

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC

MADE IN GERMANY

BOM

Audit

Security Assessment 13. June, 2022

For



Disclaimer	3
Description	5
Project Engagement	5
Logo	5
Contract Link	5
Methodology	8
Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)	9
Tested Contract Files	10
Source Lines	11
Risk Level	11
Capabilities	12
Inheritance Graph	13
CallGraph	14
Scope of Work/Verify Claims	15
Modifiers and public functions	23
Source Units in Scope	25
Critical issues	26
High issues	26
Medium issues	26
Low issues	26
Informational issues	26
Audit Comments	27
SWC Attacks	28

Disclaimer

<u>SolidProof.io</u> reports are not, nor should be considered, an "endorsement" or "disapproval" of any particular project or team. These reports are not, nor should be considered, an indication of the economics or value of any "product" or "asset" created by any team. SolidProof.io do not cover testing or auditing the integration with external contract or services (such as Unicrypt, Uniswap, PancakeSwap etc'...)

SolidProof.io Audits do not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug- free nature of the technology analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the technology proprietors. SolidProof Audits should not be used in any way to make decisions around investment or involvement with any particular project. These reports in no way provide investment advice, nor should be leveraged as investment advice of any sort.

SolidProof.io Reports represent an extensive auditing process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology. Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. SolidProof's position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. SolidProof in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze.

Version	Date	Description
1.0	31. May 2022	Layout projectAutomated-/Manual-Security TestingSummary
1.1	04. June 2022	· Reaudit
1.2	08. June 2022	· Reaudit
2.0	13. June 2022	· LPPrice

Network

Polygon MATIC

Website

https://bomcoin.com/

Telegram

https://t.me/bomcoinofficial

Twitter

https://twitter.com/bom_coin

Facebook

https://facebook.com/bomcoinofficial

Instagram

https://www.instagram.com/bom.coin

Medium

https://bomcoin.medium.com/

Discord

https://discord.gg/xrtEEMmZfU

Youtube

https://www.youtube.com/c/BomCoinOfficial

Description

TBA

Project Engagement

During the 30th of May 2022, **BOM Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo



Contract Link v1.0

- Github
 - https://github.com/BOM-Token/BomSmartContract/commit/ 5442b25c6228a5cb78d20a2afa3f73e6df1e40a8
 - · Commit: 5442b25c6228a5cb78d20a2afa3f73e6df1e40a8
 - https://github.com/BOM-Token/BomSmartContract/commit/ c49b6f29b608af8fd240630435398a90dc186266
 - · Commit: c49b6f29b608af8fd240630435398a90dc186266

v1.2

- Github
 - https://github.com/BOM-Token/BomSmartContract/tree/main/ smartcontract
 - Commit: ef294938fb7ec669d010d2527e2f92054984ea09

v2.0

- · Github
 - https://github.com/BOM-Token/BomSmartContract/tree/main/ smartcontract

Commit: 3e9f11ca7096248130fffc6d8d6732770a1a87b0



Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

Dependency / Import Path	Count
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol	2
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/extensions/ERC721URIStorage.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Strings.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol	2



Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.0

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/BOMNFT.sol	39d6ae4f455cb2bcb05a610ded26783556b92c7c
contracts/BOMToken.sol	628de59531807d049a15d7f038d8fa4838355581
contracts/IERC20.sol	5cafd4d53f797d5c18267a2c3deb3d5e68f77bc6

Metrics

Source Lines v1.0



Capabilities

Components

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	5	0	4	1

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Ve	Version Public		Payable
1.0		79	3

Version	External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
1.0	52	57	0	0	33

State Variables

Version	Total	Public
1.0	46	41

Capabilities


Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experim ental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembl Y	Has Destroya ble Contract s
1.0	^0.8.1 ^0.8.7		yes		

Version	Transfer s ETH	Low- Level Calls	Deleg ateCa II	Uses Hash Function s	EC Rec ove r	New/ Create/ Create2	
---------	-------------------	------------------------	----------------------	-------------------------------	-----------------------	----------------------------	--


1.0	yes					
-----	-----	--	--	--	--	--

Inheritance Graph

v1.0



CallGraph v1.0



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 2. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
- 3. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- 4. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 5. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Correct implementation of Token standard

	ERC20			
Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
TotalSupply	Provides information about the total token supply	√	√	\checkmark
BalanceOf	Provides account balance of the owner's account	\checkmark	√	\checkmark
Transfer	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	√	√	√
TransferFrom	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	√	√	√
Approve	Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	√	√	√
Allowance	Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	√	√	√

