

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC



BetBoom

Audit

Security Assessment

17.November,2022

For







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| Version | Date | Description |
|---------|------------------|--|
| 1.0 | 31.October,2022 | Layout projectAutomated- /Manual-Security TestingSummary |
| 1.1 | 17.November,2022 | Reaudit |

Network Polygon

Website

https://betboom.io/

Telegram

https://t.me/betboomglobalofficial

Twitter

https://twitter.com/betboom_io

Discord

https://discord.gg/katYxVK9g5

Description

BetBOOM represents a decentralized reform in games.

BetBOOM marks a great foray of Web3.0 into games. Through the model "BET to Earn", guessing games are no longer simply zero-sum ones, with players enjoying diverse benefits. Bring it on! We will embark on a brand-new path of decentralized games.

Project Engagement

During the 31st of October 2022, **BetBoom** team engaged Solidproof.io to audit the smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying the security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo



Contract Links

v1.0

https://github.com/betboomeco/betboom/commit/9fc1c9c25860d4873e5e013624fe5b75a36f1d21

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

| Level | Value | Vulnerability | Risk (Required Action) |
|---------------|---------|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 | A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken. | Immediate action to reduce risk level. |
| High | 7 – 8.9 | A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way. | Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible. |
| Medium | 4 – 6.9 | A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario. | Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period. |
| Low | 2 – 3.9 | A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective. | Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk. |
| Informational | 0 – 1.9 | A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code. | An observation that does not determine a level of risk |

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
 - Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analyzing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

```
../../interfaces/IERC20.sol
../../interfaces/IERC20.sol
                                                                      ../../interfaces/IERC721.sol
                                   ../../libraries/SafeMath.sol
../../libraries/SafeMath.sol
                                                                      ../common/Operator.sol
../../libraries/SafeERC20.sol
                                   ../../libraries/SafeERC20.sol
                                                                      ../../interfaces/ILuckyGame.sol
../../types/Ownable.sol
                                   ../common/Op.sol
                                                                      ../../interfaces/IERC20.sol
                                   ../../interfaces/ILuckyPool.sol
../common/Auth.sol
                                                                      ../../libraries/SafeMath.sol
                                   ../../libraries/Address.sol
../../interfaces/ILuckyGame.sol
                                                                      ../../libraries/SafeERC20.sol
../../interfaces/ILetDaoSwap.sol
                                   ../../libraries/EnumerableSet.sol
                                                                      ../../interfaces/IExp.sol
../../libraries/EnumerableSet.sol
                                  ../../types/ReentrancyGuard.sol
                                                                      ../../libraries/EnumerableSet.sol
                                   ../../interfaces/INFTPool.sol
../../interfaces/ILetDao.sol
                                                                      ../../interfaces/IPlayerNFT.sol
                                                                      ../../interfaces/ILetDao.sol
```

../../types/ERC20.sol

../../types/MinterOwned.sol

../../libraries/SafeMath.sol

Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.

A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.


v1.0

| File Name | SHA-1 Hash |
|-------------------------------|--|
| contracts/games/LuckyGame.so | 635cda402129f59fc36f79eb12779f79d9efaea0 |
| contracts/common/Op.sol | f44bf1e577c5019f89c43d5951236d31c858fc89 |
| contracts/common/Operator.sol | 1e9a54568ad75bf28b0ef626f29e79289b36345e |
| contracts/common/Parama.sol | 6370b308988727cd7276601575fd53ed92e1b53 2 |
| contracts/common/Auth.sol | 55ea0f997c7f0a18aac7fbc401f3009aac02614b |
| contracts/pools/LuckyPool.sol | a6cf7987f0742ae832eec8dca42935b33ba21332 |
| contracts/pools/NFTPool.sol | 7aac378302694223177444e4e99bf3d6ca95142 8 |
| contracts/token/LET.sol | 3dbca3af750d5819ce0d169625fe7cfeb9e472dc |
| contracts/token/BET.sol | 07adb2f0dabc148f9c200afd1f841b017fd4707c |

Metrics

Source Lines

v1.0



Capabilities

v1.0

Components

| ▶ Contracts | Libraries | Interfaces | Abstract |
|--------------------|------------------|------------|----------|
| 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 |


Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.




| External | Internal | Private | Pure | View |
|----------|----------|---------|------|------|
| 95 | 115 | 0 | 7 | 64 |

StateVariables




Capabilities




Inheritance Graph

v1.0



Call Graph

v1.0



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Is contract an upgradeable
- 2. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 3. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
- 4. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- 5. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 6. Deployer can set fees
- 7. Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe address
- 8. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Is contract an upgradeable

| Name | |
|-----------------------------|----|
| Is contract an upgradeable? | No |



