the nation, Miami citizens are more engaged in elections than any other form of civic participation.

Miami citizens also report discussing politics with friends and neighbors at rates that are higher than the United States average and slightly higher than Minneapolis-St. Paul (Figure 10). This result is undoubtedly related to the fact that these data were collected in November 2008 immediately following the Obama election. As an important swing state, Florida, in general, and South Florida, in particular, drew a great deal of campaign attention in both the primaries and the general election. Given the constant stream of media and candidates in the region and the focus of the Hispanic community on the electoral process, it is probably not surprising that people were talking about politics at rates that exceeded national and even Twin City rates.

In the same context, Miami residents show relatively high rates of attention to television, radio, and magazine news sources. In addition

to the heat of the 2008 presidential race, these results probably reflect the robust character of the Spanish-language press in Miami. Finally, we note that Twin Cities residents appear to have somewhat stronger social networks than do residents of Miami (Figure 11). More of them have meals with other members of their households, use the Internet to connect with family and friends, and talk to neighbors than is true for Miami. The single exception is exchanging favors with neighbors, which Miami residents are slightly more likely to do, compared to Minneapolis-St. Paul residents.

FIGURE 7: REGISTRATION AND VOTING 2008




FIGURE 8: NON-ELECTORAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION




FIGURE 9: VOLUNTEERING, COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, AND CHARITABLE GIVING




FIGURE 10: ATTENDING TO POLITICS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS





FIGURE 11: CONNECTING TO SOCIAL NETWORKS



Earlier in this report, we noted that the concentration of Hispanics in the city of Miami together with non-Hispanic white abandonment of Miami and the outlying county has produced significant patterns of demographic variation across the communities that comprise the Miami metropolitan area. The civic consequences of that variation are demonstrated in Table 1, where we show results for each of the civic engagement measures for Miami-Dade County, Broward County, and Palm Beach County, respectively. With the exception of voting and discussing politics, the urban core of the Miami metro area shows rates of civic engagement that are two to four times lower than the outlying counties.

Once again, reflecting the strong electoral focus of the Cuban community, registration and voting rates and rates of discussing politics in Miami-Dade County are the highest in the metro area. Reinforcing the earlier observation about the robustness of the Spanish-language media in Miami, we note the high levels of attention to radio and to news magazines in Miami-Dade compared to other regions of the metro area.

We hasten to underscore the fact that even the most engaged communities within the Miami metropolitan region remain far below the engagement rates found in Minneapolis-St. Paul. But the point is that the combination of low education, high poverty, a large non-citizen population, and perhaps, civic values that focus on the electoral process to the exclusion of other avenues of engagement all come together at Miami's urban core to produce significantly lower levels of civic engagement. As we shall note below, additional evidence suggests that the relative strengths and weaknesses of community institutions associated with civic engagement may also contribute to the low levels of engagement in Miami's urban center.



TABLE I CIVIC ENGAGEMENT WITHIN THE MIAMI METROPOLITAN REGION

	MIAMI-DADE COUNTY	BROWARD COUNTY	PALM BEACH COUNTY
REGISTRATION AND VOTING			
Registered to Vote	78%	67%	68%
Voted in 2008	72%	63%	62%
VOLUNTEERING, COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, AND CHARITABLE GIVING			
Worked with neighbors to address a community issue	3%	7%	7%
Attended Public Meeting	3%	6%	9%
Volunteered	11%	16%	24%
Participated in at least one community group	6%	15%	26%
Donated at least \$25 to charity	33%	40%	49%
NON-ELECTORAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION			
Taken part in a march, rally, or demonstration	1%	3%	1%
Attended political issues meeting	4%	6%	7%
Bought or boycotted a product or service	2%	6%	7%
Contacted public official	3%	9%	5%
Donated/worked for candidate or party	7%	10%	12%
ATTENDING TO POLITICS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS			
Discuss politics at least a few times a week	63%	45%	43%
Get news from television at least a few times a week	87%	97%	88%
Get news from a newspaper at least a few times a week	55%	65%	73%
Get news from radio at least a few times a week	68%	52%	41%
Get news from other Internet sources at least a few times a week	20%	20%	30%
Get news from a news magazine at least a few times a week	30%	13%	17%
CONNECTING TO SOCIAL NETWORKS			
Eat dinner with household members at least a few times a week	82%	90%	91%
Communicate with family/friends using email or Internet at least a few times a week	47%	58%	56%
Talk with neighbors at least a few times a week	34%	50%	66%
Exchange favors with neighbors at least a few times a week	15%	20%	27%

DOES DEMOGRAPHY EXPLAIN THE CIVIC GAP?

Given the enormous differences in the demographics—income, race and ethnicity, age, country of origin, immigration history, and education—between the Twin Cities and Miami, it would be reasonable to expect that demographic differences explain the gaps in civic engagement. Indeed, previous research by NCoC and many others has found that people are more likely to engage in the ways measured by the CPS if they have higher incomes and more education, if they are native-born rather than immigrants, if they are white or African American rather than Latino, and if they are older.¹³

We have analyzed the relationship between such demographic variables and civic engagement in the two metropolitan areas featured in this report. Details are presented in the Appendix. To summarize the results: demographics do correlate with civic engagement in the expected ways in these two cities, but demographic differences between Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami do not come close to explaining the civic engagement gap between those two areas. Some illustrative facts support that case:

- Across virtually all of the civic engagement indicators (the exceptions were attending to public affairs, donating to charity, and voting) an individual with a high school education in Minneapolis-St. Paul was about as likely to be engaged as an individual with a college education in Miami.
- Across all income levels, individuals in Minneapolis-St. Paul were more likely to report having participated in civic engagement activities than in Miami. Indeed, for five of the items (volunteering, attending public meetings, working with neighbors, non-electoral participation, and group participation), individuals in Minneapolis-St. Paul in the lowest income group were *more likely* to report having engaged in the activity than individuals in Miami in the highest income group.
- Native-born citizens in Miami were less likely to report participating in each civic activity (except for attending to public affairs) than native-born citizens in Minneapolis-St. Paul.
- In Minneapolis-St. Paul, older people were considerably more likely to engage in civic acts than young adults. In Miami, for some of the civic activities (such as volunteering) there was virtually no evidence of growth over the life course.
- In both cities, non-Hispanic whites generally had higher levels of civic engagement than minority groups. However, non-Hispanic whites in Miami were less civically engaged than non-Hispanic whites in Minneapolis-St. Paul (the one exception being attending to public affairs).

These findings and others presented in the Appendix suggest that something beyond demographic differences must underlie the gap in civic engagement between the two metropolitan areas.

DOES THE PERFORMANCE OF INSTITUTIONS EXPLAIN THE CIVIC GAP?

Previous research finds that public institutions work better and are more popular and trusted in communities where civic engagement is stronger.¹⁴ That relationship could arise because effective and trustworthy public institutions make residents want to engage, because engaged citizens make institutions work better; or perhaps for other reasons (such as underlying cultural or economic factors).

The Knight Foundation's *Soul of the Community* survey tested attitudes toward government and community institutions generally in St. Paul, Palm Beach, and Miami.¹⁵ Levels of trust and satisfaction were much higher in St. Paul than in Miami, with Palm Beach in between (Minneapolis was not surveyed in the Knight study). For example, 42% of St. Paul citizens generally trusted the local government, compared with just 24% of Miamians. Thirty-two percent of St. Paul citizens felt the leaders of their community represented their interests, compared with just 18% of Miamians. Satisfaction with police, schools, and parks was much higher in St. Paul than in either of the South Florida cities, and St. Paul citizens were more satisfied with their fellow residents' sociability and caring for one another (see Table 2).



TABLE 2 CITIZEN ASSESSMENTS OF THEIR COMMUNITY: MIAMI, PALM BEACH, AND ST. PAUL

	MIAMI, FL	PALM BEACH, FL	ST. PAUL, MN
OVERALL SATISFACTION WITH THE COMMUNITY			
Taking everything into account, how satisfied are you with this community as a place to live? (Percent "satisfied" or "extremely satisfied")	50%	67%	73%
SATISFACTION WITH LOCAL SERVICES			
The availability of outdoor parks, playgrounds, and trails (Percent "good" or "very good")	60%	76%	92%
The effectiveness of local police (Percent "good" or "very good")	53%	67%	73%
The overall quality of public schools in your community (Percent "good" or "very good")	46%	49%	64%
SATISFACTION WITH OPPORTUNITIES TO BUILD SOCIAL NETWORKS			
Being a good place to meet people and make friends (Percent "good" or "very good")	55%	56%	71%
The availability of social community events (Percent "good" or "very good")	52%	64%	82%
How much people in this community care about each other (Percent "good" or "very good")	25%	36%	55%
CITIZEN ATTITUDES TOWARD LOCAL GOVERNMENT			
How much of the time do you think you can trust the local government to do what is right? (Percent saying "at least most of the time" or more)	24%	27%	42%
The leadership of the elected officials in your city (Percent "good" or "very good")	21%	30%	39%
The leaders in my community represent my interests (Percent "agree" or "strongly agree")	18%	22%	32%

Source: John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, Soul of the Community, <http://www.soulofthecommunity.org/>

TABLE 3 STRENGTH OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: MIAMI AND MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL

	NUMBER OF ACTIVE NONPROFITS PER 1000 RESIDENTS	REPORTED REVENUE PER CAPITA	REPORTED ASSETS PER CAPITA
Miami MSA	2.03	\$3,398	\$6,780
United States	3.19	\$5,656	\$12,675
Minneapolis-St. Paul MSA	3.92	\$10,739	\$33,741

Source: Internal Revenue Service, Exempt Organizations Business Master File (2010, Aug) The Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable Statistics, <http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/> ©2010

If we juxtapose these results with the CPS data on civic engagement discussed above, we see that St. Paul has more engaged citizens and more popular and trusted public institutions than Miami and Palm Beach. These surveys cannot reveal whether these results are related, but other clues help to complete the picture.

