

Nietzsche  
Courses, Lectures, and Works  
by Michel Foucault  
Edited by Bernard E. Harcourt

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## Translator's Note

This is a translation of the book Foucault M (2024) *Nietzsche. Cours, conférences et travaux* (BE Harcourt ed), Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, France. The French was published as part of the publishers' ongoing series 'Cours et travaux de Michel Foucault avant la Collège de France'. The previous entries in this series are:

- Foucault M (2018) *La sexualité: Cours donné à l'université de Clermont-Ferrand (1964), suivi de Le Discours de la sexualité: Cours donné à l'université de Vincennes (1969)* (C-O Doron ed), Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, France.
- Foucault M (2021a) *Binswanger et l'analyse existentielle* (E Basso ed), Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, France.
- Foucault M (2021b) *Phénoménologie et psychologie. 1953-1954* (P Sabot ed), Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, France.
- Foucault M (2022) *La Question anthropologique. Cours, 1954-1955* (A Sforzini ed), Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, France.
- Foucault M (2023) *Le discours philosophique* (O Irrera and D Lorenzini eds), Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, Paris, France.

The first of these has been published in English translation (by Graham Burchell) by Columbia University Press as Foucault M (2021) *Sexuality: The 1964 Clermont-Ferrand and 1969 Vincennes Lectures* (Burchell G trans, C-O Doron ed), Columbia University Press, New York, USA. That book is part of their series 'Foucault's Early Lectures and Manuscripts', which intends to publish English translations of the entire 'Cours et travaux de Michel Foucault avant la Collège de France' series. Columbia University Press have yet to publish translations of any of the other volumes. As such, I have produced my own translations, of which this is one. The others have been completed and may be accessed by contacting me.

For citation purposes, the beginning of each page of the French text is marked by the inclusion, on a new line, of 'Page N', in bold typeface. The footnotes are given in a numerical numbering system that remains constant throughout, due to technical limitations that have prevented me from restoring the alphabetical, resetting-each-page system of the original French. As such, for citation purposes, please note that footnotes in the French are given not as 1,2,3..., but as a,b,c..., and that the lettering begins anew on each new page of the French. For example, page 19 has 2 footnotes, which the French lists as 'a' and 'b'. When adjusting for this, remember that my own translator's footnotes are of course not in the French, and so should not be given a corresponding letter. In the 'Context', the footnotes are simply numbered; when citing it as the French, remember to exclude my own footnotes, and to restart the counting at the beginning of the 'Context'.

My alterations to the text have been kept to the minimum possible, I have tended to prefer more literal translations where available, but in some cases adjustments have been necessary. I point these out, even if they seem fairly minor, in order to be as clear as possible about what Foucault wrote. To those who prefer a reading experience with minimal interruptions, I can only offer my condolences.

When Foucault refers to a passage from Nietzsche, Harcourt has provided both the reference to the edition Foucault used and the reference to the standard scholarly edition (the Colli and Montinari edition) of Nietzsche's works, in French translation. Harcourt does not restore the published translations of these passages, only references them, preferring to maintain the passages as Foucault wrote them. With that in mind, I have translated these passages as closely to the French as possible: my goal is to translate not Nietzsche, but Foucault, including any ambiguities, inaccuracies, and errors. I have checked the Colli and Montinari edition in English translation so that I can insert the appropriate references, but have taken as little guidance as possible from its translation decisions.

In texts from the 1950s especially, Foucault cites Nietzsche via the French translation of a book by Karl Jaspers. The end of the French translation of that book mentions that the texts are cited by the 1896 Naumann edition of *Nietzsche's Werke* (Harcourt adds the relevant citations to this edition), a German edition, but gives the titles of each volume in French. In most cases this causes no confusion, but, where volumes 9 and 10 are referenced, Foucault cites texts called, respectively, *Écrits et esquisses de 1869-1872* and *Écrits et essais de 1873-1876*, and no such books exist. I have attempted to find the cited passages in the Colli and Montinari edition, but this has not always been possible.

The table of contents at the beginning is my own insertion, which gives the page numbers of this document followed by the page numbers of the French. For example, the 'Foreword to the French Edition'

begins on page 7 of the French edition (where it is titled 'Avertissement'), but on page 5 of this translation, so it is given as '5/7'. The table of contents in the French edition is, as is common in French, placed at the end of the book. It includes the brief summaries found at the start of each Foucault text. As such, I have decided to translate this also, and label it the 'Detailed Table of Contents'.

Some translation decisions deserve special comment.

French has two words for 'knowledge', 'connaissance' and 'savoir'. The distinction between the two is complex and forms a key part of Foucault's work. Put briefly (and too simply), one can think of 'connaissance' as a kind of knowledge of pure fact that is more immediate than its counterpart, and can think of 'savoir' as a 'knowing-how' that is produced by action (including study). I have followed the practice, standard when translating Foucault, of translating both as 'knowledge' and giving the original in parentheses afterwards.

Inversely, the term 'bas-fond' is one French word with many English translations. The meanings of this term are innumerable and it is, strictly speaking, impossible to translate adequately. It can, for example, refer to the criminal underworld, or to the shallows of the sea. Etymologically speaking its two parts are, respectively, related to the English 'base' and 'fundament'. The closest English translation possible would be something like 'bottom-base', but even that eccentricity would be inadequate. Throughout, I translate it in the way that seems most appropriate given the context, and place it in brackets the first time it is used in that part of the text.

There are times where Foucault uses the French words 'vouloir' and 'volonté' in ways that are, inconsistently, sometimes distinct and sometimes not. This is particularly bad in regards to the phrase 'will to know', which can, at different times, translate 'volonté de savoir', 'vouloir savoir', and even 'volonté de connaître' — such ambiguity in so central a concept is miserable, but difficult to avoid. The only adequate means I have found of responding to this is to bite the proverbial bullet and translate both as 'will', giving the French in brackets where it seems relevant. Moreover, there are times when he uses the words 'vouloir' and 'volonté' in a way that would seem to suggest a meaning closer to 'want', in which case I translate appropriately but put the French in brackets. A series of related words such as 'voulut', 'veut', etc., are translated as either 'want' or 'will' according to my judgement, but when the will is the topic of discussion I place the French in brackets.

'Commencement' is always translated as 'beginning', but 'recommencement' is always given as 'recommencement'.

Various other, more specific decisions I have made are noted in footnotes where significant. I insert the French term in brackets whenever I feel this would be beneficial, so quite liberally.

*Foreword to the French Edition*

François Ewald

From 1952 to 1969, when he was nominated to the chair of the History of Systems of Thought at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault taught in several universities and institutions: psychology at the École Normale Supérieur (from 1951), Lille (1952–1955), and Clermont-Ferrand (1960–1966), and then philosophy at Tunis (1966–1968) and Vincennes (1968–1969). In addition, in October 1965 he lectured at the University of São Paulo on the subject addressed in *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (1966).

Foucault kept only some of the manuscripts of the lectures he delivered during this period. These are deposited in the Foucault collection of the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (under NAF 28730). In the same boxes in which the lectures are kept, there are also some texts from the same period, some of which are highly developed. We thought it useful to include them in the volumes that make up this series of 'lectures and works' from the period prior to Foucault's election to the Collège de France.

The volumes are edited according to the following rules:

- The text is based on the manuscripts deposited in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France. The transcriptions are as faithful as possible to the manuscripts and have been subject to collective review within the editorial team. The difficulties that the reading of some words gives rise to are indicated in footnotes. Only minor modifications have been made (the correction of obvious errors, punctuation, and layout) in order to assist the reading and clear understanding of the text. They are always indicated.
- Quotations have been checked, and references to the texts used are indicated. The text is accompanied by a critical apparatus that seeks to elucidate obscure points and clarify critical points.

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- To make the text easier to read, each lecture or chapter is preceded by a brief summary that indicates its principal articulations.
- As with the editions of the Collège de France lectures, each volume ends with a 'context' for which the editor is responsible: it seeks to provide readers with elements of the context needed for them to understand the texts and situate them in Foucault's published work.

The members of the editorial committee responsible for the project are Elisabetta Basso, Arianna Sforzini, Daniel Defert, Claude-Olivier Doron, François Ewald, Henri-Paul Fruchaud, Frédéric Gros, Bernard E. Harcourt, Orazio Irrera, Daniele Lorenzini, and Philippe Sabot.

We would like to extend particular thanks to the Bibliothèque Nationale de France for enabling us to consult the manuscripts on which this edition is based.

François Ewald

Daniel Defert

died on February 7, 2023 before seeing the completion of the edition of the 'Courses and works of Michel Foucault before the Collège de France', which he never ceased to surround with his attention and advice. The editorial committee expresses its fullest appreciation and affection.

*Rules for Editing the Text*

Bernard E. Harcourt

*Nietzsche. Courses, Lectures, and Works* presents Michel Foucault's manuscripts on Friedrich Nietzsche that have remained unpublished, kept in Box 65 of the archives of the Foucault collection at the Bibliothèque nationale de France, titled 'Nietzsche 1955-1973' (BNF, Fonds Foucault, code NAF 28730).

There are four sets of documents: 1) the notes of the course on Nietzsche that Foucault delivered at the Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes as part of his philosophy teaching in 1969-1970; 2) the notes of the course entitled 'Knowledge and Desire' (*La connaissance et le désir*), given by Foucault at New York State University in Buffalo (State University of New York at Buffalo) in 1970; 3) lectures on Nietzsche and the problem of truth given by Foucault at McGill University in Montreal, Canada in 1971; and 4) multiple sheets and manuscripts that Foucault wrote on Nietzsche from the 1950s.

These texts shed a different and singular light on Foucault's reading of Nietzsche. They must be read each for themselves, complementing the few texts on Nietzsche that Foucault published during his lifetime, his books and courses at the Collège de France, as well as the manuscripts already published in this series of 'Courses and works of Michel Foucault before the Collège de France'.

The general rules for editing the texts follow those put in place by the scholarly committee for all the volumes of this series of 'Courses and works of Michel Foucault before the Collège de France' (see 'Foreword to the French Edition', *supra*).

However, this volume has some particularities. The first concerns quotes from Nietzsche's works, variously referenced in Foucault's manuscripts, often elliptically. In order to homogenise their presentation, we have chosen to

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follow any quotation in the text with the title of the book in French, so that the reader is immediately informed of its origin, and when adding the complete references in the endnotes: 1) first, we indicate in the note the book and the section, the number of the paragraph or of the aphorism (for example *The Joyful Science*, §340) to give a universal reference for all editions and translations, in any language, of Nietzsche's works; 2) then, for passages with a direct quote from Nietzsche's writings, we indicate the edition that Foucault used (or seems to have used) at the time of writing the manuscript; and 3) we also give the reference to the edition of Nietzsche's *Œuvres philosophiques complètes* edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari at Gallimard. For the works or passages simply mentioned (without direct quotation), we indicate the reference in the *Œuvres philosophiques complètes* edited by Colli and Montinari.<sup>1</sup>

As for the translation of Nietzsche's writings, we have kept Foucault's translations in his manuscripts and, when they are philosophically significant, clarified the possible differences with the editions he used. If it is only a minor difference (punctuation, placement of a word, etc.), we have taken up the text of the edition used. In his manuscripts, Foucault almost never emphasises the words put in italics in texts published by Nietzsche; on the other hand, Foucault sometimes emphasises a different word or group of words, which are not in italics in published texts. To favour Foucault's thought and transcribe the ideas he found important, we chose to reproduce only the passages underlined by Foucault (in italics). Apart from Nietzsche's quotes, we have italicised all the words that Foucault underlined in his manuscripts, unless there is an indication to the contrary in a footnote; we have also italicised foreign language words (German,

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<sup>1</sup> [I have kept the references to the editions Foucault has used, and replaced the references to the *Œuvres philosophiques complètes* with references to the English translation of the Colli and Montinari edition wherever possible. It is currently in progress, being published by Stanford University Press as *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, expected to total 19 volumes — Tr.]

Latin, Ancient Greek) and book titles. In order to avoid any confusion with the editorial interventions indicated in square brackets, the cuts made by Foucault in Nietzsche's quotes are marked by simple ellipses, without brackets.

The transcription of these courses, lectures, and works has been fully re-read by Henri-Paul Fruchaud and Daniel Defert. I thank them very much.

*Abbreviations*

- NC* Anonymous, 'Notes de cours. Michel Foucault, Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes, 1969-1970, "Nietzsche, la généalogie"' online: [web.archive.org/web/20230513132347/https://cinqheuresdusoir.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/foucault-nietzsche-la-gc3a9nc3a9alogie-vincennes-69-70-b1.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20230513132347/https://cinqheuresdusoir.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/foucault-nietzsche-la-gc3a9nc3a9alogie-vincennes-69-70-b1.pdf) (consulted 5 February 2024).
- DE* Michel Foucault, *Dits et Écrits. 1954-1988*, 4 vol., ed. established under the dir. of Daniel Defert and François Ewald, with the collab. of Jacques Lagrange, Paris, Gallimard, 1994.
- OCFN* Friedrich Nietzsche, *Œuvres complètes de Frédéric Nietzsche*, ed. established under the dir. of Henri Albert, Paris, Société du 'Mercure de France', 1899-1922. The translators of this edition are only named when the translations are not by Henri Albert himself. Unlike the other abbreviated references in this volume, and given the multiple editions of this vast translation enterprise conducted under the aegis of Henri Albert, we systematically add after the volume concerned the date of the edition cited, as well as the first edition when they are different (*OCFN*, t. X, 1948 [1903]).
- OPC* Friedrich Nietzsche, *Œuvres philosophiques complètes*, 14 t., 18 vol., texts and variants established by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, ed. under the dir. of Gilles Deleuze and Maurice de Gandillac, Paris, Gallimard, 1967-1997.<sup>2</sup>
- [*CW*] Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, 19 vol., texts and variants established by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995-ongoing.]
- [*EW*] Michel Foucault, *The Essential Works of Michel Foucault: 1954-1984*, 3 vol., ed. established under the dir. of Paul Rabinow and James Faubion, New Press, New York, 1997-2000.]<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> [As per my previous footnote, I replace mentions of this with references to *CW* — Tr.]

<sup>3</sup> [The square brackets on this page indicate my additions — Tr.]

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*Nietzsche  
Courses, Lectures, and Works*

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FIRST PART

***Nietzsche***

*Course given at the Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes (1969-1970)*

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## LECTURE 1

### **[*The Second Unfashionable and the historical sense*]**

*Introduction.* I. *The Second Unfashionable:* 1. *The non-historical individual, the historical individual, the supra-historical individual;* 2. *The three types of history (monumental, antiquarian, critical);* 3. *The five disadvantages (weakening of the personality; belief in justice; suppression of illusion; the last moment; scepticism).* II. *Historical sense: sixth sense;* First question: *what is historical sense as opposed to history?;* Second question: *where does this historical sense come from and how was it formed?;* Third question: *what are the dangers of this semi-barbaric sense?;* Fourth question: *how to ensure that semi-barbarism gives rise to a high culture?*

#### **[Introduction (1)]**

Between paragraphs one and two of the Preface to *On the Genealogy of Morality*, there is, if not a lacuna, a gap (*décalage*): from awakening to the twelve strokes of noon to the search for the origin of moral prejudices (2).

How to move from this awakening to this search? From the twelve strokes which have just occurred to the search for a far-off origin? From this event that has just happened to us, to the prejudices of which we are in spite of ourselves, no doubt, carriers? From this non-knowledge (*connaissance*) that makes us rub our ears to the meticulous knowledge (*savoir*) of the events where we were caught and that were engraved in us?

This is where the whole problem of historical knowledge (*connaissance*) lies. In two aspects:

- a. How can awakening to a future that is both lost in the dispersion of the account and amassed in the briefest

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moment of noon give rise to a historical knowledge (*connaissance*)?

b. How, inversely, can a historical analysis (which is based on philology, on the history of peoples and races, on the history of so many neglected domains) have the value of an awakening, from a long slumber, at the stroke of noon?

Answering these two questions which face one another implies that we reconstruct what Nietzsche means by historical knowledge (*connaissance*).

#### **[I.] *The Second Unfashionable* (3)**

Three series of distinctions, with which a fourth, less manifest, becomes mingled.

1. The three forms of history where life finds its utility: monumental, antiquarian, critical (4).
2. The five nefarious consequences of the excess of history (weakening of individuality; illusion of justice; destruction of necessary illusion; belief in the completion of the world; scepticism) (5).
3. The non-historical individual; the historical individual; the supra-historical individual (6).

1. *Despite appearances*, it is perhaps the third distinction which is the most important.

- a. The non-historical

It is defined as living absolutely in the instant, and under the sign of total and immediate forgetting.

It characterises in turn:

- Animal existence: man can only begin to exist by detaching himself from this immediacy. And inversely, the animal cannot detach itself from it. This incommunicability is symbolised by the human-animal dialogue — impossible dialogue. It is then happiness without memory.

- A certain power to forget with which some are endowed; with which undoubtedly all living beings are endowed, but we can grasp (*saisir*) both its existence and its efficacy by imagining what one deprived of it would be:

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abandoned to the indefinite fracturing of becoming. It is this which is necessary to live.

- A certain neutral<sup>4</sup> element (*Unhistorisches* opposed to *Historisches*):

- which is necessary (because without it existence would be impossible),
- which must, however, be restrained (because without this restriction man would be led to a *tierisch*<sup>5</sup> *existence*),
- which must be in a dominant position, although in equilibrium in relation to that which is historical. Indispensable atmosphere (see sheet: 'L'élément non historique est fondamental' (7)).

It is a certain sign of health for man, people, culture.

These three characterisations are not easy to adjust to one another: since on the one hand, the non-historical is incommunicable, on the other hand, it is a certain power (which would be opposed to an insidiously invasive recollection), finally it is an element to be limited and equilibrated even if it has a dominant position.

Doubtlessly it is the Dionysian.

#### b. The supra-historical (*Überhistorische*)

It is not a symmetrical element with respect to the non-historical. It is a point of view of knowledge (*connaissance*). Point of view that is characterised:

- by the fact that there is no difference between that which has passed and that which must come (in the *Unhistorische*, we cannot make two moments communicate; here, there is total communication);
- by the fact that it is possible for consciousness to grasp (*saisir*) the totality of becoming; all the past can be given as present;
- by the fact that<sup>6</sup> the supra-historic point of view [must be considered] as a point of view of the last instant of history on all history; ultimate moment (8).

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#### c. The historical

It is the intermediary between the non-historical and the supra-historical. But this intermediary has precise functions.

It appears as that which must traverse the non-historical in the manner of a light (but without dissipating it) (see sheet: 'L'élément non historique est fondamental' – second part (9)). This is specified in three modes:

- It is responsible for limiting (*einschränken*).
- It is responsible with taking hold of that which has been experienced (*vécu*) in the *unhistorisch* mode.
- It must remain at the service of *Leben*<sup>7</sup> and of what there is of the non historical in *Leben* (see sheet: 'L'histoire et la santé des peuples' (10)).

Hence the table:


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<sup>4</sup> [The word 'neutre' could also be understood as 'neutered', both de-masculinised and unproductive. Foucault is probably referring to both meanings, as they are interrelated ideas in Nietzsche — Tr.]

<sup>5</sup> *Tierisch*: bestial.

<sup>6</sup> *Stricken*: "that it is the heir of theology".

<sup>7</sup> *Leben*: life.

Non historical	Historical	Supra-historical
Becoming	Limitation	Identity
Capacity to forget	Taking possession	Totality
Happiness	[Subordination (11)]	

From there, we can see how the three types of history and the five disadvantages of history are distributed.

2. The three types of history (monumental, antiquarian, critical). These are all different ways for the historical element to exercise its triple function with respect to the non-historical. Three different ways to limit, take possession, and subordinate.

a. Monumental history:

- it limits: in choosing the sublime;
- it takes possession: in the mode of reactivation;
- it subordinates: wants to make itself<sup>8</sup> something grand.

b. Antiquarian history:

- it limits: our horizon, our valley (12);

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- it takes possession: in the mode of veneration;
- it subordinates: wants to affirm its continuity.

c. Critical history:

- it limits: practice of the just and the unjust;
- it takes possession: in the mode of acceptance/refusal;
- it subordinates: wants to free itself from the weight<sup>9</sup> of the past.

These are therefore modalities of equilibration and limitation of the historical and the non-historical (see sheet: 'L'utilité pour la vie des trois formes d'histoire' (13)).

3. The five disadvantages (weakness of the personality; belief in justice; suppression of illusion; the last moment; scepticism).

These five disadvantages are all linked to the inverse subordination of the historical to the supra-historical. Subordination that translates [in] two ways:

– Effacement of all differences (of that which could be singular, discontinuous, mute, intense in the non-historical).

General equivalence of times. *Alles vollgebracht*.<sup>10</sup>

– Effacement of the soil or non-historical atmosphere to which all history is linked. So that the practice of history becomes unsupported.

From there, the five disadvantages:

- weakening of the individuality:
  - that which one studies,
  - that of history;
- belief in justice:
  - of facts (see the passage on their stupidity (14)),
  - of the subject;
- suppression of illusion:
  - denunciation of error,
  - belief that it leads to the truth;
- the final moment:
  - all history has led us to this ultimate moment, which is a

<sup>8</sup> Conjecture, word is difficult to read.

<sup>9</sup> Conjecture, word is difficult to read.

<sup>10</sup> *Alles vollgebracht*: everything has been done.

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- scepticism in regards to the future.

Now these disadvantages are linked to an exaggeration (*Übermass*). This excess:

- a. it is not to do too much, or for too long, or too meticulously (see sheet: 'Le rapport histoire/vie' (15));
- b. it is to give too limited a place to the "non-historical". It is to completely historicise it, and to constitute as like everything in history;
- c. that is to say, to entirely dissolve the non-historical in historical science (see sheet: 'L'histoire ne doit pas être une science pure' (16), in full).

Hence the distinction [between]:

- *Wissenschaft*,<sup>11</sup>
- and historical sense.

## Conclusion

From there, we can measure the work that will have to be done:

- Free the supra-historical from its eschatological and totalitarian character. That it [appears] no longer as the cumulation of everything but as the return of the same.
- Endow the non-historical with the categories of the instant and intensity since it [must] recall its own forgetting.
- Thus, the two extremes will be able to communicate: that which will return in the Eternal Return is the instant and becoming; and the supreme point of happiness will be to recall all forgetting.

As for the historic: how has it changed?

Genealogy is history as it takes part in the play between the instant and the Eternal Return.

## II. The historical sense

Nietzsche, beginning from the *Second Unfashionable*, speaks more often of the historical sense than of history as science.

The principal texts devoted to the *historical sense* [are] *Human, All Too Human*, §272-294 (17); 'The Wanderer and His Shadow', §188 (18);

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*Dawn*, §307 (19); *The Joyful Science*, §337 (20); *Beyond Good and Evil*, §223-224 (21); *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, §25 (22).

### **First question: what is historical sense as opposed to history?**

a. It is that which animates the curiosity and practice of historians. It is the condition of their possibility. Just as geometry needs a sense, sight, history needs a sense, the sixth (Nietzsche takes up the usual theory of the sixth sense (23)):

- sense: which makes differences (see sheet: 'Le sens historique contre la démocratie' (24), *Beyond Good and Evil*);
- sense: which has its tastes, its distastes (see sheet: 'L'histoire et le sens de la noblesse' (25), *Human, All Too Human*);
- sense: which has its physical laws (see 'The Wanderer and His Shadow' (26): "History [is a] science of remedies").

b. But this sixth sense has a history.

- In Nietzsche, the senses like the body have a history. Sight comes from the hunt. Even the visionary gaze (*regard*) of metaphysics does not rely on the weakening of this sense.
- Similarly, the historical sense has a history. A very recent history:

- since it is only found in Europe; the high civilisations have hardly made their history (see sheet: 'Le sens historique' (27));
- since it did not appear until the 16<sup>th</sup> century (see *The Joyful Science* (28)).

It is the differential element of modern Europe.

c. Now this sense, like all the other senses, needs a support:

- In instinct. Cf. that which occurs to the gaze (*regard*).

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<sup>11</sup> *Wissenschaft*: science.

- And if it is missing, the historical sense will be perverted, as sight has been perverted by metaphysics, that is to say:
  - it will be forgotten as sense and as body; it will be presented as ideal truth;
  - and it will be repressed as principle of taste and distaste, as principle of choice; it will be presented as objective neutrality.

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The historical sense is therefore the condition of history: its bodily condition, its historical condition, and the condition of its perversion as a science.

It is the genealogical element that makes it possible to do both the history and the critique of science. It is thus that for which the *Second Unfashionable* called, when it said: "The origin of the historical culture... must be studied from the historical point of view" (29) (see sheet: 'Faire l'histoire de l'histoire' (30)).

### **Second question: where does this historical sense come from and how is it formed?**

a. Our civilisation had to leave its high state of culture. In its point of classicism, a civilisation only knows (*connaître*) difference in the form of exclusion.

To know (*connaître*) difference, for high culture as for nobility, is to ignore that which is difference. (That which is the opposite of Socratic and democratic ignorance: to ignore something is to ignore that we know (*sait*) it, that it is already there, that it has always been the same thing.)

Historical knowledge (*connaissance*) is decay by relation to the ignorance of high culture. In this sense, it is a relapse towards barbarism.

b. But which barbarism?

– Barbarism (that of the Germans and Goths at the gates of the Roman Empire) was indeed a certain recognition (*reconnaissance*) of a foreign civilisation.

- While they were designated as barbarians (that is to say, unworthy of being known (*connus*)), they rushed to Rome, inhabited its temples, re-wore its faded finery, reanimated its institutions.

- So also the Barbarians of Alexandria in the Hellenistic era.

These two great eras that for Nietzsche and Burckhardt serve as a model for ours (31).

– However, our barbarism is different. It is only a semi-barbarism (*Beyond Good and Evil* (32)).

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- It is that we are barbarians, because we are mixtures. The European, *mischen man* (*Mischmensch*).<sup>12</sup>

While the Barbarians grasped (*saisissaient*) difference because they were rejected to the outside, we find it in ourselves.

- The Barbarians took hold of these differences: that is, as vanquishers, they maintained a difference in this difference that they abolished.

We, we have to find them in ourselves; and our true work should consist of finding these scattered pieces, these cyclopean blocks, these ruined temples that populate us (see sheets: 'Les systèmes passés': "It is in the possibility of restituting...", *Human, All Too Human*, §274 (33); 'Le moi historiquement multiple', "someone who, while studying history, [felt constantly transforming, not only his mind, but also his heart, and who, in opposition to metaphysicians, is happy to shelter in him, not an immortal soul, but many mortal souls]", *Human, All Too Human II* (34)).

### **Third question: what are the dangers of this semi-barbaric sense?**

a. Self-denial: since we are made only of these strange (*étranges*) and foreign (*étrangers*) morsels, we must know (*connaître*) them one by one and in the most neutral way possible.

Instead of grabbing them wildly, we will try to show good taste.

b. Or on the contrary, appropriation (*sich eignen*), which can take two aspects:

- the Hegelian domination that makes us believe that we have reached the edge of extreme old age and that we are only what we have been;

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<sup>12</sup> *Mischen*: mixed; *Mischmensch*: mixed man. [The translation of the relevant passage in CW 8, §224, gives *Mischen* as both 'mingling' and 'mixture', and uses no English equivalent for *Mischmensch* — Tr.]

– the pity of Schopenhauer: to melt his individual will into the swarming of all these past wills (35).

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So Christian asceticism, Hegelian totality and the will of Schopenhauer await the historical sense and immediately deform it. It took the centuries of the Middle Ages and Luther's Reformation to digest the barbarism of the Germans and the Goths; it may take us a few years for the semi-barbarism of history, far from giving rise to a high culture, to be treacherously reduced to Christian, state and democratic non-culture.

### **Fourth question: how to make semi-barbarism give rise to a high culture?**

On several occasions, Nietzsche evokes the possibility that this historical sense — differential element of modern Europe — gives rise to an elevated cultural form.

- "Marvellous flower with a marvellous scent" (*The Joyful Science* (36)).
- Age of an "experimentation where all heroisms would have something to satisfy"; finally "cyclopean monuments" will be built (*The Joyful Science* (37)).
- "Our joy is that of the infinite... we drop the reins before the infinite, like the rider on his panting steed" (*Beyond Good and Evil* (38)).

These obscure, contradictory promises of historical sense, how could they be kept? How could the fragile germ of historical sense, how could this symptom of our disease be protected and reversed into its contrary?

#### a. Parody and masks (*Beyond Good and Evil* (39))

- The *Mischmensch* of the 19<sup>th</sup> century looks for an identity. He seeks it in all these identities of which he is the mixture. His historical tastes (for the Greco-Roman man with Winckelmann, for the man of the Middle Ages with the romantics, for the Renaissance man with Burckhardt) are desires for identification (40).
- Of course, he is not commensurable with these identities. The costume is too large for him. But it is possible to transform this effort into a game:
  - not to reconstruct an identity that would come to us from the exterior;

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- but to draw all these identities from ourselves and wear them, not as truths, but as masks.

To be the secondhand sellers (*fripiers*) of our own nature; the crossdressers (*travestis*) of ourselves.

Punches<sup>13</sup> and buffoons of God: that is, to redo divine creations as marionettes; to substitute for the seriousness of providence and the finality of history, the playful repetition of figures.

Parody is the endless repetition of multiple selves (*moi*) (thus opposed to the Hegelian succession of forms of consciousness that move one by one towards a self (*moi*) that is an us (*nous*), an us that is a self). Parody is the *Phenomenology* unravelled (41).

#### b. Pharmacopoeia ('The Wanderer and His Shadow' (42))

- Historical sense must not forget the body of which it is one of the faculties. It is not a question of erasing tastes and distastes, preferences and impulses, utilities and inconveniences.
- Consequently, history will be unjust; or it will be the instrument of injustice: it will respond to needs. It will remain under the orders of the *Unhistorisches*.  
Repetition, but of the noblest, the most intense, the most elevated. And no longer fusion, by pity, with all the pains of the world.

#### c. Experiment on ourselves (*Human, All Too Human* (43))

- Historical sense must not be internalisation of what has occurred. It is not a matter of bringing the contents of history back to that which we are as if we were the end and the truth.
- But we must be the instruments: wearing the mask, taking the remedy, it is not bringing history back to us, it is making our existence an instrument to know (*connaître*) history (see

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<sup>13</sup> ['Polichinelles', referring to the 'Punch' of a Punch and Judy show. Possibly also referring to the characters in the 1892 ballet *The Nutcracker*, by Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky — Tr.]

sheet: 'Le moi historiquement multiple', *Human, All Too Human* (44); see also: "This would be the moment of engaging in an experimentation where all heroisms would have something to be satisfied with", *The Joyful Science* (45)).

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### d. The cleave and the gift (*The Joyful Science* (46))

– The role of historical sense must not be to appropriate the past and its pains; but to fit them (in the text *eignen*, opposed to *tragen*),<sup>14</sup> as the tragic hero (Prometheus fits the miseries of man, while Christ identifies himself with them).

– We must only fit them to the extent that we are, not the last man (this stunted, eschatological, and awful little man that we see appear in *The Joyful Science* and *Zarathustra*), but the first — or rather the first man of a second day.

To fit man's pains to the folding of time, in the cleave of the instant.

– And that which has occurred can be repeated again this time (no longer as parody, no longer [as] remedy, no longer as experiment, but as gift). Generosity of he who cleaved time in two and:

- on the one hand, sees it multiply to infinity (different from the saving (*salvatrice*) cleave of Christians and humanists);
- on the other hand, sees it transfigured. The fisherman in the setting sun, he is that which has no history (the gesture that is ceaselessly forgotten, the inessential figure that is effaced). But from the fold and repetition, this transfigured figure becomes precious and imperishable like a carving<sup>15</sup> of the world.

## Conclusion

– Redistribution of the non-historical, the historical, and the supra-historical.

a. While History as *Wissenschaft* passes the non-historical into the speculative totality of the supra-historical, here the supra-historical is not totality but cleave. The supra-historical is both:

- caught in history (since it is only a moment, or the repetition of a moment that is itself history);

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- entirely void of history since it does not have its own content (all its content is already given).

b. And suddenly the historical and the non-historical communicate indefinitely with each other. They are caught up in an inexhaustibly reversible relation. Indeed:

- by the return, this entire non-historical that immediately sinks into forgetting is repeated; and everything becomes history;
- but each moment of this repetition is forgotten in turn, falls back into silence; history is immediately fragmented into the multiplicity of non historical instants.

c. From there, no doubt, the ambiguity of this historical sense, which is both the instrument of repetition and that which immediately disappears in it. In this sense, any survival of the historical passes it into the supra-historical. The historical must not be only (as in the *Second Unfashionable*) subject to the non-historical: it must be the non-historical itself.

Historical/non historical scintillation in repetition.

– Correlatively, the historical sense will aim to make what is non-historical in history reappear. The moments of high civilisation when history did [not] command and was unknown (*inconnue*). That which must be repeated is not the historical consciousness constantly superimposed on itself; but on the contrary that which is non historical. The Greeks. The sun and the fisherman.

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<sup>14</sup> ['Eignen' means 'to suit something, to fit it, to be up to it', whereas 'tragen' means 'to carry something, to bear it like a burden'. The French word I have translated as 'fit' is 'porter', meaning 'to put on, as clothes (or perhaps a mask)' — Tr.]

<sup>15</sup> [The French word 'ciselure' refers to a specific technique in metalwork, known in English as 'chasing', but translating it accordingly in the text would lead to more confusion than clarity — Tr.]

Genealogy: historical sense diverted from the constitution of a supra-historical that would envelop the entire non-historical, but returned to the repetition of the non-historical, and of that non-historical from which it is formed.

From there, three characteristics of genealogy:

- symptoms;
- chance;
- the stupidity of facts.

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## NOTES

1. In the program of the Department of Philosophy of the Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes for the autumn semester of the year 1969-1970, it is indicated that Michel Foucault gave a course titled 'Nietzsche' (see *infra*, Annexe A to the 'Context', p. 389, accessible in Charles Soulié, 'La pédagogie charismatique de Gilles Deleuze à Vincennes', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, nos 216-217, 2017, pp. 42-63, here p. 48). Elsewhere, this course is designated under other titles. Thus, an anonymous student, who took Foucault's course at Vincennes, called it 'Nietsche, la généalogie' (see *NC*; for details of the abbreviations used in the notes, see *supra*, p. 11). In his chronology, Daniel Defert reports that Foucault gave a course in 1968-1969 whose title was 'Nietzsche et la généalogie' (D. Defert, 'Chronologie [1926-1967]', in M. Foucault, *Œuvres*, under the dir. of Frédéric Gros et al., Paris, Gallimard, 2015, t. II, pp. ix-xxxix, here p. xii). Defert probably refers to the lectures on Nietzsche that Foucault would have given during the preceding year, in 1968-1969, and which carry the title 'La fin de la métaphysique' (see *infra*, Annexe B to the 'Context', p. 391). On another list of teaching modules (where the names of teachers are missing), there is a course from 1969-1970 — probably Foucault's — titled 'Le signe chez Nietzsche' (see Université Paris 8, 'Liste des UV – 1968-1972', Bibliothèque numérique de Paris 8, p. 57, online: octaviana.fr/document/FVNG0002, consulted 5 February 2024; see also *infra*, Annexe C to the 'Context', p. 393). We have chosen for this edition the most generic title, 'Nietzsche'. According to the notes of the student, Foucault would have given the first lecture presented here on 17 December 1969 (see *NC*, p. 5).

2. Friedrich Nietzsche, 'Preface' in *On the Genealogy of Morality* [1887], trans. by Adrian Del Caro, *CW*, vol. 8, *Beyond Good and Evil / On the Genealogy of Morality*, 2014, pp. 207-215, here pp. 207-208.

3. The 'Second Unfashionable' refers to Friedrich Nietzsche's text titled 'On the Utility and Liability of History for Life'. Composed in the Autumn of 1873, when Nietzsche was 29 years old, and published in January-February 1874 by Ernst Wilhelm Fritzsch in Leipzig, this text constitutes the second of four *Unfashionable Observations*, published between 1873 and 1876: F. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et de l'inconvénient des études historiques pour la vie' [1874], *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, *Considérations inactuelles. David Strauss ; De l'utilité et des inconvénients des études historiques*, 1907, pp. 119-256; *id.*, 'On the Utility and Liability of History for Life', *CW*, vol. 2, *Unfashionable Observations*, trans. by Richard T. Gray, 1995.

4. *Ibid.*, §2, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 138; *CW*, vol. 2, p. 96.

5. *Ibid.*, §5, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 170; *CW*, vol. 2, pp. 115-116.

6. *Ibid.*, §1, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, pp. 123-132; *CW*, vol. 2, pp. 87-96.

7. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Box 33b, chemise 4, 'L'élément non historique est fondamental'. In this reading note, Foucault quotes a passage from

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the first part of the second of the *Unfashionable Observations*: "The animal, devoid of "historical conceptions", lives in a "relative happiness" and without simulation. / The faculty of being able to feel, to a certain extent, in a non-historical way, must therefore be considered by us as the most important faculty, as a primordial faculty, insofar as it contains the foundation on which alone can be built something solid, healthy and great, something truly human. / That which is non-historical resembles an ambient atmosphere, where only life can be generated, to disappear again with the annihilation of this atmosphere. To tell the truth, man only becomes man when he comes by thought, rethinking, comparing, separating and reuniting, to restrict this non-historical element. In the cloud that envelops it, a ray of clear light is then born and it has the force to use what has happened, in view of life, to transform events into history. But,

when historical memories become too overwhelming, man ceases to be again" (F. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et des inconvenients...', §1, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, pp. 129-130; *CW*, vol. 2, p. 91).

8. *Ibid.*, §1, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, pp. 132-136; *CW*, vol. 2, pp. 92-94.

9. On the reading note 'L'élément non historique est fondamental', see *supra*, note 7.

10. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Box 33b, chemise 4, 'L'histoire et la santé des peuples'. In this reading note, Foucault cites some passages from the first part of the second of the *Unfashionable Observations*: "there is a degree of insomnia, rumination, historical sense that harms the living being and ends up annihilating it, whether it is a man, a people or a civilisation. / And here is precisely the proposition that the reader is invited to consider: the historical point of view as well as the non-historical point of view are necessary for the health of an individual, a people and a civilisation" (F. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et des inconvenients...', §1, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, pp. 127 and 129; *CW*, vol. 2, pp. 89 and 90).

11. In his manuscript, Foucault writes "Taking possession" on two lines, while in the students' notes, we read on the third line: "Subordination". Everything else is the same (except the last cell that includes "End" in the manuscript and "Last moment" in the student's notes). We have restored "Subordination" in this edition, following the student, to restore the sense of the third dimension in accordance with Foucault's words in his manuscript (see next paragraph).

12. This word is difficult to read, but we propose "valley" based on the student's notes: "it is the history of my valley, my city, my tombs, everyday life" (*NC*, p. 8).

13. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Box 33b, chemise 4, 'L'utilité pour la vie des trois formes d'histoire'. In this reading note, Foucault takes up two passages from the first part of the second of the *Unfashionable Observations*: "When the man who wants to create something great needs to take advice from the past, he seizes it by means of *monumental history*; when, on the contrary, he wants to dwell on what is agreed, what routine has admired at all times, he occupies the past as an *antiquarian historian*. Only the one who tortures an anguish of the present and who, at all costs, wants to get rid of his burden, he is the only one feels the need for a critical history, that is,

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a history that judges and condemns. / Every man, every people, according to his ends, forces and necessities, needs a certain knowledge (*connaissance*) of the past, sometimes in the form of monumental history, sometimes in the form of antiquarian history, sometimes in the form of critical history, but not like a troop of pure thinkers who only look at life would need it, not as individuals eager to know (*savoir*) and whom only knowledge (*savoir*) can satisfy, for whom the increase in knowledge (*connaissance*) is the very goal of all efforts, but always in view of life, therefore also under domination, under the supreme leadership of this same life" (F. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et des inconvenients...', §2 and 4, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, pp. 148 and 157-158; *CW*, vol. 2, pp. 102 and 108).

14. Foucault refers to the passage where Nietzsche writes: "the fact is always stupid, having always resembled a calf more than a god" (*ibid.*, §8, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 219; *CW*, vol. 2, p. 145).

15. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Box 33b, chemise 4, 'Le rapport histoire/vie transformé par la science'. Foucault here cites the following passage from the second of the *Unfashionable Observations*: "a new star is introduced. The constellation is truly transformed, and this by *science*, by the pretension to make history a *science*. From then on, it is no longer only life that dominates and tames knowledge (*connaissance*) and the past. All the limits are torn off and everything that has ever existed rushes on man. Perspectives move to the mists of time, to infinity, as far as there was a future. No generation has yet experienced such a spectacle, a spectacle impossible to dominate with the gaze (*regard*), like the one shown today by the science of universal becoming: history. It is true that it shows it with the dangerous audacity of its motto: *fiat veritas, pereat vita*" (F. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et des inconvenients...', §4, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 159; *CW*, vol. 2, p. 109).

16. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Box 33b, chemise 4, 'L'histoire ne doit pas être une science pure'. Foucault here cites the second of the *Unfashionable Observations*: "History, considered as pure science that has become sovereign, would be, for humanity, a kind of conclusion and balance of life. Historical culture, on the other hand, is only beneficent and full of promises for the future when it rubs shoulders with a powerful and new current of life, a civilisation that is forming, therefore only when it is dominated and led by a superior power and does not dominate and lead itself. / History, insofar as it is placed at the service of life, is at the service of a non-historical power, and, because of this, in this state of subordination, it can and should never be a pure science, as is, for example, mathematics" (*ibid.*, §1, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 137; *CW*, vol. 2, p. 95).

17. *Id.*, *Human, All Too Human. A Book for Free Spirits* [1878], vol. 1, §272-294, *CW*, vol. 3, *Human, All Too Human I*, trans. by G. Handwerk, 1995, pp. 184-197.

18. *Id.*, *Human, All Too Human. A Book for Free Spirits* [1879-1880], vol. 2, 'Second Part. The Wanderer and His Shadow', §188, 'Spiritual and physical transplantation as remedy', *CW*, vol. 4, *Human, All Too Human II and Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Human, All Too Human II (Spring 1878-Fall 1879)*, trans. by G. Handwerk, 2013, pp. 232-233.

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19. *Id.*, *Dawn* [1881], Book Four, §307, 'Facta! Yes, facta ficta!', *CW*, vol. 5, *Dawn. Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality*, trans. by B. Smith, 2011, p. 190.

20. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir* [1882], Livre quatrième, §337, 'Le "sentiment d'humanité" de l'avenir', Fr. trans. by Alexandre Vialatte, Paris, Gallimard, 1950 [1939], pp. 166-167; *CW*, vol. 6, *The Joyful Science. Idylls from Messina. Unpublished Fragments from the Period of The Joyful Science (Spring 1881-Summer 1882)*, trans. by A. Del Caro, 2023, pp. 199-200.

21. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal. Prélude d'une philosophie de l'avenir* [1886], VII, 'Nos vertus', §223-224, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948 [1903], pp. 219-224; *CW*, vol. 8, trans. by A. Del Caro, 2014, pp. 125-128. In his manuscripts, Foucault uses different abbreviations to refer to Nietzsche's book *Beyond Good and Evil*, such as 'Par-delà', 'P.B.M.', etc. To harmonise the references, we have chosen to use only the translation of the edition of Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (*OPC*), 'Par-delà bien et mal' [I have chosen to use *Beyond Good and Evil* as it is almost universally accepted as the only English translation of the title — Tr.]

22. *Id.*, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, §25, *CW*, vol. 8, p. 340-343.

23. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §224, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948, p. 221; *CW*, vol. 8, p. 126 (the historical sense: "this new sense, this sixth sense").

24. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Box 33b, chemise 4, 'Le sens historique contre la démocratie'. Foucault takes up the following passage: "The historical sense (or the faculty to quickly divine the hierarchy of the appreciations according to which a people, a society, a man have lived; the "divinatory instinct" of the relationships of these appreciations, from the authority of values to the authority of active forces) / (then comes a passage on the deterioration [conjecture] of this sense in the democratic mixture of Europe)" (F. Nietzsche, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §224, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948, p. 220; *CW*, vol. 8, p. 126).

25. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Box 33b, chemise 4, 'L'histoire et le sens de la noblesse'. Foucault here cites three passages from Nietzsche: "Compared to the past, we enjoy all cultures and their productions, and we feed on the noblest blood of all time... while older civilisations only enjoyed themselves without going beyond (3, 99)"; "if one feels the history of all humanity as *his own history*, one experiences, generalised in formidable proportions, the affliction of the...hero on the evening of the undecided battle from which he returns wounded and mourning a friend...; but endure...this mass of miseries... as a man who has as a horizon millennia in the future as in the past, as an heir... the most noble of the old nobility and the first of a new...this should finally produce a happiness such that man has never known it...And this divine happiness would be...humanity! (*The Joyful Science*, §337)"; "At the time of the last man: "We will be smart (*Klug*), we will know everything that happened in the past (*alles, was geschehen ist*); so we will have something to make fun of endlessly". The first passage comes from *Human, All Too Human*, in the translation which appeared in the book by Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche. Introduction à sa philosophie*, Fr. trans. by Henri Niel, letter-preface by Jean Wahl, Paris, Gallimard, 1978 [1936], p. 243. [See Jaspers K (1997) *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, (Wallraff CF and Schmitz FJ trans), The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, USA, p. 239 — Tr.] The second passage comes from Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §337, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 167; *OCFN*, t. VIII, 1942 [1901], p. 79; *CW*, vol. 6, p. 200. Foucault makes here a pastiche of a long paragraph, without reproducing the italics of the original or the exclamation point at the end of the paragraph. He adds as a note, in the margin: "Ext[remely] useful"

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→ review the whole text" (the following two lectures will indeed be explanations of the text of this important paragraph from the *Joyful Science*). The third passage comes from Nietzsche, *Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra* [1883-1885], Première partie, 'Prologue de Zarathoustra', §5, bilingual edition, Fr. trans. and pref. by Geneviève Bianquis, Paris, Aubier, 1946, p. 63; (2007) *Thus Spoke Zarathoustra: A Book for All and*

*None*, (Del Caro A trans), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, USA, 'Zarathustra's Prologue', §5, p. 10.<sup>16</sup> Foucault adds the words in German.

26. Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human II*, 'Second Part. The Wanderer and His Shadow', §188, *CW*, vol. 4, pp. 232-233.

27. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Box 33b, chemise 4, 'Le sens historique'. Foucault here cites the following passages from *Beyond Good and Evil*: "the "historical sense" almost means the sense and instinct proper to understanding all things...which clearly demonstrates that it is a sense *without nobility*"; "Men of a noble culture: The very precise affirmation and negation of their sense, their very quick distaste, their cold reserve about everything foreign, their horror of bad taste...all this worries them and predisposes them to be unfavourable even to the best things in the world, when they are not their own and *could not* serve as their prey"; ""base plebeian curiosity" of the historical sense"; "We men of the "historical sense"..., we are unpretentious, disinterested, modest, enduring, fully capable of dominating ourselves, full of abandon; very grateful (*reconnaisants*), very patient, very welcoming."; "That which we do not understand is "the point of perfection, of final maturity in any culture and art, the proper mark of aristocracy in works and men"" (F. Nietzsche, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §224, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948, pp. 221-223; *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 126-128).

28. F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §337, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 166-167; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 199-200.

29. The complete quotation in the referenced edition (*OCFN*) indicates: "Because the origin of historical culture and its fundamental and radical opposition to the spirit of a "new time", a "modern consciousness" — this origin itself must be studied from a historical point of view" (*id.*, 'De l'utilité et des inconvenients...', §8, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 212; *CW*, vol. 2, p. 141).

30. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 4, 'Faire l'histoire de l'histoire'. Foucault here quotes the following passage: "the origin of historical culture and its fundamental and radical opposition to the spirit of a "new time", a "modern consciousness" — this origin itself must be studied from a historical point of view. History *must* solve the very problem of history; science must turn its spur against itself, — this triple obligation is the imperative of the spirit of the "new time", in the case where there is truly something new, powerful, original and vivifying in this "new time"" (F. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et des inconvenients...', §8, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 212; *CW*, vol. 2, p. 141).

31. Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) was Nietzsche's interlocutor, friend, and principal colleague at the University of Basel. Recognised as a precursor of the study of *Kulturgeschichte* (cultural history, which consists of studying a civilisation by examining the social institutions and spiritual manifestations of its daily life), he is best known today as a historian of the Italian Renaissance. But his first great book, *Die Zeit Constantins des Grossen*

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(1853) ("The Time of Constantine the Great"), focused on the decline of the Roman Empire and the rise of Christianity. Burckhardt spent many years giving lectures and preparing manuscripts on Ancient Greece. These works were edited by his nephew Jacob Oeri and published posthumously in four volumes, under the title *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* (1898-1902) (*Histoire de la civilisation grecque*, 5 vol., Fr. trans. by Frédéric Mugler, Vevey, Éditions de l'Aire, 2002). [See Burckhardt J (1999) *The Greeks and Greek Civilization* (Stern S trans), St Martin's Griffin, New York, USA — Tr.]

32. F. Nietzsche, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §224, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948, p. 221; *CW*, vol. 8, p. 126.

33. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 4, 'Les systèmes passés'. Foucault here quotes §274 of Nietzsche's *Human, All Too Human*, in Alexandre-Marie Desrousseaux' translation of Henri Albert's edition, which he cuts into three sections (he only refers in his manuscript to the second passage): "It is a sign of superior culture to consciously maintain certain phases of evolution, which lesser men go through almost without thinking about it... It is necessary to isolate these phases by artifice. / It is in the possibility of quickly reconstructing, on given occasions, such systems of thoughts and feelings, as we restore the effect of a temple after a few columns and sections of walls... this is what the historical sense consists of. / The first result is that we understand our fellows as such fully determined systems and as representatives of diverse cultures, that is, as necessary, but as modifiable. And in return: that, in our own evolution, we are able to separate morsels and take them apart" (F. Nietzsche, *Humain, trop humain*, vol. 1, §274, 'Une

<sup>16</sup> [The CW edition of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* has yet to be published: when it is it will be vol. 7. As such, I have chosen to use Del Caro's translation, which is based on the Colli and Montinari edition — Tr.]

section de notre Moi sert d'objet artistique', Fr. trans. by A.-M. Desrousseaux, *OCFN*, t. VI, 1904 [1899], pp. 300-301; *CW*, vol. 3, p. 186).

34. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 4, 'Le moi historiquement multiple'. Foucault here quotes three passages from Nietzsche: "forgive yourself your own Self (*Moi*), because in any case you have in you a ladder of a hundred degrees, on which you can ascend to knowledge (*connaissance*)"; "It is necessary to..." "[make] a retrospective journey, travelling through the vestiges where humanity has marked its long painful march through the desert of the past: this is how you will most surely learn in which direction all future humanity no longer has the opportunity or the right to go. And while you seek with all your forces to discover in advance how the knot of the future is still tight, your own life takes on the value of an instrument and a means of knowledge (*connaissance*). It depends on you that all the traits of your life: your attempts, your errors, your faults, your illusions, your suffering, your love and your hope enter without exception into your purpose. This purpose is to become yourself a necessary chain of the rings of civilisation and to conclude, from this necessity, necessity in the march of universal civilisation""; "someone who, in studying history, feels constantly changing, not only his mind, but also his heart, and who, in opposition to metaphysicians, is happy to shelter in him, not one immortal soul, but many mortal souls". The first two passages come from: F. Nietzsche, *Humain, trop humain*, vol. 1, §292 'En avant', *OCFN*, t. VI, 1904, pp. 312 and 314-316; *CW*, vol. 3, pp. 194 and 195. The third comes from: *ibid.*, vol. 2, 'Première partie. Opinions et Sentences mêlées', §17, 'Bonheur de l'historien', *OCFN*, t. VI, 1909 [1902], p. 28; *CW*, vol. 4, p. 18. It is this third passage to which Foucault refers in his manuscript.

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35. Arthur Schopenhauer's ethics identifies *Mitleid* (pity, compassion; literally, "suffer with") as the human psychological motivation (*Triebfedern*) that forms the basis of true moral actions, because moral value presupposes a total distance from the desire for one's own well-being and is fully opposed to the desire for the misfortune of others. To practice *Mitleid* and the desire for the well-being of others, one must be able to identify directly with the other, thus abolishing the barrier between ego and non-ego. See A. Schopenhauer, *Über die Grundlage der Moral* (1840) ('Foundation of Morality') and *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1818-1819) ('The World as Will and Representation'). On the relationship between Schopenhauer's *Mitleid* theory and Nietzsche's criticism of pity, see David E. Cartwright, 'Schopenhauer's Compassion and Nietzsche's Pity', *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch*, vol. 69, 1988, pp. 557-567. On the reception of Schopenhauer in France, see René-Pierre Colin, *Schopenhauer en France. Un mythe naturaliste*, Lyon, Presses universitaires de Lyon, 1979.

36. F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §337, *op. cit.* (trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 166 ("a perfectly marvellous plant with a scent no less marvellous"); *OCFN*, t. VIII, 1942, p. 288 ("a marvellous plant with an odour just as marvellous"); *OPC*, t. V, p. 227 ("a marvellous plant of a not less marvellous odour"). [*CW*, vol. 6, p. 200 ("a wonderful plant with an equally wonderful fragrance") — Tr.]

37. *Ibid.*, Livre premier, §7, *op. cit.* (trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 38; *OCFN*, t. VIII, 1942, p. 47; *CW*, vol. 6, p. 45.

38. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §224, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948, p. 224 (Foucault makes some slight changes that we retain); *CW*, vol. 8, p. 128.

39. *Ibid.*, §223, *CW*, vol. 8, p. 125.

40. Johann Joachim Winckelmann (1717-1768) was a German art historian and archeologist, best known for his book *Geschichte der Kunst des Altertums* (1764) ("The History of Ancient Art"), which delimits a historical progression in four stages within the classical artistic tradition and places Greek Antiquity at the top of aesthetic success. Instead of fixating on the antiquity of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the romantic writers of the early 19<sup>th</sup> century glorified and imagined the Middle Ages as an ideal period characterised by social cohesion and a picturesque colourfulness, in contrast to the coldness of the emerging mercantilist rationalism. Writings celebrating fantasy and chivalry abound, from *Queen Mab* (1813) by Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822) and *Christabel* and *Kubla Khan* (both in 1816) by Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834), to *Ivanhoe* (1819) by Walter Scott (1771-1832) and *La Belle Dame sans merci* (1819) by John Keats (1795-1821). Jacob Burckhardt (see *supra*, note 31, p. 34) analysed and celebrated the cultural achievements, political development, and humanist renewal of Renaissance Italy.

41. Foucault had in 1949 devoted a thesis of philosophy, under the direction of Jean Hyppolite, to Hegel and his *Phénoménologie de l'esprit*, recently published under the title *La Constitution d'un transcendantal historique dans la Phénoménologie de l'esprit de Hegel. Mémoire du diplôme d'études supérieures de philosophie* (ed. by Christophe Bouton, Paris, Vrin, 2024). See more generally Jean-Baptiste

Vuillerod, *La Naissance de l'anti-hégélianisme. Louis Althusser et Michel Foucault, lecteurs de Hegel*, Paris, ENS Éditions, 2022, pp. 227-260.

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42. "History as a whole, as the knowledge of different cultures, is a mode of *instruction in remedies*, but not the science of medicine itself" (Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human II*, 'Second Part. The Wanderer and His Shadow', §188, *CW*, vol. 4, p. 233).
43. *Id.*, *Human, All Too Human I*, §292, *CW*, vol. 3, pp. 194-196.
44. On the reading note titled 'Le moi historiquement multiple', see *supra*, note 34.
45. F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre premier, §7 'Pour les travailleurs', *op. cit.* (trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 38; *OCFN*, t. VIII, 1942, p. 47; *CW*, vol. 6, p. 45.
46. *Ibid.*, Livre quatrième, §337, *op. cit.* (trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 166-167; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 199-200.

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## LECTURE 2

### [The Joyful Science §337]

*Introduction.* I. Elements regrouped in a single text: a. The recurring elements; b. The inconsistently recurring elements; c. The new elements. II. Analysis of the text itself: 1. The point of view of the analysis; 2. Tugend und Krankheit.

#### **Introduction (1)**

A large number of elements that are found in Nietzsche's other texts, but in an isolated state. Their encounter in a single text is unique in Nietzsche's work (2).

In addition, there are a number of propositions that are rare, not to say absolutely isolated, in Nietzsche's work.

Finally, this richness of the text is coupled with a considerable difficulty: the unity of all these elements is not exposed in a discursive manner, but in a poetic manner. Three metaphors of different levels:

- the hero and the battle,
- the god full of laughter and tears,
- the setting sun.

#### **I. What are these elements**

##### **(before analysing their distribution)?**

a. The recurring elements (at the start of the text)

- Historical sense defined as *Gefühl*<sup>17</sup> (and implicitly opposed to *Wissenschaft*), and is approximated to:

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- "divinatory instinct"; faculty of quickly divining hierarchy and evaluations (*Beyond Good and Evil* (3));
- "enjoying all other cultures" (*Human, All Too Human* II (4));
- "quickly reconstructing the effect of a temple" (*Human, All Too Human* I (5)).

The recurrence of this theme does not prevent a difference: in the texts cited, it is above all an instinct, a quick glance: here it is a *Gefühl*.

- Historical sense is of recent formation, it characterises our era:

- both complaint against the excess of historicism; and the project to make a history of history (*Unfashionable Observations* II (6));
- connaturality between historical sense and plebeian culture (*Beyond Good and Evil* (7));
- European mix and historical curiosity (*Beyond Good and Evil* (8)).

But with this difference: here it is less about the deep roots of history, than about its novelty, its youth, the fact that it is less a result than a differential character.

- The historical sense has a future:

- the project of a cyclopean history (history of feelings, of festivals, of instincts) (*The Joyful Science* (9));
- the project of doing a science of appearance to show that the world is "the result of a mass of errors and fantasies" (*Human, All Too Human* (10)).

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<sup>17</sup> *Gefühl*: presentiment.

But the difference is that the future of history is not thought of here as the accumulation of a knowledge (*savoir*), but as the growth of a feeling, and, to tell the truth, of happiness.

– Historical sense as universal comprehension: mirror and asceticism (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (11)). But here it is a matter:

- de suffering with (*Mitleid*),
- of enduring (*tragen*).

b. The inconsistently recurring elements

– We see appear in this text the theme that history weakens all vigour, and freezes all life.

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We find this same theme in the *Second Unfashionable*; and in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, "these eunuch concupiscents" (12).

– Or [we see] that history deprives us of any future, that it is the point of view of totalised time; that history is the looking-upon-itself of time in agony.

*Second Unfashionable*. History and the supra-historical point of view.

But whilst in the texts in question, these two themes are taken up by Nietzsche on his own account (he estimates that this weakening or eschatology is part of history, or is a condition of it), here Nietzsche attributes them to others; it is others who think this of history. And they are wrong.

c. Finally, the new elements

– The relation of history with the instant, the cleave, the space-between.

Whereas in the *Second Unfashionable*, the pure instant was non historical.

– The link of history with the return.

Surprisingly enough, Nietzsche hardly articulated his conception of history on the Eternal Return, save in this text, where the articulation is double since:

- history carries everything that happened,
- and it accepts the recommencement.

However, in the *Second Unfashionable*, there was, in regards to monumental history, a rapprochement between History and the Eternal Return.

- But the Eternal Return is considered as the theory of the Pythagoreans;
- and the impossibility of the return manifests the impossibility of monumental history.

– Finally, the link of history with happiness (and, what's more, Dionysian happiness).

While in most previous texts:

- consciousness of becoming is a tragic consciousness: suffering of torn individuality;

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- happiness is incompatible with consciousness of becoming (see sheet: 'L'instinct et le bonheur', *Unfashionable Observations II*, §1 (13)).

We therefore have a considerable amount of elements, some new, others reappearing. But these same recurring elements are affected by an index of singularity. But as it is the only text where Nietzsche relates what he calls historical sense and the return, Dionysian happiness, the cleave of the instant (in short, all the themes of his final philosophy), this is undoubtedly where we can grasp (*saisir*) the relation between genealogy and philosophy.

## II. Analysis of the text itself

### 1. The point of view of the analysis

It is a matter of doing:

- not the history of the future from our present,
- but the history of the present from a future which is only defined by its remoteness (14).

Where is this future situated? Is it even a future, and why would it not be a past? Where does this balcony that allows one to see the present come from?

- It is necessary to remark that it is not given by history, that it is not extrapolation from a historical consciousness; it is that from which history tells its history.
- It is therefore a transport of the subject without historical support. But equally without imaginary support. Pure and simple duplication of time from the present. To see the present rendered distant from itself by a pure and simple distance.

This may already be the point of view of the Eternal Return. To be six thousand feet above time itself, in an instant that is both future and present or past.

We see that it is not the genealogy of history that is made here. But the perception of the point where, indefinitely, history begins to begin again. It is less the formation of history in our society than the unearthing of the instant of eternal history.

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Instant which is going to appear as:

- *Tugend – Krankheit*.<sup>18</sup>
- Still-fragile novelty, and not weakening of the old.
- Not disease and final moment, but second morning.
- Reunite all in one soul.
- Happiness and transfiguration of the fisherman (15).

#### 2. Tugend und Krankheit

What do these two words and the association of these two words mean? *Tugend* has both senses of the word "virtue": it is property, internal force, specific power; it is also the opposite of vice. Ascetic virtue and specific virtue.

– Ascetic virtue:

- a. Because it implies the suppression of all preferences, of all tastes, hence of any individual position.  
Annihilation of the subject.
- b. Because it implies the erasure of the body, of real events, in favour of what has been done. *Facta ficta* (16).

– Disease:

This ascetic virtue [is] indeed the symptom of a disease. This disease has two aspects:

- a. Weakening of a culture which recognises that there are other cultures. What is characteristic of high cultures is not that they deny others, it is not that they perceive differences with others; it is that they do not even have to deny; they are themselves the difference, without anything that differs from them.

The law of the difference of individuality is of being a difference without comparison. Differentiation, taxonomy, characterisation are the disease of individuality. (This is already sketched in the text from the *Unfashionables*, regarding the Eternal Return: which alone repeats without weakening individuality (17).)

- b. The mix of individuals. European man is a *Mischmensch*. That is to say:

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- that the individual difference has disappeared in him; he is the same as all the others; interchangeable;
- but at the same time, he becomes absolutely precious, since in him is collected the entire essence of every man,<sup>19</sup> that which means that all the others are similar. He can therefore accept neither his death, nor the death of his own culture, nor his overcoming, etc.

– Specific virtue:

The virtues of disease: see Preface to the second edition [of] *Human, All Too Human*, where disease is characterised as the hook of knowledge (*connaissance*) (18). Disease consists precisely in looking for similarities, while we are in solitude — in difference without resemblance. This disease has three stages which are both disease and cure:

- tear loose from what one venerates and affirm(s), self;<sup>20</sup>
- living to experiment, offering itself to adventures, will to health, effort to mimic it;

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<sup>18</sup> *Tugend*: virtue; *Krankheit*: disease.

<sup>19</sup> This word is difficult to read. It seems that Foucault uses the expression "every man (*l'homme chacun*)" to express the idea contained in the German *Mitmensch* (the similar).

<sup>20</sup> [Foucault writes "se détacher de ce qu'on vénère et s'affirmer, soi". Since the phrase is highly fragmented, the final part of that could mean "and affirm oneself," or it could mean "and from that which one affirms, namely, oneself." I have decided to retain the ambiguity — Tr.]

- opening the eyes to the nearest things.<sup>21</sup>

However, the disease of resemblance from which Europe is affected gives rise to a knowledge (*connaissance*) which is historical sense.

- Historical sense is the vain search for an identity. The costumes, the disguises of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. And by this, in this parody, we discover that no clothing fits. God's clowns. Fall of all veneration.
- Historical sense rediscovers past systems, and rediscovers them in itself (*en soi*). The historically multiple me (*moi*).
- Finally the things nearby: ourselves as experiments.

Thus there is a circularity:

- The existence of a historical sense is symptom of a disease (which is ascetic, *Tugend*).

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- This disease develops a historical sense which is the specific virtue (*Tugend*) of this disease.
- And this specific virtue, in developing, will lead to something that is happiness.

But this nascent happiness is fragile.

1. It courts dangers. Which?
2. In what does it consist?

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#### NOTES

1. According to the student notes, Michel Foucault would have given the second lecture on 14 January 1970 (see *NC*, p. 17).

2. F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, §337, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 166-167; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 199-200.

3. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §224, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948, p. 220; *CW*, vol. 8, p. 126.

4. *Id.*, *Human, All Too Human II*, 'Mixed Opinions and Maxims', §179, 'Good fortune of the age', *CW*, vol. 4, pp. 78-79.

5. "The sense for history consists of being able to quickly reconstruct such systems of thought and feeling on a given occasion, as if we were reconstructing the total impression of a temple from a few columns and ruined walls that have remained standing by chance" (*id.*, *Human, All Too Human I*, §274, *CW*, vol. 3, p. 186).

6. See *supra*, note 30, p. 34. Foucault refers to the passage from the second of the *Unfashionable Observations* where Nietzsche writes: "History itself *must* solve the problem of history" (*id.*, 'De l'utilité et des inconvénients...', §8, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 212; *CW*, vol. 2, p. 141).

7. *Id.*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, VII, 'Our Virtues', §224, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 126-127.

8. *Ibid.*, §223, *CW*, vol. 8, p. 125.

9. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, §7, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 37-38; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 44-45.

10. *Id.*, *Humain, trop humain*, vol. 1, §16, 'Apparence et chose en soi', *OCFN*, t. VI, 1904, p. 39; *CW*, vol. 3, p. 27.

11. *Id.*, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, §26, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 343-344.

12. *Ibid.*, *OCFN*, t. XI, 1913 [1900], p. 276; *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 344-345.

13. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 4, 'L'instinct et le bonheur'. Foucault there quotes the following two passages by Nietzsche: "He who does not know (*sait*) how to rest on the threshold of the moment, forgetting all the past, the one who does not know how to stand up, as the genius of victory, without vertigo and without fear, will never know (*saura*) what happiness is, and, what is worse, he will never do anything that can make others happy. Imagine the most complete example: a man who would be absolutely devoid of the faculty of forgetting

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<sup>21</sup> [There is no endnote specifying this, but most of the terms in these three points are drawn from §3-4 of *Human, All Too Human*'s 'Preface'; see endnote 10 for the citation of the edition to which Foucault referred, which is available digitally here: <https://archive.org/details/NietzscheHumanTropHumain1rePartie> — Tr.]

and who would be condemned to see, in everything, becoming. Such a man would no longer believe in his own being, would no longer believe in himself. He would see all things unfold in a series of moving points, he would get lost in this sea of becoming"; "Cf. a little above, what is said about the animal and its happiness of not remembering anything. And if he is asked "Why don't you speak to me of your happiness...?" — "... This comes from the fact that I forget each time what I intend to answer." But the animal forgets this answer itself the moment it wants to make it" (F. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et des inconvénients...', §1, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, pp. 126 and 123; *CW*, vol. 2, pp. 89 and 87).

14. We can read here, for the first time, this expression "history of the present" which becomes so important for characterising the genealogical method: M. Foucault, *Surveiller et Punir. Naissance de la prison*, ed. by Bernard E. Harcourt, in *Œuvres*, t. II, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

15. Aphorism §337 ends on a passage which refers to the "poorest fisherman" who "rows with golden oars. This divine feeling would then be called — humaneness!" (F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §337, *op. cit.* [Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte], p. 167; *CW*, vol. 6, p. 200.)

16. *Id.*, *Dawn*, Book Four, §307, 'Facta! Yes, *facta ficta!*', *CW*, vol. 5, p. 190. Foucault had written a reading note on the text '*Facta ficta*' with a few passages from §307 of *Dawn* (BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 4).

17. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et des inconvénients...', §2, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, pp. 142-143; *CW*, vol. 2, pp. 98-100.

18. *Id.*, *Human, All Too Human I*, 'Preface' (Nice, Spring 1886), §4, *CW*, vol. 3, p. 9: "From this sickly isolation, from the desert of such years of trial, it is still a long way to this tremendous, overflowing certainty and health that cannot dispense even with sickness as a means and a hook for knowledge (*connaissance*), to the freedom of spirit..."

## LECTURE 3

### [The Joyful Science §337 (continued)]

*Second part of the text: the two false historical interpretations; I. The first misinterpretation: history is new only as weakening of the old; II. Second misinterpretation: that of others. Third part of the text: the foundation-deepening of the historical sense is established by a series of oppositions; feeling/bearing; generalisation/particular; evening/dawn; affliction/happiness.*

Historical sense is therefore [on the one hand] the symptom of a disease, its manifest result — that strange irregularity that appears on the surface of our world, that new form of sensitivity that the high eras have not known (*connue*). But on the other hand, and at the same time, it is healing, the three-stage movement of self-affirmation, the experience of the distant, and of *Ja Sagen*<sup>22</sup> to what is closest to us (1).

This disease and movement of healing is what characterises our era; this is what Nietzsche himself experienced:

- history as disease, when he was a philologist, when he engaged in the ascetics of objective knowledge (*connaissance*);
- history discovered as symptom of a deeper disease, as expression of the nihilism of the era (this is the *Unfashionables* and *Human, All Too Human*);
- history as principle of healing in the form of historical sense (this is *Dawn, The Joyful Science*(2)).

Nietzsche's relations to history are the individual model of our era's relations to history. But not in the sense that Nietzsche the individual would be the expression of his era; in the sense that

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our era's relations to history pass through Nietzsche, through Nietzsche's individual history and the individual relation Nietzsche has with history.

Why am I a destiny?<sup>23</sup>

In *Beyond Good and Evil* and in *On the Genealogy of Morality* (3), history as final form:

- of objectivism,
- of nihilism,
- of asceticism.

All these texts therefore show in historical sense:

- not only something that is not new,
- not only the weakening of this not-new,
- but the already-old weakening of this not-new.

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<sup>22</sup> *Ja Sagen*: saying yes.

<sup>23</sup> Foucault crosses out the following passage, without which the text which remains is difficult to understand:

First problem: the critiques against historical sense.

A. There is a strangeness in this text by Nietzsche: manifest contradiction with other texts.

a) In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche speaks about history as a weakening of all feelings.

Eunuchs like Renan "who, by the sharp falsity of their homilies, betray what they lack". "Objective armchairs" (*On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, §26).

b) But here, the theme that runs throughout this development of genealogy is attributed to others — or rather, it is a temptation that it is a matter of rejecting. Why is this a temptation? Why?

The passage which follows begins with point "C".

Is it necessary to say that Nietzsche distances himself here from what he said or will say elsewhere?<sup>24</sup>

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### Second part of the text

#### **The false historical interpretations**

There are two:

- the first: "Fast scheinst es uns",<sup>25</sup>
- the second: "Anderen erscheint er".<sup>26</sup>

#### **I. The first misinterpretation**

That by which Nietzsche is tempted:

It consists of saying that:

- historical sense is nothing new in itself: it is only the prolongation of feelings that pre-exist;
- historical sense brings something new only in the sense of a diminution (*Abnahme*: weakening, decline, amputation).

This two interlaced themes (history is new only as weakening of the old), are indeed found in Nietzsche:

- a. history (or the excess of history) impairs all creative novelty (*Unfashionable Observations II* (4));
- b. history never appears [in] the era of high cultures.<sup>27</sup>

1. In the grand invective against history (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (5)), Nietzsche distinguishes two types of historians who are characterised by two names and two sets of metaphors:

- Dühring, snow, cold, priests, the winter landscape. This is absolutely ascetic history:
  - that which renounces all present individuality,
  - that which renders the entire past vain and equivalent, and which says: what's the point,
  - that which accepts the entire future, not to reform or improve it, but as it is.

He prefers this history, or rather, it is historical sense in the purity of its birth.

- Renan, castration, gentleness, hope. This is the history which renounces the ascetic courage, which mimics the joyous

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acceptance of life, but which in reality is only impotence. It is the history which tries to:

- retransform nihilistic coldness into ideality; Western civilisation would go towards the maximum of ideality by discharging itself of all materiality;
- and which would have has its end the reestablishment of God on earth, in the form of a smiling god (6).

In other words, two types of sensibility, of history that follow one another: the first nihilist (and basically without much "historical sensibility" like Dühring); and another that disguises it, mimic and sugarcoater.

2. However, if we return to the text, we see that this distinction, written in large letters in *On the Genealogy of Morality*, is signalled here, where [it] is still all narrow and budding.

- There are the two characterisations:
  - the cold, which is indeed of the nature of historical sense;

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<sup>24</sup> This passage is the section "B" to the previous crossed-out passage; it is also followed by another passage crossed-out by Foucault:

It is necessary to remark:

1. that here Nietzsche justifies this interpretation or gives the reason for it: the historical sense is cold and poor; and that the risk is of maintaining the historical sense in its poverty and coldness by this interpretation.

Interpretation which:

- takes over historical sense,
- and deprives it of its becoming by imposing on it the fixity of an ideal being.

2. Nietzsche in the general invective against history distinguishes two types of historians (*On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, §26).

<sup>25</sup> *Fast scheinst es uns*: It seems familiar to us.

<sup>26</sup> *Anderen erscheint er*: It appears for others.

<sup>27</sup> Reference left blank by Foucault.

- amputation, castration (*Abnahme*).

– The text therefore means, in short:

In the depths of the nihilistic winter of the modern world, a light is announced at the level of the sky. A poor, pale, and cold light. But a light of a new sense and an unknown (*inconnu*) happiness.

But it is necessary not to think that this light is the last glimmer of a past day. This is not the last avatar of old religious and metaphysical feelings; it is necessary not to think that our day and our happiness will now be nothing more than this white light.

– It is not a figure from yesterday frozen in the night's chill. It is already the raised finger of the day.

More specifically: that which the nihilism of Europe brings us or brings us back is the thought of becoming. This thought of becoming, it still only points to the cold accumulation of historical knowledge (*savoir*).

But the danger is that this knowledge (*savoir*) will only be taken up in metaphysical ideality — and that only God and eternity will not be restored in this way.