Correct implementation of Token standard

| | ERC20 | | | | |
|--------------|---|-------|--------|----------|--|
| Function | Description | Exist | Tested | Verified | |
| totalSupply | Provides information about the total token supply | | | | |
| balanceOf | Provides account balance of the owner's account | | | | |
| transfer | Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address | | | | |
| transferFrom | Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address | | | | |
| approve | Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account | | | | |
| allowance | Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner | | | | |

Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|--------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer can mint | | | |
| Max / Total Supply | N/A | | |

Comments:

- The owner can mint tokens wherever there is a functionality.
- Multiple authorities can mint tokens. For example, the operator account and there are also "OnlyMinter" accounts that can be set by the operator account.
- Even after renouncing the ownership, if the operator account and other authorities are not set to zero

Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot lock | | | |
| Deployer cannot burn | | | |



Deployer cannot pause the contract

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|-----------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot pause | | | |



Deployer can set fees

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|--|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer can set fees over 25% | | | |
| Deployer can set fees to nearly 100% or more | | | |

Comments:

- The maximum transaction fees can be manipulated by everyone in the FactoryBallGame.
- The owner can set the fees to any number in the RewardPool contract

Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|--|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe addresses | | | |



Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

| Tested | Verified |
|--------|----------|
| | |
| | |

Legend

| Attribute | Symbol |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Verified / Checked | |
| Partly Verified | |
| Unverified / Not checked | |
| Not available | |

Modifiers, public, and Write functions

v1.0

FactoryBallGame

- setBetAmount
- M onlyOperator
- (M) notEnd
- claim
- claimMatch
- caculateMatch
- setCancel
- setCaculateAccount
- M onlyOwner
- bet
- setFeeRate
- setMathlsOpen
- M onlyOperator
- ♦ addMatch
- addOrRemoveTeam
- M onlyOperator
- (M) isExist
- M notStart
- setMaxTeam
- M onlyOperator
- (M) isExist
- (M) notEnd
- setCanPlay
- (M) isExist
- M notEnd
- setEndTime
- M onlyOperator
- (M) isExist
- M notEnd
- setStartTime
- M onlyOperator
- M isExist
- **M** notStart
- setCupName
- M onlyOperator
- (M) isExist
- (M) notStart
- createCup
- addOrRemoveGame
- **™** onlyOperator

RewardPool

transferTo

addMint

blast

M onlyOwner

M onlyFactory

setUpAmount

™ onlyOperator

M onlyFactory

M onlyOperator

updateWeek

initBnbTime

setRewardAmount

- setExplosionAmount
- M onlyOperator
- setFactory
- **M** onlyOperator
- onlyAddAmount
- setLockTime
- M onlyOperator
- setLPToken
- M onlyOperator
- addPoolAmount
- M nonReentrant
- (M) checkAmount
- **M** updateReward
- claimInsurer
- M nonReentrant
- M checkAmount
- claimReward
- **M** updateReward
- updateAmount
- updateCaculateAmount
- updateValue
- 🖢 cliam
- setWeekDays
- **M** onlyOperator
- update
- setCoe
- M onlyOperator
- setMaxNum
- M onlyOperator
- setRate
- M onlyOperator
- setProAccount
- M onlyOperator
- setDaoAccount
- M onlyOperator
- setLP
- setLetDaoSwap

LuckyPool

- setRewardAmount
- M onlyOperator
- initBnbTime
- setRate
- M onlyOperator
- setRank
- setAssetAccount
- setLuckyGame
- setProAccount
- setDaoAccount
- M onlyOperator
- setLP
- setLetDaoSwap
- ♦ transferTo
- M onlyOwner
- initAssets
- addAssets
- addBetAmount
- userClaim
- updateWeek
- addMint
- M onlyGame
- setExplosionAmount

NFTPool

transferTo

M onlyOwner

setlsOpen setERC721 **™** onlyOperator addOrRemoveWhiteList setExp M onlyOperator updateUser M onlyPlayer setSellAmount setMaxSellNum setPlayerNFT M onlyOperator setDaoAccount M onlyOperator setBonusAccount M onlyOperator setBuyNum M onlyOperator buyAndDeposit updatePool deposit **♦** withdraw changeTokenID ♦ increaseMint M onlyContractAuth gainExperience M onlyContractAuth castNFT **M** onlyPlayer claimNFT M onlyPlayer updateWeek

Ownership (and other authorities controlled by the owner) Privileges:

The owner can assign authorities to other accounts and they can call the functions with the modifiers like, onlyGame, onlyPlayer, onlyOperator, onlyMinter, etc.