First, public institutions in the Twin Cities do not always perform better than those in South Florida. For example, the graduation rate in St. Paul high schools (Ramsey County, Minnesota) is 65.6%, and in Minneapolis it is 62.7%: virtually the same as the rate in Miami-Dade County (65.4%) and lower than that in Palm Beach (73.6%). Nevertheless, St. Paul residents rate their schools much higher than Miamians do.

Further, Twin Cities residents scored much better on two questions about civic knowledge that were included in the CPS.¹⁶ Perhaps schools do not perform much better on standard measures in Minneapolis and St. Paul than they do in the Miami metro area, but education in Minnesota is more “civic.” In other words, the Twin Cities’ schools engage adult citizens in ways that build their satisfaction and trust, the schools collaborate more with other educative institutions, and institutions do a better job of teaching specifically *civic* knowledge.

Likewise, neighborhood planning and public services such as police and parks may or may not be better in the Twin Cities than in South Florida, but clearly government and public officials in Minneapolis and St. Paul have shared power more with their citizens. St. Paul has one of the oldest and best developed systems of neighborhood governance in the United States, dating to the War on Poverty.¹⁷ More recently, Minneapolis pioneered an ambitious governance reform that devolved power to neighborhood associations whose boards must be elected in neighborhood-wide votes.¹⁸ Such reforms could have contributed to citizens’ higher level of trust in their leaders and the greater satisfaction with their neighborhoods that is reflected in the Knight study.

Finally, IRS data reveal that the infrastructure of not-for-profit institutions is much more extensive and better resourced in Minneapolis-St. Paul than it is in the Miami area. There are almost twice as many active nonprofits per capita in the Twin Cities than in the Miami area, and those in the Twin Cities have accumulated almost *five times* more financial assets, on a per capita basis (see Table 3). A strong nonprofit sector probably reflects generations of previous civic engagement and also encourages and supports current civic engagement.

In short, we hypothesize Minneapolis-St. Paul civil servants, public officials, and citizens have traditions and policies of collaboration that enhance people’s satisfaction with public institutions, leaders, and other citizens, and sustain a spirit of creativity and inclusion. That virtuous cycle is much less evident in the Miami area. Because this hypothesis is qualitative (involving the style and purpose of engagement and not just its quantity), and because it concerns long-term traditions rather than simply the contemporary situation, the CPS and Knight survey data cannot confirm it. Instead, in the next section, we offer an interpretive, historical look at civic traditions in the Twin Cities.

A DIFFERENT EXPLANATION: A SPIRIT OF ADVENTUROUS EXPERIMENT: CIVIC LIFE IN THE TWIN CITIES

“Perhaps the most attractive feature of [Minnesota], after its rare natural beauty, is its refreshing attitude toward adventurous experiment... One sees this spirit operating in the State’s cooperatives, the largest number in America. . . . With greater economic security has come a new kind of pride, and today every town of any size boasts its park, playgrounds, and scenic drives.”

—WPA Federal Writers Project Guide to Minnesota, 1938¹⁹

Compared with many communities in the nation, the Twin Cities vibrates with civic energy. Drivers bringing leaves from their yards can create traffic jams at the St. Paul compost sites in the fall. At Halloween, neighborhoods are like zany carnivals, with ghosts and goblins hanging from the trees. In election years, yard signs and posters fill the windows. People rally for candidates on street corners, and passing motorists honk their horns.

The Twin Cities area has a readily apparent civic *culture*, a spirit of “adventurous experiment” as the WPA writers guide put it decades ago, not simply scattered civic activities. The culture is in a state of constant flux and remaking. It generates a widespread sense of civic empowerment, or agency, along with the belief that people can work across differences to shape their common future.

As noted above, the Twin Cities and surrounding suburbs rank first among the nation’s metropolitan areas in rates of voluntary membership, first in voting, fourth in membership in groups, and among the top in all the major indicators measured by the CPS.



Other surveys document the patterns. The 2010 Knight Soul of Community study found that 45% of Twin Cities residents are active in school groups, neighborhood organizations, or community associations. More than 50% talk to neighbors several times a week. Civic activity is closely linked to political activity. Twenty-one percent demonstrated support for a candidate in 2009; 14.2% reported going to meetings where political issues were discussed; 18% indicated they had participated in a boycott of some sort. According to the National Research Center in 2008, 66% of Minneapolis residents say they would contact a community group if concerned about a local issue. More than a third would agree to be on a city advisory group if asked.²⁰

The numbers intimate a widely shared conviction: People feel that civic life in the Twin Cities is a relatively open landscape. The spirit of adventurous experiment translates into a belief that citizens of diverse backgrounds can contribute their civic energies and talents, and help to shape civic life as a work in progress. Head hunters' quip the Twin Cities is the hardest community to get emerging leaders to move to because of its frigid cold—and the hardest place to get people to leave.

The spirit of adventurous experiment dates back at least to statehood in 1858. "Those who grew up in Minnesota during the period immediately after the Civil War saw Minnesota emerge from a frontier state and grow into a modern commonwealth," wrote Bertha Heilbom of the Minnesota Historical Society in "Second Generation Devoted to Pursuits of Culture" for the special 75th anniversary issue of the *St. Paul Pioneer Press* commemorating statehood. She profiled, as an example, Charles M. Loring, president of the Minneapolis park board from 1883 to 1890. Loring laid the foundations for the city's system of parks. "He published articles, gave illustrated lectures, and in various other ways made clear to the people of the state the advantages of parks and civic improvement." Civic efforts spearheaded by leading citizens built libraries and schools, colleges and universities, orchestras, art galleries, theaters, and symphonies that complemented the growth of business and industry.²¹

Civic construction projects expanded through the middle years of the 20th Century, creating a large-system civic architecture that became famous across the country, suggesting the relatively strong trust of public institutions in the Twin Cities stems, in part, from the feeling that citizens created them, along with other instruments of common action. This architecture included the sanitary district of the 1930s, the airports commission in 1942, the Metropolitan Planning Commission, created by the efforts of Senator Elmer Andersen in 1957, and later the Metropolitan Regional Council. The Urban Coalition emerged out of racial protests and civil rights campaigns



in the 1960s, lasting far longer than in most cities. Public radio and public television set trends for the nation. The Twin Cities was a center of musical and cultural innovation from the 1930s on, decades before Bob Dylan got his start in coffee houses around the University of Minnesota and Garrison Keillor began his famous radio career. The cultural scene in general produced institutions well known across the country like the Guthrie Theater, the Minneapolis Institute of Art, and the Walker Arts Center. A rich array of community-rooted arts and culture programs developed alongside, including Intermedia Arts, Penumbra Theater, Migizi Communications, and others.

The spirit of adventurous experiment continues in the 21st Century. When Timothy DenHerder-Thomas visited Macalester College in St. Paul on a college tour in 2005, he felt immediately the contrast with the East Coast city where he had grown up. There, he observed, "People tend to think of themselves as consumers of society. Young people feel they don't have any agency, any power. Things just happen to them." He liked Macalester's academic program and international atmosphere but the sense of engagement in the Twin Cities impressed him the most. "It seemed to me like an active community. People actually treat things as if they can shape them, rather than react." Tim jumped into the renewable energy movement, linking college activities to the larger community.²²

Efforts of prominent civic leaders are best known, but civic life in the Twin Cities has mostly been the fruit of labors of unsung heroes and heroines who raise children, care for the elderly, earn a living, and work to build healthy communities. These labors are dramatized by immigrants to the area from around the world.

