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**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC  
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MADE IN GERMANY

**2219 by MechaChain**

**Audit**

**Security Assessment  
17. April, 2023**

**For**



**SolidProof\_io**



**@solidproof\_io**

Disclaimer	3
Description	5
Project Engagement	5
Logo	5
Contract Link	5
Methodology	7
Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)	8
Tested Contract Files	9
Source Lines	10
Risk Level	10
Capabilities	11
Inheritance Graph	12
CallGraph	13
Scope of Work/Verify Claims	14
Modifiers and public functions	24
Source Units in Scope	26
Critical issues	27
High issues	27
Medium issues	27
Low issues	27
Informational issues	27
Audit Comments	27
SWC Attacks	29

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Version	Date	Description
1.0	1. February 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Layout project</li><li>• Automated- /Manual-Security Testing</li><li>• Summary</li></ul>
1.1	17. April 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Reaudit</li></ul>

## **Network**

Ethereum

## **Website**

<https://mechachain.io>

## **Twitter**

<https://twitter.com/2219project>

<https://twitter.com/MechaChain>



## Description

MechaChain is a 3D play to earn robot combat and space conquest video game called "Mechas". Each Mecha is a collection of NFT representing robot parts. They can be purchased online with the game's cryptocurrency called Mechanium, using Ethereum, or by card. These parts once assembled give birth to a controllable robot in a PvP combat video game. The player earns Mechanium by winning battles. He is then able to trade and buy new Mecha parts to become the best MechaChain pilot.

## Project Engagement

During the Date of 1 February 2023, **2219 by MechaChain Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

## Logo



## Contract Link

### v1.0

- <https://github.com/MechaChain/MechaChain-Smart-Contracts/blob/main/contracts/ERC721/MechaPilots2219V1.sol>
- **Commit:** 25de3240d60d787338891a5469e847f353fb491a

### v1.1

- <https://github.com/MechaChain/MechaChain-Smart-Contracts/blob/main/contracts/ERC721/MechaPilots2219V1.sol>
- **Commit:** 1b571e9a61fad16751c43db8bd207cd54d29ab62

# Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
<b>Critical</b>	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
<b>High</b>	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.
<b>Medium</b>	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
<b>Low</b>	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
<b>Informational</b>	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

# Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

## **Methodology**

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

## Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

```
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC721/ERC721Upgradeable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC721/extensions/ERC721BurnableUpgradeable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC721/extensions/ERC721RoyaltyUpgradeable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/PausableUpgradeable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20Upgradeable.sol
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlUpgradeable.sol
../../libs/operator-filter-registry-v1.4.1/src/upgradeable/UpdatableOperatorFiltererUpgradeable.sol
```



## Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.

*A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.*


### v1.0

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/ MechaPilots2219V1.sol	12827c097c5e02a7cadb88c0659046692 ae7f873


# Metrics

## Source Lines v1.0

source comment single block mixed  
empty todo blockEmpty



## Risk Level v1.0



# Capabilities

## Components

 Contracts	 Libraries	 Interfaces	 Abstract
1	0	0	0

### Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.





 Public	 Payable
26	3







External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
11	28	0	0	10

### StateVariables

Total	 Public
17	12

### Capabilities

Solidity Versions observed	 Experimental Features	 Can Receive Funds	 Uses Assembly	 Has Destroyable Contracts
0.8.17		yes		

 Transfers ETH	 Low-Level Calls	 DelegateCall	 Uses Hash Functions	 ECRecover	 New/Create/Create2
			yes		

 TryCatch	 Σ Unchecked

# Inheritance Graph

## v1.0



# CallGraph v1.0



## Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

1. Is contract an upgradeable
2. Correct implementation of Token standard
3. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
4. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
5. Deployer cannot pause the contract
6. Deployer cannot set fees
7. Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses
8. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

## Is contract an upgradeable

Name	
Is contract an upgradeable?	Yes

Comments:

### v1.0

- Owner can deploy a new version of the contract which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
  - Be aware of this and do your own research for the contract which is the contract pointing to

## Correct implementation of Token standard

ERC721				
Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
BalanceOf	Count all NFTs assigned to an owner	✓	✓	✓
OwnerOf	Find the owner of an NFT	✓	✓	✓
SafeTransferFrom	Transfers the ownership of an NFT from one address to another address	✓	✓	✓
SafeTransferFrom	See above - Difference is that this function has an extra data parameter	✓	✓	✓
TransferFrom	Transfer ownership of an NFT	✓	✓	✓
Approve	Change or reaffirm the approved address for an NFT	✓	✓	✓
SetApprovalForAll	Enable or disable approval for a third party ("operator") to manage all of `msg.sender`'s assets	✓	✓	✓
GetApproved	Get the approved address for a single NFT	✓	✓	✓
IsApprovedForAll	Query if an address is an authorized operator for another address	✓	✓	✓
SupportsInterface	Query if a contract implements an interface	✓	✓	✓
Name	Provides information about the name	✓	✓	✓
Symbol	Provides information about the symbol	✓	✓	✓
TokenURI	Provides information about the TokenUri	✓	✓	✓



## Write functions of contract v1.1



- ◆ initialize
- ◆ mint 💰
- ◆ mintWithValidation 💰
- ◆ revealToken
- ◆ setTokenURI
- ◆ setTokenURIPerBatch
- ◆ airdrop
- ◆ setupMintRound
- ◆ pause
- ◆ unpause
- ◆ setBaseURI
- ◆ setBaseExtension
- ◆ setBurnable
- ◆ setMaxMintsPerWallet
- ◆ burn
- ◆ withdraw
- ◆ withdrawTokens
- ◆ setDefaultRoyalty
- ◆ deleteDefaultRoyalty
- ◆ setApprovalForAll
- ◆ approve
- ◆ transferFrom
- ◆ safeTransferFrom

## Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer can mint	✓	✓	✗
Max / Total Supply	2219		

Comments:

### v1.1

- Owner can mint new tokens at any time by airdropping but not more than the MAX\_SUPPLY.
- Owner can also setup the mint round in which they are able to set the duration and the price of the round to any arbitrary number.

## Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer can lock	✓	✓	✗
Deployer cannot burn	✓	✓	✓

Comments:

### v1.1

- Owner can lock user funds by
  - Setting max mints per wallet wallet amount to 0
- Tokens can be burned by msg.sender
- Owner can Enable/Disable burning

## Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer can pause	✓	✓	✗

Comments:

**v1.1**

- Owner can pause contract



## Deployer cannot set fees

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot set fees over 25%	—	—	—
Deployer cannot set fees to nearly 100% or to 100%	—	—	—



## Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe addresses

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses	—	—	—



## Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)


Tested	Verified
✓	✓

### Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verified / Checked	✓
Partly Verified	🚩
Unverified / Not checked	✗
Not available	—

# Modifiers and public functions

## v1.1



```
initialize
Ⓜ initializer
mint 💰
Ⓜ whenNotPaused
mintWithValidation 💰
Ⓜ whenNotPaused
revealToken
Ⓜ whenNotPaused
setTokenURI
Ⓜ onlyRole
setTokenURIPerBatch
Ⓜ onlyRole
airdrop
Ⓜ onlyOwner
setupMintRound
Ⓜ onlyOwner
pause
Ⓜ onlyOwner
unpause
Ⓜ onlyOwner
setBaseURI
Ⓜ onlyOwner
setBaseExtension
Ⓜ onlyOwner
setBurnable
Ⓜ onlyOwner
setMaxMintsPerWallet
Ⓜ onlyOwner
burn
Ⓜ whenNotPaused
withdraw
Ⓜ onlyOwner
withdrawTokens
Ⓜ onlyOwner
setDefaultRoyalty
Ⓜ onlyOwner
deleteDefaultRoyalty
Ⓜ onlyOwner
setApprovalForAll
Ⓜ onlyAllowedOperatorApproval
approve
Ⓜ onlyAllowedOperatorApproval
transferFrom
Ⓜ onlyAllowedOperator
```

## Ownership/Authority Privileges

- Set base URI and Extension
- Enable/Disable burning
- Airdrop Tokens
- Set/Delete default royalty to any arbitrary value
- Only Allowed Operator can get the approval
- Only Allowed operator addresses will be able to send tokens using the contract
- Owner can withdraw native network and other ERC20 tokens from the contract.



- There are several authorities which are authorized to call some functions, that means, if the owner is renounced, another address will still be authorized to call functions
  - Be aware of this

**Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.**



## Source Units in Scope

### v1.1

File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score
contracts/MechaPilots2219.sol	1	=====	999	880	408	367	260
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1</b>	=====	<b>999</b>	<b>880</b>	<b>408</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>260</b>

### Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)

# Audit Results

## Critical issues

**No critical issues**

## High issues

**No high issues**

## Medium issues

**No medium issues**

## Low issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	Main	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check)	528, 541	Check that the address is not zero
#2	Main	Weak Randomisation	893	It is the best practice to use off-chain randomisation so that the values could not be predicted and randomness stays its course.

## Informational issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	Main	NatSpec documentation missing	—	If you started to comment your code, also comment all other functions, variables etc.

## Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

## 17. April 2023:

- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Owner can deploy a new version of the contract which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
- Read whole report and modifiers section for more information



## SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<a href="#">SW C-1 36</a>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	<a href="#">CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 35</a>	Code With No Effects	<a href="#">CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 34</a>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	<a href="#">CWE-655: Improper Initialization</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 33</a>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	<a href="#">CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 32</a>	Unexpected Ether balance	<a href="#">CWE-667: Improper Locking</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 31</a>	Presence of unused variables	<a href="#">CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 30</a>	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	<a href="#">CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 29</a>	Typographical Error	<a href="#">CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 28</a>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	<a href="#">CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption</a>	PASSED

<a href="#">SW C-1 27</a>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	<a href="#">CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 25</a>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	<a href="#">CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 24</a>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	<a href="#">CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 23</a>	Requirement Violation	<a href="#">CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 22</a>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	<a href="#">CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 21</a>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	<a href="#">CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 20</a>	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	<a href="#">CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 9</a>	Shadowing State Variables	<a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 8</a>	Incorrect Constructor Name	<a href="#">CWE-665: Improper Initialization</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 7</a>	Signature Malleability	<a href="#">CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</a>	<b>PASSED</b>

<a href="#">SW C-11 6</a>	Timestamp Dependence	<a href="#">CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 5</a>	Authorization through tx.origin	<a href="#">CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 4</a>	Transaction Order Dependence	<a href="#">CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 3</a>	DoS with Failed Call	<a href="#">CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 2</a>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	<a href="#">CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 1</a>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	<a href="#">CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 0</a>	Assert Violation	<a href="#">CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 09</a>	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	<a href="#">CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 08</a>	State Variable Default Visibility	<a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 07</a>	Reentrancy	<a href="#">CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 06</a>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	<a href="#">CWE-284: Improper Access Control</a>	<b>PASSED</b>

<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">05</a>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	<a href="#">CWE-284: Improper Access Control</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">04</a>	Unchecked Call Return Value	<a href="#">CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">03</a>	Floating Pragma	<a href="#">CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">02</a>	Outdated Compiler Version	<a href="#">CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">01</a>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	<a href="#">CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">00</a>	Function Default Visibility	<a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</a>	<b>PASSED</b>



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