The historical sense, even if it is only the last avatar of Platonic and Christian asceticism, must form a cleavage in our present.

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– Historical knowledge (*savoir*) must not be interpreted as the annexation of time and the past to the ideal eternity of science

– It must be recognised as the return of the thought of becoming. The return is becoming in the form of the same, it is the repetition of becoming.

Not the repetition by thought of what happened in reality but the appearance of history, as event in becoming, is the return of becoming as thought and destiny of the West.

#### **[II.] Second misinterpretation – that of others**

Who are these others?

a. It should be noted right away that Nietzsche was not always foreign to these others.

– The supra-historical character of historical knowledge (*connaissance*). The theme that history has come to an end.

– But in the *Second Unfashionable*, Nietzsche said that this was only the exaggeration of historical knowledge (*connaissance*).

b. The others, they are:

– In one sense, the Hegelians: for whom the time has come to internalise all the past of the world and all its youth. But for the Hegelians, [this moment] is not that of imminent death, it is rather that of a luminous and perpetual present.

– In another sense, Schopenhauer: history as this moment of pure knowledge (*connaissance*), radical asceticism, where the will is completely suspended, where death is therefore imminent. History is extreme senility. But this historical knowledge (*savoir*) is never totalising for Schopenhauer:

- because he allows becoming to escape in its individuality,
- and because the will to live (*vouloir-vivre*) is indestructible; and everything will continue wanting to live (*vouloir vivre*) and living, even after this suspense of the will to live (*vouloir-vivre*).

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In short, for Hegel, the totalisation of history may be twilight, but it is not senility; for Schopenhauer, history may be of the order of death, but it is not of totality.

So that "to experience the history of humanity as one's own history" is neither the work of the Hegelians nor of the Schopenhauerians. But rather of a mixed figure.

[By a process that is familiar to him, Nietzsche portrays as individualised adversaries that which he himself discovers as a root common to several systems of thought. Not composite figures, but radical figures.

For example:

- the ascetics: monks and scholars, Christians and Platonists; positivists and mystics, priests and socialists;
- the nihilists.]<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> In brackets in the manuscript.

Here, what Nietzsche sketches is the figure of the Schopenhaurian-Hegelian. The figure that makes them both possible. Which is:

a. one of the most constant forms of his analysis:

- Dionysus-Apollo,
- Christ-Dionysus,
- Socrates-Saint Paul;

b. one of his most constant themes since he came out of Wagnerism. He then denounced Hegelianism in *The Birth of Tragedy* (7).

What is pointed out here is this assimilation, or rather the uncovering of that which makes them simultaneously possible.

This figure is the one:

– who, under the pretext of thinking time, wills (*veut*) to escape becoming. By thinking becoming from a point of view that would be foreign to it: either that dreary and monotonous will to live (*vouloir-vivre*), or the transparent ideality of absolute knowledge (*savoir*).

*It therefore dispels becoming either in the concept or in the illusion.*

– who, under the pretext of atheism, takes in himself the figure of God. Either in the form of a self (*moi*) that is a we, or in

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the form of a universal pity which makes all individual figures [communicate]<sup>29</sup>.

*It therefore resuscitates the dead God.*

– who under the pretext of surpassing the moment of individuality, gives to the whole world and becoming the form of the subject (*eigene Geschichte*).<sup>30</sup>

*It therefore renders the self (moi) absolute — by undoing individual difference.*

This is the triple operation that is at the root of Schopenhauer and Hegel. This triple operation is not an abstraction built from these two philosophies; it is the event of our history that made them possible. This event, confusedly designated here, is depicted:

– in our text, by the silhouette of the exhausted hero, who returns charged with all the miseries of the world;

– but in *Zarathustra*, we will see it in an entirely opposite form: the last of men, the one who has all the past behind him; the one who killed God; the one whose thin individuality (he is a dwarf) must carry the whole history of the world.

The doublet *Zarathustra/the last of men* illustrates this text well. Zarathustra, an exhausted hero who weeps over all the pains of the world, must not be the last of men. He could be; he is tempted to be. But the last of the men is the most different from him. He is hideous. And Zarathustra moves away from him (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (8)).

Here appears only the beautiful figure of the warrior on the evening of the battle. But the grimace of the most hideous of men may not be far away. We understand, from *Zarathustra*, the text we are studying here. What will become manifest and extreme opposition (in the form of the Zarathustra/most hideous of men) appears here as equivocation of this sick, old man, who is both the lover and the warrior.

– In a way, historical sense is born in the evening of the day; it is well formed at this world's extreme hour of

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knowledge (*connaissance*), truth, objectivity, asceticism which has been constituted for a long time already.

– But historical sense is something else: completion but recommencement; evening but dawn; memory but promised struggles.

The last man – the Schopenhauerean-Hegelian – is the man of totality-compassion. He must not confiscate history, which rests on scission-difference.

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<sup>29</sup> Foucault uses an abbreviation, "c/quer"; we propose "communiquer".

<sup>30</sup> *Eigene Geschichte*: personal history. Words difficult to read.

### Third part of the text

It is a matter of defining how historical sense must be both founded and deepened if it must, in its fragility, be protected against the asceticism-impotence of the first historians, and against the totality-compassion of the last men.

The foundation-deepening of the historical sense is established by a series of oppositions.

#### a. *Fühlen/tragen*<sup>31</sup> opposition

The last man — or at least the evening combatant — is at the outset in the order of the *fühlen*: all the pains of history are experienced by him, from the inside, both as his own and as the most general (9). This *fühlen* that allows him to recognise himself in them is the *Erinnerung*<sup>32</sup> that internalises them and makes them appear to him as his own; and it is the *Mitleid*<sup>33</sup> which communicates his individuality with all others.

This evening warrior is opposed by the hero of the dawn who bears this past: the day of the battle, courage, nobility. In a sense, he is their heir: but he is able to overcome them. And it is by bearing them that he makes them feel. This opposition takes up, in another register, the Oedipus-Prometheus opposition in *The Birth of Tragedy* (10).

Oedipus at Colonus:

– *Mitleid* for the sufferings of his people;

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– *Erinnerung*: he remembers.

At the evening of his life, blind, he is the first of the saints. And in a sense, the hero-historian, for whom there is no tomorrow.

Prometheus: the hero at the fold of time.

He bears the struggle of men and gods. He announces to the gods their end and another time.

History must be displaced from the oedipal sign to the promethean sign. Hegel and Schopenhauer were still under the sign of Oedipus, late hero, wounded warrior, tortured king who only enters the shadows with, in his eyes, memories that will die out.

It must be placed under the older sign of Prometheus, the hero who promises recommencement and the death of the gods. The morning hero on the contrary will amass (*zusammendrängen*) everything that happened, that is to say condense it into an instant, into an individual, bring it to the height of intensity to constitute:

– "a soul" (but *a* must be emphasised: that is to say, not the philosophical paradox of a substance that would only be a pure form, but an individual difference);

– a feeling (that is to say, not a universal affective communication, but a singular intensity).

History must then be displaced. Until the present it has remained under the sign of memory (or pity: which amounts to the same); that is, the systematic forgetting of singularity; of individuality; of the instant in which the historian is found. History is always the negation of the historian in his instantaneous singularity and the cleavage of which he speaks (this negation takes the form of a universal subjectivity). History must be placed under the sign of singularity (*a* soul, *a* feeling), which is both concentration of everything and difference. This singularity, which concentrates and differentiates,

– concentrates both the past and the future;

– and is this void, this pure scission between the future and the past.

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This is the dawn of the second day.

In this text is sketched the great dynasty of knowledge (*savoir*), memory, fault, truth, and pity: from Sophocles to Schopenhauer/Wagner. And the other, the identification of a Promethean moment, whose (crucified) hero — at once Dionysus, Prometheus, and also Christ — will be Nietzsche, morning hero, evening warrior, morning hero who recommences Parsifal against Zarathustra, passage of arms which announces Nietzsche contra Wagner (11).

<sup>31</sup> *Fühlen*: feel; *tragen*: bear.

<sup>32</sup> *Erinnerung*: memory.

<sup>33</sup> *Mitleid*: pity.

b. Opposition of:

- *Verallgemeinerung/eigene* (12);<sup>34</sup>
- *Zusammendrägen/eine*.<sup>35</sup>

The evening warrior: he experiences his own history as the history of all men through universalisation, that is, by the systematic erasure of individual difference. That is to say:

- universalisation makes singular difference disappear;
- but by this the warrior can experience the history of humanity as his own.

He conserves the form of the self (*moi*).

To lose individual difference in order to maintain the form of the self (*moi*): this is the effort of all metaphysics since Plato, from Descartes to Hegel's absolute knowledge (*savoir*), to Schopenhauer's [universal] *Mitleid*.

c. Evening/dawn opposition

– The evening warrior is at the end of the day. No doubt the battle is undecided: and he knows (*sait*) that it will start again. But he knows (*sait*) that the events that will unfurl, even if they are different in their form, will be equivalent in their base. Nothing new will be brought. There is no return, but a continuation.

- "Eadem sed aliter",<sup>36</sup> Schopenhauer.
- The world as will and representation (13).

– The morning hero also knows (*connu*) the undecided battle; he also knows (*sait*) that it will start again, but he knows (*sait*) that [the

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events] will return without equivalence in their very singularity. The Nietzschean return is not the shattering of Schopenhauerean continuity: it is not the annihilation, in total, of differences: but [the] return of each singularity, in its singularity. Thus of that which it has of intensity, of the unparalleled (*sans équivalent*).

Hence, a third displacement of history.

– Under the sign of the evening and foggy continuity, history can say: I only know (*sais*) the past; but I know (*connais*) it in its entirety; I have gone through all its equivalences; generalised everything that is analogous or recurring. As for the future, I do not know (*connais*) it, but I know (*connais*) it for what it is worth: that is, nothing more than the past; that is, still nothing. This generality is enough for my knowledge (*savoir*).

– Under the sign of the morning, historical sense will be able to say: I know (*sais*) that everything will come back, and indefinitely; but in its singular acuity.

And from the moment that everything comes back indefinitely, everything has already come back. And it is this singularity of each thing which will be re-offered to me indefinitely, and which I will have to know (*connaître*) indefinitely.

History is therefore not the knowledge (*connaissance*) of equivalences which are generalised to infinity; but that of singularities that come back indefinitely.

d. Gram: affliction/*Glück*: happiness opposition

– For the evening warrior, things only come back in their general equivalence. But they are worthless. Thus, *Gram*.

– On the other hand, for the morning hero, any event promises of the infinite richness of these unique returns.

It is in their unicity that things come back; therefore in their difference and what they are worth.

Thus, the happiness of the return and its richness.

Each return is a new morning; but as behind each return and beyond it looms the infinity of returns, each of these mornings is just as charged with the past and with splendour as the evening sunset.

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The metaphor can be reversed. The return of the morning is as generous as the sun at the bottom of the gulf. In the indefinite glittering of time, it transforms the fisherman's immemorial gesture into

<sup>34</sup> *Verallgemeinerung*: generalisation; *eigene*: particular.

<sup>35</sup> *Zusammendrägen*: amass; *eine*: one.

<sup>36</sup> *Eadem sed aliter*: the same, but other.

a carving (*ciselure*) of gold. The surface of the world. Carving that fades and starts again indefinitely like the fish in the sea and the waves on the shore.

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Historical sense must therefore, if it wants to escape the universality-compassion of absolute knowledge (*savoir*), the asexual objectivity of science, deepen this instant of which it is born. Not to abstract from this nihilism, this disease, this suffering which have aroused it and against which it is the only cure. Historical sense must remain as close as possible to the fissure that gave rise to it. Instead of erasing itself in its singularity, it [must] want to reach the universal of knowledge (*connaissance*) — instead of immobilising itself in a twilight which will have no end, the historical sense must keep open the scission which gave birth to it.

Historical sense must:

- know (*savoir*) itself at the Promethean fold of time, and at this point of return where the gods disappear;
- free itself from universalising memory in order to address only the individual singularity of the event;
- know (*savoir*) that it is in charge of a future of indefinite singularities, and not an equivalent future either;
- experience as a happiness that everything singularly recommences.

It is this quadruple displacement that will make historical sense into a genealogical knowledge (*savoir*). Or better, it is this quadruple replacement, as close as possible to the singular conditions of its birth, that will prevent genealogical<sup>37</sup> knowledge (*savoir*) from being displaced towards the knowledge (*savoir*) of historians.

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### NOTES

1. According to the student notes, Michel Foucault would have given the third lecture on 28 January 1970 (see *NC*, p. 27).

2. Foucault does not specify the references. We could think of the passages in F. Nietzsche, *Aurore*, Book Two, §114, *CW*, vol. 5, pp. 82-84; and in *id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §337, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 166-167; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 199-200.

3. *Id.*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, VII, §223-225, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 125 *et ff.*; *id.*, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, §26, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 343-344.

4. *Id.*, 'De l'utilité et des inconvénients...', §1, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 137; *CW*, vol. 2, p. 94.

5. *Id.*, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, §26, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 343-346.

6. *Ibid.*, pp. 343-346.

7. For a detailed treatment of the manner in which Nietzsche rejects Hegel in *The Birth of Tragedy*, see Erik D. Lindberg, 'Nietzsche contra Hegel: The Death of Tragedy and the Birth of the Unconscious', *Symposium*, vol. 2, no 1, 1998, pp. 77-100.

8. F. Nietzsche, *Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra*, Première partie, §5, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by G. Bianquis), p. 59; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11.

9. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §337, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 166-167; *CW*, vol. 6, p. 200 ("whoever [...] feels in one tremendous generalisation [...]").

10. *Id.*, *The Birth of Tragedy* [1872], §9, in (2007) *The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings* (Speirs R trans), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, USA, pp. 46-51, where Nietzsche underscores the contrast between Oedipus and Prometheus.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>37</sup> *Stricken*: "historical".

<sup>38</sup> [*The Birth of Tragedy* has not yet been published in the Stanford University Press edition of Nietzsche's complete works, but when it is it will be in volume 1 — Tr.]

11. *Id.*, *Nietzsche contre Wagner* [1889], OCFN, t. XII, *Le Crépuscule des idoles*, précédé de *Le Cas Wagner*, *Nietzsche contre Wagner*, et suivi de *L'Antéchrist*, 1942; CW, vol. 9, *The Case of Wagner, Twilight of the Idols, The Antichrist, Ecce Homo, Dionysus Dithyrambs, Nietzsche contra Wagner*, Del Caro A, Diethe C, Large D, Leiner GH, Loeb PS, Schrift AD, Tinsley DF, and Wittwar M trans, 2021.

12. In *The Joyful Science*, §337, Nietzsche lays out the opposition between *Verallgemeinerung* (generalisation) and *eigene Geschichte* (particular history); *id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §337, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 166-167; CW, vol. 6, pp. 199-200.

13. Foucault alludes to Arthur Schopenhauer's work, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1818-1819) ('The World as Will and Representation').

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## LECTURE 4

### **[*The Usage of Genealogy*]**

*Introduction: Historical sense, three levels: a. in its origin: product of European decadence; b. in its ambiguity: form of sensibility which is born as the symptom of an illness; c. in its right use: instrument of a knowledge (savoir). History, two senses: a. the history of historians; b. history as form of knowledge (savoir). I. Genealogy and the search for the origin. II. Ursprung (origin). III. Herkunft (provenance). IV. Entstehung (emergence). Conclusion.*

#### **Introduction (1)**

The terms historical sense and history are therefore not used by Nietzsche univocally, nor at the same level.  
*Historical sense.* Three levels:

- a. In its origin: product of European decadence. Low birth. Its link to the "European mix" and to democracy (*Beyond Good and Evil* (2)).
- b. In its ambiguity: form of sensibility which is born as symptom of a disease; but which could be cure or remedy. It was formed from the worst: it can thus strengthen the movement from which it comes, as well as oppose it and reverse it (*The Joyful Science* (3)).
- c. In its proper use: instrument of a knowledge (savoir) which must allow the critique of metaphysical philosophy, and of history itself.  
"The instinct of historical knowledge (*connaissance*) — its goal: to understand man in his becoming, here again suppress the miracle" (*Unpublished Fragment, 1870-1875* (4)).  
"It is a sign of superior culture [to maintain in full consciousness certain phases of evolution, that

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lesser men traverse almost without thought and then erase from the table of their soul, and to draw a faithful image of it: this is the highest species of the art of painting, which only few people understand]" (*Human, All Too Human* (5)).

"I do not need glory..." (*Unpublished Fragment, Autumn 1881* (6)).

"Faculty of quickly divining the hierarchy of evaluations" (*Beyond Good and Evil* (7)).

*History.* Two senses:

- a. Sometimes, it is the history of historians: history that introduces into it the supra-historical dimension. That which goes back:
  - to give itself the totality of the past,
  - to erase the perspective and difference of the historian,
  - to impose the asceticism of objectivity.
- b. Sometimes, it is history as form of knowledge (savoir) likely to be opposed to traditional philosophy, the metaphysics of eternity and the immobile being, its Egyptianism.  
See historical philosophy different from metaphysical philosophy (*Human, All Too Human* (8)).  
"Philosophy, in the only aspect in which I still admit it, is the most general form of history" (*Unpublished Fragments. Autumn 1884-Autumn 1885* (9)).  
"We are historians from floor to ceiling" (*Unpublished Fragment, 1885* (10)).

But we now know (savons) under what conditions this passage of history to the second sense of the word can be made, and this "rescuing" of historical sense. It is a matter:

- of freeing it from a metaphysics of memory: that is, access to the totality of being, which has become both pure spirituality and transparent truth;
- and of placing it under the sign of the return, that is:
  - of the perpetual, indefinite discontinuity (by opposition to totality),
  - of the perpetual repetition of difference (by opposition to spiritual indifference),

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- of the indefinite reiteration of the same, in its own identity (and not in its transcription in a true discourse or in a consciousness of truth).

Several questions are now posed:

1. How will this historical sense manifest, if it is thus freed from a metaphysics of memory? What instruments will it use? To what objects will it be addressed? Where will it take its knowledge (*savoir*), its analysis, its critique, its destruction?
2. How will it effectuate and recommence as many times as it takes — that is, without stopping — the necessary freeing? How will it have to stay in the salutary forgetting of memory?
3. To what will it lead? Towards which humanity of the future will this historian head?

### I. Genealogy and the search for the origin

*On the Genealogy of Morality* is the only text in which the term "genealogy" is used in a systematic way. And it is always a matter of designating the search for an "origin", a beginning.

*On the Genealogy of Morality* is the search for the origin of moral prejudices. In that, it only reprises a long series of texts:

- *The Birth of Tragedy*;
- *Human, All Too Human*: [on the origins of] justice, [of] religious cults, [of the] comic, [of] music, [of] faith, [of] freedom of spirit, [of] nobility of blood, [and of] courage (11);
- 'The Wanderer and His Shadow': [on the origin of] laws (12);
- *Dawn*: [on the origins of the] contemplative life, [of] religion, [of] morality, [and of] bad temperament (13);
- *The Joyful Science*: [on the origin of] poetry, [of] knowledge (*connaissance*); [of the] logical; [of] sin (feeling of sin); [of] the Reformation; [of] religion; [of] sciences; [of] moral feelings; [of] great religions; [of] scholars; [of] religion; [of] consciousness; [and of] knowledge (*connaissance*) (14).

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In his texts, to designate what he is looking for, Nietzsche uses, apart from *Geburt*, which will not often intervene after *The Birth of Tragedy*, three terms: *Ursprung*, *Herkunft*, *Entstehung*.<sup>39</sup> He uses it in a seemingly non-regular way (15). However, in a certain number of texts, he gives a specific content to the term *Ursprung* and opposes it to the other two.

- In *Human, All Too Human*, he opposes a metaphysical philosophy, which admits the *Wunderursprung* of things, and a historical philosophy which studies on the contrary the *Entstehung*. The questions of *Entstehung* and *Anfang*<sup>40</sup> are repressed by humanity (*Human, All Too Human* (16)).
- In other texts, he plays on the solemnity of the term *Ursprung*. He reprises some questions which did not come from him, which were formulated either by Schopenhauer or by the utilitarians, who pose the problem of the beginning in terms of *Ursprung* and to which he himself answers in different terms:
  - *Ursprung* of morality? In some horrible little conclusions (*Dawn* (17)).
  - Religion finds its origin in a metaphysical feeling.<sup>41</sup> While it is the result of an invention (*Erfindung*), an artifice (*Kunstwerk*) (*The Joyful Science* (18)).
- Finally, in *On the Genealogy of Morality* (Preface), he gives the history of his own searches for the origin:
  - speaking of his religious childhood, or of the works of Paul Rée, he characterises them as search for *Ursprung*;

<sup>39</sup> *Ursprung*: origin; *Herkunft*: provenance; *Entstehung*: emergence.

<sup>40</sup> *Anfang*: beginning.

<sup>41</sup> *In the margin*: "Schopenhauer".

- then, characterising his own works, he says that these are *Entstehungshypothesen*.<sup>42</sup>

In a general way, he tends to abandon the term *Ursprung*.<sup>43</sup>

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### [II.] *Ursprung*

A. By gradually abandoning the term *Ursprung*, or by repeatedly giving it a negative value, Nietzsche wants to keep a number of theses distant.

1. The thesis that at the origin of things lies and has been posed once and for all a fundamental meaning that history will only have to explicate.

Example: utility as first instantiation of moral and social rationality.

2. The thesis that in the origin of things is hidden the law of all their episodes or processes or events.<sup>44</sup>

Example: evolution as principle of all biological and social events.

3. The thesis that at the origin, things would have both their greatest ontological weight and the greatest value. The origin would be truth at the threshold of history.

Example: what Schopenhauer says about the origin of religion, in a metaphysical feeling.

4. The thesis that our task today would be to find what was said or traced in their origin, to explain its necessary content, and to dispel the forgetting or illusion that pushed back its presence.

Example: socialism as actualisation of what was present in the first relations of utility.


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B. To these theses that are virtually present in searches for the origin, Nietzsche opposes four theses:

1. There is no fundamental and primary meaning of things, because meanings are only interpretations. And these interpretations are not readings, they are gestures which appropriate, deviate, transform (meaning as perversion).

Meaning is not what is posed at the beginning, it is a surreptitious appropriation.

Example:



There is no meaning by nature or by essence. And history is not the place of emergence of these meanings. Meaning is nothing more than, for an instant, the product of history.

2. What happens to the first element is not located within the field it [has] opened; but crosses it with a whole series of other heterogeneous, discontinuous, chance events. Between the beginning and we who seek to find it, there is not a single line, but countless intersecting roads. Accidents, reversals, incursions (dispersion of events).

<sup>42</sup> *Entstehung*: emergence; *hypothesen*: hypotheses.

<sup>43</sup> Foucault writes a first draft of his development on the *Ursprung*, on one page, which he strikes and then develops his thinking in a more articulated way in the part numbered "II". The crossed-out passage is as follows:

Through this term of *Ursprung*, what Nietzsche is trying to isolate is a history.

The idea that the origin would be the truth — already there of that which is rooted in it. The origin would hold:

- the sense of what will happen afterwards; thus utilitarianism;
- its necessity: all accidents that would occur already have their law there; thus evolutionism;
- its end: our task today would be to accomplish what was given from the start; thus socialism.

This has for its consequences:

- a) That the origin is what has the highest value; the principle of all value. It is at the highest point: it is a creation or a self-creation.
- b) That what happened to it can only be forgotten, recused, veiled (not in its unalterable essence, but in its manifestations).

<sup>44</sup> *Stricken*: "by which they will be relayed. It holds the principle of both what manifests them and what hides them."

Example:

- Good: – victory of the weakest,
- confiscation by the priests,
- asceticism.

3. The first element when we manage to reconstitute it is not more true, does not have ontological content that is more decisive, or of higher value, than the events that occur afterwards. It is without privilege. It might as well have been at another point in the series. It has no less metaphor, displacement, and illusion than any other. (*Anfang* exists, but not as origin.)

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Radical arbitrariness of the beginning: "Are morals just a figurative language of passions?" (*Beyond Good and Evil* (19).)

4. When we turn to the beginning, to its arbitrariness and the adventures in which it was caught, it is not a return, the reappearance of a foundational truth. But a diagnosis of ourselves: what forces have played and are still playing for us to be there? What forces can we use and what reprisals, what reappropriations are possible?

Example: Errors of the world.

These four theses have the consequence of opening up time indefinitely. It is not blocked by any original solemnity. No door has ever opened history. This is nothing more than the indefinite runoff of events. The beginning is only one fact, preceded indefinitely by other events.

It is this indefinitely open character of time:

1. which makes it possible to understand the articulation of human history on animal history; there has not been an instantiation of humanity in its most general meanings, but a perpetual intersection of animal events and human events, the perpetual enjambment of the biological on the historical.

If there is a biological in Nietzsche, it is not in the form: after the animal comes man; but in the form: animality is always crossed with humanity. (Replace the evolutionist anteriority of the biological with the enjambment of the biological and the historical.)

2. which makes it possible to understand the Eternal Return; if time is indefinite — as many events as we imagine, they will eventually repeat themselves indefinitely.

Nothing is further from this Nietzschean repetition than the metaphysical theme (so frequent in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries) of a return towards the original or of the original. Nothing could be further away than the theme of a curve of time leading to a truth of origin, a unique and unheard-of event. The return is the effect of the scarcity of events in the indefinite opening of time.

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3. but these four theses have another consequence: to undo the belonging knotted by metaphysics between truth, sense, and history.

– In a classical conception, whose model Hegel gave, but which is found well after him, these three elements belong to each other:

- sense is the way truth takes shape in history and is given in a way that is both visible and hidden; sense is the nerve of truth that traverses history;
- but history, in turn, is an obscure sense that gradually walks towards its truth and will achieve it when all senses have [been] elucidated;
- as for truth, it is the law of sense traversing history, it is what commands sense from afar: it is that towards which sense is obscurely headed.

– But, in Nietzsche, these three elements become exterior to one another:

- sense has nothing to do with truth: it is the effect of process without interpretation;
- truth is only the product through the history of a mask;<sup>45</sup>
- history: it is a series of chances that modify, transform, disguise forces and previous states.

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<sup>45</sup> Foucault first writes "of a will", then he strikes it and writes "illusion", then strikes it and writes "mask". The word "mask" is difficult to read here and in the next paragraph, and could read "missing", but the sense of illusion and, later, disguises is much closer to "mask".

Three notions: domination,<sup>46</sup> mask,<sup>47</sup> chance undo the sense-truth-history circle and make them fall away from each other.

We could summarise all this by saying:

- just as linguists were forced to abandon the theme of the original language that would be in direct contact with things and whose meanings would traverse all of history,

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- similarly, Nietzsche had to get rid of the myth of the original institution of rules and values.

### [III.] *Herkunft*

Provenance.

At first glance, it is a matter either of race, or of ancestral belonging to a group.

Race:

For example: "Sin, as it is considered today wherever Christianity reigns..., is a Jewish feeling, a Jewish invention... Christianity has indeed sought to Judaise the entire world... The Greeks, on the other hand, readily admitted that sacrilege could also possess dignity... as with Prometheus..." (*The Joyful Science* (20)).

Group:

"The scholar comes in Europe from the most diverse classes and social environments, like a plant that does not need this or that particular soil... But... in... the idiosyncrasy of the scholar..., we almost always find, covered, the genesis of this scholar, his family..." The sons of clerks (who collate); the sons of lawyers who plead for the truth (*The Joyful Science* (21)). Darwinism, born among small English shopkeepers (struggle for life) (*The Joyful Science* (22)).

Moral differentiations were born in slaves (*Beyond Good and Evil* (23)).

But it is necessary to see how Nietzsche makes this belonging function.

It is not at all to bring an individual into a general type, or an event into a spiritual totality. It is not to give him the status of the concept.

a. *It is first of all an instrument of differentiation.*

Text on sin (*The Joyful Science* (24)):

- It is turned against continuist and generalising explanations. Against an explanation of the following type:
  - that which harms men has in every civilisation been sanctioned by society;

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- society, to give rigour to these prohibitions, has made them religious laws;
- the Greek gods guaranteed the same morality as the Jewish God, one in a more abstract form, the other in a more visible form;
- Christianity as conciliation.<sup>48</sup>

– Now Nietzsche's text introduces the following distinctions and discontinuities:

1. sin is a *Jewish invention*: therefore neither general nor natural; it took an exertion of force;
2. Jewish sin is characterised as sin against God (and the best proof is that repentance, manifested to God, is enough to erase it); it is therefore out of all proportion to blame the fault on men;
3. Greek fault has more dignity as it is addressed to the gods (Prometheus);
4. this Jewish invention, Christianity forcibly imposed it on the world; Christianity is not the self-consciousness of all religions; it is rather their oppression.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> *Stricken*: "interpretation".

<sup>47</sup> *Stricken*: "illusion".

<sup>48</sup> Conjecture, word difficult to read; could say: "conciliator".

<sup>49</sup> Foucault reorders this numbering and crosses out the fifth point ("5. Thus the distinction Jewish poetry/Greek tragedy.").

In what we call, in general, sin,<sup>50</sup> genealogy reveals distinct elements, foreign to each other: and if they have joined, it is not that they have found a common form, but it is that they have struggled against one another, they have used violence. They took hold of their masks, they exchanged their disguise.

The search for *Herkunft* does not tend to rediscover an original community, where the present would find the ground of its birth. On the contrary, it tends to dissociate the present; and [to] find, below the unitary consciousness that it tries to give itself, the marks of all the heterogeneous elements entangled in it.

It is not searching for an identity which would be constant throughout history, it is searching for ruptures, violences, appropriations, and disguises.

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b. *It is a tool for weakening.* In doing this search for provenance, it is not a matter of restoring and establishing, on an original base, a lost or threatened unity. On the contrary, it is a matter of ironically but severely (and with a hammer) undoing those identities best closed in on themselves.

Text: The Germans (*Beyond Good and Evil* (25)). But above all: *The Joyful Science*, §348 (26).

Science is given as that which is of a purely intellectual nature, sheltered from all desire and subjectivity, developing according to laws that are only its own. Hence its sense of security.

But if we no longer questioned the form or content of science, but the will to know (*volonté de savoir*); and if we questioned not science as entity, but scientists as individual and historical form of this will — what would we find?

- Beneath the objectivity of description and classification, the strange will to record, transcribe, preserve. There is the feeling of mistrust and the form of the contract. One finds the will to constitute material charters. Not the pure gaze of perception, but a whole juridical world of institutions.
- Beneath attachment to truth, a passion to triumph through discourse. That of sophists, lawyers, rhetoricians. Discourse as instrument of power. If that had not been so, would the meticulous dialectic of truth ever have seen the light of day?

This provenance of the truth has nothing in common with that original ground that Husserl later had to look for on the side of Greek surveyors. What Husserl was looking for was the constitution of this horizon of rationality that mathematics has never ceased to explore in a climate of pure rationality. It is a matter of breaking that confidence that knowledge (*connaissance*) could have in itself; of referring it, not to the essence of its inner structure, but to the irregularity of the desire that invests it.

Not search for foundations.

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c. *It is a method of diagnostics which bears on the very body of the present* (27).

The nearest:

- by doing so, it is not the distant that one is trying to reconstruct,
- but the closest, that which is there in us in our body.<sup>51</sup>

"Physiology" of science.

Example: Men of dissolution (the end of the [Roman] Republic, the end of the Middle Ages) (*Beyond Good and Evil* (28)). One does the genealogy of these men not to find out where they come from, but to know (*savoir*) what is happening at the level of their gesture, their body, their will, and their energy. The genealogy will consist of:

- grasping (*saisir*) how multiple origins have been inscribed in the form of instincts, valorisations;
- grasping (*saisir*) how these contradictory elements are in struggle;
- grasping (*saisir*) how the individual reacts to these struggles that weaken him by a desire for peace;
- but how in some the effect is the opposite:
  - α. because [of] a supplementary heredity: the ability to wage war on oneself (instead of the will (*vouloir*) to appease);

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<sup>50</sup> *Stricken*: "evil".

<sup>51</sup> *Stricken*: "The search for provenance is not moving towards an ideal identity, which would have been posed once and for all; it is much more a matter of identifying stigmata and marks in the bodies of things, institutions, and men. Genealogy interrogates the body of the world and not the initial figures of the mind."

β. because of the ability to dominate and fool themselves. Rather than the will (*volonté*) to reconstitute an illusory unity with full force; to put oneself at the level of the game, deceive, and dominate.

In the analysis of provenance, the body appears as the surface of inscription of events and the place of dissociation of spiritual units. Forces, struggles, dissimulation, theatre. To make the present the theatre of ancestral figures.

Provenance: it is more a matter of an uprooting than an entrenching.<sup>52</sup>

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More a taking apart<sup>53</sup> of our present body than a reconstruction of spiritual totalities.

More a way to lose the ground on which we find ourselves than a way to find it and make sure of it.

More a method to multiply time than a method to bend it back.

"Provenance" is a principle of the demolition of great historic-transcendental unities, of great teleological organisations.

#### [IV.] *Entstehung*

It is the analysis of the surging-forth, of emergence: the scene of the apparition. However, it is no more the analysis of external determinations (let us say external causality) than the study of *Herkunft* was that of ideal foundation.

It comes to be articulated on this theatre of forces that *Herkunft* unearths in the body of history.

a. *Entstehung* is characterised not by the network of causes but by the play of forces. This play is all at once:

- their number,
- their state,
- their reactions: the manner in which they divide, turn, and are disguised.

Examples:

- the Reformation (*The Joyful Science* (29)):
  - α. weakness of Christianity,
  - β. in Germany, it weakens less than elsewhere,
  - γ. it divides against itself;
- or again, *Beyond Good and Evil* (30);
- *Entstehung* of the ascetic (*On the Genealogy of Morality*), as double reaction to weakness:
  - α. the other world since it almost no longer exists;
  - β. restore vigour to the body (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (31)).

b. *Entstehung*, as play of forces, as possibility of action, reactions, subdivisions, reversal, disguise,

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is open to chance. It is not the chain of necessity; it is a functional set where chance events can be registered. Probabilistic matrix.

The birth of species and of individuals (*Beyond Good and Evil* (32)).

A small aristocratic society as in the first Greek cities. All the energy of individuals tends towards maintaining this domination. Domination of the group as group. All the individual differences that chance can produce have been undermined — by education, morals, criminal laws, intolerance. Machine to eliminate the variant.

And then relaxation: chance begins to play. Energy is used to form individual variation. And to establish the individual. The individual appears (*entsteht*) when the state of forces is susceptible to supporting a certain level of chance that could not be tolerated in the preceding state.

Force is not the cause which eliminates chance or dominates it.

It is the element that welcomes it and reacts to it.

c. *Entstehung* constitutes a point of stabilisation or, in any case, of fixation. However, it should not be understood as reconciliation or new unity. Figure of consciousness or history. It is the establishment, violent and temporary, of a system of domination.

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<sup>52</sup> [The words translated as 'uprooting' and 'entrenching' here are 'déracinement' and 'enracinement', literally 'de-race-ing' and 'en-race-ing', that is, removing one from or attaching one to race — Tr.]

<sup>53</sup> [Literally 'placing in pieces' — Tr.]

Logic (*The Joyful Science* (33)): it is a system of abstract rules that deal with the treatment of any object whatsoever. Hence erasure of all singular differences. However, this instantiation presupposes:

- a violence done to all these singularities;
- a second violence done to those who perceive the analogies too slowly (by nature and competition);
- a third violence done by the men who present and impose logic as "natural and true" system.

"The way in which logical thoughts and deductions follow each other in today's brain, corresponds to a process and a struggle of instincts that are in themselves highly illogical and unjust; we generally perceive only the result of

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this struggle: so much that this ancient mechanism functions quickly in us and, now, secretly" (*The Joyful Science* (34)).

The most stable and regular figures born in culture are nothing other than dominations. Rules form violence. And systems are not serene structures gradually deciphered in nature, or from it; systems are forms of domination.

Analyses of emergence replace spiritual totalities, units constituted by the era or spirit, systems that must be understood as both the rules of a game and the laws of a domination.

- Thus is outlined that which is our task today: to articulate one on top of the other an *épistémè* of chance, of the probable and the improbable, of the hazard and the game,
- and an analysis, a critique, a placing-in-question of forms of domination.

We are in the era of revolutionary strategy — in an era when that which we are is no longer to be understood or gathered in the form of spiritual totalities or in the form of that transcendental destination that overlooks the West, but to be understood and dispersed into various chance-based systems which are so many forms of domination.

#### Conclusion

– Commentators are used to opposing genealogy and historical knowledge (*savoir*). The knowledge (*savoir*) that would be the expression of positivism — therefore of Christian asceticism. And the genealogy that would carry the Nietzschean philosophy of history.

Commentators take up the old opposition as follows:

- *Historie*: knowledge (*connaissance*) with positive, therefore illusory claim (that philosophy critiques);
- *Geschichte*: as the very movement of the becoming of the world, in its meaning, its rationality, its destination (and that philosophy must express while letting itself carry it).

– But this opposition plays quite differently in Nietzsche:

1. Assimilation of philosophy to a historical activity (which can also be knowledge (*connaissance*) of the past, diagnostics

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of the present, foretelling of the future, cesura in time, fold and recommencement of the world).

2. This activity is a knowledge (*savoir*): made simultaneously of meticulousness, flair, intuition, evaluation, quasi-medical ability to appreciate forces and recognise points of weakness.

3. Knowledge (*savoir*) discovers that the becoming of humanity:

- is not entrenched (*enracine*) in any origin, and has neither truth nor teleology: and that since there is no absolute threshold of the origin,
  - α. on the one hand, all is beginning; each instant is absolutely new;
  - β. and on the other, all is beginning recommenced. One is within indefinite repetition.
- It discovers that this becoming is never totalised in a present that would have the unitary and spiritual form of memory. But that it is always divided against itself, indefinitely plural, makes multiple crossings of multiple series. Not in logical contradiction, but in real struggle, in the great, precarious play of dominations.
- It discovers that this becoming is not linked by any logical necessity; but that it is open to chance, that it is a chance-based response to chance, that each event has its individuality on a base of night that never completes it.

Historical sense is the knowledge (*savoir*) of the eternal recommencement of chance multiplicities.

Certainly, this knowledge (*savoir*), by this definition, differs from positivist history (*Historie*). But it differs from it in that positivist history is based, basically, on the theme of *Geschichte* (the great unitary and teleological movement of the world).

Genealogy is historical sense<sup>54</sup> to the extent that it turns away from the thought of *Geschichte* to become knowledge (*savoir*) of *Werden*.<sup>55</sup>

Genealogy makes it possible to lift the illusory veil of *Geschichte* to grasp (*saisir*) *Werden*. To return to the Greeks, but not by a deepening of *Geschichte* and its destination.

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#### NOTES

1. According to the student notes, Michel Foucault would have given the fourth lecture on 11 February 1970 (see *NC*, p. 39).

2. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, VII, 'Our Virtues', §224, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 126-128.

3. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §337, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 166-167; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 199-200.

4. *Id.*, *Fragment posthume, 1870-1875*. This translation seems to come from Karl Schlechta, 'Histoire et tradition. Les rapports de Nietzsche avec l'histoire', trans. by Pierre Guiraud, *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, vol. 8, 1958, pp. 100-106, here p. 101. Schlechta's article was published shortly after his "new edition of the works of Nietzsche [which] has appeared these recent years (1954-1956) published by Carl Hanser, in Munich, in three beautiful volumes totalling more than 4,000 pages" (*ibid.*, p. 100). [The information Harcourt provides is not sufficient to be certain, but if this fragment is to be found in any of the volumes of *CW* published so far, it is in *Unpublished Writings from the Period of Unfashionable Observations* (Gray RT trans), *CW*, vol. 11, 29[89], p. 235, but if that is the text, it seems quite different from what Foucault has written. If it has yet to be published in *CW*, it will probably be in volumes 1 or 10. — Tr.]

5. F. Nietzsche, *Humain, trop humain*, vol. 1, §274, *OCFN*, t. VI, 1904, pp. 300-301; *CW*, vol. 3, p. 186.

6. *Id.*, *Unpublished Fragments. Spring 1881-Summer 1882*, in *CW*, vol. 6, 15[17], p. 482.

7. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §224, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948, p. 220; *CW*, vol. 8, p. 126.

8. *Id.*, *Human, All Too Human I*, §1, 'Chemistry of concepts and sensations', *CW*, vol. 3, pp. 15-16 (comparison of traditional metaphysical philosophy and the more recent historical philosophy).

9. *Id.*, *Unpublished Fragments (Spring 1885-Spring 1886)* (Del Caro A trans), *CW*, vol. 16, 36[27], p. 126.

10. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, 2 vol., ed. by Friedrich Würzbach, trans by G. Bianquis, Paris, Gallimard, 1942 [1935-1937], here vol. 2, livre III, §306, p. 101. We find this fragment in *CW*, vol. 16, 34[73], p. 18 ("we are *historical* through and through"). Here, as at Buffalo and McGill, Foucault uses the edition of *The Will to Power* established in 1922 by Friedrich Würzbach, who produced his compilation on the basis of the "deformations" of Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Heinrich Köselitz (alias Peter Gast), augmented in 1911, without consulting the manuscripts themselves: M. Foucault and G. Deleuze, 'Introduction générale' [1967], in *DE I*, no 45, pp. 561-564, here p. 561; on the history of the publication of *The Will to Power*, German and French editions, see Mazzino Montinari, «*La Volonté de puissance* n'existe pas», ed. by Paolo d'Iorio, trans by Patricia Farazzi and Michel Valensi, Paris, Éditions de l'Éclat, 1996, pp. 20-27 and 169-179 respectively.<sup>56</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Stricken: "knowledge (*savoir*)".

<sup>55</sup> *Werden*: being.

<sup>56</sup> [I have found no English translation of Montinari's book, but one part of it was first published in English as 'The New Critical Edition of Nietzsche's Complete Works' (Thatcher DP trans) in *The Malahat Review*, n° 24, October 1972, pp. 121-133. The French translation of Montinari's book mentions English editions of *The Will to Power* only once, to note that the edition usually understood by that title (composed of 1,067 aphorisms, published in German in 1906) was translated into English in 1912 as *The Will to Power*, vols. 14-15 of *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche*, O Levy ed, New York, Macmillan. The reader may wish to know that the same collection, in roughly the same order, has been re-edited on the basis of Nietzsche's own manuscripts and translated by R. Kevin Hill and Michael A. Scarpitti as *The Will to Power: Selections from the Notebooks of the 1880s* in 2017, published by Penguin. To my knowledge, the Würzbach edition, translated into French by Bianquis, does not correspond to any English edition — Tr.]

Würzbach's edition was translated by Geneviève Bianquis for Gallimard in 1935. Very faulty in many respects, this edition was used by French philosophers at the time; today, it has been completely replaced by the editorial work of Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari on the posthumous fragments (*CW*).

11. Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human I*, §92, 'Origin of justice'; §111, 'Origin of the religious cult'; §169, 'Origin of the comic'; §219, 'Religious origin of modern music'; §226, 'Origin of

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faith'; §232, 'Conjecture about the origin of free-spiritedness'; §479, 'Wealth as the origin of a nobility of blood'; §572, 'Origin of courage', *CW*, vol. 3, pp. 70, 89-93, 128, 146-147, 156, 159, 261, and 278, respectively.

12. *Id.*, *Human, All Too Human II*, 'The Wanderer and His Shadow', §39, 'Origin of laws', *CW*, vol. 4, p. 177.

13. *Id.*, *Dawn*, §42, 'Origin of the *vita contemplativa*'; §62, 'On the origin of religions'; §102, 'The oldest moral judgements'; §247, 'Origin of intemperateness', in *CW*, vol. 5, pp. 34-35, 45-46, 70, and 172, respectively.

14. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, §84, 'On the origin of poetry'; §110, 'Origin of knowledge';<sup>57</sup> §111, 'Descent of the logical'; §135, 'Origin of sin'; §148, 'Where reformations arise'; §151, 'On the origin of religion'; §300, 'Preludes to science'; §345, 'Morality as a problem'; §347, 'Believers and their need for believing'; §348, 'On the Descent of Scholars' and §349, 'Once more the descent of scholars'; §353, 'On the origin of religions'; §354, 'On the "genius of the species"'; and §355, 'The origin of our concept of "knowledge"',<sup>58</sup> *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 94-97, 118-120, 121, 133-134, 139, 141, 177-178, 210-211, 213-215, 215-217, 220-221, 222-224, and 224-225, respectively.

15. We find here, of course, the development that Foucault will pursue with his article 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' [1971], in *EW* 2, pp. 369-391. We already find the traces of this work in his 'Journal intellectuel' from 9 August 1969: "Nietzsche. *Ursprung* different from *Herkunft, Abkunft, Entstehung, Entartung, Geburt*. In §44 of *Dawn*, Nietzsche links *Ursprung* and *Bedeutung*" (BNF, Fonds Foucault, cote NAF 28730, Boîtes 91-92, chemise 4, 'Journal intellectuel de Michel Foucault', *Cahier rouge*, 24 June 1963-20 August 1969).

16. F. Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human I*, §1, *CW*, vol. 3, pp. 15-16.

17. *Id.*, *Dawn*, Book Two, §102, 'The oldest moral judgements', *CW*, vol. 5, p. 70.

18. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §151, et Livre cinquième, §353, *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 141 and 220-221.

19. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, V, 'Histoire naturelle de la morale', §187, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948, p. 147; *CW*, vol. 8, p. 82.

20. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §135, 'Origine du péché', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 108-109; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 133-134.

21. Foucault refers here to two examples which Nietzsche develops in the following manner: "An example: the sons of registrars and office scribes of all kinds, whose main task had always been to classify multifarious materials, catalogue it in drawers and generally to schematise it, demonstrate, in the event they become scholars, an inclination to consider a problem nearly solved if only they have schematised it... The talent for classifications and for tables of categories betrays something; one pays the price for being the child of one's parents. / The son of an advocate will also have to become an advocate as a scholar: his first consideration is for his cause to be proven right in court, his second, perhaps, to be right" (*id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre cinquième, §348, 'De l'origine des savants', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 180; *CW*, vol. 6, p. 246).

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22. F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre cinquième, §349, 'Encore au sujet de l'origine des savants', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 181; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 216-217.

23. *Id.*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, IX, 'What is Noble?', §260, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 170-173.

24. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §135, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 108-109; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 133-134.

25. *Id.*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, VIII, 'Peoples and Fatherlands', §244, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 148-151.

26. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre cinquième, §348, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 180-181 ("especially the Germans, an unreasonable race, with whom one must always start by 'examining their head'"); *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 215-216.

<sup>57</sup> [The French edition calls this 'connaissance' — Tr.]

<sup>58</sup> [The French edition calls this 'connaissance' — Tr.]

27. In *Le Discours philosophique*, written some years earlier in July 1966, Foucault elaborates on this method of diagnostics characteristic of post-Kantian philosophy and attributes to Nietzsche's thought the particular philosophical activity of diagnostic work. Moreover, he opens his manuscript, with Nietzsche, on this theme, in the first chapter that he titles 'Le diagnostic': "For some time already — is it since Nietzsche? even more recently? —, philosophy has received as its lot a task that had not been familiar to it until this point: this is to *diagnose*"; M. Foucault, *Le Discours philosophique*, ed. by Orazio Irrera and Daniele Lorenzini, Paris, Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, 2023, p. 13; see also *id.*, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', art. cit., p. 382; *id.*, (1999) 'Who Are You, Professor Foucault?' (Cairns L trans) [1967] *Religion and Culture* (J Carrette ed), Routledge, New York, USA, pp. 87-103, here p. 96.

28. F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, V, 'On the Natural History of Morality', §200, *CW*, vol. 8, p. 94.

29. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §148, 'De l'origine de la Réforme', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 113; *CW*, vol. 6, p. 139.

30. *Id.*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, V, 'On the Natural History of Morality', §200, *CW*, vol. 8, p. 94. Foucault adds, in the margin and in parentheses, a reference "to the preceding §", hence to §199 (*ibid.*, pp. 92-93).

31. *Id.*, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, §15, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 314-317.

32. *Id.*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, IX, 'What is Noble?', §262, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 175-177.

33. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §111, 'Origine de la logique', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 98-99; *CW*, vol. 6, p. 121.

34. *Ibid.*

## ANNEX 1

### [***General Definition of Genealogy***]

*I. Knowledge (connaissance) of the beginning: the notion of genealogy is not easy in Nietzsche; he lacks a definition of the concept and the methods which are its own. II. The Preface to On the Genealogy of Morality: 1. Genealogy is placed in the dimension of knowledge (connaissance): a. the knowledge (connaissance)/consciousness (conscience) dissymmetry; b. the knowledge (connaissance)/exposition dissymmetry; c. disequilibrium in Schopenhauer as in Kant. 2. Genealogy concerns us with ourselves.*

#### [I. (1)]

Knowledge (*connaissance*) of the beginning, or rather of a process where what we are today begins.

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The placing in context of the notion of genealogy is not easy to do in Nietzsche.

- A. Because he lacks a definition of the very concept of genealogy, and of the methods which are its own.
- B. Because the object that is proper to it is itself not clearly delimited.

In particular, we are used to saying that this is a matter of the origin of values.

a. But the designation of this origin is far from being univocal in the German texts.

– Sometimes it is designated as *Ursprung*.

– Sometimes the word *Ursprung* is explicitly recused, and replaced by *Entstehung* and *Herkunft*.

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b. As for the analyses themselves, they concern themselves just as much:

– with *conditions* in which value judgements have been formed;

for example the caste of priests and the values of asceticism;

– with the *value of values*: the role that they have played in the development of humanity;

for example: the value of the concept of good;

– with their symptomatic *content*: that which they in practice reveal of the energy or [health]<sup>59</sup> of humanity;

for example: the symptomatic value of the judgement of kindness.

C. Because there is no exact delimitation between history and genealogy.

– On the one hand, a whole series of texts against historians and history.

In the second of the *Unfashionable Observations* up to the text of *Beyond Good and Evil* [and] of *On the Genealogy of Morality* (see sheets: 'Le sens historique'; 'Contre l'histoire "positiviste"' (2)).

– But on the other hand, Nietzsche speaks of his work and activity as of a work of the historian.

a. He proposes to make the history of that of which we have not yet made the history

To make the history [of] that which gives colour to existence: love, greed, envy, consciousness, pity; divisions of time, festivals, food; the growth of instincts (*The Joyful Science* (3)).

To make the history of appearance (that is, of thought, to show that the world is the result of a host of errors and fantasies) (*Human, All Too Human* (4)).

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<sup>59</sup> Conjecture; word is difficult to read.

b. For this history, he proposes to use a method that is not comprehensive or interpretative, but documentary and almost realist.

The genealogist's colour is grey (*On the Genealogy of Morality*; see sheet: 'Pour une histoire de la morale' (5)).

c. He proclaims the possibility of a historical philosophy.

Opposition to a metaphysical philosophy (which believes in the *Wunderursprung*<sup>60</sup> of things) and a historical philosophy which has a double character (*Human, All Too Human* (6)):

– of finding its problem like the philosophy of two thousand years ago: how can the opposite arise from its opposite?

– of not being separated from natural science (and of being related to chemistry) (see sheet: 'La philosophie historique' (7)).

Even if the word and the very notion of historical philosophy disappear from the work, the necessity of introducing the historical sense into philosophical thought is reaffirmed several times.

– As manner of struggle against Egyptism, that is, the refusal of becoming and the desire to see all *sub specie aeterni*,<sup>61</sup> which at the same time amounts to refusing the senses, illusion, and the body (see sheet: 'L'histoire et le corps' (8)).

– As modality of diagnostics allowing one to establish differences, hierarchies (see sheet: 'Le sens historique contre la démocratie'; *Beyond Good and Evil* (9)).

– As capacity for a culture to reactivate in it the highest moments of other cultures.

The happiness of all these found torments

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(see sheet: 'L'histoire et le sens de la noblesse'; *The Joyful Science* (10)).

D. Because the status of genealogy in knowledge (*connaissance*) and as knowledge (*connaissance*) is not clearly determined.

– On the one hand, genealogy, inasmuch as it is knowledge (*connaissance*), reveals that will to know (*vouloir-savoir*) of which *The Birth of Tragedy* already spoke as a *Wissensgier*.<sup>62</sup>

Now this *Wissensgier* opposes truth and error, claims to know (*connaître*) the base of things, supposes a theoretical optimism.

And by this, it recovers the tragic intoxication that delights in illusion and error; it fixes it and immobilises it like Socrates' Cyclopean eye.

– But it is precisely this genealogy that can be traced:

*The Birth of Tragedy*, §15; *The Joyful Science*, §111: *Entstehung* of logic; *The Joyful Science*, §110: *Ursprung* of knowledge (*connaissance*); *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III: asceticism (11).

Is genealogy perhaps therefore to be situated at the interior of knowledge (*connaissance*), if it is true that we can "genealogise" knowledge (*connaissance*) itself?

– On the other hand, genealogy appears not as liberation of or return to, but meticulous destruction of that which we are.

Finding instincts, events, operations under values, certainties and continuities.

Insofar as genealogy is indeed a knowledge (*connaissance*) then knowledge (*connaissance*) is punishment, destruction, and cruelty (see sheet: 'Cruauté et connaissance'; *Beyond Good and Evil* (12)):

– It removes the simplicity of the superficial, and seeks profound difference.

– It appears as inquisition and punishment of itself.

– It is one of the major moments of the great human sacrifice. Knowledge (*connaissance*) making humanity perish (see sheets:

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'L'humanité se sacrifiant à la connaissance. *Aurore*'; 'L'instinct de connaissance. *Aurore*' (13)).

<sup>60</sup> *Wunderursprung*: miraculous origin.

<sup>61</sup> *Sub specie aeterni*: from the viewpoint of the eternal.

<sup>62</sup> *Wissensgier*: eagerness to know (*savoir*).

But if genealogy is the destruction of knowledge (*connaissance*), does it not destroy destruction, will it not put an end to this great sacrifice where humanity links the will to know (*vouloir savoir*) to a will not to be? (14)

These are some of the uncertainties in which the notion and practice of genealogy is taken. They indicate the three points we will have to speak about:

- origin,
- history,
- knowledge (*connaissance*) and destruction.

## II.

All these themes, we find them interlaced in the first paragraph of the Preface to *On the Genealogy of Morality*.

1. Genealogy is placed in the dimension of knowledge (*connaissance*).

First sentence: "We are unknowns (*inconnus*) for us, we knowers (*connaissants*) – unknown to ourselves" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (15)): <sup>63</sup>

- a. there exists an *Unbekannt*, <sup>64</sup> which is ourselves;
- b. "we are knowers (*connaissants*)"; but this proposition is in apposition to the preceding.

Apposition which could mean four things:

- Although we are knowers (*connaissants*), we do not know (*connaissons*) ourselves.
- We do not know (*connaissons*) ourselves; but since we are knowers (*connaissants*), we have the power and the duty to [know (*connaître*)] ourselves.
- We do not know (*connaissons*) ourselves; and that in us which escapes us, and prevents us from being transparent to ourselves, is the fact that we are knowers (*connaissants*)
- We do not know (*connaissons*), because we are knowers (*connaissants*); because [knowledge (*connaissance*)] is made, organised, directed in such a way that we never know (*connaissons*) ourselves.

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The *Unbekannt-Erkennende*<sup>65</sup> juxtaposition as it arises stylistically in the text can therefore cover several relations:

*Unbekannt* ↔ *Erkennende*: Opposition

*Unbekannt* ← *Erkennende*: Objection

*Unbekannt* → *Erkennende*: Belonging

*Unbekannt* ← *Erkennende*: Causality

The pseudo-explanation that is then given only repeats at the level of the fact the opposition formulated at the start.

In any case, we see that we are entirely at the level of the *Erkenntnis*.<sup>66</sup> The two terms "unknowns (*inconnus*) — knowers (*connaissants*)" are of the same level. Neither of the two imbalances which could occur, do occur.

- a. The *knowledge (connaissance)/consciousness (conscience)* dissymmetry. "Schopenhauerian dissymmetry"

In Schopenhauerian analysis, we go from knowledge (*connaissance*)<sup>67</sup> to the unconscious; that is, we show how:

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<sup>63</sup> [What Foucault writes would, literally, be "We are unknowns (*inconnus*) for us, we knowers (*connaissants*) – ourselves to ourselves". The sentence in Nietzsche is translated (see endnote 15, *infra*) as "We are unknown to ourselves, we knowing ones: and this for a good reason." I have thus taken some liberties with the translation of this sentence — Tr.]

<sup>64</sup> *Unbekannt*: unknown (*inconnu*).

<sup>65</sup> *Erkennende*: knowing (*connaissant*).

<sup>66</sup> *Erkenntnis*: knowledge (*connaissance*).

<sup>67</sup> Foucault uses abbreviations: "c/cé" for "knowledge (*connaissance*)" and "cse" for "consciousness (*conscience*)".

- on the one hand, the roots of knowledge (*connaissance*) are unconscious, such that that from which we know (*connaissons*), and the forms and limits of this knowledge (*connaissance*), escape us;
- but on the other hand the unknowable (*inconnaisable*) is not the thing in itself, but that very will over which a veil is cast, and which makes knowledge (*connaissance*) possible (16).

The Schopenhauerian reduction<sup>68</sup> thus comprises three times:

- the deportation (*reconduction*) of consciousness to the unconscious<sup>69</sup> from which it proceeds;
- the return of the unknown-unknowable (*inconnu-inconnaisable*) in an unconscious;
- the identification of these two unconsciouses in the will.

In Nietzsche, on the contrary, we are at the level of knowledge (*connaissance*) and the unknown (*inconnu*).

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##### b. The knowledge (*connaissance*)/exposition dissymmetry

For Kant equally, the formula "we are unknowns (*inconnus*) to ourselves, we knowers (*connaissants*)" uncovers a dissymmetry, but of another type.

Indeed, the (critical) knowledge (*connaissance*) that we take of ourselves as subjects of knowledge (*connaissance*) is subject to neither a formal deduction (since it is a matter of a transcendental logic) nor a perception (since it is a matter of categories that [are only accessible in the understanding]<sup>70</sup>). This knowledge (*connaissance*) can only be delivered in a specific mode which is that of exposition, and by a particular operation that Kant calls "reflection" (17).

Such that the Kantian formula "we are unknowns (*inconnus*)" would have as content:

we have not yet been exposed to our own eyes by the proper movement of reflection.

c. But in any case, in Schopenhauer as in Kant, there exists a similar disequilibrium which is not found in Nietzsche.

It is the disequilibrium which makes it that, to the knower (*connaissant*), can be opposed:

- the unknown (*inconnu*),
- or the unknowable (*inconnaisable*).

And to the Nietzschean formula, we can respond in two ways:

- we are unknowns (*inconnus*) in fact and in correlation with a possible knowledge (*connaissance*);
- we are unknowns (*inconnus*) by right and without any correlation with a possible knowledge (*connaissance*).

But Nietzsche escapes this disequilibrium since in the following sentence:

- he says that the reason is in the fact that we did not search for ourselves;
- he evokes the possibility of knowing (*connaître*) ourselves one day, and that day when we will have searched for ourselves.

The limit from the known (*connu*) to the unknown (*inconnu*) is the limit as it is drawn by research.

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We are therefore in the dimension of the *Erkenntnis*, of an *Erkenntnis* which is not limited by right, and which can be developed according to the norms of a positive knowledge (*savoir*).

#### 2. Genealogy concerns us with ourselves.

What is that we ourselves are? It is defined by the opposition hive, treasure, loot (*heimzubringen*),<sup>71</sup> heart on the one hand, and *Leben-Erlebnis*,<sup>72</sup> ear on the other.

How does this opposition function? Difficult to establish at first glance, since on the one hand there are metaphors plus an organ, on the other there are notions plus an organ.

<sup>68</sup> Stricken: ""genealogy"".

<sup>69</sup> Foucault uses an abbreviation, "Ics". Since for Schopenhauer it would tend to be a matter of the unconscious (*inconscient*) rather than unconsciousness/unawareness (*inconscience*), we have chosen "unconscious (*inconscient*)".

<sup>70</sup> Conjecture; passage missing.

<sup>71</sup> *Heimzubringen*: to return home.

<sup>72</sup> *Leben*: life; *Erlebnis*: experience.

Happily, in the rest of the text, the metaphor that corresponds to *Leben-Erlebnis*, and that balances the hive, the bees appears: these are the twelve blows.

Easy opposition:

- harvest/is chimed;<sup>73</sup>
- be careful (*kümmern*) and return to its place/be distracted and be awake;
- [Mouth]<sup>74</sup>/ear;
- *Herz/Sein*.<sup>75</sup>

It is necessary to study the second side of the metaphor a little, since it is this which is going to give us the meaning of what genealogy is.

A. That which is chimed is the twelve strokes of noon. Noon for Nietzsche:

- a. Is the moment of the shortest shadow: that which escapes the shimmer of appearance is therefore limited to a minimum; it is appearance appearing, out of all depth, of all somber continuity.
- b. Is the moment of the longest count; this is the paradox of noon: it lasts only an instant (whilst the evening is long, and the morning is progressive); but to grasp (*saisir*) it, it is necessary to count for a long time, and to count discrete units separated from each other.

Noon is appearance without depth and the instant in its dispersion.

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It is therefore not the sensory image of eternity, it is the opposite.

B. That which is distracted is characterised as:

- *göttlich Zerstreuter*: lost in God, thrown out of itself by God;
- *in sich versenker*: set deep within itself.

Opposition that is balanced by the fact that the distracted is the one that [is] both lost in God and pushed into itself, two expressions that are part of the vocabulary of spirituality:

- it is at the bottom of oneself that we find God;
- it is by getting lost in God that we find ourselves.

Or the awakening due to the twelve strokes of noon:

- a. I am not thrown out of myself towards the invisible God, but by this opening of the ear which is sensitive to the rhythm and successions of the world successive events come to be inscribed in me.
- b. These twelve strokes awaken, *i.e.* bring out of the dream, that is, of the Apollonian vision by which the events, sufferings, passivities of the body are veiled.
- c. And they discover inside me:
  - not an eternity, not the eternal present of God, but that which is lost, the discharge,
  - and the fact that I am this very dispersion, and nothing other than it.

The twelve strokes of noon in waking me dissipate the *göttlich*<sup>76</sup> and the *in sich*, thus revealing their face to face. The death of God and the dissipation of the subject.

C. [Mouth]<sup>77</sup>/ear

The ear is the Dionysian sense:

- Rhythm, music; that which is lost.

It is opposed:

- to the mouth which acquires, stores, captures the solid;
- to the eye which immobilises appearance.

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<sup>73</sup> [The word 's'égrenner', here translated as 'is chimed' (in the sense of a clock chiming the strokes of the hour) could also be translated as 'is shelled' (in the sense of shelling a nut or some other harvest) — Tr.]

<sup>74</sup> In brackets in the manuscript.

<sup>75</sup> *Herz*: heart; *sein*: being.

<sup>76</sup> *Göttlich*: divine.

<sup>77</sup> In brackets in the manuscript.

– The murmur: that which is lost, is immediately forgotten, passes without trace. The ear is that for which there is no writing. To ward off grapho-centrism.

The sound that chimes is opposed to the honey that accumulates. Under the image of honey probably runs the anecdote of bees coming to land and make their honey on Plato's lips (18).

D. The final opposition is that of *Leben-Erlebnis-(Sein)* to *Herz-(Schatz)*<sup>78</sup>

On the one hand: the knowledge (*savoir*) which is brought back as a loot and which accumulates in the form of subjective interiority. A knowledge (*connaissance*) in the form of a hive.

On the other: the knowledge (*savoir*) of *Leben* and *Erlebnis*.

- There is no assimilation of *Erlebnis* to the continuity of *Leben*.
- There is no reduction of *Leben* to the instantaneous experience of *Erlebnis*.

But their identification is made in the form of the twelve strokes of noon: a being which is never given except as already having fled; never there but having to return.

Such is genealogy: the knowledge (*savoir*) of this being that we are; being, understood as the discontinuity of events that resonate but leaving neither trace nor graphism; being that can never be re-grasped (*ressaisi*) like a treasure buried in ourselves or like the visible image of the god, but as what [is] already no longer there and can only ever return.

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#### [Sheet]

Historical series (19):

- Homer: the Greeks dreaming.
- The Dionysian for the Barbarians, against which the Greeks defend themselves by Apollo brandishing Medusa's head. Doric art.

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- Then Apollo can only do one thing, reconcile with Dionysus and thereby disarm him.

But reconciliation:

- which leaves the abyss open,
- irritations, exchanges.

Other historical series (20):

- Bronze age: battle of Titans.
- Apollonian domination: Homer.
- Dionysian wave.
- Taken up by classical tragedy.

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#### NOTES

1. In the chemise dedicated to the Vincennes course (BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 65, 'Nietzsche 67-70'), we have found three other texts which are either preparatory works, or notes for lectures given in 1968-1969 or in 1969-1970. They do not correspond to the student notes for the year 1969-1970. It is not possible to know in which order they were given, nor if they form part of the series of lectures from the course on Nietzsche from 1969-1970. We thus put them in annexes. See *infra*, 'Context', p. 337.

2. F. Nietzsche, 'On the Utility and Liability of History for Life', *CW*, vol. 2; *id.*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, VII, 'Our Virtues', §224, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 126-128; *id.*, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Third Treatise, §25, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 340-343. For the sheet on 'Le sens historique', see *supra*, note 27, p. 34. On the second indication, see BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 4, 'Contre l'histoire "positiviste"'. Foucault there quotes a passage from Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morality*: "Its supreme claim is today to be a *mirror*; it rejects any teleology; it no longer wants to "prove" anything; it disdains to erect itself as judge, and believes by this to show its good taste, — it affirms as little as it denies, it notes, it "describes"... All this is certainly asceticism, but to an even higher degree, *nihilism*... / these eunuch concupiscents of history, all these

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<sup>78</sup> *Schatz*: treasure.

followers (*raccrocheurs*)<sup>79</sup> of the ascetic ideal... I can't stand all those coquettish bedbugs who put their unbridled ambition into sniffing out the infinite until the infinite smells like bedbugs; I can't stand these whitened tombs that mock life, I can't stand these tired and blinded beings, who cloak themselves in wisdom and give themselves an "objective" gaze..." (F. Nietzsche, *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §26, *OCFN*, t. XI, 1913, pp. 274-276; *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Third Treatise, §26, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 343-345).

3. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre premier, §7, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 37-38; *The Joyful Science*, Book One, §7, *CW*, vol. 6, p. 44.

4. *Id.*, *Human, All Too Human I*, §16, *CW*, vol. 3, pp. 26-28.

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5. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 4, 'Pour une histoire de la morale'. Quoting Nietzsche, Foucault writes the following passage: "Paul Rée, like the English, builds his history of morality, "in the void, in the azure". / "It is clear that for the genealogist of morality there is a colour a hundred times preferable to azure: I mean grey, by this I mean everything that is based on documents, what can really be established, what really existed, in short, the whole, long hieroglyphic text, laborious to decipher, of the past of human morality!"" (F. Nietzsche, *La Généalogie de la morale*, 'Avant-propos', §7, *OCFN*, t. XI, 1913, p. 20; *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 'Preface', §7, *CW*, vol. 8, p. 213; *italics by Nietzsche*). This passage will give impetus for the famous first sentence which opens Foucault's article, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History': "Genealogy is grey", as well as the development of the first paragraphs (M. Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', art. cit.).

6. F. Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human I*, §1, *CW*, vol. 3, pp. 15-16 (comparison of traditional metaphysical philosophy and the more recent historical philosophy).

7. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 4, 'La philosophie historique'. Foucault writes, quoting Nietzsche: "Metaphysical philosophy... denying that one was born of the other and admitting for things of high value a miraculous origin, the exit from the core and essence of the "thing in itself" / Today, we find the same problems as two thousand years ago: how can a thing be born of its opposite: "Historical philosophy... which can no longer be conceived at all separately from natural science, the most recent of all philosophical methods, discovered in particular cases (and probably, this will be its conclusion in all) that there are no opposites... according to its explanation, there is, strictly understood, neither non-egoist conduct, nor completely disinterested contemplation; both are only sublimations, in which the fundamental element seems almost volatilised... ["Everything we need, and that can be given to us for the first time, thanks to the current level of particular sciences, is"] a chemistry" (F. Nietzsche, *Humain, trop humain*, vol. 1, §1, *OCFN*, t. VI, 1904, pp. 19-20; *Human, All Too Human I*, §1, *CW*, vol. 3, pp. 15-16).

8. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 4, 'L'histoire et le corps'. Foucault writes, quoting a passage from Nietzsche: "The idiosyncrasy of philosophers? "For example, their lack of historical sense, their hatred against the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They believe they honour a thing by releasing it from its historical side, *sub specie aeterni...*" / "... detach it from the illusion of the senses, of the future, of history, of the lie, — history is only faith in the senses, faith in lies"" (F. Nietzsche, *Le Crépuscule des idoles*, 'La "Raison" dans la philosophie', §1, *OCFN*, t. XII, 1942, p. 102; "Reason" in Philosophy', §1, *CW*, vol. 9, p. 57).

9. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §224, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948, p. 221; *Beyond Good and Evil*, VII, 'Our Virtues', §224, *CW*, vol. 8, p. 126 (the *historical* sense: "this new sense, this sixth sense"). For the sheet 'Le sens historique contre la démocratie', see *supra*, note 24, p. 33.

10. On the sheet 'L'histoire et le sens de la noblesse', see *supra*, note 25, p. 33. See F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §337, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 166-167; *The Joyful Science*, Book Four, §337, *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 199-200.

11. F. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-75; *id.*, *The Joyful Science*, Book Three, §111, 'Descent of the logical', *CW*, vol. 6,

<sup>79</sup> [To use 'followers' as a translation of 'raccrocheurs' is woefully inadequate, but I believe there is nothing even resembling an English equivalent, at least without getting into illegibly opaque metaphor. A 'raccrocheur' is perhaps best understood by summarising its etymology: 're', which is not noteworthy, plus 'accrocher', a verb meaning something like 'to create a connection': this could be an emotional connection between a person and an object, it could be closing a circuit, it could be a car crash. The only English descendent of 'accrocher' I have found is 'inaccreachable', meaning 'unable to be sold' (often due to sexual content), used of media. In this context, a 'raccrocheur' would be one who seeks to join with the past as opposed to judging it from a distance. Other options I have considered include 'bandwagoners', 'joiners', 'hangars-on', and 'partners'. The feminine version, 'raccrocheuse', meant 'prostitute' about 200 years ago — Tr.]

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p. 121; *ibid.*, §110, 'Origin of knowledge', *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 118-120;<sup>80</sup> *id.*, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Third Treatise, §13, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 309-310. On the birth of asceticism, see also M. Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', art. cit., p. 377.

12. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 5, 'Cruauté et connaissance'. Foucault writes, quoting Nietzsche: "... the Knower (*Connisseur*) [der Erkennende] himself, when forcing his mind to knowledge (*connaissance*), against the penchant of the mind and often even against the wish of his heart — that is, to deny, when he would like to affirm, love, worship — acts as an artist and transfigures cruelty. Any attempt to get to the bottom of things, to clarify mysteries is already a violence, a will to make suffer, the essential will of the mind that always tends towards appearance and the superficial, — in all will to know (*connaître*) there is a drop of cruelty." / The mind "has the will to reach from diversity to unity, a will that restrains, that subjugates, thirsts for domination and is really made to dominate." / "To this will to appearance, simplification, mask, coat, surface — because every surface is a coat — is opposed that sublime penchant of the one who seeks knowledge (*connaissance*), this penchant which takes and wants to take things in a deep, multiple way, in their essence. It is like a kind of cruelty of consciousness." / Cf. also on knowledge (*connaissance*) such as inquisitions, confession, conquest, adventure — wickedness [*Dawn*, §432]". The first passage comes from F. Nietzsche, *Par-delà bien et mal*, §229, *OCFN*, t. X, 1913, p. 234. Foucault adds the word in German (der *Erkennende*). The second and third come from §230, *ibid.*, pp. 234 and 236, respectively; *Beyond Good and Evil*, §229-230, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 132-135. The final paragraph refers to *Aurore*, Livre cinquième, §432, 'Chercheur et tentateur', *OCFN*, t. VII, 1912, pp. 335-336; *Dawn*, Book Five, §432, 'Researchers and experimenters', *CW*, vol. 5, pp. 224-225.

13. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33a, chemise 1, 'L'humanité se sacrifiant à la connaissance'. Foucault there quotes *Dawn* once more: "Of all the means of exaltation, it is human sacrifices that, for all times, have most elevated and spiritualised man. And perhaps there is a single prodigious idea which, even now, could annihilate any other aspiration, so that it would win over the most victorious, — I mean the idea of humanity sacrificing itself. But to whom must it sacrifice itself? We can already swear that, if the constellation of this idea ever appears on the horizon, knowledge (*connaissance*) of the truth will remain the only enormous goal to which such a sacrifice would be proportionate, because for knowledge (*connaissance*) no sacrifice is too great. In the meantime, the problem has never been posed... Perhaps when we have managed to fraternise with the inhabitants of other planets, in order to reach knowledge (*connaissance*), and when, for a few thousand years, we have communicated our knowledge (*savoir*) from star to star, perhaps then the flood of enthusiasm provoked by knowledge (*connaissance*) will attain such a height!" (F. Nietzsche, *Aurore*, Livre premier, §45, 'Un dénouement tragique de la connaissance', *OCFN*, t. VII, 1912, p. 59; *Dawn*, Book One, §45, 'A tragic ending for knowledge', *CW*, vol. 5, p. 37.) In the reading note 'L'instinct de connaissance' (BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 5), Foucault writes, quoting Nietzsche: "We do not want to return to barbarism. Yet the Barbarians were happier than us. "But it is our instinct for knowledge (*connaissance*) that is too developed for us to still appreciate happiness without knowledge (*connaissance*), or, better, the happiness of a solid and vigorous illusion; we suffer simply by imagining such a state of things! The disquiet of

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discovery and divination has taken on as much charm for us... as is, for the lover, *unhappy love*...; — yes, perhaps we, too, are unhappy lovers. / Knowledge (*connaissance*) has turned in us into a passion that is not afraid of any sacrifice and has, at bottom, only one fear, that of itself fading... Passion for knowledge (*connaissance*) will perhaps even make humanity perish! — this thought, too, is without power over us. So has Christianity been frightened of similar ideas? / if *passion* does not make humanity perish, it will perish from *weakness*. What do we prefer? This is the main question. Do we want humanity to end in fire and light, or in sand?"<sup>"</sup> (*ibid.*, §429, 'La nouvelle passion', *OCFN*, t. VII, 1912, pp. 333-334; *ibid.*, §429, 'The new passion', *CW*, vol. 5, pp. 223-224.)

