

# Public-Key Encryption Theory

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Cryptography, Autumn, 2021

- 1** Definitions and Securities of Public-Key Encryption
- 2** Trapdoor Permutations
- 3** Security Against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
- 4** Public-Key Encryption from TDP in ROM

## **1** Definitions and Securities of Public-Key Encryption

## 2 Trapdoor Permutations

## 3 Security Against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks

## 4 Public-Key Encryption from TDP in ROM

# Limitations of Private-Key Cryptography

- The key-distribution need physically meeting.
- The number of keys for  $U$  users is  $\Theta(U^2)$ .
- Secure communication in open system:

Solutions that are based on private-key cryptography are not sufficient to deal with the problem of secure communication in open systems where parties cannot physically meet, or where parties have transient interactions.

# Needham-Schroeder Protocol for Symmetric Key


- Key Distribution Center (KDC) as Trusted Third Party (TTP), which has the shared key with Alice, and with Bob, respectively.
- $E_{Bob}(k)$  is a **ticket** to access Bob,  $k$  is **session key**.
- Used in MIT's Kerberos protocol (in Windows).

## Strength:

- each one stores one key
- no updates

## Weakness:

- single-point-of-failure



# Merkle Puzzles (Key Exchange W/O TTP)

**Alice** prepares  $2^{32}$  puzzles  $\text{Puzzle}_i$ , and sends to Bob.

$$\text{Puzzle}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{(0^{96} \| p_i)}(\text{"Puzzle \#"} x_i \| k_i),$$

where  $\text{Enc}$  is 128-bit,  $p_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{32}$  and  $x_i, k_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{128}$ .

**Bob** chooses  $\text{Puzzle}_j$  randomly, guesses  $p_j$  in  $2^{32}$  time, obtains  $x_j, k_j$  and sends  $x_j$  to Alice.

**Alice** lookups puzzle with  $x_j$ , and uses  $k_j$  as secret key.

■ **Adversary** needs  $2^{32+32}$  time.

## Better Gap?


Quadratic gap is best possible if we treat cipher as a black box oracle.

# Public-Key Revolution

- In 1976, Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman published “*New Directions in Cryptography*”.
- **Asymmetric** or **public-key** encryption schemes:
  - **Public key** as the encryption key.
  - **Private key** as the decryption key.
- **Public-key primitives:**
  - Public-key encryption.
  - Digital signatures. (non-repudiation)
  - Interactive key exchange.
- **Strength:**
  - Key distribution over public channels.
  - Reduce the need to store many keys.
  - Enable security in open system.
- **Weakness:** 2 or 3 orders of magnitude slower than private-key encryptions, active attack on public key distribution.


# Alice and Bob [xkcd:177]

Question: Who sends the message?





# Definitions



- **Key-generation** algorithm:  $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}$ , key length  $\geq n$ .
- **Plaintext space**  $\mathcal{M}$  is associated with  $pk$ .
- **Encryption** algorithm:  $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(m)$ .
- **Decryption** algorithm:  $m := \text{Dec}_{sk}(c)$ , or outputs  $\perp$ .
- **Requirement**:  $\Pr[\text{Dec}_{sk}(\text{Enc}_{pk}(m)) = m] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(n)$ .

# Security against Eavesdroppers = CPA

The eavesdropping indistinguishability experiment  $\text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{eav}}(n)$ :

- 1  $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$ .
- 2  $\mathcal{A}$  is given input  $pk$  and so oracle access to  $\text{Enc}_{pk}(\cdot)$ , outputs  $m_0, m_1$  of the same length.
- 3  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ .  $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(m_b)$  (challenge) is given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- 4  $\mathcal{A}$  continues to have access to  $\text{Enc}_{pk}(\cdot)$  and outputs  $b'$ .
- 5 If  $b' = b$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeded  $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{eav}} = 1$ , otherwise 0.

## Definition 1

$\Pi$  is **CPA-secure** if  $\forall$  PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\exists$   $\text{negl}$  such that

$$\Pr [\text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A},\Pi}^{\text{cpa}}(n) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n).$$

# Security Properties of Public-Key Encryption

## Theorem 2

*Q: Would a deterministic public-key encryption scheme be secure in the presence of an eavesdropper?*

## Proposition 3

*Q: If  $\Pi$  is secure in the presence of an eavesdropper, is  $\Pi$  also CPA-secure? and is it secure for multiple encryptions?*

## Proposition 4

*Q: Is perfectly-secret public-key encryption possible?*


# Key Size Comparison

NIST recommends the **key lengths** (in bits) with comparable security. NIST deems a 112-bit effective key length acceptable for security until the year 2030, but recommends 128-bit or higher key lengths for applications where security is required beyond then.

