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**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC
Development | Marketing**

MADE IN GERMANY

Peernetics Audit

**Security Assessment
24. August, 2023**

For



SolidProof_io



@solidproof_io

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| Version | Date | Description |
|---------|-------------------|--|
| 1.0 | 06. February 2023 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Layout project• Automated- /Manual-Security Testing• Summary |
| 1.1 | 24. August 2023 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Reaudit |

Network

Polygon

Website

<https://www.peernetics.io/>

Telegram

@peernetics

Twitter

<https://twitter.com/peernetics>

Facebook

<https://m.facebook.com/Peernetics>

Instagram

<https://www.instagram.com/peernetics/>

LinkedIn

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/peernetics/>

Description

A global crypto payment gateway made easy and accessible to everyone. Accept Bitcoin, Ethereum, Peernectics token and other cryptocurrencies, gain new customers globally, and avoid the cost of high fees and chargebacks. From start to finish, Peernectics makes accepting these payments easy.

Project Engagement

During the 3rd of February 2023, **Peernectics Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo

Contract Link

v1.0

- Github
 - <https://github.com/Peernectics-Ltd/token-smart-contract>
 - **Commit**
 - c844788106b806a2fca85406d3f2e584ce903436

v1.1

- Github
 - <https://github.com/Peernectics-Ltd/token-smart-contract>
 - **Commit**
 - 94b6e0b2de1fc5164130a753646e2457ecf998d8

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

| Level | Value | Vulnerability | Risk (Required Action) |
|----------------------|---------|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 | A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken. | Immediate action to reduce risk level. |
| High | 7 - 8.9 | A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way. | Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible. |
| Medium | 4 - 6.9 | A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario. | Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period. |
| Low | 2 - 3.9 | A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective. | Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk. |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 | A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code. | An observation that does not determine a level of risk |

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology


The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)


Imported packages:

MarketingVesting



SafeMath
IERC20
Context
Ownable

ResearchAndDevelopmentVesting




SafeMath
IERC20
Context
Ownable

Peernetics


IERC20
IERC20Metadata
Context
ERC20
Ownable
IUniswapV2Pair
IUniswapV2Factory
IUniswapV2Router01
IUniswapV2Router02
paymentSplitter

TeamVesting



SafeMath
IERC20
Context
Ownable

UpdatedICOVesting



SafeMath
IERC20
Context
Ownable

Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.1


| File Name | SHA-1 Hash |
|--|--|
| contracts/MarketingVesting.sol | 05308b2be9b3083078b026214bbf231c6f00b332 |
| contracts/ researchAndDevelopment.sol | 1574fb2231ba6d42486764185dff44ecd238ee0 |
| contracts/ICOclaim.sol | fb0a4369fae78b61b3f1f74ef002c9aa3c4961ee |
| contracts/TeamVesting.sol | dcf53ca52159bb237ccdd7e9ba9e2b16b80cb09a |
| contracts/Peernetics.sol | 133b8a66726f2cfae479bf765f806d35a6157fc1 |

Metrics

Source Lines v1.0



Risk Level v1.0



Capabilities

Components

| Version | Contracts | Libraries | Interfaces | Abstract |
|---------|-----------|-----------|------------|----------|
| 1.0 | 7 | 4 | 10 | 10 |

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

| Version | Public | Payable |
|---------|--------|---------|
| 1.0 | 151 | 6 |

| Version | External | Internal | Private | Pure | View |
|---------|----------|----------|---------|------|------|
| 1.0 | 103 | 190 | 2 | 62 | 63 |

State Variables

| Version | Total | Public |
|---------|-------|--------|
| 1.0 | 49 | 16 |

Capabilities

| Version | Solidity Versions observed | Experimental Features | Can Receive Funds | Uses Assembly | Has Destroyable Contracts |
|---------|----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| 1.0 | 0.8.17 | | yes | | |


| Version | Transfers ETH | Low-Level Calls | DelegateCall | Uses Hash Functions | EC Recover | New/Create/Create2 |
|---------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|------------|--------------------|
|---------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|------------|--------------------|

| | | | | | | |
|-----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1.0 | yes | | | | | yes → NewC ontrac t:paym entSpl itter |
|-----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|



Inheritance Graph

v1.0



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

1. Is contract an upgradeable
2. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
3. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
4. Deployer cannot pause the contract
5. Deployer cannot set fees
6. Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses
7. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