14. We find here an early notion of the 'will to know (*vouloir savoir*)' that Foucault would develop in his course on the will to know (*volonté de savoir*): M. Foucault, *Leçons sur la volonté de savoir. Cours au Collège de France, 1970-1971*, suivi de *Le Savoir d'Œdipe*, ed. by D. Defert, Paris, Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, 2011. [See Foucault M (2013) *Lectures on the Will to Know: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1970-1971, and Œdipal Knowledge*, (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA — Tr.] In his 'Journal

<sup>80</sup> [The original French note here refers to these passages as 'Origine de la logique' and 'Origine de la connaissance' — Tr.]

'intellectuel', Foucault anticipates these developments, writing on 15 July 1969: "The will to know (*vouloir savoir*) rather than the formal structures of knowledge (*connaissance*) or the motives for knowing (*connaître*) — the morphology of this will"; then on 18 July, "Nietzsche, at least in the era of *Human, All Too Human*, analyses the will to know (*vouloir savoir*) in terms of errors, chimaeras, illusions. Later he will grant importance to perspective, injustice, as symptom and primary implementation of the will to know (*volonté de savoir*)" (BNF, Fonds Foucault, cote NAF 28730, Boîtes 91-92, chemise 4, 'Journal intellectuel de Michel Foucault', *Cahier rouge*, 24 June 1963-20 August 1969). See Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human I*, §251, 'Future of science', *CW*, vol. 3, pp. 171-172.

15. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, 'Preface', §1, *CW*, vol. 8, p. 207.

16. A. Schopenhauer, *Le Monde comme volonté et comme représentation*, 2 vol., Fr. trans. by Auguste Burdeau, 6<sup>th</sup> ed., Paris, Félix Alcan, 1912 [1818-1819], t. III, Supplément au Second Livre, Chapitre XXII, pp. 89-91. [See Schopenhauer A (1969) *The World as Will and Representation* (Payne EFJ trans), 2 vol., Dover Publications, New York, USA, v. 2, 'Supplements to the Second Book', Chapter XXII, pp. 275-278 — Tr.]

17. Immanuel Kant, *Critique de la raison pure*, ed. under the dir. of Ferdinand Alquié, trans. by Alexandre J.-L. Delamarre and François Marty, Paris, Gallimard, 1980 [1781], 'Appendice : De l'amphibologie des concepts de la réflexion', A260/B316, pp. 988-1010. [See Kant I (1998) *Critique of Pure Reason* (Guyer P and Wood AW trans), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, USA, 'Appendix: On the amphiboly of the concepts of reflection through the confusion of the empirical use of the understanding with the transcendental', A260/B316, pp. 366-383 — Tr.]

18. According to Pliny the Elder, bees "alighted on the mouth of Plato even when he was still an infant, portending the charm of that matchless eloquence": Pline l'Ancien, *Histoire naturelle*. Livre XI, Fr. trans. by Alfred Ernout and Roger Pépin, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1947, §XVIII, p. 46. [See Pliny the Elder (1855) *The Natural History Books 1-11* (Riley HT and Bostock J trans), digital version hosted by ToposText, §11.18.1, <https://topostext.org/work/148> — Tr.]

19. The "historical series" to which Foucault refers is found in Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §2, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-21.

20. The "other historical series" to which Foucault refers is found *ibid.*, end of §4, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

## ANNEX 2

### [*Beginning, Origin, History*]

The Nietzschean semantic field of Geburt (birth) poses four questions: a. who are the progenitors, who made it?; b. in which form of action and reaction?; c. what is its role?; d. what are its symptoms? For Nietzsche, man finds only himself in things.

Now-quotidian tradition of the opposition between beginning and birth:

- |           |   |  |
|-----------|---|--|
| Beginning | { | – point of irruption of a phenomenon<br>– empirical fact<br><br>– situated in history<br>– caught in a network of determinations   |
| Origin    | { | – that from which there is a beginning<br>– that in which all phenomena are founded<br><br>– therefore not pertaining to any history<br>– and must be repeated, since not accessible |

The play of Nietzschean notions is not distributed between these two poles.

The German semantic field comprises:

- *Anfang, Ursprung* (irruption, point of origin), *Grund*<sup>81</sup> (*Urgrund, Ungrund*),
- *Geburt, Entstehung* (emergence?).

For Nietzsche the organising notion is *Geburt*, which designates, for him, as for all the Germans:

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- a. the fact of birth,
- b. race or stock,
- c. background (*extraction*) so far as it is susceptible of a certain quality.

It is a notion that is neither philosophical nor historical, but rather biological, and that entails with it:

- the semantic domain of genealogy (noble or not),
- and that of hereditary (good or bad, loaded or healthy; degenerescence or improvement).

Genealogy and heredity are inscribed (at least in this era) in a domain of value.

The science of births (Socrates, Nietzsche).

In what does the question of birth consist?

Take the example of the genealogy of morality: "the birth of Good and Evil".

In this text, two questions:

- In what conditions did man...?
- What value...?

Question redoubled in turn:

- relation to development,
- symptom.

However, what the text does not say, the first question is divided [also] into two (this appears in the development):

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<sup>81</sup> *Grund*: fundament.

- Who are the progenitors, who made it?
- Under what circumstances: following what encounter, what crossing, what struggle?

[Yet] these four questions are related in the sense that it is the nature and value of the progenitor that commands the nature and value of the encounter and these in turn command the role and symptomatic function of the elements.

All the questions are thus linked to each other by the question of value. Or rather, the answer to these questions will at the same time raise the question of the value of the elements.

Hence the fact that in any question of genealogy the question of value arises.

Example of truth: Why do [we] prefer the truth (*Beyond Good and Evil* (1))?

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The fact that the genealogy of morality is the question of the value of value.

#### a. First question: *who*?

– [On the one hand,] it replaces the question: *whence*? From what? Of what principle or of what truth?

It's the Socratic invention: you pull it out of your head in spite of yourself (and taken up by Kant) against sophists.

- The sophist knew (*savait*) that the truth of a discourse is not independent of the one who pronounces it.
- But wanted to make everyone capable of winning: democracy.

– On the other hand, it replaces the question: *why*?

- This is also the question of Socrates and the utilitarians.
- They believe that there is a utility in itself. And that this utility has been forgotten and covered in the form of morals.

– The question *who*? is the question placed outside legitimacy by all philosophy. The most naïve and most radical question. The primitive question.

There is no universal subject (no more at the empirical level of a human nature than at the fundamental level of a constituent subject).

And to this question, Nietzsche has not stopped answering in a most precise way:

- first Dionysos and Apollo (a little in the way of Schelling);
- And then the Jews, the priests, the Goths.

#### b. The second question is: in what form of action and reaction?

Birth is the production of a difference: good/evil; good/bad; pure/impure; useful/useless; true/false.

We are used to saying:

- The good births are actions and affirmations.
- The bad are reactions and negations, [thus] *ressentiment*.<sup>82</sup>

It's more complicated.

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– There is a true reaction which is part of the action itself; and a negation which is like the shadow of the affirmation itself.

– There is on the contrary [a] reaction:

- which is not action, but imaginary compensation; unreal;
- which begins by negation, instead of beginning by affirmation.

Example : the birth of good and bad.

– The good is first affirmed as pure difference, without exteriority, without anything else. Kind of intensity (intensity, for Deleuze and Klossowski, is difference which is opposed to nothing, which is distinguished by itself, by its own *Entstehung*; and not by its *Entscheidung* (2)).<sup>83</sup>

Then by reaction (but interior to action) an ambiguous designation of the others:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• as the ones below</li> <li>• and the unhappy</li> </ul> | { <span style="margin-left: 10px;">deilos (in English, unfortunates)<sup>84</sup></span> |
|--|--|

<sup>82</sup> [I have kept this word in the French, as Nietzsche borrows it from French as a technical term — Tr.]

<sup>83</sup> *Entstehung*: emergence; *Entscheidung*: decision.

<sup>84</sup> [The original reads: 'en français, misérables' — Tr.]

- The good and the bad are affirmed in the interior of the same individual, the priest (see voluntary suffering):
  - the pure and the impure,
  - weakness,
  - and reversal of usage:
    - α. one will call bad all the qualities affirmed by the good,
    - β. and good, all the contrary traits, weakness, chastity, sadness.
- It is then that the "bad" apply the epithet "good", and inversely.

We see that the action/reaction system which characterises a *Geburt* is complex:

- not only because there is no action and reaction on one side;
- but [also] because there are some very different operations:

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- negative attitudes; compensation; struggle, confiscation; reversal; plotting; alliances.
- But because, far from it being ideas that clash, it is forces that take over language (*langage*).
- Finally, and above all, because there exists an essential moment: that which is characterised by the priests.

The strange form of this action that causes the reaction.

The connection:

- tragedy,
- Socrates,
- the priests.

c. The third and fourth questions on the role and symptoms concern the question of the origin and beginning less directly.

- The role is not null:
  - role of asceticism in culture,
  - tyranny of priests.
- The symptom with its two faces :
  - future,
  - past.

From there, the position of history.

- Critique of historical sense.
  - In a text of youth:
    - α. history as theatre (loss of reality of the historian),
    - β. destroys the germ of all life.
  - In a text from *Beyond Good and Evil* (3): popular history which accepts everything.
- But this does not imply a genealogy that would be a "quest for the original" without articulation on a historical knowledge (*savoir*).
  - opposition of the azure utilitarians to the grey of the document (see sheet: 'Pour une histoire de la morale' (4));
  - etymologies.
- In fact, history is diagnostics: that is, re-grasping (*ressaisie*) of forces, of states of health (see sheet: 'L'histoire et le sens de la noblesse'; see also and above all the start of the text from *Beyond Good and Evil* (5)).

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Philosophical reading shows that conscious activity is instinctive (*Beyond Good and Evil* (6); see the analysis of Kant's text on synthetic a priori judgements (7); *The Joyful Science* on translation (8)).

Interpretation for Nietzsche – man finds only himself in things:

- what he finds is science;<sup>85</sup>
- what he introduces is art.

There is a logic, [which] is an originary interpretation. A ciphered writing. Postulates of logic: identity, analogy. Find the masked postulates. Logic is an abbreviation in service of a certain form of will to power.

- Metaphysics is an interpretation. The sign must be read genealogically: show how a concept has been produced (*Sprachwissenschaft*, the linguistic?).

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<sup>85</sup> Conjecture, based on an abbreviation.

- Interpretation: that which makes it possible to spot points of reading.
- Genealogy: how an originary interpretation is historically developed.
- Originality: seeing that which has never been seen (*The Joyful Science* (9)).
- *An Liebe*:<sup>86</sup> (*The Joyful Science* (10)).

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#### NOTES

1. F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §224, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 126-128.
2. Deleuze G (2017) *Difference and Repetition* (Patton P trans), Bloomsbury Academic, London, UK, chapter 5, in particular pp. 305-322 (the three characteristics of intensity); Klossowski P (2001)<sup>87</sup> *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* (Smith DW trans), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA, pp. 62-66.
3. Foucault does not specify the paragraph, but one could think of F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 9, 'What is Noble?', §260, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 170-173.
4. On the reading note 'Pour une histoire de la morale', see *supra*, note 5, p. 92. See F. Nietzsche, 'Preface' to *On the Genealogy of Morality*, §7, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 213-224.
5. *Id.*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 1-3. On the reading note 'L'histoire et le sens de la noblesse', see *supra*, note 25, p. 33.
6. F. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §3, *CW*, vol. 8, p. 7.
7. *Ibid.*, §4, *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 7-8.
8. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre deuxième, §83, 'Traductions', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 77; *id.*, *The Joyful Science*, Book Two, §83, 'Translations', *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 93-94.
9. *Ibid.*, Livre troisième, §261, 'Originalité', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 134; *ibid.*, Book Three, §261, 'Originality', *CW*, vol. 6, p. 160.
10. Foucault does not end this sentence, but notes: "§59". The two other words which he writes are difficult to read. In §59 of *The Joyful Science*, Nietzsche speaks of love, hence our conjecture: *ibid.*, Livre deuxième, §59, 'Nous autres artistes!', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 66-67; *ibid.*, Book Two, §59, 'We artists!', *op. cit.*, *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 80-81.

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<sup>86</sup> *An Liebe*: to love. Conjecture, words difficult to read.

<sup>87</sup> [The copyright page mentions no year beyond 1997, the first publication of the translation, but it is evidently a different version as the book elsewhere mentions Klossowski's death in 2001. I thus give 2001 as the earliest possible year of publication — Tr.]

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## ANNEX 3


## **[History and Genealogy]**

*To determine what is proper to Nietzschean genealogy by the use of words, like origin, beginning, birth. Genealogy preserves historical sense and permits thinking the return.*

- There are theoretical or polemical texts on history: the *Second Unfashionable*.
  - There are historical analyses: Homer.
  - There are texts which operate the division between history and genealogy. To determine what is proper to Nietzschean genealogy:<sup>88</sup>
    - less by the texts on history and genealogy,
    - less by the utilisation of terms<sup>89</sup> (concepts),
    - than by the usage of a certain number of words like:
      - origin, beginning;
      - before, since the beginning, since times immemorial

What analysis does he do — what is his discursive practice of history?

Birth:



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Multiplying development.  
Generation, connoted by the term.

Duality: Duplicity of the Apollonian  
Abstract of the Dionysian (1)

These are not two separate existences, two substances, but a duality the support of which is not specified between "x" (principles – elements).

This duality, one could grasp (*saisir*) it:

- metaphorically: by the duality of the sexes;
  - in forms:
    - gods

<sup>88</sup> Stricken: "the distinction of level".

<sup>89</sup> Stricken: "rubrics".

<sup>90</sup> *Fortentwicklung*: continuous development. Foucault only underlines "Fort" because he wants to make apparent the supplemental sense that "*Fort*" (continuous) brings to the notion of *Entwicklung* (growth).

<sup>91</sup> [The French, 'Développement plus accroissement', could also be understood as 'More growth than development' — Tr.]

- and in what they protect
  - plastic
  - non plastic (2)

– in an analogy: dream/intoxication (3).

These three dualities-oppositions do not have the same function in Nietzsche's discourse:

1. The two sexes: is for us a metaphor:
  - which refers to the œuvre as product,
  - to the nature of the *Trieb*<sup>92</sup> of the producers. Transitory metaphor.
2. Apollo/Dionysos:
  - is an expression which was actually used by the Greeks;
  - expression which is attached to secret thoughts.
3. Dream/intoxication: way for us to understand and *Voraussetzungen*:<sup>93</sup>
  - of the plastic,
  - and of the non-plastic.

All this to arrive at the generation (*Erzeugung*) of an œuvre which is that result of a *Paarung*<sup>94</sup> of the Dionysian and of the Apollonian.

Thanks to (*durch*) a miracle of Greek will (4).

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This is the equivalent of what in the Greek "Elegies" concerns "births" (see *Gorgias – The Banquet*).  
Nobility of birth.

## Conclusion

Genealogy is that which preserves the historical sense.

- of all comparison (by the uncovering of individuality),
- of all weakness (as diagnostics of forces),
- of all eschatology (as recognition (*reconnaissance*) of the future).

That is to say:

- that which permits thinking the return (because, to think the return:
  - it is necessary to think the singularity of the break and not continuity,
  - it is necessary to think the intensity of forces and not the objectivity of facts,
  - it is necessary to think the infinity of the future and not totality);
- but inversely the return is that which founds genealogical analysis:
  - it is the return which founds the singularity of the instant<sup>95</sup> (since any instant is the infinity of all instants);
  - it is the return which founds the intensity of forces;
  - it is the return which makes it possible for the future to be infinite.

Genealogy is the meticulous knowledge (*savoir*) which protects the historical sense against any temptation towards the supra-historical; which keeps it as close as possible to becoming by discarding all eternalisation in science; and which allows this historical sense to burst into the thought of the return.

And it is at the same time this indefinite and indefinitely accumulable knowledge (*savoir*) that is placed under the sign of the return, the ring, and circularity.

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<sup>92</sup> *Trieb*: drive, impulse, pulsion.

<sup>93</sup> *Voraussetzungen*: conditions.

<sup>94</sup> *Paarung*: pairing. [The French given by Harcourt here is 'accouplement', which could be both 'coupling' and 'mating'  
— Tr.]

<sup>95</sup> *Stricken*: "the event".

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#### NOTES

1. This whole passage is a commentary on the opening of *The Birth of Tragedy* (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy, op. cit.*, §1, pp. 14-19).
2. At the start of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche opposes plastic Apollonian art to non plastic Dionysian art – music (*ibid.*, p. 14).
3. On intoxication in Nietzsche, recall the manner in which Nietzsche describes intoxication (*Rausch*) as Dionysian in *The Birth of Tragedy* (*ibid.*, §2, p. 19) and indeed in the elegy in *Twilight of the Idols* (*id.*, *Twilight of the Idols*, 'Forays of an Untimely One', §8, 'On the psychology of the artist', *CW*, vol. 9, pp. 92-93).
4. Foucault takes up almost word for word Nietzsche's formulation: "*durch einem metaphysischen Wunderakt des hellenischen Willens*" (Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §1, p. 14: "a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic 'Will'").

SECOND PART

***Knowledge (connaissance) and Desire***

*Course given at the University of Buffalo (March-April 1970)*

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## COURSE ON NIETZSCHE

### ***Knowledge (connaissance) and Desire***

*Introduction: The Nietzschean critique of scholars and science. I. An example: history; A. The Second Unfashionable and the three positions with regards to becoming; B. Other texts regarding history; C. Conclusion. II. The illusion of knowing (connaître): knowledge (connaissance) is an invention; knowledge (connaissance) rests on a struggle of instincts. III. The fable of truth: the three moments of Nietzschean critique. IV. To perish by knowledge (connaissance).*

#### **Introduction (1)**

– The attacks Nietzsche directs against science and scholars:

a. Against scholars:

"The cultured philistine, ... the great talkative old young man and young old man, ... a full stomach that does not yet know what it is to be really hungry, really thirsty" (*Unfashionable Observations II* (2)).

"... these eunuch concupiscents of history, all these followers (*raccrocheurs*) of the ascetic ideal... I cannot stand these bleached sepulchres that parody life, I cannot stand these tired and blind beings, who drape themselves in wisdom and give themselves an "objective" look..." (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (3)).

"Is man's tendency to shrink, his will (*volonté*) to become small, not, since Copernicus, in perpetual progress?" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (4)).

b. Against science:

"... delirious illusion that thought guided by causality descends to the ultimate abysses of being" (*The Birth of Tragedy* (5)).

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"Science prepares a sovereign ignorance, a feeling that knowledge (*connaissance*)... itself is a completely contradictory representation" (*The Will to Power* (6)).

– But these attacks seem incompatible with the "naïve" support Nietzsche takes in the sciences, philology, biology, history, physics (see the text 'Long live physics!', *The Joyful Science* (7)).

He threw himself on a rather simplistic Darwinism:

- α. rejecting the most valid, scarcity, and substituting for it the theme of a generous nature;
- β. accepting, on the contrary, that man descends from the monkey.

He uses a dubious philological knowledge (*savoir*):

- α. *esthlos – esti*: that which is, which has reality;<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>96</sup> [I have decided to add the references for these three examples as footnotes, since Harcourt does not give them an endnote. For this first example, see *On the Genealogy of Morality*, First Treatise, §5, CW, vol. 8, p. 222, where Nietzsche writes: "The word ἔσθλος coined for this means in its root someone who *is*, who has reality, who is real, who is true". The Greek word there transliterates to *esthlos*, but it is unclear where Foucault gets *esti* from. Possibly he is attempting some amateur philology of his own on the German word *ist*, which is translated by *is* in the above quote. It is also possible that Foucault wrote *est*, quoting p. 37 of the OCFN edition (t. XI) where this passage appears, which Harcourt perhaps mistranscribed as *esti* — Tr.]

β. *malus* – *melas*: black;<sup>97</sup>

γ. *gut* – *göttlich*: Goth.<sup>98</sup>

So what is this critique of scholars and science; and this use, a little wild, a little crude, of knowledge (*savoir*)?

## I. An example: history

Two large series of texts.

### A. The Second Unfashionable

#### 1. Three positions with regard to becoming:

*Unhistorisch* – the instant, the immediate of forgetting, the indefinitely discontinuous, happiness:

- it is the animal position (not so much of animals as of what there is of the animal in man);
- forgetting;
- it is the absence of all language (symbolic dialogue of man [when] he asks the bullock if it is happy (8));
- it is the thought of becoming taken in becoming.

*Überhistorisch* – the position of a knowledge (*connaissance*) for which:

- there is no difference between the different moments of time, they are equivalent, interchangeable, universally communicating, causality connects them (equivalence from the *unhistorisch* point of view was of the order of discontinuity);

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- becoming can be totalised: one can grasp (*saisir*) it in its connection, in its necessity, in its teleology, the beginning and the end (the absolute, not of the immediate like earlier, but of all);
- the present is the last moment of time: the one from which we can perceive totality, the one that is therefore at the limit of disappearance.

It is thus thought of becoming that has eliminated becoming from itself.

*Historisch* – it is a position:

- which differentiates: in the discontinuous equivalence of the non-historical or the continuous equivalence of the supra-historical, it introduces differences; it will isolate the great monuments of history, the instants of high culture, the moments when life is most intense:
  - against the forgetting of the non-historical, it retains and makes reappear;
  - not however in the form of totality (as the supra-historical), but in the form of discontinuity, of choice.
- But this choice is based not on theoretical preferences, but on the present itself of the historian; on what he is, on what he needs, on his desire:
  - Thus there are moments of weakness, sapping, general equalisation, where one needs great examples, where one needs to make sure that history is not [at] its last degree of exhaustion. Monumental history.
  - (• There are moments when the present has lost its identity, and needs to find the signs, the marks, everything that in the past has gradually drawn it and formed it.) [Antiquarian history.]
  - There are moments when one needs to question the present, to bring it out of itself, to transform it. Critical history.

The historical position is therefore a position that introduces a certain form of discontinuity (that of choice) from another discontinuity (that of the instant).

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To do history is thus not:

<sup>97</sup> [See *On the Genealogy of Morality*, First Treatise, §5, CW, vol. 8, p. 222, where Nietzsche writes: "In Latin *malus* (which I place beside μέλας) could refer to the common man as dark-coloured, above all as black-haired". The Greek word there transliterates to *melas* — Tr.]

<sup>98</sup> [See *On the Genealogy of Morality*, First Treatise, §5, CW, vol. 8, p. 223, where Nietzsche writes: "Our German "gut" itself: is it not supposed to mean "the godly one [*den Göttlichen*]," the man "of godly race [*göttlichen Geschlechts*]"? And is it not identical with the popular (originally noble) name of the Goths?". The square brackets are my addition, based on the German of the Colli-Montinari edition — Tr.]

- as Hegelians think, to restore the great totality of time in the form of self-consciousness;
- but it is also not, as the relativists (Schopenhauer)<sup>99</sup> think, to make some discontinuous elements appear above the continuity of becoming and the uninterrupted flux of becoming.

It is to do the play of two discontinuities:

- the discontinuity of choice, of the perspective;
- from the non-historical discontinuity of that which we are.

The discontinuity of forgetting and the discontinuity of desire.

## 2. From these three positions and the play of discontinuity, one can understand:

a. What are the three histories that Nietzsche recognises (*reconnait*) as valid?

- The monumental: which raises the discontinuity of the summits from the singular moment of disease and weakness.
- The antiquarian: which raises the near, the familiar, from the singular moment of lost identity.
- The critical: which raises the evil, the unjust, that which one cannot accept, in the present.

b. What are the disadvantages of history? Nietzsche enumerates five:

- Weakening the personality of the historian himself, erasing his individual singularity, acting as if he were nothing in the face of history or after history.
- Belief in the accuracy of what he says, denial that he has a perspective, thinking that he finally and more than any other era has a more just perspective than others.
- Cessation of belief in the future.
- Imagining that one is at the end of time.
- Being sceptical, cynical, belief in general equivalence.

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Now these disadvantages have a common root<sup>100</sup>: will (*vouloir*) to erase the discontinuous. And this in two ways:

- in letting believe that history is a unity which is in continuity with itself and which ends with us, that history is all done;
- and that we ourselves are nothing: nothing but history (in pure continuity with it), but this history [is] done, so we are nothing at all.

We are all of history and nothing.

When Nietzsche opposes history and life, it is not to oppose the coldness of science to the warmth of life; it is in a much more precise and differentiated way:

- He critiques neither the possibility nor the right of a historical knowledge (*savoir*).
- But he critiques a form of historical knowledge (*savoir*) which denies, or dodges, its own body, its own present, the discontinuity from which it departs to make other discontinuities.
- He critiques consequently a history which wants to bring all discontinuity of the future (of *Werden*) into a total history that would be both the present and the past, that which we are and that which we are no longer. He critiques *Geschichte*.
- For him, it is a question of keeping *Werden* out of history. Or rather to play history outside *Werden*, rather than wanting (*vouloir*) like Hegel to bring all *Werden* into the unity of *Geschichte*.
- For him, it is a matter of maintaining history in its primary subordination to the non-historical (to the discontinuity of the instant, to the present moment,<sup>101</sup> to the indefinite repetition of this present) and to make it escape subordination to the supra-historical.

The law of history, its ground, is not the supra-historical, it is the infra-historical. It is therefore necessary to re-found

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history, to do the inverse of what the philosophers of history have done.

<sup>99</sup> In the manuscript, Foucault adds parentheses around "relativists" and in the margin: "Schopenhauer".

<sup>100</sup> *Stricken*: "a common character".

<sup>101</sup> Conjecture.

### B. It is easy to understand Nietzsche's other texts regarding history

1. First, the whole series of texts where Nietzsche says that philosophy must become historical. Return to Heraclitus.
  - Metaphysical philosophy and historical philosophy opposition (*Human, All Too Human* (9)).
  - "Philosophy, in the only aspect where I still admit it, inasmuch as it is the most general form of history, an attempt to describe in a general way the Heraclitean becoming and abbreviate it into signs" (10). "What separates us from Kant and Leibniz is that we only believe in becoming, even in spiritual things. We are historians from the bottom" (*The Will to Power* (11)).
2. Then, the texts against the positivist historians about [whom] he says:
  - that they are eunuchs: they have chastened themselves of their bodies, their present, their desire, their principle of choice. They wanted (*voulu*) to escape *Werden* and the discontinuity of the instant, by placing themselves in a world of ideality, in a world without bodies;
  - that they are "white sepulchres which parody life" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (12)): i.e. they make historical knowledge (*savoir*) the tomb of becoming, in which becoming is enveloped — and for which it is at once both present and absent;
  - that they are, finally, tired<sup>102</sup> and blind beings (13) who believe they are pure mirrors, they believe they can grasp (*saisir*) the infinity of time in a single glance. They "show their endless ambition to smell the infinite until the infinite smells of bugs" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (14)).
3. Finally, the texts on the birth of history and the historical sense.

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- We see that "positivist" history is articulated on both:
  - nihilism (as negation of becoming);
  - asceticism (as negation of the body).
- History, as characteristic discipline of our era, is thus linked to our present in its fundamental characteristics.  
Its paradox is therefore that if it wants to escape *Werden*, it is because of the characteristics specific to its birth and future.
- The historical sense as Nietzsche wants to practice it would consist of:
  - analysing where history comes from, what its genesis is, how it could have been born from Christian asceticism and Western nihilism; in short, discovering the *Werden* that bears it;
  - then finding the whole set of discontinuities that we deny in our needs today;
  - consequently, transforming that which we are today.

### C. Conclusion

– The history which is linked to asceticism and is practised by the ascetic scholar; the history that is linked to nihilism and that wants to align itself with the project of a nihilistic (i.e. idealistic, eternal, foreign to becoming) science, this history is critiqued.

That which is critiqued is thus history as it is linked to the scholar of today; and to today's science. Thus attacks against scholars as supports of knowledge (*savoir*), and against science as ideal of knowledge (*savoir*).

– But that which is freed is [a] knowledge (*savoir*) which would turn against scholars and against science; a knowledge (*savoir*) which would know (*connaîtrait*) its conditions of appearance and would allow itself to both be free from them and modify them.

Possibility of a knowledge (*savoir*) against scholars and science:

- a. Against scholars as human and social type, as product of a certain history, as result of a

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- religion and a metaphysics, as mix of priest and philosopher.
- b. Against science as institution, as ideal norm, as implicit metaphysics.

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<sup>102</sup> Stricken: "blind".

## II. The illusion of knowing (*connaître*)

From this model, one can understand what knowledge (*connaissance*) is for Nietzsche.

- a. Knowledge (*connaissance*) is not man's oldest instinct, it is not his nature; it is not even a general form and *a priori*. Knowledge (*connaissance*) is an invention, which has had its preliminaries, its conditions, its ruses, its reasons for being, its mechanisms, its ends:

"In some lost corner of this universe whose blaze is spread in innumerable solar systems, there was once a star on which intelligent animals invented knowledge (*connaissance*). It was the instant of the greatest lie and the supreme arrogance of universal history" (*On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*, 1873 (15)).

- b. What is it to invent knowledge (*connaissance*) and why is it the moment of the greatest lie?

– To say that it was invented is to say that it was not already formed in a divine intellect, that it had not been given to man, ready to grasp (*saisir*) things: or that it was not the memory of a previous knowledge (*connaissance*).

Knowledge (*connaissance*) is therefore without model, without external guarantee.

– This means on the other hand that there is nothing in things that is intended for knowledge (*connaissance*) to grasp (*saisisse*) them. Things are not made to be seen and known (*connues*); they do not turn towards us an intelligible face that would look at us and wait for our gaze to cross it. So things:

1. do not have any more or less hidden sense which must be deciphered;

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2. do not have any essence which would constitute their intelligible nervure;

3. are not objects obedient to laws. See the text from the *Joyful Science*: no law, no finality in the world (16). Get rid of the shadow of God. The character of the world is chaos.

– This means lastly that knowledge (*connaissance*), if it is not based on any prior knowledge (*connaissance*) or intelligibility of the object, could only be articulated on something *entirely other*. On non-knowledge (*non-savoir*). That is to say on instinct, on fear, on contempt, on the desire for possession, on rivalry.

"We, whose consciousness registers only the last scenes of this long process, ... we think that "intelligere"<sup>103</sup> is something conciliatory, just, good, essentially opposed to instincts; while it is simply a certain relationship of instincts between themselves" (*The Joyful Science* (17)).

In this knowledge (*connaissance*) there is perhaps something heroic, but nothing divine (*The Joyful Science* (18)).

The poisons from which knowledge (*connaissance*) is made: the instinct for doubt, delay, negation, dissolution, collection (*The Joyful Science* (19)).

Knowledge (*connaissance*)<sup>104</sup> rests on a fasciculus of instincts, or on a struggle of instincts, or on a victory of one instinct over another.

The triumph of the gaze and the instinct for the hunt.

– Now:

1. This implies that if we know (*connaissons*) things, it is never in what they are, but inasmuch as they concern our instincts, our choices, our desires, our violences. Our knowledge (*connaissance*) is always a perspective.

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Not a perspective in the Husserlian sense (a profile that would allow us to grasp (*saisir*) the very fulness of the thing); but a perspective that fragments the thing and prevents us from ever having access to its fulness.

2. This implies that what prevents us from knowing (*connaître*) things is not a limit to our knowledge (*connaissance*), it is not a finitude, or an external obstacle, that which prevents us from knowing (*connaître*) things is ourselves, insofar as we know (*connaissons*), since we know (*connaissons*) from our instincts. The reason that prevents us from knowing

<sup>103</sup> *Intelligere*: "understand" (it is Foucault who notes it in his transcription of this passage by Nietzsche).

<sup>104</sup> *Stricken*: "knowledge (*savoir*)"; replaced by the abbreviation "c/ce" for "knowledge (*connaissance*)".

(*connaître*) is knowledge (*connaissance*) itself, since knowledge (*connaissance*) is rooted in non-knowledge (*non-connaissance*). (The foundation of our stupidity.)

"Why doesn't man see things? He is himself in the way: he hides things" (*Dawn* (20)).

One will say: Kant. But in Kant, it is finitude and *a priori* forms that prevent us from knowing (*connaître*). What prevents us from knowing (*connaître*) in Nietzsche is the foundation of knowledge (*connaissance*), its root, its life, its dynamism, its history.

3. Finally, this implies that knowledge (*connaissance*) is of no order other than that of instinct; that it has nothing to do with an ideal world of justice; that it is in no way like goodness, wisdom, adiaphora. But that it is of the same order as wickedness, savagery, relentlessness, murder.

"In all will (*volonté*) to know (*connaître*) there is a taste for cruelty" (*Beyond Good and Evil* (21)).

(Cruelty with regard to oneself.)

(Knowledge (*connaissance*) is taken in the instance of desire.)

### Conclusion

1. We can then see why knowledge (*connaissance*) is lie, since, to function as knowledge (*connaissance*), it is must:

- gives things to itself as if it knew (*connaissait*) them in their nature itself = nature, an essence, a true world;

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(Nietzschean lie, Kantian illusion)

- remove obstacles as if they were contingent, as if they could be lifted or in any case determined = god;
- give itself as free in relation to the movements and violences of instincts = soul.

Knowledge (*connaissance*) can only know (*connaître*) by a first act of recovery, of illusion, of lie. Knowledge (*connaissance*) is illusory, not because it is plagued by error, but because it poses the illusion that makes it itself exist. Knowing (*connaître*) is only possible on the basis of illusion.

2. This illusion is truth.

3. This fundamental illusion is the one that is constantly renewed by metaphysics. Indeed, metaphysics always supposes:

- a. that there is an essence of things, that this essence is eternal, and that it is hidden under their appearance;
- b. that there is a knowledge (*connaissance*) without limits (in God, or in us, or at the end of an infinite progress) that would allow us to know (*connaître*) absolutely;
- c. that knowledge (*connaissance*) and morality are linked to each other in a common perfection, that knowledge (*connaissance*) is good, and that the good consists in knowing (*connaître*).

Metaphysics — Platonic, Kantian, or Hegelian — is the founding illusion of knowledge (*connaissance*), repeated in the very discourse of knowledge (*connaissance*).

Nietzschean critique is discourse that, rather than repeating the illusion, states (*énonce*) it, formulates it. This critique has two successive forms:

- Tragic knowledge (*connaissance*): "discovery by knowledge (*connaissance*) of its own limits" (*The Birth of Tragedy* (22)). "It is necessary to will (*vouloir*) illusion oneself, — this is the tragic" (1872) (23).
- But later Nietzsche [will consider] that it was wrong to seek this tragic knowledge (*connaissance*) as luxury of our civilisation (24).<sup>105</sup>

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#### III. The fable of truth

If knowing (*connaître*) has illusion for its first condition, if it is from this illusion that knowledge (*connaissance*) is possible, then what about the truth? Do we not have to admit a knowledge (*connaissance*)

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<sup>105</sup> *Stricken*: "that it is not a question of will (*vouloir*) to an illusion, because it already exists, it is already willed (*voulu*) (and it is in this repetition of the illusion that the *Origin of Tragedy* is still metaphysical). / And it will inaugurate a critique of "free spirits". It is this that must now be analysed (Truth — destruction)."

without truth? But then what is knowing (*connaître*), if knowing (*connaître*) is not knowing (*connaître*) the truth?

#### *First moment of Nietzschean critique*

– Traditional philosophy always bases knowledge (*connaissance*) on the truth by saying that to know (*connaître*) is to know (*connaître*) the truth; and that where there is error, there is not truly knowledge (*connaissance*). To know (*connaître*) error is to not know (*connaître*).

1. Descartes: a false idea is not an idea (25).
2. Kant: the transcendental illusion is not a knowledge (*connaissance*) (26).

Knowing (*connaître*) the true and truly knowing (*connaître*) are only one thing.

– But Nietzsche points out that this circle of truth and knowledge (*connaissance*), accepted by all philosophy, supposes:

1. that knowledge (*connaissance*) wills (*veut*) the truth: that by nature knowledge (*connaissance*) is always directed towards the truth rather than towards error;
2. that knowledge (*connaissance*) poses truth as being better than error. That there is an intrinsic value to truth which renders it preferable to error;
3. that knowledge (*connaissance*) thus poses the truth as a good, as its good; and attaining the truth as its duty.

Under the great affirmation that to know (*connaître*) is to know (*connaître*) the true, that true knowledge (*connaissance*) and knowledge (*connaissance*) of the true do only one and the same thing, hides in reality a postulate of a completely different nature: that truth is good, and that it is necessary to seek the truth.

Moral postulate which serves as root of all Western metaphysics: the true is better than that which is not true.

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- Postulate that was clearly formulated by Plato, the belonging of the true and the good.
- Postulate that has been hidden since then to the extent that we have always pretended to base morality on metaphysics.

Nietzschean critique: to bring out this secret of the moral in everything that appears as affirmation of truth.

- This is the sense given to the *Umwertung*.<sup>106</sup>
- How far all this is from a liberating critique that denounces psychological, or anthropological, errors in moral judgements.

#### *Second moment of Nietzschean critique*

Why did we will (*voulu*) the truth? Why has knowledge (*connaissance*) been put under the sign and orders of truth, that is, of that which is ideal, universal, and eternal?

1. To make people believe that knowledge (*connaissance*) is not of the order of instinct, force, violence, and the body. To make people believe, consequently, that knowledge (*connaissance*) can be open to all, the weak, the degenerate, the slaves, the sick. To democratise knowledge (*connaissance*).

The organisation of metaphysics around the postulate that truth is better than error is correlative with the organisation of Greek democracy.

One said that the truth was preferable when we wanted to impose the law of all on the violence of a few.

2. To make people believe that one will only reach knowledge (*connaissance*) by controlling one's body, punishing it, silencing your instincts. To make people believe that there is, in the body, and above it, something like a soul that alone is susceptible to accessing that eternal and immutable thing which is the truth.

It was to submit the body to the sovereignty of the soul that one postulated that truth was preferable to error.

3. To make people believe that there is beyond the material and sensory world another world that is both more solid and more just; a world where the injustices and inequalities of this one

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will be compensated. This world-beyond (*monde-là*) is the true world; and knowing (*connaître*) it is already entering it. Since it is better than this one, it is that which is better to know (*connaître*).

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<sup>106</sup> *Umwertung*: reversal.

The postulate that truth is better than non-truth is linked to the separation of an ideal world from the world of sensation.

The will to truth (*vouloir de la vérité*) is thus linked to democracy (that is, to a certain type of society); it is linked to asceticism (that is, to the refusal and exclusion of the body, to its punishment); it is [linked] to idealism (that is, to the division of appearance and the other world).

It is usually believed that it is the search for the truth that has led as theoretical consequence to idealism, as moral consequence to the refusal of the body, as political consequence to democracy.

In fact, it is the three moral inventions of the soul, the other world, and the city that founded the search for truth.

### *Third moment of Nietzschean critique*

Thus posed, this truth had a history, linked to the avatars of democracy, asceticism, and idealism.

This history of truth has nothing to do with the progress of knowledge (*connaissance*): it is the transformation of a fable — the fable of a beyond accessible to all but only by the intermediary of the spirit.<sup>107</sup>

First episode: Greek. The true world is accessible to every man, if he is wise, if he is virtuous. So the truth of the afterlife is given now in this world: "I, Plato, I am the truth" (*Twilight of the Idols* (27)).

Second episode: Christian. The true world is inaccessible now: it will only open as reward to the sinner who has done penance. "Progress of the idea, it becomes finer, more captivating" (*Twilight of the Idols* (28)). It no longer takes the body.

(Interiorisation, passage to the beyond.)

Third episode: Kantian. The real world is inaccessible, indemonstrable, and can no longer even serve as promise. But it is imposed as obligation, imperative, pure thought. "It is the old sun at bottom, through the clouds;

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the idea becomes pale, sublime, Nordic, Königsbergian" (*Twilight of the Idols* (29)).

(Interiorisation, as becoming; passage to the infinite.)

Fourth episode: positivist. We cannot even know (*savoir*) if this true world that is not attained is inaccessible. Consequently, it does not oblige. It is as if it were not. "Dreary morning, rooster-song positivism" (*Twilight of the Idols* (30)).

(Passage to the beyond of all certainty. Pure belief.)

Fifth episode. Then the true world is no longer useful for anything, a superfluous idea. It must be abolished. There remains only appearance (*Twilight of the Idols* (31)).

(Nihilism.)

But if appearance remains, it must be opposed something. To the truth. Therefore, if we want to abolish the truth, we must also abolish appearance.

Hence the necessity of suppressing the opposition of appearance and truth.

– This is the point [where] Nietzsche's philosophy is separated from its first form.

– This is where positivism and nihilism (thus a certain idea and a certain practice of science) lead.

– "Incipit Zarathustra. End of the longest of errors" (*Twilight of the Idols* (32)).

It must be remarked that this end of the longest error is not a point of return. But it is the effect of a movement by which the beyond always retreats, the truth is always interiorised; each gradually extinguishing the other. This is the most accentuated point of asceticism:

– since it is necessary to will (*vouloir*) the truth without reward in the beyond;

– and since it is so detached from any body that it is no longer even given to thought.

### **IV. To perish by knowledge (*connaissance*) (33)**

Knowledge (*connaissance*) has been borne by the negation of the body, the negation of the future, the negation of this world. Thus by the whole nihilism of European culture.

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But it has led to the negation of the other world, eternity, and the soul. It has therefore revived the nihilism from which it derives. It dodged and destroyed the same thing that supports it.

Such is the point of redoubling of European nihilism.

<sup>107</sup> [The word 'esprit' could also be translated as 'mind', which would convey the passage's implications for modern philosophy more accurately, but would miss the connection to history that is in question here — Tr.]

"As an earthquake devastates and desolates cities, ... so life itself collapses, weakens, and loses courage, when the tremor of concepts produced by science takes away from man the basis of all his security, all his calm, his faith in all that is durable and eternal" (*Unfashionable Observations II* (34)).

There is "an abyss in scientific consciousness... Today's science does not have the slightest faith in itself; it does not aspire to a high ideal... It is the most noble and newest form of the ascetic ideal" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (35)). To this nihilism, Nietzsche reacted successively in two different ways.

1. In the *Unfashionable Observations* (and doubtless also *The Birth of Tragedy*), it is a matter of restoring the subordination of knowledge (*connaissance*) to life. Going back beyond all Western asceticism and finding the point where life, instead of searching for the true, accepts the play of appearance:

- This is the function of art, which must not be, in relation to scientific knowledge (*connaissance*), a compensation, a limitation, but rather a foundation.
- It is the role of tragic knowledge (*connaissance*) as will (*volonté*) to appearance.
- It is the aspiration for culture "united of artistic style in all the vital manifestations of a people" (*Unfashionable Observations II* (36)),<sup>108</sup> opposed to scientific knowledges (*connaissances*) that are chaotic.
- It is the fascination with Greek culture.

"The Greeks gradually learned to organise Chaos, remembering, in accordance with the Delphic doctrine, themselves" (*Unfashionable Observations II* (37)).

The problem is thus to restore life, appearance, culture, and self (*soi*). "Should life dominate knowledge (*connaissance*) and science, or should knowledge (*connaissance*) dominate life?... No one will have doubts, life is the superior and

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dominating power, because knowledge (*connaissance*), in destroying life, would [at the same time] destroy itself" (*Unfashionable Observations II* (38)).

However, what emerges beginning from *Human, All Too Human*, is the opposite solution: that knowledge (*connaissance*) therefore go to the bottom of this destruction of life, because it will destroy itself. (The *Unfashionable Observations* supposed that we had to conserve knowledge (*connaissance*) and that, for this, we had to conserve life; we had to save the one and the other; we can now lose both, one by the other.)

2. It is a matter of taking one more step into nihilism.

- Indeed, there is at least one thing that nihilism preserves, or supposes to preserve, which is the objectivity of knowledge (*connaissance*); it is the fact that this scholar (who no longer believes in the soul, eternity, or the afterlife) nevertheless thinks that his gaze is neutral, objective, just, absolutely cold.
- He believes it to be a gaze without direction.
- He takes himself for a mirror. But a mirror is only an instrument. He believes that objectivity is an end in itself. But it must be an instrument in the hands of one more powerful than it (*Beyond Good and Evil* (39)).

Now nihilism must attack this — this postulate of the self (*moi*) and objectivity. It is now necessary:

- to use against oneself (*soi-même*) (against the knowing (*connaissant*) subject, against the mirror of objectivity, against the neutrality of the gaze) all the bad instincts of knowledge (*connaissance*). In particular all the wicked practises of the confession, the inquisition;
- to discover the rock of spiritual fatality on which we rest; our injustice, our partiality;
- and thus to release appearances: but not the beautiful calm appearances of the Greek world, but an appearance without law and without hierarchy; an appearance with neither point of gravity nor centre, since the self (*moi*) will be part of the appearance, the multiplicity, and the dream.

"Appearance is... life that makes fun of itself (*soi*) enough to make me feel that there is only appearance,

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<sup>108</sup> [From here to the end of this text Foucault switches from referring to this book as *Considérations intempestives* to calling it *Considérations inactuelles* — Tr.]

wildfire, dance of the elves, and nothing more; that in the midst of so many dreamers I too, who "knows (*connais*)", I dance the same step as the others..." (*The Joyful Science* (40)).

What opposes "joyful knowledge (*gai savoir*)" to the sadness of "nihilism" is that nihilism maintains the knowing (*connaissant*) subject at the level of the true (as empty form of the true, as objectivity); it maintains it in the system of ascetic morality; it makes it the absolute point around which nihilism is organised. But on which nihilism does not bear.

The joyful knowledge (*gai savoir*), by making nihilism bear on the self (*moi*) and against the self (*moi*), by making the self (*moi*) enter into the great destructive movement of all metaphysics, discovers a new knowledge (*savoir*): there will no longer even be appearance (since there will no longer be anything real), there will be nothing unjust and false, since there will no longer be anything just or true.

The indefinite play of an uncentered appearance.

"There is no "reality" for we others" (*The Joyful Science* (41)).

Thus knowledge (*connaissance*) will consist in undertaking this long experiment on oneself (*soi*), as self-destruction. And we cannot know (*savoir*) how far it will go. Hence these four themes:

- a. Life is not to be opposed to knowledge (*connaissance*) as what must be saved to what must be subordinated. Life itself must be an experiment and a means of knowledge (*connaissance*): "... that day when the great liberator came to me, the idea that life could be experiment... As for knowledge (*connaissance*) itself,... it is a world of perils, it is a universe of victories... "Life is a means for knowledge (*connaissance*)"; when one has this principle at heart one can live not only brave but happy..." (*The Joyful Science* (42)).
- b. Knowledge (*connaissance*) is no longer on the scale of humanity: as long as we believed in salvation, we sought to have knowledges (*connaissances*) that we could acquire during the time of life, now we accept the indefinite movement of trial and error.

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"We have regained the good courage to wander, to try... and that is precisely why individuals and entire generations can consider tasks so grandiose that they would have appeared in the past as madness and an ungodly game with heaven and hell" (*Dawn* (43)).

- c. Knowledge (*connaissance*) is henceforth rooted less in the metaphysics of truth than in the old passion for human sacrifice.

"Of all the means of exaltation, it is the human sacrifices that have, for all time, most elevated and spiritualised man" (*Dawn* (44)). Today, the only thing for which humanity would agree to sacrifice itself is knowledge (*connaissance*).

Knowledge (*connaissance*) poses the question of its coexistence with man (*The Will to Power* (45)).<sup>109</sup>

- d. So much so that at the limit, knowledge (*connaissance*) is what will make humanity perish.

"Knowledge (*connaissance*) has turned into a passion that is not afraid of any sacrifice and has, at base, only one fear, that of dying itself... The passion for knowledge (*connaissance*) may even make humanity perish... If passion does not make humanity perish, it will perish from weakness. What do we prefer?... Do we want humanity to end in fire and light or in sand?" (*Dawn* (46))

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## NOTES

1. Michel Foucault was invited to the University of Buffalo (State University of New York at Buffalo, SUNY) as a "Visiting Faculty Professor" in the second semester of the 1969-1970 school year and spent two months, from 2 March 1970, teaching in Buffalo. See Letter from Michel Foucault, 21 February 1970; Archives of SUNY Buffalo, Memorandum of John K. Simon, President of the University's Department of French Literature, 2 March 1970. Foucault gave a course that he entitled 'Le désir de savoir, ou les

<sup>109</sup> Paragraph added later.

fantasmes du savoir dans la littérature française aux XVIII<sup>e</sup> et XIX<sup>e</sup> siècles' (The desire to know, or fantasies of knowledge in French literature in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries), attended by students and professors from different departments of the university. See Archives of SUNY Buffalo, Memorandum of John K. Simon, 17 November 1971. On 2 March, when Foucault arrived in Buffalo, John Simon explained: "In addition to his participation in an international colloquium in mid-April and a certain number of lectures and informal discussions with professors and students, he [Michel Foucault] will give a course, French 588, on the theme 'Le désir de savoir, ou les fantasmes du savoir dans la littérature française des XIX<sup>e</sup> et XX<sup>e</sup> siècles' (The desire to know, or fantasies of knowledge in French literature in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries). The authors addressed will be: Sade, Balzac, Flaubert, perhaps Jules Verne, Georges Bataille, and Maurice Blanchot. The course, which is open to all interested students and professors, will take place regularly from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. on Tuesdays, starting (if possible) tomorrow, 3 March." It may be that this lecture on Nietzsche formed part of this course; or that it was the subject of a separate lecture.

2. F. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et des inconvénients...', §10, OCFN, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 244; CW, vol. 2, p. 160.

3. Id., *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §26, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 276; CW, vol. 8, p. 345. Foucault refers to §25 in the manuscript, but this passage is found in the following.

4. Ibid., III, §25, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 271; CW, vol. 8, p. 342. Foucault slightly reworks this quote and uses the word "perpetual" when the text says "continual".

5. Id., *The Birth of Tragedy*, §15, cited in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, op. cit., p. 179 [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, op. cit., p. 176 — Tr.] (which refers to F. Nietzsche, *Werke*, t. I, p. 103). Karl Jaspers cites here a posthumous fragment published in *The Will to Power*; he refers to Nietzsche's *Werke*, 16 vol. (the *Kleinoktavausgabe*, 'petit in-octavo'), Leipzig, Carl Gustav Naumann, 1899-1912. Before the modern reissue by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, there were two German reference editions of Nietzsche's complete works. The first is that published by Carl Gustav Naumann (Leipzig), known by the name *Nietzsche's Werke*, published between 1894 and 1926 in 20 volumes (the *Großoktavausgabe*, 'grand in-octavo', which augmented the petit in-octavo by four volumes of *Philological Writings*). The grand in-octavo was republished in 1926 by Alfred Kröner Verlag (Leipzig). See M. Montinari, « *La Volonté de puissance* n'existe pas, op. cit., p. 21 and note 5. Although there are slight changes between the two editions, the page numbers are virtually identical. As to the petit in-octavo edition of Naumann, that cited by Jaspers, *Wille*

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zur Macht (*The Will to Power*), it was incorporated in volumes XV and XVI. See *supra*, note 10, p. 77.

6. F. Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, cited in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, op. cit., p. 179 [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, op. cit., p. 176 — Tr.] (*Nietzsche's Werke*, op. cit., t. XVI, p. 98). Foucault consulted and used Jaspers' book from the years 1951-1955 (the book appeared in French translation in 1950). See Stuart Elden, *The Early Foucault*, Cambridge, Polity, 2021, pp. 114-115; Aner Barzilay, *Michel Foucault's First Philosophy. A Nietzschean End to Metaphysics in Postwar France, 1952-1984*, PhD Dissertation, Yale, 2019, chapter 3. Foucault also wrote reading notes on other works by Jaspers (see for example BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 37, fiches on the work *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* ['Psychology of Conceptions of the World', 1919]; BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33a, fiches on *Psychopathologie* [*Allgemeine Psychopathologie*, 1913] by Karl Jaspers).

7. See F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §335, 'Vive la physique!', op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 164-166; OCFN, t. VIII, 1942, pp. 282-287; CW, vol. 6, pp. 196-199.

8. Foucault here alludes to the silent dialogue with animals at the beginning of the second of the *Unfashionable Observations*, as well as to the dialogue with the beggar and the cows in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. See F. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et des inconvénients...', §1, OCFN, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 123; CW, vol. 2, p. 87; id., *Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra*, Quatrième partie, 'Le mendiant volontaire', op. cit. (trad. par G. Bianquis), pp. 517-525; see also *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, op. cit., pp. 216-220.

9. Id., *Human, All Too Human I*, §1, 'Chemistry of concepts and sensation', CW, vol. 3, pp. 15-16.

10. Id., *Unpublished Fragments (Spring 1885-Spring 1886)*, CW, vol. 16, 36[27], p. 126.

11. Id., *La Volonté de puissance*, op. cit., vol. 2, livre III, §306, p. 101. Foucault cites the passage exactly, with a single modification: he does not include Plato in the list of philosophers, with Kant and Leibniz, from

whom we are separated; the original text gives: "That which separates us from Kant as from Plato and Leibniz..." Concerning this edition of *The Will to Power*, see *supra*, note 10, p. 77.<sup>110</sup>

12. *Id.*, *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §26, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 276; CW, vol. 8, p. 345.

13. *Ibid.*

14. *Ibid.*

15. *Id.*, 'Introduction théorique sur la vérité et le mensonge au sens extra-moral (été 1873) (exposé continu)', in *Le Livre du philosophe. Études théorétiques*, bilingual, Fr. trans. by Angèle Kremer-Marietti, Paris, Aubier-Flammarion, 1969, pp. 168-215, here p. 171 (translation modified by Foucault); Kremer-Marietti's translation gives: "In some corner away from the universe spread in the blaze of innumerable solar systems, there was once a star on which intelligent animals invented knowledge (*connaissance*). It was the most arrogant and false minute in "universal history"..." See also *id.*, 'On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense', in *The Birth of Tragedy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-153, here p. 141. As Daniel Defert notes in the *Lectures on the Will to Know*,<sup>111</sup> Foucault mentions that this text, *On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense* [1873], appeared "in full Kantianism, at least in the midst of Neo-Kantianism", which

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explains Foucault's point of departure here. See M. Foucault, 'Truth and Juridical Forms' [1973], in *EW* 3, pp. 1-89, here p. 6: "I speak of insolence in this text of Nietzsche's because we have to remember that in 1873, one is if not in the middle of Kantianism then at least in the middle of neo-Kantianism; the idea that time and space are not forms of knowledge (*connaissance*), but more like primitive rocks onto which knowledge (*connaissance*) attaches itself, is absolutely unthinkable for the period." Further, as Angèle Kremer-Marietti notes, Nietzsche also alludes to Hegel in disdainfully using the expression *Weltgeschichte* ("universal history"); see F. Nietzsche, *Le Livre du philosophe*, *op. cit.*, p. 249, note 1.

16. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §109, 'Gardons-nous', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 95-96; CW, vol. 6, pp. 117-118.

17. *Ibid.*, Livre quatrième, §333, 'Qu'est-ce que connaître?', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 163; CW, vol. 6, p. 194. Foucault does not emphasise the words which are italicised at the end of the passage ("a certain relation of instincts between them").

18. *Ibid.*, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 163; CW, vol. 6, p. 194.

19. *Ibid.*, Livre troisième, §113, 'Pour la science des poisons', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 99-100; CW, vol. 6, pp. 122-123.

20. *Id.*, *Aurore*, Livre cinquième, §438, 'L'homme et les choses', OCFN, t. VII, 1912, p. 339; CW, vol. 5, p. 227.

21. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §229, OCFN, t. X, 1948, p. 234; CW, vol. 8, p. 134.

22. *Id.*, *La Naissance de la tragédie*, §17, in *L'Origine de la tragédie, ou Hélénisme et pessimisme*, Fr. trans. by Jean Marnold and Jacques Morland, OCFN, t. I, 1947 [1906], p. 155; *The Birth of Tragedy*, *op. cit.*, p. 82.<sup>112</sup>

23. *Id.*, *Unpublished Writings from the Period of Unfashionable Observations*, CW, vol. 11, 19[35], p. 13: "One must even desire illusion — that is what makes it tragic".

24. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre cinquième, §370, 'Qu'est-ce que le romantisme?', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 204 ("Je prenais la connaissance tragique pour le vrai luxe de notre culture"); CW, vol. 6, p. 246 ("I took tragic knowledge as the true luxury of our civilisation").

25. See René Descartes, *Méditations métaphysiques*, ed. by Marie-Frédérique Pellegrin, Paris, Flammarion, 2009 [1641], 'Troisième méditation', pp. 109-141 [See Descartes R (1901) *Meditations on First Philosophy* (Veitch J trans), 'Meditation III', digitised here: [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Meditations\\_on\\_First\\_Philosophy/Meditation\\_III](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Meditations_on_First_Philosophy/Meditation_III) — Tr.]. See also M. Foucault, *Le Discours philosophique*, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-34; and BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 70, dossier 3, 'Méditations', feuillet [41/2]: "What relation do they have with what they [the ideas] represent? 1. Regarding these ideas, one must remark: — that they

<sup>110</sup> [Harcourt does not give a reference to the Colli-Montinari edition, but this passage can be found in Nietzsche, *Unpublished Fragments (Spring 1885-Spring 1886)*, CW, vol. 16, 34[73], p. 18. The passage as given there reads: "What separates us from Kant just as from Plato and Leibniz" — Tr.]

<sup>111</sup> [Harcourt does not provide the citation, but it is the first endnote to the 'Lecture on Nietzsche', pp. 202-223, here p. 220, in *Lectures on the Will to Know*, *op. cit.* — Tr.]

<sup>112</sup> [Page 155 of OCFN edition does not contain this quote, so I have cited the page in the English edition which matches the OCFN page Harcourt cites — Tr.]

are not false in themselves (materially); — that only the judgement that relates them to something else can be false" (to be published in the same series of 'Cours et travaux de Michel Foucault avant le Collège de France' as the present volume).

26. I. Kant, *Critique de la raison pure*, op. cit., 'Deuxième division. Dialectique transcendantale', A297/B354, pp. 1015 ff. (discussion of the *transzendentale Illusion*) [See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., 'Second Division. Transcendental Dialectic', pp. 386 ff. — Tr.]

27. F. Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 'How the "True World" Finally Became a Fable', §1, CW, vol. 9, p. 62. The development which follows, on the "episodes" of the true world, is a commentary on this text.

28. *Ibid.*, §2.

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29. *Ibid.*, §3.

30. *Ibid.*, §4.

31. *Ibid.*, §5, CW, vol. 9, p. 63.

32. *Ibid.*, §6.

33. This theme interested Foucault from his first encounters with Nietzsche, and will accompany him throughout his life. We find a first development in a 1950s manuscript, precisely titled 'To Perish by Absolute Knowledge (*connaissance*) May Even be Part of the Foundation of Being', which appears in this edition, *infra*, p. 213; see also M. Foucault, *La Question anthropologique*, op. cit., pp. 180-188; id., 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx' [1967], dans *EW* 2, pp. 269-278, here p. 275; *id.*, *The Order of Things*, op. cit., p. 357: "thought [...] is] a perilous act. Sade, Nietzsche, Artaud, and Bataille have understood this on behalf of all those who tried to ignore it." See also the notes of Gérard Simon on Foucault's course on Nietzsche at the ENS in October 1953, where we find a long development on the theme of "To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*)...": 'Notes de Gérard Simon prises aux cours de Foucault sur Nietzsche', in the archives of the Centre d'archives en philosophie, histoire et édition des sciences (CAPHÉS) at the ENS (code GS. 4.9). For a discussion of the importance of this passage to understand Foucault's works, see A. Barzilay, 'Nietzsche, Ontology, and Foucault's Critical Project: To Perish from Absolute Knowledge', *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 40, n°s 1-2, 2023, pp. 201-218, online: doi.org/10.1177/02632764221151128.

34. F. Nietzsche, 'De l'utilité et des inconvénients...', §10, OCFN, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 250; CW, vol. 2, p. 164. Foucault adds "see equally p. 223", which could be referring to the passage where Nietzsche writes: "The ground gives way under your steps to bring you back to uncertainty" (*ibid.*, §9, OCFN, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 223; CW, vol. 2, p. 157).

35. *Id.*, *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §23, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 258; CW, vol. 8, p. 336. We retain Foucault's modifications.

36. *Id.*, 'De l'utilité et des inconvénients...', §4, OCFN, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 163; CW, vol. 2, p. 111.

37. *Ibid.*, §10, OCFN, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 254; CW, vol. 2, p. 166.

38. *Ibid.*, §10, OCFN, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, pp. 250-251; CW, vol. 2, p. 164.

39. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VI, 'Nous autres savants', §207, OCFN, t. X, 1948, pp. 187-190; CW, vol. 8, pp. 106-108.

40. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre premier, §54, 'La conscience et l'Apparence', op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 62; CW, vol. 6, pp. 76-77.

41. *Ibid.*, Livre deuxième, §57, 'Aux réalistes', Fr. trans. by P. Klossowski, Paris, Club français du livre, 1965, p. 96; op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 65; CW, vol. 6, pp. 79-80.

42. *Ibid.*, Livre quatrième, §324, 'In media vita', op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 159; CW, vol. 6, pp. 189-190.

43. *Id.*, *Aurore*, Livre cinquième, §501, 'Âmes mortnelles!', OCFN, t. VII, 1912, p. 371; CW, vol. 5, p. 249.

44. *Ibid.*, Livre premier, §45, 'Un dénouement tragique de la connaissance', OCFN, t. VII, 1912, p. 59; CW, vol. 5, p. 37.

45. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, op. cit., vol. 2, livre III, §579, p. 177.

46. *Id.*, *Aurore*, Livre cinquième, §429, 'La nouvelle passion', OCFN, t. VII, 1912, p. 334; CW, vol. 5, pp. 223-224. This passage from *Dawn* and its

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interpretation by Foucault could be related to his development of the passage from *Beyond Good and Evil*, §39 ("To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) may even be part of the foundation of Being") in his essay of the same name from the 1950s (see *infra*, p. 213), as well as in his manuscript *La Question anthropologique*, op. cit., pp. 180-181.

THIRD PART

***Lectures on Nietzsche***

*Lectures given at McGill University in Montreal (April 1971)*

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## LECTURES ON NIETZSCHE

### ***Knowledge (connaissance) and Desire<sup>113</sup>***

*Introduction: Knowledge (connaissance) has no origin, but a history; Truth was also invented, but later. I. The invention of knowledge (connaissance); Knowing (connaître) and knowing (connaître) the truth. II. The delay of truth. III. The event of the truth: 1. The will (volonté) to truth; 2. The paradoxes of the will (volonté) to truth; 3. Birth of the truth. IV. History and end of truth: A. The four ways Nietzsche formulates this history: 1. Selection; 2. Destruction; 3. The disappearance of truth (and of appearance); 4. Truth as that from which we must free ourselves; Two supplementary notes.*

#### **Introduction (1)**

In classical thought, a whole system of relations between a certain number of elements: knowledge (*connaissance*), truth, science, subject, desire.<sup>114</sup>

These relations certainly vary; but a number can be considered as the invariants of metaphysics. For example:

- Reciprocal implication of knowledge (*connaissance*) and truth (there can only be knowledge (*connaissance*) where truth is given, there is truth only in a relations of knowledge (*connaissance*)).
- Non-reciprocal exclusion of knowledge (*connaissance*) and desire (if all desire indeed envelops a certain knowledge (*connaissance*) – *nulla cupido ignoti*<sup>115</sup> –, knowledge (*connaissance*) itself puts desire out of circulation).

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- The subject of science is implied by the subject of knowledge (*connaissance*), but the reciprocal is not true.

(The subject of science is constituted from universal elements which characterise the subject of knowledge (*connaissance*)).

But it is these fundamental invariants that Nietzsche questioned, advancing a number of theses that are very difficult for us to grasp (*saisir*).

- For example: that the truth is "the most impotent form of knowledge (*connaissance*)" (*unkräftigste*) (*The Joyful Science*; Klossowski translates by non contingent (2)); and that this form was invented late, well after knowledge (*connaissance*) itself.

What is a knowledge (*connaissance*) without truth? What does the often repeated affirmation signify: knowledge (*connaissance*) for a long time only knew (*connu*) error? Much more, knowledge (*connaissance*) was error; much more still, lie.

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<sup>113</sup> [Part of this lecture, from p. 139 to p. 158, was previously published in *Leçons sur la volonté de savoir*, subsequently translated by Graham Burchell as *Lectures on the Will to Know*. Where relevant I have drawn on Burchell's translation, but have not hesitated to make alterations to align with the text presented by Harcourt. It seems that the version published previously, edited by Daniel Defert, was edited a little more heavily with an eye to presenting a more cohesive text — Tr.]

<sup>114</sup> In this series, Foucault had written "scholar", then crossed it out and replaced it by "subject"; he had finished the series with "freedom", but crossed it out and did not replace it.

<sup>115</sup> *Nulla cupido ignoti*: "we do not desire that which we do not know".

- Or again, the whole series of affirmations on knowledge (*connaissance*) and desire (*The Joyful Science* (3)), on knowledge (*connaissance*) and wickedness (*Beyond Good and Evil* (4)), on the instincts which compose knowledge (*connaissance*) (*The Joyful Science* (5)).

*Dawn*: "It is necessary that we proceed with things as in the trial, that we sometimes be good, sometimes wicked to them, acting in turn with justice, passion, and coldness. One such conversation with things as policeman, another as confessor, a third as traveller and curious one... The one is pushed forward, pushed to see clearly, by the veneration that it inspired by its secrets, the other on the contrary by indiscretion and malice in the interpretation of mysteries" (6).

- Or again the whole series of texts against the universality of the subject of knowledge (*connaissance*) and the subject of science. Texts which go:

- from the invective against the scholar who is the most particular, the most marked by stigmata and symptoms, the most diseased:
  - "the cultivated philistine" (*Unfashionable Observations II* (7));
  - "these eunuch concupiscent of history" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (8));
  - "these physiological disgraces, these vermin" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (9)).

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- up to the affirmation of an impossibility of coexistence between knowledge (*connaissance*) and the human subject:

"The passion for knowledge (*connaissance*), a monster that has the wings of the eagle, the eyes of the owl, the feet of the dragon. She wonders: "How can I exist in men? How can man exist with me?"' (*The Will to Power* (10)).

The principle conjunctions and disjunctions, implications and exclusions which characterise classical metaphysics or philosophy are therefore brought into play.

This is why Nietzsche does not constitute what one could call a new theory of knowledge (*connaissance*). Indeed, a theory of knowledge (*connaissance*) admits these invariants (either they are all supposed as givens, or it attempts to justify them, or it attempts to demonstrate some from others):

- Descartes: the truth-knowledge (*connaissance*) relation founds all other relations (11).
- Spinoza: the knowledge (*connaissance*)-desire exclusion founds the others (12).
- Kant: the science-knowledge (*connaissance*) relation accounts for the others (13)).

Such that the analysis is never external; it is always based on oneself: it is always an internal explanation of the activity of knowing (*connaître*). A foundation.

In Nietzsche, the position is much more paradoxical. He wants to be:

- outside of knowledge (*connaissance*) (and for example, re-grasping (*ressaisir*) it at its beginning, in its external determinations, where it is articulated on instincts, where it is linked to a history of races, political systems, diseases);
- outside of the truth (in showing that it is never anything other than a crisscrossing of errors, or that its history is that of a fable) (see sheet: 'Le refus de la vérité'; see also the text: *Nietzsche contra Wagner* (14));
- outside of science (with which it is in altercation).

And yet, if he were truly out of all this, how could he speak? And what would be this strange discourse be, which would be neither form of knowledge (*connaissance*), nor speech of truth, nor [illegible].

And indeed, Nietzsche never ceases speaking of himself:

- As seeker of truth.

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For example: I (*moi*), the knower (*connaissant*). *Der Erkennende* (*The Joyful Science* (15)).

"As seeker of knowledge (*connaissance*)" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (16)).

- As teller of truth.

For example: "We are the truthful ones. To be absolutely truthful, — heroic and magnificent pleasure of man" (1872 (17)).

"Truthful — this is what I call the one who goes into the deserts without gods and who has broken his reverent heart" (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (18)).

- As scholar.

Utilisation of philology or of history, or of analogy.

We must become "new men, men of a single faith... And for this we must learn, we must discover all that is law and necessity in the world: ... we must be physicists... whereas so far

we have never built any ideal... other than on ignorance... of physics. Consequently: long live this physics!" (*The Joyful Science* (19)).

So much so that the question arises: from whence does Nietzsche speak? What is his discourse? On what does he rely? What title does he have to speak?

But perhaps this question is not just. Because if it is true that critique must be radical, it must not leave the place from which it comes unshakeable and solid; it must disturb its own ground. Precisely, it must not be able to be founded. Hence, doubtless, two characteristic traits of Nietzsche's discourse:

- The exterior/interior oscillation; whereas Kant wants to pose limits and to enclose the interior, Nietzsche ceaselessly frees the limit. To pass outside of knowledge (*connaissance*), outside of the truth, outside of science, but by asserting scientific concepts, true assertions, contents of knowledge (*connaissance*).

Not only transgressing the limit; but transgressing the very fact that there is a limit.

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- The increasingly marked assignation of the instant when he speaks. Substitute for the question of the place where one speaks, the question of the instant when one speaks.

### I. The invention of knowledge (*connaissance*)

*Text*: "In some lost corner of this universe whose blaze pours forth innumerable solar systems, there once was a star on which some intelligent animals invented knowledge. This was the moment of the greatest lie and supreme arrogance of universal history" (*On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense*, 1873 (20)).

This term *Erfindung*, invention, refers to many other texts. For example:

- The religion of which Schopenhauer sought the origin is in fact an invention (*The Joyful Science* (21)).
- The fabrication of the ideal (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (22)).
- Or again, [the text] on the origin of poetry (*The Joyful Science* (23)).

Everywhere this term is opposed to the origin. But it is not synonym of beginning.

*That knowledge (*connaissance*) is an invention means:*

1. That it is not inscribed in human nature; that it does not form the oldest instinct of man. But above all that its possibility is not defined by its very form.

The possibility of knowledge (*connaissance*) is not a formal law: it finds its possibility in a space of play where it is a question of altogether other, that is to say:

- of instincts, and not reason, or knowledge (*savoir*), or experience;
- of doubt, negation, dissolution, temporisation, and not of affirmation, certainty, conquest, serenity.

"There is no instinct for knowledge (*connaissance*); the intellect is at the service of various instincts" (*The Will to Power* (24)).

That which is behind knowledge (*connaissance*) is something entirely other; that which is foreign, opaque, irreducible to it. Knowledge (*connaissance*) does not precede

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itself: it is without pre-existence, without secret anticipation. Behind knowledge (*connaissance*), the wall of non-knowledge (*non-connaissance*).

Thus: difference with empiricism, which places perception, or sensation, or impression, or representation in general, behind knowledge (*connaissance*);

2. That means that it is without model: that it does not have an external guarantee in something like a divine intellect. No prototype of knowledge (*connaissance*) preceded human knowledge (*connaissance*).

- It was not stolen by some Prometheus from a primordial and divine fire.
- It was not imitated by human intelligence remembering a divine spectacle.
- No reminiscence;

In knowledge (*connaissance*), there is perhaps something heroic, but certainly nothing divine (*The Joyful Science* (25)).

3. That means that it is not joined to the structure of the world as a reading, a deciphering, a perception, or an obviousness (*évidence*).<sup>116</sup> Things are not made to be seen or known (*connues*). They do not turn towards us an intelligible face which looks at us and waits for our gaze to meet them. Things:

- do not have a hidden sense to be deciphered;
- do not have an essence that would constitute their intelligible nervure;
- are not objects obedient to laws.

"[But] the character of the world is on the contrary that of an eternal chaos, not due to the absence of a necessity, but due to the absence of order, sequence, form, beauty, wisdom... The world does not in the least seek to imitate man... It ignores all law. Let us keep from saying that law exists in nature... When will all these shadows of God cease to confuse us? When will we have completely "de-deified" nature?" (*The Joyful Science* (26)).

4. Finally, it means that it is the result of a complex operation. There is nothing of the order of a gift of sense, of an original foundation that would allow knowledge (*connaissance*) to establish itself and develop from itself.

See 'What is it to know (*connaître*)?' (*The Joyful Science* (27)).

a. knowledge (*connaissance*) is made [of] *ridere, lugere, detestari*;

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- b. a struggle of these three elements;
- c. a contract;
- d. the unconscious of knowledge (*connaissance*).

It is necessary to specify a little in what this operation consists:

a. We can see first that it appears like wickedness; laugh, despise, detest. That is to say, it is not at all a matter of recognising (*connaître*) oneself in things, but of keeping away from them, of protecting oneself from them (by laughter), of differentiating oneself from them by devaluation (despise), of wanting to repel and destroy them (*detestari*).

Knowledge (*connaissance*): murderous, devaluating, differentiating. It is therefore neither of *homoiōsis*<sup>117</sup> nor of the order of the good.

b. But it is a wickedness that is also turned towards the one who knows (*connaît*).

- Knowledge (*connaissance*) is opposed to a "will (*volonté*) to appearance, to simplification, to the mask, to the cloak, to the surface". It wants to take things "in a deep, multiple way, in their essence" (*Beyond Good and Evil* (28)).

- Knowledge (*connaissance*) is opposed to the will (*volonté*) to affirm, to adore, to love. Knowledge (*connaissance*) is that which negates (*Beyond Good and Evil* (29)), that which introduces doubt, temporisation.