AES	RSA ( $N$ )/DH ( $p$ )	ECC (order $q$ )
56	512	112
80	1024	160
112	2048	224
128	3072	256
192	7680	384
256	15360	512

# Construction of Hybrid Encryption

To speed up the encryption, use private-key encryption  $\Pi'$  (data-encapsulation mechanism, DEM) in tandem with public-key encryption  $\Pi$  (key-encapsulation mechanism, KEM).



## Construction 5

$\Pi^{hy} = (\text{Gen}^{hy}, \text{Enc}^{hy}, \text{Dec}^{hy})$ :


- $\text{Gen}^{hy}$ :  
 $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$ .
- $\text{Enc}^{hy}$ :  $pk$  and  $m$ .
  - 1  $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ .
  - 2  $c_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(k)$ ,  
 $c_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}'_k(m)$ .
- $\text{Dec}^{hy}$ :  $sk$  and  $\langle c_1, c_2 \rangle$ .
  - 1  $k := \text{Dec}_{sk}(c_1)$ .
  - 2  $m := \text{Dec}'_k(c_2)$ .

Q: Is hybrid encryption a public-key enc. or a private-key enc. ?

# Security of Hybrid Encryption

## Theorem 6

*If  $\Pi$  is a CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme and  $\Pi'$  is a private-key encryption scheme that has indistinguishable encryptions in the presence of an eavesdropper, then  $\Pi^{\text{hy}}$  is a CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme.*



## How do the following applications work by using hybrid encryption?

- **Sharing encrypted files:** In modern file systems, a user (Alice) can store encrypted files to which other users (Bob, Charlie) have read access.
- **Key escrow:** Consider a company that deploys an encrypted file system such as the one described above. The company runs a key escrow server which generates a public key pair. One day Alice is traveling, but her manager Bob needs to read one of her files to prepare for a meeting.

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<sup>1</sup>from BonehShuop v0.5


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
# Overview

**Trapdoor function:** is easy to compute, yet difficult to find its inverse without special info., the “trapdoor”. (One Way Function with the “trapdoor”)

A public-key encryption scheme can be constructed from any trapdoor permutation. (*“Theory and Applications of Trapdoor Functions”*, [Yao, 1982])



# Families of Functions



## Definition 7

$\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Samp}, f)$  is a **family of functions** if:

- 1 **Parameter-generation** algorithm:  $I \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$ .
- 2 **sampling** algorithm:  $x \leftarrow \text{Samp}(I)$ .
- 3 The deterministic **evaluation** algorithm:  $y := f_I(x)$ .

# Definition of Families of Trapdoor Permutations

A tuple of polynomial-time algorithms  $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Samp}, f, \text{Inv})$  is a **family of trapdoor permutations (TDP)** if:

- **parameter generation** algorithm  $\text{Gen}$ , on input  $1^n$ , outputs  $(I, \text{td})$  with  $|I| \geq n$ .  $(I, \text{td})$  defines a set  $\mathcal{D}_I = \mathcal{D}_{\text{td}}$ .
- $\text{Gen}_I$  outputs only  $I$ .  $(\text{Gen}_I, \text{Samp}, f)$  is OWP.
- deterministic **inverting algorithm**  $\text{Inv}$ .  $\forall (I, \text{td})$  and  $\forall x \in \mathcal{D}_I$ ,

$$\text{Inv}_{\text{td}}(f_I(x)) = x.$$

Deterministic polynomial-time algorithm  $\text{hc}$  is a **hard-core predicate** of  $\Pi$  if  $\forall$  PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\exists \text{negl}$  such that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(I, f_I(x)) = \text{hc}_I(x)] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n).$$

# Examples

Let  $f$  with  $\langle I, \text{td} \rangle$  be a TDP. Which of the following  $f'$  is also a TDP?

- $f'(x) = f(x) \parallel \text{td}$
- $f'(x) = f(x) \parallel I$
- $f'(x \parallel x') = f(x) \parallel \text{Inv}_{\text{td}}(f(x'))$
- $f'(x \parallel x') = f(x) \parallel f(x')$
- $f'(x) = \begin{cases} f(x) & \text{if } x[0, 1, 2, 3] \neq 1010 \\ x & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$

Is the following public-key encryption scheme from any TDP is secure?

$$\text{Enc}_I(m) = f_I(m), \text{Dec}_{\text{td}}(c) = f_I^{-1}(c).$$


## Construction 8

- Gen:  $(I, \text{td}) \leftarrow \widehat{\text{Gen}}$  output **public key**  $I$  and **private key**  $\text{td}$ .
- Enc: on input  $I$  and  $m \in \{0, 1\}$ , choose a random  $x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_I$  and output  $\langle f_I(x), \text{hc}_I(x) \oplus m \rangle$ .
- Dec: on input  $\text{td}$  and  $\langle y, m' \rangle$ , compute  $x := f_I^{-1}(y)$  and output  $\text{hc}_I(x) \oplus m'$ .