| S.No. | File | Description |
|-------|---------------------|---|
| #1 | Auth.sol | • Set "UP" amount, Add amount, limit amount, and per amount but more than zero |
| #2 | Operator.sol | • Set operator, add/remove auth contracts |
| #3 | FactoryBallGame.sol | •Set result, calculate account, match open, add match, and create cup |
| #4 | LuckyGame.sol | •Can call setBlockHash and bethSetBlockHash functions |
| #5 | LuckyPool.sol | Set reward amount, rate, rank, asset account, LuckyGame contract address, pro account, DAO Account, LP pair, and initialize BNB time Transfer tokens Initialize and Add assets and bet amount Call the userClaim function Update week, and change the NFT Pool Add mint and set explosion amount |
| #6 | RewardPool | Set explosion amount, factory contract, lock time, LP token, week days, reward amount, MaxNum, Rate, rank,pro account, dao account, and initializeBNB time. Transfer tokens, add mint, and call the explosion function |

| #7 | NFTPool.sol | • Set ERC721, EXP, LockTime, Sell Amount, Max sell |
|----|----------------|---|
| π/ | 141 11 001.001 | number, Player NFT, DAO Account, Bonus Account, |
| | | Buy Number, IsOpen |
| | | • Increase mint by increasing BET and LET amounts |
| | | Add/Remove accounts from the whitelist. |
| | | • Mint LET tokens by the bonus accounts which is |
| | | controlled by the operator. |
| | | • Transfer the balance of the contract (including |
| | | native tokens) to any wallet, and Update user |
| | | |

Source Units in Scope

v1.0

| File | Logic Contracts | Interfaces | Lines | nLines | nSLOC | Comment Lines | Complex. Score |
|-------------------------------|-----------------|------------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|----------------|
| contracts/games/LuckyGame.sol | 1 | | 840 | 806 | 674 | 1 | 434 |
| contracts/common/Op.sol | 1 | | 29 | 29 | 19 | 1 | 14 |
| contracts/common/Operator.sol | 1 | | 58 | 58 | 43 | 1 | 38 |
| contracts/common/Parama.sol | 1 | | 51 | 51 | 41 | 1 | 21 |
| contracts/common/Auth.sol | 1 | | 30 | 30 | 22 | 1 | 23 |
| contracts/pools/LuckyPool.sol | 1 | | 436 | 426 | 345 | 1 | 303 |
| contracts/pools/NFTPool.sol | 1 | | 492 | 470 | 381 | 1 | 291 |
| contracts/token/LET.sol | 1 | | 43 | 43 | 29 | 1 | 23 |
| contracts/token/BET.sol | 1 | | 38 | 38 | 29 | 1 | 20 |
| Totals | 9 | | 2017 | 1951 | 1583 | 9 | 1167 |

Legend

| Attribute | Description | | |
|------------------|---|--|--|
| Lines | total lines of the source unit | | |
| nLines | normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines) | | |
| nSLOC | normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines) | | |
| Comment Lines | lines containing single or block comments | | |
| Complexity Score | a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,) | | |

Audit Results

AUDIT PASSED

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

No high issues

Medium issues

| Issue | File | Туре | Line | Description |
|-------|-----------------|---------------------|------|---|
| #1 | RewardPool.s ol | Fees can be 100% | 344 | The authorized addresses can set the fees amount to any arbitrary value. |
| #2 | BSBall.sol | Claim will not work | 354 | The factory contract will not get the claim here, It will only return the amount of the result or getChoiceRate but it will not be able to claim any tokens |

Low issues

| Issue | File | Туре | Line | Description |
|-------|---------------|---------------------------------|---------|---|
| #1 | Op.sol | Missing zero address validation | 16 | We recommend to check that the passed address is not zero |
| #2 | LuckyPool.sol | Missing Zero address validation | 147-170 | We recommend to check that the passed address is not zero |
| #3 | Auth.sol | Missing Events | All | Emit events for critical parameter changes |

| #4 | All | Floating Pragma | - | The current pragma Solidity directive is "^0.8.0". Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using other versions. |
|-----|-----------------|--|------------------------------------|--|
| #5 | LuckyPool.sol | Owner can Drain Tokens | 174 | Owner can withdraw native tokens because there is no protection against it. |
| #6 | NFTPool.sol | Missing Events | 106-133 | Emit events for critical parameter changes |
| #7 | NFTPoolsol | Missing Zero address validation | 98,102,121- 129 | We recommend to check that the passed address is not zero |
| #8 | LuckyPool.sol | Missing Events | 96,101,109,1 47- 170,413,391 | Emit events for critical parameter changes |
| #9 | BSBall.sol | Uninitialized State Variables | 148,156 | indexMaxTake is never initialized that means that this variable will always be 0 • We recommend to set it this variable after getting the maxTake • beforeTake will always be smaller than afterTake because it is set to 0 all the time (see • above) this causes that the else condition is not reachable |
| #10 | BSBall.sol | Variables Can be set without limitations | 173 | concedeInfo[cupID][mID].nu mber can be set without limitation in L182 Number should not be modulo 25 != 0 Next number should not be smaller than the previous number in the array concedeInfo[cupID][mID].pay Rate in L183 payRate should not be under 10.000 or should not be higher than uRate (factory.checkGame() |
| #11 | LuckyPool.sol | Shadowing Local Variables | 331 | Rename the local variables that shadow another component. |
| #12 | RewardPool.s ol | Owner can drain tokens | 372 | The factory address can drain the contract's balance. |

| #13 | AII | Contract doesn't import npm packages from source (like OpenZeppelin etc.) | - | We recommend importing all packages from npm directly without flattening the contract. Functions could be modified or can be susceptible to vulnerabilities |
|-----|-----|---|---|---|
|-----|-----|---|---|---|