- Knowledge (*connaissance*) is opposed to utility, because it is a game. It is a matter of making room for the fors and againsts (*The Joyful Science* (30)). But this game only transposes wickedness. Appearance of intellectual combat, rivalry (*ibid.*).

See *Dawn* where knowledge (*connaissance*) appears as renunciation of the first happiness of a "solid and vigorous illusion" (*Dawn* (31)). But this renunciation now has so much charm for us that we cannot renounce it.

c.<sup>118</sup> This wickedness is the one that goes behind the surface of things to look for the secret. Trying to extract an essence

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behind the appearance, a power behind the fugitive scintillation, a mastery. And to do this one uses all the means of ruse and seduction, violence and sweetness towards the thing (*Dawn* (32)).

But this is also that in this finally fractured secret which knows (*sait*) how to recognise (*reconnaître*) that there is still only appearance, that there is no ontological foundation. And that the man himself who knows (*connaît*) is still and always appearance (see sheet: 'La connaissance et l'apparence'; *The Joyful Science* (33)).

<sup>116</sup> [A technical term in Descartes with no English equivalent. It refers to the specific kind of undeniable obviousness found in statements like the famous "I think, therefore I am" — Tr.]

<sup>117</sup> *Homoiōsis*: assimilation, resemblance.

<sup>118</sup> Here begins the second lecture. Foucault marks the top right of the page with several lines and writes in the margin: "Stop here. Reprise in the following course."

Knowledge (*connaissance*) is not the operation which destroys appearance (either by opposing it to being as Plato does, or by unmasking the object = *x* that hides beyond it); no more is it the vain effort that always remains in the appearance (in the manner of Schopenhauer). (Difference from the tragic knowledge (*connaissance*) which is in question in *The Birth of Tragedy*.)

This is what constitutes indefinitely the novelty of appearance in the piercing of appearance.

- Knowledge (*connaissance*) is that which goes beyond appearance, which wickedly destroys it, submits it to question, snatches its secrets from it.

A knowledge (*connaissance*) that remains at the level of what is given as appearance would not be a knowledge (*connaissance*). Against the welcoming sweetness of a phenomenology, the murderous relentlessness of knowledge (*savoir*) must be applied.

- But it is that in this work which is never rewarded with an access to being, or to essence, but incites new appearances, makes them play one against the others, and one beyond the others.

"Things themselves have no true existence, they are like the lightning and the spark issuing from drawn swords, they are the glow of a victory in the combat of opposed qualities" (*Écrits et Essais de 1873-1876* (34)).

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*Hence, a certain number of consequences*

a. Instinct, interest, play, struggle are not that from which knowledge (*connaissance*) tears away. This is not the unavowable motive, the contingent and quickly forgotten origin.

It is the permanent, perpetual, inevitable, necessary support:

- one finds it in the sciences;
- and it will pose the problem of asceticism, of objective knowledge (*connaissance*).

b. Knowledge (*connaissance*) will always be perspective, unfinished; it will never be closed in on itself; it will never be adequate for its object; it will always be separated from a thing in itself. But:

- neither in the sense of Husserl: where perspectives are recouped in the very essence of the thing that is at once the law and the geometrical of all these perspectives (35);
- nor in the sense where Kant says that knowledge (*connaissance*) is limited: because for Kant what prevents us from knowing (*connaître*) is both knowledge (*connaissance*) itself (its form, thus nothing external or foreign), and at the same time the limit of knowledge (*connaissance*) (that which is no longer it).

For Nietzsche, that which prevents us from knowing (*connaître*) is that which forms the support, the root, the dynamism of knowledge (*connaissance*), its *force* and not its *form* (instinct, wickedness, greed for knowledge (*savoir*), desire); but that which both prevents and constitutes knowledge (*connaissance*) is something entirely other than knowledge (*connaissance*).

"Why doesn't man see things? He is himself in the path: he hides things" (*Dawn* (36)).

c. From there, in total, the two major cleaves: in relation to being and in relation to the good.

*Knowing (connaître) and knowing (connaître) the truth*

The principle: "knowledge (*connaissance*) was invented, but truth was invented even later" is articulated in several questions:

- What is a knowledge (*connaissance*) that would not be from the outset knowledge (*connaissance*) of the truth, or knowledge (*connaissance*) addressing

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the truth, or knowledge (*connaissance*) wanting the truth? What is a knowledge (*connaissance*) that does not suspend the truth or put it out of circulation, but is the place where truth emerges in a secondary, aleatory, non-essential way?

- Knowing (*connaître*) before the truth.
- The delay of the truth.

– What is the invention of the truth? What turn of events made it possible? Question which involves what knowledge (*connaissance*) of the truth will be: must it be analysed as an illusion or as a will, or as a structure? In other words, is the relation between knowledge and the truth of the order:

- of error (i.e., of non-truth);
- of will;

- or of law?

This is the problem of truth as incidence.

The event of the truth.

— What is knowledge (*connaissance*) when it has become knowledge (*connaissance*) of the truth? And what happens to truth when it has arisen and found its place in knowledge (*connaissance*)? Is truth an episode? Will there be an end to truth? Can we imagine or think a new knowledge (*connaissance*) that would again be knowledge (*connaissance*) without truth? Is there a truth of the future or a future without truth?

- Can we recount the history of truth?
- The fable of truth.

Despite some superficial analogies, different from a Comtean or positivist type of history of knowledges (*connaissances*).

— In that positivist history, truth is not given from the start. Knowledge (*connaissance*) seeks the truth for a long time: blind, groping knowledge (*connaissance*). Truth is given as the result of a history.

— But that relation finally established between truth and knowledge (*connaissance*) is a relation of right posed from the departure. Knowledge (*connaissance*) is made to be knowledge (*connaissance*) of the truth. There is an original belonging between truth and knowledge (*connaissance*). And this belonging is such:

— that truth is the object of knowledge (*connaissance*);

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- that knowledge (*connaissance*) without truth is not true knowledge (*connaissance*);
- that truth is the truth of knowledge (*connaissance*).

Nietzsche's insouciance is to have unraveled these implications. And to have said: truth is added to knowledge (*connaissance*), later — without knowledge (*connaissance*) being destined [to] truth, without truth being the essence of knowledge (*connaissance*).

— Nietzsche's first insouciance is saying: neither man, nor things, nor the world are made for knowledge (*connaissance*); knowledge (*connaissance*) comes after, preceded by no complicity, guaranteed by no power. It arrives, emerging from the entirely other.

— His second insouciance is saying: knowledge (*connaissance*) is not made for truth. Truth arrives after, preceded by the non-true — preceded rather by something that we cannot say is either true or not true, since it is prior to the division proper to truth. The truth emerges from that which is foreign to the division of the true.

## **II. The delay of truth**

What is knowledge (*connaissance*) before truth?

Two answers emerge through two oppositions established by Nietzsche:

a. Nietzsche presents this knowledge (*connaissance*) not linked to truth as pure "will to know (*vouloir connaître*)" which is opposed to the schematisations, the simplifications of a knowledge (*connaissance*) orientated towards truth.

— Schematising knowledge (*connaissance*):

"The whole apparatus of knowledge (*connaissance*) is an apparatus of abstraction and simplification, organised not for knowledge (*connaissance*), but for mastery over things" (*The Will to Power* (37)).

"In the formation of reason, of logic, of categories, it is need that is decisive: not the need to know (*connaître*), but to sum up, finally to understand and predict" (*The Will to Power* (38)).

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— Knowledge (*connaissance*) in order to know (*connaître*):

"To this will to appearance, simplification, cloak, surface is opposed that sublime penchant of the one who seeks knowledge (*connaissance*), that penchant which wants to take things in a deep, multiple way, in their essence" (*Beyond Good and Evil* (39)).

"The one is possessed in advance, possessed to see clearly, by the veneration that [the] secrets [of things] inspires in him, the other on the contrary by indiscretion and malice in the interpretation of mysteries" (*Dawn* (40)).

We see opening the possibility of a knowledge (*connaissance*) deployed in the space of the secret, of prohibition, of unveiling, of transgression. "We are of an audacious morality" (*Dawn* (41)).

- Linked to threat.
- Profanation (but not publication).

To this profanation of knowing (*connaître*) for the sake of knowing (*connaître*) is opposed knowledge (*connaissance*) — good knowledge (*connaissance*), good, useful, generous, accommodating knowledge (*connaissance*). That which does good, that is to say, does something other than know (*connaître*).

b. Nietzsche puts into play another opposition, inverse of the preceding.

- A primary and corporeal knowledge (*connaissance*), prior to any truth, and governed entirely by need. It is not a question of knowledge (*connaissance*) here, but of life, struggle, the hunt, food, rivalry.

"All our organs of knowledge (*connaissance*) and our senses develop only in the service of our preservation and growth" (*The Will to Power* (42)).

- Facing this knowledge (*connaissance*), and after it, a secondary and ascetic knowledge (*connaissance*) is formed. It suppresses the point of view of the body. Suspends utility. Erases partialities and limits. Wants to see everything with an eye that is equal and without prejudice. Knowledge (*connaissance*) that wants to be pure.

"To eliminate the will in general, to suppress the passions entirely, supposing we

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were able to: what then? would this not be to castrate the intellect?" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (43))

Here the opposition is asserted between a real knowledge (*connaissance*), immediately articulated on life, on need. And a knowledge (*connaissance*) at once historically effective and illusory, paradoxical, that of the ascetic scholar. That of Kant.

Regarding asceticism: "Such a contradiction..., 'life against life' — it is clear that it is... quite simply an absurdity. It can only be apparent; it must be a sort of provisional expression, an interpretation, a formula, a compromise, a psychological misunderstanding" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (44)).

So, knowledge (*connaissance*) before truth is:

- sometimes defined as the violent and wicked knowledge (*connaissance*) of the secret; the profanation that unveils;
- and sometimes defined as the violent and useful knowledge (*connaissance*) that serves life; the partiality that allows domination and growth.

In other words, this "entirely other" of the violence which acts as framework to knowing (*connaître*) and presents itself in knowledge (*connaissance*), this "entirely other" gives place to the useless and profaning wickedness of knowing (*connaître*), to the pure transgression of knowledge (*savoir*), or gives place to the partiality of life articulating itself in its own growth?

What then — finally or firstly — is the nature of a knowledge (*connaissance*) not yet denatured by the truth?

Perhaps it is the question itself which is poorly posed. Or rather, in this position of the question is still found a certain number of postulates that have to be reexamined.

To ask what the first nature of knowledge (*connaissance*) is, is to accept that it is a certain type of relation between a subject and an object. Relation of which one then asks if it is one of utility or contemplation, of utilitarian domination or religious profanation, if it is ordered according to the pure gaze or to the needs of life, etc. But questioning knowledge (*connaissance*) radically, questioning it on the basis of what is entirely other than it, must never leave intact as which determines it that subject-object relation

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from which knowledge (*connaissance*) is defined, when this is what constitutes that relation.

Nietzsche says: there is no "knowledge (*connaissance*) in itself" (*On the Genealogy of Morality; The Will to Power* (45)). Which does not mean: "There is no knowledge (*connaissance*) of the in-itself." But: "In the violence of knowing (*connaître*) there is not a constant, essential, and preexisting relation that the activity of knowledge (*connaissance*) has both to deploy and effectuate." To say that there is no knowledge (*connaissance*) in itself is to say that the subject-object relation (and all its derivatives: the *a priori*

knowledge (*connaissance*), objectivity, pure knowledge (*connaissance*), constitutive subject) is not the foundation of knowledge (*connaissance*) but is in reality produced by it.

To explain this:

a. Knowledge (*connaissance*) rests on a network of relations:

- Different in their form: it may involve destruction, appropriation, punishment, domination;
- Different in their points of support and the terms between which they establish relations: a body with another body; a group with another group; an individual with a thing, an animal, a god.

The basis of knowledge (*connaissance*) is therefore this interplay of differences:

"The world is essentially a world of relations... The world is essentially different at every point; it weighs on all the points and all the points resist it and in every case the results are perfectly non congruent" (*The Will to Power* (46)).

Relations which are unknowable (*inconnaisables*) in themselves: "Formless and unformable world of the chaos of sensations" (*The Will to Power* (47)). And how would they be knowable (*connaissables*) since it is not of the order of knowledge (*connaissance*)?

At the root of knowledge (*connaissance*), there is not consciousness.

b—Among these relations, a group of them is characterised by the fact that they forcibly join together several differences, that they exert violence so as to impose on them the analogy of a resemblance, of a common utility or affiliation, which marks them with a common stamp — of

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knowledge (*connaissance*) and analogy (*The Will to Power*); of signs (*ibid.* (48)).

This mark has the double property:

- of allowing a utilisation or a domination, or rather of extending the first level utilisation or domination. The mark is the multiplier of the relation. It refers therefore to a will to power (*volonté de puissance*);
- of allowing return, repetition, the identity of successive differences. The identification of first level differences. The mark is the identifier of the relation.

It refers to a reality.

In a sense we can say that this will (*volonté*) is the necessary foundation of this reality: we may wonder "if the activity that "posits things" is not alone real, and if "the action of the external world upon us" is not the consequence of the presence of such voluntary subjects" (*The Will to Power* (49)).

But we can also say: that this will (*volonté*) is will to power (*volonté de puissance*) (i.e., more than action and reaction, but infinity of will (*vouloir*)) only because there are marks which constitute things, which posit their reality.

[This is also how] Nietzsche turned Schopenhauer's theory: will (*volonté*) and representation (a representation which is only illusion, and [a] unique will (*volonté*) which is all reality).

c. From this is constituted:

— The subject:

- α. which is at the same time the point of emergence of the will (*volonté*), the system of deformations and perspectives, the principle of dominations;
- β. and that which receives in return, in the form of the word, of the personal pronoun, of grammar, the mark of identity and reality of the object.

— The object:

- α. which is the point of application [of] the mark, the sign, the word, the category;
- β. and to which in return we relate the subject's will (*volonté*) in the form of the substance, of the intelligible essence, of nature, or of creation.

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d. This is why Nietzsche obstinately refuses to place at the heart of knowledge (*connaissance*)<sup>119</sup> something like the *cogito*, that is to say, a pure consciousness,<sup>120</sup> in which the object is given in the form of the subject, and the subject may be the object of itself.

All philosophies have founded knowledge (*connaissance*) on the preestablished relation of subject and object, their sole concern being to bring subject and object closer together (either in the pure form of the *cogito*, or in the *minima* form of sensation, or in pure tautology A = A). Nietzsche wanted to account for knowledge (*connaissance*) by putting the maximum distance between subject and object. By making them products which are far removed from each other and which can be confused only by illusion.

Far from the subject-object relation being constitutive of knowledge (*connaissance*), the existence of a subject and an object is the first and major illusion of knowledge (*connaissance*).

But what does Nietzsche introduce in place of the *cogito*? It is the interplay of mark and will (*vouloir*), of word and will to power (*volonté de puissance*). Or again of sign and interpretation.

- The sign is the violence of analogy; it is that which masters and erases difference.
- Interpretation is that which posits and imposes signs; it is that which plays with them. That which introduces secondary differences (those of words and sense) into the primary differences of chaos.

The sign is interpretation inasmuch as it introduces the lie of things into chaos. And interpretation is the violence done to chaos by the reifying game of signs.

"[What, in short, is knowledge (*connaissance*)?] It "interprets," it "introduces a sense"... (in most cases it is a new interpretation of an old interpretation which has become unintelligible and which is no more than a sign)" (*The Will to Power* (50)).

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[The sign is that which] establishes below reality the lie of things. And interpretation is the violence done to reality by the reifying game of signs.<sup>121</sup>

### Conclusions

1. For Nietzsche himself:
  - a. We understand why Nietzsche speaks of knowledge (*connaissance*) as lie (the moment of the greatest lie regarding the discovery of knowledge (*connaissance*)). It is lie in two senses:
    - First because it falsifies reality, because it is perspectivist; because it erases difference; and it introduces the abusive reign of resemblance.
    - Then because it is something entirely other than knowledge (*connaissance*) (relation of subject to object). This relation, far from being the truth of knowledge (*connaissance*), is its untruthful product.

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<sup>119</sup> Foucault uses an abbreviation "c/ce" here. Foucault sometimes uses this same abbreviation for "connaissance" and "conscience". Here, the transcription "connaissance" makes the most sense.

<sup>120</sup> Foucault uses the same abbreviation "c/ce".

<sup>121</sup> Stricken: "— On both sides of this focus, significant interpretation—interpreting sign constitute the subject and the object, produce words and the violence that imposes them."

The being of knowledge (*connaissance*) is the being of the lie.<sup>122</sup>

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b. We understand why Nietzsche says both:

- that this primordial knowledge (*connaissance*) is something entirely other than a knowledge (*connaissance*) (a plurality of relations with neither subject nor object);
- that this knowledge (*connaissance*) is the only knowledge (*connaissance*) that is addressed to reality, every other form of knowledge (*connaissance*) being the result of an interpretive violence falsified by perspective, domination, need.

Roughly: knowledge (*connaissance*) in the form of relations of reality is not really a knowledge (*connaissance*); and what we can really call a knowledge (*connaissance*) is lie by relation to every relation of reality.

At the beginning of knowledge (*connaissance*), there is the entirely other. Knowledge (*connaissance*) that is not at all a knowledge (*connaissance*). Knowledge (*connaissance*) that does anything other than knowing (*connaître*). It is not difference that makes knowledge (*connaissance*), it is knowledge (*connaissance*) that is made of anything other than itself.

c. Thus, at the core of knowledge (*connaissance*), even before we have to speak of truth, we find a circle of reality, knowledge (*connaissance*), and lie.

Which will allow the insertion of truth as morality.

2. In the most general way, such an analysis makes it possible:

- a. to speak of sign and interpretation, of their inseparability, outside of a phenomenology;
- b. to speak of signs outside of any "structuralism";
- c. to speak of interpretation outside of any reference to an original subject;
- d. to articulate the analysis of systems of signs on the analysis of forms of violence and domination;

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e. to think knowledge (*connaissance*) as a historical process before any problematic of the truth. And more fundamentally than in the subject-object relation.

Knowledge (*connaissance*) freed from the subject-object relation is knowledge (*savoir*).

### III. The event of truth

There is a knowledge (*connaissance*) before truth. This means:

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<sup>122</sup> The verso of this page is entirely crossed out:

resist, and the results are in any case perfectly non-congruent" (*The Will to Power*, [op. cit., vol. 1, livre I, §206, p. 101]).

"Reality is reduced exactly to this particular action and reaction of every individual towards the whole..." ([*The Will to Power*, (op. cit., vol. 1, livre I, §208, p. 102)].

– These relations are anterior to any formation of subject or object. They are thus "unknowables (*inconnaisseables*)" (*The Will to Power*, [op. cit., vol. 1, livre I, §202, p. 99]).

They are neither true nor even "apparent" (since there is nothing to oppose to them which would be more than apparent).

They are real (*wirklich*).

– From them can be constituted:

- subject as centre of domination, perspective, utilisation;
- object as sign, as mot, as applicable category of force to the play of pure differences and pure singularities.

[In the margin: The subject is the centre of perspective to which the sign of the object is related (word, personal pronoun). The object, as substance or essence, is the marked reality on which is related the centre of perspective as the critique of the *cogito*, punishment (critique of *On the Genealogy of Morality*).]

– So that at the heart of knowledge (*connaissance*), or rather at its beginning, what we find is inseparably linked to the sign and interpretation.

a. The sign: that is, the mark which reduces, homogenises, erases and masters difference. The sign is the rape of reality by resemblance. It is the violence of the analogy.

b. Interpretation: that is, the violent play with signs; the construction of signs and of signs of signs.

The sign is interpretation insofar as it constitutes things. And interpretation is [...].

- Not in the positivist or genetic sense, that knowledge (*connaissance*) takes a long time to encounter or discover the truth, that it fixes its norms belatedly;
- But that truth is an episode, an invention, perhaps a diversion of knowledge (*connaissance*); that it will be neither its norm nor its essence. The truth is not the truth of knowledge (*connaissance*).

"'Truth' is not a thing that exists and has to be found, discovered, but something that must be created and that provides a name for a certain process, even more, for a will (*volonté*) to do violence to the facts, to infinity: introducing truth into facts, by a process *in infinitum*, an *active determination*, not the becoming conscious of a reality that is firm and defined by itself. It is one of the names of the 'will to power (*volonté de puissance*)'" (*The Will to Power* (51)).

"To maintain that there was a 'truth' that one could *approach* by some procedure!" (*The Will to Power* (52))

See also "The problem is not of knowing (*savoir*) how error is possible, but how truth is possible, despite the intrinsic falsity of all knowledge (*connaissance*)" (*The Will to Power* (53)).

### 1. The will to truth (54)

Nietzsche puts the root and *raison d'être* of truth in the will (*volonté*).

An important shift with regard to the philosophical tradition.

- a. For the latter, the truth-will (*volonté*) relation is characterised by the fact that:

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- The will (*volonté*) has only to let the truth assert itself. To will (*vouloir*) the truth is to will (*vouloir*) it to appear, to enounce itself, to be there. It is to make way for it.

- Now, in order to make way for the truth, the will (*volonté*) had to erase from itself all that might not be empty space for the truth. Erase all its individual characteristics, all its desires, and all its violences. A pure will. A will at once:

- α. suspended for it must not predetermine any object;
- β. castrated, for none of its own determinations must be allowed to remain.

- Hence the fact that the will (*volonté*) to truth could only be thought:

- α. in the form of attention: pure subject, free from determination, and ready to welcome, without deformation, the presence of the object;
- β. in the form of wisdom: mastery of the body, suspension of desire, blockage of appetites.

Descartes and Plato. Obviousness (*évidence*) and pedagogy.

In the philosophical tradition, what we find at the heart of the will (*volonté*)-truth relation is freedom.

- α. Truth is free with regard to the will (*volonté*). It does not receive any of its determinations therefrom.

- β. The will (*volonté*) must be free to be able to give access to the truth.

Freedom is the being of truth; and it is the duty of the will (*volonté*). An ontology (freedom of the truth will be God or nature); an ethics (the will's duty will be prohibition, renunciation, passage to the universal). This fundamental freedom, which articulates will (*volonté*) and truth, the one on the other, is formulated:

- α. in Plato's *homoeōsis tō theō*,
- β. in Kant's intelligible characteristic,
- γ. in the Heideggerian opening.

- b. For Nietzsche, the will (*volonté*)-truth relation is entirely other:

Truth is born:

- in the element of the will,

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- from its singular characteristics and its most precise determinations,
- and in the form of constraint and domination.

The connection of one to the other is not freedom, it is violence.

This shift is — must be — of a considerable effect which we are still far from having been able to gauge entirely.

- It should render impossible a whole "ideology" of knowledge (*savoir*) as the effect of freedom and reward for virtue.
- It should make it possible to rethink the history of knowledge (*connaissance*) and science; the status that should be given to its universality; and the link of science to certain forms of society or civilisation.

But its effects solely at level of philosophical reflection, as it is traditionally practiced, are especially jolts and disruptions. Some paradoxes arise.

## 2. The paradoxes of the will (*volonté*) to truth

- If it is true that truth is violence done to things, then this puts it on the same footing as knowledge (*connaissance*). It is a product or an effect of knowledge (*connaissance*). It is not its norm, or condition, or foundation, or justification.
- Now, if it is true that it is posterior in relation to knowledge (*connaissance*), if it arises from knowledge (*connaissance*) and as violence, it is violence done to knowledge (*connaissance*). It is not true knowledge (*connaissance*). It is a deformed, tortured, dominated knowledge (*connaissance*). It is a false knowledge (*connaissance*). In relation to "true" knowledge (*connaissance*) it is a system of *errors*.
- But at the same time, if it leaves behind it, as prior to the truth, a whole process of knowledges (*connaissances*) — knowledges (*connaissances*) still without truth, and which must be reworked so that they become true, then it makes a non-truth loom up behind it.

It appears against the background of illusion, and as violence done to illusions.

- One must go further. If truth is destruction of the illusion of knowing (*connaître*), but if this destruction is developed

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against knowledge (*connaissance*), and as destruction of knowledge (*connaissance*) itself, then truth is lie. It is something other than what it claims to be. It is by no means truthful when it enounces itself as reward for knowing (*connaître*).

"The apparent world and the mendacious world, that is the antagonism. Until now the latter was called the 'true world,' 'truth,' 'God.' This is what we have to destroy" (*The Will to Power* (55)).

These paradoxes show us that:

- truth is [not] true if it is a knowledge (*connaissance*), since all knowledge (*connaissance*) is an illusion;
- truth is not true insofar as it is a non-knowledge (*non-connaissance*), since it superimposes on knowledge (*connaissance*) or replaces it with a system of errors;
- truth is not true when it claims to be a knowledge (*connaissance*), it is lie.

Which allows us:

- a. to pose as principle that truth cannot be predicate of itself. The truth is not true. All truth is deployed in the non-true; the truth is the non-true. There is no ontology of truth.

In the predicative judgment "truth is true", the verb "to be" has the ontological sense of: truth exists.

Nietzsche transforms the skeptical assertion "truth does not exist" into a series of paradoxes deriving from the proposition "truth is not true".

- b. to distribute the major categories of the non-true truth:

- Illusion: that is to say, truth insofar as it is a mode of knowledge (*connaissance*).
- Error: insofar as it is violence done to knowledge (*connaissance*) (thus non-knowledge (*non-connaissance*));
- Lie: insofar as this non-knowledge (*non-connaissance*) (*Lüge*)<sup>123</sup> claims to dissipate the illusion of all knowledge (*connaissance*), although it is knowledge (*connaissance*).

- c. Starting from here, we can see the Nietzschean task: to think the history of truth, without relying on truth. In an element where truth does not exist. This element is appearance.

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Appearance, this is the element of the non-true within which the truth dawns. And, in doing so, it redistributes appearance into the categories of illusion, error, and lie.

Appearance is the indefinite of truth. Illusion, error, and lie are the differences introduced by truth into the game of appearance.

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<sup>123</sup> ["*Lüge*", the brackets around it, and its italicisation, are from Foucault — Tr.]

But these differences are not only the effects of truth; they are truth itself.

We could also say:

Truth makes appearance appear as illusion, error, lie.

Or better illusion, error, and lie is the mode of being of truth in the indefinite element of appearance.

- Illusion: or the root of truth.
- Error: or the system of truth.
- Lie: or the operation of truth.

See the texts on truth as error:

"Truth is a sort of error" (*The Will to Power* (57)).

"What then, in the final analysis, are man's truths? They are irrefutable errors" (*The Joyful Science* (58)).

[Texts] on the renunciation of truth:

"The belief that there is no truth, the nihilist belief, is a great relaxation of all the limbs for the champion of knowledge (*connaissance*) who is constantly struggling with ugly truths" (*The Will to Power* (59)).

"A conviction that no epoch has ever had: we do not have the truth. Previously all men had the truth, even the skeptics." (*Dawn. Posthumous Fragments. Spring 1880* (60)).

[Texts] on appearance:

"'Appearance' ... is the true and unique reality of things, that to which all existing predicates are suited... I do not posit 'appearance' as the contrary of 'reality'; I assert on the contrary that appearance

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is reality, that which is opposed to transforming the real into an imaginary 'true world'" (*The Will to Power* (61)).

### 3. Birth of the truth<sup>124</sup>

From what was truth born?

a. We saw that the subject and the object were born from the play and the intersection between the sign and interpretation (62).

— The power that interprets receives the signs of the object.

— The appearance that is masked receives the identity of power.

b. Truth is formed when violence done to real differences best serves life. When it is even indispensable to life.

"Truth is a kind of error, without which a certain species of living beings could not live. That which decides in the last resort is its value for life" (*The Will to Power* (63)).

See also: "its true task is to help the triumph and duration of a certain kind of non-truth and to take as basis, for the conservation of a given species of living being, a coherent set of falsifications" (*The Will to Power* (64)).

The more essential the game of knowledge (*connaissance*) is to life, the more true is that which it believes it knows (*connaître*) (illusorily, by error and in the form of lie) is. The true is therefore that which establishes, roots the will (*volonté*) to interpret. This is what revives it.

The true revives the will (*volonté*) to interpret. This is its condition of possibility.

But while the true was, in classical philosophy, the condition of knowledge (*connaissance*) at the level of its form or content, here, it is at the level of will (*vouloir*).

Knowledge (*connaissance*) and truth, which were separated, are here reunited anew. But in an entirely other mode. Knowledge (*connaissance*)

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is that error which makes truth possible. The truth is that which makes it possible to live on this will (*volonté*) for knowledge (*connaissance*).

Error, life, and will (*volonté*) connect truth and knowledge (*connaissance*) which in classical philosophy belonged together by right (in the form of obviousness (*évidence*), the *a priori*, and freedom).

<sup>124</sup> The third lecture probably begins here, where Daniel Defert ended the lecture published in *Lectures on the Will to Know*.

Obviousness (évidence)	Error
<i>A priori</i>	Life
Freedom	Will ( <i>volonté</i> )

c. But this has three sorts of consequences:

*First consequence:* truth and the will to know (*volonté de connaître*) are in an infinite relation.

The more the will to know (*volonté de connaître*) is strong, violent, lively, the more it multiplies this error which is truth.

The more this error that is truth is prolonged, the more the will to know (*volonté de connaître*), the stronger life will be: and the more errors-truths that can be produced.

Hence the texts on the world, whose truth is a long series of errors, an immense mixture of colours.

For example: "The totality of this universe which truly matters to us, the one in which our needs, our desires, our joys, our hopes, our colours, our lines, our imaginations, are rooted ... it is a universe that we have created ourselves ... Just as language is the primitive poem of the people, the whole visible and sensory world is the original poem of humanity ... We inherit this whole set at once, as if it were reality itself" (*The Will to Power* (65)).

Similarly: "These tableaux of "real" nature, these are the poems and paintings created by primitive humanity..." (*The Will to Power* (66)).

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And at the same time as this world gets richer, the will to truth (*volonté de vérité*) becomes more and more fierce. To the point of today becoming conscious of itself. The "will to truth (*volonté de vérité*) manages to become conscious of itself... this is the grandiose spectacle in a hundred acts, reserved for the next two centuries of European history" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (67)).

*Second consequence:* the stronger the will to truth (*volonté de vérité*), the more belief in the error of which it is made. The error, in which knowledge (*connaissance*) consists, will be enlarged. Error:

- which consists of believing in identity and substance;
- which consists of believing in resemblance (and essence);
- which consists in believing in immortality and being;
- which consists in believing in logic and metaphysics.

But all this is exactly contrary to life, which is changing, difference, movement, grounding, and chaos. And that the truth is contrary to life implies two things:

a. That it is linked to the refusal of life. And that it allows life, basically, only to those whose life is to refuse change, difference, becoming, and chaos.

It is only condition of life for the ascetic. The ascetic (by a new circular process) is at once the product of truth (of the division between an eternal truth and a becoming), and the one who constantly relaunches the quest for truth.

b. Which leads him to death: "To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) may even be part of the foundation of Being" (*Beyond Good and Evil* (68)).

To the question: why do we want truth (rather than error)?, the answer will be: because of morality. Morality is not that which gave birth to truth, but

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that which took hold of it. It is interpretation of truth.

To the question: towards what does the will to truth (*vouloir de vérité*) tend?, the answer will be: not to the absolute, not to reward nor to being, but to death and to non-being.

*Third consequence:* but the will to truth (*volonté de vérité*), insofar as it is will (*volonté*) (and linked to the will to power (*volonté de puissance*)), is linked to life. So much so that applied

to itself, eager to know (*connaître*) itself, it will lead not to be founded as in classical philosophy, but to destroy itself, by showing the illusion, error, and lie of which it is made. Now, if it destroys the error of knowledge (*connaissance*), and if this error is necessary for life, it will lead again to its destruction. Hence: inasmuch as it is will to *truth* (*volonté de vérité*), the will (*volonté*) turns away from life and goes to death. Inasmuch as it is the *will* to truth (*volonté de vérité*), it is error, and dispelling this error leads it to death.

#### IV. History and end of the truth

The truth, episode that occurs to knowledge (*connaissance*), has a history. But in a very particular mode.

- Not: the truth being what it is, how can it have a history and an unfolding in time?
- But: history being what it is, how can the truth be produced there?

Now, once produced in history, what happens to the truth? And what happens in return to this history, now that it is stuffed with truth?

##### A. Nietzsche formulates this history in four different ways

###### 1. Selection.

The truth, as error useful to a species. All those who do not believe in this truth are condemned (the madmen).

In this way, the truth perfects the species or rather transforms it — by strengthening it, making it more powerful.

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"From the origin of organic life, an unprecedented cruelty eliminated everything that "smelled different". — Science is perhaps only the extension of this process of elimination..." (*The Will to Power* (69)).

"Science only continues the infinite process that began with the first of the organic beings... We advance science; my friends, this can only mean, in the long run: we advance man..." (*The Will to Power* (70)).

See [another passage on the "purpose of science"] (*The Will to Power* (71)).

We see that it is as error that the truth plays this role.

As fabric of errors, tangle of illusions and lies, truth is inscribed in the biological history of life.

###### 2. Destruction.

Other history, inverse. To know (*connaître*) the truth, or rather to advance in the presumption of the truth, is in fact to go to the destruction of the one who knows (*connaît*).

Since it is to substitute being for becoming, since it is to substitute things for signs, since it is to substitute the soul for the body: since it is to substitute this world for another world — both unknown (*inconnu*) and true.

"Perfect knowledge (*connaissance*) might make us gravitate, brilliant and cold like stars, around things — a short instant again! Then it would be our end, the end of beings eager for knowledge (*connaissance*) who enjoy an existence of spiders..." (*The Will to Power* (72)). Knowledge (*connaissance*) compared to human sacrifices. If "the idea of humanity that sacrifices itself... appears on the horizon, knowledge (*connaissance*) of the truth will remain the only enormous goal to which such a sacrifice would be proportionate, because for knowledge (*connaissance*) no sacrifice is too great" (*Dawn* (73)).

###### 3. The disappearance of the truth (and of appearance).

Knowledge (*connaissance*) has not ceased destroying the truth itself.

And this very will to know (*vouloir connaître*), which implicates the will to

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truth (*vouloir de vérité*), destroys the truth — in recognising (*reconnaisant*) the truth as error.

Such is the fable recounted in *Twilight of the Idols* (74).

- The true world, accessible to the sage. "I, Plato, I am the truth."
- The true world, inaccessible now, but promised to the pious man. Make penitence.
- The true world, not susceptible to promise, but as idea and imperative. Kant.
- The true world, of which one cannot even know (*connaître*) if it is unknowable (*inconnaisable*). Thus no obligation. Positivism.

- The true world, become useless; contradictory idea. The free spirits.
  - But the world of appearance disappears with it. "Noon, instant of the shortest shadow; end of the longest of errors; ... Incipit Zarathustra" (*Twilight of the Idols* (75)).
4. Finally, the truth is that which must be destroyed today, that from which it is necessary to free ourselves.
- One must attack it because [it] is dangerous to life:  
 "It is of cardinal importance to abolish the true world. It is a cause that we suspect and which depreciates the world we are; it is our most dangerous attack on life.  
 War on all the hypotheses that were used to imagine a true world" (*The Will to Power* (76)).
  - One must attack it in that which roots it, that is, morality. This morality of which we today are still far from being free.  
 "Let us suppress the true world; and to do this, we will have to suppress the old supreme values, morality... It is enough to prove that morality is immoral, in the sense that the immoral has been judged to the present. When we have broken the tyranny of ancient values in this way, and suppressed the "true world",

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a new order of values will naturally follow" (*The Will to Power* (77)).

Thus difficulty of giving a status to this episode of the truth:

- Expect a transformation of man and perhaps the passage to the overman; in any case, let the will to power (*volonté de puissance*) speak through him.
- See the great sacrifice of humanity announced through him, this drunkenness that is both the height and the opposite of asceticism: the joy of holocaust.
- Decipher that subtle work by which in knowledge (*savoir*), in the movement that the true promises, discover that the true is inaccessible, useless, non-existent.
- Recognise (*reconnaitre*) the moment when it is necessary to violently uproot the true and take away all the supports it takes in morality.

Four ways to analyse the history of the true, its episodic character, and the current turning-point where its disappearance is announced.

*B. Between these four ways of analysing the history of the true, it is possible to define a system of belonging. It would be this one:*

The will to power (*volonté de puissance*) that emerges through the will to know (*vouloir savoir*) requires the sacrifice of humanity, the passage to a moment when man will no longer be there, the passage to the overman.

And this passage to the overman is correlated with the disappearance of truth and appearance (the erasure of the truth/appearance opposition).

And this passage (with the disappearance related to it), it is both our fatality and that which we must will (*vouloir*).

But we must reprise this system of belonging a little. To say that humanity is strengthened by the truth as principle of selection means:

- that the sense of the truth always chooses and reinforces the most useful errors: "an organic edifice of errors that agglutinates to the body and soul and ends up governing emotions and instincts. Vital selection is operated out continuously" (*The Will to Power* (78)).
- So that the will to power (*volonté de puissance*) is supported and walks through this truth. In its root, in its destiny, in its success and its solidification, the truth serves the will to

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power (*volonté de puissance*): "The will (*volonté*) to "find the true" is developing in the service of the "will to power (*volonté de puissance*)". Looking closely, its true task is to help the triumph and duration of a certain kind of non-truth..." (*The Will to Power* (79)).

- Now, what does the will to power (*volonté de puissance*) will (*veut*)? Not to be, but to change, not to stay in life, but to live in the element of becoming. The will to power (*volonté de puissance*) refuses being as essence, and life as fixed species. That is to say that it refuses:

- the truth as being, as immobility, as eternal and immobile essence, as the beyond in relation to the changing;

- human nature as species defined by the soul and body, taken in the constellation of good and evil and able or not to be saved.

The truth is therefore the ruse that the will to power (*volonté de puissance*) used to dominate, and to free itself from, that which had made the truth possible (that is, the hypothesis of being and the moral devaluation of the body).

– This is why the appearance and then disappearance of the truth are part of our destiny and we cannot escape them. But this is our destiny only in the form of the will (*volonté*). We will (*voulons*) the truth (we are the seekers of knowledge (*connaissance*)), and by willing (*voulant*) it, a will (*volonté*) through us wills (*veut*) the disappearance of truth, man, the soul/body opposition, the truth/appearance opposition, the opposition of the world here below and the world beyond.

"And do you know (*saviez*) what "the world" is to me?... This world: a monster of force, with neither beginning nor end..."

Do you want a name for this universe...? This world is the world of the will to power (*volonté de puissance*), and no other. And you yourself are also this will to power (*volonté de puissance*), and nothing else" (*The Will to Power* (80)).

The discovery, in a true discourse, of the non-truth of the truth reveals the will to power (*volonté de puissance*). The will to power (*volonté de puissance*) is the root of truth, it is the non-true

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essence of the truth, it is the non-essence of the truth. The non-predictability of the truth.

Where a speculative philosophy (critical, positivist, sceptical) would have simply found that truth rested on errors or illusions, so that truth was inaccessible, or that it was only a convention, or that it could not be reciprocated with being, Nietzsche shows that the will to power (*volonté de puissance*) is the non-truth of truth: that which makes the truth be as non-truth.

But what is this will to power (*volonté de puissance*) thus uncovered?

A reality which has been freed from (immutable, eternal, true) being: becoming.

And knowledge (*connaissance*) which reveals that it does not reveal being. But a truth without truth.

There are thus two "truths without truth".

- the truth which is error, lie, illusion; the truth which is not true;
- the truth freed from this truth-lie; the truthful truth; the truth which is not reciprocable with being.

### [Note] regarding The Will to Power

Constant quantity. No augmentation.

That which it makes it possible to avoid:

- finality;
- first cause;
- orientation.

That which it makes it possible to affirm:

- chance;
- an eternity;
- but an eternity without essence or nature.

If the quantity of energy in the world is constant, the will (*volonté*) can only be will (*volonté*) to dominate. A greater force is not a supplementary creation; it is, in a world of equal energy, an appropriation, a domination, a sovereignty.

But by the same token, since no new energy is created, there cannot be novelty indefinitely. Hence the limited character of possibilities. And the return.

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### [Note on subject, truth, discourse]

That it is necessary to think about the event of knowing (*connaître*) before and independently of the structures of knowledge (*connaissance*) poses a number of problems:

1. What about the subject and the object?
2. What about the truth?
3. What about philosophical discourse?

## NOTES

1. Michel Foucault taught at McGill in April 1971. See D. Defert, 'Chronologie (1968-1984)', art. cit., p. xv: "April [1971]: Foucault is invited by the University of McGill, in Montréal, where he gives three lectures on Nietzsche and the problem of truth. He is questioned on the experience of the GIP [Groupe d'informations sur les prisons]. He meets independent Québécois militants, gets to know [Michel] Chartrand, Robert Lemieux, [Charles] Gagnon, and visits in prison the author of *Nègres blancs d'Amérique*, Pierre Vallières, ideologue of the Front de libération du Québec." It is likely that this was at the invitation of professor Benjamin F. Weems III, director of the 'Programme in Comparative Literature' at McGill. See Letter from John K. Simon to Weems, 25 February 1972, in the SUNY Buffalo archives. In the manuscript, the three lectures are linked without new introductions or conclusions. For this reason, we publish them in one piece, indicating in notes where Foucault stops and starts again. We have added two other lectures, placed in the appendix (see *infra*, pp. 173 and 197).

2. Pierre Klossowski translates this expression as "la forme la moins contraignante de la connaissance". See F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §110, 'Origine de la connaissance', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by P. Klossowski), p. 194; *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 96 ("cette forme la moins efficace des formes de la connaissance"); *OCFN*, t. VIII, 1942, p. 164 ("la forme la moins efficace de la connaissance"); *CW*, vol. 6, p. 119 ("the least strongest form of knowledge").

3. *Ibid.*, Livre premier, §2, 'La conscience intellectuelle', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 33-34; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 39-40.

4. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §229 and 230, *OCFN*, t. X, 1948, pp. 234 and 236; *CW*, vol. 8, pp. 132-134 and 134-136.

5. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §333, 'Qu'est-ce que connaître?', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 162-163; *CW*, vol. 6, pp. 194-195.

6. *Id.*, *Aurore*, Livre cinquième, §432, 'Chercheur et tentateur', *OCFN*, t. VII, 1912, pp. 335-336; *CW*, vol. 5, pp. 224-225.

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7. *Id.*, 'De l'utilité et des inconvénients...', §10, *OCFN*, t. V, vol. 1, 1907, p. 244; *CW*, vol. 2, p. 160.

8. *Id.*, *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §26, *OCFN*, t. XI, 1913, p. 276; *CW*, vol. 8, p. 345.

9. *Ibid.*, III, §14, *OCFN*, t. XI, 1913, p. 215; *OPC*, t. VII, p. 313.

10. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, livre III, §579, p. 177.<sup>125</sup> We reproduce the passage slightly reworked by Foucault; the translation by Bianquis says: "the *passion for knowledge* (connaissance) exists; it is an enormous, new, growing power, as we have never seen it; it has the wings of the eagle, the eyes of the owl, and the feet of the dragon. It... wonders: "How can I exist in *men*? How can man henceforth exist *with me*?"

11. R. Descartes, *Méditations métaphysiques*, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-166 [See Descartes, *Meditations*, *op. cit.*, 'Meditation IV', digitised here: [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Meditations\\_on\\_First\\_Philosophy/Meditation\\_III](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Meditations_on_First_Philosophy/Meditation_III) — Tr.]; *id.*, *Discours de la méthode*, pref. by Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, Paris, Flammarion, 1966, 'Seconde partie', pp. 41-49 [See Descartes R (1853) *Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking Truth in the Sciences* (Veitch J trans), 'Part II', digitised here: [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Discourse\\_on\\_the\\_Method/Part\\_2](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Discourse_on_the_Method/Part_2) — Tr.]. See also M. Foucault, *Le Discours philosophique*, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-38; as well as *id.* (2005) *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982* (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA, '6 January 1983: First Hour', pp. 1-24, here pp. 14-19 (where Foucault develops the 'Cartesian moment' and the difference between philosophy and spirituality).

12. Baruch Spinoza, *Éthique*, Deuxième partie, propositions 40-42 (in particular the notes to proposition 40), in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. by Roland Cailliois, Madeleine Francès, and Robert Misrahi, Paris, Gallimard, 1954, pp. 392-396 (where Spinoza develops the distinction between three kinds of knowledge (*connaissance*)) [See Spinoza B (1853) *Ethics* (Elwes RHM trans), 'Part Two: On the Nature and Origin of the Mind', propositions 40-42, digitised here: [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ethics\\_\(Spinoza\)/Part\\_2](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ethics_(Spinoza)/Part_2) — Tr.];

<sup>125</sup> [The endnotes to this lecture refer to this edition of *The Will to Power* 30 times. As I have previously said, this edition is not available in English, and I do not have access to a French copy. As such, locating the passages in reliable English translations of Nietzsche's work takes, on a good day, an hour per citation. I have decided that for this lecture the result would not be worth the effort — Tr.]

*ibid.*, Troisième partie, proposition 9, pp. 422-423 (where Spinoza treats of desire and the appetite) [See Spinoza, Ethics, op. cit., 'Part Three: On the Origin and Nature of the Emotions', proposition 9, digitised here: [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ethics\\_\(Spinoza\)/Part\\_3](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ethics_(Spinoza)/Part_3) — Tr.].

13. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, op. cit., A832/B860, 'The Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Third Chapter: The Architectonic of Pure Reason', pp. 691 ff.

14. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33a, chemise 5, 'Le refus de la vérité'. Foucault there quotes the following passage from Nietzsche: "There are certain things that we know (*savons*) too well, now, we who have knowledge (*connaissance*): oh how we henceforth learn to forget well, to *ignore* well, as artists!... No, this bad taste, this will (*volonté*) to attain truth, "truth at all costs", this adolescent mania in the love for truth — all this does not matter to us anymore: we are too experienced (*expérimentés*), too serious, too gay, too hardened, too *deep*... We no longer believe that truth remains truth, when the *veil* is torn off, — we have lived long enough to be persuaded... One should have more respect for *modesty*, refuge of nature which is hidden behind enigmas and multiple uncertainties. Perhaps truth is a woman, and she has reasons to not *let us see her reasons*?... Perhaps her name, to speak Greek, is *Bubo*?" (F. Nietzsche, *Nietzsche contre Wagner*, 'Épilogue', §2, OCFN, t. XII, 1942, p. 81; CW, vol. 9, p. 407).

15. F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre premier, §54, 'La conscience et l'Apparence', op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 62-63; CW, vol. 6, pp. 76-77.

16. *Id.*, *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §12, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 205 ("en notre qualité de chercheurs de la connaissance"); CW, vol. 8, p. 308 ("In the end, particularly as knowing ones").

17. Foucault refers to a passage by Nietzsche reproduced in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, op. cit., p. 207 which comes from *Nietzsche's Werke*, op. cit., t. X ("To be totally truthful, [is a — Tr.] magnificent, heroic envy of man in his lying nature! But only very relatively possible... Truthfulness of art, it alone is now loyal") [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, op. cit., p. 204 — Tr.]

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18. Foucault cites "VI. 150", in reference to K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, op. cit., p. 214 [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, op. cit., p. 210 — Tr.] and to the edition *Nietzsche's Werke*, op. cit. See F. Nietzsche, *Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra*, Deuxième partie, 'Des sages illustres', op. cit. (Fr. trans. by G. Bianquis), p. 217; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, op. cit., pp. 79-81, here p. 80.

19. F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §335, 'Vive la physique!', op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 166; CW, vol. 6, pp. 196-199. Foucault does not emphasise the word italicised in Nietzsche's text ("ignorance"), and does not reproduce the final exclamation mark.

20. *Id.*, 'Introduction théorique sur la vérité et le mensonge au sens extra-moral...', art. cit., p. 171 (translation modified by Foucault); see also *Écrits posthumes (1870-1873)*, OPC, t. I, vol. 2, p. 277 [The relevant volume of CW has yet to be published — Tr.]. See *supra*, note 15, p. 129.

21. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre cinquième, §353, op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 183-184; CW, vol. 6, pp. 220-221.

22. Foucault refers to *On the Genealogy of Morality*, but it is difficult to say which passage precisely. We could think here of several paragraphs from the first treatise on the transformation of concepts and the revolt of slaves in morality: F. Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, First Treatise, §4 and 7, CW, vol. 8, pp. 220-226.

23. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre deuxième, §84, 'De l'origine de la Poésie', op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 77-78; CW, vol. 6, pp. 94-97.

24. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, op. cit., vol. 1, livre II, §274, p. 282.

25. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre quatrième, §333, op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 162-163; CW, vol. 6, pp. 194-195.

26. *Ibid.*, Livre troisième, §109, 'Gardons-nous', op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 95-96; CW, vol. 6, pp. 117-118.

27. *Ibid.*, Livre quatrième, §333, op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 162-163; CW, vol. 6, pp. 194-195.

28. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §230, OCFN, t. X, 1948, p. 236; CW, vol. 8, pp. 134-136.

29. *Ibid.*, §229, OCFN, t. X, 1948, p. 234; CW, vol. 8, pp. 132-134.

30. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §110, op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 96-98; CW, vol. 6, pp. 118-120.

31. *Id.*, *Aurore*, Livre cinquième, §429, 'La nouvelle passion', OCFN, t. VII, 1912, p. 333; CW, vol. 5, pp. 223-224.

32. *Id.*, *Dawn*, Book Five, §432, CW, vol. 5, pp. 224-225.

33. BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33a, chemise 5, 'La connaissance et l'apparence'. Foucault reproduces passages from §54 of the *Joyful Science*, and introduces the German words used by Nietzsche. We reproduce here the corresponding passages, with the German additions by Foucault, from the edition by Henri Albert: "What an admirable place I occupy facing the whole entirety of existence, with my knowledge (*connaissance*) [*Erkenntnis*], as it seems to me new and at the same time appalling and ironic! I discovered for myself that old humanity, old animality, yes even all primitive times and the past of any sensory existence, continue to live in me, to write, to love, to hate, to conclude, — I suddenly woke up in the middle of this dream, but only to realise that I was dreaming earlier and that I must continue to dream, so as not to perish... What "appearance" for me now? It is certainly not the opposite of any "being"... It is certainly not an inanimate mask... Appearance is for me life and action itself which, in its irony of

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itself, goes so far as to make me feel that there is there appearance and wildfire and dance of the elves and nothing else — that, among these dreamers, I too, I "who seeks knowledge (*connaissance*)" [*ich, der Erkennende*], I dance the step of the whole world, that the knower (*connaisseur*) [*Erkennende*] is a way to prolong the earthly dance, and that because of this he is part of the ceremonial masters of life, and that the sublime consequence and link of all knowledges (*connaissances*) is and may be the supreme means for maintaining the generality of the reverie, the understanding of all these dreamers among them and, by that very reason, the *duration of the dream*" (F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre premier, §54, OCFN, t. VIII, 1942, pp. 96-97; *op. cit.* [Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte], pp. 62-63; CW, vol. 6, pp. 76-77).

34. F. Nietzsche, *Écrits et Essais de 1873-1876*, cited in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, *op. cit.*, p. 213 [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, *op. cit.*, p. 209 — Tr.] (*Nietzsche's Werke*, *op. cit.*, t. X, pp. 34 ff.).

35. Foucault dedicated a manuscript in 1954 to Husserl, *Phénoménologie et Psychologie* (*op. cit.*).

36. F. Nietzsche, *Aurore*, Livre cinquième, §438, 'L'homme et les choses', OCFN, t. VII, 1912, p. 339; CW, vol. 5, p. 227.

37. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre I, §195, p. 98.

38. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre I, §193, p. 97.

39. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §230, OCFN, t. X, 1948, p. 236; CW, vol. 8, pp. 134-136. Foucault makes several small modifications and does not emphasise some of the words. The published text, translated by Henri Albert, says: "To this will (*volonté*) to appearance, simplification, mask, cloak, surface — because every surface is a cloak — is opposed that sublime penchant of the one who seeks knowledge (*connaissance*), that penchant that takes and wants to take things in a deep, multiple way, in their essence."

40. *Id.*, *Aurore*, Livre cinquième, §432, OCFN, t. VII, 1912, pp. 335-336; CW, vol. 5, pp. 224-225. We have reestablished the text of the Henri Albert edition.

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre I, §192, p. 97.

43. *Id.*, *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §12, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, pp. 206-207; CW, vol. 8, pp. 308-309.

44. *Ibid.*, III, §13, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 207; CW, vol. 8, p. 309.

45. *Ibid.*, III, §12, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 206; CW, vol. 8, p. 308; *id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre I, §207, p. 102.

46. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre I, §206, p. 101. Foucault makes an important change to this passage. The second sentence states, in the original, "it being [that of the world] is essentially different at each point", whereas Foucault writes "the world is essentially different at each point". Foucault may be trying to avoid the ontological question.

47. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre I, §202, p. 99.

48. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, §287-289, pp. 286-287.

49. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre I, §202, p. 100.

50. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre I, §197, p. 99; brackets are in the original.

51. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, §291, p. 287.

52. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre I, §199, p. 99.

53. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, §292, p. 288. Foucault slightly modifies the quote; instead of writing, as in the published text, "how any truth is possible", he writes in his manuscript: "how truth is possible". We reproduce his modification in the text.

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54. In his intellectual journals, on 20 August 1969, Foucault insists on the importance of "distinguishing will to know (*vouloir savoir*) and will to truth (*volonté de vérité*) (cf. Nietzsche)" (BNF, Fonds Foucault, cote

NAF 28730, Boîtes 91-92, chemise 4, 'Journal intellectuel de Michel Foucault', *Cahier rouge*, 24 June 1963-20 August 1969).

55. F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre I, §210, p. 104.

56. In his intellectual journals in July 1969, Foucault anticipates these themes. In chemise 4, a red cahier (24 June 1963-20 August 1969) contains fragments on the need of error and the categories of non-true truth. On 19 July, he writes: "Nietzsche: the desire to know (*savoir*) [...] is nourished by error, illusion, fantasy. [...] It will be necessary to analyse the will to know (*vouloir savoir*) regardless of this need for error (illusion is not the affective foundation of knowledge (*savoir*)); independently of this will to individual power (*volonté de puissance individuelle*). To tell the truth, the problem is the relation between science and asceticism" (BNF, Fonds Foucault, cote NAF 28730, Boîtes 91-92, chemise 4, 'Journal intellectuel de Michel Foucault', *Cahier rouge*, 24 June 1963-20 August 1969) On the great categories of non-true truth, see Freud S (1961) *The Future of an Illusion* (Strachey J trans), W. W. Norton, New York, USA, pp. 30-31 (where he develops and compares the categories of illusion, error, and the delirious idea in psychiatry).

57. F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre II, §308, p. 292.

58. *Id.*, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §265, 'Dernier scepticisme', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 135; CW, vol. 6, 1982, p. 160. Foucault does not emphasise the word italicised in the original ("irrefutable").

59. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, livre III, §330, p. 107.

60. *Id.*, *Unpublished Fragments from the Period of Dawn (Winter 1879/80-Spring 1881)*, 3[19], CW, vol. 13, p. 42: "33. What is new in our present attitude toward philosophy is a conviction no other age has had: *that we do not have the truth*. All earlier people "had the truth": even the skeptics."

61. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, livre III, §592, p. 181.

62. See *supra*, pp. 149-153. Foucault also develops these points in the course that we have placed in annex; see *infra*, Annexe 1, p. 173.

63. F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre II, §308, p. 292.

64. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, livre III, §603, p. 184. We have reestablished this quote as it appeared in the translation by G. Bianquis (Paris, Gallimard, 1942). It had been slightly reworked by Foucault. Instead of writing "its true task", Foucault wrote in his manuscript "The task of the truth". Several sheets later, Foucault reprises this quote without this modification. See *infra*, note 79, p. 172. Here too, Foucault does not retain, in his manuscript, "determined by living beings".

65. F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, livre III, §614, p. 187.

66. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, livre III, §615, p. 187.

67. *Id.*, *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §27, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 282; CW, vol. 8, p. 348. Foucault manipulates and shortens Henri Albert's translation, which begins rather like this: "The will to truth (*volonté de vérité*), once conscious

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of itself will be — it cannot be doubted — *the death of morality*: this is the grandiose spectacle [...]."

68. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, II, 'L'esprit libre', §39, OCFN, t. X, 1948, p. 74; CW, vol. 8, p. 40-41.

69. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre II, §115, p. 233.

70. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, §282, pp. 284-285. We have reestablished the quote as published in Nietzsche's text.

71. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, §162, p. 247: "The goal of science, after all, is to define the feeling of *man* — and not of the individual... It is not truth but *man* we are trying to know (*connaître*)..."

72. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, livre III, §585, p. 180.

73. *Id.*, *Aurore*, Livre premier, §45, 'Un dénouement tragique de la connaissance', OCFN, t. VII, 1912, p. 59; CW, vol. 5, p. 37. The passage in Henri Albert's edition begins in the following way: "And perhaps there is a single prodigious idea that, even now, could annihilate any other aspiration, so that it would win over the most victorious, — I mean the idea of *humanity sacrificing itself*. But to whom should it sacrifice itself? We can already swear that, if ever the constellation of this idea appears on the horizon, the knowledge (*connaissance*) of the truth..."

74. *Id.*, *Twilight of the Idols*, 'How the "True World" Finally Became a Fable', §1-6, CW, vol. 9, pp. 62-63.

75. *Ibid.*, §6, CW, vol. 9, p. 63.

76. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre I, §212(B), p. 106.

77. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre I, §210, p. 103.

78. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, livre III, §624, p. 189. Foucault does not retain the word "vital" and copies only "Selection operates continuously." We have reestablished the text according to the translation by G. Bianquis (1942).

79. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, livre III, §603, p. 184.

80. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, §51, p. 216.

## ANNEX 1

### [Knowledge (connaissance) and Truth]

*Knowledge (connaissance) as unveiling, as a relation of the subject to the object, and in its relation to the truth. I. The subject-object problem. II. The truth as affirmation. III. Knowledge (connaissance), the truth, and the will to power (volonté de puissance). IV. Telling the truth and the Eternal Return.*

If knowing (*connaître*) it is indeed an event, then how can knowledge (*connaissance*) be given as an unveiling, or an illumination, or a grasping (*saisie*) (1)?

How can it be given as a relation of the subject to the object?

What about its relation to the truth?

Text (2).

1. Violent mark and not by unveiling.

- Mark of identity (excluding becoming).
- Mark of analogy (excluding singularity).
- Mark of measure (excluding intensity).

These are not at all signs.

- They do not respond to any significant intention.
- They do not translate at all the expressive or utilitarian values of things.

They are imposed by violence and power.

For example, the signs of punishment:

- Identity of the individual.
- Analogy of faults.
- Measure of moral hierarchies.

Thus under the event, a certain relation of power.

2. Subject and object.

The *subject-object* relation does not preexist:

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– These are the marks which constitute the object as:

- element identical to itself;
- susceptible to being taken conceptually (generality);
- that can be included in the generality of the calculation.

– These are also the marks which constitute the subject:

- substantial identity;
- element analogous to others;
- where all identities are reduced.

3. Truth, *Verfälschung*.<sup>126</sup>

In four senses:

1. The violence of the mark.

2. Appearance of the false:

becoming ( $\neq$  identity)  
singular (analogy)  
intense (calculable).

*Verfälschung*: it is a fabrication of the false.

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<sup>126</sup> *Verfälschung*: falsification.

3. From there, constitution of an opposition of the true and the false, as essential dichotomy.
4. This same gesture passes for true.

## I. The subject-object problem

### 1. So what is the object according to Nietzsche?

Text: "Knowledge (*connaissance*): it facilitates experience by simplifying real phenomena to the extreme, both in the aspect of the acting forces, and in the aspect of our constructive faculties; it seems in this way that there are analogous and identical things. Knowledge (*connaissance*) falsely reduces the innumerable diversity of facts to identity, analogy, countable quantities. Life is only possible with the help of this falsifying apparatus. Thought consists in falsifying by transformation, sensation consists in falsifying by transformation, the will (*vouloir*) consists in falsifying by transformation; everywhere it is the faculty of assimilation that is at work, and it presupposes the will (*volonté*) to bring external things back to our resemblance" (*The Will to Power* (3)).

From this text we can retain, leaving aside for the moment the problem of "falsification", several things:

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*Negatively:*

- a. It must be remembered that there are no preliminary objects waiting in the shadows or the silence to be grasped (*saisis*) by the knowing (*connaissant*) subject.
- b. It must be remembered that the object is not constituted by empty forms of experience, which would be identity, substance, quantity.

*Positively:*

- c. It must be remembered that the object appears from a deformation, a transformation violently imposed on the infinite diversity of facts.
- d. It must be remembered that this transformation consists not so much in operating a synthesis (i.e. the union of two different unities), but much more radically, in introducing the very element of the unit from which the object can exist. (Unity is violence.)

This element of unity is introduced by transformation in three forms:

- The identity which ensures the constitution of a permanence by denying the future.
  - The analogy which ensures the constitution of a generality denying singularity.
  - The countable quantity which ensures measure by denying the chaos of differences.<sup>127</sup>
- e. Finally, it must be remembered that this introduction of unity has for its purpose an assimilation. Assimilation which has two sides: assimilation of facts between each other, assimilation of differences, assimilation of pluralities. But assimilation of all this to us. Establishment of a *homoiōsis*, which allows us to know (*connaitre*) the object as us; and to recognise (*reconnaitre*) ourselves in the object (Domination).

However, if we now wonder how this violence of unity is introduced, many of Nietzsche's texts are there to tell us (*The Will to Power* (4)).

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It is by the use of the sign and the mark. Of the mark — which is one, which is the same, which remains; which allows one to recognise (*reconnaitre*) the same thing, to treat different things as similar; which allows one to count.

The object is therefore the result of a transformation. It should still be noted that it is not a matter of a real transformation, of the sort of manual elaboration of a material which is raw and which would thus gradually take on a human and legible face.

The object is the effect (of falsification) carried with it by the use of marks; it is that which is determined — as pseudo-identity or permanence — in the space of the play of signs. It is the shimmering under the mark that is imposed by the will (*volonté*) to the similar.

There is therefore no fundamental or original relation to the object; there is not even the general form of a relation to the object, no "objectivity" with its laws and limits. Even before the object existed, or the horizon of objectivity unfolded, there was domination, assimilation, and transformation by the mark. *The Will to Power* says it: even what is given, apparently in all simplicity by sensation, is the product of a marking.

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<sup>127</sup> Foucault writes in the margin "*The logical*" and strikes out the following passage: "Now if we wonder how this violence of unity is introduced, many of Nietzsche's texts are there to tell us."

"The eye, in vision, operates exactly like the mind that understands. It simplifies the phenomenon,... brings it back to things already seen, transforms it to the point of making it graspable (*saisissable*), useable. The senses operate like the "mind"; they take hold of things... There is no desire for "objectivity"..." (*The Will to Power* (5)).

Far from the object being that in relation to which we can speak of knowledge (*connaissance*), far from being that which we know (*connait*) in knowledge (*connaissance*), it is an effect of knowing (*connaitre*).

## 2. As for the subject that knows (*connait*), we can do a symmetrical analysis.

Thought is not the phenomenon to which we have immediate access in the form of consciousness: thought is not knowledge (*connaissance*) that would be at the same time and in one go the act that knows (*connait*) and the instance that is known (*connait*). Thought itself is only an effect.

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- In this sense, first of all, that it is only the result of processes which are heterogeneous to it: bodily or nervous processes; pathological processes of disease; movements of emotions or desires.
- But effect in another sense: because if thought is the result of these processes, it is not that it is the direct product of them; it is that it is their isolation, schematisation, simplification, forced unity. Thought is *effect* of extra-thought, not as natural result, but as violence and illusion. It is an effect that only takes place in unreality.
- And if this effect takes place in the unreal, and not at the level of the processes that support it, it is because signs and then signs of signs have come to operate this simplification, this schematisation (hierarchisation).

"Thought is not yet the internal phenomenon itself, but another ciphered language that expresses a compromise of power between emotions" (*The Will to Power* (6)).

- However, this set of signs through which multiple and heterogeneous processes constitute the effect of thought, this set of signs is the one we know (*connaissons*): that of identity and permanence. It is the filter of logic.

Logic "serves as schema and filter with the aid of which we dilute and simplify the real and extremely complex phenomena that compose thought; such that our thought becomes graspable (*saisissable*), noticeable, and communicable by signs. To allow that the intellectual phenomenon really corresponds to this regulatory pattern of an imaginary thought is the masterpiece of falsification that allows what we call "knowledge (*connaissance*)" or "experience"" (*The Will to Power* (7)).

We see it: it is indeed a logic that makes knowledge (*connaissance*) possible. But it is by no means a transcendental logic permitting the subject's thought to be knowledge (*connaissance*) of the object; it is not a logic of the identity of conditions (of the experience)

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and of the existence of the object); it is a logic of the effect which permits that, in the event of knowing (*connaitre*), the unreality of the object and that of thought are gradually produced.<sup>128</sup>

Logic, as violent establishment of signs of identification, produces as effects the thinking subject and the envisioned object; it is that which permits, in the event of knowing (*connaitre*), the establishment of an effect of knowledge (*connaissance*).

This analysis allows two orders of consequences to be drawn:

1. The complete upheaval of the theory of knowledge (*connaissance*).
  - We call rationalist a theory of knowledge (*connaissance*) that first posits the subject and object, then the form of knowledge (*connaissance*), then their ordering to the act of knowing (*connaitre*).
  - We call empiricist the theory that still presupposes the subject and the object, then the act or series of acts of knowing (*connaitre*), then the generalised form of knowledge (*connaissance*).
  - We call critique the theory that first presupposes the general form of knowledge (*connaissance*), then subordinates to it the relationship of the subject to the object, and then finally the act of knowing (*connaitre*).

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<sup>128</sup> Stricken: "And if we now ask ourselves what the subject is in relation to this thought already unified by signs, it would appear as." Since the following passages, of three pages, are preserved and represent the development of his thought, we reestablish them.

Nietzschean analysis first posits an act of knowing (*connaître*) that, not being subordinate to the pre-existence of a subject and an object, cannot even be said to be an *act*, but only an event; it then characterises this event by the appearance of an effect of knowledge (*connaissance*) where the illusion of the subject and the illusion of the object are correlatively brought into play.

This upheaval, we can immediately see what possibilities it opens up and what problems it leads to:

- By taking knowing (*connaître*) outside of knowledge (*connaissance*), by making it emerge as an event not internal to the structure or legislation of knowledge (*connaissance*), it makes it possible to do a history.<sup>129</sup> (A history that will no longer be that of the structure of knowledge (*connaissance*) revealing, across the event of knowing (*connaître*), either its identity, or

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its transformations; a history which will be that of the effects of knowledge (*connaissance*) as we can see them played in these events of knowing (*connaître*) — which we could call, in another vocabulary, knowledge (*savoir*).

We say that it is there, in this Nietzschean reversal of knowing (*connaître*) in relation to knowledge (*connaissance*), that the first possibility of a history of knowledge (*savoir*) is opened, which would be historical analysis of the conditions under which effects of knowledge (*connaissance*) are produced.

- But at the same time as this possibility is opened, we can clearly see the terrible problem that is posed.<sup>130</sup> It is this: not only is the subject-object relationship no longer foundational; it is no longer even founded; or rather it is only founded as an illusory effect. The subject and the object — the relation of knowledge (*connaissance*), is that which is illusion in knowing (*connaître*). Knowing (*connaître*) is real, it is knowledge (*connaissance*) that is illusion.

Hence the *problem of the truth*: if the false is at the very root of knowledge (*connaissance*), how can there be truth?

But how to speak of the false, if there is no opposite, or rather to keep the law of this falsity, and the principle of its division, something like the truth?

2. *But another thing must also be noted.* It is that Nietzschean analysis, when it speaks of signs, or interpretation, does not address the signifier or the effect of sense that is proper to it; it addresses that in the sign which is a mark, that is to say, appropriation, domination, transformation. It is addressed to this face of the sign that looks not on the side of the signifying system, but on the side of the singular will (*vouloir*).

Therefore, nothing would be more false than to bring the Nietzschean critique of knowledge (*connaissance*) back to a theory of the signifier. Certainly, we have some tendency to do it; because it has two advantages: first, re-inscribing Nietzsche within a theoretical horizon which is now familiar, even if it is very outdated, even if it carries with it a whole ideology, even if it prevents, among other things, thinking

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the event; as for the other advantage, it is that we avoid, by this recourse to the signifier, having to confront the terrible difficulties of a theory of will (*volonté*):

However, this is what this first part of the examination led us to. It was a question of seeing how Nietzsche avoided what we could [call] the redoubling (Aristotelian or Platonic) of knowledge (*connaissance*): how he avoided assuming, before knowing (*connaître*), before the desire to know (*connaître*), a prior knowledge (*connaissance*) (whether in the form of memory and forgetting, or in the form of the sensation and the pleasure it provides in that which could be the most useless (8)). And now what we find immediately behind this un-redoubled knowledge (*connaissance*), this unprecedented knowledge (*connaissance*), is the will (*vouloir*).

Thus turning around: it was said that to really think the desire to know (*savoir*), it was necessary to bypass all previous repetitions, all the prerequisites of knowledge (*connaissance*). And now we

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<sup>129</sup> In the margin: "One possibility (two problems)."

<sup>130</sup> In the margin: "Problem of the truth."

realise this: that to think knowledge (*connaissance*) without preconditions, to think it in the pure event of knowing (*connaître*), one must think something like the will to know (*volonté de savoir*).<sup>131</sup> [Other] question: what of the truth?

We take the text [from] *The Will to Power* on knowledge (*connaissance*) and its "falsifying apparatus" (*The Will to Power* (9)).

This apparatus, as we have seen, consists of imposing marks of identity, permanence, quantity. How can these marks

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be called "falsifying"? What is the *Verfälschung* that is effectuated by it, or effectuated across it?

1. The mark requires that it mark a form completely different from what it is. On the different, the mark imposes the violence of unity; on becoming, it imposes notably the figure of the same; on the heterogeneous, it imposes the form of the homogeneous.

The mark does not allow the multiplicity of what is marked to come to light; it imposes on it the tyranny, the unique, constant, homogeneous monarchy of the mark. It subjects it to an entirely other order.

2. The mark falsifies in another sense: it makes all that which is foreign or irreducible to the mark appear as inessential, exterior, negligible, accidental:

- The difference that abounds under identity will become the inessential or the accessory.
- The becoming that rumbles under permanence, the mark makes it a simple illusion.
- The heterogeneous, which proliferates under quantity, the mark makes it a simple appearance.

It *renders false* all that which falls outside of the mark; it values it as inessential, illusory, or apparent. It exercises a cut beyond which there is the false.

3. It falsifies in a third sense: it posits that which is subject to it as being the very nature of things:

- That which falls under the blow of unity, the mark gives it as being essence.
- That which falls under the blow of the permanent, the mark gives it as being the real.
- That which falls under the blow of the homogeneous, the mark gives it as being substance.

The truth is thus an effect of knowing (*connaître*) insofar as this is a strategy of falsification, or rather, it is the ensemble and result of operations of falsification which unfurl in the event of knowing (*connaître*).

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4. Finally, we see a last falsification that completes and achieves all the others: it is the one that consists, for the gesture of marking, in valuing itself as the unveiling of the truth; as what allows the truth to be seen, to appear, to differentiate and to tell itself.

The last falsification of the mark is to mask itself as mark (violent, tyrannical, falsifying) and to give itself as sign (in the calm element of language, which designates and states). The last falsification of the mark is to make the power relation underlying the mark be taken for a relationship of signification that [passes through] language.

This analysis takes its dimensions of a certain order of consequences that can be drawn from it:

1. Giving another sense to the old impredicability of the truth.
2. Inverting the relations of knowledge (*connaissance*) to the truth. Henceforth, the truth is interior to knowledge (*connaissance*).

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<sup>131</sup> Foucault outlines a first sketch of what he will develop in more depth in the following passages: "And now, we have not reached the end of our pains. / — To avoid the prerequisite of knowledge (*connaissance*) by relation to the desire to know (*connaître*), it was necessary to upset the entire edifice of the theory of knowledge (*connaissance*). / — But here we are now in the presence of two notions that are by themselves much more formidable than those of desire and knowledge (*connaissance*); since it is a matter of will (*volonté*) and truth. / At the heart of the effect of knowledge (*connaissance*) in the event of knowledge (*savoir*) reign both the domination of the will (*vouloir*) and the enchantment of the false. / It is there, in this direction — towards the relations of this domination and this enchantment, towards the relation of the will (*vouloir*) and [of] the true and false — that it is now a question of moving forward."

3. Putting at the heart of our knowledge (*savoir*) much more than critical caution or sceptical uncertainty: placing an almost vertiginous incompatibility there.

- The truth since it is falsification, adulteration, is incompatible with knowing (*connaître*); and the more we advance in the truth, the less we know (*connait*).
- And knowing (*connaître*), if it wills (*veut*) to sink into knowing (*connaître*), must get rid of the truth, and perhaps be as false as possible.

[4. And this is what appears in the history of truth as Nietzsche recounts it.]<sup>132</sup>

And, by the same, this history does not lack curious paradoxes.

- The affirmation of the truth will be all the more sovereign as domination, power (the will to power (*la volonté de puissance*)) will be more intense; and inversely, the more truth there will be, the more domination there will be, [the more the will to power (*la volonté de puissance*) will also be strengthened].<sup>133</sup>

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So there is a first history that is in a way the affirmative history of the truth.

- But since this truth is fraud and it produces an effect of knowledge (*connaissance*) that is in itself illusory, the history of the truth will be the history of an error that grows and is constantly multiplied by itself.

[Second history:] history of error.

- But what does this error consist of, fundamentally? Denying our becoming, denying our difference, denying our body and the (real-irreal) play of its intensities. Thus denying ourselves; denying in us this game of divergent, non-hierarchical, multiple, changing, domineering or defeated wills (*volontés*), of which our individuality is only the apparent and temporary theatre.

[Third history:] history of asceticism.

- But in this movement by which we deny ourselves, that which we end up controlling, defeating, and excluding is this will (*volonté*) to truth, it is the fraudulent will (*volonté*) to truth.

