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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Transgovernmental networks and security policy coordination in North America and the European Union: A framework for transatlantic comparative research

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Abstract
This article outlines a new research agenda for the study of security policy coordination in Europe and North America. Despite the pressure to build coherent regional and transatlantic architectures to face common security challenges, since 9/11 the two regions have witnessed the coalescence of untidy bricolages of policy-coordination mechanisms—regional, sub-regional, and inter-regional; formal and informal; overarching and issue-specific; functional and dysfunctional. These dynamics raise relevant questions about how best to characterize, explain, and evaluate these network-driven types of policy coordination. Building on the literature on transgovernmental networks (TGNs), this article seeks to address these questions by proposing a comparative and cross-issue analytical framework that seeks to capture the particular forms and functions of existing security policy coordination initiatives across the Atlantic.

Keywords Security · Policy coordination · Transgovernmental networks · European Union · North America · Transatlantic relations

The end of the Cold War brought an acceleration of regional economic integration in North America and Europe, and then—particularly after 9/11—a recognition that the free flow of people, goods, and money also intensified complex transnational security challenges like terrorism, organized crime, uncontrolled migration, pandemic disease, and environmental disruption. Thus, in the early 2000s most observers expected—or at least hoped—to see the building of new regional security institutions in each region, to protect the economic and social benefits of integration, and

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greater cooperation across the Atlantic to address common challenges. Instead of the design and construction of coherent regional and transatlantic security architectures, however, we have seen the coalescence of untidy bricolages of policy-coordination mechanisms—regional, subregional, and inter-regional; formal and informal; overarching and issue-specific; functional and dysfunctional.

These patchwork arrangements created some frustration among policy-makers, business, and civil society organizations, but new policy-coordination mechanisms continued to accumulate, and there was a modest sense of ongoing momentum. More recently, however, we see the eruption of new populist–nationalist and nativist movements in each region (e.g., Trump, Brexit), which manifest themselves in anti-integration, anti-trade, and anti-immigration impulses, and thereby threaten to massively disrupt regional security cooperation both within and between Europe and North America. The sources of these impulses are varied and complex. However, a significant part of the explanation can surely be traced back to doubts—at least within some segments of society—about the efficacy and the legitimacy of these evolving regional security arrangements.

So, why did North America and Europe end up with the regional security governance structures that they did? How well do they work? Are there ways to make them more effective without severely compromising national sovereignty and democratic accountability? This collection explores these questions by looking comparatively at the form and function of security policy coordination initiatives across regional contexts and issue areas. Our contributors approach these questions from a variety of different theoretical and methodological directions. However, all begin with a focus on the institutional forms for policy coordination, with a particular emphasis on transgovernmental networks (TGNs), and the political mechanisms by which central decision-makers "manage" those networks.

Transnational challenges and transgovernmental responses

Two key realizations have shaped both the study and the practice of regional security cooperation after the Cold War. First, the centralized, inflexible institutions that modern states built to defend themselves against conventional military threats from other states are ill-equipped to manage the kinds of fragmentary, ephemeral, perpetually recurring threats they encounter in the "post-modern" environment. Complex, transnational threats like terrorism and organized crime can only be contained by flexible, adaptive governance structures.[1] Second, no matter what resources they invest, and no matter how they organize themselves, individual states cannot effectively manage these transnational challenges on their own. Global- or regional-scale transnational threats can only be contained by effective global or regional policy coordination.[2]

[1] Eilstrup-Sangiovanni [17], Anderson and Sands [3] and Ackleson Lapid [2].

[2] Den Boer et al. [13].

