



cloud-native software  
supply chain security:  
the hard truth





# Software Supply Chain




The software supply chain involves a multitude of tools and processes that enable software developers to write, build, and ship applications.

Melara & Bowman, 2022, Intel Labs







# CNCF - SSC in a 🏈



# CIS - SSC ⚡ in a 🥚







# Stages of the SSC



# Stages/Elements of the SSC

- Code
- Dependencies
- Build
- Artifacts & Distribution/Deployment
- (Runtime)





# Stage: Code

**code content**

**code  
management**



# Stage: Code - code content

 threats

 - bugs

 - malicious code

 - license

 solutions

 - scanning

 - testing

 - policies



# Stage: Code - code management

## threats


 - manipulation

 - theft

 - deletion

## solutions

 - access  
RBAC  
Codeowners  
signatures  
MFA

 - repo  
config  
push policies



# Stage: Code - show of 🖐️

mandatory MFA for source code access

—

enforced commit message convention



# Stage: Dependencies




packages, libraries, ...

**Please use a  
Package Manager**





# Stage: Dependencies

## threats

- ☐ - bugs
-  - malicious code
-  - license
-  - integrity

## solutions

-  - scanning
-  - testing
-  - policies
-  - inventory
-  - signature
-  - SBOM
- ☐ - airgapping



# Stage: Dependencies - show of 🖐️


using a package manager

—

package usage policy in place



# Stage: Build










# Stage: Build

## threats

- ☐ - build bugs
-  - malicious env

## solutions

-  - dedicated env
-  - zero trust
- ☐ - single use env
- | - pipelines
- { } - as code
-  - reproducible



# Stage: Build - show of 🖐️


fully automated build

—

truly bitwise reproducible builds



# Stage: Artifacts & Distribution/Deployment






CD<sup>1</sup> ... Continuous Delivery

CD<sup>2</sup> ... Continuous Deployment



# Stage: Artifacts & Distribution/Deployment

## threats

- ☐ - theft / deletion
-  - replacement
-  - no transparency
-  - updates

## solutions

-  - repo security
-  - signatures
-  - attestation
-  - SBOM
- ☐ - TUF



# Stage: Artifacts - show of 🖐️

dedicated artifact management

—

create “extended” SBOM



# Bottom Line Message

Software Supply Chain has multiple levels → very different threats ⚡

Solutions / Mitigations on different levels of effort and complexity 👉



in the real world



# Context

MBA Master thesis research, looking for a “somewhat complete” set of SSCS controls

literature input from..

- CIS Software Supply Chain Security Guide
- CNCF Software Supply Chain Best Practices
- OWASP SCVS Software Component Verification Standard
- SLSA Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts
- Microsoft Secure Supply Chain Consumption Framework
- DoD Enterprise DevSecOps Reference Design





# Context

3 Implementation  
Groups

167 controls  
6 categories


83 questions  
4 possible answers

30 companies  
(DACH)




# Context

- **IG 1**
  - small company
  - no sensitive data
- **IG 2**
  - middle size company
  - some sensitive data
- **IG 3**
  - enterprise
  - highly sensitive data






# Findings - Companies per IP




# Findings - Using VCS






# Findings - Implementing all IG1 controls






# Findings - Implementing IG3 controls

- 🙌 only necessary for IG3 companies
- 😞 25% definitely not implemented
- 👍 1/3 implemented somewhere
- 🧐♂ > 1/3 unknown
  - no policy?
  - know how?





# Findings - Controls vs Effort





# Lessons Learned



IG / company size



Transparency


~25-50% of controls per group not implemented

scans, tests & checks  policies

Low hanging  not reaped



build, SBOM, attestation

automation is   
(IaC, pipelines, testing, PaC, ..)





# The Hard Truth



lots of information available



many simple controls not implemented



most complex controls not implemented

bigger company = less transparency/adaptation

# Daniel Drack

Senior Dev Ops Engineer @ FullStackS



**Organizer / Host**  
**CNCG Graz + KCD Austria**

- **BSc MA MBA**
- CK{A/AD}, TFA, VA, GitLab, PSM I, Snyk

 [daniel.drack@fullstacks.eu](mailto:daniel.drack@fullstacks.eu)  
 <https://drackthor.me>  
**@DrackThor**



# Further Reading

## Code:

- [SAST](#)
- [\(GitLab\) Push Rules](#)
- [Codeowners](#)
- [IaC Scanning Tools](#)
- [The Test Pyramid](#)

## Dependencies:

- [SCA Tools](#)
- [SBOM Introduction](#)
- [Dependency Track](#)

## Build:

- [Reproducible Builds](#)
- [Zero Trust Paradigm](#)
- [container based build](#)

## Artifacts, Distribution & Deployment:

- [The Update Framework](#)
- [In-Toto Attestation](#)
- [Sigstore](#)

## used Literature (selection):

- [CNCF Supply Chain Best Practices](#)
- [CIS Supply Chain Security Guide](#)
- [NIST SSDF](#)
- [SLSA](#)
- [OSSF S2C2F](#)
- [OWASP ASVS](#)
- [SSA Secure Software Controls](#)