In the 19th Century, Swedish immigrants wrote thousands of "America letters." One described "the democracy that obtained in the new country. . . . Caste lines in Sweden were severely restrictive [but] here was a land where everyone was a landlord and servants sat down to table with the masters." "I am my own master, like the other creatures of God," wrote another immigrant, after two and a half years in Minnesota. "Neither is my cap worn

out from lifting it in the presence of gentlemen. There is no class distinction here between high and low, rich and poor, no make-believe, no 'title sickness' or artificial ceremonies."²³

That picture was complicated—racism and prejudices mingled with openness and opportunity. In the 1930s, Minneapolis was known as the anti-semitic capitol of the nation. But meeting grounds for diverse people to get to know each other and work on common projects also existed throughout the Twin Cities. Thus, for instance, the Twins Cities Federation of Settlements (TCFS), a group of 11 settlement houses in the 1920s and 1930s which consciously promoted values of respect and cultural interaction between immigrants and established residents. The Federation had a mission "to develop neighborhood forces, arouse neighborhood consciousness, to improve standards of living, incubate principles of sound morality, promote a spirit of civic righteousness, and to cooperate with other agencies in bettering living, working, and leisure-time conditions."²⁴ Settlement houses typically had staff living on site "in order to ensure that those employed understood the local community dynamics and undertook all their work from that vantage." They stressed working with neighborhood residents and new immigrants, rather than "ministering unto" them. According to the federation, this meant that settlements did most of their work through "the influence and power of example."²⁵

Lori Sturdevant in her biography of Harry Davis, a school-board member who was also the first black elected official in Minnesota, describes how the Phyllis Wheatley settlement house, established in 1924 by Gertrud Brown for African American immigrants coming up from the South, was a vital community meeting ground in North Minneapolis. "It is fair to say that Phyllis Wheatley Settlement House is what brought the African Americans of North Minneapolis together into a functioning community," Sturdevant writes. "The Wheatley settlement provided [blacks] with self-awareness and pride. It fostered relationships. It taught people to help one another and to raise their families in a difficult and challenging environment."²⁶ The formative experiences of Richard Green, a leading American educator who grew up in the 1940s and 1950s, illustrate. Green remembered Wheatley as a community commons full of public activities and extended relationships that shaped his vision for what public schools should be: a commons for the modern age. Like the commons of old, Green told *Minneapolis Star Tribune* reporter Kay Miller, Wheatley was "the focal point" of social life and more. It taught values of hard work, self-discipline, accountability, achievement, and giving back. "Even though we were not a community of wealth, it certainly was a community of cooperation and helping the young people grow up in a healthy manner."²⁷



In recent years, new waves of immigrants from Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America have reshaped Twin Cities' neighborhoods and the overall civic culture. The story of the Hmong illustrates this pattern.

The Hmong were a hill people who had resisted imperial authorities in China for millennia. Many migrated to Laotian and Vietnamese hill country in the early 19th Century. Fearful of communist totalitarianism when war broke out in Indochina in the 1950s, many allied with the United States in what is called the Secret War in Laos. More than 30,000 ended up fighting alongside the Americans and their allies.

After the victories of the communists in Vietnam and Laos, Hmong were targeted for re-education or extermination. Tens of thousands were killed. Many more fled their homes. Hmong immigrants to Minnesota were refugees without a land of their own. Kao Kalia Yang's highly acclaimed family memoir, *The Latehomecomer*, vividly recounts her family's story of survival in the jungles of Laos, harrowing passage across the Mekong River, life in settlement camps in Thailand, and then migration to America. "Even in the very beginning, we knew that we were looking for a home," explained Kalia Yang's father. "Other people... can look to a place in the world where they might belong. We are not like that. I knew that our chance was here... to share in a new place and a new home."²⁸ Minnesota seemed a highly unlikely destination. "Toua [my husband] and I arrived at the international airport in Minneapolis on March 15, 1976," recounted Mao Heu Thao, an early settler. "I was wearing a pair of sandals, a light shirt, and a skirt.... I was so surprised when the extreme cold greeted me at the door."²⁹ Challenges multiplied over the years. Climate, language, clothes, smells, foods, customs were unfamiliar. Most Hmong came without formal education. A written Hmong language dated only from the 1950s (ethnographers argue that Hmong learned other ways to communicate, like the intricate patterns in their beautiful hand-woven "story cloths," whose messages imperial powers could not decipher). Hmong family life, based on a strong clan system in which

elderly men were recognized heads of the household, underwent dramatic change. Women took new public roles and often became family breadwinners. Children learned English, picked up American behavior patterns, and negotiated the new environment far more easily. Divorce, gang violence, and depression, rarities in Laos, came to beset the community. In these circumstances older Hmong often despaired. "If we heard that someone has been murdered, or if someone has left the family and [is] not returning, we feel sad, but we don't have the power . . . to help resolve the issue," explained Xiong, a CIA-trained soldier, clan leader, and business owner.³⁰

Despite such difficulties, the Hmong community over the decades nonetheless came to prosper in the Twin Cities. They drew both on their own traditions of hard work, community self-help, strong commitments to education, and also from a network of support from strong allies that ranged from Catholic Charities and Lutheran Social Services to the University of Minnesota cooperative extension service. Supporters encouraged families to learn English and to find jobs which allowed them to translate mechanical and farming skills into new settings. "This was a friendlier environment for newcomers [than other parts of the country] based on the fact that we were given the opportunities to work," explained Gaoly Yang, an immigrant who created a Hmong women's empowerment project. "I recruited my sister. . . . My husband encouraged many of his relatives to move here. After learning about our lives in St. Paul, they want to settle here. So it is the Hmong people who helped and recruited each other to create their own community here."³¹

In contrast, as noted above, the Cuban community in Miami feels "institutionally complete": residents can engage only with Cuban-American associations. Moreover, as Jan Nijman argues, the shared narrative of Miami is one of economic and population growth fueled by in-migration and economic competition but not loyalty to the community as a whole. Nijman observes, "Newcomers to this city tend to experience Miami's social climate as cold and have difficulty in forging a social network that extends beyond their own ethnic group. At a different level, this lack of sociability and social control is reflected in the exceedingly large number of gated residential communities in Miami (reminiscent of some Latin American cities with their highly stratified social structure) and thriving security businesses."³²

In 1990, only 11% of Hmong [in St. Paul/Minneapolis] held high school diplomas; by 2006, Hmong American graduation rates in St. Paul reached the same level (83%) as that of white students. Many Hmong became outstanding students, in ways that fulfilled the passionate hopes which their parents voiced in family meetings, vividly described in Yang's account. New civic and political leaders also

came to prominence. Choua Lee was elected to the St. Paul school board in 1991. Mee Moua became the first Hmong member of a state legislature when she won a seat in the state senate in 2002.

Official census figures in 2000 showed a growth rate of 135% over the decade of the 1990s, to 41,800, though community leaders and service organizations insist that as many as 70,000 Hmong lived in the Twin Cities by that year. The numbers continued to climb through the 2000s.³³

Pekou Hang, a prominent political activist from one of the early arriving families, insists that the story of the Hmong and their allies was of crucial importance to the flourishing of the Hmong. Former CIA and military comrades of the Hmong living in Minnesota, along with political allies like Congressman Bruce Vento and Senator Paul Wellstone, helped the community "craft a public narrative that made an enormous difference," she explained. "The Hmong people were U.S. allies, fighting for their own freedom, not mercenaries or victims."³⁴ Further, they were allies betrayed. The CIA had gone back on its promise of expedited citizenship.

Lee Vang, a Hmong play writer, wrote *Hmong! The CIA's Secret Army*, which first appeared on stage in 1999. That same year, Hmong leaders in St. Paul—many students in area colleges—enlisted family networks and friends, Hmong and non-Hmong alike, across the nation in an organizing campaign to secure passage of the Hmong Veterans Recognition Bill. The bill, passed with the strong advocacy of Vento and Wellstone, granted the status earlier awarded other U.S. allies. By the 2000s, the Twin Cities was known as the "Harlem Renaissance" of Hmong cultural and intellectual life, likened to the black intellectual and cultural center during the 1920s and 1930s.

Each July, the Hmong Freedom Celebration brings tens of thousands of new immigrants and their native-born American friends together for three days in Como, a large park in St. Paul. Dozens of soccer teams play round the clock. The smells of Hmong cooking fill the air. Extended families gather for conversation, story-telling, and celebrations. Children play traditional Hmong games with cousins, alternating with American-style games, showing off their twirling skills at the same time. Adults spend much of their time discussing key social and political issues facing the Hmong community, sometimes coming to decisions. The event is dedicated to the concept of "freedom," at the heart of Hmong culture. It refreshes the idea for native residents on the Fourth of July. They also lend it the positive meanings which it held for earlier generations—not simply freedom from oppression but also freedom to create a common civic life.