## Theorem 9

If  $\widehat{\Pi} = (\widehat{\text{Gen}}, f)$  is TDP, and  $\text{hc}$  is HCP for  $\widehat{\Pi}$ , then Construction  $\Pi$  is CPA-secure.

**Idea:**  $\text{hc}_I(x)$  is pseudorandom. Reduce  $\mathcal{A}_{\text{hc}}$  for hc to  $\mathcal{A}$  for  $\Pi$ .



$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}_{\text{hc}}(I, f_I(x)) = \text{hc}_I(x)] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\Pr[b' = b | z = \text{hc}_I(x)] + \Pr[b' \neq b | z \neq \text{hc}_I(x)]).$$

$$\Pr[b' = b | z = \text{hc}_I(x)] = \Pr[\text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{eav}}(n) = 1] = \varepsilon(n).$$

If  $z \neq \text{hc}_I(x)$ ,  $m' = m_b \oplus \overline{\text{hc}_I(x)} = m_{\bar{b}} \oplus \text{hc}_I(x)$ ,  
which means  $m_{\bar{b}}$  is encrypted.

$$\Pr[b' = b | z \neq \text{hc}_I(x)] = \Pr[\text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{eav}}(n) = 0] = 1 - \varepsilon(n).$$

$$\Pr[b' \neq b | z \neq \text{hc}_I(x)] = \varepsilon(n).$$

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}_{\text{hc}}(I, f_I(x)) = \text{hc}_I(x)] = \frac{1}{2} \cdot (\varepsilon(n) + \varepsilon(n)) = \varepsilon(n).$$

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# Scenarios of CCA in Public-Key Setting

- 1 An adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  observes the ciphertext  $c$  sent by  $\mathcal{S}$  to  $\mathcal{R}$ .
- 2  $\mathcal{A}$  send  $c'$  to  $\mathcal{R}$  in the name of  $\mathcal{S}$  or its own.
- 3  $\mathcal{A}$  infer  $m$  from the decryption of  $c'$  to  $m'$ .

## Scenarios

- **login to on-line bank with the password:** trial-and-error, learn info from the feedback of bank.
- **reply an e-mail with the quotation of decrypted text.**
- **malleability of ciphertexts:** e.g. doubling others' bids at an auction.

# Definition of Security Against CCA/CCA2

The CCA/CCA2 indistinguishability experiment  $\text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{cca}}(n)$ :

- 1  $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$ .
- 2  $\mathcal{A}$  is given input  $pk$  and oracle access to  $\text{Dec}_{sk}(\cdot)$ , outputs  $m_0, m_1$  of the same length.
- 3  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ .  $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(m_b)$  is given to  $\mathcal{A}$ .
- 4  $\mathcal{A}$  have access to  $\text{Dec}_{sk}(\cdot)$  except for  $c$  in **CCA2**<sup>2</sup> and outputs  $b'$ .
- 5 If  $b' = b$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeded  $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{cca}} = 1$ , otherwise 0.

## Definition 10

$\Pi$  has **CCA/CCA2-secure** if  $\forall$  PPT  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\exists$  negl such that

$$\Pr \left[ \text{PubK}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{cca}}(n) = 1 \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n).$$

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<sup>2</sup>CCA is also called Lunchtime attacks; CCA2 is also called Adaptive CCA.

**Let  $(Gen, E, D)$  be CCA-secure on message space  $\{0, 1\}^{128}$ . Which of the following is also CCA-secure?**

- $E'(pk, m) = (E(pk, m), 0^{128})$   
$$D'(sk, (c_1, c_2)) = \begin{cases} D(sk, c_1) & \text{if } c_2 = 0^{128} \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$
- $E'(pk, m) = (E(pk, m), E(pk, 0^{128}))$   
$$D'(sk, (c_1, c_2)) = D(sk, c_1)$$

# State of the Art on CCA2-secure Encryption

- **Zero-Knowledge Proof**: complex, and impractical. (e.g., Dolev-Dwork-Naor)
- **Random Oracle** model: efficient, but not realistic (to consider CRHF as RO). (e.g., RSA-OAEP and Fujisaki-Okamoto)
- **DDH(Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption) and UOWHF(Universal One-Way Hashs Function)**:  $\times 2$  expansion in size, but security proved w/o RO or ZKP (e.g., Cramer-Shoup system).