To respond to these complex security challenges, it was argued, bureaucrats and law enforcement officials would have to break out of their departmental silos, pool their information and resources, and apply their specialized technical knowledge to the creation of more effective common standards and practices. Moreover, these technical rationales for bottom-up, network-driven coordination were reinforced by the political lessons that policy-makers had learned from prior experience with economic and regulatory integration. After NAFTA, ratification in the US was nearly derailed by the emergence of the popular anti-globalization movement and partisan politics in the Senate, political leaders in the US (and in Canada and Mexico) were determined to avoid the "politicization" of future regional cooperation.[3] In Europe, the diplomatic and political crises of the late 1990s and early 2000s undermined the Cold War era "permissive consensus" for regional integration, creating incentives for national and EU policy-makers to minimize their reliance on formal treaty making and focus on more informal, network-driven forms of policy coordination.[4] These types of coordination mechanisms have also characterized transatlantic relations, with the establishment of a series of semiformal forums (e.g., the biannual EU-US Ministerial Meeting on Justice and Home Affairs) where officials from homeland security departments from both sides of the Atlantic have met to discuss and share information about matters of common interest (i.e., international terrorism, cyber threats, human smuggling, aviation security).[5] By encouraging bureaucrats and regulators to work more closely with their counterparts, and cementing the results of that coordination through reciprocal executive commitments (rather than formal treaties), central decision-makers argued, policy changes could be made in a more flexible way, and progress could be shielded from the fearmongering and parochialism associated with legislative oversight and ratification.

While there was widespread support for network-driven policy-coordination mechanisms after 9/11 on both sides of the Atlantic, there has also been a growing uneasiness about some of the diplomatic and political implications.[6] The long, frustrating struggle to consolidate the US Department of Homeland Security—for example—proves that more comprehensive, integrated bureaucratic entities are not always more efficient or effective. Furthermore, the ongoing migrant crisis in Europe has highlighted the wide gap between FRONTEX's ambitious mandate as a common border security service and its weak capacity for coordinated surveillance and enforcement. On top of this, critics have worried that transgovernmental networks might develop common policies that were technically sound, but not politically sustainable because they had not been developed through the long, slow process of building constituencies within and across national boundaries. Moreover, bureaucrats left to their own devices—with minimal executive guidance and little or no legislative oversight—might put shared professional loyalties ahead of political accountability, might consciously or unconsciously put their departmental priorities

[3] Ayres and Macdonald [5], Brunet-Jailly [9], and Anderson and Sands [3].
[4] Jönsson et al. [25], Börzel [8], Hollis [22], Cross [11], and Hillebrand [21].
[5] Christiansen and Neuhold [10] and Zaiotti [39].
[6] Slaughter [35] and Anderson and Sands [3].

before national interests, or might just complacently settle for the picking of "low-hanging fruit."[7]

Contexts and comparisons

These apparent contradictions raise important questions about how best to characterize, explain, and evaluate network-driven forms of policy coordination. There is a significant body of existing theory and research on these forms of governance. However, until recently, most of that work was not well-suited to close examination of real-world, network-driven policy coordination, and particularly to cross-issue and cross-region comparisons.

Early theory and research on TGNs tended to begin with a stark dichotomy between two abstract models of governance: i. a conventional, intergovernmental model, in which states' central decision-makers came together from time to time with their counterparts to negotiate the terms of formal treaties which would ultimately be codified through national legislation, and ii. an unconventional, transgovernmental model, in which the representatives of various functional agencies met spontaneously and continuously with their counterparts to work out common standards and practices, which would be codified only informally, through executive commitments to make reciprocal policy adjustments.[8] In the intergovernmental model, states were supposed to be unitary, and policy coordination was centralized, authoritative, territorially delimited, general purpose, and intensely political. In the transgovernmental model, on the other hand, states were "disaggregated," and policy coordination was network-driven, fragmented, specialized, and "technical" (rather than political).[9]

More recently, however, there has been a recognition that the real world rarely approximates either of these two ideal types, but instead tends to gray areas in between.[10] The same kinds of regional and domestic political constraints that drive policy-makers to pursue network solutions will often set strict limits on what can be achieved and with what policy instruments. More generally, it is clear that formal structures and legal rules enable, limit, and direct transgovernmental and transnational network interactions, and, in turn, network processes and outcomes may sometimes effectively reshape overall government priorities and practices.[11] In practice, political leaders have tried to reconcile these tendencies by designing "hybrid" systems that allow for central decision-makers to "manage" TGNs without smothering them, such as the Security and Prosperity Partnership in North America and the

[7] Scharpf [34], Slaughter [35], and Hillebrand [21]; for a counter-argument, see Moravcsik [30].

[8] Hooghe and Marks [23].

[9] This distinction between these two governance models also resonated with a parallel distinction between the traditional concept of "hard law" and increasingly important forms of "soft law," which involved governance without formal legislation, through the coordination of reciprocal executive commitments and negotiated common practices. Abbott and Snidal [1] and Eberlein and Grande [14].