The story of the success of the Hmong in Minnesota illustrates the continuing vitality of a civic culture of empowerment. Such a culture, in turn, suggests important innovations in the theory

and practice of the civic field and civic engagement generally. For decades, scholars have pointed to trends such as technocracy, narrowing understandings of professionalism, and marketplace assumptions that detach schools, nonprofits, businesses, even government agencies from the life of communities. In a recent study for the Kettering Foundation, for instance, Richard Harwood and John Creighton found that even leaders of nonprofits with strong community-serving missions, such as strengthening local schools and helping vulnerable children, feel enormous pressures to turn inward, define success in terms of narrow definitions of service delivery, and avoid genuine partnerships with lay citizens in their work. Derek Barker, terming such dynamics the “colonization of civil society,” has described how intellectuals have assumed these trends to be an irreversible, one-way process. But as Barker points out, there are counter examples of institutions “realigning their identities and routines with the habits and civic norms of communities.”³⁵ The spirit of adventurous experiment in the Twin Cities—a vital, empowering civic culture—is full of such examples, with lessons for civic renewal in communities everywhere.

APPENDIX: THE DEMOGRAPHY OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL AND MIAMI

The findings presented in this Appendix help explain how a variety of socio-economic and demographic factors affect patterns of civic engagement. Specifically, we examine which groups are more or less likely to exhibit patterns of civic engagement, and how these differences manifest themselves in Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami. We examine different patterns of civic engagement across different demographic groups. Furthermore, because many of the demographic groups we examine may overlap with each other we also estimate the separate effect of each demographic group while we simultaneously control for the effects of all other group characteristics.³⁶

EDUCATION

Level of educational attainment has long been considered a strong predictor of civic engagement. In both Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami, individuals are more likely to be civically engaged as level of educational attainment increases (Appendix Table 1). However, the overall effect of education on levels of civic engagement differs quite dramatically when comparing Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami. Specifically, higher levels of education in Minneapolis-St. Paul are

considerably more likely to boost civic engagement than in Miami. For example, a majority of the college educated in Minneapolis-St. Paul reported engaging in seven of the nine civic engagement activities (volunteering, donating to charity, non-electoral participation, group participation, attending to public affairs, voting, and being connected to a social network). In contrast, a majority of college educated in Miami reported being engaged in only four of the indicators (donating, attending to public affairs, voting, and being socially connected).


An additional means of demonstrating the more muted effects of education on civic engagement in Miami is to compare college educated in Miami with those individuals in Minneapolis-St. Paul who graduated high school but did not attend college. Across virtually all of the civic engagement indicators (the exceptions were attending to public affairs, donating to charity, and voting), an individual with a high school education in Minneapolis-St. Paul was about as likely to be engaged as an individual with a college education in Miami. That is, the difference in the percentage reporting to have participated in the activity was no more than five percentage points on six of the civic engagement indicators. This illustrates the more general point about the overall higher levels of civic engagement in Minneapolis-St. Paul (except for attending to public affairs), irrespective of the level of education an individual attained.



Given that education may overlap with the other demographic variables, especially income and race/ethnicity, it is important to determine whether the strong effects found for education hold up when we take into account other variables. In fact they do. In both Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami, education exerted a statistically significant effect on *all* of the civic engagement indicators even after controlling for the other demographic variables. However, again, there are important differences evident when comparing both cities. First, in Minneapolis-St. Paul, education had the *largest effect* of any of the variables on six of the nine civic indicators (volunteering, non-electoral participation, group participation, attending to public affairs, voting, and being connected to a social network). While education also had a statistically significant effect on every civic engagement indicator in Miami, it only had the largest effect on three of the items (group participation, attending to public affairs, and being socially connected). And in two cases (group participation and attending to public affairs) education barely beat the second most important demographic variable.

Second, the net effect of education was much greater in Minneapolis-St. Paul than in Miami. The net effect is the difference in the predicted probability of engaging in each activity for an individual with the highest and lowest levels of education while all other variables are held constant at their mean values (see Appendix Figure 1). In other words, the net effect shows us how two individuals who are alike in every way, except for having different levels of educational attainment, differ in terms of their levels of civic engagement. For Minneapolis-St. Paul this net effect of education was smallest for working with neighbors to fix problems in the neighborhood (a 13 percentage point difference between highest and lowest levels of education) and was largest for non-electoral participation (a 66 percentage point difference). Across all nine civic indicators, the average net effect is 31 percentage points. For Miami, the net effects of education were smallest for attending a public meeting and working with neighbors (3 percentage point difference) and highest for being connected to a social network (36 percentage point difference). For Miami, the average net effect of education across all nine indicators was 15 percentage points, and on only one item (being connected to a social network) was the effect of education greater in Miami than in Minneapolis-St. Paul.

APPENDIX FIGURE 1 NET EFFECTS OF EDUCATION AFTER CONTROLLING FOR OTHER VARIABLES



Bars show the difference in the predicted probability of engaging in each activity for highest and lowest education categories while holding all other variables constant at their mean values.

APPENDIX TABLE I CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND EDUCATION

CIVIC ACTIVITY	LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL	HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE	SOME COLLEGE	COLLEGE GRADUATE
VOLUNTEERED				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	9%	13%	13%	23%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	24%	20%	34%	51%
United States	13%	17%	27%	40%
ATTENDED PUBLIC MEETINGS ON COMMUNITY ISSUES				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	3%	4%	4%	10%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	5%	7%	14%	20%
United States	3%	6%	10%	18%
WORKED WITH NEIGHBORS TO FIX SOMETHING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	2%	5%	4%	8%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	6%	8%	11%	18%
United States	4%	6%	9%	15%
DONATED AT LEAST \$25 TO CHARITY				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	19%	34%	41%	56%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	28%	48%	63%	79%
United States	25%	43%	54%	71%
PERFORMED AT LEAST ONE NON-ELECTORAL ACTIVITY				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	3%	11%	14%	23%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	7%	20%	35%	53%
United States	9%	17%	29%	42%
PARTICIPATED IN AT LEAST ONE COMMUNITY GROUP				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	12%	16%	20%	35%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	16%	33%	42%	61%
United States	17%	26%	38%	52%
FREQUENTLY ATTENDED TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	30%	41%	52%	57%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	17%	32%	36%	52%
United States	19%	31%	41%	51%
VOTED IN 2008				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	30%	45%	59%	64%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	38%	57%	73%	81%
United States	30%	51%	65%	73%
FREQUENTLY CONNECTED WITH A SOCIAL NETWORK				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	39%	58%	79%	75%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	60%	71%	81%	86%
United States	51%	63%	73%	80%

- Percentages shown are the percent of residents who reported having participated in the activity.

- For volunteering, attending public meeting, working with neighbors, and donating to charity, percentages are for residents aged 16 and older. For all the other civic engagement items, percentages are for residents aged 18 and older.

INCOME


Along with education, family income reflects a second social status variable that has been shown to affect civic engagement. The findings for Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami confirm that civic engagement increases as income rises. However, mirroring the findings across the cities for level of educational attainment, the effect of income on civic engagement in Miami is much less evident than in Minneapolis-St. Paul (Appendix Table 2). At all income levels, individuals in Minneapolis-St. Paul were more likely to report having engaged in the civic engagement activities than in Miami. Indeed, for five of the items (volunteering, attending public meetings, working with neighbors, non-electoral participation, and group participation) individuals in Minneapolis-St. Paul in the lowest income group were *more likely* to report having engaged in the activity than individuals in Miami in the highest income group. This pattern is noticeable even in an item like voting, where an income gap is often evident; individuals in the *highest income group* in Miami were only 6 percentage points more likely to have reported voting than those in the *lowest income group* in Minneapolis-St. Paul.

Interestingly, when the separate effects of income are examined, statistical significance for some of the civic engagement items is achieved, suggesting the effects of income, in some cases, can be



explained away by other demographic variables, most likely level of education. Specifically, income has an effect only on four of the civic engagement items for Minneapolis-St. Paul (volunteering, donating to charity, voting, and being connected to a social network) and four for Miami (volunteering, donating to charity, attending to public affairs, and voting). Income had the largest effect for Minneapolis-St. Paul for volunteering, while it had the biggest effect on voting for Miami. Its effects on donating to charity were almost identical in both cities (Appendix Figure 2).

**APPENDIX FIGURE 2
NET EFFECTS OF INCOME AFTER CONTROLLING FOR OTHER VARIABLES**



- Bars show the difference in the predicted probability of engaging in each activity for highest and lowest income categories while holding all other variables constant at their mean values

APPENDIX TABLE 2 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND FAMILY INCOME

CIVIC ACTIVITY	LESS THAN \$35,000	\$35,000 TO \$49,999	\$50,000 TO \$74,999	\$75,000 OR MORE
VOLUNTEERED				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	8%	13%	19%	24%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	25%	34%	37%	46%
United States	16%	23%	28%	37%
ATTENDED PUBLIC MEETINGS ON COMMUNITY ISSUES				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	4%	6%	6%	9%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	10%	18%	13%	16%
United States	6%	9%	11%	16%
WORKED WITH NEIGHBORS TO FIX SOMETHING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	3%	6%	5%	8%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	12%	15%	10%	14%
United States	6%	8%	10%	14%
DONATED AT LEAST \$25 TO CHARITY				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	26%	38%	39%	59%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	44%	66%	64%	75%
United States	35%	49%	56%	68%
PERFORMED AT LEAST ONE NON-ELECTORAL ACTIVITY				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	13%	13%	16%	18%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	35%	24%	36%	41%
United States	19%	25%	29%	38%
PARTICIPATED IN AT LEAST ONE COMMUNITY GROUP				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	17%	17%	18%	32%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	40%	46%	40%	54%
United States	26%	33%	38%	48%
FREQUENTLY ATTENDED TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	39%	39%	46%	63%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	35%	27%	43%	48%
United States	28%	36%	41%	49%
VOTED IN 2008				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	45%	47%	64%	70%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	64%	72%	75%	82%
United States	49%	59%	66%	74%
FREQUENTLY CONNECTED WITH A SOCIAL NETWORK				
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	54%	74%	58%	76%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	74%	68%	74%	88%
United States	60%	66%	71%	79%

- Percentages shown are the percent of residents who reported having participated in the activity.