Informational issues

| Issue | File | Type | Line | Description |
|-------|-------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| #1 | All | NatSpec documentation missing | | If you started to comment your code, also comment all other functions, variables etc. |
| #2 | NFTPool.s ol | Uninitialized local variable | 348 | We recommend to initialize all local variables |
| #3 | BSBall.sol | Unnecessary require statement | 215 | Unnecessary require statement because ".isBet" will never become true on line 221 |
| #4 | BSBall.sol | State Variables missing visibility | 26-29,35- 37,41-42 | Make sure to explicitly define visibility of all variables |
| #5 | FactoryBa IIGame.sol | State Variables missing visibility | 45,46,110- 114 | Make sure to explicitly define visibility of all variables |
| #6 | IRewardP ool.sol | Wrong Spelling of functions | 9,21 | Correct the spellings to improve the readability of the code |
| #7 | Main | Dead Code | | Unused/Dead/Commented code exists in the contract and we recommend to remove all of it |

Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

17. November, 2022:

- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Read the whole report and modifiers section for more information.
- Reward Pool contract was not provided to SolidProof so we cannot comment on the safety of its code.



SWC Attacks

| I D | Title | Relationships | Status |
|---------------------------------|---|--|---------------|
| S W C : 1 3 6 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method | PASSED |
| S W C : 1 3 5 | Code With No Effects | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | NOT PASSED |
| S W C : 1 3 4 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | CWE-655: Improper Initialization | PASSED |
| S W C - 1 3 3 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay | PASSED |
| S W C - 1 3 2 | Unexpected Ether balance | CWE-667: Improper Locking | PASSED |
| <u>S</u> <u>W</u> <u>C</u> - | Presence of unused variables | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | PASSED |

| 1 3 1 | | | |
|------------------------------|--|--|--------|
| S W C : 1 3 0 | Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E) | CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information | PASSED |
| S W C 1 2 9 | Typographical Error | CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator | PASSED |
| S W C 1 2 8 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | PASSED |
| S W C 1 2 7 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality | PASSED |
| S W C : 1 2 5 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order | PASSED |
| <u>S</u> <u>W</u> <u>C</u> : | Write to Arbitrary | CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition | PASSED |

| 1 2 4 | Storage Location | | |
|----------------------------|---|---|---------------|
| S W C : 1 2 3 | Requirement Violation | CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller | PASSED |
| S W C | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity | PASSED |
| S W C 1 2 1 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | PASSED |
| S W C 1 2 0 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values | PASSED |
| S W C : 1 1 9 | Shadowing State Variables | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | NOT PASSED |

| S W C - 1 1 8 | Incorrect Constructor Name | CWE-665: Improper Initialization | PASSED |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|--------|
| S W C : 1 1 7 | Signature Malleability | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | PASSED |
| S W C : 1 1 6 | Timestamp Dependence | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | PASSED |
| S W C - 1 1 5 | Authorization through tx.origin | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | PASSED |
| S W C 1 1 4 | Transaction Order Dependence | CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | PASSED |
| S W C : 1 1 1 3 | DoS with Failed Call | CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions | PASSED |

| S W C : 1 1 2 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | PASSED |
|------------------------------------|---|---|--------|
| <u>S</u> <u>W</u> <u>C</u> : 1 1 1 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | PASSED |
| S W C - 1 1 0 | Assert Violation | CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation | PASSED |
| S W C - 1 0 9 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer | PASSED |
| S W C : 1 0 8 | State Variable Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
| S W C : 1 0 7 | Reentrancy | CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow | PASSED |

| S W C . 1 0 6 | Unprotected SELFDESTR UCT Instruction | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | PASSED |
|----------------------------|--|--|---------------|
| S W C : 1 0 5 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | PASSED |
| S W C 1 0 4 | Unchecked Call Return Value | CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value | PASSED |
| S W C 1 0 3 | Floating Pragma | CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime | NOT PASSED |
| S W C 1 0 2 | Outdated Compiler Version | CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities | PASSED |
| S W C : 1 0 1 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation | PASSED |

| S W C 1 0 0 | Function Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
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Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC

