

## A1: BROKEN OBJECT LEVEL AUTHORIZATION



Attacker substitutes ID of their resource in API call with an ID of a resource belonging to another user. Lack of proper authorization checks allows access. This attack is also known as IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference).


## USE CASES

- API call parameters use IDs of resourced accessed by the API:  
/api/shop1/financial\_details
- Attackers replace the IDs of their resources with different ones, which they guessed:  
/api/shop2/financial\_details
- The API does not check permissions and lets the call through
- Problem is aggravated if IDs can be enumerated:  
/api/123/financial\_details

## HOW TO PREVENT

- Implement authorization checks with user policies and hierarchy
- Don't rely on IDs sent from client. Use IDs stored in the session object instead.
- Check authorization each time there is a client request to access database
- Use random non-guessable IDs (UUIDs)

## A3: EXCESSIVE DATA EXPOSURE



API exposing a lot more data than the client legitimately needs, relying on the client to do the filtering. Attacker goes directly to the API and has it all.

## USE CASES

- APIs return full data objects as they are stored by the database
- Client application shows only the data that user needs to see
- Attacker calls the API directly and gets sensitive data

## HOW TO PREVENT

- Never rely on client to filter data
- Review all responses and adapt responses to what the API consumers really need
- Define schemas of all the API responses
- Don't forget about error responses
- Identify all the sensitive or PII info and justify its use
- Enforce response checks to prevent accidental data and exception leaks

## A2: BROKEN AUTHENTICATION



Poorly implemented API authentication allowing attackers to assume other users' identities.

## USE CASES

- Unprotected APIs that are considered "internal"
- Weak authentication not following industry best practices
- Weak, not rotating API keys
- Weak, plain text, encrypted, poorly hashed, shared/default passwords
- Susceptible to brute force attacks and credential stuffing
- Credentials and keys in URL
- Lack of access token validation (including JWT validation)
- Unsigned, weakly signed, non-expiring JWTs

## HOW TO PREVENT

- Check all possible ways to authenticate to all APIs
- Password reset APIs and one-time links also allow users to get authenticated and should be protected just as seriously
- Use standard authentication, token generation, password storage, Multi-factor authentication
- Use short-lived access tokens
- Authenticate your apps (so you know who is talking to you)
- Use stricter rate-limiting for authentication, implement lockout policies and weak password checks

## A4: LACK OF RESOURCES &amp; RATE LIMITING



API is not protected against an excessive amount of calls or payload sizes. Attackers use that for DoS and brute force attacks.

## USE CASES


- Attacker overloading the API
- Excessive rate of requests
- Request or field sizes
- "Zip bombs"

## HOW TO PREVENT

- Rate limiting
- Payload size limits
- Rate limits specific to API methods, clients, addresses
- Checks on compression ratios
- Limits on container resources

# OWASP API Security Top 10

## A5: BROKEN FUNCTION LEVEL AUTHORIZATION



API relies on client to use user level or admin level APIs. Attacker figures out the "hidden" admin API methods and invokes them directly.

### USE CASES


- Some administrative functions are exposed as APIs
- Non-privileged users can access these functions if they know how
- Can be a matter of knowing the URL, using a different verb or parameter

```
/api/users/v1/user/myinfo
/api/admins/v1/users/all
```

### HOW TO PREVENT

- Don't rely on app to enforce admin access
- Deny all access by default
- Grant access based on specific roles
- Properly design and test authorization

## A7: SECURITY MISCONFIGURATION



Poor configuration of the API servers allows attackers to exploit them.