[10] Abbott and Snidal [1] and Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond [38].

[11] Jacobsson [24] and Eberlein and Newman [15].

complex of overlapping networks and agencies associated with the Schengen Agreement in Europe.[12]

To go beyond the old argument about *whether* TGNs matter and think more systematically about *where and how* they matter, we need to develop a common analytical framework to structure and guide comparative research. The first challenge here will be to selectively borrow and adapt models and concepts from the extensive research on regulatory and legal coordination, to fill out the shallower and less theoretically grounded literature on security policy coordination.[13] The second will be to selectively borrow and adapt models and concepts from the relatively extensive and robust literature on European security cooperation as a foundation for the development of a new, cross-regional comparative research agenda.[14]

It is not obvious that insights from theory and research on regulatory policy coordination can be readily adapted and applied to the security domain. The earliest research on transgovernmental relations, back in the 1970s, was predicated on a tacit assumption that they represented a distinctive form of international cooperation found only in "low politics" issues, because central decision-makers would jealously guard their control over higher-stakes "high politics" issues.[15] This dichotomy has been implicitly upheld by more recent studies, such as the well-known work of Anne-Marie Slaughter, who looks for TGNs only in areas like finance, regulation, and legal cooperation.[16] Many of the "new," post-Cold War security challenges—such as organized crime and migration control—cut across, and thereby raise questions about, the conventional distinction between high and low politics issues. However, we still might expect TGNs to be less prominent and less consequential in these issue areas, because these new security challenges are politically contentious and cut deeply into the core functions of the sovereign state (e.g., citizenship, surveillance and policing). Moreover, central decision-makers *do* tend to set strict limits on information sharing and bottom-up policy innovation in some areas, like counter-terrorism policy. Nevertheless, there was less centralization in these areas in the past, and there is a lot less centralization in other security policy fields,[17] such as the coordination of efforts to contain pandemic disease or respond to natural disasters.

There are also reasons to be cautious about adapting insights from the European experience and applying them to North America. The two main differences are structural—i.e., the asymmetry of power is much more pronounced in North America—and institutional—i.e., Europe has built up a latticework of supranational institutions to manage policy coordination, and North America has very deliberately

[12] Egeberg and Trondal [16], Den Boer [12], Gaisbauer [18], Occhipinti [32], and VanNijnatten and Craik [37].

[13] Eberlein and Newman [15], Egeberg and Trondal [16], Slaughter and Hale [36], Bach and Newman [6], Levi-Faur [29], Blauberger and Rittberger [7], and Newman and Zaring [31].

[14] Research on regional security cooperation in North America proliferated after 9/11, but tended to be light on theory, and rarely engaged with the broader comparative regional security governance literature: for useful exceptions, see Hale [19] and Harvey [20].

[15] Keohane and Nye [27].

[16] Slaughter [35].

[17] Lefebvre [28].

avoided formal institution building.[18] The existence of supranational agencies in Europe, and the option to create more of them, does not necessarily prevent or overwrite TGN-driven coordination there, but it does complicate the picture. EU agencies may actively constrain or suppress networks, formally create and direct them, or coexist in symbiotic partnership with them.[19] It is this institutional difference that has underpinned the implicit rejection of comparisons across the two regions. However, the importance of formal supranational institutions has probably been overstated in theory and research on European security cooperation, TGNs play essential roles in driving policy coordination even where there are well-established supranational agencies, and the rationale and conditions for TGN formation and function seem likely to be similar across the two regions.[20]

A preliminary overview of post-9/11 security cooperation suggests that there are probably more significant differences between issue areas within either of the two regions than there are between regions. Some differences across policy domains seem to be driven mostly by the nature of the policy coordination "problem" in play within that domain. Counter-terrorism policy, for example, is a highly politicized issue area, where voters' expectations are very high, and central decision-makers are determined to avoid blame for intelligence failures or mismanaged operations.[21] On both sides of the Atlantic, therefore, political leaders have allowed for some sharing of information between cooperating agencies, but set stringent limits on transgovernmental network activity, particularly concerning the sharing of politically sensitive intelligence and the direction of enforcement operations. The governance mechanisms for the management of border security and migration control, however, are strikingly different, in ways which seem to have more to do with particular states' preexisting institutional or legal structures, region- or subregion-specific ideas about the nature of the problem and the role of the state in managing it, or the interventions of particular political or bureaucratic leaders. It often seems that the specific institutional forms and processes we see in any given policy area are profoundly contingent artifacts of a particular time and political context, best explained in terms of some mixture of exogenous shocks, political opportunism, and path dependency.