ERC721						
Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified		
BalanceOf	Count all NFTs assigned to an owner	\checkmark	√	\checkmark		
OwnerOf	Find the owner of an NFT	\checkmark	√	\checkmark		
SafeTransferFrom	Transfers the ownership of an NFT from one address to another address	√	√	√		
SafeTransferFrom	See above - Difference is that this function has an extra data parameter	√	√	√		
TransferFrom	Transfer ownership of an NFT		√	\checkmark		
Approve	Change or reaffirm the approved address for an NFT	√	√	√		
SetApprovalForAll	Enable or disable approval for a third party ("operator") to manage all of `msg.sender`'s assets		√	√		
GetApproved	Get the approved address for a single NFT	√	√	√		
IsApprovedForAll	Query if an address is an authorized operator for another address	√	√	√		
SupportsInterface	Query if a contract implements an interface	√	√	√		
Name	Provides information about the name		1	√		
Symbol	Symbol Provides information about the symbol		√	√		
TokenURI	Provides information about the TokenUri	√	1	1		

Write functions of contract v1.0

1. addBlackList	1. addAllowedSupply
2. approve	2. addBlackList
3. burn	
4. burnFrom	3. approve
5. changeDistDelay	4. mint
6. decreaseAllowance	5. mintNFTs
7. distRewardToNFTHolders	6. pause
8. fetchLPPrice	
9. increaseAllowance	7. removeBlackList
10. mint	8. renounceOwnership
11. pause	9. safeTransferFrom
12. removeBlackList	10. safeTransferFrom
13. renounceOwnership	
14. setBomNFTAddress	11. setApprovalForAll
15. setLPPriceInfo	12. setBaseURI
16. setLPStake	13. setLPPriceInfo
17. setLPpairaddress	14. setLPpairaddress
18. setMarketingStake	14. Sotti paradoress
19. setRewardWalletAddress	15. setMaxSupply
20. transfer	16. setTokenURI
21. transferByNFT	17. setUsdCost
22. transferFrom	
23. transferFromByNFT	18. setwithdrawAddress
24. transferInvestorWalletOwnership	19. transferFrom
25. transferOwnership	20. transferOwnership
26. unpause	21. withdraw

27. withdrawReward

v2.0

setCurrentPrice setUpdatePriceFromLP updatePriceFromLP addNewPair

Note: Not listed functions was imported from external libraries



Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot mint	\checkmark	√	X

Comments:

v1.0

- · Anyone can mint new nfts
- · Owner can mint new tokens in BOMToken to him-/herself



Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot lock	\checkmark	√	X
Deployer cannot burn	√	√	\checkmark

Comments:

v1.0

- · Owner can lock user funds by
 - blacklisting addresses
 - · Pause contract
- Tokens
 - · can be burned by msg.sender

Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot pause	\checkmark	√	X

Comments:

v1.0

· Owner can pause contract

Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)




Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verfified / Checked	\checkmark
Partly Verified	P
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

Modifiers and public functions

v1.0



Comments

• Deployer can set following state variables without any limitations

- BOMToken
 - · Can only be decreased
 - marketingStake
 - IpStake
- BOMNFT
 - usdCost
 - maxSupply
 - allowedSupply
- LPPrice
 - _set.currentprice
- Deployer can enable/disable following state variables
 - BOMNFT
 - paused
 - isBlackListed
 - LPPrice
 - _set.isUpdatePriceFromLP
- Deployer can set following addresses
 - BOMToken
 - · Ipinfo
 - IpAddress
 - bomnft
 - IpMasterAddress
 - marketingWallet
 - teamWallet
 - techWallet
 - BOMNFT
 - IpAddress
 - Ipinfo
 - baseURI
- Existing Modifiers
 - BOMToken
 - whenNotPaused
 - whenPaused
- · Owner can withdraw contract balance to withdrawAddress
 - · Withdraw address can be set to any address
- Owner can add new LP settings

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

Source Units in Scope

v1.0

Туре	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
pQ.	contracts/BOMNFT.sol	2	1	219	213	165	12	177	. <u>Š</u> .
) Q	contracts/BOMToken.sol	4	2	715	640	376	169	366	
Q	contracts/IERC20.sol		1	81	22	17	57	15	
	Totals	6	4	1015	875	558	238	558	. <u>Š</u> .

Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)

Audit Results

AUDIT PASSED

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

No high issues

Medium issues

No medium issues

Low issues

No low issues

Informational issues

No informational issues

Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

13. June 2022:

- Owner is acknowledged that it is possible to set addresses as zero in I PPrice
- · Read whole report and modifiers section for more information



SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>25</u>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>24</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>23</u>	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>21</u>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
SW C-1 20	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>7</u>	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>05</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>04</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
SW C-1 03	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	PASSED
SW C-1 02	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED



Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC

MADE IN GERMANY