- For volunteering, attending public meeting, working with neighbors, and donating to charity, percentages are for residents aged 16 and older. For all the other civic engagement items, percentages are for residents aged 18 and older.

AGE

Civic engagement tends to depend upon an individual's position in the life cycle, with older people more engaged than younger people. Overall the patterns of civic engagement exhibited in Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami follow this pattern, although there are some interesting exceptions (Appendix Table 3). For most of the civic engagement items, there is a steady increase from the youngest age group up until about the 55-64 age group, with some decline then occurring among the 65-74 and over 75 age groups on several of the items. Once again, with the exception of attending to public affairs, the levels of activity across age groups are higher in Minneapolis-St. Paul than in Miami.


This pattern was not as evident in Miami with respect to volunteering. Although only 17% of the youngest age group reported volunteering, this was just one percentage point less than that reported by 45-54 year olds. Furthermore, while only 47% of the youngest age group in Miami reported that they voted, this was higher than for the 25-34 and 35-44 age groups, and only four percentage points lower than for the 45-54 age group. Almost half of the youngest age group also reported attending to public affairs, which was considerably larger than that found nationally.

The one civic engagement item that did not consistently increase with age was being connected to social networks. Indeed, the youngest age group in Miami had the largest percentage of individuals (73%) who reported being frequently connected to social networks. In Minneapolis-St. Paul, there was essentially no relationship between age and being connected to a social network.

Age does have an effect across civic engagement items in both cities when we control for the other demographic groups (Appendix Figure 3). In fact, for Minneapolis-St. Paul, only two civic engagement items were *not* affected by age (attending to public affairs and being socially connected). For three items (attending public meetings, working with neighbors, and donating), age had the largest effect of any demographic group. In Miami, age had a substantial effect, failing to achieve significance for only two items (volunteering and attending to public affairs). And for three items (attending public meetings, donating, and voting), the effect of age was larger than any other demographic group.

Overall, the effects of age on civic engagement were larger in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Across the seven civic engagement items where age was statistically significant, the average net effect of moving from the lowest to highest age group was 24 percentage points. The effect was smallest for volunteering (a difference of 8 percentage points) and was largest for donating to charity (a difference of 48 percentage points). In Miami, the average net effect was 19 percentage points, although that is largely due to the very substantial net effects of age on donating to charity and voting (differences of 45 and 46 percentage points, respectively). Furthermore, in Miami, age had the only negative effect on an item, with the youngest age group being 17 percentage points *more likely* than the oldest age group to be frequently connected with social networks.

APPENDIX FIGURE 3
NET EFFECTS OF AGE AFTER CONTROLLING FOR OTHER VARIABLES



- Bars show the difference in the predicted probability of engaging in each activity for highest and lowest age groups while holding all other variables constant at their mean values

APPENDIX TABLE 3 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND AGE

CIVIC ACTIVITY	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	75+
VOLUNTEERED							
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	17%	12%	15%	18%	17%	11%	10%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	30%	31%	39%	39%	35%	39%	37%
United States	21%	21%	29%	29%	27%	26%	20%
ATTENDED PUBLIC MEETINGS ON COMMUNITY ISSUES							
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	1%	3%	4%	6%	9%	11%	8%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	5%	8%	12%	16%	18%	23%	23%
United States	4%	7%	11%	12%	14%	13%	10%
WORKED WITH NEIGHBORS TO FIX SOMETHING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD							
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	2%	4%	4%	6%	9%	7%	3%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	4%	8%	11%	14%	18%	22%	16%
United States	4%	7%	10%	11%	12%	11%	7%
DONATED AT LEAST \$25 TO CHARITY							
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	13%	28%	40%	54%	48%	44%	49%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	27%	57%	66%	70%	75%	75%	74%
United States	23%	43%	55%	58%	62%	62%	58%
PERFORMED AT LEAST ONE NON-ELECTORAL ACTIVITY							
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	10%	7%	11%	21%	19%	15%	15%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	25%	32%	31%	40%	52%	42%	28%
United States	18%	21%	27%	30%	32%	32%	22%
PARTICIPATED IN AT LEAST ONE COMMUNITY GROUP							
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	17%	7%	28%	26%	23%	23%	28%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	41%	37%	44%	50%	56%	48%	38%
United States	26%	31%	40%	38%	37%	40%	33%
FREQUENTLY ATTENDED TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS							
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	48%	44%	52%	55%	46%	37%	44%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	39%	37%	34%	42%	49%	43%	28%
United States	33%	37%	41%	42%	40%	35%	28%
VOTED IN 2008							
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	47%	38%	42%	51%	67%	65%	67%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	57%	64%	64%	73%	80%	82%	77%
United States	44%	49%	55%	63%	68%	70%	66%
FREQUENTLY CONNECTED WITH A SOCIAL NETWORK							
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	73%	62%	71%	64%	73%	56%	51%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	80%	83%	77%	80%	81%	71%	75%
United States	69%	73%	73%	69%	68%	66%	53%

- Percentages shown are the percent of residents who reported having participated in the activity.

- For volunteering, attending public meeting, working with neighbors, and donating to charity, percentages are for residents aged 16 and older. For all the other civic engagement items, percentages are for residents aged 18 and older.


GENDER

Gender differences in civic engagement have largely been eroded due to societal changes that have affected gender roles, together with greater access to education, income and employment for women. The effects of gender on civic engagement are modest in both Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami (Appendix Table 4), with no gender gap greater than 10 percentage points for any of the civic engagement items across both cities. The largest gap was in Minneapolis-St. Paul for volunteering and donating to charity, where women were 9 percentage points more likely to have reported doing both of these activities than men. The largest gender gap in Miami was for donating to charity, where women were 4 percentage points more likely to have donated than men.

These findings are confirmed when we control for other demographic groups which might overlap with gender. In Minneapolis-St. Paul, gender had a statistically significant effect on four of the civic engagement items (volunteering, donating, voting, and being socially connected), and it had the same effect on the same items, except for voting, in Miami. However, all of the net effects of a change were quite modest, with no difference in either city being in excess of 10 percentage points.



APPENDIX FIGURE 4
NET EFFECTS OF GENDER AFTER CONTROLLING FOR OTHER VARIABLES



- Bars show the difference in the predicted probability of engaging in each activity for women and men while holding all other variables constant at their mean values

APPENDIX TABLE 4 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND GENDER

CIVIC ACTIVITY	MEN	WOMEN
VOLUNTEERED		
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	13%	17%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	31%	40%
United States	22%	28%
ATTENDED PUBLIC MEETINGS ON COMMUNITY ISSUES		
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	6%	5%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	13%	14%
United States	10%	10%
WORKED WITH NEIGHBORS TO FIX SOMETHING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD		
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	6%	4%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	12%	13%
United States	9%	8%
DONATED AT LEAST \$25 TO CHARITY		
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	38%	42%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	57%	66%
United States	48%	53%
PERFORMED AT LEAST ONE NON-ELECTORAL ACTIVITY		
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	16%	13%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	37%	35%
United States	26%	27%
PARTICIPATED IN AT LEAST ONE COMMUNITY GROUP		
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	22%	22%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	45%	46%
United States	33%	37%
FREQUENTLY ATTENDED TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS		
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	50%	45%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	39%	40%
United States	40%	36%
VOTED IN 2008		
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	53%	52%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	66%	73%
United States	56%	60%
FREQUENTLY CONNECTED WITH A SOCIAL NETWORK		
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	63%	68%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	75%	83%
United States	67%	71%

- Percentages shown are the percent of residents who reported having participated in the activity.


- For volunteering, attending public meeting, working with neighbors, and donating to charity, percentages are for residents aged 16 and older. For all the other civic engagement items, percentages are for residents aged 18 and older.

RACE/ETHNICITY

Given the very substantial differences in the racial and ethnic composition of Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami, to what extent does this demographic characteristic explain differences in civic engagement across both cities? The general pattern is that non-Hispanic whites generally have higher levels of civic engagement than minority groups (Appendix Table 5). However, confirming a familiar pattern, non-Hispanic whites in Miami still remain less civically engaged than non-Hispanic whites in Minneapolis-St. Paul (the one exception being attending to public affairs). Indeed, on five of the civic engagement indicators (volunteering, attend public meetings, donating to charity, non-electoral participation, and voting) the gap between the percentage reporting the activity across both cities is greater for non-Hispanic whites than the gap for non-Hispanic blacks.