Core questions

The pattern across and between the two regions seems to defy any simple explanation, and yet, while there does seem to be quite a bit of complexity and contingency in each policy area, there do seem to be some parallels which could be the basis for systematic comparative research. This collection of essays represents a starting place for this more ambitious research agenda, which taps into the specialized expertise of scholars working on particular policy areas in each regional context. We

[18] Ayres and Macdonald [5], Aspinwall [4], and Pastor [33].
[19] Börzel [8] and Kaunert et al. [26].
[20] Zaiotti [39], see also Jönsson et al. [25].
[21] Harvey [20].

asked our contributors to consider three main research questions but left them with some discretion in choosing which questions to focus on, and what approach to take in seeking answers to those questions.

First, can we identify different *types* of TGN-driven coordination across different policy areas? Our conception of TGNs as a mechanism for policy coordination is based on an underlying view of networks as both a form and a process. TGNs are interesting because they are connected by a sense of common purpose and have been given (or have taken for themselves) a measure of autonomy in sharing ideas and information. They recognize one another as members of the network based on their professional credentials and overlapping responsibilities, and they are empowered to seek out and advance a common policy agenda based on their technical expertise and competencies. We do not, however, necessarily accept the implicit premise, in early theory and research on TGNs, that they are only important where politics has been displaced by technical problem solving. Technical knowledge and claims to authority are always intensely political. Moreover, as noted above, the classic model of transgovernmental relations is an ideal type, and, in practice, TGN activity is always explicitly or implicitly sanctioned by central decision-makers. The interesting question is not whether policy coordination in a particular issue area conforms to the intergovernmental model or the transgovernmental model, but rather what kind of hybrid model has been constructed and how it functions.

Some specific features of TGN-driven policy coordination seem especially important as bases for comparative research in this context.

- Is there one coherent network that takes in all or most of the relevant bureaucrats and law enforcement officials within a given issue area, or are there multiple networks? If there are multiple networks, do they overlap, or are they separated, perhaps according to constituent agencies or areas of responsibility?
- Did the existing networks form "organically," through ad hoc engagement between members, or were they deliberately "built" by central decision-makers, in order to resolve particular problems?
- What sorts of transactions constitute the interactions among network members? Do they merely share information about their own standards and procedures, with an eye to identifying "best practices," or do they seek to negotiate a set of common policies? Do they share resources with one another, and, if so, is that pooling of resources limited to sharing information, or does it include sharing of personnel, training, resources, or equipment?
- How are the results of network interaction translated into policy coordination outcomes? Are the agreed-upon standards and practices formalized in regional treaties and/or national legislation, or are they informally institutionalized through reciprocal executive policy adjustments?
- What sort of formal or informal mechanisms are in place to allow central decision-makers to "manage" network activity? Do central decision-makers set the agenda, timetable, and evaluation criteria for network engagement? Do they directly oversee network interactions, or just respond to the results?
- As an extension of the previous question, have central decision-makers created bodies to oversee TGN activity, and, if so, are those informal "processes" like

the Canada–US Beyond the Border initiative, or are they formal agencies like the EU's FRONTEX? What difference—if any—do EU supranational institutions make to the form and functions of TGNs in the given policy domain?

Raphael Bossong provides a broad overview of internal security networks in Europe, based on an impressive catalog of more than 180 different TGNs, in police cooperation, counter-terrorism, border security, migration policy, cybersecurity, and disaster prevention. He outlines some of the variation observed within the dataset, with specific attention to composition/participation, functional differentiation/specialization, task and purpose, and mechanisms for control and accountability.

Mai'a Cross looks at counter-terrorism and intelligence sharing within the EU's Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) area. She specifically compares the epistemic community dealing with security in outer space with the emergent TGN for intelligence sharing (IntCen). Her findings are that these security networks are organized very differently, with different kinds of resources to work with, and these differences are directly connected to their effectiveness in policy coordination. She distinguishes between different types of networks mostly in terms of the degree to which they take on the properties of an epistemic community—such as Copernicus—and argues that these are generally "stronger," in terms of their influence on policy outcomes and the consistency with which network members follow common goals and practices.