Hence, the fact that the whole history of Western truth consists in finally denying the truth.

Fourth [history:] nihilist history.

So we arrive at this result that is ultimately quite complex:

- The will (*vouloir*) to truth is a will (*vouloir*) that does not know (*sait*); so it is a non-will to know (*vouloir connaître*). Radical will (*vouloir*) to illusion.
- However, this will (*vouloir*) to truth historically gives rise to a whole tangle of errors that are all ordered to an effect of knowledge (*connaissance*), and the will (*vouloir*) to truth then becomes, as will (*vouloir*) to error, a will to knowledge (*vouloir de connaissance*).
- And this will to knowledge (*vouloir de connaissance*) as ascetic will (*vouloir*) (to eternity, to reality, to identity) is a will (*vouloir*) to not will (*vouloir*); it is a will (*vouloir*) that ultimately refuses the truth as will (*vouloir*), and the will (*vouloir*) to truth.
- So that knowledge (*connaissance*) that must be read not as nature, law, and reward for a desire to know (*connaître*), but as illusion, must be read as the

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historically real movement by which we have destroyed the truth.<sup>134</sup>

This knowledge (*connaissance*) that would not be subject to the truth (and therefore would not have the form of knowledge (*connaissance*)), but which would nevertheless be an authentic event of knowing (*connaître*), this knowledge (*savoir*) saying the true (and not

<sup>132</sup> The brackets are in the original.

<sup>133</sup> *Idem*.

<sup>134</sup> *Stricken*: "Compared to the event of knowing (*connaître*), the affirmation of the truth is second, unnecessary, and in a sense avoidable. It is then that it is understood what Nietzsche says about a knowledge (*savoir*) that would both be true and escape the truth. It would escape the truth in that it would not affirm identity, eternity, and reality. And it would be true in this that the event of knowledge (*savoir*) which would occur in this way would not carry with it falsification and consequently avoid the effect of knowledge (*connaissance*)."

affirming the truth), this truthful knowledge (*savoir*), Nietzsche sought it successively in three directions.

- a. *In tragic knowledge* (*connaissance*): in the constitution of a philosophy that would deny identity, eternity, and reality. (But it is insufficient: this "true" philosophy is still part of the effect of knowledge (*connaissance*)).
- b. In the perversion of marks, and the putting into play of a diagnostic knowledge (*connaissance*). Return the system of marks (which in classical knowledge (*connaissance*) are used to assimilate, to eternalise, to immobilise) to make it say on the contrary the differences, history, discontinuities, violences.  
This is the use of science and history to destroy the effect of knowledge (*connaissance*).
- c. Finally and above all by the affirmation of the Eternal Return. That is to say:
  - The affirmation that once all the differences are exhausted there will still be this: that each difference will have to be repeated in an infinite number of instants perfectly distinct and different from each other.
  - The affirmation that everything being completed, nothing will remain as it is, nothing will remain since everything will recommence, instant by instant, and an indefinite number of times.
  - Finally, the affirmation that everything is as real or unreal as we are going to will (*voudra*) (the moonlight, the spider on the wall), because it will return indefinitely.

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The affirmation of the Eternal Return is thus very exactly the affirmation which excludes that of the truth.

We understand that the second method to escape the truth (the perversion of marks) was insufficient: because as long as the affirmation of truth that reigned under our system of marks was not radically unraveled, the risk of the truth being reconstructed continued to weigh. [It is not sufficient to return the marks to show that nothing is eternal, is identical, is nothing, is therefore true. This is nihilism.]

This reversal of marks starting from knowledge (*connaissance*) must escape the truth and the effect of knowledge (*connaissance*), by the affirmation of the difference of things multiplied by the infinite difference of time.

The condition for there to be a discourse that does not affirm the true is the affirmation of the Eternal Return. Singular affirmation, which is neither true (of course, since it frees from the truth) nor truthful (since it is a condition of truthfulness). Affirmation that is event, event that will return eternally.

But what is this affirmation, which is not truth, but is a pure event, what is this affirmation that does not hold something "for true" — if not a will (*volonté*)?

The will to power (*volonté de puissance*) itself. But no longer as domination, schematisation, simplification and identification. The will to power (*volonté de puissance*) as will (*volonté*) to the multiple, and to a multiple infinitely multiplied by itself: since the least identity, even the least is multiplied indefinitely by the return.

A will to the true (*volonté du vrai*) appears: it is the will to power (*volonté de puissance*) itself; it is the multiple will (*volonté*) to the multiple; it is the will (*volonté*) to the Eternal Return. Pure event of knowing (*connaître*), which completes nihilism and cuts the history of the world in two.

The first moment of the analysis has shown:

1. that knowledge (*connaissance*) never precedes itself; that it rests, at each instant, on anything other than itself: instincts, impulses;

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2. that among these instincts and impulses, there was no instinct to know (*connaître*); but that these impulses were to laugh, to detest, to master, to dominate;
3. that knowledge (*connaissance*) occurred through a kind of pacification, neutralisation, submission to fraud;<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> These last words are difficult to read.

4. and that consequently, it is necessary to speak of knowledge (*connaissance*) rather than an event of knowing (*connaître*) at the surface of processes which are not of the order of knowledge (*connaissance*).

It is now necessary to analyse this event of knowing (*connaître*).

Respond to four questions:

1. Is it not by a play on words that we speak of an event of knowing (*connaître*)?

What about the subject and the object?

Response: the subject and object relation, the structure of knowledge (*connaissance*) is an effect, an optical illusion in the event of knowing (*connaître*).

2. So what about the truth? Can we speak of knowledge (*connaissance*) without truth?

Response: truth is not that which is given to knowledge (*connaissance*); it is an affirmation in the event of knowing (*connaître*). Falsifying affirmation.

3. What is the will (*volonté*) that then posits this will (*volonté*) to falsifying affirmation?

Response: it is the will to power (*volonté de puissance*) inasmuch as it is the link from which:

- truth and knowledge (*connaissance*) are born,
- proceeds their incompatibility and mutual destruction.

4. Is it still possible to know (*connaître*) (outside of knowledge (*connaissance*)) and to tell the truth, to be truthful (without being subject to the truth)?

[Response:] yes to the extent that the will to power (*volonté de puissance*) is no longer going to will (*voudra*) domination by unity, but dispersion and multiplication in the Eternal Return.

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## II. The truth as affirmation<sup>136</sup>

In the event of knowing (*connaître*) and in the formation of the effect of knowledge (*connaissance*), where is the truth located, and how is the truth arranged?

It is located in the instance of the mark, and in the movement of falsification that is linked to it.

How so?

a. As soon as the same mark is placed on two different events, the history of an identity that falsifies begins. And that falsifies in three ways:

- It imposes on that which is different the violence of a single mark; it wills (*veut*) identity.
- But it falsifies in this other sense that it renders false this difference on which it violently imposes itself; it makes it fall back to the other side, as pure and simple appearance, which comes to shimmer above or below the identity.
- Finally, it falsifies in a third way, by affirming that this mark, thus separated from appearance, is true.

Thus the formation of truth takes place through three falsifications (*Verfälschung*).<sup>137</sup>

b. This falsification that is found with the mark of identity, is found in the same way with the mark of permanence.

As soon as the same mark is destined to last over time, as soon as it is found identical to itself in two separate instants, as soon, consequently, as it is constituted as permanence and designates a permanence, a triple falsification occurs — analogous to the earlier one.

- It imposes permanence on that which is becoming, making it violent, and imposing itself on it by fraud.

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- It rejects outside itself this becoming to which it is violent. It constitutes it as false by rejecting it as illusion.
- Finally, it falsifies in a third way by saying that this non-illusion is true, since it is permanent.

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<sup>136</sup> Foucault writes: "3. The truth and the will (*volonté*)", then corrects the numbering and the title.

<sup>137</sup> *Stricken*: "The first which is fraud and violence. / — The second which is separation of a world from the appearance and constitution of this world as false. / — The third which is the erroneous assertion that the truth is true, because it is identical to itself."

c. Finally, the falsification of the truth plays out in a third way. With the mark of reality. When, on our most intense impressions or emotions, we impose a mark of reality, we again make a triple falsification.

- We make an absolute distinction between them and others, a distinction that makes them do violence.
- We reject everything that is less intense in the unreal, and we constitute a world of falsity.
- And we falsify a third time by [affirming] that this non-unreality is true because it is real.

Thus, by this very game of marks, a truth is constituted defined by identity, eternity, and reality; to this truth we oppose appearance, illusion, and the unreal. However, under each of these three aspects, the truth is falsification: falsification as fraud, falsification as exclusion constituting the false, and falsification as erroneous affirmation.

We can say in sum that under each of its aspects (identity, eternity, reality), the truth is affirmed three times, and each time in a different mode:

- It is constituted in the gesture of assimilation that bears the mark.
- It is constituted a second time by the negation of negation (by the exclusion of something that thereby becomes the negative).
- It is constituted a third time in this (false) assertion that the truth is true (the error is multiplied if we think that the truth in classical theory is impredicative: we cannot claim, says Descartes, or Spinoza, that the truth is true. And yet, Nietzsche replies, the constitution of this impredicative truth is based on this predication that is both impossible — from the classical point of view — and false — from the Nietzschean point of view).

Affirmation, falsification, which culminates in an affirmation.

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We can therefore say, in sum, that the truth is an affirmation. And from there, we can understand an important point:

The truth is not given to knowledge (*connaissance*). It is not its intuitive correlate or formal guarantee.

The truth is a set of affirmations that are at once multiple, linked, and repeated in the event of knowing (*connaître*). It is through this affirmation that the play of marks produces the effect of knowledge (*connaissance*) and singularly that structure of knowledge (*connaissance*) that is the subject-object relation.

We therefore have in total an event of knowing (*connaître*) that involves a play of marks, and across, below these marks, an affirmation of truth (a falsifying affirmation), whose illusory effect is knowledge (*connaissance*) — the subject and object of knowledge (*connaissance*).

The truth-knowledge (*connaissance*) relation is a complex, unequal, wobbly relation that has nothing to do with this belonging by right which was drawn in Aristotle, which was formulated, in its fullest extent, in Spinoza. At the very limit, it must be said that truth and knowledge (*connaissance*) are mutually exclusive, not due to a logical exclusion, but according to a historical relation of domination, destruction — almost persecution and reciprocal injury.

### III.<sup>138</sup> Knowledge (*connaissance*), the truth, and the will to power (*volonté de puissance*)

What, indeed, is the affirmation of the truth? What is this *Verfälschung* as primary fraud?

It is not at all a judgement (true or false). It is a will (*vouloir*). But it is the will (*vouloir*) that there be no difference (will (*vouloir*) to assimilation). It is the will (*vouloir*) that there be no becoming (will (*vouloir*) to permanence). It is the will (*vouloir*) that there not be a multiple chaos of intensities (will (*vouloir*) to reality). It is a negative will (*vouloir*), it is a will (*vouloir*) that... not... And which gives itself as affirmation that there is (permanence, identity, reality). That is where the fraud is. The truth is the affirmative form taken by a negative will (*vouloir*). It is the yes that posits and makes be what is opposed to what we do not will (*veut*); it is the ontological guarantee that there is not what we do not will (*veut*) [there] to be.

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The truth is not the rightful correlation to a will (*volonté*) inscribed in nature in the form of a desire. In short, the truth is not the necessary reward and the guarantee of a desire to know (*connaître*); it is that which is

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<sup>138</sup> Foucault renumbers this section, before "2.", and replaces " the will (*volonté*)" by "and the will to power (*volonté de puissance*)".

voluntarily affirmed, when we do not will (*veut*) there to be difference, becoming, the chaos of divergent intensities.

From there we can understand the origin of this will (*vouloir*) to truth, and its strange historical destination. The origin. As fraud in assimilation, permanence, reality, the will (*vouloir*) to truth is not at all a will to know (*vouloir connaître*), it is a will (*vouloir*) to dominate, it is a will (*vouloir*) to master, it is a will (*vouloir*) to seize, to consume, to retain, to reign. It is a manifestation of the will to power (*volonté de puissance*).

And the whole history of the truth will be the history of this will to power (*volonté de puissance*). [...]<sup>139</sup>

We summarise all this:

In Aristotle, the will to know (*volonté de connaître*) was taken as prerequisite of knowledge (*connaissance*); it was nothing but the delay of knowledge (*connaissance*) in relation to itself; and that is why it was desire, even less than "desire"; it was desire-pleasure (10).

And this was only possible to the extent that knowledge (*connaissance*) (even in the most elementary form of sensation) was already related to the truth.

In Nietzsche, knowledge (*connaissance*) is an illusory effect of the fraudulent affirmation of truth: the will (*volonté*) that carries them both has this double character:

1. of being not at all will to know (*volonté de connaître*), but will to power (*volonté de puissance*);
2. of founding between knowledge (*connaissance*) and truth a relation of reciprocal cruelty and destruction.

The will (*volonté*) is that which says in a double and superposed voice:

I will (*veux*) the truth so much that I do not will (*veux*) to know (*connaître*)

and

I will (*veux*) to know (*connaître*) to this point and to such a limit that I will (*veux*) there to be no more truth.

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The will to power (*volonté de puissance*) is the breaking point where truth and knowledge (*connaissance*) unravel and destroy each other.

### IV. Telling the truth and the Eternal Return<sup>140</sup>

– Such is the history of truth and knowledge (*connaissance*) that it is on the basis of the effect of knowledge (*connaissance*) that the will to truth and truth have been destroyed; whereas, however, knowledge (*connaissance*) exists only as illusory effect produced by the affirmation of truth.

We are now entering a phase in which nihilism is no longer the destination and gradient of Western history; but is in fact becoming our state:

- a knowledge (*connaissance*) that unfolds without truth (without this truth that it has itself killed);
- an effect of knowledge (*connaissance*) that is no longer the effect of anything (the light of a star long since extinguished). This is science;
- such that no one can say if and until when science itself, and this knowledge (*connaissance*) without truth, will last.

What will knowledge (*connaissance*) be if we no longer have the truth? And what use is our asceticism if there is no truth to attain[?]

– But at the same time as this problem arises, another is posed; another that had already been posed a long time ago.

This discourse that Nietzsche holds, this discourse on knowledge (*connaissance*) and truth, where does it come from? If it is a discourse of truth, it is falsifying, and if it is a discourse of knowledge (*connaissance*), it is illusory. In any case, how could it be external to truth and knowledge (*connaissance*) at the same time?

Is it possible to conceive of a knowledge (*savoir*)<sup>141</sup> that would escape the affirmation of truth (without, however, being false) and that would be an event of knowing (*connaître*) (without being caught up in the illusory effect of knowledge (*connaissance*))? This knowledge (*savoir*), as we can see, would be:

- the completion and reversal of nihilism;
- the point from which Nietzsche's own discourse can be held.

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<sup>139</sup> Two pages, initially put here, have been moved further up in the text: see *supra*, pp. 182-183.

<sup>140</sup> Foucault had written "3.", but corrects it to "IV".

<sup>141</sup> *Stricken*: "a truth", then "a discourse of truth".

But it is no doubt necessary to go further.

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Isn't it playing with words to say that knowledge (*connaissance*) is an "effect" in the event of knowing (*connaître*)? And isn't this playing with words in two ways?

- by making knowledge (*connaissance*) an effect in knowing (*connaître*), on the sole pretext that knowledge (*connaissance*) does indeed manifest itself in knowing (*connaître*); and that it is through knowing (*connaître*) that we can reflect on it;
- by speaking of knowing (*connaître*) as if it were an event that could occur out of nothing, and in any case without the prior structure of subject and object. Can we say that "knowing (*connaître*)" occurs if it is not for a subject the act of knowing (*connaître*) an object? But no sooner have we spoken of the subject and object prior to knowing (*connaître*) than we have already reintroduced a whole structure of knowledge (*connaissance*).

It is around the problem of subject and object that the possibility of thought is engaged.

[...]<sup>142</sup> regulator (ideal or real) of the acts by which we come to have knowledge (*connaissance*); it is the result of violent transformations, the series of which is called "knowing (*connaître*)".

2. As for the subject who knows (*connaît*), we can make a symmetrical analysis.<sup>143</sup>

α. What is thought, in fact, if not complex phenomena, of varying intensity and directions, also of heterogeneous origins, of divergent functions, and to which we give marks by language?<sup>144</sup> Thought is made up of bodily movements, nervous discharges, desires, illnesses, actions and reactions, vengeances or dominations; and to this multitude of processes, which is itself based on and intertwined with an even greater multitude still, marks have been given, which are words and grammar. In this way is constituted, as *The Will to Power* says:

"[a] schema and [a] filter by means of which we dilute and simplify the real and extremely

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complex phenomena that compose thought; such that our thought becomes graspable, notable, and communicable by signs" (*The Will to Power* (11)).

β. And the subject as the unity or point of origin of thought can then be no more than a mark — a mark of marks; unity that is obtained by violence and transformation exerted on a multiple, divergent, and heterogeneous thought; unity that consequently faces the object: unity that borrows from the object the schema of causality just as this in turn had been borrowed from the will (*volonté*): unity that is to thought what God is to the world, just as God conversely is only the grammatical subject of the world.<sup>145</sup>

Subject and object are not origin and destination of the mark; they are not its point of departure or its target: but they are constituted as points of intersection and grouping of marks, and marks of marks. The subject is not that which imposes the signs: it is a sign whose signs in turn are affected. And the object is not that which receives the sign: but that which takes shape through the circulation and repetition of signs. And if we call interpretation any new application of a previous system of signs, any redoubling of a play of signs on itself, any attempt to impose new signs on old signs that have become enigmatic again, then we can say that knowing (*connaître*) is interpreting.

"[What in sum is knowledge (*connaissance*)?] It "interprets", it "introduces a sense"... (in most cases, it is a new interpretation of an old interpretation that has become unintelligible and is no more than a sign)" (*The Will to Power* (12)).

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We can summarise all this by saying that, for Nietzsche, the subject-object relation, far from being the condition of possibility or the most general form of the relation of knowledge (*connaissance*), is in reality only an effect of optical symmetry within this series of events that constitutes knowing

<sup>142</sup> Three pages are missing here, which we have not been able to find.

<sup>143</sup> *In the margin*: "thinking subject".

<sup>144</sup> *In the margin*: "Thought."

<sup>145</sup> *In the margin*: "the subject".

(*connaître*). We would not have really eliminated knowledge (*connaissance*), we would not have really given "knowing (*connaître*)" its status as event, if we left in place, behind it, the sovereign relation of subject and object: and if we had to make knowing (*connaître*) the activity proper to a subject in relation to the object.

From all this, we can draw two remarks:

- a. the subject-object relation as it defines knowledge (*connaissance*) is in fact an effect within knowing (*connaître*). It is because there is "knowing (*connaître*)" that the subject and the object, with their relation of knowledge (*connaissance*), come into play as ceaselessly repeated effect, in an event of knowing (*connaître*), where signs are in play.<sup>146</sup>

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#### NOTES

1. This text is found in the chemise of lectures of Michel Foucault at McGill University. These are very fleshed-out notes for a lecture. There are corrections made to the manuscript in Foucault's hand; Foucault very often made such annotations while he was teaching. In addition, the numbering in the top right suggests that this course may have actually been given. However, it does not seem to be one of the three lectures given in April 1971, which is why we place it in an annex. See *infra*, 'Context', pp. 339 ff.

2. It is possible that the text to which Foucault refers here is in F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance, op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre II, §287, p. 286, which is in question a little later on [The text is found in *CW*, vol. 16, 34[252], pp. 74-75 — Tr.].

3. *Ibid.* Foucault does not give this quote in his manuscript, but indicates only the reference. We have thus restored the quote; as for the others (see *supra*, 'Rules for Editing the Text', p. 9), we do not reproduce the multiple italicisations of the published text, which do not necessarily reflect the points that Foucault would have emphasised.

4. F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance, op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre II, §289, pp. 286-287 [See *CW*, vol. 16, 38[2], pp. 156-157 — Tr.].

5. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, § 288, p. 286 [See *CW*, vol. 15, 26[448], p. 249 — Tr.].

6. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, § 290, p. 287 [See *CW*, vol. 16, 1[28], p. 268 — Tr.].

7. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, § 289, p. 286 [*CW*, vol. 16, 38[2], pp. 156-157 — Tr.].

8. Allusion to Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book A, 1, 980a 21-24; see M. Foucault, *Lectures on the Will to Know, op. cit.*, pp. 6 ff.

9. F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance, op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre II, §287, p. 286 ("falsifying apparatus") [*CW*, vol. 16, 34[252], pp. 74-75 — Tr.]; *ibid.*, §289, p. 286 ("masterpiece of falsification").

10. M. Foucault, *Lectures on the Will to Know, op. cit.*, pp. 7-18.

11. F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance, op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre II, §289, p. 286 [*CW*, vol. 16, 38[2], pp. 156-157 — Tr.].

12. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre I, §197, p. 99; the brackets are in the original.

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<sup>146</sup> The manuscript is interrupted here. The rest of this passage has not been found.

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## ANNEX 2

### **[*Status and History of Truth*]**

*The status of the truth. I. The delay of the truth is only a metaphor; A. The truth begins with identity; B. The truth begins with the permanent; C. The truth begins with the real. II. Relation between will to know (volonté de connaître) and will to truth (volonté de vérité); A. Paradox of the history of the truth; Affirmative history of the truth; B. Ascetic history of the truth; C. Nihilist history of the truth.*

At the point we have reached, a number of formidable difficulties are presented (1). Here are some of them:

- If it is true that knowing (*connaître*) is an event that is not supported by any prior structure of knowledge (*connaissance*); if knowing (*connaître*) does not refer to a certain relation of subject [and] object, but to an event where it is a question of the mark, violence, and will (*volonté*), in what sense can we still speak of knowing (*connaître*)? Does using such a word still make sense, where there is no more room, it seems, for the truth?
- And immediately a new problem arises: what, in these conditions, of the truth?

Because, from two things, we must select one:<sup>147</sup>

- Either we admit that a certain truth reigns below or beyond the event of knowing (*connaître*) and its perspective — a truth that, far from revealing, it dodges and masks. But then, from where can we speak of it? And what allows access to [it,] since it is not knowledge (*connaissance*)?
- Or there is no truth; and at that moment, by what right can we speak of knowing (*connaître*)? And in what is this event

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distinguished from will (*vouloir*), desire, domination, possession?

And from there, a new wave of questions is approaching: what, then, is this discourse that we are holding, and holding precisely on knowledge (*connaissance*)? A true discourse? But then, one must give a status at least to this truth. A discourse of knowledge (*connaissance*)? But from what right can it speak, and as if in retreat, of any knowledge (*connaissance*) at all? What is its right to speak?

Now, these questions must be answered; because, if we let the truth lurk all around this event of knowing (*connaître*), it is something like an ideal knowledge (*connaissance*), or a divine understanding, or an absolute intelligence that we will restore; and the theme of an event of knowing (*connaître*), which would not be act of a knowledge (*connaissance*), this theme will immediately wither: and we will find that theme of the finite, limited, partial character of knowledge (*connaissance*), the theme of its relativity. And the theory of knowledge (*connaissance*) will be renewed once again, in the form of scepticism, positivism, or critique.

*1. It is indeed the truth that is in question in knowledge (connaissance).*

But it is still necessary to understand in what manner it is a question of the truth in knowing (*connaître*). Certainly not in the mode where the truth would be there, prior to any knowledge (*connaissance*), both discovered and veiled for it and by it. But doubtless not in the mode of a division or a delay either. It can only be in the mode of metaphor that we can say that after knowing (*connaître*) comes the truth, and that the truth would only be an episode in the history of knowing (*connaître*).

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<sup>147</sup> [That's my best attempt at translating 'Car de deux choses l'une' in this context. If you have anything better, let me know — Tr.]

"It is only very late... that the truth arises, this least effective of the forms of knowledge (*connaissance*)" (*The Joyful Science* (2)).

The truth is neither before nor after knowing (*connaître*). They are in a relation of simultaneity: but this relation of simultaneity is not a relation of correlation, complementarity, accomplishment. It's about something entirely other. What?

a. The truth begins with identity. As soon as we place the same mark on two different events; as soon as we place the first mark on the first event, and

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then go on to find it, then begins the history of the truth: that is, the history of an identity that falsifies the different begins. And falsifies it in two ways: by imposing on that which is different the violence of a single mark; and on the other hand by asserting this difference as pure and simple appearance above the true identity.

b. The truth begins with the permanent. As long as the mark is destined to remain and to find itself identical to itself, it brings with it a "falsification". In two senses, again: it imposes on becoming the violence of a durable mark; and it makes becoming appear as false difference from the truth that endures.

c. The truth begins with the real. That is to say: as soon as, in becoming, a difference is intense enough and we react to it strongly enough that it is thus marked, as by its own force, then we assert it as real. We impose this falsifying supplement on it to consider it as the only real, among so many other differences that we consider illusory.

""True": for feeling, that which most strongly moves the sensitivity (the "me");

For thought, that which gives thought the greatest feeling of force;

For touch, sight, hearing, that which requires the strongest resistance from them.

Thus, the object that provokes the most lively activity on our part is the one that we believe is "true", that is to say, real. The feeling of force, struggle, resistance, persuades us that there is a *thing* we resist" (*The Will to Power* (3)).

We therefore see that the truth is, from the outset, linked to knowing (*connaître*). No doubt, truth<sup>148</sup> is out of time by relation to knowing (*connaître*), since it is not truth which makes knowing (*connaître*) possible; and it is not to it, the truth, that knowing (*connaître*) the truth is addressed. Much more, it is in the play of knowing (*connaître*) that the truth arises: not in front of knowing (*connaître*), in relation to it or for it; but in it, in its game, in its interstices; it is dispersed throughout the event of knowing (*connaître*). Truth is therefore historically secondary to knowing (*connaître*) in this sense. And we understand why *The Joyful*

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*Science* could speak of the delay of the truth, and its very imperfect character as means of knowledge (*connaissance*).

But in another sense, the truth is not so behind knowing (*connaître*) [since] it is from the first marks registered by knowing (*connaître*) that the truth is installed in the middle of knowledge (*connaissance*). The will to know (*vouloir connaître*) is immediately a position of truth. Truth is therefore not, for Nietzsche, the correlate of knowledge (*connaissance*): it is the affirmation scattered in the very heart of knowing (*connaître*). If knowing (*connaître*) is an event, the truth is the affirmation that unfolds in it.

Such is doubtless the sense that must be given to the text: "The very first intellectual activity is a kind of affirmation. From the beginning we "take as true". Explain how this way of "taking as true" was born. What is the sense behind the word "true"?" (*The Will to Power* (4)). See also [the text from] *The Will to Power* [on the "principle of contradiction"] (important (5)).

From this relation between truth and knowledge (*connaissance*), we can immediately conclude:

– First, that truth is produced, as we have seen, by a "falsification": it is established when unity is substituted for difference, the lasting to becoming, the real to the intense. It is displacement, transformation, as well as metaphor. This is why truth as falsification is constantly revived by language, which is also displacement and metaphor.

– Then, that the truth is that by which a falsification is produced, that is, a certain division between an identical essence (considered as true) and a variable surface (considered as appearance), an

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<sup>148</sup> [In this passage Foucault refers to both truth and knowing (*connaître*) as 'it'. In French the former is feminine and the latter masculine, such that they have different versions of the word 'it' ('elle' and 'il', respectively). This distinction, which allows the reader to follow which is being referenced, is lost in English, so I replace the term 'it' by the appropriate noun where necessary — Tr.]

eternity (true) and a change (illusory), a reality (true) and impressions (lies). It is the truth that, in the fundamental division it establishes, makes appearance, illusion, lie fall outside of itself.

It is by the truth that there is appearance, illusion, lie. But it is by falsification that there is truth. The root and condition of the truth is a falsification, which has the effect of the false in these three forms of appearance, illusion, and lie.<sup>149</sup>

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We can see in these conditions that truth is not symmetrical to error, that the true is not distinguished from the false according to a pertinent opposition. The opposition of true and false is asymmetrical, wobbly, offbeat; it is not isotopic.

On the one hand, it is around and starting from the affirmation of truth that the false is distributed; and not even the false in general, but these excluded and devalued elements that are the illusory, the lie, the apparent. It is the affirmation of the truth that produces such divisions. The construction of the category of the false occurs only after, above these divisions, as if to catch up with them and put them face to face with the truth. It is only then that it is possible to divide any assertion between the true and the false.

But on the other hand, this truth, from which errors are distributed, we saw that it was an affirmation. However, of this affirmation, we cannot say that it is true since it is that from which any assertion can be said to be true. It cannot be said to be false either, at least in the sense in which a judgement is false. However, we must examine what is said in this affirmation: it is said not that something is true, but that the truth exists, that there is something like the truth. Affirmation that is founded on nothing but the negation of becoming, the erasure of difference, the levelling of intensities.

That which is the basis for the affirmation of the true is obviously not a truth, it is also not an error, it is a refusal, a negation: a will (*vouloir*) to... *not*. Will (*vouloir*) it not to become; will (*vouloir*) it not to be infinitely differentiated, will (*vouloir*) it not always to be dispersed and divergent singularities. We therefore understand:

- a. why the truth is characterised by Nietzsche as falsification, and it would probably be better to translate *Verfälschung* by fraud, alteration, adulteration. This is a way of translating the "...not" element of the will (*vouloir*) to not.<sup>150</sup>

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It is a way to bring out the negation that is at the heart of the affirmation of truth.

b. We also understand why Nietzsche can speak at once of the truth as affirmation and negation, at the very limit as error; and as something willed (*voulu*). Why he can speak of a will (*volonté*) to truth, which would at the same time be the will (*volonté*) to the deepest error.

But then, the question arises of what the relations between the will to know (*volonté de connaître*) and the will (*volonté*) to truth are. What is willed (*voulu*) first and fundamentally: the event of knowing (*connaître*), or the affirmed truth?

Is it because fundamentally the truth is affirmed that the effect of knowing (*connaître*) is sought?

Or is it because knowing (*connaître*) is the desired event that the true is affirmed?

2. *It is through their reciprocal and entangled history that one can respond to this question.*

- a. The first paradox to note concerns the history of truth. It is not in order to know (*connaître*) that man posits the truth. He posits the truth in order to live. He posits the truth to subsist as individual and as species. He posits the truth to master chaos.

"The greatest uncertainty, a kind of chaos must have reigned originally, it took long periods of time before all this was *fixed* by heredity. People whose perceptions of distance, light, colours, etc., were essentially different, were ousted and could hardly perpetuate their species. It is likely that for thousands of years, this divergent form of impressions has been

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<sup>149</sup> *Stricken*: "At the limit, can we say that the truth is false? No doubt, this would not make much sense: and it is no more possible to say in the Nietzschean mode that the truth is false, than it is possible to say in the Cartesian mode that the truth is true. / It would be better to say, at least provisionally, something like this: the truth is not that which opposes error; it is that around which error is distributed: that which is incited by its [...]."

<sup>150</sup> [The French reads: "l'élément « ne... pas » du vouloir ne pas." That which is expressed in English by the word "not" is expressed in French by placing the words "ne" and "pas" on either side of the thing being denied. For example, when English says "this is not", French would say "ce n'est pas". I have tried to approximate the "ne...pas" structure by "... not" — Tr.]

felt and avoided as "madness"... From the origin of organic life, an unprecedented cruelty has eliminated everything that "felt differently". — Science is perhaps only an extension of this process of elimination..." (*The Will to Power* (6)).

Or again: "The truth is a kind of error, failing which a certain kind of living being could not

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live. That which decides in the last resort is its value for life" (*The Will to Power* (7)).

Truth is therefore in the order of life. The more vigorous and demanding it is, the stronger, more binding, and heavier the truth thus imposed will be. But in the same [blow,] the more one advances in the path of this falsification, this fraud-lie that takes with it the "will (*vouloir*) that this does not change", the "will (*vouloir*) that this not be different" proper to the will (*volonté*) to truth. We therefore sink into this negation that the affirmation of truth then ceases to denounce and distribute as illusion, appearance, lie, error. In the steps of the truth, error never ceases to simmer and thicken.

Under the "true" world, under the historically constituted world of the truth runs a whole interweaving of errors. And the more this need for truth carried by life rises, the deeper the pyramid of errors that supports it becomes (see *The Will to Power* (8)).

So much so that the proposition "flaw of the truth, some living beings could not live" (*The Will to Power* (9)) also becomes the proposition: "the illusion and the will (*volonté*) to make illusion,... non-truth are part of the conditions of man's existence" (*The Will to Power* (10)). The truth is throughout history a multiplier of errors.

b. This is why the will (*volonté*) to truth will be relaunched from itself, and it will write, as if in superimposition by relation to this tissue of multiplied errors, an entirely other history.

We now know (*connaissons*) how to pinpoint this error: it is the fact that the truth by affirming itself distributes around it the system of errors that allows it to denounce, in return, as falsification its own conditions of possibilities, and the set of operations on which it rests. Therefore, the truth, working in a way on itself, must expel the errors that form the basis of its own affirmation. It will therefore have to deny the will (*volonté*) that posits it; and in the name of the truth of what it affirms, it will have to punish the fact that it is an affirmation outside of all truth.

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This punishment takes several aspects:

— Separating truth from the will (*vouloir*): and positing it in an ideal sky where it exists at all times. It therefore no longer has anything to do with life. Much more, in its eternity and ideality, it is what is most contrary to life; it is the principle in the name of which life is devalued.

"The true world... is a cause due to which we suspect and deprecate the world that we are; it is our most dangerous attack on life" (*The Will to Power* (11)).

— Between this truth thus separated and the will (*vouloir*), there can only be a link in the form of obligation. The truth is no longer what we want (*veut*), or rather it is no longer a will (*vouloir*); it is a duty. No longer an affirmation, but a law. It imposes itself from the exterior, as obligation to accept, ceasing to be will (*volonté*) to affirm.

"The belief that the world that should be is, really exists, is a belief of the unproductive, who do not seek to create a world as it should be. They posit it as present... will (*volonté*) to truth — as impotence of the will (*volonté*) to create" (*The Will to Power* (12)).

— And what will be the law that will be imposed in this way to chase from the truth the very error that made it possible? This law will be that of the hunted contradiction: to think only one thing at a time, to always think the same thing, to think that things remain the same, to think that everyone thinks the same way. In short, this law can be read in two ways:

— As logical law of non-contradiction: "In not contradicting yourself, you will not deceive."

— And as moral law of the excluded lie: "It is by not seeking to deceive that you will be sure not to deceive."

Thus begins to unfold — I was going to say above the first, but we should say rather interwoven with it — a second history of truth. Moral and ascetic history

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of truth. History of a truth separated from the body, history of a truth turned against all power of affirmation; history of a truth responsible for correcting all individual singularity; history of a truth which is given as eternal ideality and place of a communication without secret.

On all this, see *The Will to Power* (13): "... one then needed to involve a *moral category*: no being can be mistaken, no being must deceive: as a result there is a general will to know (*volonté générale de connaître*) the true. ...

The principle of contradiction provides the framework: the true world, whose path is sought, cannot be in contradiction with itself, cannot change, cannot become, has no beginning or end."

Here we have the principle that explains how and why truth is ascetic in relation to itself. How and why logic is the instrument of this asceticism. How and why the principle of contradiction has a moral root.

"This absolute will (*volonté*) to truth is... the faith in the ascetic ideal itself" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (14)).

To this "affirmative" history of truth overlaps and is enchain the "ascetic" history of the truth.

c. But this ascetic history cannot remain stable in itself. Because its determination to find, in any affirmation of truth, everything that can hide there of contradiction, bias, desire, singular will (*volonté*), this relentlessness means that all truth is finally rejected and excluded.

The asceticism that seemed to bear upon the extrinsic conditions of the truth, the accidents that surround [it], or the errors that compromise it, finally bears upon the truth itself. Truth discovers that it is only an affirmation, and that consequently this truth (eternal, motionless, logical) that seemed to be affirmed and that was, in fact, historically affirmed, this truth does not exist.

– The discovery that truth does not exist (or rather the discovery that it is *true* that truth does not exist) is the singular point of modern thought.

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"There are certain things that we know (*savons*) too well, now... this bad taste, this will (*volonté*) to attain the truth, "the truth at all costs", this adolescent mania in the love of truth — all this does not matter to us anymore: we are too experienced, too serious, too hardened, too deep... We no longer believe that the truth remains the truth, when the veil is torn away..." (*Nietzsche contra Wagner* (15)).

– But this discovery or belief, which breaks out today, this affirmation that there is no truth, has already traversed the Western world more or less secretly. It was already at work since the origin. It is nothing more than the immense gradient of nihilism that has guided our history and that today reaches its formulation.

"The belief that there is no truth, the nihilist belief, is a great relaxation of all limbs for the champion of knowledge (*connaissance*) who is constantly struggling with ugly truths. Because the truth is ugly" (*The Will to Power* (16)).

– This great history of truth discovering that the truth does not exist is the one recounted in *Twilight of the Idols*, in six successive phases, which are like so many stages in the retreat and then the vanishing of the truth (17).

– The true world [is] accessible to the sage: "Me, Plato, I am the truth."

– The true world is inaccessible now, but it is promised elsewhere and later to the piety of the man who will do penance: Christianity.

– The true world is no longer even a world that can be promised in the future and in a transfigured reality: it is definitively inaccessible — existing only as regulatory idea for knowledge (*connaissance*), and imperative for morality: Kant.

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– The true world whose very unknowability (*inconnaisseabilité*) cannot be known (*connue*) or proven. It carries with it no obligation: Positivism.

– Finally, the true world is completely useless — and "by the same token refuted": "Clear day; first meal; return of good sense and cheerfulness; Plato blushes with shame and all free spirits make a din of the devil" (*Twilight of the Idols* (18)).

There is still a sixth phase. But it must be left aside for an instant.

We therefore have three histories of truth that overlap: one is the affirmative history of truth; the other, the ascetic history of truth, the third, the nihilist history of truth. None, as we see, is confused with the history of truths, things, judgements or propositions that are admitted to be true. Because in these three histories

it is a matter of the will (*volonté*) to truth in its form, in its direction, in the divisions it makes, in the point that it turns against itself. It is the history of the will (*volonté*) to truth in its power of affirmation and in its belligerence with itself.

But no doubt it is dangerous to suggest that these three histories overlap as if they were of different levels, and as if each had its autonomy. They are in fact absolutely in solidarity with each other; and at each moment they can be found implicated in each other. For the first affirmation of a truth as lasting and real identity is already the ascetic gesture by which we exclude or repress the singularity of energy, the affirmation of difference, the vivacity of becoming (and suddenly, the ascetic history of truth has already begun); it is also already the gesture by which we begin to separate appearance from truth, by which we begin to suspect the non-true everywhere, and by which the non-true begins to gain indefinitely on this true that is posited at the same time as it (and suddenly the nihilist history begins).

Now it is in this braiding of the three histories of truth that the relation of the will (*volonté*) to truth with knowing (*connaître*) and the will to know (*volonté de connaître*) can finally be analysed.

How does Nietzsche come out of the Aristotelian spiral that before knowledge (*connaissance*) placed a natural desire to know (*connaître*), but before

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this desire, and to found it, placed anew the preliminary of knowledge (*connaissance*)?

Bu that which renders necessary this preliminary of knowledge (*connaissance*) by relation to desire, and that which, inversely, renders possible that knowledge (*connaissance*) gives a place to desire, is the belonging of truth and knowledge (*connaissance*).

The Nietzschean analysis of the will to knowledge (*volonté de savoir*) consists simultaneously in unmaking the Aristotelian spiral, erasing the preliminary of a knowledge (*connaissance*) always anticipating itself, and evading the belonging by right of knowledge (*connaissance*) and truth.

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#### NOTES

1. This text is in the McGill University chemise. It is the second part of a lecture or a preparatory work for a lecture. The text is fleshed-out, well written, unnumbered, and does not seem to have been given because there are no corrections to the manuscript. It may therefore be the first draft of a lecture or a preparatory work. Since this work does not seem to be part of the three conferences given at McGill, we have placed it in an annex. See *infra*, 'Context', pp. 339 ff.

2. F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §110, *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), p. 96; OCFN, t. VIII, 1942, p. 164; CW, vol. 6, p. 119.

3. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre I, §119, p. 73.

4. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre I, §101, p. 67. Foucault writes "the sense", although the published text indicates "the sensation" in the last sentence: "What is [the sense/sensation] behind the word "true"?" We reproduce Foucault's reworking in his manuscript.

5. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre I, §115, pp. 71-72.

6. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, §115, p. 233.

7. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, §308, p. 292.

8. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, livre III, §624, p. 189.

9. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre II, §308, p. 292. Foucault reworks this passage, which he had already quoted verbatim *supra*, to present it as principle.

10. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, livre III, §586, p. 180: "Considering becoming, we realise that illusion and the will (*volonté*) to make illusion, that *non-truth* have been part of the conditions of man's existence; it is necessary to lift this veil."

11. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, livre I, §212(B), p. 106.

12. *Ibid.*, in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-195 (*Nietzsche's Werke*, *op. cit.*, t. XVI, p. 84) [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, *op. cit.*, p. 192 — Tr.].

13. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, livre I, §211, p. 104. Foucault writes "can", rather than "wants" ("no being wants to be wrong, no being should deceive"). We retain Foucault's modification.

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14. *Id.*, *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §24, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 264; CW, vol. 8, p. 339.

15. *Id.*, *Nietzsche contre Wagner*, 'Épilogue', §2, OCFN, t. XII, 1942, p. 81; CW, vol. 9, p. 407.

16. *Id.*, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, livre III, §330, p. 107.
17. *Id.*, *Twilight of the Idols*, 'How the "True World" Finally Became a Fable', §1-6, *CW*, vol. 9, pp. 62-63.
18. *Ibid.*, §5, *OCFN*, t. XII, 1942, p. 109; *CW*, vol. 9, p. 63.

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FOURTH PART

***Works on Nietzsche***

*From the first half of the 1950s*

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## WORKS ON NIETZSCHE

### ***Philosophy***

"To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) may be part of the foundation of Being"; *Philosophy and exegesis; Metaphysics of the will* (*vouloir*); *Metaphysics of the will* (*volonté*); *Hegel, Hölderlin, Nietzsche; German philosophy; Hegel and Nietzsche; Repetition; Philosophy, language, and image; Wilhelm Meister, Zarathustra and the Bildung*.

[*"TO PERISH BY ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE (CONNAISSANCE)  
MAY BE PART OF THE FOUNDATION OF BEING"* (1)]

To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) may [even] be part of the foundation of Being. All Western philosophy has approached — more or less — from the very centre of this sentence; as if it contained its heart, its centre of gravity, and yet what always keeps it at a distance, since it is in the space that it spares itself in relation to this sentence that it unfolds its discourse in all its magnitude.

A sentence that means many things: that there can be no absolute knowledge (*connaissance*); that there is in absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) something which stinks<sup>151</sup> of death; that this death linked to absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) comes from far away, not from knowledge (*connaissance*), not from the one who knows (*connaît*), not from what is known (*connu*), but paradoxically from what is not open to knowledge (*connaissance*) — the fundamental — and from what is not subject to death — the foundation of being. Such that to know (*savoir*) what this sentence means, it would be necessary to reach, by knowledge (*connaissance*), this foundation that precisely finds its death, and to be there at this point where it illuminates its own disappearance, where, accessing that which finds it, it dies by the blow and the law of this foundation which is its own. This sentence

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can only ever remain at the end of philosophical language, circling its borders — or rather showing that it is philosophical language which revolves around its stubborn fixity.

To tell the truth, this sentence could serve as a law for a critical thought, or a mystical experience, or a dialectical language. Everything that philosophises, and the very possibility of philosophising, is subject to the fatality it designates. And the very approach that one can develop towards it is no exception.

It emphasises the importance in philosophy of knowledges (*connaissances*) in the movement of their disappearance: of these knowledges (*connaissances*) that are not knowledges (*connaissances*) of themselves. That there is no ground in critique, that there is no dialectical discourse without the laughter that interrupts it, that philosophy is no longer a discourse, but experiences that are at once illuminating and dead.

To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) may [even] be part of the foundation of Being.

This text says first, at the surface of the words, the distance of knowledge (*connaissance*) and being, the void that is dug out when they head towards one another, and that Orphic fading that occurs when, one serving as blind guide to the other, they walk towards the impossibility of their common illumination; that same illumination from whence they come — beyond death and the triple river which rings the place of their actual-yet-forbidden encounter. Distance which neither designates a milepost nor calls for the survey of a critique, but which is in fact birthed from the movement of knowing (*connaître*), which finds in this

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<sup>151</sup> [A more literal translation would give this word as 'strikes', but the idiom wouldn't work in English with this sentence structure, so I have rendered it more liberally as 'stinks' — Tr.]

movement its space and its place, the possibility of opening and stretching indefinitely: because nothing is more foreign to knowledge (*connaissance*) than profanation, but nothing is more essential to it than a slight, than an imperceptible detour that has already inflected its steps even before it began to walk. Knowledge (*connaissance*) has, from its awakening, from this troubled point where it knows (*connait*) *nothing*, but where in the absolute it knows (*connait*), knowledge (*connaissance*) has already detached its eyes from the community panicking with being, where blood flows and circulates, without limits, across all limits, horror. Into this turn, the detour has slipped a white space by which it is stated (*énonce*) that a "representation" can be given: and it is necessary to leave in its indecision the sense of the word "aesthetics" where philosophers bury both the abstract concept of beauty and the need for a primary passivity; some

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thing will be represented that is sensory plenitude, infinite reserve of colours and lines, mornings and evenings; then the great panicked tremor can be silenced under the immobile beauty of the mask. "It is beautiful to look upon things, but terrible to be them" (*Écrits et Essais de 1873-1876* (2)). Not that the gaze dresses things, and that through it they exert a fascination that petrifies, penetrating through frozen eyes, a gaping mouth, a whole *Medusa-ed* body, their secret horror; but in a more morning (*matinale*) way, the terror of being things opens in its night the possibility of the detour, the light of the gaze, the distance that puts them before it, and the mute language of their originary beauty.

Knowledge (*connaissance*) is thus linked to something which is not foreign to the essence of theatre, to the beauty, offered to the gaze, of a being presented in its terrifying power: and perhaps it is all only a mode of this theatrical experience which gives itself to sight by presenting masks, which draws the face of beauty by dodging the terrors before the gaze. Beyond all possible memory, the human beast knows (*connait*) only because there has been theatre. The words *Vorstellung* and representation, by which philosophers designate here and there the primary element of knowledge (*connaissance*), are those which designate equally well the active moment, the ritual moment of the theatre: the one marks above all that which it puts forward and by which it covers as much as it shows — and doubtless it shows even this; the other marks more its trait of iteration, its capacity to be re-say or reconstitute which is equally its incapacity, marked from the very beginning of the play, to be the absolute contemporary of the dawn. A distance at the very core of this play of the mask which renders the face more visible and closer, a cleave in time at the very core of the movement which, to infinity, repeats, affects knowledge (*connaissance*) with an essential retreat from being — a retreat that space and duration never cease to exploit in the very interior of knowledge (*connaissance*) and of that which it knows (*connait*).

No doubt it is not possible for knowledge (*connaissance*) to say more about itself, nor to go back higher in its genealogy, than it can escape by the Greek word which identifies "knowing" (*savoir*) and "having seen" (*eidenai*).<sup>152</sup> No primacy is given to perception or experience. What is denounced is the

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kinship of knowledge (*connaissance*) and the spectacle, this distance at the interior of that which we see that makes it so that we only see it by having seen it — therefore no longer seeing it, or only seeing it rendered visible by this absence that offers it by already dodging it: in short, its link with the mask. In this sense, Platonism aims at the essential in knowledge (*connaissance*) when it presents it as memory and the indispensable fall of time. But it misdirects attention away from that which is fundamental when it sees allusion to a contemplation [of ideas],<sup>153</sup> to a happiness beyond the sky towards which it tries, with neither feathers nor wings, to go. That which knowledge (*connaissance*) indispensably designates as anterior to itself is the space which opens to it, the distance disposed to it, the detour by which it turns its face and raises its mask. What precedes it is that which is repeated in the repetition of the theatre, without it ever having manifested itself there for the first time and in its original purity, without it ever being able to accomplish it either.

Because knowledge (*connaissance*) offers the dream of total representation as if it could find there the panicked movement from which it has turned away — or rather turning away from which has allowed it to be. But the great panicked fusion before knowledge (*connaissance*) is not totality, nor even the delirious dream of an impossible totality: these are nothing else, in the very interior of knowledge (*connaissance*), than the mechanism by which, by projecting a circle in front of it, it tries to erase the gap that made it

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<sup>152</sup> [This latter is Foucault's insertion — Tr.]

<sup>153</sup> Conjecture.

possible. "Let us be on our guard against thinking that the world is a living being...that the universe is a machine...Let us be on our guard against saying that there are laws of nature...The shadows of God darken true being" (3). The cry: "the great Pan is dead" which resounded so profoundly at the end of Antiquity, dazzling, it would seem, Hellenic happiness, and announcing at the same time the birth of a new God who was also dead, but to live from the endless life of the survivors, perhaps it was not, for the Greek world, the word of the end; it was rather the word of the beginning; the language that announced tragedy and knowledge (*connaissance*) in the same rift (*The Birth of Tragedy* (4)). Again, this beginning could only be stated (*énoncé*), and as a novelty, at the moment

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when it ended, that is, when knowledge (*connaissance*) had attained this point of the perfect curve which led it to pure reflection: the death of Pan does not speak (*dit*) the recent catastrophe of a god who we will no longer know (*connaître*), but this constant, uninterrupted, and absolutely original event by which all knowledge (*connaissance*) was made possible, and this singularly, that Pan himself is dead. And in this curve where the destiny of Greek thought is accomplished to the point of fulfilment, the presence of an absent god is manifested, the death of a god who does not die, his resurrection in eternity. The announcement of the death of Pan is, in its cry, limit-speech (*la parole-limite*): in the ears of the ancient world, it made resound its death and its beginning, and its re-beginning in a Christianity which is completed and rejected in death. It is at once the speech of the division and the first word of the dialectic, doubtless the base<sup>154</sup> of all philosophical discourse: this, in its original sense, will only be commentary.

In this simple, declarative speech, welded to the absolute of an event and its now irretrievable fatality, philosophical language finds both the sentence that initiates it and the one that closes it: but, even more, the very field of its exercise is entirely circumscribed: it finds the model of its critical use — the hard statement (*énoncé*) of the limit, and the model of its dialectical possibilities, with the indefinite chain of all the reborn gods. Still, these two uses are dissociated only for us, that is, for those who have heard the absolute cry resound, and have been able precisely to hear it in two ways. But for those who were lodged in the interior of this death of Pan, without having been driven away from it by the word that proclaims it, for those who spoke in the hollow of this death not yet stated (*énoncée*), philosophical language was the commentary of this silent sentence, and the commentary undivided between declaration and promise, between the revelation of death and the prediction of a new tomorrow. That was the sophistic speech.

Socrates, basically, never departed from the sophists. And how could he have done so? Since they drew up the birth certificate of philosophy while meeting it at the crossroads of its impossibility. They took the language where it was and have nothing but the fact that it says nothing. *Ouden legeis* (5). You don't say anything. And whatever

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this young man, Socrates, says, he will be refuted. That is to say that the sophistic language, in its dialogued discussion, leads to its own death, to the discovery that we say nothing, that this proposition leads nowhere, and that its contrary leads nowhere else, that we stayed in place, but that we discovered in this place that each word was equivalent to any other, therefore nothing, and that the great panicked fusion of language in the discussion proclaimed only that Pan is dead. Sophistic language reaches from itself to laughter, which is then its only truth and end: laughter does not indicate so much the moment when language breaks and renounces itself for this noisy silence; but the moment when it joins its principle, reaches what it is from top to bottom, and maintains itself, for an instant but forever, in the impossible and necessary unity of limit and promise, critique and dialectics, in the awareness that we must not mourn the death of Pan since the gods will be reborn, and that we must not mourn the fatal rebirth of the gods, since all, fortunately, are promised the destiny of Pan, who from the bottom of time, from the bottom of the origin envelops them. One can find nothing which would be further from the laughter of the sophists than Socratic irony: irony, which pretends not to know (*savoir*) yet, because it knows (*sait*) well that it will know (*saura*), and that it will know (*saura*) it precisely because it already knows (*sait*), establishes a game with time where nothing is serious: neither the time that is already there, nor the language that is nothing more than the instrument. On the contrary, the laughter that silences language and suspends it in the instant gives it, as well as time, the seriousness of philosophy. In the tears which are said to accompany it in heaven, the announcement of the death of Pan responds to the laughter of the identification between Christ and Dionysus, that laughter in which Nietzsche's philosophy was killed and fulfilled (6). The tears

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<sup>154</sup> [The word 'fond', translated here as 'base', is the root of 'fondamentale', which I translate as 'fundamental' — Tr.]

show that limit speech (*parole limite*) is experienced as separation, the laughter that it is experienced in communication.

But in a communication that is neither dialectical continuity nor panicked community, but a solitary form of sovereignty: something, no doubt, that from the side of thought and language looks like intoxication (7).

There are three close experiences: the dream, intoxication, and unreason. They are not superposable, despite the confusion in which we

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usually muddle them, as if all three of them would only form various aspects of that same and impalpable night which is opposed to the discourse of reason. One day it will be necessary to try to distinguish them as accurately as possible — for the moment it suffices to mark in the dream the appearance of that private and singular world of which Heraclitus spoke, and in it the birth of a whole flowering of images according to the laws of a space which is very fundamental and very close to the originary powers of expression: in this sense, the dream is indeed the visible continuity of existence, the colourful, dramatic, and uninterrupted form even in the eve before and even by the most applied of thoughts, of everything in existence which advances towards expression: the dream, as well, is not a product of the night, but of the morning and the passage to the day; it is what is most primitive and also closest to its essence in the Apollonian. The sun that illuminates all real things, all acute forms, all beautiful, tangible stones, is also, by this very fact, the god of the dream with the uninterrupted chain of its shining images. Unreason, on the other hand, has only the opposite existence: it is to reason like night to day; it forms the experience of that which is radically other. Or rather, there is not, there cannot be direct, plain, immediate experience of unreason; for it exists only in its difference from reason; it is always already captured by reason, such that the separation, which it essentially designates, links it, without possible separation, to that to which it is opposed; it is submitted to the simple and yet paradoxical definition of the limit: existing at the exterior only to the extent that a line has been traced from the interior; further, this line could only define the interior that it circumscribes by already designating outside itself, etc.: to tell the truth there is never any separation of reason and unreason, but always of the bottom of their existence, this double existence.

Intoxication is neither this nor that, neither dream nor unreason, neither Apollonian experience nor limit of the night. But the whirl in which the limit is manifested and dissolved: incommunicable experience of communication, where all real forms glitter in the liquid element of the image, but of an image which is, in its base at least, absolutely different from that of the dream: the image of intoxication has the sense of sinking, not to approach the fundamental

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or to let it approach, but to push it further away, to discover little by little that it is not supported by any platform or rock, but that the absolute of distance opens in it, and to infinity. The whirl proper to intoxication, to all intoxication, this play of distances abolished and multiplied, things which enter disproportionately through the eyes, then through the pupils like a vibratory torrent to get lost at the extreme or rather not to get lost but to be saved to infinity in the ocean of a space which is distended in each instant without ever bursting, and then suddenly disappear and appear anew, as if by the effect of a shutter as gigantic as the world and as minuscule as an eyelid, all this doubtlessly indicates that intoxication reveals that there is nothing of base (*fond*) in the fundamental, but that this absence of base that denounces the deep spirits in their abyssal dialectics is already visible and magnified at the surface of that which is most superficial: in the oscillation of the intoxicated image. Intoxication is neither deep like the dream, nor fundamental like unreason. It is neither *Tiefsinn* nor *Wahnsinn*.<sup>155</sup> It is precisely at the level of the shallows (*bas-fond*). "There are thinkers who push their heads into the swamp: which should be a sign neither of depth nor of profound thought! They are good diggers for the shallows" (*Dawn* (8)). The head in the swamp, there, in the sludge where the feet slowly sink, we see without seeing this soft and baseless earth; we see where we rest without rest, where we advance without progress or end, where we are born and where we die, over which infinite distance we are perched, on the surface of that base without base. It is there, in that swamp where the head is level with the soil, where the farthest is the closest, where thought makes a circle, where we see blurrily.

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<sup>155</sup> *Tiefsinn*: depth; *Wahnsinn*: madness.

Intoxication accumulates in its spiral the gesture of transgression that crosses and the circle that bends to its origin. It is both the passage to the other side, the forbidden limit since crossed,<sup>156</sup> but manifested by this crossing, and the absolute return to the same, the repetition in the place and instant of the origin. In intoxication, things shatter by staying where they are — where they are from the base of time that shows its obstinate solidity in this very flight, but just as well the impossibility of ever joining it.

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Intoxication is an experience which prowls the confines of knowledge (*connaissance*) — perhaps the only one which is capable of apprehending that which, in the immediate, could be a limit, which is capable of granting knowledge (*connaissance*) in the closest of its sensory beauties, and of withdrawing it to a horrifying distance. It makes in a unique and dazzling contact the beautiful moment that offers things to the gaze, and the terror of being these things, thus reconstructing, at the core of time, and in an inverted image, that first moment, out of time, when the detour of knowledge (*connaissance*) was emerging: "It is beautiful to look upon things, [but] terrible to be them". It is by that, by this unity from which knowledge (*connaissance*) opens and measures its impossibility, that intoxication is closest to and furthest from what it is to know (*connaître*). It is in the strict sense the blindness of all knowledge (*connaissance*), and the bright burst of what it is at its base. By bringing back to their impossible unity the pleasure of looking upon things and the terror of being them, it sovereignly undoes the theatrical space in which knowledge (*connaissance*) has always unfolded, bringing it all down to a limit where it disappears as an illusion, where it becomes pure and simple illusion, and leads it back to a void which is serious because it is without distance. And in this destruction, it indicates to the theatre that it is unravelling the moment of celebration from which it was born, but never to stop turning away from it. It unmasks, delivering things themselves without their stable beauty, but immediately stealing them away in a whirl that blinds and masks better than any mask, since it dissipates beings in night and non-being; and in the absolutely compelling violence of its movement, it throws the spectator into the being of what he is looking at, identifying him without recourse with this spectacle that ceases to be a spectacle but in which, far from finding his being, he has to recognise (*reconnaitre*) without a doubt that it is escaping him, that it is hurtling towards the farthest, most inaccessible of distances, since it is right here, underfoot, in this mud, in these shallows. The vertigo of intoxication makes the gaze and being spiral closer to their common and impossible centre, the beauty that attaches itself to the gaze and fixes it, the terror that makes being flee.

Perhaps nothing is closer to absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) than intoxication, since it brings us into the presence of things themselves, without the thickness of the mask, without the distance of the theatre. But nothing

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is closer to the absolute destruction of being, to its endless flow, to its loss, since it experiences it escaping itself, and escaping itself in the very place where it is. "To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*)" is certainly part of that fundamental experience of being that is intoxication. But is it part of the knowledge(*connaissance*) of being or the foundation of being? And can we imagine a knowledge (*savoir*) that could decide this?

No knowledge (*savoir*) is further from this intoxication than sobriety, than the slow knowledge (*savoir*) of those who question language. And who question it not in what it is, not in its extreme possibilities, not in that region of limits where it is ready to fall silent, but according to its continuity, in that which it has never ceased to be up to us. What could be further from the intoxicating whirlpool in which absolute being flees in the vertigo of the image than philology in its obstinate effort to "hold up to the present world the mirror of the classical and eternal world"? And yet, within the contradictions and possibilities of philology, an experience emerges which is related, in its structure, to the profound Dionysian movement.

To tell the truth, the ground of philology does not have the immediate solidity that we believe. To listen to a language and hear (*entendre*) it, hear it say what it says — nothing else and nothing more, in an original hearing as if it were speaking for the first time, and as if we had never heard anything else, further, even, as if language in general was speaking for the first time, in an absolutely unheard-of purity of sense and for an initiation that would have had no prerequisites, this is undoubtedly an almost impossible experience, one towards which philology must constantly move, which it may perhaps reach, but when? At what extreme point of refinement? At what twilight limit of its existence? "To be able to read a text as text,

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<sup>156</sup> [This could also be translated as 'the limit [which is] forbidden since [it is] crossed', there is no indication in the French as to which is meant — Tr.]

without mixing in an interpretation, is the most belated form of inner experience — it may be an experience which barely exists" (*The Will to Power* (9)). As if only the final could hear the first. As if there could be an absolute understanding (*entente*) of language only in the perfect and impossible form of the circle, and from one extreme to the other of time. In this stretch, distance is abolished and exteriority erased so that an inner experience is affirmed — or rather an experience that is exhausted at the birth of its interiority,

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at this point where it joins itself by rejecting itself outside of itself. And can we then conceive the strange relationship that is established: this absolute presence of distance, its extreme proximity in a naked truth, how would it be possible? How to think this "unimaginable eye, an eye whose gaze must not, at any price, have any direction" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (10))? There is no gaze without perspective. And no understanding that does not indicate, obscurely at least, how much one listens.<sup>157</sup> In any perception there is a base, blind and raw, which is not the dark heart of what we perceive (the distant and unassimilable core, still dark, at the end of all knowledge (*connaissance*)), but the much more invisible one which gives posture to perception and makes it stand where it is. A perception cannot be circumvented infinitely, and critiqued without rest. The philologist who seeks to hear a language absolutely, he may well know (*savoir*) that he has his prejudices, his modes of attention; that he belongs precisely to this time which listens and not to the one which speaks; and that his very language as a philologist, one day in its turn, he will be listened to as if it were first, and precisely to the extent that it cannot avoid being so: all these reduplications of critical consciousness will never erase the ground from which he listens and speaks, and will not be able to dodge it beneath his feet. There always remains something that is absolutely solid (the very same which resists all consciousness) and precarious (the most subject to time, always the readiest to change); which is first (that from which all listening is possible) and last (that which is most remote from the first language); which is indissociably both open possibility and raw limit. "At the bottom of ourselves, at the very bottom, is found something that cannot be rectified, a rock of spiritual fatality" (*Beyond Good and Evil* (11)). There, in this rock that is manifested and hidden, that is buried, but flush with the earth, is "the great stupidity that we are, ...what is unteachable in us, 'there at the bottom'" (*Beyond Good and Evil* (12)).

Backed by this stupidity, the philologist listens to what language says from the bottom of time. He listens to it in his narrow-minded certainty, which keeps him undoubtedly away from the truth of what is said, away from the unique, primary, definitively distant truth; his hearing will be multiple, diffracted into multiple interpretations, without being able to reach the beatifying interpretation. What will he hear

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in Homer's voice? What the Alexandrian grammarians perceived: a first song promoted to authenticity for reasons of purity of language and aesthetic rigour (which belonged solely to the Alexandrian genius), and tracing from the *Iliad* to the *Odyssey* the curve of an individual genius expressing itself at its zenith in the first and at its sunset in the second? Or what Friedrich August Wolf (13) thought he recognised there: the multiple voices of the popular poets who, born on the shores of Hellas like so many phenomena of nature, expressed what is profoundly original in a people; the moving, unassignable fringe of foam, always erased but always brought back, which separates it by one and the same trait from these natural landscapes and from barbarism? The good philologist will hear neither this nor that, but that which, from the old language of Homer, stretches out like an immense tablecloth, at once mute and talkative, up to our terminal and primary stupidity; that which, from this language, is turned towards us, and reveals between its words, that is to say from the base of its words, the quasi-divine presence of Homer, no longer emerging behind language as the thaumaturge who produces it and brings it into being, but before language, after it, in the element it constitutes and the space it opens up, as the non-human and blind core of what it says. Homer advances towards us, arms outstretched and groping, not because his language transmits to us an existence which would otherwise have been precarious, but because it was born rigorously from him and in the space reserved for the divine whose possibility this language founded. Philology thus addresses by vocation something that is akin to the theogonies. Or rather, something that surrounds them: since for it language is not that which recounts the birth of the gods, but rather that which gives rise to them.

So philology reveals that it has a much more essential power than that of finding the past or summoning to us that which is furthest from us; it reveals as absolutely close (since in history) that which is beyond all expanses, in a distance which is foundational for all possible spaces: the presence among us of the gods, their kinship with our words, their birth where we speak and in this space that language opens.

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<sup>157</sup> [A more literal translation would be 'to the point to which one listens'. French usage aligns more with the translation given, but Foucault may be playing off this duality — Tr.]

Philology does not destroy song (*chant*), it enchants (*enchanter*) language, and it listens enchanted (*l'écoute enchanté*). "We must be grateful

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to Philology, which is neither a muse nor a messenger of the Gods. And just as the muses descend to the Boeotian peasants, it comes into a world of dark colours and somber images, a world of pain; it speaks of a distant and happy, enchanted country that is in the familiar company of the beautiful, luminous forms of the Gods" (14).<sup>158</sup> And in this distant light that intersects with the proximity of our words, our rock of stupidity appears for what it is: an obscure land deprived of gods, yet born of its dead gods, constructed from their skeletons, but turned away from their life and death by the death and resurrection of a God who has no truth, essence, or secret, other than their absence. In this way, philology can exercise its critical rigour outside all limitation: not only does it give birth to the gods from language itself, from our language, but it enunciates<sup>159</sup> under our language all the dead gods, all the corpses that lie our dark earth; it opens up to us at once the marvellous birth of the divine and the space where we are without gods; in one and the same speech, it reveals their birth and shows them to be dead. But precisely this speech is a double speech. It is the language of language: the language which murders<sup>160</sup> theogonic language, but just as much the thaumaturge language that restores the speech of the gods, and the gods within language. Philology philosophises with hammer blows:<sup>161</sup> with the blows of that hammer which makes the faces of statues appear from the bottom of time and from marble, and which breaks the clay of idols, which shatters for us — and in order to leave us in the void — the birth of the gods.

It finds the old experience: "It is beautiful to look upon things, but terrible to be them". It finds it, but imperceptibly overturns it, since its wisdom gradually discovers how beautiful it was to be in the company of the gods, and to be oneself, at the heart of language, these gods themselves; how terrible it is now to look in the distance at their glittering presence, their presence that turns away, their presence forever absent. And in a language which is neither that of nostalgia nor that, above all, of promise, in the pure language of knowledge (*savoir*), philology indissociably says the imminence and turning-away of the divine.

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In this, it doubtless makes a radical experience of language. Not of language in its form. But rather language inasmuch as it has actually been spoken by men, and inasmuch as it carried them in their history. It shows it inasmuch as it was, from end to end, our ground — this high horizon line that, behind our back and in front of us, overlooks us — but also this unbreakable stone atop which we are in spite of ourselves: rock of our stupidity, utter bottom (*bas-fond*). This is why philology as remembrance of language, more than any other knowledge (*savoir*) and probably to the exclusion of any other, [is] the only critical experience which is actually possible: the only one that can be incarnated in a body of knowledge (*connaissance*), the

<sup>158</sup> [The French as Foucault gives it is: "Et tout comme les muses descendent vers les paysans bœtiens, elle vient en un monde de couleurs obscures et de sombres images, dans un monde de douleurs; elle y parle d'un pays enchanté lointain et heureux qui est dans la confiante familiarité des belles formes lumineuses des Dieux." The phrase "la confiante familiarité" would literally be "the confident familiarity", but that is so obscure that it loses most of the meaning. I have chosen to translate it as "the familiar company" in the hope that "company" will convey the same idea of coexistence as "familiarité" and "familiar" will convey the same level of trust as "confiante" (which is "confident" in both the normal sense and the sense of "confiding"), without the phrase overall losing too much of its poetic, sonic element. Note also that "bœtien" and "Boeotian" are sometimes used to mean "philistine", a concept Nietzsche uses often — Tr.]

<sup>159</sup> *Stricken*: 'denounces'.

<sup>160</sup> [The phrase "langage meurtrier du langage théogonique" has no precise English equivalent. Strictly speaking, "langage meurtrier" is closest to "murderous language", "meurtrier" is an adjective (and hence does not have any grammatical tense, be it past, present, or future), but the adjective is not simply "murderous". The word "murderous" implies that the noun is likely to commit murder, it is in some way predisposed to murder, but what is being murdered is not grammatically indicated. With the phrase Foucault uses, the adjective does indicate what is being murdered. The best translation I have come up with is what I have given, but it loses the repetition of "murderous language [...] theogonic language [...] thaumaturgic language" — Tr.]

<sup>161</sup> [Taken literally this would be rendered as "Philology philosopher with hammer blows:", or, a little less literally, "Philology, philosopher-by-hammer-blows:" — Tr.]

only one that [can] rely on the solidity of a ground that it volatilises in the recognition of its stupidity. Thus, in this experience, everything is made language: "all the speeches of being and their most secret compartments are opened to me" (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (15)); but being, in this language which speaks of absence and does not even have its own ground to support itself, only appears in the whirlwind where it fades. It is given and withdrawn, absolutely reconciled and assigned in an absence without recourse. All distances, to tell the truth, are abolished in this axial movement of language that continues itself and identifies with the whirling of intoxication. The slow, methodical knowledge (*savoir*) of the philologist reprises in him the Dionysian experience, or rather the moment when knowledge (*connaissance*) begins its turning-away: it reaches this great chiasmus of time when the terror of being things, that is also to say of being gods, crosses the beauty of being them; and where the beauty of the gaze that stops on things — or on gods — places its mask upon the terror of seeing them in the face.<sup>162</sup> So, in this cross of time, the sad and grey knowledge (*connaissance*) of language lovers (*amateurs*) becomes joyful knowledge (*savoir*).<sup>163</sup>

Knowledge (*savoir*) whose gaiety is not the beatitude of eternal knowledges (*connaissances*), no more than it is the irony of those<sup>164</sup> which know (*savent*) themselves to be rejected from the absolute. This gaiety is that of a knowledge (*savoir*) that knows (*sait*) itself to be absolute, that knows (*sait*) itself to be the only absolute, and which, not in spite [of] this sovereignty, but precisely because of it, knows (*sait*) itself to be deprived of any homeland, of any definitive ground, of any promised future, and destined to die, or rather to have already entered death — the death of what it knows (*sait*) and the death of what it is. But this death is neither limit nor exile, rather the centre around which all being pivots and

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which by turns offers it and conceals it, illuminates it in appearance, but also masks it within it, traverses it by day and by night, finds it as being and as absence of being. This gaiety does not smile at the knowledge (*savoir*) that we will perish if we want to access absolute knowledge (*connaissance*); it does not rejoice at the thought that in this knowledge (*connaissance*) we will die to time and access the foundation of being; it becomes intoxicated by the experience that it perishes (and does so currently, in the immediate present) through an absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) (not promised but exercised, in fact, in the remembrance of language), and that this death is part of the foundation of being (which is thus founded in its necessary absence). This knowledge (*savoir*) is intoxicated by knowing (*savoir*) itself to be intoxicated.

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Perhaps philology, as learned (*savant*) and memorable love of language, sustained Nietzsche's thought from beginning to end, right up to the final intoxication of the identification between Christ and Dionysus, to which it was already and from the outset profoundly linked. Perhaps it has also taken on, in its laborious movement as historian, all the critical functions (up to the critique of man himself and the imperative to destroy him) that the 19<sup>th</sup> century had entrusted to the dispersed order of philosophical knowledges (*connaissances*) or experiences. But perhaps philology as the doubling of language on itself now peremptorily defines the field of all possible philosophy: we have no more to think than our language, not because it is adequate to our thought; but, entirely to the contrary, because it infinitely surpasses it, overhangs it on all sides, obstinately points it to the [pedestal]<sup>165</sup> of the gods and shows it the empty place, and it houses it within itself, giving itself to it as task. Knowledge (*savoir*) of language is not the past of philosophy, it is its space; in neither the world nor the heavens is there any object for philosophy other than this language which it redoubles, and whose fall into time, whose inscription in the book, forgetting, or

<sup>162</sup> [Literally the translation would be "the gaze that stops on them — or on them — places its mask upon the terror of seeing them in the face". The first "on them" here is "sur elles", in the feminine, indicating that it refers to the word "choses" ("things"), which is feminine. The second is "sur eux", the masculine, indicating that it refers to the word "dieux" ("gods"), which is masculine. The third use of "them" translates the word "les" in the phrase "de les voir en face". In this third case, the rules of French require using "les" (a plural version of that which in English is "the"), one of the few French pronouns to not be gendered. The French thus has an ambiguity (does "les" refer to "choses", "dieux", or both?) which I have attempted to retain, at the cost of rendering the first two uses of "them" as nouns rather than pronouns, unfortunately detracting from the stylistic flair of the passage — Tr.]

<sup>163</sup> [The phrase on which the paragraph ends is "le gai savoir", the French title for Nietzsche's book *Die fröhliche Wissenschaft*, rendered in English as *The Joyful Science*. Thus, "savoir" is here an untranslatable pun — Tr.]

<sup>164</sup> [That is, those knowledges (*connaissances*) — Tr.]

<sup>165</sup> Conjecture.

memory, whose already-fled non-being constitutes in each instant its glittering being. Seneca said: "Philosophia facta est quod philologia fuit" (16).

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## PHILOSOPHY AND EXEGESIS

### ***Introduction***

Nietzsche's philosophical experience begins with philology, as if it discovered its native soil in commentary and took on its original dimensions in the care for a rigorous exegesis. The philological importance of Nietzsche's work alone would not provide definitive proof if Nietzsche had not himself testified to the end of a very clear consciousness of the exegetic sense of all his reflection. Of his sense of exegesis, we should also say of his ambiguity of exegesis.

- On the one hand, the philosophical experience is situated on a line that ideally extends a pure reading free of any interpretative context, of any implementation within a presupposed plan for reading. To read not through a system of signs and references to sense, but in a perpetual youth of understanding that inaugurates at every instant its form of understanding with the text. Ideal experience, no doubt, barely sketched, but towards which the secret experience of philosophy is projected: "Being able to read a text, as text, without mixing an interpretation, is the latest form of the inner experience, perhaps an experience that barely exists" (*The Will to Power* (17)).
- And yet, how would there be a reading without perspective, without a space of vision, in which the point of view always takes on the unconditioned character of a presupposition and in which the gaze inevitably chooses the cardinal points of its orientation? Without this perspectival deployment of the gaze, the subject would be similar to "an unimaginable eye, an eye whose gaze must not have direction, at any price" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (18)). "There exists only a perspectival vision, a perspectival "knowledge" (*connaissance*)" (*On the Genealogy of Morality* (19)).