When the effects of race/ethnicity are examined while we control for other demographic groups, the difference between non-Hispanic blacks and non-Hispanic whites completely wash out in both cities (Appendix Figures 5 and 6). The only statistically significant difference was in Minneapolis-St. Paul, where non-Hispanic blacks were 13 percentage points less likely to volunteer than non-Hispanic whites. This suggests that the differences between non-Hispanic whites and blacks in both cities are likely attributable to social status variables such as education, income, and also possibly age.

**APPENDIX FIGURE 5
NET EFFECTS OF RACE AFTER CONTROLLING FOR OTHER VARIABLES (MIAMI ONLY)**



- Bars show the difference in the predicted probability of engaging in each activity for each racial/ethnic group while holding all other variables constant at their mean values (reference group is non-Hispanic whites).

**APPENDIX FIGURE 6
NET EFFECTS OF RACE AFTER CONTROLLING FOR OTHER VARIABLES (MINNEAPOLIS-ST.PAUL ONLY)**



- Bars show the difference in the predicted probability of engaging in each activity for each racial/ethnic group while holding all other variables constant at their mean values (reference group is non-Hispanic whites).

APPENDIX TABLE 5 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT AND RACE/ETHNICITY

CIVIC ACTIVITY	NON-HISPANIC WHITE	NON-HISPANIC BLACK	HISPANIC, CUBAN	HISPANIC, CENTRAL OR SOUTH AMERICA	HISPANIC, OTHER	NON-HISPANIC ASIAN
VOLUNTEERED						
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	21%	15%	7%	10%	13%	*
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	38%	17%	*	*	32%	23%
United States	29%	18%	19%	13%	13%	18%
ATTENDED PUBLIC MEETINGS ON COMMUNITY ISSUES						
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	9%	4%	4%	2%	2%	*
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	15%	8%	*	*	3%	3%
United States	12%	8%	8%	4%	4%	5%
WORKED WITH NEIGHBORS TO FIX SOMETHING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD						
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	8%	3%	3%	2%	2%	*
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	13%	8%	*	*	4%	7%
United States	10%	7%	5%	5%	4%	4%
DONATED AT LEAST \$25 TO CHARITY						
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	52%	29%	32%	32%	28%	*
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	65%	33%	*	*	38%	51%
United States	56%	37%	41%	32%	33%	46%
PERFORMED AT LEAST ONE NON-ELECTORAL ACTIVITY						
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	22%	15%	12%	6%	15%	*
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	40%	18%	*	*	14%	8%
United States	30%	23%	14%	11%	13%	14%
PARTICIPATED IN AT LEAST ONE COMMUNITY GROUP						
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	31%	17%	15%	16%	17%	*
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	47%	43%	*	*	28%	27%
United States	39%	32%	22%	24%	21%	27%
FREQUENTLY ATTENDED TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS						
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	49%	44%	48%	45%	49%	*
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	41%	32%	*	*	22%	34%
United States	40%	41%	45%	33%	25%	28%
VOTED IN 2008						
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	65%	45%	53%	36%	43%	*
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	76%	51%	*	*	24%	36%
United States	65%	62%	48%	30%	31%	32%
FREQUENTLY CONNECTED WITH A SOCIAL NETWORK						
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	79%	57%	57%	58%	59%	*
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	81%	72%	*	*	66%	65%
United States	73%	63%	60%	57%	57%	63%

- Percentages shown are the percent of residents who reported having participated in the activity.

- For volunteering, attending public meeting, working with neighbors, and donating to charity, percentages are for residents aged 16 and older. For all the other civic engagement items, percentages are for residents aged 18 and older.

* Number of cases insufficient for reliable analysis

The effects for non-Cuban Hispanics in Miami also were not significant, again confirming that differences in civic engagement by race and ethnicity largely vanish when controlling for other variables. Hispanics from South and Central America were 2 percentage points less likely to attend public meeting than non-Hispanic whites. While other Hispanics were 3 percentage points less likely to have worked with neighbors and 19 percentage points less likely to have donated to charity than non-Hispanic whites.

A somewhat different finding emerges for lower levels of civic engagement for Hispanics, especially Cuban Hispanics in Miami. On five of the civic engagement items (volunteering, attending public meeting, working with neighbors, donating to charity, and group participation), Cuban Hispanics were less likely to be engaged than non-Hispanic whites. However, the changes in the predicted probabilities were quite modest, with only donating to charity exceeding double-digits, where Cubans were 18 percentage points less likely to donate to charity than non-Hispanic whites.

In Minneapolis-St. Paul, Hispanics were actually 14 percentage points *more likely* to donate to charity than non-Hispanic whites after controlling for all other variables, but were 27 percentage points less likely to have voted. There were no significant differences for Hispanics on any of the other civic engagement indicators. The minority group which was least likely to participate in Minneapolis-St. Paul after controlling for other variables was Asians, who were 8 percentage points less likely to attend a public meeting, 27 percentage points less likely to engage in non-electoral participation, 10 percentage points less likely to participate in one community group, 40 percentage points less likely to vote, and 18 percentage points less likely to be connected with social networks.

CITIZENSHIP

Across both cities, rates of civic engagement are generally higher among citizens than non-citizens (Appendix Table 6). This likely reflects civic engagement being less of a priority for non-citizens who have only recently arrived in the United States. Interestingly in Miami, naturalized citizens were *more likely* to have donated money to charity and attended to public affairs than native-born citizens, and they were as likely to have voted as native-born citizens. That many naturalized citizens in Miami are Hispanic Cubans may explain some of this, although on donating money to charity, Cubans (as discussed above) were less likely to donate money.



Again, what stands out is that even when controlling for citizenship status, native-born citizens in Miami were still less likely to report participating in each activity (except for attending to public affairs) than those in Minneapolis-St. Paul. Thus, once more a simple demographic explanation—that Miami has more non-citizens than Minneapolis-St. Paul—cannot offer a full explanation for the differences in levels of civic engagement across the two cities.

Citizenship status is likely related to social status variables, however, for Miami even when we take into account other demographic groups, it remains significant across several civic engagement indicators (Appendix Figures 7 and 8). Native-born citizens were more likely to be civically engaged than non-citizens on all the indicators (except for donating and attending to public affairs). However, the net effects were modest. Only for non-electoral participation and being connected to social networks did the net effect reach double digits. The largest effect was for being connected with social networks, with native-born citizens 30 percentage points more likely to report being frequently connected with social networks than non-citizens. The effects were also modest among naturalized citizens, with the highest being attending to public affairs, where naturalized citizens were 14 percentage points more likely than non-citizens to attend to public affairs. Interestingly, being a native-born citizen had no effect on this item.

Citizen/non-citizen differences were not as evident in Minneapolis-St. Paul. On only two items (volunteering and non-electoral activity) did the citizenship variable achieve statistical significance. Citizens were 14 percentage points more likely to have volunteered and 21 percentage points more likely to have engaged in non-electoral activities than non-citizens. Of course, the net effects are very slight given the relatively smaller number of non-citizens in Minneapolis-St. Paul.

APPENDIX TABLE 6 CIVIC ENGAGEMENT BY CITIZENSHIP STATUS

CIVIC ACTIVITY	NATIVE	NATURALIZED CITIZEN	NOT A CITIZEN
VOLUNTEERED			
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	20%	9%	8%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	37%	*	19%
United States	27%	17%	11%
ATTENDED PUBLIC MEETINGS ON COMMUNITY ISSUES			
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	7%	6%	1%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	14%	*	4%
United States	11%	6%	3%
WORKED WITH NEIGHBORS TO FIX SOMETHING IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD			
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	6%	5%	1%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	12%	*	7%
United States	9%	5%	3%
DONATED AT LEAST \$25 TO CHARITY			
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	43%	44%	25%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	62%	*	37%
United States	52%	50%	32%
PERFORMED AT LEAST ONE NON-ELECTORAL ACTIVITY			
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	22%	12%	2%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	39%	*	7%
United States	29%	17%	8%
PARTICIPATED IN AT LEAST ONE COMMUNITY GROUP			
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	27%	20%	12%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	47%	*	39%
United States	37%	29%	20%
FREQUENTLY ATTENDED TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS			
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	47%	54%	40%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	41%	*	29%
United States	40%	33%	24%
VOTED IN 2008			
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	66%	66%	na
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	77%	*	na
United States	64%	53%	na
FREQUENTLY CONNECTED WITH A SOCIAL NETWORK			
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach	77%	55%	53%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington	81%	*	65%
United States	71%	60%	57%


- Percentages shown are the percent of residents who reported having participated in the activity.