Simon Hollis focuses on disaster management coordination in Europe, and, more specifically, the EU's Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM). Based on participant-observation research, he describes in some detail the form and function of the UCPM's 2016–2017 European Disaster Response Exercise (EDREX), situating it within the larger landscape of European disaster management efforts. He characterizes the UCPM network as a cluster of overlapping and diverse sub-networks, organized in a variety of different ways. "The UCPM," Hollis finds, "exhibits both centralized and decentralized, informal and formal, and horizontal and vertical forms of cooperation." Looking more closely at the mechanisms of coordination, he raises questions about the way we usually think about the "strength" or "depth" of a TGN, recognizing that while the UCPM and associated initiatives are generally limited to intergovernmental decision-making, governed by very detailed legal agreements, they are also characterized by "deep" coordination of common practices and extensive pooling of training and resources.

Tony Payan shifts the focus to border security cooperation in the US–Mexico relationship, and considers the persistence and effectiveness of TGNs in this area, despite legacies of mistrust, conflicting government priorities, and severe resource asymmetries. He traces the accelerating growth of TGNs in these areas, particularly after 9/11, and the lack of effective oversight and coordination mechanisms. He argues that while the Security and Prosperity Partnership and the Merida Initiative give the impression of highly structured network governance structures, these issues have tended to be dominated by US agencies, which may in some times and places create ad hoc cross-border networks based on small-scale trust and overlapping organizational interests. In most cases, these networks tend to be highly informal, and limited to relatively small-scale operational cooperation, rather than real coordination of national policies and practices.

Second, how can we explain the "selection" of different forms of TGN-driven policy coordination? Particular problems considered include:

- Do particular policy "problems" tend to generate similar modes of coordination, across regional contexts?
- Where do we see deliberate "venue-shopping," with policy-makers selecting informal options as a way to avoid oversight or circumvent legal obstacles?
- When and how are existing modes spread or copied to new policy areas?
- When and how is the selection of mechanisms for policy coordination directed or constrained by existing laws, regulations, or bureaucratic procedures?
- When is the process of designing network-driven coordination initiatives likely to be dominated by the interests and ideas of particular government (or supranational) agencies?
- When are conditions like the ones above likely to be overridden by the raw exercise of power by dominant states?

Bossong outlines four perspectives on the sources of informal security policy coordination—functional selection of formal coordination or informal coordination, venue-shopping selection of informal coordination, and professional community building around language and practices—each of which links a particular logic to the selection of a particular form of network-led governance. He briefly reviews previous efforts to test these perspectives empirically, and then looks for patterns in his data to support each of these perspectives. He finds significant variation across issue areas but, in general, finds quite a bit of support for the importance of technocratic impulses and shared knowledge and practices among bureaucrats and law enforcement officials.

Cross' comparison of Europe's outer space and intelligence sharing communities highlights the importance of functional demand for network-driven coordination as the impulse behind their creation but stresses the importance of network attributes and institutional context in selecting the particular form that the network ultimately takes. She argues that the interactions among individuals working on the issue of outer space evolved into something more than an information clearinghouse because network members came to agree on common priorities and principles, and thus operated as an epistemic community. IntCen, on the other hand, has been limited to basic information sharing and negotiation of common practices within the network, mostly because of the nature of intelligence sharing as a policy problem (even for open-source information).

Hollis uses his overview of the UCPM and close study of the EDREX to try to understand the process by which EU disaster management coordination networks are formed and evolve. He explains the form and function of the UCPM in terms of the reconciliation of policy-makers' political priorities and bureaucrats' demands for resources and procedures needed to respond to policy problems. The picture that emerges through his close observation of EDREX is of technical experts working together to discover and work through a long list of anticipated and unanticipated legal and practical obstacles. Those continuously expanding and evolving "technical" solutions are then ratified and institutionalized through formal agreements.

With his longer-term historical perspective, Payan draws out the importance of historically rooted mistrust, path dependencies, and sovereignty-protecting legal constraints in limiting the construction and function of TGNs in the US–Mexico relationship. He emphasizes the gap between the aspirations embedded in the SPP and the Merida Initiative and the reality of much more limited and ineffective small-scale network building within them.