### USE CASES

- Unpatched systems
- Unprotected files and directories
- Unhardened images
- Missing, outdated, misconfigured TLS
- Exposed storage or server management panels
- Missing CORS policy or security headers
- Error messages with stack traces
- Unnecessary features enabled

### HOW TO PREVENT

- Repeatable hardening and patching processes
- Automated process to locate configuration flaws
- Disable unnecessary features
- Restrict administrative access
- Define and enforce all outputs including errors

## A6: MASS ASSIGNMENT



### USE CASES

- API working with the data structures
- Received payload is blindly transformed into an object and stored

```
NodeJS:
var user = new User(req.body);
user.save();
```


```
Rails:
@user = User.new(params[:user])
```

- Attackers can guess the fields by looking at the GET request data

### HOW TO PREVENT

- Don't automatically bind incoming data and internal objects
- Explicitly define all the parameters and payloads you are expecting
- For object schemas, use the readOnly set to true for all properties that can be retrieved via APIs but should never be modified
- Precisely define at design time the schemas, types, patterns you will accept in requests and enforce them at runtime

## A8: INJECTION



Attacker constructs API calls that include SQL-, NoSQL-, LDAP-, OS- and other commands that the API or backend behind it blindly executes.

### USE CASES


Attackers send malicious input to be forwarded to an internal interpreter:

- SQL, NoSQL
- LDAP
- OS commands
- XML parsers
- Object-Relational Mapping (ORM)

### HOW TO PREVENT

- Never trust your API consumers, even if internal
- Strictly define all input data: schemas, types, string patterns - and enforce them at runtime
- Validate, filter, sanitize all incoming data
- Define, limit, and enforce API outputs to prevent data leaks

## A9: IMPROPER ASSETS MANAGEMENT



Attacker finds non-production versions of the API: such as staging, testing, beta or earlier versions - that are not as well protected, and uses those to launch the attack.

### USE CASES

- DevOps, cloud, containers, K8S make having multiple deployments easy (Dev, Test, Branches, Staging, Old versions)
- Desire to maintain backward compatibility forces to leave old APIs running
- Old or non-production versions are not properly maintained
- These endpoints still have access to production data
- Once authenticated with one endpoint, attacker may switch to the other

### HOW TO PREVENT

- Inventory all API hosts
- Limit access to anything that should not be public
- Limit access to production data. Segregate access to production and non-production data.
- Implement additional external controls such as API firewalls
- Properly retire old versions or backport security fixes
- Implement strict authentication, redirects, CORS, etc.

## A10: INSUFFICIENT LOGGING & MONITORING



Lack of proper logging, monitoring, and alerting let attacks go unnoticed.

### USE CASES

- Lack of logging, monitoring, alerting allow attackers to go unnoticed
- Logs are not protected for integrity
- Logs are not integrated into Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems
- Logs and alerts are poorly designed
- Companies rely on manual rather than automated systems

### HOW TO PREVENT

- Log failed attempts, denied access, input validation failures, any failures in security policy checks
- Ensure that logs are formatted to be consumable by other tools
- Protect logs as highly sensitive
- Include enough detail to identify attackers
- Avoid having sensitive data in logs - If you need the information for debugging purposes, redact it partially.
- Integrate with SIEMs and other dashboards, monitoring, alerting tools



### ABOUT 42CRUNCH

The 42Crunch platform provides a set of integrated tools to easily build security into the foundation of your API and enforce those policies throughout the API lifecycle. By delivering security as code you enable a seamless DevSecOps experience, allowing innovation at the speed of business without sacrificing integrity.

### ABOUT OWASP

The OWASP Foundation came online on December 1st, 2001 it was established as a not-for-profit charitable organization in the United States on April 21, 2004, to ensure the ongoing availability and support for our work at OWASP. OWASP is an international organization and the OWASP Foundation supports OWASP efforts around the world. OWASP is an open community dedicated to enabling organizations to conceive, develop, acquire, operate, and maintain applications that can be trusted. All of the OWASP tools, documents, forums, and chapters are free and open to anyone interested in improving application security. We advocate approaching application security as a people, process, and technology problem because the most effective approaches to application security include improvements in all of these areas. We can be found at [www.owasp.org](http://www.owasp.org).

### OWASP PROJECT DETAILS

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP\\_API\\_Security\\_Project](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_API_Security_Project)

### GITHUB PROJECT

<https://github.com/OWASP/API-Security>



**VS Code OpenAPI Extension**

<http://bit.ly/42vscode>

**API Security Info & News**  
[APIsecurity.io](http://APIsecurity.io)

**42Crunch API Security Platform**  
[42Crunch.com](http://42Crunch.com)