- For volunteering, attending public meeting, working with neighbors, and donating to charity, percentages are for residents aged 16 and older. For all the other civic engagement items, percentages are for residents aged 18 and older.

* Number of cases insufficient for reliable analysis

APPENDIX FIGURE 7


NET EFFECTS OF CITIZENSHIP AFTER CONTROLLING FOR OTHER VARIABLES (MIAMI ONLY)



- Bars show the difference in the predicted probability of engaging in each activity by citizenship status while holding all other variables constant at their mean values (reference group is non-citizens).

APPENDIX FIGURE 8

NET EFFECTS OF CITIZENSHIP AFTER CONTROLLING FOR OTHER VARIABLES (MINNEAPOLIS-ST.PAUL ONLY)



- Bars show the difference in the predicted probability of engaging in each activity by citizenship status while holding all other variables constant at their mean values (reference group is non-citizens).

SUMMARY

The analysis of the demography of civic engagement in both Minneapolis-St. Paul and Miami suggests a limited role for variables that have traditionally been used to explain patterns of engagement. This is best demonstrated by the limited explanatory power of all the demographic variables on the civic engagement indicators. Moreover, irrespective of the demographic groups examined, civic engagement levels were consistently higher in Minneapolis-St. Paul than in Miami. In both cities, education and age emerged as the strongest predictors of civic engagement. However, these effects appeared to be much stronger in Minneapolis-St. Paul than in Miami.


To demonstrate these effects, consider two individuals who are college educated, in the highest income group, older and who are native-born citizens. In other words, the two individuals possess the demographic characteristics that ought to produce higher levels of civic engagement. These individuals are alike in every way save for the fact that one resides in Minneapolis-St. Paul and one in Miami. What effect does simply residing in Minneapolis-St. Paul and in Miami have on civic engagement? Appendix Figure 9 shows the probability for each individual being civically engaged for each item. By way of contrast, Appendix Figure 10 reports the probabilities for individuals in both cities who had less than a high school education, in the lowest income group, the youngest age group, and non-citizens. ³⁷

The civic engagement gap between the two cities is less the result of less educated, poorer, younger, non-native U.S citizens in Miami not being civically engaged relative to their counterparts in Minneapolis-

St. Paul. The differences in the probability of being civically engaged are negligible, except in the case of being connected with social networks (which is higher in Minneapolis-St. Paul) and attending to public affairs (which is higher in Miami).


Rather, the gap is the result of better educated, affluent, older individuals who are native-born U.S. citizens in Miami not engaging at the levels their status would predict if they resided in Minneapolis-St. Paul. No gap appears among these individuals in the two cities for attending to public affairs, voting, and being connected to a social network. But for all the other civic engagement indicators the gap is considerable. Across the remaining six indicators, better educated, affluent, older individuals who are native-born citizens were, on average, 20 percentage points more likely to be civically engaged in Minneapolis-St. Paul than their counterparts in Miami. The largest gap being 28 percentage points for volunteering, and the smallest being 12 percentage points for donating to charity. The tale of civic engagement in these two cities is more about differences in civic engagement among higher status individuals in each city, than it is about high status/low status differences within each city.

APPENDIX FIGURE 9 PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT BY COLLEGE EDUCATED, AFFLUENT, OLDER INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NATIVE BORN U.S. CITIZENS



- Predicted probabilities were based on the logistic regression models for each city. They were estimated by setting the effects of education, income, age, and citizenship status to their highest values while all other variables were held constant at their mean values.

APPENDIX FIGURE 10 PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF CIVIC ENGAGEMENT BY LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL, POORER, YOUNGER INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE NATIVE BORN U.S. CITIZENS



- Predicted probabilities were based on the logistic regression models for each city. They were estimated by setting the effects of education, income, age, and citizenship status to their highest values while all other variables were held constant at their mean values.

ENDNOTES

- ¹ See <http://civic.serve.gov/>
- ² See <http://www.loufrey.org/publications/floridaCivicHealthIndex.php>
- ³ See http://www.augsburg.edu/democracy/documents/MN2009CHI_web.pdf
- ⁴ For example, Robert Putnam finds that "states where citizens meet, join, vote, and trust in unusual measure boast consistently higher educational performance than states where citizens are less engaged with civic and community life." Such engagement, he finds, is "by far" a bigger correlate of educational outcomes than is spending on education, teachers' salaries, class size, or demographics. Robert D. Putnam, "Community-Based Social Capital and Educational Performance," in Diane Ravitch and Joseph P. Viteritti, eds., *Making Good Citizens: Education and Civil Society* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), pp. 69-72. For the benefits of volunteering to individuals, see John Wilson, "Volunteering," *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 26, (2000), pp. 231-3. For a finding that civic higher participation in Chicago is associated with lower death rates, especially for Black men, see Kimberly A. Lochner, Ichiro Kawachia, Robert T. Brennan and Stephen L. Bukac, "Social Capital and Neighborhood Mortality Rates in Chicago," *Social Science & Medicine*, vol. 56, issue 8 (April 2003), pp. 1797-1805.
- ⁵ International Association of Chiefs of Police Community Policing Committee. Available online: <http://www.iacpcommunitypolicing.org/about.php>
- ⁶ Minnesota Planning State Demographic Center, *Turn of the Century: Minnesota's Population in 1900 and Today*, November, 1999. <http://www.demography.state.mn.us/documents/centuryo.pdf>
- ⁷ Grenier, Guillermo J., and Stepick III, Alex eds. *Miami Now: Immigration, Ethnicity and Social Change* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1992) p. 5.
- ⁸ Grenier, Guillermo J., "The Creation and Maintenance of the Cuban American 'Exile Ideology': Evidence from the FIU Cuba Poll 2004," *Journal of American Ethnic History*, Winter/Spring 2006, p. 212. See also Matthew J. Gibney, Randall Hansen, eds. 2005 *Immigration and Asylum: From 1900 to the Present*. (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc.)
- ⁹ Passel, Jeffrey S., and Cohn, D'Vera, *U.S. Population Projections: 2005–2050*, Pew Research Center, 2008. Available online: <http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportID=85>
- ¹⁰ Pérez, Lisandro, "The Politics of Language in Miami" in Guillermo J. Grenier and Alex Stepick, III eds., *op. cit.* p., 91 ff
- ¹¹ DC Fiscal Policy Institute, "Income Inequality in the District of Columbia Is Wider Than In Any Major U.S. City." Available online: <http://www.dcfpi.org>
- ¹² Guillermo J. Grenier and Alex Stepick, III eds., *op. cit.*, p., 12.
- ¹³ See, e. g., The National Conference on Citizenship in association with CIRCLE and the Saguaro Seminar, *Broken Engagement: America's Civic Engagement Index*, (September 18, 2006); and J. Foster-Bey, "Do Race, Ethnicity, Citizenship and Socio-economic Status Determine Civic-Engagement?" CIRCLE Working Paper #62 (2008). Available online: <http://www.civicyouth.org>.
- ¹⁴ A foundational study was Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
- ¹⁵ Gallup and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation launched the Knight Soul of the Community project in 2008 and interviewed close to 43,000 people in 26 communities over three years. Miami, Palm Beach, and St. Paul were included in the study. For more information, see <http://www.soulofthecommunity.org/>
- ¹⁶ In the Twin Cities, 65% of respondents knew that the ultimate decision about the constitutionality of a law is made by courts, compared to 54% in Miami. Forty-five percent knew how many votes it takes to override a veto in Congress, compared with 31% in Miami.
- ¹⁷ Leighninger, Matt, (2006) *The Next Form of Democracy: How Expert Rule Is Giving Way to Shared Governance—and Why Politics Will Never Be the Same*, (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press), p. 211.
- ¹⁸ Fagotto, Elena, and Fung, Archon, (2006) "The Minneapolis Neighborhood Revitalization Program: An Experiment in Empowered Participatory Governance," LogoLink. Available online: <http://www.logolink.org/index.php/resource>, p. 12.