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- The perspectival character of all reading does not constitute the negative limit. To only be able to read in an already polarised space does not simply mean that all reading carries, in the element of its possibility, its own system of relativity. The necessity of a perspectival structure hides, from the very lucidity of the reader, a positive content, which is both the absolute origin of its reading and the limit of its interpretation: the zero point of the perspectival orientation. In this positive element, relativity becomes fatality, the system of intellectual lucidity petrifies into an original stupidity, and the successive horizons of knowledge (*savoir*) are polarised on the rock of the unteachable: "Deep within ourselves, at the very bottom, there is something that cannot be rectified, a rock of spiritual fatality... To each fundamental problem is attached an ineluctable 'I am this'" (20). And finally, we are led to decipher, in the solution of these problems, "clues of the problem that we are, more precisely of the great stupidity that we are, of our spiritual fatality, of the unteachable that is in us, 'there at the bottom'" (21).

Thus, "reading" discovers its own space between two limits of the ineluctable: flush with the earth, the invisible rock, only sensed, from which extends the perspectival view; and at the bottom of the horizon the inevitable voice, the invincible voice, which speaks of itself and in its mother tongue, outside of any system of translation or interpretation: "Here all the speeches of being and their most secret compartments open to me; here every being wishes to be verb..." (*Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (22)). In this space whose limits immediately take on the character of fatality — between a text that speaks of itself, in a language which [is] its own, and to listen to, or, at most, to read which will be the extreme task of intelligence, and a silent rock that serves as the absolute origin of the forms of deciphering — reading deploys its interpretative virtualities: and in this light, all intelligence takes the form of interpretation.

It is even the character proper to philosophical discourse not to present itself as a text, or as positive first speech against a background of silence, but to constantly enlighten itself with its interpretative consciousness.

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- Consciousness which is first and foremost that of its latitudes of interpretation: discourse, to be philosophical, must keep enlightened, deep in itself, the perilous freedom from which it cannot be detached: "the same text can have innumerable interpretations; there is no right interpretation" (*Unpublished Fragment 1882/1883-1888* (23)).
- Consciousness, on the other hand, that truth can only be perceived in its negative forms, and detected upside down, in the certainty of error. A truth, *the truth*, is only a reprehensible presupposition in the rigorous exercise of exegesis, which can only denounce non-truth, in a kind of asceticism that indefinitely refuses the benediction and beatitude of a truth. "Presupposing that there is really an exact interpretation, that is, a single exact one, seems to me experimentally false. We can, in fact, determine in innumerable cases what is wrong: what is right, never... In short, the old philosopher says: there is no single beatifying interpretation" (*Letter to Carl Fuchs, 26 August 1888* (24)).
- Consciousness lastly that, in philosophical discourse, the unveiling of a truth that its always-prior character designates as a fatality, and the original act of the *Wahrsager*, which is always projected into the element of freedom, are found inextricably mixed. The two aspects constitute the very profile of philosophical discourse: "The description of nature by the philosopher. — He discovers the truth by inventing it, and he invents it by discovering it" (*The Will to Power* (25)).

These are only very provisional indications on the surface of the experience that Nietzsche has made of philosophy: only to situate in what space philosophical discourse is located, and in what mode it can address its object. The few texts cited already make it possible to divine that philosophical discourse will be intended to bring to the light of formulation the speeches *already* pronounced in an anterior silence. Philosophy will never be the first speech, but the same speech, found between two fatalities, in the free latitude of exegesis.

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### ***Modern philosophy as exegesis***

It is not only his own style of philosophical reflection for which Nietzsche gives the major traits, in these few definitions [from] which we have just quoted. It is more: it is the modern destiny of philosophy, both its truth and its fatality — the deepest form of its power to be (*pouvoir-être*), and probably also its malediction. Dilthey is certainly one of those who have seen with the most lucidity the exegetic character of *Philosophieren*, which is expressed by the rise of exegesis across European culture since the Renaissance and the Reformation. It is probably not sufficient to say that Western civilisation has discovered in History a form of totalisation and justification that definitively attaches it to itself. This history in fact received from the outset an indication of its extent in a kind of "textual imperative", of which Protestant fidelity to the Bible was the first expression and for a long time remained the major manifestation (26).

Is this Renaissance, which Husserl characterised by the rediscovery of the *ratio* in the immanence of nature, not even more, the discovery that there is a *logos* present in the very text of our culture — *logos* of which it is a matter of deciphering in a rigour whose form is entirely to be invented? If the mathematisation of nature took for classical reflection the exemplary value assigned to it by Descartes, it is because it immediately offered to this search for a method of exegesis an inexhaustible guarantee of internal rigour. But we must forget:

- neither that Descartes himself was perfectly conscious of the margin of freedom that mathematical exegesis of nature left around it (see the relations of physics and mathematics);
- nor that Spinoza shortly after would try the most prodigious effort of Western culture to regrasp (*ressaisir*) with a single gesture the *logos* that exegesis tries to listen to across historical traditions and textual infidelities — and which deploys, at the very level of the forms of nature, the necessity of geometry.

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Brunschvigg was therefore correct in placing *logoi* and *mathemata* in the original constellation of Western philosophy. But his error is to have detected an incompatibility, inherent in the essence of a truth programmatic for its "hard labour" (27), and which would have manifested itself from the outset in the sinking of Pythagorean mysticism on the pitfall of the irrational number that makes mathematical truth inexhaustible in terms of the *logos*. In fact, whatever may have happened, for the moment, to Greek science, the rediscovery, not so much of Antiquity, but of the Ancient Text in a Christian world, has suddenly given a sense to the very existence of the Bible, as the permanence of a text, and the presence of a language that has long since ceased to hold the fidelity of its listeners or the attention of its readers: a *language* had been spoken, which its now silent text designated as *speech* in the desert. It is perhaps not

only by its pagan character that the Renaissance provoked a Christian reaction, but because in revealing, regarding Antiquity, the problem of the *text* in general, it manifested, in the faith of the Middle Ages, an essential deafness to the Word (*Parole*), and in mediaeval dogma, the very silence of the Text. In the movement of Renaissance, Reformation, then Counter-Reformation that leads us to the historical milieu of Cartesianism, it may not be sufficient to see a series of movements which are balanced out in the search for a new equilibrium, but a single movement by which our culture, in its Christian fidelity and in its Greek heritage, finds a *logos* that it is a matter of listening to through all the texts in which it has been transcribed: and these texts will be, indifferently, the Bible, the message of Antiquity, or that mathematics to be deciphered under the appearances of nature.

This listening to the *logos* that has characterised our culture since the end of the Middle Ages is specified:

- As ethical task: the totalisation of cultural heritage is not only a requirement of historical objectivity; it is a moral imperative; our culture will not have the right to relax from its concern until it has detached each text, every "line of every letter", from the chance that transmitted it to us and, having placed it back in the light of the discourse which once served as its place of birth, gave it, for an instant, its

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usage of necessity. The whole morality of our civilisation bears the sign of deciphering, of which Luther gave the ruthless formula: "No line of any letter is unnecessarily transmitted; even more so, no word (*parole*)" (28).

– As determination of absolute forms of certainty. Luther again: "It is necessary, he says, that I myself hear what God says" (29) — a formula that is of course the short-circuiting of the paths of authority, but which also foretells, for the future of truth, a perceptive model where sense is immediately present to the sensory. In the form of sensory evidence are both unveiled and hidden all the formulations of the truth whose discourse, in its entirety, constitutes the absolute and original Word (*Parole*): "Do not rely too much on the spirit, when you do not have the concrete Word (*Parole*) for yourself. It might not be a good spirit, but the devil of the hells... And after all, has not the Holy Spirit enclosed all wisdom and advice and mystery in the Word (*Parole*)?" (30)

– As convocation of man by himself: because the purity of his perception restores him to a truth that is his own, and the rigour of the sense he deciphers introduces him to a liberated existence. In such a way that uncovering the sense of the sensory will quickly become being freed from the sensory to collect in oneself the obscure text to which the key had been lost. This Word (*Parole*) is then revealed as that which is closest to man, that which is most intimate to him, and gives him his absolute weight from his earthly existence: "One can preach the Word (*Parole*); no one, but God alone, can imprint it in the heart of man" (31).

It is as fundamental attention to *logos* that the humanism of classical philosophy will unfold, and it is in this attention that the new metaphysics, the religious renaissance, the first forms of exegesis will find in the 17<sup>th</sup> century the unity of their original concern. And it is doubtless no coincidence, if the one who was to bring the experience of classical metaphysics to its limit was, in his contradictions, in the very rifts of his life, the symbol of this effort that listens to the same *logos*, across the Talmud in the Bible, across geometry in nature,

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across imagination in the idea. The splendour of Spinoza's destiny is not in the project of a geometrically demonstrated ethics, nor in the deduction of the world from the *Deus sive natura*; but in that he has extended to the limits of the possible the surface of exegesis on which, from the Renaissance, all philosophical discourse is based. At the same time, far from bringing philosophical reflection back to the forms of a mathematical consciousness, Spinoza makes manifest the insertion of mathematical knowledge (*savoir*) in the great exegesis of *logos*, and the "*more geometrico*" designates only the rigour of a mode of reading, and not at all the syntax of the Text to be deciphered.

In any case, it is not surprising that from Spinoza to Nietzsche, from this exegete to this philologist, there has been through the centuries this flash witnessed by the postcard of 30 July 1881, addressed to Overbeck: "I am absolutely astonished, absolutely enchanted; I have a precursor; what a precursor! I barely knew Spinoza. It was instinct that pushed me towards him just now" (*Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche* (32)). By exploring Spinoza's work, from the first attempts at biblical interpretation, to that analytic of the imagination which occupies the last three books of the *Ethics*, we cross below metaphysics the regions where the fundamental forms of exegesis are born as modes of original hearing of the *logos*.

Never, no doubt, had a reflection devoted to the *mathemata* been so close to the *logos* where they originate, never had a philosophy of truth [touched] more closely the peril of seeing it fade away in the interpretation of the Word (*Parole*). If it is said in the *Theological-Political Treatise* that a "thing is known (*connue*) intellectually when it is perceived by pure thought outside words and images", this fading of the Word (*Parole*) and the image is not a taking-leave from the discourse that, in them, takes on a sensory body, but on the contrary it puts this discourse in a light that offers the *logos* without speech, and the Face without image (33).

And from this point of view, Malebranche and Berkeley appear as the Christian acolytes of Spinoza, as blessed "readers" of the world, who, in the discourse of appearances, discover the grammar of a text which is read by God to men. But — and this is why they remain Christians — this

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God who pronounces the discourse is not in himself the discourse; it protects its transcendence through its providential concern to offer men their salvation, the possibility of which discourse guarantees in the absolute, and for which it constitutes for man the possible instrument:

1. the sensory world,
2. the Adamite world and the fall,
3. the diverse forms of discourse.

What makes reflections of the type of Malebranche or Berkeley decisive is first of all that the address of the discourse is inscribed in the dimension of the fall. The discourse is organised when its original transparency has been abolished in sin and when the happiness of a sense that delivers its code even before any reading has been lost.

This means that the discourse carries both the index of the fall and already the promise of redemption — that it unfolds in an entirely moral horizon:

- horizon which encloses it in a moral sense given in advance, which constitutes the space in which the discourse finds at once its possibility, its justification, and its necessity;
- and which is very different from the ethical sense that Spinoza's exegesis acquires from itself, and by a right of origin. Spinozist elucidation involves an ethical openness that is so to the very extent of the rigour of its deciphering. It is not the text which wants to be lodged in the space of the fall, but, in itself, it surrounds and covers all the regions of ethics, of which it constitutes the original grammar. The *Ethics* is the movement of the text towards its own light that gradually makes it emerge from the shadows and illuminates it in its entirety as *logos*.

But, whatever the differences between Spinoza and the Christian heirs of Descartes may be at this level, it is still more important to discover their unity:

- a. The Discourse defines a certain "openness" in which the overlap of perspectives guarantees, with an absolute possibility of communication, the establishment of a universally accessible text of truth. (Again the Reformation, and the Protestant version of the Bible, bear witness to

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the sense of a philosophy that will make its procession two or three centuries later).

- b. There is more: the very sense of the text is the truth, in this double manner:

- the relationship of the sense of the text to be deciphered to the text itself, the validity of the mode of reading designate themselves as "the truth": the truth being the necessity, which is secret at first, then manifests after reading, of a relationship between the visible aspects of the text and the sense of its effective content: "the truth" of perception is the projection, in the imprecise and blurred forms of the sensory (*sensibilité*), of a geometric rigour that is elusive as such;
- but this geometric rigour in turn plays the role of truth, since it is the truth of this projected truth: it forms the sense of sense, and it achieves the truth in a text that presents itself without alteration, in the thinness of its rigorous definition.

As a result, the truth becomes the transparency of the sensory text to its deciphered sense, their superposition mediated in the act of understanding.

So much so that every moment of the Discourse (the ciphered language, the elucidated text, their presence to each other in the unity of a sense) in turn confiscates the truth, and ultimately makes it the general indication of its meaning. The truth becomes the justification of discourse in each of its moments and even in its existence as discourse.

- c. The Discourse always includes, from its origin, a certain address; it is a Discourse addressed to man. As Berkeley said, the world is the grammar of the discourse that man addresses to God. So

much so that the labyrinth of deciphering must return man to man. And it is in this that man makes his salvation in the very act of deciphering.

In this, the essence of the Discourse as face of the world, and as primary possibility of reflection, is opposed to those forms of reflection whose deciphering nevertheless also seems to be the essential movement, but which Western philosophy, since the Renaissance, has always left in the margins

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of its night. *Hermeticism* in its most general form is the very opposite of that *hermeneutics* where European metaphysics finds its own space. Hermeticism is a completely different way of defining not only the relationship of the Word (*Parole*) to man, but also that of the Word (*Parole*) to sense, and finally the way in which truth comes to light in the Word (*Parole*).

a. The Word (*Parole*) is indeed not the place where the truth is revealed as an opening, the space of habitation for intelligences. On the contrary, it is that nocturnal part of discourse where it conceals itself in a closure that banishes all intelligence to only elect initiates. Discourse is not the *agora* of the truth, it is its citadel — the impregnable Acropolis, in both senses of the words:

— *fortress* from which one surveils the countryside from afar to recognise *foreign* bands and where leaders gather, in a time of panic, all those who by birth have the right of citizenship, all those who were born of this land, and have their *fatherland* there from beyond all memory;

— but equally *sacred space* to which the visible forms of the gods have long been withdrawn, defining in this high place, against which the public chatter of the lower city comes to batter and die, this region of silence which one only accesses in procession in order to renew, in mystery, the pact with the secret forces of this land. And it is from this retreat, where they have created the sacred, that the now-serene gods, far from threats and out of reach, will extend their gaze, to the confines of the sea, no longer to watch over (*surveiller*), but to watch (*veiller*), this land where the visible beauty of men must be born.

This is enough to say that this high earth, while maintaining its initial relationship with war — it had to transmute the inhuman forms of Eris into those of Athena Nike — does not accept its derisory heritage under the species of sophistry, dialogue, interrogation, everything that Socrates, sphinx of crossroads, will designate in Western philosophy, under the name of "dialectic", as the birthplace of truth. On the contrary, it marks the limit where all forms of dialectics must be abolished, so that in this place of

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retreat the gods can continue their watching-over, in this motionless and gazeless watch.

It is to these Greek rocks, not to markets or public squares, that hermeticism is related: and if it took on, for the first time, its name and [its] status in the land of Egypt, it is probably because the Egyptian gods, the sacred and Egyptian mysteries had, at all times, overlooked like an acropolis of silence the buzz of Greek crossroads. Hermes, god of roads which cross, will be restored to his primary vocation: that of leading men on the invisible paths, which lead them to the sacred, as he leads souls to Hell, by other paths of shadow, hardly less visible; he will find the steep paths that mount and descend along the acropolises, and where the crowd of those whom Socrates must stop with his stick to challenge them cannot hurry, but where those who have already been called must strive one to one: on these paths — Orpheus will remember —, one walks alone, without outstretched hands, and only on the call of a voice, which narrates a secret, inaccessible even to the furious hands of the Maenads. As a text quoted by Huginus a Barma says:<sup>166</sup> "The Sages moving away from the Profanes will admit only the Elect to their sacred mysteries; as soon as they possess this rare present of divine Wisdom, they will give thanks to the supreme Being, and put themselves under the banner of Harpocrates" (34).

b. But we must not believe that this path of election by which Hermes removes us from public squares is only a secret path to lead us to the truth, to the *same* truth. The path must lose us and get lost with us, because its sole truth is to be the indefinite deception of the labyrinth. The paths of Hermes only apparently have a way out in Discovery, Salvation, and Felicity.

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<sup>166</sup> [From here until the end of p. 241 Foucault repeatedly cites a number of very old alchemical texts, translated into French centuries ago. I have tried my best to translate these as well as I can, but the age of the language coupled with their somewhat esoteric phrasing and vocabulary has proven quite a challenge, so I apologise if the phrasing is awkward — Tr.]

– In fact, Discovery is only the certainty, indefinitely reflected within its own limits, that the secret of all discovery is still there to discover, that is to say that hermetic Discovery reveals that at the end of this path that has no end, each discovery definitively veils what it reveals. Having arrived in the third

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Chamber ("of Purple to the base of Gold"), Trevisan inquired "where the Master and Mistress of the Lodge were. I was told that they were hidden in the back of this Chamber and that they had to pass through another one further away... *I could not see the fourth apartment because it must be hors d'Œuvre; but I was told that it consisted only of a chamber, whose only furniture was a fabric of sun rays...*" (35). This text is made even more significant by the title of the book from which it is extracted: "*The green dream, truthful and true, because it contains truth.*" But the last lines tell us that this truth is definitely out of reach since it is hors-d'œuvre, although it is the natural light, the sun of all these chambers of which the quester<sup>167</sup> has so far Discovered. The truth will always evade in a solar inaccessibility, more obscure than the night, where the Discovery is finally lost in its successive twilights.

– This is why Salvation is not the Arrival at the end of the labyrinth, it does not take place when the last Door is crossed, but when each door has stolen a little more the hope of the outcome, and there remains only the *indefinite* recommencement of the labyrinth, as an *indeterminate* accomplishment of the work (*œuvre*): "It has a door, placed obliquely and difficult to access. *The more you run for the outside wanting to leave, the more he himself, by his sudden detours, pushes you inside, towards the depth where the exit is found.* He seduces you every day in your races, he plays and mocks you by the returns of hope; like a dream that abuses you by vain visions until the time that regulates the comedy has elapsed and the demise, unfortunately, ordering everything in the shadows, has received you without allowing you to succeed in reaching the outcome" (36). Like the labyrinth of Solomon, the paths of Hermes lead nowhere, they draw in total the circular figure where the serpent is symbolised:

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the wisdom that is designated there is not that one which traces, with Parmenides, the right path of truth, but the one that enwraps itself around its own errors and from its imprecise paths makes the rigour of its destiny, and the certainty of its salvation (37). The serpent's circle consecrates to its perfection the secrets of error: it closes the ring that seals, in an eternity without leave, the turns and returns and folds of time. Thus, in its smooth curve, it ensures and protects, not the manifest dialectic of opposites, but the secret circle of contraries: "And know (*sachez*) that the end is only the beginning and that death is the cause of life and the beginning of the end. See black, see white, see red, that is all: for this death is eternal life after glorious and perfect death" (38). The open and manifest dialectic of discourse is replaced by the secret and definitively closed on itself chain of contraries that are not named. The chatter of the dialectic gives way to the seriousness of this silence that inhabits an almost Heraclitean *logos*.

– Does the circle, however, close the Garden of Happiness (*jardin des Félicités*), and define the place of transparent happinesses (*bonheurs*)? This is what many hermetic texts suggest: "*This is where we will see what the eye has never seen, where we will hear what the ear has never heard, since it is in this place that we must taste an eternal felicity that God himself has promised to those who will try to make themselves worthy of it...*" (39). Yet, this happiness is not the rest of slumbering things, of calmed movements, of unity finally reconquered and blissfully possessed. The Felicity which is in question in hermeticism is rather the secret justice that separates and unites injustices in an absolute decision, it is the obscure ordinance of rifts, deaths, and mournings, and the enjoyment of the accomplishment which is effectuated through them. Here again the image of the serpent, in its very original symbolism, releases, suddenly, the imaginary powers that remain hidden in the theme of this hermetic

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<sup>167</sup> Conjecture.

felicity: and these powers are not the calm forces of Paradise, they are close rather to the violences of Hell; the perfection of the circle that encloses them conceals the rage of the serpent that devours itself, and which in its hostility uncurls to give birth to two serpents who each live only from the death of the other: "These two... being therefore united together, in the vessel of the Sepulchre, they both bite each other cruelly; and by their great poison and furious rage, never leave each other from the moment they are caught and entangled... that both of them, by their slobbering venom and mortal wounds, are bloodied in all the parts of their Bodies, and finally killing each other, have suffocated in their own venom, which changes them, after their death, into living and permanent Water" (40). Thus, the perfect justice of the circle encloses the rage of murder, and its immobility is nourished by silent and bloody efforts. It is therefore through mourning that the face of joy will appear in a procession of Rewards: and if the mother is in mourning and death, the child who is born of her will be the very death and joy of this reciprocal mourning: "Baleus says: The Mother carries the mourning of the death of her Son and the Son wears a robe of joy, colour of the death of his Mother, and thus reward each other" (41). Felicity is not the moral reward for effort and virtue, it is not the end of man's path, but in this path itself, indefinitely renewed, it constitutes in the inflexible justice of "Rewards", the absolute order to which disorders, violences, and murders are ordered; it forms a heaven where thought finds, not its rest, but the space of its movement and the fatherland of its disquiet: and this is what hermeticism calls the heaven of philosophical Felicity. "It is not possible for any generation to be done without corruption; and in our work, corruption and generation are impossible without the philosophical Heaven" (42).

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It is therefore necessary that the roads of hermeticism lead us to the Truth, that it be taken as Discovery, as Salvation, as Beatitude. [They] lose us on the contrary, and [if they] have promised the Profane such rest in his slumber, [they] on the contrary awaken the initiate of the dream of Beatitude to the bloody justice of Rewards, from the hope of Salvation to the risky and uninterrupted rigour of the labyrinth, from the dream of Discovery to respect for the sacred indefinitely hidden in its retreat. The thread of Ariadne that hermeticism has placed in our hands is not destined to make us find that the route to the thousand detours is straight, but to make us lost, in a concerted and lucid way, in a night where the face of the truth is dissipated.

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#### **METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL (*VOULOIR*)<sup>168</sup>**

The two senses of *Wesen* :<sup>169</sup>

- inasmuch as it is that of existence;
- inasmuch as it is that of the *Grund*<sup>170</sup> of existence.

That is to say, *Wesen* is always in retreat from existence — retreat which is not a shift towards anteriority, but a distancing to the base of itself, from which the absolute manifestation of *Wesen* springs as existence. *Wesen* is borne as an indispensable indication in the light of existence, it is this tautological relationship of existence to existence, where all the ideal abstractions of essence are dissipated, and where existence is accomplished as manifestation of itself, and absolute phenomenon of its being. But at the same time, essence, as autochthonous manifestation and origin of existence, is that in which existence comes to itself as existence, the ether where its light bursts, the night finally from which its aurora arises. *Wesen* is therefore both the light of light, and the darkness from which it proclaims itself as light: pure morning in which light is announced and stated, thickness of the night from which only light can arise.

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<sup>168</sup> [Unless otherwise specified, the word 'will' in this section translates the French 'vouloir' — Tr.]

<sup>169</sup> *Wesen*: being.

<sup>170</sup> *Grund*: foundation.

*Wesen*, as *Grund*, therefore has its negativity. But this negativity, this absolutely nocturnal moment, is not negativity conceived as moment of alienation, of self-forgetting, of the fall into exteriority, but as the decisive instant of the call to self, of tearing from interiority towards the truth of manifestation. If there is negation, it is to the extent that there is tearing; but this tearing makes the absolute moment of light appear between two shores<sup>171</sup> which then take on the figure of the night. Double negativity, consequently: that of tearing, that one henceforth revealed to itself by lightning; but which also implies a double positivity, since the tearing is made towards the light, and since the night is simply night only when traversed in all its thickness by the instant of light. It is in this movement that *Wesen* is *Grund*: both the base of existence, and the retreating out of existence in a night where existence is denied; both the light where existence manifests in lightning, where its loss is accomplished in the instant, and obscurity where existence darkens in the night that welcomes the wake of its manifestation. Analysed in its negative and positive moments, *Grund* loses its sense, which is precisely to dodge at this level the distribution of the positive and the negative. It is immediately the positivity of negativity and the negativity of positivity.

It is the inverse of all existence, as that which existence manifests in place of itself. It is thus the nature of all existence par excellence; speaking of it in the absolute, it is the very *Nature of God*. Nature of God, in the sense that the *Wesen* is the very *Grund* of God, in an ontological implication which is always put as an argument when it comes to the existence of God — but also in the sense that it is that in which God is manifested as visible face, in all the forms of God's presence. Spinoza's *Deus sive natura* designates as tautology and identity that which is the essence of essence, the *Grund* of *Grund* — the Spinozist abstraction is not in pantheism but in the character of the immediate and immobile identity of *Deus* and *Natura*: a structure of thing hides, for Spinoza, the retreat, the tearing, and the nocturnal lightning that reveals in God the nature

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of God, or which reveals *Wesen* as the absolute Nature of God, as that in which everything is existence.

This is why Spinoza coins under the species of a mechanics of individual Desire that which is the original relation of *Grund* to *Wesen*, i.e. of *Grund* and *Wesen* to itself, and which dodges the great metaphysics of will that the *Deus sive natura* involved. It also made others forget this when they thought they made a metaphysics of will by conceiving the dynamic unity of wills (*volontés*) in the deep and somber will to live. In fact, this is by no means metaphysics of will, but the reduction of will to the positivity of the *impetus*. The metaphysics of will opens by bringing to light the original relations of *Wesen* and *Grund*: it measures the distance of the retreat of *Wesen* into *Grund*, by the tearing of the lightning in which *Grund* is manifested as *Wesen*. The metaphysics of will can therefore have nothing in common with a philosophy of energy, or a lyrical exaltation of the vital, or an ethics of the will (*volonté*): which all resign themselves to the philosophical inertia of an accepted positivity (positivity conceived both as positivity of science and as the blessed positivity of the real, the spirit, the truth: the positivity of Comte and that of Hegel are not so distant from each other, one bearing in itself the presumption of science, the other reflected in the form of knowledge (*savoir*); the multiplication of negativities in Hegel does not conjure the presuppositions of positivity, but only indulges in the care of manifesting it not seeing that positivity is second in relation to the flash of manifestation); the metaphysics of will is addressed neither to truth nor to positivity, but to the empty space of manifestation where positivity and truth take their face. It is entirely born: not genesis from (*à partir de*), transformation of the given, following the mediations of the immediate — but assignation originating from (*du*) the rift in the opening from which (*duquel*) the representation of the positive and the negative will be played out. Phenomenological genesis from (*à partir du*) the already there is still inscribed in a positivity, from which it is liberated neither by the bringing [to] light of a transcendental flux, which is at base only the last element of the positivity of becoming — nor by the assignation of a pre-given which is only the most general horizon of the positivity of the perceived. A phenomenology of the

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will (*volonté*) must paradoxically be situated in a reflection that, from the outset, refused to assign its place to the tearing of will, and for which, consequently, freedom will only ever be the guiding idea of reflection.

A metaphysics of will is the philosophical experience that renders useless a phenomenology — Hegelian or Husserlian —, i.e. any form of reflection that seeks to fill the ground of positivity of any manifestation, even if, pushed to its extreme, this form of reflection paradoxically reveals this ground as the ether of the spirit or the transcendental flux of becoming. There is phenomenology each time the being of the phenomenon is assigned to the level of positivity of the phenomenon; there is transgression of

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<sup>171</sup> Word difficult to read.

phenomenology in a metaphysics of will each time positivity is questioned about the gaping space of its manifestation. It is no longer a philosophy of genesis, it is an experience of dawn.

But why call it *a metaphysics*, and a metaphysics of *will*? Will to the extent that the origin is not required in the positivity of an original, [illegible] in the tearing of the decision; the opening in which manifestation looms is not the gap of the truth nor the luminous space of the vision, but the claw blow by which *Wesen*, retreating towards *Grund*, appears as manifestation of self against the base of *Grund*. That is to say, a will that is both non-transitive and unreflected; to will neither of something nor of oneself, will which is neither will to live nor will to be; neither will to be other nor will to endure; but will in the sense of tracing in the night of oneself the dazzling diagonal in which *Wesen* appears, *in the light of its night*, it is both the most extreme and the very first tension of will; it is to crisscross the space in which understanding and will (*volonté*) find their place; it is the definition of any space in which there would be the truth, the object, the self. And this is called will in the sense that the essence of will is *decision*, i.e. laceration, tearing, sharp application of the blade. The opening refers to the will, like the wound to the blow; light comes from the will like blood from the knife. This decision of will both as retreat and as tearing, should not be interpreted only as

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negation: as will to die, or will to disappear — in the manner of Schopenhauer. The decision goes to the opening and that in it which takes on the appearance of suppression, negation, fall of appearance in the night, all this is not the essence of will, but that in the will which designates the retreat that makes manifestation and appearance possible. It is this retreat that makes the philosophy of will a metaphysics, or in other words a nihilism: the philosophy of will is metaphysics in action, it is the act by which philosophy accomplishes its vocation of metaphysics and pursues it to the end.

Nothing is more opposed to a metaphysics of will than a philosophy of *impetus* or energy, that is, philosophies of development; the metaphysics of will is a philosophy of absolute origin that discovers the origin in the retreat, the birth of light in the accomplishment of the night. But that this is the metaphysical experience of philosophy does not mean that philosophy must be definitively commensurate with this metaphysics, in the form of pessimism, of an ontological and moral negation of appearance. In Heidegger's sense, metaphysics is the substitution of the consideration of the first of beings to the question of being. But one must not forget the appearance through Western philosophy of themes of the philosophy of will. It is characteristic that this discovery has taken the label of "Oriental" philosophy — which has no other sense, for our experience as for Schopenhauer's, than this: with the metaphysics of will, we touch the limits of Western metaphysics, and we already designate with our finger the horizon of a philosophy that will advance indefinitely on the path of return of metaphysics. The metaphysics of will carries within it the catastrophe of Western philosophy: and the Buddhist drowsiness that Schopenhauer assigns to thought and the world is only a way of thinking, in the form of metaphysics, the achievement of this metaphysics. This event which is the philosophy of will, on both sides of the Hegelian achievement of philosophy, with Schopenhauer and Schelling, so ignorant of each other, constitutes what is obscurely the most decisive moment of Western philosophy: the forgetting in

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which it fell, its condemnation as *Unphilosophie* (43) would constitute in itself a presumption, if this philosophy of will that rejects Western philosophy had not always been its infernal vocation, and the vertigo of its own loss, under the reassuring face of freedom.

We cannot say that the Greeks omitted the problem of freedom, or that this problem did not yet exist for them. Because it is in philosophy only the way for metaphysics to experience its own limit by always remaining below this limit: the metaphysics of will shifts philosophy precisely towards this limit itself, thereby eliminating the question of freedom. To ask about freedom is to seek to designate the place and the instant of retreat in the very world that this retreat should make sink into the night; it is to want to open up the possibility of distancing without ever accomplishing it, as virtuality, as *virtue* of existence, without recognising that this is the very duty of philosophy, to suppress itself as metaphysics. The antinomies of the metaphysics of freedom are but the sign of this limit of metaphysics encountered and hidden in the placing-in-question of freedom. We could find an echo of this in the Husserlian reduction, as if Husserl had not been able to reach the problem of freedom, but had renounced accomplishing philosophy through a metaphysics of the will that effectively eliminates the problem of freedom, in the bringing [to] light of the will; hence the reduction as exercise of freedom which maintains, at the entrance to philosophy, the sign that it is always there, but by putting it out of the circuit of the philosophical problem. But from then on, philosophy will be in the serene daylight of appearance, the illumination of phenomena — in the total forgetting of the scratch

made by the will. By sidestepping metaphysics in this way, phenomenology does not accomplish philosophy, but in its claim to a rigorous commencement, it forgets that history assigns it to be *recommencement*. And it can claim to be a rigorous science while at the same time being the highest exercise of freedom: but this is merely to shift the relationship defined by Descartes at the level of God between freedom and truth towards man, and in the end it becomes an exercise in style on the implication of truth and freedom.

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### METAPHYSICS OF THE WILL (*VOLONTÉ*)<sup>172</sup>

In Berkeley: appearance of a new dividing line which does not coincide with either of the two great separating lines of Cartesian thought.

The trait Berkeley draws passes neither between subjective certainty and objective content, nor between finite understanding and infinitely and absolutely free will (*vouloir*). It passes between the passivity of the understanding and the will (*vouloir*) that runs through the entire domain of thought.

"Nothing that is perceived or perceives wills (*veut*)" (44).

"The idea is the object or matter of thought: that which I think, whatever it may be, I call an idea whereas thought itself, the act of thinking, it is an act, i. e.<sup>173</sup> a volition, that is in so far as it is opposed to its effects, the will" (45).

This is important:

- As an absolute novelty in relation to Descartes: the essential thing is no longer a form of opposition between understanding and will, but the belonging of *thought* to the domain of the will, thought the essence of which is thereby freed from *understanding* and *free* for a space that is no longer the fatherland<sup>174</sup> of ideas.
- This thought is that of the imagination and the memory, and is the element of artistic creation (46). Paradoxically, Berkeley restores, to a thought freed from the idea, the forms of experiences by which Plato had recognised the presence of the idea in his thought (Beauty, memory).

He thus inaugurates a Platonism without *ideas*, in which:

1. Appearance occupies the entire space of mobility of thought. More precisely, the understanding passively receives the passivity of the idea: i.e. the negative side of the appearance.

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This form of being that consists entirely in the fact of being perceived or of perceiving. Being insofar as it masks appearing and evades the absolute responsibility of thought. It is only in appearance, freed from an *esse* external to the *percipi* or *percipere*, that thought can free itself from the idea.

2. A new problem arises: that of the will (*vouloir*). The metaphysics of will (*vouloir*) is only possible in a way of thinking that unfolds in appearance: i.e. in a way of thinking for which being does not go *without saying*, but is taken from a non-being. Indeed, a philosophy of appearance is, on the one hand, the definition of a positivity of being in the phenomenon of appearance, but at the same time the presence of a negativity; being is *not* outside that which appears. Its glory in appearing is threatened by that night which surrounds it. A philosophy of appearance cannot fail to take non-being seriously, and the procession of being from non-being equally seriously. This is what defines the problematic of a philosophy of the will (*vouloir*).

An analysis of the will in the manner of Descartes is nevertheless part of a psychology of freedom. The mark of God which reveals his infinity is only the negative guarantee of this freedom within a psychology defined by the understanding. The analysis of will (*vouloir*) that emerges from Berkeley is already question of being. Berkeley and Hume constitute a kind of achievement of *classical metaphysics*.

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<sup>172</sup> [Unless otherwise specified, the word 'will' in this section translates the French 'volonté' — Tr.]

<sup>173</sup> Conjecture.

<sup>174</sup> Conjecture.

Hume, through a psychology of the understanding, dissipates the problem of will (*vouloir*) (as silent problem of being) in the concept of nature — which itself comes under the understanding → *foundation of truth*.

Berkeley, through the definition of a will (*vouloir*) which is irreducible to the idea and the understanding, leads to the problem of the *foundation of appearance* — both solutions are superficial, but they both pave the way for what is going to be presented as the necessary renewal of philosophy.

Hume → foundation of truth → Kant.

Berkeley → foundation of appearance → Schopenhauer.

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This constitutes the end of classical metaphysics since:

- it is the dissociation of the problem of truth and appearance;  
(natural judgement in all classical metaphysics as reflexive unity of these two problems)
- the problem of the foundation of truth challenges the accepted unity of the analysis of truth and the psychology of the understanding; the problem of the foundation of appearance challenges the accepted unity of the passivity of impressions and the origin of freedom.

Schopenhauer's error was to confuse his problem (the foundation of appearance) with that of Kant (the foundation of truth). Kant did not make this error, since he saw only his own problem. Schopenhauer believed himself to be the successor to Kant and this problematic of truth. Hence a whole metaphysics of truth which encumbers his reflections on appearance. Nietzsche will have to proceed with the systematic indictment of truth (see separation with Schopenhauer) in order to rediscover, with the problematic of appearance, [the problem] of will (*vouloir*) and being. The whole problem of the foundation of truth must undoubtedly lead to a dialectic that masks the problem of the foundation by a discourse of justification. The dialectic is the discourse by which truth justifies itself, by evading question about its foundation. Questioned about its foundation, it responds by its justification (the sophists). Because the foundation of truth refers back to the problem of the *Erscheinung* (see the movement of the transcendental analytic): the dialectic reverses the *Erscheinung* [and] includes its own indication towards truth (see the beginning of the *Phenomenology*). Note that this indication is already of the order of language.

This fragility of the problem of truth is characteristic of all Kant's successors, and explains why all post-Kantian philosophy is presented as the need for a return to Kant, whereas, for Kant, post-Kantian philosophy could only be a return to philosophy beyond his own work. The record has been broken. Phenomenology is indeed return to Descartes, not in the sense that Husserl says in the *Cartesian Meditations*, but as effort to rediscover, beyond Kant, beyond Hume and Berkeley, the unity of truth and appearance, in obviousness (*évidence*). But in fact,

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phenomenology cannot fail either to rediscover the problem of the foundation (in that of the original), or to intersect that of the dialectic (in that of constitutions). None of the exorcisms that have been practised around phenomenology, in order to make it absolute philosophical commencement, can prevent it from being recommencement, and recommencement of metaphysics. No doubt phenomenology carries something else in its destiny: which is the unity of truth and appearance — but the search for unity, for the problem of their foundation. That is, it carries within itself the germ of its own destruction, the marks of its imminent invalidation.

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The whole Schopenhauer, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger lineage, philosophy of art, of will (*vouloir*), of being in its relation with non-being (not in the logical sense).

In Nietzsche, no philosophy of art, but a philosophy of the history of art, the face of art under which it became truth. The philosophy of a museum without imaginary.

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[HEGEL, HÖLDERLIN, NIETZSCHE]

Nietzsche walks in the opposite direction (*sens*), in his life and thought, the path Hegel had travelled since his friendship with Hölderlin. Hegel, at the end of the *Erste Systementwurf*, speaks of the "Vereinigung" with time, after the dream in the eternal universality of the ideal (47). Nietzsche, on the contrary, finds, from a thought that has endeavoured to give all its weight of seriousness to the future, the duplication of the instant, this rift of present fulness that takes away all *seriousness* by rendering it at once *derisory* and *tragic*. The Hegelian seriousness of becoming is the absolute positivity of its novelty, the virginity of this nascent body; this seriousness is the history that finds in the future an always new Spring. But it is also that which cheats the future, or

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rather bears responsibility for a future which can and must answer for it; the Hegelian seriousness of becoming lies in the fact that each present bears a full responsibility, without, however, ever exercising the blade of its freedom. It is from this seriousness that Nietzschean deepening has liberated becoming by turning it into the arbitrary instant of a repetition, and at the same time by sinking to the very base of eternity the flash of freedom that it unceasingly releases. Derisory and tragic, tragic because derisory, the Nietzschean present does not carry with it the weight of a reconciliation with time, on the contrary, it is the fulguration that tears time apart, restores its original discord, and passes it over as the war of the past and the future, of time and eternity, of freedom and repetition. That in this rift is outlined the curvature where the circle of eternity is already read — this is not a sign of a reconciliation with time in the form of an eternity as total assumption of time, but, if you will, of a reconciliation with an eternity which is the total rupture of time with itself.

On the other hand Hegel, after his friendship with Hölderlin, discovers the *Schicksal der Schicksallosigkeit*.<sup>175</sup> Is this not, after all, the adventure of Zarathustra? The uprooting of destiny must lead to the worst of destinies, and Nietzsche, in his course where from peak to peak he follows and discovers the crest of freedom, finally lets himself be led to madness. In fact, what has been accomplished with Nietzsche is undoubtedly the opposite: the discovery of the *Schicksallosigkeit* of the one who accepts and loves his destiny — not that he has become independent of it, by a kind of *coup d'État* in eternity, but because, like Zarathustra, at each instant he kills his destiny, every day he loses his disciples, every night he massacres the monsters that are formed in his image: he kills the madmen who speak the language of his truth. He is to each present the death of his destiny. And in his life the moment of madness is not the fulfilment of destiny, but the instant of his death: madness is the last derision that prevents destiny as truth of life from closing on itself, which opens it, on the contrary, onto the ultimate question, on this last absence

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of truth, which questions everything up to the sense of the destiny that comes to get lost in it (48).

Nietzsche somehow traversed the entire field of Hegelianism in reverse and found, in the very first Hegelian experiences, those dating from the friendship with Hölderlin, enough to flip the entire Hegelian universe.

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#### [GERMAN PHILOSOPHY]

The *Zuhausesein*: in German philosophy, plays the role of the cogito, of reflexive certainty in French philosophy. "*To be at home*" — "*to be sure of oneself*". German philosophy seeks a ground and a homeland; French philosophy, a light, a transparency.

The immediate has two senses: for the Germans, it is the ground in which [we] are entrenched; it is what we find, by going back through all the positive mediations of history, like the thickness of an earth where the familiar fecundity of long-buried myths rests. This is why the immediate is also *gründlich*, in the geological and architectural sense of the word: geological bedrock, the rock on which the temple is built, the *Grund* conceals all the sacred powers that will gradually fill the space that consecrates and manifests it: the beauty of the temple is the sensory face of these forces — the petrified gesture by which they have come, in the light of the world, to take the solid form of truth. Truth encircles the impalpable volume of the sacred with a stone wall. It protects it and guarantees it, watching over it with all the immobility of a

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<sup>175</sup> *Schicksal der Schicksallosigkeit*: destiny of the absence of destiny.

caryatid that raises the roof full of its silence to the height of its forehead. This is thought: leaning against the sacred, which it encloses in its night, it turns its stony face towards the sun and towards mankind: saying the truth? But not the truth of the sacred, whose enclosure it closes; but saying the truth of these stones, these walls, this temple that hide the sacred from the light and enclose it, perhaps forever, in this inert ceremony. And this truth has a human face.

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To turn the brow of thought towards this night, to plunge into the temple the faces that had taken on for us the gravity of truth — and to perceive, in this night, their grimaces; in this night, their cries; in this night, their human agony; in this night, again, their young beauty.

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#### [HEGEL AND NIETZSCHE]

On the end of History in Hegel, see Löwith's passage about the neo-Hegelians on R. Krömer (49):

The Christian basis of the Hegelian idea of *accomplishment* (*Vollendung*): accomplishment is not achievement, as definitive stage of a history, but a certain essential change in the relation to *logos*. There is no *Vollendung* except in relation to *logos*, just as there is no accomplishment in Christianity except because there has been Scripture, sacred texts, prophecy, in short, *logos*: and the accomplishment that Christianity constitutes is only possible because there have been *Scriptures* (Scripture as the condition of possibility of the Christian religion as accomplishment); the basis of Christianity is this chthonic relationship to *logos*, this troubled but necessary relationship that makes Christianity the accomplishment already promised by *logos*, and at the same time the truth, the very body of this *logos*. In this way, Christianity sank into the soil of Western thought an essential relationship to the *logos*, which Hegel was precisely to bring [to] light in the course of a work which, starting from Jewish and Greek consciousness, finally found its reconciliation in Christian consciousness, because *in fact* it already presupposed this fundamental relationship to the *logos* in order to analyse Jewish consciousness and Greek consciousness: and finally, he saw as the accomplishment of history that which had already been achieved *for him* in his first philosophical research, thus giving the curious example of a philosophical journey that finally succeeded in identifying the ground on which it operated, but giving it as the result of the journey itself.

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And henceforth, after him, it is indeed that which is in question in a fragmentary way at first: the critique of religion, the problem of accomplishment and the end of history; interrogation regarding *logos*, truth, being. As Hegel's successors move away from his point of arrival, losing sight of what he reached (the Christian accomplishment of the relationship to *logos*), they themselves diminish the force of their critiques and lose the effective sense of the problem posed: the critique of religion [leads to] the psychology of the religious soul; end of history and historicism, Dilthey's relativism. *Logos*: Hegel's panlogism fully critiqued in the name of experience, of the real.

And suddenly Nietzsche, recouping these critiques, passes brusquely over to the other side, and finds the means, circling Hegel at the level of the Christian *logos*, to reprise the themes of Hegelianism, and to experience himself, behind Hegel who accomplished philosophy, as the *murderer* of philosophy.

In so doing, he freed himself to be *absolutely sensitive* to the Greek soul, to Greek culture, to *Greek being*, whereas Hegel, always presupposing the Christian relationship to *logos*, only managed to conceive of them in the myth of the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the *Aufklärer* myth of beautiful unity: because the unity had already been given. Nietzsche, on the other hand, having pierced this relationship, could be sensitive to the Greek rift: the blood of Greek being. And Hegel, inevitably, had to drift, from the Greek city to Christian consciousness; Nietzsche had to not stop going back into Greek consciousness, beyond Socrates, beyond even Aeschylus, up to Dionysus, to that first death of a god. The Greeks are not those who had their gods present in the city, they are those to whom *even* their gods cry out. Christ Dionysus — this does not at all have the Hegelian sense of a reconciliation between the beautiful Greek unity and the beautiful Christian soul (the unity of unity and tearing apart); Nietzsche's comparison has the opposite sense: the resurrected Christ related to the death of Dionysus.

For Hegel, the cry that shook the gaiety of the ancient world, proclaiming the death of Pan, this cry is the identification of the death of Dionysus with the resurrection of Christ: because Christ is risen, the

Greek god dies; and his death, once, on the borders of Thrace, was already the promise of the resurrection of Christ.

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But for Nietzsche, on the contrary, the resurrection of Christ revives, as it were, the death of Dionysus, which is its absolute sense; it is because Dionysus died once that Christ could rise again; but the resurrection of Dionysus will in [turn] be the death of Christ. This great implication of Dionysus and Christ must not be thought, with Hegel, in the serious form of reconciliation, but in the ironic and bloody form of Nietzsche. Christ and Dionysus. The *Dionysus philosophos*, at the end of Nietzsche's philosophy, like the accomplished *logos* of Christianity, rises to the summit of Hegelian philosophy.

That Hegel and Nietzsche both assigned this relationship between Dionysus and Christ as the foundation of their philosophy is the essential point: they put their finger on that which renders philosophy possible — or impossible.

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### [REPETITION]

Repetition (50). This so singular experience that contemporary culture makes, that the world folds, bends, and tends to reach the zero level of its ascension. The true sense of this experience is difficult to identify: it strongly opposes the theme — which was the "religion of civilised peoples" — that time is the space where progress deploys its deferral, that history is the gospel of this progress. But its positive, effective sense is not defined; and the first emergences of this theme did not exclude misinterpretations, they called on them, on the contrary, as if to mitigate the obvious: pejorative theme of a world that goes to its loss, submerged in its own technical universe, or engulfed, in its "Western or civilised" destiny, by the tidal wave of barbarism; theme of a world that must return to the young, naive, and healthy forms of its experience, which needs a supplement of childhood to rebuild a truth, as Bergson's world needs a supplement of soul to rebuild a purity, a virginity (understand a life); theme of a world which is achieved in

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the history of itself, which can be no more than reason reflecting on the path of truth, promenading in the imaginary museum: the world would be achieved in this crystal sphere where its history is read. It is not certain that the Nietzschean theme of the Eternal Return did not favour some of these misinterpretations. But what repeating means concerns neither achievement, nor the immediate, nor catastrophe. The seriousness of repetition is more serious than all these myths, because it is the destruction of the myth. Repetition is return, but return to the very foundation of the truth. Repetition is both the founding act and, to this extent, the return to the founding act. The founding act is not first, then repetition of self. It is to the extent that it is founder that it designates itself as having already been accomplished and effectuated. It is not because the foundation has been effectuated that it can be repeated: it is because it is repetition [that it] is founding, that it is unveiled as reiterated founding act. Repetition is that in the founding act which allows it to define the temporality of what is thus founded. That is to say, repetition as return through the centuries is only the phenomenon of that which is in its essence founding repetition: original sense of the founding act that unveils its truth only as the truth of what is already accomplished.

For example in mathematics: the founding act of axiomatics that is indicated as repetition.

For example in philosophy: the unveiling of being.

For example in music.

Hence: the theme of forgetting, as essential dimension of history. Historical time is the time of forgetting even more than of manifestation. See Plato. Repetition as critique. *The forgetting of forgetting*.<sup>176</sup>

The theme of a necessity of history or an absolute sense of history. History which is not history of phenomena or truth, but history of being itself; history of the mathematical object; history of the musical object.

The theme of a new morning: the absolute sense of classicism. But this new morning does not promise night.

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<sup>176</sup> In the margin: "Critique is not excluded, choice: it is the realised demonstration of that undemonstrable which is non-existence."

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### [PHILOSOPHY, LANGUAGE, AND IMAGE]

The element of philosophy and the guiding thread of its approach, if they are lived experience and its explication, inscribe the destiny of philosophy under the constellation of anthropology. The sense that we decipher there refers, of necessity, to an analytic of human existence, or to a dialectic of its history.

If philosophy is to find its way into the horizons of language, and if the whole history of being ultimately has only the thickness of a *philology*, it is difficult for philosophy to escape a limitation within a phenomenology of the *logos*.

And if the guiding thread of philosophy, the furrows of the terrain whose depth commands its free march to the limit of the earth and space, of night and light, if the geology of its route, of its shadows and its stops, if the relief of its gorges and overhangs, of its straights and its hesitations were the image — the image as hard as a rock whose millennial wind makes the dust of the paths? That which drives philosophy into the world is the ground of the image. That is why metaphysics is the metaphor of the world.

It is not by language that philosophy and poetry communicate, but by the image.

The courage, for a philosophy, of recognising (*reconnaître*) itself as the imaginary of the truth.

See in Nietzsche: from philology to Zarathustra.

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### [WILHELM MEISTER, ZARATHUSTRA, AND THE *BILDUNG*]

The wanderer and Zarathustra, another traveller, depart for an adventure which may have opened the same option as that of Wilhelm Meister (51). It is a matter of the same *Wandergeschichte*

— story of an errancy. But in Wilhelm Meister, it is a matter of a voyage, a training, a *Bildung*.<sup>177</sup> Nietzsche's wanderer does not travel, he errs; from his shadows, he does not trace an eternal profile, he does not fashion a statue, he does not form, he deforms, he undoes, he lets himself be gnawed, with his shadow, in the great midday light.

Compare: the voyage of *Wilhelm Meister* and the errancy of Zarathustra — that which the noon, the Mediterranean experience, Greek culture, represent for them.

Culture: *Bildung*, *Umbildung*,<sup>178</sup> the Goethean statue of the image, the clay and marble of the faces of culture.

Culture, for Nietzsche: the defeat of images, metaphor, return to the painful consciousness of *Gleichnis*;<sup>179</sup> the tragic of philosophy, in the space of play of the metaphor, as opposed to the serenity of Goethean wisdom, in the expressive continuity of symbols. The Nietzschean image rips — *Gleichnis* lacerates the *Bildung*. In the sea of poetry, we find only the smashed head of a dead God (Zarathustra — the poets).

Terrestrial voyages for Goethe, maritime, aerial voyages for Zarathustra.

The *Bildungsroman* has become the novel of the destruction of a culture.

And yet, there is reconciliation with Goethe, the Dionysian of Goethe, as defined in *Twilight of Idols*. The overcoming of culture, through the deepening of a culture. The sense of a culture is its death (Letter to Overbeck, 21 May 1884: we find the only German culture in the mystic hermits, Goethe and Beethoven included (52)). The pilgrimage to the abyss.

<sup>177</sup> *Bildung*: coming-of-age.

<sup>178</sup> *Umbildung*: transformation.

<sup>179</sup> *Gleichnis*: resemblance.

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## NOTES

1. In this essay, Michel Foucault develops the passage from *Par-delà bien et mal*, II, 'L'esprit libre', §39, OCFN, t. X, 1948, p. 74 ("Périr par la connaissance absolue pourrait même faire partie du fondement de l'Être"); CW, vol. 8, *Beyond Good and Evil*, II, 'The Free Spirit', §39, pp. 40-41 ("indeed it could be part of the fundamental character of existence that someone would perish from complete knowledge of it"). On this passage, see *supra*, note 33, p. 131. In the notes Gérard Simon took at Foucault's course one Nietzsche at the ENS in October 1953, there is a long development on this theme, as well as on the majority of themes developed in the 1950s manuscripts like, for example, the origin of tragedy, the Apollonian and the Dionysian, the idea of "becoming Greeks", the will to truth, the solitude of being, and Karl Jaspers on Nietzsche. See 'Notes de Gérard Simon prises aux cours de Foucault sur Nietzsche', doc. cit. The CAPHÉS archives contain: "Foucault: psychological causality. Course by Michel Foucault attended by Gérard Simon, 1953-1954. 1. Plan of Michel Foucault's course on "Social psychology" from 1951; 1 handwritten sheet. 2. Course on psychological causality, 16 November 1953-29 March 1954; 39 handwritten sheets. 3. Course on the history of anthropology, December 1954; 9 handwritten sheets. 4. Course on Nietzsche; 4 handwritten sheets. 5. Course on cybernetics; 3 handwritten sheets."

2. F. Nietzsche, *Écrits et Essais de 1873-1876*, in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, op. cit., p. 213 [K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, op. cit., p. 209 — Tr.] (*Nietzsche's Werke*, op. cit., t. X, *Schriften und Entwürfe, 1872 bis 1876*, p. 324). [CW, vol. 11, part 32, §67, p. 336 — Tr.]

3. After the first sentence, Foucault very liberally cites the text of §109 of *The Joyful Science*: F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Livre troisième, §109, op. cit. (Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte), pp. 95-96; CW, vol. 6, pp. 117-118.

4. Id., *La Naissance de la tragédie*, §11, OCFN, t. I, 1947, p. 102; *The Birth of Tragedy*, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

5. Plato, *Euthydème*, §275e, in *Œuvres complètes*, t. V, Première partie, *Ion, Ménexène, Euthydème*, Fr. trans. by Louis Méridier, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1931, p. 150. [Plato (1997) *Euthydemus* (Sprague RK trans) §275e, in Plato (1997) *Complete Works* (JM Cooper ed), Hackett, Indianapolis, USA, pp. 708-745, here p. 713 — Tr.]

6. This passage reminds us, in anticipation, of the role that Nietzsche will play in the *History of Madness*. See M. Foucault, *History of Madness*, op. cit., p. 536: "Nietzsche's last cry, as he proclaimed himself to be both Christ and Dionysos, is not at the limits of reason and unreason, the vanishing point of their œuvre, their common dream, reached at last and instantly evaporating, a reconciliation between 'the shepherds of Arcady and the fishermen of Tiberias'; but it is rather the destruction of the œuvre itself, the point at which it becomes impossible, and where it must begin to silence itself: the hammer falls from the philosopher's hand."

7. On intoxication in Nietzsche, see *supra*, note 3, p. 106.

8. F. Nietzsche, *Aurore*, Livre cinquième, §446, 'Classification', OCFN, t. VII, 1912, p. 341; *Dawn*, Book Five, §446, 'Hierarchy', CW, vol. 5, pp. 228-229.

9. Id., *La Volonté de puissance*, in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, op. cit., p. 293 [K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, op. cit., p. 289 — Tr.] (*Nietzsche's Werke*, op. cit., t. XVI, p. 10). [The relevant volume of CW, volume 18, has not yet been published — Tr.]

10. Id., *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §12, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 206 (Foucault modifies the translation by Henri Albert); *On the Genealogy of Morality*, III, §12, CW, vol. 8, pp. 307-309, here p. 308.

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11. Id., *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §231, in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, op. cit., p. 295 [K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, op. cit., p. 291 — Tr.] (*Nietzsche's Werke*, op. cit., t. VII, p. 191); CW, vol. 8, pp. 136-137, here p. 136.

12. Ibid.

13. Friedrich August Wolf (1759-1824), German philologist and Hellenist, author of a critical edition of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, is discussed at length by Nietzsche in his inaugural address at Bâle. See Nietzsche F (2012) *Homer and Classical Philology* (trans unnamed), The Nietzsche Channel, here pp. 6, 9, 10, and 25.

14. F. Nietzsche, *Homer and Classical Philology*, op. cit., p. 25: "We demand *gratitude*, certainly not in our name, for we are atoms — but in the name of philology itself, which in fact is neither a Muse nor a

Grace, but a messenger of the gods; and just as the Muses descended upon the dull, tormented Boeotian peasants, so philology comes into a world full of gloomy colours and images, full of the most profound and incurable sorrows, and comfortingly gives an account of the beautiful, bright, godlike figure of a distant, azure, happy land of enchantment."

15. *Id., Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra*, Troisième partie, 'Le retour au pays', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by G. Bianquis), p. 365; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *op. cit.*, Third Part, 'The Homecoming', p. 147.

16. Foucault liberally cites a sentence from Seneca, but relates it more to the reversal that Nietzsche operates in his inaugural address at Bâle in 1869, where he writes: "*Philosophia facta est quæ philologia fuit*" ("What was once philology has now been made into philosophy"). See F. Nietzsche, *Homer and Classical Philology*, *op. cit.*, p. 25; see also *infra*, note 11, p. 319. The indicated sentence from Seneca is: "*Itaque quæ philosophia fuit, facta philologia est*" ("Hence what used to be philosophy has now become mere philology"). See Seneca (2015) *Letters on Ethics: To Lucilius*, (Graver M and Long AA trans), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA, Letter 108, §23, p. 431. On the following sheet, Foucault draws up the following bibliography of works on Nietzsche:

SIMMEL Georg, 'Friedrich Nietzsche Eine moral-philosophische Silhouette', *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, Leipzig, 107, 1896, pp. 202-215.

GALLWITZ Hans, 'Friedrich Nietzsche als Erzieher zum Christentum', *Preußische Jahrbücher*, Berlin, Feb. 1896, pp. 324-347.

'Nietzsches Geistesblitze', *Stimmen aus Maria Laach* (Catholic review) TSI. p. 227.

BREYSIG Kurt, 'Nietzsches ethische und soziologische Anschauungen', *Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung*, 1896, pp. 1-23.

HECKEL Karl, 'Friedrich Nietzsche und Richard Wagner', *Neue Deutsche Rundschau*, 1896, pp. 721-37.

NIETZSCHE Friedrich, 'Aus der Einsamkeit des Denkers', *Zeit d. Fröhliche Wissenschaft*, Leipzig, Ernst Wilhelm Fritzsch, pp. 22-?, 1887.

RIEHL Alois, 'Friedrich Nietzsche als Künstler', *Die Wahrheit*, v, 1897, pp. 219-224.

'Friedrich Nietzsche als Denker', *Die Wahrheit*, vii, 1897, pp. 1-10, 51-60, 85-92, 140-150.

DESSOIR Max, 'Shakespeare und Nietzsche', *Die Wahrheit*, viii, 1897, pp. 289-301.

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RIEHL Alois, 'Nietzsches Lehre von dem Übermensch', *Die Wahrheit*, viii, 1897, pp. 33-41.

KNODT Karl Ernst, 'Die Gefahr "Nietzsche" und ihre Nachwirkung in der neuesten deutschen Lyrik', Leipzig, *Monatsblätter für Deutsche Literatur*, 1897, pp. 364-369 and 395-402.

'Lesefrüchte aus Nietzsches Zarathustra u. anderem', *ibid.*, pp. 380-384 and 430-432.

LICHTENBERGER Henri, 'Quelques lettres inédites de Nietzsche', *Cosmopolis*, vi, pp. 460-474.

KLEIM Robert, 'Nietzsche und unsere Zeit', *Die Gesellschaft*, 4, Quart., 1898, pp. 48-55.

BARTH Paul, '2 Schriften über Nietzsche', *Die Wahrheit*, viii, pp. 363-367.

BETTELHEIM Anton, 'Leben von Friedrich Nietzsche', *Cosmopolis*, vi, pp. 265-327.

17. F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance*, in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, *op. cit.*, p. 293 (*Nietzsche's Werke*, *op. cit.*, t. XVI, p. 10). [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, *op. cit.*, p. 289 — Tr.]

18. *Id.*, *La Généalogie de la morale*, III, §12, OCFN, t. XI, 1913, p. 206; CW, vol. 8, p. 308.

19. *Ibid.*

20. *Id.*, *Par-delà bien et mal*, VII, 'Nos vertus', §231, in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, *op. cit.*, p. 295 (*Nietzsche's Werke*, *op. cit.*, t. VII, p. 191); CW, vol. 8, p. 136. [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, *op. cit.*, p. 291 — Tr.]

21. *Ibid.* Foucault emphasises different words, with some other punctuation distinctions; we retain his modifications.

22. *Id., Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra*, Troisième partie, 'Le retour au pays', *op. cit.* (Fr. trans. by G. Bianquis), p. 365; *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

23. *Id.*, *Fragment posthume 1882/1883-1888* in *Nietzsche's Werke*, *op. cit.*, t. XIII, p. 69. Foucault cites the translation by H. Niel in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, *op. cit.*, p. 293. [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, *op. cit.*, p. 289 (see also CW, vol. 16, 1[120], p. 287) — Tr.]

24. F. Nietzsche, Letter to Carl Fuchs, 26 August 1888; cited in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, *op. cit.*, p. 293. [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, *op. cit.*, p. 289. See also Nietzsche F (1969) *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche* (Middleton C trans), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA, 'Letter 175 to Carl Fuchs, Sils Maria, August 26, 1888', pp. 305-308, here p. 306 — Tr.] Carl Dorius Johannes Fuchs (1838-1922), German musician and composer, was an acquaintance and a

correspondent of Nietzsche. According to Jaspers, their friendship dated from 1872 (*ibid.*, p. 83 [See *ibid.*, p. 78 — Tr.]).

25. F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance*, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, livre IV, §174, p. 271.

26. In the same era, Foucault wrote a manuscript which bore in part on Wilhelm Dilthey, *La Question anthropologique* (*op. cit.*, pp. 120-139).

27. Léon Brunschvicg, 'Le dur labeur de la vérité', *Études philosophiques*, vol. 4, n<sup>o</sup>s 3-4, 1949, pp. 319-335.

28. Lucien Febvre, *Un destin. Martin Luther*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., Paris, PUF, 1945 [1928], p. 186.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

32. F. Nietzsche, *Lettres choisies (20 novembre 1868-21 décembre 1888)*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed., Fr. trans. by A. Vialatte, Paris, Gallimard, 1937, p. 176; see also *La Vie de Frédéric Nietzsche, d'après sa correspondance*, ed. and trans. by Georges Walz, Paris, Rieder, 1932, Letter n° 147, p. 326. [See *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche*, *op. cit.*, 'Letter 89 to Franz Overbeck, Sils Maria, July 30, 1881', p. 177 — Tr.]

33. B. Spinoza, *Traité des autorités théologique et politique*, Chapitre IV, 10, 'De la loi divine', in *Œuvres complètes*, *op. cit.*, 1954, p. 674 [See Spinoza B (1862) *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (Willis R trans), Chapter IV, 'Of the Divine Law', digitised here: [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Theologico-Political\\_Treatise\\_1862](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Theologico-Political_Treatise_1862) — Tr.]; Foucault writes: "outside of speeches and images".

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34. Foucault refers to maxim XXXVI of the book *La Pierre de touche, ou Principes des philosophes qui doivent servir de règles pour l'œuvre*, by a certain "Huginus a Barma", the author of which has never been identified. See René Alleau, *Aspects de l'alchimie traditionnelle. Textes et symboles alchimiques, suivi de « La Pierre de touche » d'Huginus a Barma (1657)*, pref. by Eugène Canseliet, Paris, Minuit, 1953, p. 200. The book *La Pierre de touche* was published as an appendix to the *Règne de Saturne*, published in the first edition in 1657 in Latin; then translated into French in 1780 in Paris, "at the expense of Pierre Derieu", and presented as a translation of the Latin of "Huginus a Barma", pseudonym, under the title *Le Règne de Saturne changé en siècle d'or, S. M. I. S. P., ou Le Magistère des sages, qui a été tenu secret jusqu'à ce jour, et que l'on publie maintenant en faveur des enfans de la science. On y a joint, pour lui servir comme de Pierre de touche, une suite des maximes puisées chez les Philosophes les plus authentiques ; avec une pratique très-facile*.

35. Foucault cites the end of Bernard le Trévisan's book, *Le Songe Verd, Véridique et véritable, parce qu'il contient Vérité*, in *Bibliothèque des philosophes chimiques*, Paris, André Cailleau, 1740, t. II, pp. 437-446. See R. Alleau, *Aspects de l'alchimie traditionnelle*, *op. cit.*, pp. 192 and 231. [See Bernard le Trévisan (1920) *The Text of Alchemy and the Songe-Verd* (Davis TL trans), *The Monist*, 30:70-106, here p. 105: "I could not see the fourth apartment because it was necessarily out of the way; but I was told that it consisted only of a single room the furnishings of which were only a tissue of the purest sunbeams concentrated in this purple fabric at which I had just been looking" — Tr.]

36. R. Alleau, *Aspects de l'alchimie traditionnelle*, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-128.

37. See *Le Poème de Parménide*, ed. by Jean Beaufret, Paris, PUF, 1955, p. 77: "It was by this road that I was carried; because it was on it that the very prudent mares who pulled my cart drove me, and some young girls showed the road."

38. Foucault refers to a passage from *La Tourbe des philosophes, ou L'Assemblée des disciples de Protagoras, appelée Le Code de vérité*, in *Bibliothèque des philosophes chimiques*, *op. cit.*, p. 31, cited in R. Alleau, *Aspects de l'alchimie traditionnelle*, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-185.

39. Foucault refers to the end of Bernard le Trévisan's book, *Le Songe Verd*, cited in R. Alleau, *Aspects de l'alchimie traditionnelle*, *op. cit.*, p. 192. [See Bernard le Trévisan *The Text of Alchemy and the Songe-Verd*, *op. cit.*, p. 106: "All that I had seen up to then was nothing in comparison with that which it was promised I would be shown. In order to console myself, however, I have only to reflect on that celestial empire where the All-powerful appears seated on his throne environed with glory and accompanied by angels, archangels, cherubims, seraphims, thrones, and dominions. It is there that we shall see what the eye has never seen, that we shall hear what the ear has never heard — since it is in this place that we shall taste an eternal felicity that God himself has promised to all those who strive to make themselves worthy of it" — Tr.]

40. Foucault refers to a passage from Nicolas Flamel's book, *Explication des figures hiéroglyphiques du cimetière des S.S. Innocents à Paris*, in *Bibliothèque des philosophes chimiques*, *op. cit.*, cited in R. Alleau, *Aspects de l'alchimie traditionnelle*, *op. cit.*, p. 174. [See Flamel N (1980) *Alchemical Hieroglyphics* (Orandus

E trans), Heptangle Books, New Jersey, USA, p. 45: "these two, I say, being put together in the vessel of the *Sepulchre*, do bite one another cruelly, and by their great poison and furious rage they never leave one another from the moment that they have seized on one another (if the *cold* hinder them not) till both of them by their slavouring venom and mortal hurts be all of a gore-blood, over all the parts of their bodies, and finally, killing one another, be stewed in their proper *venom*, which after their death, changeth them into living and *permanent water*" — Tr.]

41. *La Tourbe des philosophes*, p. 20, cited in R. Alleau, *Aspects de l'alchimie traditionnelle*, op. cit., p. 184.

42. Huginus a Barma, *La Pierre de Touche*, Maxime XII, cited in R. Alleau, *Aspects de l'alchimie traditionnelle*, op. cit., p. 196.

43. We find this term (translated by "non-philosophie") in Karl Jaspers' book, *Nietzsche*, regarding Nietzsche's atheism (op. cit., p. 441 [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, op. cit., p. 440, where it is translated as "unphilosophy" — Tr.]). Foucault uses it in a similar context in his course on anthropology, where he associates it with Nietzsche's atheism: "That is to say, Nietzsche's atheist philosophy becomes an *Unphilosophie* [non-philosophy], while escaping atheism as such by its will to philosophise (*volonté de philosopher*) in the atheist mode" (M. Foucault, *La Question anthropologique*, op. cit., p. 205).

44. Foucault writes, in the margin: "Berkeley, C. P. B. 659. Gueroult p. 29". See George Berkeley, *Philosophical Commentaries. Generally Called the Commonplace Book*, ed. by Arthur Aston Luce, London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1944 [1707-1708], fol. 55, §659, p. 233: "I say nothing w<sup>ch</sup> is perceived or does perceive Wills."

45. Foucault writes: "Berkeley, C. P. B. 808. Gueroult p. 35". See *ibid.*, fol. 82, §808, p. 287: "Idea is y<sup>e</sup> object or Subject of thought ; y<sup>t</sup> I think

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on w<sup>t</sup>ever it be, I call Idea. thought it self, or Thinking is no Idea tis an act i. e. Volition i. e. as contradistingu'd to effects, the Will."

46. G. Berkeley, *Principes de la connaissance humaine*, §27-28 and 36, trans. by Dominique Berlioz, Paris, Flammarion, 1991 [1710], pp. 79-81 and 85; id., *Trois dialogues entre Hylas et Philonous*, trans. by Geneviève Brykman and Roselyne Degrémont, Paris, Flammarion, 1999 [1713], Deuxième dialogue, pp. 138-140. [For the English originals, see George Berkeley, *A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A\\_Treatise\\_Concerning\\_the\\_Principles\\_of\\_Human\\_Knowledge](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/A_Treatise_Concerning_the_Principles_of_Human_Knowledge); and id., *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, digitised here: [https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Three\\_Dialogues\\_Between\\_Hylas\\_and\\_Philonous](https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Three_Dialogues_Between_Hylas_and_Philonous) — Tr.]

47. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Logique et Métaphysique (l'éna, 1804-1805)*, Fr. trans. by Denise Souche-Dagues, Paris, Gallimard, 1980. [See Hegel GWF (1986) *The Jena System 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics* (Burbidge J and di Giovanni G trans), McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston, Canada — Tr.]

48. Foucault elaborates on the question of Nietzsche's madness in his *History of Madness*, as well as, a few years later, in an interview with Serge Jouhet on France Culture. M. Foucault, *Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, op. cit., pp. 555-556; id., 'La folie de Nietzsche. Entretien de Michel Foucault avec Serge Jouhet', interview in the broadcast by Serge Jouhet, titled 'Analyse spectrale de l'Occident', devoted to Nietzsche and broadcast on France Culture on 8 January 1966 (publication forthcoming). On how Foucault and other philosophers like Deleuze treat the question of Nietzsche's madness, see Heinz Georg Kuttner, *Nietzsche-Rezeption in Frankreich*, Essen, Die Blaue Eule, 1984.

49. Karl Löwith, *De Hegel à Nietzsche*, Fr. trans. by Rémi Laureillard, Paris, Gallimard, 1969 [1941], pp. 161-173. Foucault refers here to the German neo-Hegelian philosopher Richard Kroner (1884-1874), evoked by Karl Löwith in his book. Deposed from his university chair in Kiel by the Nazis in 1934, Kroner emigrated to New York and took a university position during the war at the Union Theological Seminary, close to Columbia University in New York. Similarly, Löwith emigrated first to Japan, then to the United States, and taught at the New School for Social Research in New York and at Hartford Theological Seminary in Connecticut from 1941 to 1952.

50. Foucault develops here and elsewhere in his manuscripts the Nietzschean concept of repetition, associated with that of the Eternal Return, which is a key to reading [Nietzsche] for him. On this point, see Arianna Sforzini's note in *La Question anthropologique* (op. cit., p. 223, note 124), which refers us to an unpublished text from Boîte 65 (the first six feuillets of the dossier 'Uppsala, 1955-1956') where Foucault develops his relationship to the Eternal Return and which links to *Folie et Déraison* (1961).

51. Wilhelm Meister is the protagonist of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's work, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* (1795-1796). This novel describes how an idle young man, a theatre lover, eager for a bourgeois life, becomes a mature and self-aware person. This transformation takes place through travels, romances, and the interpretation of the main role in a production of *Hamlet*. The book is a classic example of the *Bildungsromane* ("learning novels" or "cultural novels"), a popular literary genre in the German romanticism of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries.

52. Nietzsche, *Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, op. cit.*, 'Letter 124 to Franz Overbeck, Venice, May 21, 1884', p. 226: "I welcome with joy your speaking of the "mystical separatists"; recently I was telling Köselitz that no "German culture" exists or has ever existed — except among mystical hermits, Beethoven and Goethe very much included!". [Harcourt translates this into French from English. I have restored the English rather than translating Harcourt's French — Tr.]

## WORKS ON NIETZSCHE

### ***Psychology***

*Reason and unreason; Nietzsche and Freud; The vocation of psychology; The festival of Rolandseck.*

#### REASON AND UNREASON

To identify the problem of madness with the limits of the normal and the pathological — this is to immediately fall below the level of the problem of reason. It is not so much to opt from the outset for reason — it is on the contrary to refuse to be placed inside reason to question it about its own light.

The idea that *unreason* is *disease* and its reciprocal, that *reason* is *health*, do not signal the access of the problematic of reason to positivity, but on the contrary mark the fall of this problematic, and the forgetting of its central question.

Reason would be leading — for which it would be necessary to ask for a norm for reason. The idea of norm. How the idea of norm replaced the question of reason.

The critical problem: beginning from the critical theme and the forgetting of its philosophical rooting — the idea of norm hides the question of reason.