Third, how effective have these various modes of policy coordination been, in terms of producing significant policy adjustments and in mitigating the security threats they were designed to address? Effectiveness can only be assessed against the aims of the specific policy coordination initiative in question, and we have to be attentive to the problem of dogs that do not bark. Once we have identified specific structures and conditions which seem to have been more successful in meeting their objectives, we hope to be able to distill some broader lessons about improving the effectiveness and legitimacy of network-driven security policy coordination.

- What criteria are set for the evaluation of policy coordination initiatives?
- Who sets those criteria, and who is responsible for overseeing, assessing, and correcting network activities?
- How are effectiveness criteria linked to functional impulses which drive the formation of TGNs?

Bossong's broad survey does not leave much room for measuring the effectiveness of particular initiatives but is relevant here for highlighting some of the difficulties involved in drawing general lessons. In addition to the sheer number and variety of TGNs within the security domain in Europe, there are inherent difficulties in assessing effectiveness, including the decomposition across multiple networks of various government functions related to a particular security challenge (e.g., information sharing vs enforcement).

Cross argues that both the outer space and IntCen networks have been effective within the areas they have carved out for themselves. However, the outer space security community has been more ambitious in attempting to influence national policies, and has often been successful in doing so, because it has the attributes of an epistemic community—i.e., shared knowledge and practices, plus shared priorities in shaping the broader policy agenda, rather than just their bureaucratic mandates. Cross digs deeper into the sources of the outer space epistemic community's effectiveness, by tracing its consolidation back to the political rationale for the network's formation, and the professional incentives for network members, in national and supranational contexts.

Effectiveness is a primary focus of Hollis's study of European disaster management efforts. He argues that the key to effectiveness is the design of mechanisms to reconcile the political concerns of policy-makers with the technical problem-solving efforts of bureaucrats/experts. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of policy coordination efforts for disaster response, but Hollis finds that there are few political obstacles in this area, as emergency management coordinators are given a great deal of latitude to work out joint plans and pool resources as needed; the

limits on coordinated disaster response therefore seem to have more to do with overall resource constraints and the complexity of the challenges themselves.

Payan's history of US–Mexico cooperation finds that most TGNs have either been ineffective or actually dysfunctional. TGNs, as a mechanism for policy coordination, have mainly served to allow openings for US law enforcement and intelligence agencies to intervene directly in Mexico, and the main consequence was a massive escalation of violence and growing mistrust. These outcomes are partially attributable to the overall asymmetry of power in the US–Mexico bilateral relationship. However, they can also be connected to the poor design of policy-coordination mechanisms themselves and the lack of a longer-term strategy for building up the capacities of the Mexican state.

One of the consequences of the persistence of traditional security challenges such as terrorism, and the emergence of new ones such as cybercrime, is that issues of homeland security will remain a top priority in policy agendas of the Western world and beyond for years to come. As these challenges have important cross-border implications and governments share similar objectives when it comes to addressing them, the demand for international cooperation in the security domain is likely to remain strong as well. Yet, whether security cooperation can continue to thrive and, if so, in what form, are not predetermined outcomes. The Trump administration, for instance, despite its open contempt for international engagements, has not (yet) pulled out of all cooperative security arrangements introduced by its predecessors. Since the real estate mogul became president, US Homeland Security officials and their European counterparts have, in fact, continued to hold regular meetings to discuss issues of common concern. The current populist and isolationist wave spreading across the Western world has nonetheless weakened the political support for international collaborations, and these phenomena are likely to affect the long-term appeal and viability of existing transgovernmental security networks and their potential to expand.

In order to be properly understood, the complex and at times conflicting dynamics affecting security cooperation across the Atlantic require a thorough theoretical and empirical analysis. By mapping existing transgovernmental networks in North America and Europe and by engaging with questions about these networks' effectiveness and legitimacy, the contributions to this special issue seek to offer a comprehensive and compelling account of the current state of security cooperation in the two regions. Taken together, these contributions represent a first step toward the establishment of a transatlantic comparative research agenda that aims at expanding our understanding of the international ramifications of what is typically considered an "internal" matter (homeland security) and at showing how concepts and ideas used in other policy areas (i.e., transgovernmental networks dealing with economic matters) can be fruitfully applied to the security realm.

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