Is contract an upgradeable




| Name | |
|-----------------------------|----|
| Is contract an upgradeable? | No |



Write functions of contract v1.0

| |
|-----------------------------|
| ▼ PNS |
| approve |
| burn |
| claimStuckedToken |
| clearStuckedToken |
| decreaseAllowance |
| disableTax |
| enableTax |
| exclude |
| increaseAllowance |
| removeExclude |
| renounceOwnership |
| setAutomatedMarketMakerPair |
| setBuyTax |
| setMaxTxAmount |
| setMaxWalletAmount |
| setSellTax |
| setSwapThreshold |
| setTaxWallets |
| transfer |
| transferFrom |
| transferOwnership |
| triggerTax |

| |
|---------------------------------|
| ▼ RESEARCHANDDEVELOPMENTVESTING |
| addVesting |
| addVestingMultiple |
| claim |
| renounceOwnership |
| transferOwnership |



Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|----------------------|------------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot mint | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Max / Total Supply | 1000000000 | | |



Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer can lock | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Deployer cannot burn | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |



Deployer cannot pause the contract

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|-----------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot pause | — | — | — |



Deployer cannot set fees

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|--|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot set fees over 25% | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Deployer cannot set fees to nearly 100% or to 100% | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Comments:

v1.0

- Fees can be set max to 10%

```
991     function setBuyTax(uint256 researchAndDevelopment↑, uint256 marketing↑) public onlyOwner {
992         buyTaxes["researchAndDevelopment"] = researchAndDevelopment↑;
993         buyTaxes["marketing"] = marketing↑;
994         require (researchAndDevelopment↑ + marketing↑ <= 100, "max buyFees should be less than equal to 10 percent");
995     }
996
997     /**
998      * @dev Sets tax for sells.
999      */
1000     function setSellTax(uint256 researchAndDevelopment↑, uint256 marketing↑) public onlyOwner {
1001         sellTaxes["researchAndDevelopment"] = researchAndDevelopment↑;
1002         sellTaxes["marketing"] = marketing↑;
1003         require (researchAndDevelopment↑ + marketing↑ <= 100, "max sellFees should be less than equal to 10 percent");
1004     }
```

```
768     uint256 private denominator = 1000; //tax denominator
769
```

Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe addresses

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|---|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses | — | — | — |



Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

| Tested | Verified |
|--------|----------|
| ✓ | ✓ |

Legend

| Attribute | Symbol |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Verified / Checked | ✓ |
| Partly Verified | ⚠ |
| Unverified / Not checked | ✗ |
| Not available | — |

Modifiers and public functions

v1.0

Peernetics

```
✓ 🔹 triggerTax
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 burn
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 setAutomatedMarketMakerPair
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 exclude
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 removeExclude
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 setMaxTxAmount
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 setMaxWalletAmount
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 setSwapThreshold
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 setBuyTax
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 setSellTax
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 setTaxWallets
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 enableTax
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 disableTax
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 clearStuckedToken
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 claimStuckedToken
    ☹️ onlyOwner
```

```
✓ 🔹 renounceOwnership
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 transferOwnership
    ☹️ onlyOwner
```

MarketingVesting/ ResearchAndDevelopmentVest ing/TeamVesting

```
✓ 🔹 addVesting
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 addVestingMultiple
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 claim
    ☹️ nonReentrant
```

UpdatedICOVesting

```
✓ 🔹 addVesting
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 addVestingMultiple
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 claimTGEAmount
    ☹️ nonReentrant
✓ 🔹 setTGE
    ☹️ onlyOwner
✓ 🔹 claim
    ☹️ nonReentrant
```

Comments

- [Deployer can set following state variables without any limitations](#)
 - Peernetics
 - sellTaxes

- Only max to 10%
- buyTaxes
 - Only max to 10%
- swapThreshold
- maxWalletAmount
 - Min 1% of total supply
- maxTxAmount
 - Min 1% of total supply
- Deployer can enable/disable following state variables
 - Peernetics
 - taxStatus
 - excludeList
 - automatedMarketMakerPairs
- Deployer can set following addresses
 - Peernetics
 - taxWallets
- Existing Modifiers
 - Peernetics
 - onlyOwner
- Peernetics
 - Owner is able to
 - Also the owner is able to call the “clearStuckedToken” function to clear the stucked token from the payment handler to an arbitrary address
 - Accidentally matic send to contract will be automatically transferred to the marketing wallet. If the marketing wallet is set to 0 address the funds will be lost.
- All Vestings
 - Only owner is able to
 - Addvesting
 - addVestingMultiple