**CCA2-secure implies Plaintext-aware**: an adversary cannot produce a valid ciphertext without “knowing” the plaintext.

## Open problem

Constructing a CCA2-secure scheme based on RSA problem as efficient as “Textbook RSA”.

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# Random Oracle Model (ROM) – Overview

- **Random oracle (RO):** a truly random function  $H$  answers every possible query with a random response.
  - **Consistent:** If  $H$  ever outputs  $y$  for an input  $x$  “on-the-fly”, then it always outputs the same answer given the same input.
  - No one “knows” the entire function  $H$ .
- **Random oracle model (ROM):** the existence of a public RO.
- **Methodology:** for constructing proven security in ROM.
  - 1 a scheme is designed and proven secure in ROM.
  - 2 Instantiate  $H$  with a hash function  $\hat{H}$ , such as SHA-1.
- No one seriously claims that a random oracle exists.<sup>3</sup>

*With ROM, it is easy to achieve proven security, while keeping the efficiency by appropriate instantiation.*

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<sup>3</sup>There exists schemes that are proven secure in ROM but are insecure no matter how the random oracle is instantiated.

# Simple Illustrations of ROM

An RO maps  $n_1$ -bit inputs to  $n_2$ -bit outputs.

- An RO as an OWF, experiment:

- 1 A random function  $H$  is chosen
- 2 A random  $x \in \{0, 1\}^{n_1}$  is chosen, and  $y := H(x)$  is evaluated
- 3  $\mathcal{A}$  is given  $y$ , and succeeds if it outputs  $x'$ :  $H(x') = y$

- An RO as a CRHF, experiment:


- 1 A random function  $H$  is chosen
- 2  $\mathcal{A}$  succeeds if it outputs  $x, x'$  with  $H(x) = H(x')$  but  $x \neq x'$

- Constructing a PRF from an RO:  $n_1 = 2n$ ,  $n_2 = n$ .

$$F_k(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} H(k \| x), \quad |k| = |x| = n.$$

# Security Against CPA

**Idea:** PubK CPA = PrivK + (Secret Key = TDP + RO)



## Construction 11

- Gen:  $pk = I$ ,  $sk = td$
- Enc:  $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ , output  $\langle c_1 = f_I(r), c_2 = H(r) \oplus m \rangle$
- Dec:  $r := f_{td}^{-1}(c_1)$ , output  $H(r) \oplus c_2$

## Theorem 12


*If  $f$  is TPD and  $H$  is RO, Construction is CPA-secure.*

$H$  can not be replaced by PRG, since the partial info on  $r$  may be leaked by  $c_1$ .



# CCA-secure based on Private Key Encryption

**Idea:** PubK CCA = PrivK CCA + (Secret Key = TPD + RO).



## Construction 13


- $\Pi'$  is PrivK
- Gen:  $pk = I$ ,  $sk = \text{td}$ .
- Enc:  $k := H(r)$ ,  $r \leftarrow D_I$ ,  
output  $\langle c_1 = f_I(r), c_2 = \text{Enc}'_k(m) \rangle$ .
- Dec:  $r := f_{\text{td}}^{-1}(c_1)$ ,  
 $k := H(r)$ , output  $\text{Dec}'_k(c_2)$ .

## Theorem 14

If  $f$  is TDP,  $\Pi'$  is CCA-secure, and  $H$  is RO, Construction is CCA-secure.

# CCA-secure based on TPD in ROM

**Idea:** PubK CCA = TDP + 2 RO (one for enc, one for mac)



## Construction 15

- Gen:  $pk = I, sk = td$
- Enc:  $r \leftarrow D_I$ , output  $\langle c_1 = f_I(r), c_2 = H(r) \oplus m, c_3 = G(c_2 \| m) \rangle$
- Dec:  $r := f_{td}^{-1}(c_1)$ ,  $m := H(r) \oplus c_2$ . If  $G(c_2 \| m) = c_3$  output  $m$ , otherwise  $\perp$

## Theorem 16

If  $f$  is TDP,  $G, H$  are ROs, Construction is CCA-secure.

# Private Key Encryption vs. Public Key Encryption

	<b>Private Key</b>	<b>Public Key</b>
<b>Secret Key</b>	both parties	receiver
<b>Weakest Attack</b>	Eav	CPA
<b>Probabilistic</b>	CPA/CCA	always
<b>Assumption against CPA</b>	OWF	TDP
<b>Assumption against CCA</b>	OWF	TDP+RO
<b>Efficiency</b>	fast	slow