This is why it is through the problem of unreason that the problem of reason can emerge anew. Just as *Unphilosophie* can restore access to philosophy. The Copernican revolution that will make it possible to overturn maintained<sup>180</sup> practice, the only way to regain critical vivacity, the violence of its wound, and to join its underside — it is no longer a

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search for *conditions* and *limits*, but a search for foundations and for the work of negativity.

This negativity is neither that of contradiction, nor that of forgetting, nor that of nothingness, nor that of death; but that of the *end*. The end, as end of philosophy, is linked to the problem of *repetition*; the end, as end of reason, is linked to the problem of abolition.

End of philosophy which is announced in the positivity of knowledge (*connaissance*); end of reason which is announced in the objectivity of conduct.

Both problems are implicated, because if the end of reason is considered as *critical moment* of the normal and the pathological, it is because philosophy *ends* in positive knowledge (*connaissance*). What this implies for the *morality* of a culture, of an era. The moral sense of psychoanalysis. The immorality of psychology. The paradoxes of Nietzsche who thought all problems of reason and philosophy in terms of disease and health. The critical sense he lent to psychology. What he could give back is the end of all anthropology as assignation of a kinship of essence between man and truth, and the end of all humanism as claim to a true essence of man. And if it is thus the liquidation of all these anthropological reflections which had emerged from criticism — it is even more profoundly the rise beyond the Platonic theme that the soul and ideas are close relatives.

If metaphysics<sup>181</sup> is possible after Nietzsche, it is insofar as it interrogates:

- this destiny of being conceived as repetition and that in opposition to the tautology of *being is*;
- this freedom of thought, in opposition to the abstract gratuitousness of philosophy;
- this necessary link of freedom of thought to the destiny of being, necessity which must be thought of neither in the form of truth nor in the form of history, but as that from which truth and history are possible.

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<sup>180</sup> Conjecture.

<sup>181</sup> Here, and in this manuscript, Foucault uses the Greek letter  $\mu$  as an abbreviation for the word 'metaphysics'.

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One must not take the Eternal Return as a metaphysical concept, as the space of possibility of a metaphysics; one must not take the overman as the metaphysics of man, but as the way in which one must go beyond the truth of man so that a metaphysics as freedom of thought linked to the destiny of being is possible.

Similarly the will to power.

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## NIETZSCHE AND FREUD

In *Fatum und Geschichte*, the division of freedom and determinism is not the division of consciousness and the unconscious (1). There are forms of the unconscious that carry the sign of freedom, which [they] translate, by betraying it if necessary, into the language of destiny. The way in which the events of a life are composed can draw the silent trajectory of a freedom, which works, secretly, to make the appearance of determinism: on the surface of consciousness is woven the involuntary framework of impressions; what makes it so manifest is precisely the vivacity of the impression that at each instant determines it; the language of consciousness obeys the syntax of the sensory (*sensibilité*); and the day that illuminates it must not be confused with the deep radiation of freedom. From that time, for Nietzsche, reflexive virtuality is not the index of freedom; and suddenly consciousness is stripped of a double privilege: that which confuses in it *the development of a virtuality* and *the exercise of freedom*; that which gives the deaf forms of its *origin* the sense and value of an absolute *beginning*. That dimension already looms along which those in-depth analyses will be made that we find in *Human, All Too Human*, or in *On the Genealogy of Morality*; yet we see on what ground the journey of *Zarathustra* will draw, on the face of the world, the enigma of a freedom that traces, in the chance of the event, the cipher of its destiny. Freedom appears as the wake of sense left behind it by the invisible navigation

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of the unconscious: freedom paradoxically forms the most brilliant manifestation of the unconscious (it is the unconscious at the surface of the day), and at the same time, it consecrates the unconscious, as the stone consecrates the sand, because from its lines entangled in a drawing that blurs every moment, it makes, slowly, but forever, meaning arise, like a face. Freedom is both the shimmering of the unconscious on the instantaneous surface of the day — and the slow advent of its definitive consecration. The unconscious protects freedom, in its *sinking to the interior of the being* — and freedom guarantees the unconscious in its *development towards the figures of history*. Man is free only because he is unconscious; and he is unconscious only because he is free; and because the unconscious is the ground of freedom — and freedom is the temple that makes this ground the fatherland common to men and gods.

Freud is much closer to the classical tradition, which makes consciousness and freedom the illusion of the unconscious and determinism. Freudian thought is reductive: the unconscious is proof that freedom does not rest on any deep ground.

Existential analysis (2).

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## [THE VOCATION OF PSYCHOLOGY]

This infernal vocation of psychology, *Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta mouebo*<sup>182</sup> (3). But if psychology must take the measure of Hell, it is not to find, by another way, the path that leads to Olympus. The measure of hell must be taken for itself. Arrow launched towards the night, towards the heart of the Earth.

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<sup>182</sup> "If I cannot bend the gods from above, I will be able to move the Achérion [the river that must be crossed to access the underworld]."

Not to make the day right, nor to do the geology of our landscapes, but to courageously, indefinitely, make way to this nocturnal point, where both the truth and the truth of man are abolished, where being itself is dead. The sense that

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psychology must take today is the impossibility of philosophising in the clear and serene space of an anthropology: we can only philosophise from the night, by a leap from the abyss of non-knowledge (*non-savoir*), with recourse to neither man nor humanist excuse; we can only philosophise once all fatherlands are lost.

The ambiguity: psychology — in its actual historical roots — is entirely woven into the forgetting of this vocation; its light is made only of that hidden night, is carried only by its gaze which turns away from this night. And it is by looking opposite its gaze that we rediscover that from which it escapes. Psychology indicates a philosophical task on the condition that it is brought up against the current; it is not by letting ourselves slip along its current that we find ourselves, by a silent and accomplished reduction of oneself, in the presence of philosophical and radical questioning. It serves us, but provided that it is diverted from its use, and that this small core of negation that its positivist affirmations have never ceased to hide is burst in the full light of day. Psychology is ambiguous not because it imports in its positivity the rodent secret of a transcendental questioning, but because it carries its sense in the wrong direction (*contresens*), because its answers are a way, are *the way*, no doubt, of refusing to question, because its light is only intended to hide the seriousness of a night.

Ought the cardinal orientation of a path to philosophy necessarily be this "counter-sense" of psychology? Is this only the determination of a moment in the destiny of our Western thought? Can the destruction of the truth, the fatal wound of being, only be opened to the one who mounts the banks of the knowledge (*connaissance*) of man? Now, always? It is very likely that there is something historical here: for a thought that has not known (*connu*) Western destiny, the opening is produced elsewhere and otherwise. For us, the point of disrepair of the world is man. Our Western world is anthropological, insofar as it asks a truth of man, an essence of man, finally the being of man, to replace the crumbled Truth, the engulfed Essence, the bleeding Being, and to hide, under a

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mastery of man by man, a Disaster where much more than man is found compromised. Psychology is the most decisive profile of this "anthropologisation", the simplest, most derisory form of this mastery.

Where does this anthropologisation begin? Long before Kant's *Anthropology*: already Socrates preferred to question men, and since the *Phaedra*, trees are no more the landscape of philosophy than things ordered in the garden. The Christian God was only possible in the ancient world once the kingdom of Anthropology was installed. And the most transparent form, the quintessence of this anthropologisation, is psychology, as positive form of the knowledge (*connaissance*) of man in his truth. Positivity, knowledge (*connaissance*), and truth, linked in the element of an essence of man, to hide that at the bottom of our Western culture, at the bottom of our Western consciousness, at the bottom of Western man, there is the negativity of a non-knowledge (*non-savoir*) where it is undone, and where truth, and man, and their essence are undone. The historical repetition of culture, the reflection, in the opposite direction (*contresens*), of the positive image that man gives of himself in knowledge (*connaissance*), the aesthetic experience in his creative risk, the opening, finally, onto the freedom of political enterprise, are all ways to make these postulates of Anthropology burst. So many possible ways, because they are not necessarily such, or rather they are not such in full light. Undoubtedly, political enterprise or creation always tear the fabric of Anthropology and are in any case a death of humanism. But even to the extent that they do not enlighten themselves as such, they constrain Anthropology to more inaccessible, more secret, more abyssal forms: they push Anthropology even further into the heart of the world. And the historical repetition of culture is necessary, the reflection in the opposite direction (*contresens*) of the "truth" of man is necessary, to snatch it from him, and finally make possible a philosophy without man, a truth without knowledge (*connaissance*), a knowledge (*savoir*) without subject, a world whose face is without gaze, an art without face.

This opening onto the night — it is the beginning of philosophy; it is also the philosophy of the beginning. This night is philosophical beginning, it is philosophy beginning (*philosophie commençante*). And this in an unsurpassable and absolute

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way. As long as it does not begin with this night and through this night, any questioning of origin is impure. The Hegelian interrogation of the shifting surfaces of day, with which the *Phenomenology of Spirit* starts,

the Husserlian interrogation of the penumbra of landscapes that open up to the awakening, already flowing, of a consciousness, the Heideggerian interrogation of the brilliance of Greek truth in the sunlit opening of being — all these ways of interrogating the beginning are impure: however morning (*matinales*) they may be, they all begin after daybreak — whereas it is the crux of night that must be questioned about its future suns; it is this that must be taken seriously, as origin and source, not the already all-too-clear pallor of the dawn. From the night flows the day, like springs from the earth. When appearance flees, when a full world, still without predicate, opens up to my temporal flux, when presence shines in the illumination of being, the injustice of man already reigns, and with it history; only these philosophies have nothing to complain about if we try to bypass them by following the paths of history; they have always left history behind their own beginning. To begin philosophy is not, it cannot be, to take the sensory, the phenomenon, the lived experience (*vécu*), or being at the level of their appearance, but to seek them where they are not; it is to seek the sun in the middle of the night, man in the middle of the desert, truth in the networks of dreams, the *logos* in madness. Thought must not begin where things point, but where they cannot grow; it does not begin in spring, but in the middle of winter. It is born in ashes.

The sense and the necessity of critique. Ought philosophy begin with destruction, with critique? Scepticism, moral and social critique, Kantian critique, anthropological critique — these are all ways of arriving at the residue, or the indispensable, or the *a priori*, or the essential, i.e. of being able to start with something other than nothing, i.e. of making philosophy have already begun; this is why critique is never serious, because it either runs short or it never ends. Critique is indeed the presupposition of philosophy: but not like the path leads to the Promised Land, nor like prevention of all belief permits one to reach to; critique must

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not precede philosophy, it is enveloped in the beginning of philosophy, it is simply the experience of the night, the experience that we do not have the truth, the experience that being is fatally wounded, the experience that all possible life has entered into slumber. This is critique: the point at which the vertigo of Discourse plunges, when it is not yet philosophy, but as soon as it has plunged, it is already philosophy. Critique is only the critical *point* at which philosophy begins; taken rigorously, it is the night that its beginning requires.

Psychology was born as a psychology of error and not as a psychology of truth; as a psychology, not of love, but of perversion; not of virtue, but of passions, vices, lies; not of consciousness in its waking state, but of forgetting, unconsciousness, and slumber. It is not originally designated as man's way of accessing his truth, but as the discovery of the path along which man [tends] to forget and lose himself, until the end of his decline. The first psychological emotion — I mean its first movement, and its original pathos, is moral bad conscience. There is no need here to show how a philosophy of obviousness (*évidence*) must call for a psychology of the imagination, a metaphysics of intelligible space, a psychology of 'natural judgements' in perception, or an ethics of bliss, a psychology of desire. What is essential when it comes to identifying what reflection and research can be in psychology, is simply to emphasise that they were born in the playground of a morality, or rather in the movement by which man recognises (*reconnait*) that he is not at home in truth, that his gaze is not originally open to being, that his discourse does not carry the language of truth in its form. Insofar as it is the rediscovery of this fatherland, the gazing-anew at the morning of truth, and the discourse which listens to this language, knowledge (*savoir*) is the disappearance of psychology, the erasure of the distance in which it unfolds: or again, metaphysics, as the accomplishment in the form of knowledge (*savoir*) of what morality implies as requirement, guarantees the effective disappearance of psychology. Psychology is the provisional metaphysics of fallen man, the truth of his

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error, the nature that keeps him at a distance from the truth of nature. Psychology, in the thought of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, is the set of concepts that explain why metaphysics can be, as knowledge (*savoir*), the most radical requirement of morality. It is that by which suppression in metaphysics allows metaphysics to be the accomplishment of morality. It is through psychology that the Christian ethics of fallen man has been able to accomplish and surpass itself in a metaphysics of truth. And this is why metaphysics is presented as metaphysics of nature, i.e. as rediscovered truth of that which man has lost. The philosophy of the 17<sup>th</sup> century is the philosophy of man before the fall, or after the redemption: it is in this that it is the suppression of psychology, the least anthropological philosophy there is. And far from psychology being then what it will be later, that which ensures the insertion of philosophy into an anthropology or of truth into the essence of man — it plays in philosophy the capital role of erasing man from truth, and of insuring

philosophy against any kind of anthropology. Psychology is not return to man but disappearance of man. By suppressing itself from metaphysics, it dissipates the face of man and the morning of truth.

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#### THE FESTIVAL OF ROLANDSECK (4)

1. The repetition whose silence opens the space of *Nachdenken*.<sup>183</sup>
2. Philosophy as obstacle to this *Philosophieren*,<sup>184</sup> which is *Nachdenken*.
3. Thought about the future and the past — the present being only a *Gedankenstrich*.<sup>185</sup>  
Thought belongs by nature to the festival.

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4. The definition of philosophy by the future of culture.
5. The explosion and the silence, the solitude. — The violence, the terror — the speech. The Greek and Latin earth did not know (*connait*) violence, any more than philosophy.

The importance of the festival:

The explosion of noise in the silence; the trumpets on the banks of the Rhine, the cries, the songs, as evening falls. The festival is the burst of noise surrounded by silence. That is the essence of the festival: when *all* is silent, there must be something that speaks, and cries — the divinity of noise in the temple of silence. *All* has to hush, in the sense that *the all* has to hush, that speeches have to come to rest in things, to find there, for an instant at least, their birthplace and the as yet unformulated instant of their origin. In the presence of things, words must slumber: not so that they can slip away into the night, but so that their profile can emerge, without denomination, into the full light. There can be no festival without the sun, because the festival is the absolute illumination of things, when their language has slumbered in accordance<sup>186</sup> with its immobility, it guarantees and manifests the presence of things in the silence of words that have finally returned to their hive. If words have come to rest in things, it is to restore its absolute sense to the cry, to the din, to the detonation — to everything that tears silence apart with a bloody line, and renders words derisory extending silence to the very base of itself, the base towards which it has launched its arrow. The cry measures the thickness of silence like a pebble thrown into a well: but this lacerating measure, this arrow's trajectory, the vibrancy of which we watch for on the target, reversibly indicates the point at which silence dies in the gush of the cry. And is this sought-after target, this end of an undecided trajectory, at the end of the cry, the base of silence, or the pure source of the speech that, for the first time, takes shape in this open wake? It is the cry in any case, which opens silence along its longest diagonal line, and the opening of silence by the cry is the original gesture of the festival; it circumscribes its useless necessity: the liberation, as *howl*,

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of a secret power of expression that is muzzled daily by language, but which words, drowsy in the sun, let escape in this festive day into the silence of things. The festival unleashes the secret, nocturnal, and demonic spirit of language — that *soul* of expression that language has long since conjured into a solid and infernal absence: it thus offers the silence of its contemplation to the ravages of a noise that runs through it, possesses it, and exalts it as the unpredictable source of speech. The festival expresses nothing — it is expression expressing itself; it constitutes the most original form of *return*, or, let's say, of *reflection*. It does not begin — or rather, as soon as it begins, it recommences. It is not for nothing that it is the mark of time: not because it bears its stigma, but because it traces the curve where its birth is sheltered. It celebrates an origin that exists only through it, and by its grace becomes the origin of times. It is not the festival that obeys the seasons of time, but time that bears the festival's insignia, arms, and emblem: time recommences, before it has begun, but it was to recommence that it began; there is no time without origin

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<sup>183</sup> *Nachdenken*: reflection.

<sup>184</sup> *Philosophieren*: philosophise.

<sup>185</sup> *Gedankenstrich*: dash, indent.

<sup>186</sup> Conjecture.

of times — and it is all the more remote the deeper the cry goes into the depth of silence. Time must therefore be *explored* by paths other than the usual ones: this deep nature of time means that it is not flux, current, the living water of a lost spring — but a ring of metal, whose inflexibility recommences at every point, in that joyous festival of gold that sings the glory of not being able to be broken; and on this ring, the cipher engraved must only be read as it rises, in the *Nachdenken*, forming a text that takes on sense as the ring turns: this is the *Schicksal*.

This is why the festival that begins its recommencement with the instant cry, with the *explosion* of a noise, with this absolute *externalisation*, opens, in the circular space of the *Erinnerung*, the retrospective path of the *Nachdenken*. By placing it on the ring of destiny, the festival opens to man a thought that already by right of origin is a memory.

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#### NOTES

1. F. Nietzsche, *Fatum et Histoire* [1862], in *Écrits autobiographiques 1856-1869*, Fr. trans. by Max Marcuzzi, ed. by Marc Crépon, Paris, PUF, 1994, pp. 189-194, here p. 194. [See Nietzsche F (2012) *Fate and History*, in *Nietzsche's Writings as a Student* (trans unnamed), The Nietzsche Channel, pp. 63-67, here p. 66 — Tr.]

2. The critique of Freud that Foucault formulates in this text may be related to that which we find in his introduction to *Dream and Existence* and in *Binswanger et l'analyse existentielle*. See M. Foucault, 'Dream, Imagination and Existence' (Williams F trans), in Binswanger L and Foucault M (1986), *Dream and Existence* (K Hoeller ed), Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, Seattle, USA, pp. 29-78, here p. 34, §2, ff.; *id.*, *Binswanger et l'analyse existentielle*, ed. by Elisabetta Basso, Paris, Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, 2020, pp. 18 ff.

3. This passage comes from Virgil's Aeneid: *Énéide*, vol. 2, Livres V-VIII, Fr. trans. by Jacques Perret, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1978, Livre septième, p. 94, line 312. Foucault wrote in his manuscript: "Superos si flectere nequeo, Acheronta movebo"; we reestablish in the text the version published by Les Belles Lettres. [See Virgil (2003) *The Aeneid* (West D trans), Penguin, London, UK, Book 7, p. 150, line 312, which gives: "If I cannot prevail upon the gods above, I shall move hell" — Tr.]

4. The title of this fiche makes reference to an experience lived by Nietzsche in a forest on the banks of the Rhine, near Bonn where he was a student. He recounts it in the first lecture of *Sur l'avenir de nos établissements d'enseignement*, ed. by G. Colli and M. Montinari, Fr. trans. by Jean-Louis Backès, pref. by J.-C. Hémery, Paris, Gallimard, 1973, pp. 25-49; see also *Écrits posthumes (1870-1873)*, OPC, t. I, vol. 2, pp. 81-97. [See Nietzsche F (2016) *Anti-Education: On the Future of Our Educational Institutions*, (P Reitter and C Wellmon eds, Searls D trans), New York Review of Books, New York, USA, pp. 3-19; the relevant volume of CW has yet to be published — Tr.]

WORKS ON NIETZSCHE

***Greek Thought***

*To (physically) become Greeks; Homer and classical philology; Dialectics and tragedy, or truth and veracity; Philosophy is Greek history; Dialectics and tragedy; Heraclitus; Theatre and the death of God; On The Origin of Tragedy; The philosophy of the will (volonté) and Dionysian lyricism; Lyricism, image, soul of the world; Repetition.*

TO (PHYSICALLY) BECOME GREEKS<sup>187</sup>

We are becoming more Greek by the day: as if we were Hellenising ghosts. Hellenising, for Nietzsche, is already a way of no longer being Greek. Hellenism dissolves the autochthonous presence of the Greeks in their Greek land and sky, in a universality that pushes the contours of the cosmos to the confines of geography, assigning them, in a way which is decisive for our philosophy, to an absence, in which the paths of positive discovery are gradually lost at the level of their ground. One should not see, in the Hellenism of Alexander, the transposition of the Greek totality to the world, the claim to Greek happiness for mankind in general, the planetary enlargement of the horizons of the Greek *kosmos*. This "progressivism" forms the imperial and Roman justification, the *political* reflection, on an event whose decisive impact falls into forgetting, expatriation, the sliding outside itself of the Greek world — more exactly in this opening of the Greek world, whose dehiscence closes it forever to itself.

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In effect this universalisation proposes a human scale for the world, as norm of its truth, thus altering, in the comfort of a universal home (*chez-soi*), the errant savagery of the sophists who monetised the Parmenidean unity of being and thought, under the guise of an implication of man and truth (and in so doing they opened the path of philosophy, "the path abounding in revelations of divinity" (1), the byways where modern philosophy has lost its way); but their community had already reached the end of the road, prophesying that this implication of man and truth would lead to the death of the truth as truth of the truth, and to the loss of man as being of the truth.

By making modern philosophy possible, the sophists at the same time gave it a rendezvous at the crossroads of its impossibility. That is why we encounter them, that is why Nietzsche encountered in them the fatal and ironic destiny of our philosophy; in them we must salute the death of our philosophy prophesied at its birth, laughter, as the ever-threatening but ever-saving sanction of our philosophy, and the proximity, suddenly flowering in thought, of Greek blood. It is indeed this blood that freezes us in this laughter, blood that lives, and blood that bleeds; blood that gathers in the heart of courage, and blood that lets its promise of flowering flow over the earth; blood exchanged by the Atreides in their great contract of murders, blood poured out in the mutual libations of war. The sophists are always close to this blood, and to this Greek pain, even if they exchange it under the monetised species of speech. Their laughter — that of Euthydemus, that of Callicles — links speech to blood, the question without response to the murder without respondent, in the tearing of dialogue (2). The sophists' laugh restores for an instant the death of truth, which is accomplished in the consecrated blood of man. To go back from the agonising implication of man and truth to the unity of thought and being in a world where man dies by killing truth, it is necessary to rediscover the great *nefarious* moment of laughter: nefarious, in the sacred fullness of the word, since it

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<sup>187</sup> Michel Foucault first titled this text "To (physically) re-become Greeks," then crossed out the "Re". He adds at the end "(XV, 419)", reference to the German edition of Nietzsche's works, *Nietzsche's Werke, op. cit.*, t. XV, p. 419. See *supra*, note 5, p. 128.

represents the rite of this murder; nefarious, for us in its poor utility, since it too prudently guarantees us against its bloodthirsty rigour. It is this echo of the sophists' laughter that Nietzsche, in the wake

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of the completion of philosophy, makes us hear again in its multiple sonorities: the laughter of the tyrant's violence, the laughter of the young blond athlete, the laughter of Callicles and Thrasymachus; the laughter of the truth that eludes man at the very moment when he proclaims himself to be its measure; the laughter of language that definitively steals the truth from its formulation; the silent laughter, finally, of the sophist who assigns to a philosophy, which he among others has rendered incapable of supporting, the formidable interrogation of being. All this is found in Nietzsche, as the absolute moment of *laughter*, which is in no case the modulation of nihilism, since nihilism, on the contrary, is ordered to it. The nihilism of Schopenhauer, that of Wagner, carry with them only the seriousness of their justification — that of Nietzsche formulates in words the fulguration of laughter.

Socratic irony was the very opposite of the sophists' laughter: its form of questioning presupposed the glimpsed face of a truth, a statue-like serenity, and even if it remained indefinitely open, it was by leaning in spite of everything against a world closed to responses. Socrates' irony made a response absolutely possible — insofar as it designated, in the index of its questioning, the response that was already there, from which the question solemnly emerged, as forgetful memory, or more precisely as secret guide to memory in the false perdition of forgetting. The sophists' laughter revealed the absolute impossibility of response: *ouden legeis*, from which rebounded the impossibility of the formulated question, invalidating the *dialegesthai*<sup>188</sup> in one blow, at the very moment when, unlike Socrates, the *dialegesthai* reveals its sense, not in the salvation of the *logos*, but on the contrary in its irreparable shipwreck. The forgetting of that which one must remember in the Socratic dialogue served as ground, sandy no doubt, but solid, for the path of the *logos*, which at the end of this beach found for its reward and rest the rock of memory. Sophistic questioning erased all traces of the ground beneath its feet, so that it could 'find itself' in the void: the sole form of memory and recognition (*reconnaissance*), the sole formula of response, being this same movement in which the ground slips away: whatever this young man, Socrates, says will be refuted (3). This loss, body and soul, of the *logos* in the recognised (*reconnue*),

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concerted cheating of the *dialegesthai* kept open the problematic of the *logos* as indefinite navigation into the abyss, and preserved it from that *forgetting* with which Socratic and Platonic memory was to envelop it. At what price, in fact, did this memory save the *logos*? At the price of a shift that detaches its absolute initiative from the *legein*<sup>189</sup> and recalls it in a nostalgia, always the same, to the promised Ithaca of the *eidenai*,<sup>190</sup> it saved it only by assigning it a home port, by reminding it of the promised presence of home, where it was born and where it should *die*: in this death at home it should acquire, not the perilous and bloody immortality of Achilles, but that eternity where in the sky of the *eidenai* it remains *ktêma eis aei*<sup>191</sup> for the sole possibility of history. The Socratic dialogue ultimately saves the *logos* only by having already lost it at the origin, and by having forgotten its *polemical* presence as soon as possible. This is not to say that the historical-psychological origin of logic lies in "discussion", but that the *logos* deploys a warlike essence, in a bloody will (*vouloir*), that it criss-crosses the world according to the trajectory of an arrow that disappears and is annihilated in the disappearance and annihilation of the other: if the *logos* 'has seen' anything, it is from the beginning of its course that target whose death it immediately bears; it has seen it dead, and it is this death that is already announced by the vibration of the taut string, and the first whistle of the arrow: whatever this young man, Socrates, says... The *logos* of the sophists is not going to die at home, nor like that of Socrates in the prepared homeland of the *eidenai*, which eternalises it by sealing over it, to make a tomb, the stone where its course was borne: memory, monument. It is lost there below (*là-bas*) in the death of the other, which it bears from the origin of itself, as its own aim, as its end, as the annihilation of itself. How could the role of the *dialegesthai* be to save the *logos*, since the *logos* never deploys anything in rigour but its essence of death? The *dialegesthai* can only form the space in which the trajectory of this

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<sup>188</sup> *Dialegesthai*: to discuss.

<sup>189</sup> *Legein*: to say.

<sup>190</sup> *Eidenai*: to have seen.

<sup>191</sup> *Ktêma eis aei*: good forever.

death is accomplished; it does not at any point define the scholarly community of academia and leisure, but opens for

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men the field in which to confront the equivocal and mortal power of the *logos*, which authorises and consecrates the advent of sovereignty.

The blunt edge of the *logos*, forgetting its thread and its perils, marks the boundary that inaugurates *Hellenic discourse* in the time of Socrates and certain 'scholastic' sophists: no longer a hymn of war and rivalry, but a pan-Hellenic proclamation; no longer a mortal challenge, but a collective teaching enterprise; no longer a movement by which the *logos* evades itself in its own absence of foundation, but an effort to give birth through the skill of dialogue to a truth already formed in the heart of a forgetful memory. Then the quarry of history, remembrance, and exegesis opens up for the *logos*, finally forming the space of philosophical reflection, and assigning it the task of rediscovering the truth from which the *logos*, through which we strive to decipher it, proceeds: this circle of truth and *logos*, or of *eidenai* and *dialegesthai*, necessarily subjects all thought to the destiny of history, giving it the task of rediscovering in the future of the *eidenai* the past anterior of the *dialegesthai*. This form historical has, since the end of sophistry, marked even the most initial approaches to philosophy. Philosophies that want to be radically beginning, such as those of Descartes and Husserl, can only conceive of themselves through the establishment of an *eidenai*, a 'having seen' which, as original truth, forms the past anterior, immediately visible, of all reflection. Its claim to an absolute obviousness (*évidence*), its claim to constitute a rigorous science, far from being an attempt to escape the form of history, represents, on the contrary, its most accomplished face: to be, in its entirety, the rigorous *history* of itself, which from the origin takes under its gaze and holds there without interruption the *eidos* from which its discourse radiates. These philosophies belong just as much to the fundamental structure of history — at least as it is defined in the Socratic relationship of *eidenai* and *dialegesthai* — as those in which the path of an *Odyssey* of recollection appears more explicitly. By forgetting the absolute sense of *logos*, and by subordinating it to the interiority of the *eidenai*, Hellenism condemned philosophy to a fundamentally historical structure. To free it from this, it is futile to have recourse to a philosophy of

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eternity or of consciousness, which is in any case lodged in the moment of the *eidenai*; it is necessary to appeal to Sophistic laughter and boldness, which tear through the night within the night, not to provide opening onto another clarity, but solely to cross the night in all its thickest dimensions of obscurity; then the *logos* tears itself away from the diurnal space of history; it no longer recites, along its path, the new landscapes it has always already seen; but it experiences its sovereignty in violence, and in the blind direction of death.

Thus, since Hellenism, we have always found ourselves, in our philosophical reflection, on a path of return: a return whose peripatetic nature the constellation of the *eidenai* prescribes for the *logos* and which defines for us its identity with philosophy, in the notion of reflection. Henceforth philosophising will mean retracing one's steps, not committing oneself to seeing, but promising oneself to see again, in such a way that the young light of the poem and of the vision in the flowering of dawn is obscured, so that the transparency of things in the serenity of the already-seen (*déjà-vu*) reigns without colour or shadow, above all without any visible trace of night or sun. Philosophy has become for us, by vocation, a lingering thought, a thought that surprises itself on the return to itself, and implies thereby, even from its first moment, the pretension of absolute knowledge (*savoir*). Henceforth, there can no longer be poetical philosophy, prey to the very first birth of the image, but only a philosophy given over to the nostalgia of 'having', of 'knowing (*connaître*)', which links it to science through an illusion of kinship. Philosophy reprises everything in a world that never recommences; it alone totals all the possible forms of recommencement of the world, the geometric place of which it forms as soon as it decides to be philosophy. But in its project to be recommencement, it makes the claim of accomplishing a completion, since all the world needs to totalise itself is to be recommenced once and for all. Thus, Platonic recollection made possible a philosophy whose future is to be the whole of the world's future: the *eidenai* that has presided over the birth of the *logos* since Socrates, by bending it towards return from the beginning, promises to complete the truth of the world, and the imposed kinship of the *logos* and the *eidenai* is immediately answered, even if it is only to be

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admitted by Leibniz and proclaimed by Hegel, by the kinship of totality and truth. Such is the intention of the temporal structure of philosophy, which Plato substituted for the fulguration of the *logos*. Since Hellenism, philosophy recommences a world that ends with it, because it has lost the youth and courage to be simply, as poetry, the beginning itself of the world. But its misfortune and its powerlessness lie precisely

in the fact that the world does not recommence, since philosophy itself, by claiming from the origin to complete it, does not authorise it to recommence. If our world has ceased to recommence for so long, it is not because of the objective laws of its history, but because since Plato we have been philosophising in a Hellenic world, where philosophy, by itself recommencing the world, has taken away the freedom to recommence. The Stoics undoubtedly make the world recommence: but for them this is not a way of letting the world be free; on the contrary, it is a way of letting its possibilities be totally exhausted, since it is only at the end of its possibilities that the world *annihilates itself* and recommences. On the contrary, Heraclitus' world recommences not through annihilation, but through a profusion of riches, through an excess of freedom, at the point of its greatest novelty: the same and not the same; the same river, never the same river; not in the 'logical' and historical sense where 'becoming' alters identity, but in the poetic and philosophical sense where the beginning is of itself recommencement; becoming does not flow from eternity, it does not modify it; on the contrary, it bears it in that which it [does] at each new moment; it does not imitate it in the recommencement that follows completion out of necessity, fatigue, and lack of creation; but creates it in its own image in the recommencement of that which it has already begun as recommencement. Freeing philosophy from the limits or confines of reflection, taking it away from the path of return where Hellenism has placed it, means both restoring to it the freedom to be the absolute poetic beginning of the world, and restoring to the world the freedom, lost under the constellation of the *eidenai*, to be, at each beginning, a free recommencement of itself.

We are becoming more Greek.

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#### HOMER AND CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY (4)

Element of the *Geschichte*:

1. access to the individuality of peoples;
2. the way in which these individualities determine themselves in images (*Bilden*?);
3. the law of the flux of appearances.

Six notions: *Volk*; *Individualität*; *bestimmen*; *Bild*; *Gesetz*; *Erscheinung*.<sup>192</sup>

Hegelian notions: this was the very subject of Hegel's first discourse at the Gymnasium in Nuremberg [in] 1809 (5). But there are differences:

- Hegel leaves in the shadows the *Volksgeist-Volksindividualität* problem that was at the forefront of his youthful works. The study of Antiquity is itself an original movement towards the universal. The *sich bilden*<sup>193</sup> is *sich heraufbilden*<sup>194</sup> towards the universal, towards the universal essence of the spirit. Nietzsche does not perceive this universality, he only deciphers the heterogeneity of a philological culture that forms "a magic potion made of plants, metals, and various...". (6). Nietzsche has lost the principle of articulation which, for Hegel, ensured the unity of philological disciplines.
- However, Hegel discovers the movement towards this universality in an appropriation of a *Volksgeist* the whole pedagogical sense of which is to maintain it in its individual and historical element.

1. *Lernen*<sup>195</sup> is first and foremost "retaining of chatter" (*Geschwätz*), which is the spontaneous language of individual representation:

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<sup>192</sup> *Volk*: people; *Individualität*: individuality; *bestimmen*: to determine; *Bild*: image; *Gesetz*: law; *Erscheinung*: appearance.

<sup>193</sup> *Sich bilden*: is formed.

<sup>194</sup> *Sich heraufbilden*: is formed in being elevated.

<sup>195</sup> *Lernen*: learning.

chatter that is the immediate form of subjective expression, the "bad" externalisation, an expression that does not develop in the element of the universal. That science of language which is philology must therefore begin with the exercise of silence. It is on the basis of this silence, which mutes all chatter, that the constellation that presided over the birth of language will slowly be shown. Philology must therefore first abolish this 'pathology' of expression, this bad subjectivity of exteriority, by renouncing the empire of its own *Vorstellung*. Philology therefore has a *critical* task. But critique carried out on the basis of the sciences of nature uncovers the *conditions* of representation in subjectivity; critique carried out on the basis of, and for the constitution of, the sciences of culture uncovers in the other culture the limits of subjective representation. And above all, critique must be a prerequisite in the sciences of culture.

Kantian critique: reflection — on the already discovered objectivity of nature — completes the return to subjectivity.

Critique and culture: the *Lernen* which aims to achieve the objectivity of cultures by renouncing the chatter of subjective representation.

But in any case, the universal is maintained; whereas Nietzsche will have lost the way to the universal: as a result, the problematic will be shifted from *Vorstellung* to *Bild* and from *Geschichte* to *Erscheinung*.

In a sense, this brings us closer to Kant, since the problem of *Geschichte* fades away in favour of the question of *Erscheinung*. But the problem of the image replacing that of *Vorstellung* gives a new sense to the problem of *Erscheinung*. *Erscheinung* is no longer ordered to the problem of truth, but is solely the light in which the image is originally illuminated. *Erscheinung*, as the luminous element into which the image is cut, escapes in the same blow the order of *Geschichte* and finds the space of its own problematic.

2. Philological *Lernen* for Hegel consists in living in the same dwelling as the Ancients, "giving oneself to them *im Kost und Wohnung*",<sup>196</sup> becoming *heimisch*<sup>197</sup> in their sky, in their horizon,

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in their landscape. Which only apparently contradicts the claim to universality: for this sky is the most beautiful, the most luminous of those ever illuminated by a sun; and it is at the same time the most original, the most *vortrefflich*.<sup>198</sup> It is the brightest and most morning-like of illuminations. It is in the morning that the day enunciates its truth. Philology is entirely Greek: and the *Zweideutigkeit*<sup>199</sup> of the Christian world must not figure in it.

3. The study of language is both the manifestation of this unity and the *Entfremdung vom Eigenen*.<sup>200</sup> Language (Greek language), insofar as it bears this luminous unity of *Erscheinung*, and mutes the chatter of subjectivity in favour of foreign objectivity, language is paradoxically the instrument of the universal.

Language opens access to the Other in its *Anderssein*.<sup>201</sup>

The Copernican revolution of a psychological subjectivity.

From chatter to the study of language, this reversal of the most fundamental forms of expression takes place.

The *Sprachformen*<sup>202</sup> contain the logos: the concept of being is enveloped in each *ist* of grammar. Just like scientific studies and military exercises.

The unity of private and public life, the quotidian character of virtue. Escape from purely private and family relationships to gain access to the State.

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But, for Nietzsche, in his 1869 discourse, culture has lost the element of universality in which it completed its sense:

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<sup>196</sup> *Im Kost und Wohnung*: in housing and food.

<sup>197</sup> *Heimisch*: original.

<sup>198</sup> *Vortrefflich*: sublime.

<sup>199</sup> *Zweideutigkeit*: ambiguity.

<sup>200</sup> *Entfremdung vom Eigenen*: alienation of self.

<sup>201</sup> *Anderssein*: alterity.

<sup>202</sup> *Sprachformen*: linguistic forms.

1. It must manifest the *Volksindividualitäten*;<sup>203</sup>
2. Taken as science of nature, it does not situate man within the horizon of a natural universality, on the contrary, it searches deep within himself for a

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*Sprachinstinkt*<sup>204</sup> which is, at the heart of his nature, the principle of human transcendence over the nature. Difference from the sciences of nature.

[3] As element of aesthetics, philology does not show man's unity with his world, the closeness of his duty, his quotidian kinship with his virtues; it is a matter of resurrecting a buried ideal world, and "of opposing to the present world the mirror of the classical and eternal world" (7).

These three elements themselves do not achieve their own unity, which is why philology never moves on to *Wirklichkeit*,<sup>205</sup> and philologists are the very people Hegel denounced as eternal disciples. The unity of philology is ensured only by the dogmatic form it takes in pedagogy: in other words, its unity, instead of taking place as a totality under the sign of the universal, is determined by the arbitrariness of a decree that chooses the most *lebenswertesten* and *bildungsfördernsten* elements.<sup>206</sup>

That is to say, philology does not address the Greek world as the absolute possibility of man, or the radical form of culture, but valorises it within a system of options, of which there is nothing at the outset to allow — quite the contrary — the supposition that the very essence of culture is expressed there. See later the critique of morality.

But to what is this loss of universality due?

- Deception and the neo-Hegelian effort.

- a. Ruge (8):

- the *Überbildung*;<sup>207</sup> Alexandrian culture; [illegible] culture. Romanticism and bourgeois culture;
- the unity of culture and political life;
- the *Selbstbewusstsein*<sup>208</sup> must become *Weltbewusstsein*;<sup>209</sup>

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- liberalism must be transformed into a democratism that erases the difference between *Gebildeten* and *Ungebildeten*;<sup>210</sup>
- *Der Geist ist Staatgeist*, and all men are *politische Wesen*.<sup>211</sup>

- b. Bauer and Stirner: detaching culture from the State (9).

- c. Burckhardt (10).

This detachment from culture and the element of universality was achieved before Nietzsche. But it was done in a Hegelian style.

That of Nietzsche already foreshadows a new style, utilising concepts that have an other resonance.

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The problem of *philology* is not that of culture. It is linked to it, but not identified with it.

Philology and culture.

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|------------|---|
| Philology: | → nostalgia — ideal world buried.                               |
|            | → it descends among the Boeotians to speak to them of the gods. |

<sup>203</sup> *Volksindividualitäten*: individualities of peoples.

<sup>204</sup> *Sprachinstinkt*: linguistic instinct.

<sup>205</sup> *Wirklichkeit*: reality.

<sup>206</sup> *Lebenswertesten*: the most agreeable to life; *bildungsfördernsten*: the most favourable to education.

<sup>207</sup> Conjecture. *Überbildung* is the "high culture (*sur-culture*)", by opposition to the popular culture.

<sup>208</sup> *Selbstbewusstsein*: consciousness of self.

<sup>209</sup> *Weltbewusstsein*: consciousness of the world.

<sup>210</sup> *Gebildeten*: educated people; *Ungebildeten*: uneducated people.

<sup>211</sup> *Der Geist ist Staatgeist*: The spirit is spirit of the State; *politische Wesen*: political beings.

- it highlights the problem of individuality.
- *Sprachinstinkt*: opening to nature.
- beyond history.

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It is no coincidence that Nietzsche's thinking finds its opening to itself in the exercise of philology; which designates not only the practice of commentary, but a little more profoundly that experience of trying to read the obscure text that words both reveal and conceal, the silent language that remains subterranean<sup>212</sup> to its formulation; in short,

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trying to decipher *that which is said by that which has been said*. It is no coincidence that Nietzsche, from the outset, reached the naive truth of contemporary philosophy, but in a form of practice completely foreign to its familiar ground: as if he were seizing the immediate essence of philosophy, but in a gesture free from all the presuppositions of philosophy.

That philology forms the unreflected truth of philosophy, that it even constitutes it in an immediate presence for reflection, Nietzsche expressed this through the equivocation of a formula he borrowed from Seneca to give a theme to the end of the discourse he gave in Basel, when he took up his chair in Greek language, on 28 May 1869: "*Philosophia facta est quæ philologia fuit*" (11). Did he mean to say that philosophy has fulfilled its essence and completed its truth on the basis of a "philology" whose immediate existence, unreflected and naïve, is effectuated and suppressed by this becoming? The becoming, now completed, of philosophy (*facta est...*) would affect with the index of the past the existence of a philology (*philologia fuit...*) which is now philosophy.<sup>213</sup> But did he not also mean that what constituted philology, by a *fact* and a *right of origin* (*quæ philologia fuit*), its essence as we can identify it on the first ground of its history, is the very thing of which philosophy gradually became (*philosophia facta est*), the space in which it found its dimensions, the element in which it deployed its essence; the opening in which it found the path towards its truth? In such a way that philosophy would take its measures on the very dimensions of philology, and its surface of reflection would be rigorously lodged in the opening that philology has provided for thought; the becoming of philosophy would find its space of play only in the existence, rooted henceforth in time, of philology: to this immemorial form of memory it would give the face of presence. "Philosophy has become the very thing that philology was."

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Let us not try to dispel this equivocation by its context: it is deeply rooted there. The sentence that immediately follows the quotation from Seneca can be interpreted, at first glance, as the affirmation that philology is enveloped by philosophy, as the singular is enveloped by the general, as a knowledge (*connaissance*) is enveloped by knowledge (*savoir*), as a scientific formula is enveloped by a global form of perception of the world: "All philological activity is enveloped and included in an intuition of the world (*Weltanschauung*), in which all that is singular and isolated is dissipated as something worthy of blame: only the Whole and the Unitary remain" (12). The Diltheyan resonance of the text would reassure us completely about the unique and irreversible direction of its sense, if one word did not merit arousing our disquiet even more, by the danger it poses to it, by suddenly stretching its virtualities: the singular limit that traces the domain of philological activity not only bears the index of the temporal, the historical, the individual; it is stigmatised by an enigmatic blame, which immediately establishes between philosophy and philology a type of relation that is irreducible to the mere progress from the singular to the universal. A philological activity that remains on par with its own domain carries with it a condemnation: a condemnation that not only dries up its virtualities, not only promises a limit to its existence, but situates it, in an ethical horizon, under the sign of a curse. Must this be seen as a first approximation to the 'fault' that Nietzsche would later assign to the very origin of individual existence?

On closer inspection, the text does not yet suggest anything of the sort, since it is in the sky of the *Weltanschauung*, and not in itself, on its native ground, that the singular appears as blameworthy. It is

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<sup>212</sup> *Stricken*: "The problem of culture and that of the end of philosophy in Ruge. The democratisation of culture and its *Verwirklichung* coincide with the end of philosophy. Culture and end of philosophy: in Ruge: Praxis, History. In B. Bauer end of philosophy and misery. Cf. Proudhon."

<sup>213</sup> Foucault adds in a footnote: "The philosophy that was philology was made."

philosophy that, with blame, brings out the absolute limit of philology, like the whole that defines the fault of *finitude*. If philological activity in itself deserves condemnation, it is not because it failed to develop into a philosophy, but because its becoming like philosophy implied, of itself, a condemnation of its own activity. Therefore, how to identify the sense of this blame, if not by locating it somewhere, within this distance that separates, in Seneca's formula, the "*fuit*" from the "*facta est*": it becomes clear that between philology and philosophy

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the relation is not ordered according to a becoming that can be measured on the scale of time, but that the *past* that is the essence of all philology is abolished by philosophy in a becoming that defines its own completion at every moment. The condemnation is not, then, of the general against the singular, but of the perpetual completion of becoming against that which envelops, in its own essence, the ineffaceable remoteness of the past. There is in philological activity an original form of retreat, of slipping outside of being into the abolished space of having been, in which the perpetual presence of philosophy in being, in the form of becoming, of "*fieri*", can designate the original sin of the philologists. But is philosophy, through which this 'fault' of philology exists (rather like Saint Paul, it is through the law that sin exists), to erase it in the same movement that birthed it? Philology would then be no more than the moment of sin in the becoming of philosophy: "*felix culpa*", since it would give philosophy the opportunity for its own redemption. Philology would be the slippage over time of a philosophical consciousness that loses possession of its becoming in its present. If the "*fuit*" of philology were to disappear into the "*facta est*" of philosophy, all possibility of retreat would then be eliminated, and Homer would never be much better than what he was before Wolf: a "good old man known under the label of genius of nature, child of a barbaric age, fully loaded with attacks against good taste and morals" (13).

Nietzsche discovers, in passing, the stumbling block of historical thought, and thereby identifies the problematic in which Dilthey's critique finds its original space: under what conditions will the Homer of philology escape the social, cultural, ethical, and philosophical horizon of the philologists who assign him (or contest him) a place at the origin of their own culture, their own society, their own morality, their own philosophy? How could the Homer of modern philologists not be the slightly evolved descendant of the 'good old man' that the 18<sup>th</sup> century situated at the point where civilisation, in an ambiguous way, is articulated on both nature and barbarism (both thought as limits, original and absolute, of a historical figure of civilisation)? Nietzsche, however, sidesteps the question, or rather, he avoids placing it in that dubious day of critical interrogation

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where it can no longer escape itself, nor rediscover the absolute distance of the present from the past. By asking itself under *what conditions the knowledge (connaissance) of the past* avoids being determined entirely by the *forms of consciousness of the present* in which it is enveloped, a critical thought in the manner of Dilthey sets itself the impossible task of defining the positive conditions of a negation, and by the same token conceals the absolute sense of the relation to the past that the present constitutes in an original way and which announces itself by the impassable character of the distance that separates them. All the difference that arises from the first texts between Dilthey's critical question and Nietzsche's interrogation can be briefly characterised: for Dilthey, the proximity, in the forms of consciousness, between knowledge (*connaissance*) of the past and the lived experience of the present compromises, through a whole network of silent complicities, the meaningful autonomy of the past, and renders irreparably fragile the core from which it radiates; for him, it is a matter of rediscovering the absolute distances of time in the spaceless present of consciousness. For Nietzsche, distance is given from the outset in all its ontological seriousness; from philosophy to philology there unfolds a whole movement of being that absolutely guarantees, even against appearance, even against knowledge (*savoir*), the distances that are verbally marked between Seneca's "*fuit*" and "*facta est*". It is not a matter of finding in the philosophical elucidation of consciousness the conditions of possibility of a philology: for the very essence of philology, and the truth of its relation to philosophy, are inscribed, from the very origin, in the unfolding of being.

If, then, there is a trace of a fault in the philologist's singular activity, an indication of a fall along a fault line in being, this 'fault' is neither profanation nor impiety. There is a certain lightness in reproaching philologists, as too many friends of Antiquity do, for the disrespect with which they lay their hands on the sacred objects of Greek beauty: did Schiller not reproach scholars for tearing Homer's crown? And many artists wonder whether philologists lack aesthetic aptitude and sensitivity, or whether the spirit of negation has henceforth become all-powerful (14). In fact, philology is the opposite of all these forms of profanation:

in its absolute respect for ontological distance, it allows the sense of the sacred to watch over the inaccessible

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limit of its own horizon, and it is this constellation that opens the rigorous space of its path to the night of its work. Nietzsche's discourse lends three aspects to this 'philological piety'. First of all, philology is the methodical exercise<sup>214</sup> of the distances of being; it is at the point of this distance, when attention must cross the whole space of being and gather itself from one end of its unfolding to the other, that, from the bottom of its landscapes, we will see the archaic and fundamental lines of its geology rise little by little: "I thought that the *Grundformationen* of a deeply sunken rock will show themselves in a more meaningful way if we look at them from above" (15). The piety of philology takes form above all in respect for this space where the truth of being is gradually drawn; and is its reward not to be found when, across this distance, the memory of a long since dormant language is expressed in the coherence of discourse? Not that it creates this discourse, or even gives rise to it, but only that it *resurrects* it (16) through a distance that it does not vainly attempt to cross, since on the contrary it respects it as the primary element of its truth. Through this space the major lines are reproduced, through this silence the speeches are repeated; the religious respect of philology, in which the sacred distance is maintained, thus defines the space of play of a repetition. Philology must not set itself a task of interpretation — constantly limited by its own index of eventuality — nor a work of reconstitution, whose organising theme must always be presupposed as self-evident. Is it not to these two errors that successive commentators on the Homeric works have fallen?

For it is neither in the sense of an interpretation nor of a reconstruction that philology will discover the proper domain of its possibilities. Philology can only respond to the problem of Homer by repeating that aesthetic judgement which, for the Greeks themselves, constituted the unique form of Homeric creation: because there was indeed the creation of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, a creation certainly assignable to a brilliant individuality; but this very certainty — and this is where Nietzsche's analysis, in this ceremonial discourse, takes on its paradoxical depth — guarantees us that this

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individuality is not Homer, since Homer, as Greek concept, is born of this very creation, as rigorous ideal and original figure of epic poetry. Thus, "the astonishing genius to whom we owe the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*... sacrificed his name on the altar of the ancestor of epic poetry" (17) — even though it was he himself who had inscribed this constellation in the sky of his own poetic universe. Beyond all reconstitution and interpretation, philology must therefore exercise its piety in a restitution, conceived in all rigour as resumption and repetition not of the act by which Homer created his epic, but of the act by which Homer was created, on Greek ground, as the myth of his epic. If philology must surround itself with the religious respect of ceremonies, it is because it repeats in the same sacred silence, not through the historical birth of works, not through their problematic appearance in the language of men, but the genesis of gods and heroes in the dazzling light of Olympus. Philology would be profanation if it did not watch over the religious repetition of this instant of birth. That is why it is neither Goddess, nor Grace, nor the Muse herself, but owes its seriousness to the divine message it carries, and through which, from one end of our history to the other, from one frontier of being in its becoming to the other, it announces the recommenced birth of the gods. To our night, it speaks of this dawn, it dispels our dark images with these forms of light; by its mere presence, it evokes on our ground a land of enchantment. "We must be grateful to Philology, which is neither a Muse nor a messenger of the gods. And just as the Muses descend to the Boeotian peasants, it comes to a world of dark colours and somber images, to a world of pain; and there it speaks of an enchanted, distant, and happy land, which lives in the confident familiarity of the beautiful luminous forms of the gods" (18). There can no longer be any mistaking it: even in its most scientific guise, philology today ensures, albeit obscurely, the repetition of the theogonies.

Firstly, the grammarians of the Alexandrian period, who attempted to reconstitute Homer on the basis of elements that were assumed to be authentic for reasons of grammatical rigour and aesthetic purity; which were not autochthonous to Greek thought but inherent only in the Alexandrian genius; if we add that they distinguished between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* the whole curve of a personal

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genius that expresses itself at its zenith in the first, and in the second at its sunset; if, finally, we specify that the variations in the Homeric poem are attributed to the oscillations inherent in any oral tradition, and then to an arbitrary fixation in the form of a written text dating from the time of Pisistratus — we see at the same

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<sup>214</sup> *Stricken*: "the practice".

time how a process of reconstitution, however objective it may claim to be, comes to be ordered to an interpretative theme, to which Nietzsche, moreover, assigns a much earlier origin, and which would be that of the Homeric personality, as the embodiment of Greek perfection, in the myth of an absolute discovery of poetry (19). The analysis proposed since Friedrich August Wolf also misses the deepest vocation of philology: the interpretative theme takes centre stage here, to the point of masking the problem of the real constitution of the Homeric poem. In the intoxication of the discovery of *Volksdichtung*, the possibility of interpreting Homeric poetry as a *Naturerscheinung*, in which any reconstitution of historical structures was automatically abolished, was at first seen as the only possibility; the "popular poets", enveloped by the wave of the *Volksseele* and carried by it, dissipated Homer's creative personality into a multiple anonymity, and scattered his initiatory gestures among the landscapes already drawn by the *Volksphantasie*.<sup>215</sup> But it is easy to show that, in seeking to avoid this, Wolf's interpretation merely distributes the problems of individual creation by multiplying eventualities: even if the volume of an avalanche is due to the length of its course, we cannot eliminate the original pebble, however small we may suppose it to be (20), and if we still want to assign an origin to Homer's poetry, it is necessary to admit that the *Volksseele* was only the privileged place of an innumerable multiplicity of individual geniuses. In other words, by multiplying its chances, by increasing the number of eventualities, philological interpretation encounters an absolute limit to its validity. At the end of the day, then, there is something like a relation of uncertainty between the scope of the domain of probability defined by interpretation

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and the rigour of individual creation defined by reconstitution: and faced with a problem like that of Homeric poetry and personality, philological investigation vainly retains the two concepts of *Volksdichtung* and *Individualdichtung*.

In this way, the experience in which philological knowledge (*savoir*) takes on its sense gradually takes shape, starting from its outer limits: an experience that is not that of the progressive conquest of a historical objectivity, nor is it the reconstitution of the face of a civilisation, nor even the effort to totalise a culture — but an experience whose forms, at once scientific and aesthetic, at once historical and critical, find the possibility of their unity only in the element of the sacred; this philological experience of the sacred, we have gradually seen formulated in Nietzsche's own text: it constitutes, in absolute respect to the distances of being, the fidelity that tirelessly watches over the repetition of the theogonies. This is already to say that it does not fall into a simplified experience of time, which would abolish all distance and project it into a past that it would be a matter not of repeating, but of rediscovering in person. Philology must have a complex experience of time; the Greek past must emerge as the ideal face of Antiquity, and at the same time appear as the real ground of our culture, the geological bedrock of our history. As ideal figure, the Antiquity of which philology speaks to us is in one sense very close to our present, it is like "the most beautiful flower" of our culture (21); but in another sense, it forms the rigorous opposite, since it represents in our darkened world a luminous sky, a vivacity of colours where the gods sparkle. Does this relationship to the present not make it doubly impossible to found the present on the past in a real and objective way? Moreover, is it really reasonable to think that our science can objectively identify the forms of existence that formed its own past? Dilthey's whole effort consisted in surmounting these difficulties, or rather in aiming for a form of synthetic unity in which these contradictions would, from the outset, be surmounted. Nietzsche, on the other hand, gives them free rein, and instead of seeking forms of philological interpretation that unify and dominate them, he makes precisely philology the element of these contradictions, the space in which they can take on all the

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distance that is their own; at the same time, the profound sense of philology will no longer be to seek the form of objective positivity in which the contradictions of its project are surmounted, but to systematically attain the level of experience where, without abandoning anything of these contradictory elements, it will illuminate its own contradictions from within. One must therefore not neglect to "grasp (*saisir*) the past with the eyes of the historian"; nor, like the naturalist, to "compare and classify the verbal forms of ancient masterpieces, thus reducing them to morphological laws" (22). But at no moment should this cause us to lose "the distinctive fragrance of the ancient atmosphere". The abyss, however, is unbridgeable, from ideal antiquity to real antiquity: to join them is an unattainable goal, but the effort, "the movement along this

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<sup>215</sup> *Volksdichtung*: popular poetry; *Naturerscheinung*: natural phenomenon; *Volksseele*: soul of the people; *Volksphantasie*: popular imagination.

line" has a sense; these threads of time running in opposite directions (*sens*) form a network, and it is this network that fixes the essential and subterranean geometry of philology; it has [a] name: it is nostalgia.

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#### [DIALECTICS AND TRAGEDY, OR TRUTH AND VERACITY]

From Aeschylian equity to the Socratic ruse, from the tragic to the dialectic, philosophy has not only changed its style, its horizons, and its interlocutors; it has pivoted on its axis. It has escaped the balance of the *dikê*, the blade of its scourge — it is now advancing along the circular path of wisdom. Tragedy is to the *dikê* what the dialectic is to wisdom. A philosophy that wants to free itself from dialectic must tear itself away from wisdom. The necessary link between the end of philosophy and the overthrow of values thus emerges. Prometheus reappears before Antigone at the moment when, after Hegel, the cycle of Socratic dialogue comes is achieved (see the passage on tragic knowledge (*connaissance*) in *The Origin of Tragedy*<sup>216</sup> (23)). What dialectics and wisdom represent, in the face of the Promethean image of the tragic *dikê*:

1. The thought of Being: to reach the deepest abysses of Being, and in this way to be able to reform existence,

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i.e. to be able to have Being itself at hand, by erasing the distance between man and his homeland, between the Earth and Life, and between the thing and its light, such that the original kinship that wisdom discovers between man and truth is unravelled. To reform existence is to reform it by restoring to it the face of its race; it is to establish existence as the inheritor of being. Taking possession of this heritage is *sophrosyne*, by which absolute distance is erased, Prometheus' crime being replaced by a gift from the gods. This heritage, its forgetting, and its rediscovery form the dialectic of truth and virtue, the recognition (*reconnaissance*) in the form of wisdom of the divine gift of being. Thus, for the first time in the history of Western philosophy, the link between wisdom and remembrance is knotted;<sup>217</sup> for the first time, memory appears as the secret retreat of Being. The sacred gesture, the criminal gesture of Prometheus torn between the human and the divine, the gesture that scaled Olympus has become the gesture of withdrawal that, piously, gathers the heritage and plunges into the bottom of memory. To succeed the crime that violates the sacred and takes possession of it — the memory that collects it, hides it, and brings it to light again. The sacred has ceased to shine, for all men, on the far reaches of Olympus; it slumbers in each person, hidden in the forgetting of memory. That which in the Tragic was the escarpment of the divine has become in the dialectic the fold of memory. With the dialectic, the gods began to become things of memory, to sink into the night of the past, to be always already dead, or at least to have always already been. From Platonic *anamnésis*<sup>218</sup> to Hegelian *Erinnerung*, the gods pursue their eternity on the path that leads them to death.

It is no doubt significant that in the Aeschylian trilogy Prometheus is not delivered until the day he reveals the secret that Zeus may give birth to a son more powerful than his father. This secret, which promises the death of the gods and at the same time the resurrection of the anti-dialectician, comes from Themis, his mother, who is one with Gaia, the Earth. It is

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in the very ground in which the race of men grows, buried in the Earth, that lies the secret that will one day free the profanatory and redemptive force of the great tragic thought from its dialectical bonds. Then the light of Zeus will be extinguished, and so will the "victory of cunning" won by the dialectic (24), according to the curse and promise of Kronos.

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<sup>216</sup> [Foucault at times refers to *The Birth of Tragedy* as *The Origin of Tragedy* — Tr.]

<sup>217</sup> Foucault had first written "is fused", then corrected to "is knotted".

<sup>218</sup> *Anamnésis*: reminiscence.

2. Metaphysics thus appears as an episode of dialectics — far from dialectics being the realisation of metaphysics as philosophy. More precisely, metaphysics appears, from the outset, to be linked to the destiny and promises of the dialectic.

— First as myth in the metaphysical sense in which Nietzsche understood it. The myth of classical Greek religion, the religion that crucified Prometheus: "New masters hold the helm in Olympus; in the name of new laws, Zeus exercises a power without rule and today destroys the colossi of yesteryear" (25). Zeus, who triumphed over Prometheus, also triumphed over his closest relatives: Ouranos, the Ocean, Kronos, Atlas, and Typhon. The world has lost its faces and its names, the slow, old, silent push of time, the living force of mountains and craters. And over their autochthonous force reigns the law of Zeus, his whims. But beneath the arbitrariness of divine decrees, necessity slumbers, ever powerful; everything is weighed, in spite of Zeus, on the scales of destiny, even the days of his ephemeral reign. The metaphysics of Greek Olympus rests on this ground, on this inflexible earth. Prometheus, smote but prophetic, remains the rock of Zeus. Aeschylus, "that profound Greek, possessed in his Mysteries an indestructible and sure base of metaphysical thought; and all the outbursts of his scepticism could be satisfied with regard to the Olympians" (*The Origin of Tragedy* (26)). It is beyond the bound Destiny that metaphysical freedom unfolds, the freedom that is linked to the grudge of the past (like the herdsman chasing Io) and which can no longer decipher the book of the future. The myth is now chained to history ("it is comical that Christian myths must at all

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costs be historical"): and with the historical form of myth, we enter the homeland of truth, certainty, and belief. By giving myth the character of history, dialectics inauguates the whole metaphysics of truth.

— Truth: if the dialectic of Euthydemus or [that] of Gorgias is no more than the skein of refutation and appearance, there is nonetheless in them a presumption of truth that Socrates brings to light. That their dialectic envelops the claim to learn, to train, to do good for the city — this already encloses the sophists in the circle of the Socratic-Platonic *mathesis*. But this visible face of truth, this essential trait of having been seen that marks the metaphysical form of truth, is a matter of dialectics. In its tragic form, truth is other, or rather, there is no truth.

"It is necessary to will (*vouloir*) illusion oneself, that is the tragic" (27).

The tragic truth, more original than the truth brought to light by the dialectician, even more ancient than that produced by memory, is the truth spoken by the prophet, his *veracity*. More fundamental than the true is veracity; of nobler birth than truth, and more closely related to the Earth, is veracity. This is the veracity of Prometheus, a gift received from Themis, a fact<sup>219</sup> and resolution that cannot be shaken by the lies of Hermes, messenger of the truth of Zeus: Hermes, dialectician, by reason; but for the veracity of Prometheus, "everything has long been seen and deliberated". But, with Zeus, with his metaphysical sky, with Hermes messenger of the dialectic, truth will pass, without ever having been able to kill veracity. Thus Cassandra, who, at the moment of her death, was already linked to the long theory of justice of the Atreides.

But what is veracity? It is not the language of those who see and are close to the heart of things; it is the speech of the cursed, the vanquished, and the "foreign dogs", the speech of

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the Vagabond, transmitted by Apollo, 'god of roads'. But Apollo, the giver of veracity, is also the one who prevents it from being received. For he shares in Zeus's wisdom, truth, and dialectic, and just as Zeus chained Prometheus's force, Apollo chained Cassandra's veracity.

And these bonds of incredulity, mockery, and *irony* are what transform Cassandra's veracity into *truth*, to her misfortune and death. A new paradox of dialectics, it is unbelievable irony, scepticism, that transforms tragic veracity into metaphysical truth. But is this metamorphosis not necessary for the circle of death to close? The fulfilment of tragedy, the completion of its ceremonial, already carries the destiny of its dialectic; already, like an inner threat to its essence, tragedy develops into *dialogue*, where truthfulness is not received, but remains misunderstood and opaque; propositions are exchanged, double-edged axes; for

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<sup>219</sup> Conjecture.

Agamemnon, in the equivocation of solemnities, the sacrifice of victory is being prepared, in which he will be the bull whose throat is slit; the speeches that greet him promise him this, weaving in their dialectical ruse the red fabric of truth. Clytemnestra, facing Cassandra, Hermes before Prometheus — characters of truth who strive in vain to close truthful mouths. Truth is linked to the lie, just as veracity is linked to blindness. But science and morality emerge from their confrontation, and wisdom from their struggle, while blindness, in its dull struggle against veracity, takes on the face of unreason, and sets up the tragic joust. Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, and Cassandra's [death],<sup>220</sup> are the murder of veracity by truth, the tragedy of the end of tragedy — and it is perhaps no coincidence that the *Oresteia*, Aeschylus' last work, ends with the triumph of Athena. In the ambiguity of Apollo, master of delusions and prophecies, but who binds speech, in this dazzling ambiguity that blinds while illuminating, truth prevails: shadow and light separate, or rather the shadow loses its luminous depth to play on the surface of things, light lie, temporary ignorance, forgetting of a moment. And wisdom reigns, naked truth, open to everyone's gaze, like merchandise at the *agora*, thing of the people. The sun

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has passed its noon, it has ceased to blind; it casts its moving shadows on the surface of its light. Veracity is the blinding noon, of which truth is already announcing the evening. "To be absolutely truthful — man's heroic and magnificent pleasure... the veracity of art, it alone is honest now" (*Écrits et Essais de 1873-1876* (28)).

There is a deep kinship between veracity and the will (*vouloir*) to illusion. The will (*vouloir*) to illusion is not the recognition (*reconnaissance*) of a useful lie, nor the voluntary forgetting of the truth; it is rooted more deeply than truth, lie, and utility, which were born after it and from it; it is the will-to-be-dazzled (*vouloir-être-ébloui*), it is the will (*vouloir*) to be at that point in the curve of the world where the lines<sup>221</sup> of day and night, noon and darkness cross. What the will (*vouloir*) to illusion is to truth, the chorus' melody is to Cassandra's threnody: the will (*volonté*) to be blinded by day. And this will (*vouloir*) to illusion, which surrounds tragic veracity with its ceremony, also secretly bears the death of tragedy: Oedipus, in whom veracity and blindness come together, will be the chorus of his own hero's, the will (*volonté*) to illusion of his truthful language, the blindness of his noon. With Oedipus begins a new tragedy, a new philosophy: the opposition of veracity and illusion, which formed<sup>222</sup> the fullness of a world without truth and outlined the constellation of its destiny, becomes individual destiny, and tips over into the dialectic of knowledge (*connaissance*) and ignorance, of knowledge (*savoir*) and non-knowledge (*non-savoir*). The will (*vouloir*) to illusion will no longer appear except in the guise of the desire for knowledge (*connaissance*), just as the radiance of veracity unfolds in the soft light of truth.

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### [PHILOSOPHY IS GREEK HISTORY]

The first philosophical formulation of Thales defines the limits and boundaries of philosophy's space of play. It is within this free field that it will be able to unfold its movements, rediscover

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the forms of its authenticity, also to encounter the paths that will lead it to its death. From that moment, from the first step it takes, philosophy comes to its own end.

Indeed, if we leave aside the problem of the cultural origins of philosophy, from Egyptian science and Eastern mysticism, we see it appear as the very face of Greek history.

The philosophical problem of the origin can neglect the cultural prerequisite without missing the fundamental significance of history. It then appears that Greek philosophy is Greek history itself, the form of emergence in which Greece as such appears, the way it assembles its world, the face it gives to its life. If Greece is the beginning of philosophy, just as philosophy is the beginning of Greece, it is insofar as

<sup>220</sup> Foucault here uses an abbreviation (the sign "+") which designates for Foucault "death".

<sup>221</sup> Conjecture.

<sup>222</sup> Conjecture.

philosophy forms the mirror in which the beauty of a body and the traits of the Greek soul are brought together to represent it. Philosophy is Greek history itself, the *griechische Geschichte*, which gives it its simultaneously historical and anti-historical character:

– Historical, since Greek philosophy is at one with art, beauty, and Greek civilisation: the philosopher "shines like a star of the first magnitude in the solar system of this civilisation" (29). This unity is not the unity of historical determination, but the simultaneously circular and transcendent relation of "justification": philosophy is justified by the Greek soul, in the sense that, in the Greek city, the philosopher is not the isolated, the meteor, the comet, the abstract individual that he will be in our European culture; the philosopher is not contingent there — chance surging from the unpredictable constellations of genius, lightning in the night of cultures —, but is himself the day of this civilisation, the light of its world carried within him so that his essence may appear. And inversely, the civilisation is justified by philosophy, since the philosopher does not play the critical, negative, destructive role that he does later; philosophy is fully positive there, in the sense that it is not a cry of anger, but a hymn to the city.

Between philosophy and its civilisation, there is no relation of the dialectical type to be sought, no linkage borrowed from a

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metaphysics of causality, for dialectics and causality do not yet have a place in the historical emergence, in the *Geschehen* of the Greek city; the relation in question here is that of the *dikē*, the rule radiating from being. Philosophy justifies the city, and the city justifies philosophy, like the circle justifies its rays and the rays are the justice of the circle: the sphere of being in Greek thought designates this fundamental character of the *dikē* in Greek reality.

– But this also manifests the antihistorical character of this philosophy, precisely insofar as it is the *griechische Geschichte*. What can be deciphered in philosophical texts is not the line of a cultural development, nor the phases of a continuous acquisition: but the fragments of the Greek sphere, like the crumbs of that great concave mirror in which the Greek soul had enclosed itself, for the spectacle of itself and for its eternal justification. This is why Greek philosophy cannot be rediscovered by following the familiar paths of History; but paradoxically, one must ceaselessly confront the fragmentary texts with the data of civilisation, place the Greek thinkers in the life of the city, in the presence of Greek beauty and art, in order to restore, through these just<sup>223</sup> individualities, the Greek personality and soul.

Of course, the day will come when this justice loses its equilibrium, when the sphere shatters and the philosopher begins his solitary life. This is when history begins, or rather the dialectic between history and philosophy; the emergence of philosophy, and philosophy as emergence, will dissociate — philosophy as nostalgia for eternity, and history as sceptical critique, as the irony of philosophy. And this arises from the "instinct for knowledge (*connaissance*)", the will (*vouloir*) to truth that is already present in philosophy, but limited by the *dikē*. When this domination of the *dikē* ceases, and sophistry appears as an unbridled instinct for knowledge (*connaissance*), then philosophy disappears as justification, and takes the form of critique; *Geschichte* ceases to be the sphere of life of the Greek personality, to become temporal succession of events to be known (*connaître*) or recognised (*reconnaître*). The negative role of philosophy in civilisation, on the one hand, and on the other

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the unfolding of emergence in a history that assigns *Geschichte* a rightful place in *Historie*, — these two aspects of Western culture stem from the destruction of the Greek sphere of being, from this rupture of the *dikē* that made philosophy the very history of Greece. The *dikē* was the foundation of the belonging of philosophy to history and history to philosophy; but philosophy, as the will to knowledge (*volonté de connaissance*), upset the balance of the *dikē* and established that dialectic with history that led it to its completion and its end.

Philosophy was promised death from the moment when, in the dialogue, the tragic became dialectic; from the moment when, in knowledge (*connaissance*), the sphere of being became history. The rhetoric and critique of the sophists — their scepticism, their relativism, their irony, their lack of homeland and seriousness — are the first sign of this promise; and it is within their dialectical thought, within their historical reflection too, that Western metaphysics has unfolded since Socrates. Philosophy, as such, could only be born from conditions that promised its death.

But let us go back to pre-dialectical philosophy, to the pre-Socratics. What was philosophy then? 1. mysticism, 2. imagination, 3. grandeur, 4. metaphor.

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<sup>223</sup> Word difficult to read.

See Anaximander.

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## DIALECTICS AND TRAGEDY

Aeschylian equity. The opposition between men and gods exalted by the Promethean theme is not dialectical in essence. For the dialectic is optimistic (*la dialectique fait œuvre optimiste*), by which I mean not only that its work, from the outset, must achieve synthesis — but more profoundly:

- that contradiction arises from the fallout of the development of essence, like a destiny growing on the very ground of unity, truth, and happiness;

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- that the negativity of the contradiction forms only a play of the surface, in the deep shimmer of positivity. It is therefore already justified, already promised reconciliation, already forgiven. It can take on the sense of fault; it is never engulfed in the absolute horror of crime;
- that the distance it establishes never indicates an original exile: it only ever measures a distance, an exteriorisation; it sings of lost homelands; but it cannot say this absolute distance, with neither interior nor exterior, this distance, without estrangement, this banishment forever where man *finds* that he has *lost* nothing.

This optimism of the dialectic is summed up — without the moment of negativity even appearing — in the three Socratic formulas:

Virtue is wisdom: the reign of ethics, as order, hierarchy, submission, renunciation, sacrifice, is in fact the very fulfilment of essence in its truth.

Man sins only through ignorance: negativity is not bloody wound, tear in life where death arises, cry that silences the herd of voices, but forgetting in the restorative moment of sleep.

The virtuous man is the happy man: truth and value are the return to the homeland in the erasure of distances travelled, resting anew on the same ground, on the very ground of being.

The nostalgic return of the dialectic is opposed by the straight radiance of equity, like the circle of the earth, the globe of the sun. This equity is illuminated by a crime, that of Prometheus. Prometheus is the non-dialectician, the Hell of the dialectic; and if it is true that the dialectic of Socrates and Plato was able to become the philosophical form of the Christian fall to the point that the Hegelian dialectic achieves the unity of Christianity as the truth of religion, and of philosophy as the truth of Greek happiness, the lesson of Prometheus has remained in suspense over our culture, over our history, over our truth, like the balcony of art over philosophy, the balcony of the tragic over the dialectic. It is this balcony that Nietzsche is sees, harbinger of the fall of

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philosophy, escarpment promised to this new morning of its ascension. Nietzsche rediscovered the imminence of Prometheus, the day when the circular path of dialectics led the philosopher's nostalgia, after Hegel, back to the original path of Socrates.

Prometheus — the anti-dialectician: Prometheus is the absolute distance, the inaccessibility of Olympus, the original *absence*, in the home of man, of the light and warmth of the sun. The first moment is not the fall, the banishment from Paradise — but the distant sun, the warmth one does not have at home, the light with its unyielding shadows. From the moment it first rises, the sun is already black for the dazzled and distant gaze of men. Man's distance from what is closest to him, from the intimacy of his home, from the widespread presence of light, this distance is crossed by crime. Not by fault, crime: without recourse, without reconciliation, without forgiveness; the crime that promises misfortune, that pronounces the curse of happiness. Man will only be at home in his hearth, master of his warmth and his light, man will only be able to inhabit the world, and the brightness of the world will only become familiar to man through the black moment of crime. Happiness is but an avatar of unhappiness, the homeland a stage of exile. From then on, justice will be no more than the justification of crime, and equity, its anti-dialectical phenomenology: the deepening of this abyss over which man has cast the network of his familiarity, the drifting away of this land where he has fixed, for a moment, the home and penitents of his exile.