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

Source Units in Scope

v1.1

| File | Logic Contracts | Interfaces | Lines | nLines | nSLOC | Comment Lines | Complex. Score |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|---------------|----------------|
| contracts/MarketingVesting.sol | 1 | ===== | 80 | 80 | 56 | 12 | 42 |
| contracts/researchAndDevelopment.sol | 1 | ===== | 80 | 80 | 56 | 12 | 42 |
| contracts/ICOclaim.sol | 1 | ===== | 104 | 104 | 71 | 14 | 52 |
| contracts/TeamVesting.sol | 1 | ===== | 80 | 80 | 56 | 12 | 42 |
| contracts/Peernetics.sol | 5 | 6 | 1065 | 770 | 355 | 366 | 468 |
| Totals | 9 | 6 | 1409 | 1114 | 594 | 416 | 646 |

Legend

| Attribute | Description |
|------------------|---|
| Lines | total lines of the source unit |
| nLines | normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines) |
| nSLOC | normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines) |
| Comment Lines | lines containing single or block comments |
| Complexity Score | a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...) |

Audit Results

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

No high issues

Medium issues

No medium issues

Low issues

No low issues

Informational issues

| Issue | File | Type | Line | Description |
|-------|------|-------------------------------|------|---|
| #1 | Main | NatSpec documentation missing | - | If you started to comment your code, also comment all other functions, variables etc. |

Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

24. August 2023:

- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Users of the marketing, research and development, and Team vesting contracts will only be able to claim the vested tokens once every 3 months.
- The owner will decide the monthly unlock per cent at the time of adding the vesting and if that amount is set to zero then the users will not be able to claim any tokens.
- Read the whole report and modifiers section for more information

SWC Attacks

| ID | Title | Relationships | Status |
|---------------------------|---|--|--------|
| SW C-1 36 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method | PASSED |
| SW C-1 35 | Code With No Effects | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | PASSED |
| SW C-1 34 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | CWE-655: Improper Initialization | PASSED |
| SW C-1 33 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay | PASSED |
| SW C-1 32 | Unexpected Ether balance | CWE-667: Improper Locking | PASSED |
| SW C-1 31 | Presence of unused variables | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | PASSED |
| SW C-1 30 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information | PASSED |
| SW C-1 29 | Typographical Error | CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator | PASSED |
| SW C-1 28 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | PASSED |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|---------------|
| SW C-1 27 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality | PASSED |
| SW C-1 25 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order | PASSED |
| SW C-1 24 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition | PASSED |
| SW C-1 23 | Requirement Violation | CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller | PASSED |
| SW C-1 22 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity | PASSED |
| SW C-1 21 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | PASSED |
| SW C-1 20 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values | PASSED |
| SW C-11 9 | Shadowing State Variables | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
| SW C-11 8 | Incorrect Constructor Name | CWE-665: Improper Initialization | PASSED |
| SW C-11 7 | Signature Malleability | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | PASSED |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|---------------|
| SW C-11 6 | Timestamp Dependence | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | PASSED |
| SW C-11 5 | Authorization through tx.origin | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | PASSED |
| SW C-11 4 | Transaction Order Dependence | CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | PASSED |
| SW C-11 3 | DoS with Failed Call | CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions | PASSED |
| SW C-11 2 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | PASSED |
| SW C-11 1 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | PASSED |
| SW C-11 0 | Assert Violation | CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation | PASSED |
| SW C-1 09 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer | PASSED |
| SW C-1 08 | State Variable Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
| SW C-1 07 | Reentrancy | CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow | PASSED |
| SW C-1 06 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | PASSED |

| | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|--|---------------|
| SW C-1 05 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | PASSED |
| SW C-1 04 | Unchecked Call Return Value | CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value | PASSED |
| SW C-1 03 | Floating Pragma | CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime | PASSED |
| SW C-1 02 | Outdated Compiler Version | CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities | PASSED |
| SW C-1 01 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation | PASSED |
| SW C-1 00 | Function Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |

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**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC
Development | Marketing**


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