- ¹⁹ WPA Federal Writers Project Guide to Minnesota 1938 (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1938, 1983), p.7.
- ²⁰ National Research Center, "Minneapolis Residents Survey 2008" (Boulder, CO), p. 4.
- ²¹ Special 75th anniversary issue of *St. Paul Pioneer Press*, December 31, 1933.
- ²² Timothy DenHerder-Thomas interview with Harry Boyte, St. Paul, June 5, 2007.
- ²³ WPA Guide, pp. 77–78; second immigrant quoted from William E. Lass, *Minnesota: A History*, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1998), p. 143.
- ²⁴ Devitt, Stephanie, "Northeast Neighborhood House: Research Report for the Center for Democracy and Citizenship," December 10, 2006, in author's possession, p. 4.
- ²⁵ Devitt, p. 6.
- ²⁶ Lori Sturdevant, ed., (2003) *Changemaker: W. Harry Davis* (Afton, MN: Afton Historical Society Press) p. 32.
- ²⁷ Miller, Kay, "Richard Green – The Minneapolis school superintendent believes 'When the public schools have failed and ceased or are weakened this nation will have failed,'" *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, September 7, 1986.
- ²⁸ Kalia Yang, Kao, (2008) *The Lathomecoer: A Hmong Family Memoir* (Minneapolis: Coffee House Press), p. 273.
- ²⁹ Quoted in Chia Youyee Vang, *Hmong in Minnesota* (St. Paul, Minnesota Historical Press, 2008), p. 78.
- ³⁰ Lynett Nyman, "The Hmong in Minnesota," NPR interview, March 9, 1999.
- ³¹ Quoted in Vang, *The Hmong in Minnesota*, p. 17.
- ³² Nijman, Jan, (1997) "Globalization to a Latin Beat: The Miami Growth Machine," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, p. 175
- ³³ Nijman, p. 62-63; p. 23.
- ³⁴ Harry C. Boyte interview with Pakou Hang, Minneapolis, November 9, 2010.
- ³⁵ Barker, Derek W. M., (2010) "The Colonization of Civil Society," *Kettering Review* Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 8-18; see also Boyte, Harry C., "Constructive Politics as Public Work: Organizing the Literature," forthcoming in *Political Theory* for a treatment of civically empowering cultures – civic agency – as a new frontier in the civic field.
- ³⁶ As each of the civic engagement indicators were dichotomous, variables-logistic regression was used for this stage of the analysis. As logistic regression coefficients are not easily interpretable, predicted probabilities were calculated for demographic variables that exerted a statistically significant effect on the civic engagement indicators. The complete logistic regressions are shown in Appendix Tables 7 and 8
- ³⁷ These predicted probabilities were based on the logistic regression models for each city reported in Appendix Tables 7 and 8. They were estimated by setting the effects of education, income, age, and citizenship status to their highest values while all other variables were held constant at their mean values.



NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CITIZENSHIP

Board of Directors

Norma Barfield
Barry Byrd
Philip Duncan
Eric Federing
Thomas Gottschalk
Gail Leftwich Kitch
Martin Krall
Dennis McGinn
A.G. Newmyer
John Reeder
Thomas Susman
Craig Turk
Michael Weiser (Chair)
Jocelyn White

Founded in 1946 and federally chartered by the U.S. Congress in 1953, the National Conference on Citizenship (NCoC) is a leader in advancing our nation's civic life. We track, measure and promote civic participation and engagement in partnership with other organizations on a bipartisan, collaborative basis. We focus on ways to enhance history and civics education, encourage national and community service, and promote greater participation in the political process.

Many distinguished Americans have been involved with the growth and development of NCoC over the years including Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower and Chief Justices Earl Warren and Warren Burger. The roster of board members, advisors and guest speakers at NCoC events represent a diverse spectrum of leaders from across government, industry, academia, community and nonprofit organizations and the media, including Senators Robert Byrd and Lamar Alexander, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Antonin Scalia, philanthropists Ray Chambers and Eugene Lang, authors David McCullough and Walter Isaacson, scholars Robert Putnam and Stephen Goldsmith, TIME Magazine's Richard Stengel, MTV's Ian Rowe, ABC's Cokie Roberts, actor Stephen Lang, AOL's Jean Case, Facebook's Sean Parker, former Clinton Administration advisor William Galston and former Bush Administration advisor John Bridgeland.

Board of Advisors

Diana Aviv
James Basker
John Bridgeland (Chair)
Jean Case
Frank Damrell
John J. Dilulio, Jr.
Jane Eisner
Chester Finn, Jr.
William Galston
Stephen Goldsmith
Scott Heiferman
Walter Isaacson
Amy Kass
Michelle Nunn
Michael Pack
Robert Putnam
Charles Quigley
Ian Rowe
Tobi Walker

NCoC's accomplishments are many, ranging from fueling the civic energy of the Greatest Generation freshly home from WWII to helping lead the celebration of our nation's Bicentennial in 1976. NCoC helped establish the observance of Constitution Day, each September 17, and our charter mandates we hold our annual conference close to this date with a focus on building a more active and engaged citizenry.

Since 2006, NCoC has produced America's Civic Health Index, the nation's leading measure of citizen actions and attitudes. In April 2009, NCoC was included in the Edward M. Kennedy Serve America Act. To help our communities harness the power of their citizens, the Corporation for National and Community Service and the U.S. Census Bureau were directed to work with NCoC to expand the reach and impact of these metrics through an annual Civic Health Assessment.

To advance our mission, better understand the broad dimensions of modern citizenship, and to encourage greater civic participation, NCoC has developed and sustained a network of over 250 like-minded institutions that seek a more collaborative approach to strengthening our system of self-government.

For more information, please visit www.ncoc.net

2010 America's Civic Health Assessment

Civic Life in America: Key Findings on the Civic Health of the Nation

To download to iPhone or Android, scan these barcodes with the free **stickybits** app

[Executive Summary](#)

[Issue Brief](#)



More information:

NCoC.net/CivicHealth2010

State and City rankings:

<http://Civic.Serve.gov>

CIVIC INDICATORS WORKING GROUP

JOHN BRIDGELAND, CEO, Civic Enterprises; Chairman, Board of Advisors, National Conference on Citizenship; and former Assistant to the President of the United States & Director, Domestic Policy Council & USA Freedom Corps

NELDA BROWN, Executive Director, National Service-Learning Partnership at the Academy for Educational Development

KRISTEN CAMPBELL, Director of Programs and New Media, National Conference on Citizenship

DAVID EISNER, President and CEO, National Constitution Center

MAYA ENISTA, CEO, Mobilize.org

WILLIAM GALSTON, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution; former Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States for Domestic Policy

STEPHEN GOLDSMITH, Deputy Mayor of New York City, Daniel Paul Professor of Government, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University; Director, Innovations in American Government; and former Mayor of Indianapolis

ROBERT GRIMM, JR., Professor of the Practice of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Management, University of Maryland

LLOYD JOHNSTON, Research Professor and Distinguished Research Scientist at the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research; and Principal Investigator of the Monitoring the Future Study

KEI KAWASHIMA-GINSBERG, Lead Researcher, Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) at the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service at Tufts University

PETER LEVINE, Director, Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE) at the Jonathan M. Tisch College of Citizenship and Public Service at Tufts University

MARK HUGO LOPEZ, Associate Director of the Pew Hispanic Center; Research Professor, University of Maryland's School of Public Affairs

SEAN PARKER, Co-Founder and Chairman of Causes on Facebook/MySpace; Founding President of Facebook

KENNETH PREWITT, Director of the United States Census Bureau; Carnegie Professor of Public Affairs and the Vice-President for Global Centers at Columbia University,

ROBERT PUTNAM, Peter and Isabel Malkin Professor of Public Policy, Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University; Founder, Saguaro Seminar; author of *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*

THOMAS SANDER, Executive Director, the Saguaro Seminar, Harvard University

DAVID B. SMITH, Executive Director, National Conference on Citizenship; Founder, Mobilize.org

HEATHER SMITH, Executive Director, Rock the Vote

MAX STIER, Executive Director, Partnership for Public Service

MICHAEL WEISER, Chairman, National Conference on Citizenship

JONATHAN ZAFF, Vice President for Research, America's Promise Alliance

CIVIC HEALTH PARTNERS

STATES:

ARIZONA - Center for the Future of Arizona

CALIFORNIA - California Forward, Common Sense California, Center for Civic Education

FLORIDA - Florida Joint Center for Citizenship

ILLINOIS - Citizen Advocacy Center, McCormick Foundation

MARYLAND - Mannakee Circle Group, Center for Civic Education, Common Cause Maryland, Maryland Civic Literacy Commission, University of Maryland

MISSOURI - Missouri State University

NEW YORK - Siena Research Institute

NORTH CAROLINA - North Carolina Civic Education Consortium, Center for Civic Education, NC Center for Voter Education, Democracy NC, NC Campus Compact, Western Carolina University Department of Public Policy

OHIO - Miami University Hamilton

OKLAHOMA - University of Central Oklahoma, Oklahoma Campus Compact

PENNSYLVANIA - National Constitution Center

TEXAS - University of Texas at San Antonio

VIRGINIA - Center for the Constitution at James Madison's Montpelier, Colonial Williamsburg Foundation

CITIES:


CHICAGO - McCormick Foundation

MIAMI - Florida Joint Center for Citizenship and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation

MINNEAPOLIS / ST. PAUL - Center for Democracy and Citizenship, Augsburg College and the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation

SEATTLE - Seattle City Club, Boeing Company, Seattle Foundation

www.NCoC.net



UF UNIVERSITY of
FLORIDA

College of Liberal Arts & Sciences
Bob Graham Center for Public Service



The Florida Joint
Center for Citizenship
A Partnership for Florida's Civic Health

KF John S. and James L.
Knight Foundation
Writing the Story of Transformation

CENTER for
DEMOCRACY
and CITIZENSHIP

AUGSBURG
COLLEGE