And Prometheus, the climber of Olympus, far from being the glorious figure of reconciliation, only exalts in his destiny the scission within things, in his body nailed to the sky the insurmountable distance from the human to the divine, from the earth to the sun, from the world to the light where it appears, grows, scintillates, and spins. Prometheus, the Titan, man and god, brother of men and relative of immortals, Prometheus who climbs to the inaccessible, and gives to the hearth of men the pure source where the heat of life and the light of truth are born, Prometheus manifests the insurmountable distance from things closed in darkness to the light where they appear in their truth — from the immobile, cold earth to the heat that makes it fertile, from the blind, sweaty man to the dwelling that makes him take the world as his most original homeland. So much

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distance from man to his homeland, from the Earth to his life, from the thing to its truth, so much distance is at once manifested, measured, and crossed by the supplicated body of Prometheus — single body with broken limbs, life attached to the immobile rock, "frontier of the world" but prey to the cycle of years, Prometheus is the first of the Dionysian men, the figurehead of tragedy, the bloody equity of Greek tragedy, facing the pure dialectic of the Platonic Epimetheus (30).

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## HERACLITUS

Not the punishment of becoming, but the justification of being. And yet "he denied being itself" (31).

The justification of being is the *dikē* by which the ways of all things and of every individual limit and prescribe their path to *hybris*. Becoming justifies being. And yet Being disappears in becoming.

Fire, as purification and destruction, is indeed this incessantly<sup>224</sup> suppressed unity of Being and becoming in the *dikē*. The *dikē* of Anaximander, as the immobility of the world, as the fullness of the astral sphere, as the sphere of heaven, this geographer's *dikē* is replaced by the Heraclitean *dikē*, which burns and destroys. The *dikē* as light is both sun and fire. Lake and light in Anaximander, the *dikē* in Heraclitus becomes river and fire. For Anaximander, becoming is always crime, violence, excess, shadow, night. But for Heraclitus, it is the justification of being, *logos*.

The Stoics failed to understand this, turning the Heraclitean conflagration into a kind of cosmological pulse. Heraclitus' conflagration is the movement of becoming that justifies being and destroys it. Cosmodicy that encloses all the -dices in the destiny of destruction: see Leibniz, who wanted to make a theodicy

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(as if the justification of the world could be made in the fullness of Anaximander), which leads to Kant. Between the injustice of Anaximander and the justifying fire of Heraclitus lies the whole problem of being (*être*) and the being (*étant*), being (*être*) and becoming; becoming justifies being (*être*) from the violence of the being (*étant*) by destroying not the being (*étant*), but being (*être*). Blood justifies being (*être*); the fire of sacrifice bears until being (*être*). Promethean *hybris* gave man the justifying and destructive fire. The myth of Protagoras, which adds the gift of justice and the social sense to the gift of fire, takes away the justifying and destructive character of Heraclitus' fire: it brings *justice*, modesty (*aidōs*, as opposed to *hybris*); it enables the construction of homes and cities (32); it constructs the dwelling of the being (*étant*), according to the justice of the laws, instead of burning being (*être*) to its purity in the just flames of the *dikē*. With the Promethean character — fire and crime — we find the anti-dialectic, pre-dialectic being (*être*), the tragic being (*être*) *par excellence*, of which Zarathustra with his eagle companion will be the living reprisal.

The fact that the relationship between being (*être*) and the being (*étant*), and between becoming and being (*être*), is thought of in the 'titanic' guise of Prometheus, in the images of crime and fire, shows the non-dialectical character of pre-Socratic thought: it is not a question of the particular and the general, nor of the finite and the infinite (despite Anaximander's words: the *apeiron*<sup>225</sup> is that which has no limit in

<sup>224</sup> Word difficult to read.

<sup>225</sup> *Apeiron*: infinite.

death, that which could not be avenged, the free air of fire), nor of becoming and eternity, nor phenomenon and essence, but of the weft of the *dikê*. It is not because the particular is the particular that it is condemned to death; it is because its injustice condemns it to death, and demands its blood, that it is particular.

It is vengeance that bears it. So, between this becoming and being (*être*), a relationship can be founded that is not the continuity of a *Historie* (33), nor even the dialectic of a *Geschichte*, but the circularity of the *Geschick*: radiance of the *dikê*, sphere of being and cycle of destiny — it is this slow ceremony of the circular path that tragic thought, the religious coryphée, leads.

Coryphée, but not "demagogue": Heraclitus' retreat to the temple of Diana. The dialectic of the rhetoricians will make of this

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procession a demagogy, and of this religious distance between the coryphée and the choreutes, the raised platform of the jugglers. The distant proximity, the silence, the hymn of the ceremonies performed by the whole city are replaced by the hustle and bustle, the repeated opinions, the discussions of the public square. As opposed to the *dikê*, the truth, with its procession of opinions, certainties, doubts, belongs to the *dêmos*.

Heraclitus, enclosed in the sun of his truth, speaks; and his speech is neither true nor false, *it neither manifests nor hides*, it prophesies; it is *truthful*.

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## THEATRE AND THE DEATH OF GOD

Lucian: "Orpheus and Musaeus, in instituting the mysteries, ordered that holy things could not be explained without dance and rhythm" (34). Holy things, above all the death of God: the Dionysian character of the theatre is linked to the fact that the absolute origin of the theatre is the death of God; the theatre is its fulfilment and at the same time its overcoming: the death of God on the stage promises his resurrection. This idea that the first thing that can be *represented* is the death of God (all the philosophies of representation unfold in the space left empty by the death of God). This 'representation' is not imitation, copy of the human, shift of reality into the imaginary; but it invokes the absolute adventure of the divine, in the movement of its truth. From the day representation imitates the human, a philosophy of representation will be made possible that will make representation a reduction of truth for man; then we will forget that there is no representation except of the death of God, i.e. of the movement by which truth tears itself away from man. Detach representation from its secondary concern with truth, free it and let it move once again into the free space of appearance, of non-truth, of this divine agony and rebirth, where man feels not only separated from truth, but free for non-truth. Find,

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behind the dialectic of truth in the representation of man, the adventure of truth, which is submerged in the representation of the divine.

Ambiguity when we say representation of man: man is represented, man represents himself. Similarly, representation of the divine: the divine is represented, the divine represents itself. Theatre is not just the image of the divine, its incarnation, its tangible presence; it is also its representation, its repetition, its iteration. The essence of theatre is to be anniversary; it is the repetition of the death of God. But by repetition one must not understand temporal echo, reprisal at the due date (*échéance*), prolongation and reactivation, but reduction of time, recapture of its depth, restitution of its subterranean unity, rediscovery of the point where the great circle finds its centre. Circular structure of the theatre: season, procession, chorus, audience — and at the centre the event repeated in a circularity reduced to the punctual; the great cycle of time has become *festival*.

Festival, theatre, and season say the death of God: the original liaison of repetition and the death of God. Restore this primordial sense of representation, which must cease to be the reduction in man of the knowledge (*connaissance*) of man and the unfolding of temporality. The philosophies of Kant and Descartes, the apotheoses of classical metaphysics, give representation only this sense of access to God and temporal deployment; whereas it must be purified, in the play of theatrical appearance, to give it back its original

sense: it will then cease to be phenopsychology, or interiority of consciousness; it will be the exteriority of appearance in all the brilliance of its divinity. The world will no longer be my representation (35); but representation will be the world in which the gods die. It is not a matter of emerging from a philosophy of representation, but of making the divine sense of representation burst forth.

See the Japanese No; Egyptian theatre.

The legendary origin of Japanese theatre, based on the theme of the god's retreat: Amaterasu, goddess of the sun, had a complaint about her brother Susanoo (incest?); she withdrew into a deep cave, the light disappeared from the sky and the earth: the gods formed a procession in front of the cave after hanging a *mirror*, hemp banners, and jewels from the trees. The goddess Ame-no-Uzume, wearing a moss sash and a garland of flowers, danced and sung at the threshold of the cave, while the sun emerged from its retreat.

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Themes of incest, the retreat of the god, the death of light, the mirror, the dance, the resurrection, the return of light. Apollonian and Dionysian themes are interwoven here in a meter that is not so very different from the Greek metre: the dance, the festival, the chorus — all Dionysian in essence — develop in the absence of the Apollonian light; but the latter returns in a dazzling reconciliation with the Dionysian. The theme of incest is linked both to the theatre and to the radiance of the sun: the sun of Oedipus. Oedipus, who has solved the enigma of man, has opened up to the light of the sun the night in which man loses his truth: there is an unbreakable core of night that the wisdom of Oedipus will never break, it is that which comes [to] light in incest, as an insult to the light of the sun; the world must lose its light — or man his gaze: for there is no *truth* in which man and the world can find their common homeland. The man who has found his truth at home, in his closest kinship with himself, the man who has recognised (*reconnu*) himself as enigma and solution to himself, the man who borrows his nature, his truth, and his light from his closest homeland — this man loses the truth of the world and raises the black sun of pestilence on the world's horizon (36). And the sun of the world can only shine again if man closes in on the night of his closed<sup>226</sup> gaze the close truth he has discovered.

The theatre is originally the poem of the adventures of this light of the world that a bloody incompatibility links to man's light on himself, to the light of the clear gaze.

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### [ON THE ORIGIN OF TRAGEDY]

All the Apollonian properties defined in *The Origin of Tragedy* delimit the free and luminous space of philosophical existence as described in the later works. All the pre-Socratics belong to the Apollonian sphere, and each of them has his abode in a region of its light: Thales

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in the imagination, and in this feeling too that the figures of reality are only appearance, and that the world they compose is not to itself its own cipher; if he was the first to take the first philosophical step — to make that leap into the imaginary that goes beyond myth and allegory alike, and reaches the shore where "all is one" — it was not in the Dionysian sense of a dissolution of the individual, but in the Apollonian sense, where the immortals all belong to the same world of Olympus, where appearances are all illuminated by the same light, where things, men, and gods all celebrate the same ceremony of the sun. For Thales, philosophy thinks as unfolded unity of the whole the reflection of this Olympian world whose light assures to everything its rightful appearance.<sup>227</sup> Anaximander, too, lives in this same Olympian radiance; undoubtedly, for him, becoming and each individual form of being are torn away from the *apeiron* only by an injustice, a violence, avenged by destruction and death alone; the individual, the isolation of the image,

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<sup>226</sup> Conjecture.

<sup>227</sup> Foucault adds in a footnote: "The philosopher seeks to make the universal symphony resonate in him and to project it out of him into concepts. ... he conserves enough presence of mind to consider himself coldly as the reflection of the universe." See F. Nietzsche, *La Naissance de la philosophie à l'époque de la tragédie grecque*, op. cit., §III, p. 47.

the precise beauty of the form have caused the blood of being to flow — this blood which brings about their precarious becoming: is this not the Dionysian tear and the death of the god separated? Do the philosophy of Anaximander and Orphism do anything other than celebrate, mourn, and avenge the same lost unity? But in fact the *apeiron* is something quite different from the ever-sacrificial prodigality of the Dionysian world: if the original being is immortal, it is not because of the inexhaustible mystery of resurrections, but "because it is exempt from the definite qualities doomed to death" (37), and watches over the justice of their birth and death within the transient world of forms. Because it is the avenger of appearance and the just scourge of becoming, being is eternal; eternally the figures of beauty are in movement on the scales of being, and if being does not die, if it is infinite, it is because it must always appeal to the blood shed, because it takes the form of that Apollonian justice which weaves the threads of blood of the Oresteia. Heraclitus was above all Apollonian,

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the solitary thinker secluded in the temple of Artemis, enclosed in the sun of his truth; and speaking the language that neither conceals nor reveals anything, the language of the god of Delphi.

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#### [THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL (*VOLONTÉ*) AND DIONYSIAN LYRICISM]

Despite everything, the philosophy of the will (*volonté*) finds itself enclosed in a metaphysics of representation and image. Lyricism constitutes the primordial experience of this imprisonment; returning to lyricism allows one to explore its limits. Lyricism, as symbolisation in the appearance of music, itself symbol of the primordial One, implies a Dionysian suppression of subjectivity.

Lyricism, on the one hand, is the Dionysian suppression of subjectivity in its fusion with the tearing and suffering of the primordial One (that which is primordial in the One is that it is torn): but by reflecting this pain in the beauty of eternal appearance, lyricism delivers subjectivity from the world, and frees Being as subject. Archilochus' sleep, inhabited by the image of Dionysus and the Maenads, forms the lyrical image of lyricism itself: sleep of subjectivity in whose silence the world makes its tumult heard, in whose night being illuminates the face of Dionysus. Then subjectivity, suppressed as individual, suppressed as subject of representation, suppressed as source of the will (*volonté*), finds in the image a new surface of emergence: the individual has become a character, the subject has become a mask — I is another; and Archilochus in a dream sees himself grazed in his sleep by Apollo's laurel (38). This double movement of a subjectivity carried to the heart of being, by the suppression of individuality, and of an individuality fixed in the eternal beauty of the image constitutes the very essence of lyricism, or rather the movement proper to lyricism in the space of play where the being of the world unfolds. It is this movement that assembles in

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a single unity lyricism, music, and tragedy: for along this trajectory we encounter the melodic fusion with the original tearing apart of the One, its reflection on the surface of images and words, and the fixation of the face, the gaze, the individual pathos in the eternal appearance of the mask. Music, hymn and tragedy define the curve of lyricism as it traverses, in its longest diagonal, the entire field of being of the world. Lyricism is, along with the labour of appearance, the very labour of being; the illumination of being as subject, and the foundation of appearance as mask; the original possibility for the Dionysian ceremony, for the intoxication that dislocates the limbs and turns the eyes, *for* the procession of the god through the landscapes of the world, to be in a primordial way *spectacle*; the inevitable Apollonian light, on the surface of appearance, borders the Dionysian night of being, limits and completes it, and turns the suffering of the invisible into the joy of the gaze. Appearance constitutes the luminous reverse side of being, and lyricism follows the long diversion that leads, from the heart of a subjectivity submerged in being, to the fixation of appearance in the ritual of the mask. This ontological odyssey of lyricism not only recounts the adventure of being in the world — it also sings of subjectivity in its works and its days: its sacrifice in a Dionysian tearing, its emergence as the face of being<sup>228</sup> in its totality, its setting, "its *mise en scène*" under the colours of the mask and with the voice of the tragic hero.

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<sup>228</sup> *Stricken*: "in the world".

The labour of being, whose night gives rise to the light of appearance, and the labour of subjectivity that regulates its seasons and days, both constitute two faces for the essence of one and the same lyricism: that of Archilochus and that of [blank passage].<sup>229</sup> But the sense of lyricism is to be this and that: and it is important that the moment of the night of being is the moment when the world emerges as subjectivity, and that the light of appearance also illuminates the mask of tragedy. Not only does this teach us that music

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is not outpouring of feelings, but lyricism of a world torn apart; not only do we understand that the tragic hero is not an exaltation of individuality, but, once the sacrifice of subjectivity has been made, the submission of the individual to the being that hangs over him like a destiny (and this is what the mask says). But we grasp (*saisissons*) even more: it is that being and subjectivity belong to the same homeland from the origin; lyricism is the hymn of their kinship — not, as the Romantic definition puts it, the recognition (*reconnaissance*) that the world is subject as life, as soul, as conscious or as unconscious; but what lyricism sings is, at the heart of being, that Dionysian subjectivity which manifests itself neither as individuality of existence, nor as subjectivity of the representation of being, but as the torn individuality from which the blood of being flows: what it sings is also the beauty of the image in which being appears as world. The blood of individuality and the wine of appearance — this is the entire reign of being, the entire domain of Dionysus; and Dionysus is none other than the character in whom this original kinship of being and a subjectivity torn from all forms of individual existence is expressed: Dionysus is the symbol of this kinship, its reflection in the image; he is therefore entirely immersed in the Apollonian light. And this is what defines the paradox of the character and the whole dialectic of art as expression of being.

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### [LYRICISM, IMAGE, SOUL OF THE WORLD (39)]

Lyricism:

- image, liberation from appearance;
- soul of the world; subjectivity without subject of Being: Dionysus.

Lyricism takes on the dimension of the distance between being and appearance, between the foundation and the image of the world, between suffering and joy. In lyricism is unfolded the suffering of the primordial and the joy of the image.

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For a philosophy of the image:

- Why do images liberate, and from what? The image frees from being, just as light frees from night. Appearance is not illusion, it is triumph. It is not through its defeat, but through its victory, that it returns to being and the foundation. Philosophy must not be *critique* of appearance, but justification, sanctification of appearance; it must be the hymn of appearance; the lyricism of the image. Philosophy is work of consecration. Philosophy sanctifies what it sacrifices and sacrifices what it sanctifies.
- Lyricism as foundation of the possibility of the tragic. The mask and the problem of the character. If the triumph of art always takes on the face of Apollo, every aesthetic character has necessarily become Dionysian. Apollo: the hymn, the statue, the image, the dream.
- Dionysus: the character, the cry, the night.

Paradox: appearance was born on Doric soil, modelled in the very stone of styles; it is eternal. And the foundation of being has the East as its fatherland.

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<sup>229</sup> There is a blank here in the manuscript. It is likely that it is either Homer or Hesiod to whom Foucault would refer. In §5 of *The Birth of the Tragedy*, Nietzsche places Archiloque and Homer at the origin of Greek poetry. But, given Foucault's text's allusions to works and days, it may be that, rather than Homer, he thinks of Hesiod here.

## REPETITION

Repetition:

- the repetition of being, in metaphysics, is the disappearance of man;
- the repetition of man in the overman is the revelation of being, before its repetition in truth.

The repetition of being eliminates the repetition of man, and inversely.

Repetition is the destiny of being, it is the profusion of noon — it is language, it is the mountainside — it is the identity of the instant and eternity.

If a critique is possible, it is not because there is an error of man — it is only because being is that which is taken up

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again and again. The *same* is the absolute richness of being, not its poverty. It is the condition of possibility of reflection and truth.

That is why we do not have the truth: when we think we have the truth, we do not have it. That is why we do not think.

Metaphysics and thought are the resumption of being, within the very repetition of being. Instead of a link of essence between man and truth, Nietzsche discovers in the freedom of thought its necessary link to the destiny of being. The overman is the concept of this necessary link between the freedom of thought and the destiny of being.

Comparison: *Gleichnis* is the simplest expression.

*Sein* is a *Gleichsein*. Metaphysics becomes a *Gleichnisrede*. As Dionysian philosopher, Nietzsche becomes *gleich* to *Dionysos philosophos* (40).

Metaphor is the original access of being to the word, of *Sein* to *Wort*. And metaphysics is the ascent through these paths of metaphysics<sup>230</sup> to the pure presence of the sky in the night. Metaphysics, inasmuch as it is metaphor, is the repetition of being. That is why it is the very seriousness of appearance. And if Nietzsche's philosophy is the end of metaphysics as the end of the ideal, supra-sensible world — it is the beginning of metaphysics as metaphor, as the repetition of being in [word missing] and the echoing voices of words (41). Metaphysics is the movement of reflection by which the world discovers itself as metaphor, as the Dionysian festival of being. Just as daylight is but the metaphor of dawn, of that instant before the dawn; just as the outpouring of the midday sun is but the metaphor of its eternity. Eternity is the metaphysics of noon, Dawn is the metaphysics of day.

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## NOTES

1. Michel Foucault here loosely quotes cite the beginning of Parmenides' Poem (*Le Poème de Parménide*, *op. cit.*, p. 77): "the road abounding in revelations of divinity".

2. Plato, *Euthydemus*, *op. cit.*, p. 713, §276b-c: "When he said this, the followers of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus broke into applause and laughter, just like a chorus at a sign from their director"; *id.*, *Gorgias* (Zeyl DJ trans), §489b-490c, in *Plato: Complete Works*, *op. cit.*, pp. 791-869, here pp. 832-833: Callicles, a rhetorician who appears in Plato's dialogues like *Gorgias*, accuses Socrates of ironising and being an idiot.

3. *Id.*, *Euthydemus*, *op. cit.*, p. 713, §275e: "Just at this moment Dionysodorus leaned a little toward me and, smiling all over his face, whispered in my ear and said, I may tell you beforehand, Socrates, that whichever way the boy answers he will be refuted."

4. Foucault borrows the title of Nietzsche's inaugural address at Bâle, *Homer and Classical Philology*, *op. cit.*

5. Hegel's address to the Gymnasium of Nuremberg on 29 September 1809 is reproduced in German in the *Werke. Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten*, 18 vol., Berlin, Duncker und Humblot, 1832-1845, here vol. 16 (1834), pp. 133 ff., as well as in the edition of Johannes Hoffmeister,

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<sup>230</sup> Foucault uses an abbreviation, the letter  $\mu$ , scribbled hastily.

*Nürnberger Schriften. Texte, Reden, Berichte und Gutachten zum Nürnberger Gymnasialunterricht 1808-1816*, Leipzig, Felix Meiner, 1938, pp. 303 ff.

6. F. Nietzsche, *Homer and Classical Philology*, *op. cit.*, p. 2: "Of course one has to admit honestly that, to a certain extent, philology has borrowed from several sciences and like a magic potion is concocted from the strangest saps, metals, and bones, so that indeed it contains more of an artistic element, one that on aesthetic and ethical grounds is imperative, but is in questionable conflict with its purely scientific behaviour."

7. *Ibid.*

8. On Arnold Ruge (1802-1880), student of Hegel, considered a "young Hegelian", see K. Löwith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-91, 270-273, 294-297, and 342-343.

9. On Bruno Bauer (1809-1882) and Max Stirner (1806-1865), also young Hegelians, see *ibid.*, pp. 105-110, 299-301, and 343-350 (on Bauer) and pp. 103-105, 247-249, 297-299, 316-318, and 355-359 (on Stirner).

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 301-303; on Jacob Burckhardt, see *supra*, note 31, p. 34.

11. F. Nietzsche, *Homer and Classical Philology*, *op. cit.*, p. 25. The famous phrase of Seneca, which Nietzsche reversed to conclude his inaugural address in 1869 and which Foucault develops here, is the following: "*Itaque quæ philosophia fuit, facta philologia est*" ("Hence what used to be philosophy has now become mere philology"). See Seneca (2015) *Letters on Ethics: To Lucilius*, *op. cit.*, Letter 108, §23, p. 431. A simple translation of the phrase used by Nietzsche,

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"*Philosophia facta est quæ philologia fuit*", would be: "What was once philosophy has now been made into philosophy" It is this reversal that Foucault analyses in this paragraph.

12. F. Nietzsche, *Homer and Classical Philology*, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26: "each and every philological activity should be enclosed and fenced in by a philosophical worldview, whereby everything individual and isolated evaporates like some reprehensible thing and only what is whole and unitary remains."

13. *Ibid.*, p. 25: "A good old man, known at best under the rubric "natural genius", at any rate the child of a barbaric age, full of offences against good taste and good morals."

14. *Ibid.*, p. 6: "whether philologists in general are lacking in artistic abilities and feelings so that they are unable to do justice to the ideal, or whether in their spirit of negation, a destructive iconoclastic movement has become powerful".

15. *Ibid.*, p. 23: "Up to this point, esteemed audience, I think I have put before you the philosophical and aesthetic characteristics of the personality of Homer, and in strictly keeping at a distance all the details; on the assumption that the basic formations of that ramified and deeply jagged mountain, which is known as the Homeric question, are most clearly and sharply set forth by looking down from a great distance and height."

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 23: "In fact this wonderful genius to whom we owe the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* also belongs to this grateful posterity; he also sacrificed his name on the altar of the very ancient father of epic heroic poetry, Homeros."

18. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 18.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 21: "a wreath of flowers".

22. *Ibid.*, p. 5: "If we place ourselves scientifically in antiquity, we may now try to comprehend with the eye of a historian that which has come to be, or in the manner of the natural scientist to rubricate and compare the linguistic forms of ancient masterpieces, if need be to restore them to some morphological law".

23. *Id.*, *The Birth of Tragedy*, §15, *op. cit.*, p. 75: "then a new form of knowledge breaks through, tragic knowledge, which, simply to be endured, needs art for protection and as medicine."

24. Aeschylus, *Prometheus Bound* (trans unnamed), digitised version, accessible here: <https://classics.mit.edu/Aeschylus/prometheus.html>: "That not by strength neither by violence / The mighty should be mastered, but by guile."

25. *Ibid.*

26. F. Nietzsche, *La Naissance de la tragédie*, §9, OCFN, t. I, 1947, p. 91; *The Birth of Tragedy*, p. 49.

27. *Id.*, *Unpublished Writings from the Period of Unfashionable Observations*, 19[35], CW, vol. 11, p. 13.

28. *Id.*, *Écrits et Essais de 1873-1876*, cited in K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, op. cit., p. 207 (*Nietzsche's Werke*, op. cit., t. X, p. 141). [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, op. cit., p. 204 — Tr.]

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29. *Id.*, *La Naissance de la philosophie à l'époque de la tragédie grecque*, Fr. trans. by G. Bianquis, 11<sup>th</sup> ed., Paris, Gallimard, 1938, §1, p. 37.

30. The myth of Epimetheus and Prometheus is found in Plato's *Protagoras: Protagoras* (Lombardo S and Bell K trans), in *Plato: Complete Works*, op. cit., pp. 746-790, here §320c-322d, pp. 756-758.

31. On the question of "being" in Heraclitus and Parmenides, see Jean Granier, 'La pensée nietzschéenne du chaos', *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, vol. 76, n° 2, 1971, pp. 129-166, here p. 148: "In this Nietzsche proclaims himself a disciple of Heraclitus. And he believes he finds and praises this Heraclitean inspiration in Lamarck's evolutionism and in Hegel's dialectics, while he is reluctant in the face of Parmenides' doctrine, which he criticises for having circulated the pernicious fable of "being", a motionless and heavily logical sphere, which excludes time, history, life in its essential fluidity. This reluctance turns into peremptory refusal when Nietzsche sees to what extravagances this Parmenidian fable of being has pushed scholastic minds, such as Leibniz, or moral enthusiasts, such as Kant, or those influenced by the optimistic rationalism of Socrates, such as Plato."

32. See the dialogue between Zeus and Hermes in Plato's *Protagoras: Protagoras*, op. cit., §322c-d, p. 758.

33. It is the German word *Historie* that Foucault opposes to *Geschichte*. The use of the three terms *Historie*, *Geschichte*, and *Geschick* (destiny) refers to Martin Heidegger. Foucault writes a whole chemise of reading notes on Heidegger (BNF, Fonds Foucault, Box 33b).

34. Lucian of Samosata (1905) *Of Pantomime, Of Dancing* (Fowler HW and Fowler FG trans), §15, digitised version, accessible here: [http://lucianofsamosata.info/wiki/doku.php?id=home:texts\\_and\\_library:dialogues:of-pantomime](http://lucianofsamosata.info/wiki/doku.php?id=home:texts_and_library:dialogues:of-pantomime): "I need hardly observe that among the ancient mysteries not one is to be found that does not include dancing. Orpheus and Musaeus, the best dancers of their time, were the founders of these rites; and their ordinances show the value they attached to rhythm and dance as elements in religion."

35. "The world is my representation" is the first sentence of book I of Arthur Schopenhauer's *The World as Will and Representation: Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung* (1818-1819).

36. The plague that Apollo sends to the Thebans. Foucault will often return to Oedipus afterwards, for example in his course at Louvain (Foucault M (2014) *Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice*, (F Brion and BE Harcourt eds, Sawyer SW trans), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA, 'Second Lecture: April 28, 1981', pp. 57-89), and at the Collège de France (*Lectures on the Will to Know*, op. cit., 'Oedipal Knowledge', pp. 229-261); see also *id.*, 'Truth and Juridical Forms', art. cit.; *id.* (2016) *On the Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980* (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA, lecture of 16 and 23 January 1980, p. 57; *id.*, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, op. cit., pp. 444-445; *id.* (2011) *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982-1983* (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA, pp. 152, 362, and 385-386; *id.* (2012) *The Courage of Truth: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983-1984* (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA, lecture of 14 March 1984, pp. 263-264; as well as in the seminar on 'La volonté de vérité dans la Grèce ancienne' at Buffalo in 1972 and on 'Le savoir d'Œdipe' at Cornell University in 1972.

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37. F. Nietzsche, *La Naissance de la philosophie..., op. cit.*, §4, p. 50; see also *id.*, *La Philosophie à l'époque tragique des Grecs*, pp. 207-273, in *Écrits posthumes (1870-1873)*, OPC, t. I, vol. 2, §4, p. 226 [See Nietzsche F (1998) *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks* (Cowan M trans), Regnery Publishing, Washington, USA, §4, p. 47. The relevant volume of CW has yet to be published — Tr.].

38. This passage refers to §5 of *The Birth of Tragedy*, op. cit., p. 30: "now Apollo approaches and touches him with a laurel."

39. This text must date from the time when Foucault lived in Uppsala, because there is written, in a difficult-to-read vertical note, a name and address in Uppsala.

40. "*Dionysos philosophos*" is an expression found in Nietzsche, which Jaspers reuses, as does Foucault when he analyses Jaspers: M. Foucault, *La Question anthropologique*, op. cit., p. 195.

41. Foucault notes in his manuscript: "see Löwith p. 62". This is a reference to the original edition in German of Karl Löwith's book, *Von Hegel bis Nietzsche*, Zürich, Europa Verlag, 1941, p. 62. The first French translation, *De Hegel à Nietzsche*, dates to 1969.

WORKS ON NIETZSCHE

**Various Fragments (1)**

*Wahrsagen and Wahrnehmen; Depth; Karl Immermann, Stefan George, and Zarathustra; Geschichte, Zeit, Historie; Socrates and Descartes; Tragedy and the return.*

**WAHRSAGEN AND WAHRNEHMEN<sup>231</sup>**

The original form of the presence of truth is not perception (the immediate face of the world, the light of its awakening), but the prophecy, the *Wahrsagen*: not taking the true, but saying it; not its face, but its language; not its awakening, but its intoxication (2).

Attaches to the theme that the point of emergence of truth is also its point of bursting, of dispersion in the true. The true speaks the truth only through the ways of dispersion and bursting of the truth; the true is not true under the sign of the presence of truth, but under the sign of its disappearance. The *Wahrsagen* brings back the truth, gathers it from its dispersion, and limits, with a magical gesture, the area of its bursting. This is why the *Wahrsagen* is not the statement (*énoncé*), the *Aussage* of the truth, but its expulsion, its destruction — in the night of myth, intoxication, dream, madness. Situation of the prophecy that belongs to Apollo's kingdom of light, but rests on the nocturnal powers of Dionysus: the true in the form of appearance by the Dionysian destruction of truth. This ambiguity of prophecy indicates that the true takes shape only in appearance, i.e. in the night, delirium, and death of truth — and on the other hand that appearance,

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the phenomenon, and their light do not refer to a sun of truth, to a noumena, to a substance, but to that night of truth where the intelligible is lost, where all solidity dissolves. The true can only be grasped (*saisir*) at the level of appearance, not because the truth is masked, where it is withdrawn, but because it has been destroyed in the very movement by which it is constituted as world. The cosmological secret is neither mystery, nor fall, nor forgetting; but only this, that the truth is destroyed by being made world. That is why the prophecy says the truth — and at the same time does not say it: it says its fulfilment in its destruction, its destruction in its fulfilment. Any prophecy is constructed on the mode of Epimenides — or rather Epimenides is the reduction, in the transparency of logic, of prophecy as destiny.

The *Wahrsagen* plays in Nietzsche's thought the role that the *Wahrnehmen* plays in phenomenology: original insertion in the world, openness to the preconstituted, presence where the silent acts of intentionality take shape and sediment. The *Wahrsagen* on the contrary is original separation, the opening to the not yet constituted, absence where the empty space of what must be willed (*voulu*) is hollowed out. The *Wahrnehmen* is rooted in an already-there, in a facticity that speaks of freedom. The *Wahrsagen* projects itself beyond a nothingness, a night, a void in the darkness of which destiny is knotted.

But in Nietzsche the *Wahrsagen*, in phenomenology the *Wahrnehmen* constitute the original moment of the emergence of the truth: the antepredicative, the pre-scientific, the original ground of the truths of judgement, the immediate presence of the *ratio*; that from which history is possible. But in phenomenology, the world of perception communicates with history by the depth of its sedimented layers: history is made present only by the diversity of cultural layers. There is an equivocation here: that history as science is possible only from the unity of a culture, but by aiming at the diversity of cultures, this is one of the paradoxes of<sup>232</sup> the methodology of history — which only concerns, moreover,

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<sup>231</sup> *Wahrsagen*: speaking truth; *Wahrsagen* also has the sense of predicting. *Wahrnehmen*: perceive.

<sup>232</sup> *Stricken*: "history as science".

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the rigour of the processes used, and not at all the absolute foundation of history: it is one of the misinterpretations (*contresens*) of the "critical" problematic of history, to have placed itself at the sole level of culture, to have taken the diversity of cultures as domain of the possible experience of history. But in a sense, this problematic is only partially critical, or rather it is anticritical since it questions cultures from culture, thus making empirical forms of culture the condition of possibility and the limit of knowledge (*connaissance*) of history. However, it is on the contrary from history that we must demand the *a priori* foundation and the critical justification of the knowledge of the diversity of cultures: and to this extent, the polychromatic flows of cultures in the thickness of the perceived world cannot serve as a guiding thread for a radical problematic of history. The diversity of cultures is made possible by history, even if it is within a certain type of culture that knowledge (*connaissance*)<sup>233</sup> of history is born. However, this foundation of culture in history can be grasped neither in the perceived world, nor in the transcendental structure of perception, nor in the silent intentional acts that animate it: perception always belongs to the horizon of cultures. But history as foundation of the possibility of cultures unfolds beyond any concrete perceptual content, in a night, in a void to which we can only have access in the *Wahrsagen*, in the truthful speech that overhangs it and masters it. The *Wahrsagen* travels in one stroke this void where cultures are born and die: it is the risk of history — this risk always younger, always more imperishable than the security of the cultures concerned. From the *Wahrsagen* that is one with the nothingness of history to the truth constituted of cultures that perish — there is the same distance as between the will to will (*volonté de vouloir*) and the will to knowledge (*volonté de connaissance*). The problematic of history is not at the level of knowledges (*connaissances*); but at the level of the truthful. This is why it is not a privileged interrogation of the past, but much rather a risk taken on the future: if knowledge (*connaissance*) of cultures is a security taken from the past, history as radical

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foundation of the diversity of cultures is an audacity of the future. History as *Historie* always marks the end of cultures, *Geschichte*, youth, and the courage of the will (*volonté*).

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### [DEPTH]

The substitution in Nietzsche of *Tiefe*<sup>234</sup> to the *Idée*. Revolution in the philosophical space, reversal of polarities; the gravity of philosophy goes up and down. That which:

1. gives a new sense to reflection, to the *Besinnung*: reflection is no longer "disengagement" from the sensory, nor movement in the space of interiority, nor recognition (*reconnaissance*) in the element of memory, nor approach according to the guiding thread of the *a priori*; reflection no longer disengages, it sinks; it does not remember, it repeats; it no longer follows the *a priori*, it follows and hunts the original; total reversal of reflection;
2. prevents philosophical reflection from taking on the allure of either a transcendental deduction or a dialectical synthesis. Synthesis is replaced by philosophy with hammer blows, the bursting of the concept, spatial dispersion, scattering, the truth taking maximum distance from itself; not to follow this path of the true that is finally collected in the whole of its truth, but to find the point of bursting from which the truth springs and disperses in the luminous dust of the true. Deduction is replaced by reduction, foundation, genealogy; justification of validity, by denunciation of origin. So that the critical style of reflection no longer seeks to define the domain of possible experience, and truth, but to follow the path by which truth was constituted as error, as myth, as legend, as illusion.

A philosophy of depth by opposition

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<sup>233</sup> Foucault uses the abbreviation 'c/ce'. Usually, Foucault uses this abbreviation for 'connaissance' and 'cse' for 'conscience'.

<sup>234</sup> *Tiefe*: depth.

to a philosophy of the Idea (or rather this absolutely new mode of philosophising in depth) does not place thought under the constellation of truth — but always engages it more deeply in a reduction, in an overcoming, in a destruction of the truth. By turning away from the Idea, the philosophy of depth frees thought from the destiny of truth.

(The error of phenomenology, of having wanted to take the form of thought in depth in a philosophy of truth with this obligation, consequently, of maintaining consciousness as absolute synthetic form of truth and origin: so that paradoxically, it is consciousness that becomes deep, while it is the world that is deep; it is not truth that is deep, it is lie; the myth is not the illusory and convenient surface of the true, it is the false (*mensongère*) depth of the truth; to return to the truth the thickness of the myth is to restore it its original depth: which does not mean that the myth is the historical origin of the truth, but that it is its third dimension, that which it appears in the world, and is always sunk into the paths of its depth. If the truth is precisely the truth of the world, it is because it is myth. It is not enough to say that thought is thought of something, it must be said, and beforehand, of what truth is the truth: because this, thought cannot say it — truth as adequation in phenomenology: see Heidegger —, but only the myth; that the truth of which is the truth, can only say its imaginary depth.)

3. This is why *Tiefe* necessarily gives the imagination a place that a philosophy of the Idea could not. Imagination could only be the body of truth, i.e. both its union with the other substance, its manifestation, its deformation; — or even the synthesis of the multiple, like the real body of transcendental synthesis, i.e. the element of the empirical forms of truth; — or again the dispersion of the profiles under which the transition of truth appears. The imagination is always that through which the truth is deciphered; the imaginary is always the "despite" of the truth; the

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truth can only be read backwards in the imaginary. But in depth, it is the truth that appears as the reverse of the imagination. But one must not give this imaginary some anthropological sense (3): it is not the subjective refraction of the world, but the verb itself of its depth.<sup>235</sup>

#### *Tiefsinn* and *Wahnsinn*.<sup>236</sup>

The great error of Husserl's successors: depth is the depth of existence. The influence of psychoanalysis, as anthropological version of thought in depth, but in a philosophical horizon still placed under the constellation of the Idea: depth characterised by the unconscious, forgetting, by fantasy, by desire — which proves that depth is still measured at the metres of consciousness, memory, reality, excesses.<sup>237</sup> The corrections made to Freud's philosophical naivety by phenomenologists reveal a still greater naivety, since they strive to find consciousness in the unconscious,<sup>238</sup> the thickness of the experience of time in forgetting, intentionality in fantasy. Whereas Freud's error was to have only perceived depth as the external limits of consciousness, memory, and intentionality, it actually had to be regrasped (*ressaisir*) in the positivity of an overcoming.

The problem of psychology: in the investigation of depth, psychology has a sense insofar as it does not stop at the subjective or the anthropological. Psychology must announce the night of depth, not reduce it, limit it, or objectify it.

The night of depth is not nothingness.

The ascents and descents of Zarathustra: as exploration of depth. The summit: that from which we see things in depth; the summit is not the height from which we see the Idea, from which we approach its purity; the summit is not the tip of spirituality, but the point of view from which the world has the most depth.

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<sup>235</sup> Foucault adds here, in the manuscript: "Intentionality."

<sup>236</sup> *Tiefsinn*: depth; *Wahnsinn*: madness.

<sup>237</sup> Conjecture. The last two words are difficult to read.

<sup>238</sup> Foucault uses an abbreviation 'Ics' for 'inconscient'.

From Immermann to George — the search for the new shepherd. In George's poetry, he will finally become the child Maximin; on the face of the man whom Immermann and Nietzsche had predicted would be a beautiful man, that he would be more beautiful than man, on this face of a blond head, and on this face of God, we will rediscover more than the enigmatic smile of the happiness that we must keep silent (4). The promised kingdom. The new shepherd and the most beautiful kingdom belong to the same promise: the promise of eternity that time carries with it; the eternal promise that each moment of time steals. The youth of the shepherd and the antiquity of the kingdom: thus finding the myth of David and of Gyges, the slingshot that topples the giant, and the gold ring that makes invisible. This shepherd is found in *Zarathustra*, not young and triumphant, magical master of the old kingdom — but on the threshold of death, suffocated by the serpent that took him by the throat: and Zarathustra will be the wisdom of the shepherd, the shepherd of the shepherd — by ordering him to cut off the black ring, the symbol of old wisdom, like the infant Hercules. Zarathustra is not the overman. Is the shepherd of the serpent episode the overman? Only, no doubt, the tradition of Immermann to George could make it possible to affirm that. Zarathustra preaching the overman, is that not Zarathustra ordering the shepherd to cut off the head of the serpent?

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#### *GESCHICHTE, ZEIT, HISTORIE*

The problem raised by Dilthey — and the triad *Geschichte*, *Weltbild*,<sup>239</sup> *Historie* — reprises the theme around which were ordered the

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post-Hegelian philosophies — except that one speaks of *Zeit* and not *Weltbild*. This is important: but to understand the analogy of *Zeit* and *Weltbild* in the structural economy of the problem, and the importance of the shift that transforms time into culture, and flux into image — one must first grasp (*saisir*) the inflections of sense that occurred even within the conceptual spheres of *Geschichte* and *Historie*.

For the neo-Hegelians, the *Geschichte* of *Seins* does only one and the same thing with the progress and the advent of *Zeitbewusstsein*:<sup>240</sup> that is, the emergence of the figures of being carries with it the progressive deepening of relations to time in the form of their completion in consciousness. *Geschichte* is not heading towards a limit of time — all the more reason it never ends with its last episode — it makes the relation to time absolute in the form of consciousness: by this the relation to time loses everything it could have of the opaque, everything it could enclose of the claim to the timeless, or of the need of eternity; the consciousness of time, as figure of the *Geschichte*, is both the absolute clarity of time, and its triumphant universality. But what does the ultimate character of this consciousness of time mean? Why does it appear as the summit of the *Geschichte*, why is the present the ultimate? This node of questions hides two problems:

- Why is the present the consciousness of time?
- Why is the consciousness of time the pinnacle of history (*Geschichte*)?

The first question: it is a reversible question, i.e. a question that raises as soon as it is formulated a question about its sense, about the polarity of its problematic. We could just as well say: why is the present of *Geschichte* the consciousness of time? as: why is the consciousness of time, as figure of the *Geschichte*, *Gegenwart*?<sup>241</sup> However, the very formulation of the first question inscribes it in the horizon of a problematic of *Historie*: it is a question for the historian, and the critical content it envelops can only promise a historical and relativistic critique — relativity that hides the imputation of the absolute, and the silent presence of *Geist*; because, in the succession of the

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<sup>239</sup> *Weltbild*: vision of the world.

<sup>240</sup> *Zeitbewusstsein*: consciousness of time.

<sup>241</sup> *Gegenwart*: present.

figures of history, the consciousness of time was prefigured, prepared, arranged; and it is necessary, if the *Geschichte* continues, that new figures appear, which will either invalidate the previous figure, or will be inscribed in it; this last solution is that of Haym, of Rosenkranz (5): consciousness of time materialised by a technique becomes the element where history will develop; but by this very reason philosophy disappears in its relation with the *Geschichte*, it is only possible as *Historie*, as figure of culture: consciousness of time, effectuated as philosophical figure of *Geschichte*, having become the World itself, *Geschichte* and philosophy can only be Historians in the element, which has become universal, of time (*Zeit*); consciousness does [not] have a direct relation to the *Geschichte* of being: it only grasps it in the abstraction of *Historie*, and in the element of time. Hence the historical character of our culture, our destiny as exegetes: consciousness only accesses *Geschichte* through the commentary of time that only writes the text of *Historie*. Again, this text, to be assured, to manifest itself as text of *Geschichte*, needs *Geist* (6).

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Ruge's text: on the eternal return of existence in the natural sciences and on the contrary the infinite novelty of structures in *Geschichte*. It is so by the universal essence of the law of nature, existence has only the weight of the example; while it is in existence that the essence of history develops: its essence is the process of its existence (7). The same thing reversed in Nietzsche: infinite novelties of nature, repetition of history; but it is not because historical existence has only the value of the example; on the contrary, it is to better link existence to the totality of history — and without appealing to *Geist*.

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For the will (*volonté*) in Nietzsche, the importance of the *Wille* as essence of the Hegelian State; see Ruge's text on the *Wille* of the State and the *Wollen*<sup>242</sup> of the individual (8).

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Politics as self-critique of the truth in Ruge.

Ruge: the ethical and political pathos of man of the 19<sup>th</sup> century: it is this pathos from which Nietzsche wanted (*voulu*) to free man — and he could only do it by a rediscovery of the philosophy where man disappeared.

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### **[SOCRATES AND DESCARTES]**

The way Nietzsche reacts to Socrates — the way phenomenology reacts to Descartes. Descartes for phenomenology, Socrates for Nietzsche, define the moments of discovery and forgetting, revelation and sedimentation. Join this point of twilight, find this sun that still leaves its light lying around, this lost sun that still accounts for the remains of the day. Repeat Socrates and repeat Descartes. But the phenomenological repetition of Descartes is only the echo of the Nietzschean repetition of Socrates. It is the *same thing* that is in question: the Cartesian metaphysics of subjectivity was only possible under the human sky of Socratic experience. The great Nietzschean repetition as the bloody end of psychology can only be repeated in the form of minor repetition, in the patient archeological work that finds forgotten layers in the sedimentations of our culture. But these re-emergences are only possible in the total space of the Nietzschean return, inside this final ring that is the experience of philosophy itself. The idea that philosophy must "return" to what has been forgotten to emerge, dredge out, and return to a safer ground, with a freer step, and according to a younger approach, this idea is "light" next to the idea that philosophy is the return itself, that its freedom, its joy, the rock of its climbing do not testify to a better path, but in a deeper, more joyful and more desperate way, that it is, for eternity, the very path of return.

Why is this return not the history of cultures (9)?

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<sup>242</sup> *Wille*: will (*volonté*); *Wollen*: will (*vouloir*).



## [TRAGEDY AND THE RETURN]

Tragedy is always discovered on a path of return, and as return from limits encountered: it is tragic knowledge (*connaissance*), which develops from the critical experience of the limits of knowledge (*connaissance*), its return is the circle of logic wrapping around itself, it is, from the refusal of any new belief and any new metaphysics, of any effort for an advance in knowledge (*connaissance*), a return to illusion and appearance willed (*voulues*) as such. The will (*vouloir*) to illusion returns to it, completes it as illusion, finds not appearance as phenomenon, but the phenomenon as appearance, and therefore *kills* it. Tragic knowledge (*connaissance*) justifies appearance in its disappearance. In the same way, the tragic scene purifies the individual in his disappearance: at the limits of the Apollonian world, art returns to the orgiastic call of Dionysus, and the joy of the tragedy breaks out in the death of the tragic hero. Tragedy is returned to the fold; it obeys the shepherd's call. But it is neither idyll nor epic: neither return to nature nor salvation of the hero. But return to being in the death of the warrior.

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## NOTES

1. These manuscripts appear on the back of the typescript of *Maladie mentale et Personnalité*. As a result, they probably date from the fall of 1953 or the winter of 1954. Michel Foucault submitted his manuscript *Maladie mentale et Personnalité* in October 1953 and the book was published by Presses universitaires de France in April 1954.

2. This development of the Nietzschean concept of *Wahrsagen* partly anticipates Foucault's work of the 1980s on truth-telling and *parrésia*. In his lectures in Louvain in 1981, Foucault juxtaposes his concept of "veridiction", the "act of telling the truth", to Nietzsche's *Wahrsagen*: "one must distinguish the assertion (which is true or false) from the act of truth-telling, from the veridiction (the *Wahrsagen*, as Nietzsche would say)" (M. Foucault, *Mal faire, dire vrai, op. cit.*, p. 9 [*Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling, op. cit.*, p. 20 — Tr.]); see also the last three courses at the Collège de France: *id.*, *The Hermeneutics of the Subject; The Government of Self and Others; The Courage of Truth* (*op. cit.*).

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3. We hear here the echo of his 'Introduction à l'"Anthropologie" de Kant': Foucault M (2008) *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology* (Nigro R and Briggs K trans), Semiotext(e), South Pasadena, USA.

4. This is about the young poet Maximilian Kronberger, called Maximin, dead at 16 years, to whom Stefan George consecrated *Le Septième Anneau* (1907).

5. Rudolf Haym, *Hegel et son temps. Leçons sur la genèse et le développement, la nature et la valeur de la philosophie hégélienne*, Fr. trans. by Pierre Osmo, Paris, Gallimard, 2008 [1857]; Karl Rosenkranz, *Vie de Hegel*, suivi de *Apologie de Hegel contre le docteur Haym*, Fr. trans. by P. Osmo, Paris, Gallimard, 2004 [1844].

6. On the distinction between *Geschichte* and *Historie* in Heidegger, see *supra*, note 33, p. 321.

7. K. Löwith, *De Hegel à Nietzsche, op. cit.*, pp. 116-118.

8. See *supra*, note 8, p. 319.

9. In the last lecture of the course Foucault gave on Descartes, he expanded on Descartes' legacy in the thought of Nietzsche, as well as on Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger. This lecture on Descartes was given in Tunis in 1967-1968. The lecture referred to is the only one preserved, to appear in the same series of 'Cours et travaux de Michel Foucault avant le Collège de France' as the present volume. With regard to Nietzsche, Foucault writes: "[5] The Nietzschean will to power (*volonté de puissance*) is the opposite of the Cartesian will to possession (*volonté de possession*). In any case, for Nietzsche, modern philosophy simply reprises, relaunches, and with increased vigour, that metaphysics of knowledge (*connaissance*), individuality, and the good that Socrates had once worried the Athenians about, to the point that they decided to have him killed."

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BERNARD E. HARCOURT

*Context*

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The courses, lectures, and works collected in this volume are hitherto unpublished manuscripts, which were found in a box titled 'Nietzsche 1955-1973' in the archives of the Fonds Foucault at the Bibliothèque nationale de France (BNF, Fonds Foucault, code NAF 28730, Box 65). These texts date from the two main periods in Michel Foucault's intellectual life during which he worked on Nietzsche's writings: firstly, the early 1950s, when he came face to face with Hegel and phenomenology, as well as Marxism. The young Foucault was experimenting with new approaches to developing a philosophy founded on experience and the analysis of discourse. Then, after the publication of *The Order of Things* in 1966, when Foucault returned to Nietzsche with élan to develop the genealogical method that would lead to his 'alethurgic' method some years later. During these two moments, it was through confrontation with Nietzsche that Foucault discovered his own way of philosophising.

## **The manuscripts, the dossier**

### **What we publish**

The manuscripts presented in this volume consist of four sets of documents. The first text is a course on Nietzsche given by Michel Foucault at the Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes (CUEV) as part of his teaching in philosophy. The 58-sheet autograph manuscript is composed of four lessons which

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follow one another, and three supplementary lessons. We know that Foucault gave a course entitled 'Nietzsche' at Vincennes during the 1969-1970 academic year.<sup>243</sup> The previous year, he had also prepared lessons pertaining to Nietzsche in a first course titled 'La fin de la métaphysique'; but this first year at Vincennes was interrupted by several months of strikes and demonstrations, and very few sessions seem to have been maintained.<sup>244</sup> We have notes from students who took the course during the 1969-1970 academic year.<sup>245</sup> A comparison of the words and concepts used in the manuscript and in the students' notes confirms that the text we are publishing constitutes the second year's course.<sup>246</sup> According to their

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<sup>243</sup> See *infra*, Annex A to the 'Context' (programme of the department of philosophy of Vincennes for the year 1969-1970), p. 389.

<sup>244</sup> See *infra*, Annex B to the 'Context' (programme of the department of philosophy of Vincennes for the year 1968-1969), p. 391. Since Foucault considers Nietzsche as a breach in philosophical discourse, he probably prepared some lessons on Nietzsche for the course on 'La fin de la métaphysique' (1968-1969), which would explain why Daniel Defert indicates in his chronology that he had given a course on Nietzsche in 1968-1969. See D. Defert, 'Chronologie (1968-1984)', in M. Foucault, *Œuvres*, t. II, dir. by Frédéric Gros, Paris, Gallimard, 2015, pp. ix-xxxix, here p. xii. We have not yet found distinct traces of this 1968-1969 course in the archives; and this first year of the course was disrupted by months of strike. According to François Regnault, who is indicated as a co-intervener in 1968-1969 and who claims not to have taught with Foucault, lessons were most often cancelled. During these five to six months of strike, Regnault remembers that "we almost never did a course" in the spring of 1969 (interview with François Regnault, 30 June 2023).

<sup>245</sup> 'Notes de cours. Michel Foucault, Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes, 1969-1970, "Nietzsche, la généalogie"' online: [web.archive.org/web/20230513132347/https://cinqheuresdusoir.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/foucault-nietzsche-la-gc3a9nc3a9alogie-vincennes-69-70-b1.pdf](http://web.archive.org/web/20230513132347/https://cinqheuresdusoir.files.wordpress.com/2016/11/foucault-nietzsche-la-gc3a9nc3a9alogie-vincennes-69-70-b1.pdf) (consulted 5 February 2024).

<sup>246</sup> Regarding the title of the course, on another partial list of teaching units of the department of philosophy in Vincennes for the year 1969-1970 (the names of the teachers are missing), it is indicated that the course (probably by Foucault) would have been titled 'Le signe chez Nietzsche'. See *infra*, Annex C to the 'Context' (Université Paris 8, 'Liste des UV — 1968-1972', Bibliothèque numérique de Paris 8, p. 57, online: [octaviana.fr/document/FVNG0002](http://octaviana.fr/document/FVNG0002), consulted 5 February 2024), p. 393. Given the greater reliability of the indications in Annex A, we use as a title for this course: 'Nietzsche'.

notes, Foucault gave his lessons on 19 November and 17 December 1969, 14 January, 28 January, and 11 February 1970. In the same box of the Fonds Foucault at the BNF, in the chemise of documents from **Page 339**

Vincennes, titled 'Nietzsche 67-70', we have found three other lectures or preparatory notes, the order or placement of which we have not been able to identify, and which do not correspond to the students' notes from 1969-1970.<sup>247</sup> We have placed them in annexes.

The second text is a lesson or lecture on Nietzsche titled 'Knowledge (connaissance) and Desire', given by Foucault while he was invited as 'Visiting Faculty Professor' at the State University of New York at Buffalo in the second semester of 1969-1970, in March-April 1970. The 8-sheet autograph manuscript again takes the form of notes. In Buffalo, where Foucault spent two months from 2 March 1970,<sup>248</sup> he gave a course, 'French 588', entitled 'Le désir de savoir, ou les fantasmes du savoir dans la littérature française aux xviii<sup>e</sup> et xix<sup>e</sup> siècles' (The desire to know, or fantasies of knowledge in French literature in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries). It was attended by students and professors from various departments at the university.<sup>249</sup> Foucault there developed theses on the writings of Sade, Balzac, and Flaubert, among others. The Buffalo manuscript on Nietzsche may have formed part of this course,<sup>250</sup> but from its structure and writing it was more likely to have been the subject of a separate lecture.

The third text consists of a series of lectures on 'Nietzsche and the Problem of Truth', delivered by Michel Foucault at McGill University in Montreal in April 1971. The 88-sheet autograph manuscript consists of three lectures that follow one another without any new introductions or conclusions; for this reason, we are publishing them as one item, indicating in notes where Foucault stops and starts again. We have added two other lectures found in

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the chemise titled 'McGill 1971', reproduced in annexes. Only the first appears to have been actually delivered, given the numbering and corrections made to the manuscript in Foucault's hand. The two texts in the appendix are very developed, very written, even if they may have been only a first draft, or even a preparatory work for something else.

The fourth set of texts is a collection of Foucault's early writings on Nietzsche, which can be dated to the first half of the 1950s. The autograph manuscripts form almost the entirety of the first folder of 84 feuillets, titled (inaccurately and not in Foucault's hand) 'Réflexions autour de Nietzsche. Uppsala 1955-1956' (Reflections around Nietzsche. Uppsala 1955-1956), from Box 65. Foucault gave courses on Nietzsche in October 1953 at the École normale supérieure (ENS) on rue d'Ulm, as well as at the University of Lille, which is probably the date of the first documents collected here.<sup>251</sup> According to Gérard Lebrun, Foucault began writing a long text on Nietzsche in November 1954.<sup>252</sup> The manuscripts we are publishing probably served Foucault as support for his lectures and work, and for his own reading of Nietzsche. Some of the annotations suggest that these early writings extend as far back as 1955 (on the back of one page there is an address in Uppsala, where he lived from October 1955). We have grouped these writings by

<sup>247</sup> Foucault was in the habit of reusing previously written course sheets; he also sometimes planned texts and did not give them, but used them elsewhere. It is therefore possible that course notes from the first year on 'La fin de la métaphysique' were used for the course titled 'Nietzsche' of 1969-1970.

<sup>248</sup> See Letter from Michel Foucault, 21 February 1970; Archives of SUNY Buffalo, Memorandum by John K. Simon, 2 March 1970.

<sup>249</sup> See Archives of SUNY Buffalo, Memorandum by John K. Simon, 17 November 1971.

<sup>250</sup> According to an unpublished preface by John K. Simon to his interview with Michel Foucault, published in the *Partisan Review* in 1971, this lesson would have been part of Foucault's course on French literature. See BNF, Archives personnelles et professionnelles Michel Foucault-Daniel Defert, code NAF 29005, 'Buffalo', chemise 1; Stuart Elden, *The Archaeology of Foucault*, Cambridge, Polity, 2023, pp. 199 and 271, note 16.

<sup>251</sup> See 'Notes de Gérard Simon prises aux cours de Foucault sur Nietzsche', in the archives of the Centre d'archives en philosophie, histoire et édition des sciences (CAPHÉS) at the ENS (code GS. 4.9). Gérard Simon (1931-2009), historian of science and professor at the University of Lille, took Foucault's courses at the ENS in 1953.

<sup>252</sup> D. Defert, 'Chronologie (1926-1967)', in M. Foucault, *Oeuvres*, t. I, dir. by F. Gros, Paris, Gallimard, 2015, pp. xxxv-liv, here p. xlvi. Gérard Lebrun (1930-1999), historian and philosopher specialising in German philosophy, also took Foucault's courses at the ENS.

themes: philosophy, psychology, Ancient Greece and various works on Nietzsche (the latter appear on the back of the typescript of his first monograph, *Maladie Mentale et Personnalité*, published in 1954).

### **Other elements of the dossier**

We have also consulted and used other elements of the archives of the Fonds Foucault at the BNF for the publication of this volume, in order to establish the critical apparatus and the present text of 'context'.

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The first set consists of reading notes that Michel Foucault drew up and filed in cardboard chemises, by themes. These notes are to be found in Boxes 33a and 33b (code NAF 28730). They systematically bear a title, given by Foucault, followed by a passage reproducing one or more quotations from books, the references of which are given at the bottom of the page. For example, there are hundreds of notes on German philosophy, arranged in folders with titles such as 'Nietzsche 1', 'Heidegger sur Nietzsche', 'Löwith, *Nietzsches Philosophie der [Ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen]*', 'Nietzsche et les philosophes', 'Généalogie', 'Volonté de puissance', 'La Seconde intempestive', as well as chemises on Schopenhauer, Hegel, Spinoza, and Merleau-Ponty. There are hundreds of pages on Nietzsche and Heidegger, whom Foucault read in German. The notes are undated, as are the chemises; they were probably written in the early 1950s and in the years that followed. Foucault also used them for his courses at Vincennes and McGill.

A second set of cahiers also came from the archives of the Fonds Foucault.<sup>253</sup> In these cahiers, Foucault articulated ideas, took notes, and sketched out theses. These are his intellectual journals. There are developments on Nietzsche, for example in chemise 3, which seems to date from July 1962 to December 1963, with a few pages in his hand dated 1950: "If God is dead, what of the finitude of man? And on what ground is it derived? And how can it still stand?" (14 February 1963). In chemise 4, a red cahier (24 June 1963-20 August 1969) contains fragments from 15 July 1969 on the will to know (*vouloir savoir*), the need for error, the will to power (*volonté de puissance*). In chemise 9 (27 October [1970]-24 November 1970), there is a 'Cahier Rhodia Spiro orange' in which Foucault clarifies his thoughts on 'The epistemological stars', as well as at length on Edmund Husserl. Then, in the 'Cahier vert' (chemise 10, 25 October 1969-October 1970), Foucault develops theses on knowledge (*savoir*) and truth.

Finally, there are other manuscripts, reading notes, notes, and documents in Box 65 of the Fonds Foucault, which we have

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decided not to publish in this volume, but which we have used for the edition. These include a 26-page typescript entitled 'La généalogie nietzschéenne' (Nietzschean genealogy), which is a final version before publication of the article 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History';<sup>254</sup> a 27-page handwritten manuscript entitled 'Freud, Nietzsche, Marx', which may be a first draft of the Royaumont presentation 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx';<sup>255</sup> a few other sheets and reading notes, annotations and plans, often untitled, on Heidegger, Blanchot regarding Jaspers, Hegel and Hölderlin, as well as on the works *The Joyful Science*, *Beyond Good and Evil*, *Zarathustra*; and a bibliography of German works on Nietzsche.

All these documents, sheets, and intimate journals have guided our editing work, they are not sufficiently complete to be reproduced in this volume. Similarly, we have already mentioned the student notes from Foucault's lectures that have come down to us. These also include Gérard Simon's notes from Foucault's lectures on Nietzsche at the ENS in October 1953.<sup>256</sup> These overlap with a number of themes that ran through Foucault's work in the early 1950s. They include developments on *The Origin of Tragedy*, 'To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) may even be part of the foundation of Being', the will (*volonté*) to truth, the Apollonian and the Dionysian, the idea of 'becoming Greeks', the solitude of being, and Jaspers regarding Nietzsche.

### **What has already been published**

The manuscripts presented here should be considered for their own sake, but also for the light they shed on the texts Foucault published on Nietzsche during his lifetime, on his books and his lectures at the Collège de

<sup>253</sup> BNF, Fonds Foucault, code NAF 28730, Boîtes 91-92, 'Journal intellectuel de Michel Foucault'.

<sup>254</sup> M. Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' [1971], in *EW 2*, pp. 369-391.

<sup>255</sup> *Id.*, 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx' [1967], in *EW 2*, pp. 269-278.

<sup>256</sup> On the 'Notes de Gérard Simon prises aux cours de Foucault sur Nietzsche', see *supra*, note 9, p. 340.

France, as well as on the manuscripts already published in this series of 'Cours et travaux de Michel Foucault avant le Collège de France'. Nietzsche is one of the philosophers Foucault read most, but about whom he wrote very little directly — an author he classifies

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in the category of "[philosophers] I know and don't discuss".<sup>257</sup> Nevertheless, the writings with a close relationship to Nietzsche can be grouped into four clusters.

Firstly, Foucault published two exegetical articles on Nietzsche during his lifetime. The first, 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx', dates from 1967 and is based on his intervention at the symposium organised by Gilles Deleuze at Royaumont in July 1964. The second, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', appeared in 1971 in a collective volume in homage to Jean Hyppolite published by Presses universitaires de France.<sup>258</sup>

Then, Foucault gave courses and lectures, and wrote texts that directly implicated Nietzsche. They form part of *Dits et Écrits* (the lectures on 'Truth and Juridical Forms' given at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro in May 1973 and published in 1974), lectures at the Collège de France (the discussion of the "Nietzsche hypothesis" in *Society Must Be Defended*), various publications during his lifetime (his introduction to the English edition of Georges Canguilhem's *The Normal and the Pathological*), and posthumously (the end of his introduction to Kant's *Anthropology*, where Nietzsche closes anthropological discourse and introduces the possibility of a philosophy beyond it).<sup>259</sup>

Nietzsche is also very present in the other manuscripts in the Fonds Foucault. He often represents an essential rupture, a way out and, at the same time, an opening towards his own philosophical inventions. In 1954-1955, in *La Question Anthropologique*, it was Nietzsche who put an end to the anthropological turn of modern Western philosophy.<sup>260</sup> In 1966, in *Le Discours philosophique*, it was

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once again Nietzsche who embodied the mutation of and overturned the Western discourse of philosophy: it was his thought that, wrote Foucault, "broke down, disarticulated, undid piece by piece the very strong armature that isolated philosophical discourse from all others, guaranteeing it its strange functioning".<sup>261</sup>

Finally, in the major books that Foucault published during his lifetime, Nietzsche appears frequently, but in different ways. Although Foucault clearly thought his books with Nietzsche, he almost never did so aloud. This silent dialogue usually takes place in the margins of the pages. Nietzsche's shadow is nevertheless very present. It looms large in the preface and some passages of *History of Madness*, usually alongside Jérôme Bosch, Antonin Artaud, or Vincent Van Gogh. Zarathustra is mentioned once in the first edition of *The Birth of the Clinic*, in 1963. Nietzsche stands out more clearly in *The Order of Things*, the book in which he makes his most marked appearance, again to open up a critical space in contemporary thought. Then he formally disappears in the books that follow, relegated to the margins of the pages, or even to the titles.<sup>262</sup> We will return to this.

The manuscripts we are publishing add to these already published texts. At Vincennes, Buffalo, and then McGill, Foucault ran a sort of relay race, each time seizing the baton to develop a spiral continuity of propositions on knowledge (*connaissance*), truth, and truth-telling. He elaborated the key concepts that he

<sup>257</sup> M. Foucault, 'The Return of Morality' [1984], in Foucault M (1996) *Foucault Live: Collected Interviews (1961-1984)*, (Lotringer S ed), Semiotext(e), South Pasadena, USA, pp. 465-473, here p. 471; see also *id.*, 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism' [1983], in *EW 2*, pp. 433-458, here p. 445.

<sup>258</sup> *Id.*, 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx', art. cit.; *id.*, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', art. cit.

<sup>259</sup> *Id.*, 'Truth and Juridical Forms' [1973], in *EW 3*, pp. 1-89; *id.*, 'Life: Experience and Science' [1985], in *EW 2*, pp. 465-478, here p. 468; *id.* (2020) *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-1976* (Macey D trans), Penguin Group, London, UK, pp. 15-17; *id.* (2008) *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology* (Nigro R and Briggs K trans), Semiotext(e), South Pasadena, USA, here p. 124.

<sup>260</sup> M. Foucault, *La Question anthropologique. Cours. 1954-1955*, ed. by Arianna Sforzini, Paris, Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, 2022.

<sup>261</sup> *Id.*, *Le Discours philosophique*, ed. by Orazio Irrera and Daniele Lorenzini, Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, 2023, p. 179.

<sup>262</sup> *Id.*, 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism', art. cit., p. 445: "I have lectured on Nietzsche but written very little about him. The only rather extravagant homage I have rendered Nietzsche was to call the first volume of my *History of Sexuality* "The Will to Know"."

first posed at Vincennes: the 'will to know' (*vouloir savoir*) and the 'emergence' of knowledge (*connaissance*). Then at Buffalo, he added the 'invention of knowledge' (*connaissance*), the 'fable of truth', and the 'history of truth'. And to these terms, Foucault added others at McGill that would be just as important for his future work: the 'birth', 'invention', and 'will' (*volonté*) to truth, as well as the 'delay', 'event', and finally the 'end' of truth, with its 'destruction' and 'disappearance'. These concepts were fundamental not only to his article.

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'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' (1971) and the development of his genealogical method, which culminated in *Discipline and Punish* in 1975, but also to all his future work on the truth-telling, *parrésia*, and the history of truth in the 1980s.<sup>263</sup>

While Deleuze systematises a Nietzsche who supersedes Kant and demolishes Hegel's dialectic — finding in Nietzsche the essence of critique, namely the questioning of the value of values — it is to the Nietzsche of the *Wahrsagen*, the one of truth-telling, the *historian of truth*, that Foucault turns. With hindsight, Foucault would say at the end of his life that his "question has always been the question of truth, truth-telling, the *Wahr-sagen* — what it is to tell the truth — and the relation between telling the truth and forms of reflexivity, of self upon self".<sup>264</sup> To better understand this assertion, let us begin by describing the context in which the manuscripts gathered here were produced.

### The context

#### **The encounter with Nietzsche: 1951-1955**

It was around 1951, at the age of 25, that Foucault encountered Nietzsche. On his return from a study period in Göttingen in August 1950, he prepared for the agrégation in philosophy for a second time and attended Jean Wahl's lectures on German philosophy at the Sorbonne, on Martin Heidegger, Søren Kierkegaard, and Franz Kafka.<sup>265</sup> At the time, Nietzsche was not on the university syllabus. You had to stumble across him, and Foucault did so "[somewhat] by chance":<sup>266</sup> "The discovery of Nietzsche occurred outside the university. Because of the way the Nazis had used him, Nietzsche was completely excluded from the academic syllabus."<sup>267</sup>

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#### **Hegel and the emergence of an anti-Hegelianism**

At the time, Hegel and Hegelian phenomenology dominated the French philosophical milieu and university education. Foucault himself was fully involved. He had been introduced to the reading of Hegel and phenomenology by Jean Hyppolite, one of the greatest teachers of Hegel, and Foucault's philosophy teacher in khâgne at the Lycée Henri-IV in Paris in 1945-1946.<sup>268</sup> When Foucault was admitted to the ENS in July 1946, Hegelianism and phenomenology — partly taken up by the existentialist phenomenology of Jean-Paul Sartre, who had just published *Being and Nothingness* in 1943 — had permeated university discourse. Foucault wrote his final dissertation (*mémoire de fin d'études supérieures*) on *La Constitution d'un*

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<sup>263</sup> Id., 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', art. cit.; id. (1991) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (Sheridan A trans), Penguin Group, London, UK; id. (2014) *Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling: The Function of Avowal in Justice*, (F Brion and BE Harcourt eds, Sawyer SW trans), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA.

<sup>264</sup> Id., 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism', art. cit., p. 446.

<sup>265</sup> See D. Defert, 'Chronologie (1926-1967)', art. cit., p. xxxix; S. Elden, *The Early Foucault*, Cambridge, Polity, 2021, p. 112 and p. 239, note 20.

<sup>266</sup> M. Foucault, 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism', art. cit., p. 438. [The English translation does not include the word 'somewhat', but Harcourt's citation of the French does — Tr.]

<sup>267</sup> Id., 'Interview with Michel Foucault' (Hurley R trans) [1980], in *EW 3*, pp. 239-297, here p. 248; see also Louis Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra. La réception de Nietzsche en France*, Paris, Seuil, 1995, p. 131.

<sup>268</sup> M. Foucault, 'Jean Hyppolite, 1907-1968' [1969], in *DE I*, no 67, pp. 779-785, here p. 779; see Didier Eribon, *Michel Foucault. 1926-1984*, Paris, Flammarion, 1989, p. 34-40.

*transcendental historique dans La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit de Hegel* under the supervision of none other than Jean Hyppolite.

Hegel made his first, rather 'timid' entry into the French university in the 1930s, with Jean Wahl's famous book *Le Malheur de la conscience dans la philosophie de Hegel* (1929), Alexandre Koyré's articles (1931-1934) and Alexandre Kojève's famous seminars at the École pratique des hautes études from 1933 to 1939, which led to his *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel* (1947).<sup>269</sup> But the second and true entry came in the early 1940s, with the publication of the first translation of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1939-1941) by Jean Hyppolite, followed by Hyppolite's *Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit* (1946), and finally with his and Jean Wahl's courses on German philosophy at the Sorbonne. Hegel took off in French philosophy at the end of the 1940s, prompting Maurice Merleau-Ponty to say in 1946: "Hegel is at the origin of everything great that has been done in philosophy for a century."<sup>270</sup>

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Yet it was also at this time that the status of Hegelianism began to be contested. In 1950, Louis Althusser published an article, 'Le retour à Hegel', a virulent critique of Hyppolite, which invited a clear choice between the idealism of Hegel or the materialism of Marx: "This Great Return to Hegel is only a desperate recourse against Marx, in the specific form that revisionism takes in the final crisis of imperialism: a revisionism of fascist character."<sup>271</sup> This text and others provoked what Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod calls the "birth of anti-Hegelianism" in French philosophy. This movement was to have important effects. A quarter of a century after Merleau-Ponty, Foucault declared in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France that "our whole era, whether it be through logic or epistemology, through Marx or Nietzsche, has attempted to escape from Hegel".<sup>272</sup>

So, as early as 1950, Althusser posed an ultimatum: Hegel or Marx. Faced with this ultimatum, Foucault experimented. He looked for other ways out, other "escape routes" for "a way out of phenomenology".<sup>273</sup> He immersed himself in the existential analysis (*Daseinsanalysis*) of the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger, a method that links Freudian psychoanalysis with Husserlian phenomenology and the thought of Martin Heidegger. Foucault wrote an introduction and contributed to Jacqueline Verdeaux's French translation of the work *Dream and Existence*, intended to introduce *Daseinsanalysis* to the French-speaking world; and he wrote a long manuscript on Binswanger.<sup>274</sup>

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Foucault also experimented with Marx. His friend Maurice Pinguet recalls: "in 1953, he was still trying to engage his thought in the Marxism-Leninism of good obedience, and in his first book attempted to

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<sup>269</sup> Louis Althusser, 'Le retour à Hegel. Dernier mot du révisionnisme universitaire' [1950], in *Écrits philosophiques et politiques*, t. I, ed. by François Matheron, Paris, Stock-IMEC, 1994, pp. 243-260, here p. 244; see also Jean-Baptiste Vuillerod, *La Naissance de l'anti-hégélianisme. Louis Althusser et Michel Foucault, lecteurs de Hegel*, Paris, ENS Éditions, 2022, pp. 11-13.

<sup>270</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 'L'existentialisme chez Hegel' [1946], in *Œuvres*, ed. by Claude Lefort, Paris, Gallimard, 2010, p. 1324, cited in J.-B. Vuillerod, *La Naissance de l'anti-hégelianisme*, op. cit., p. 11.

<sup>271</sup> L. Althusser, 'Le retour à Hegel', art. cit., p. 256, *emphasis in the original*; see also J.-B. Vuillerod, *La Naissance de l'anti-hégelianisme*, op. cit., pp. 120-130.

<sup>272</sup> Foucault M (2019) 'The Order of Discourse' (Scott-Railton T trans) in N Luxon ed, *Archives of Infamy: Foucault on State Power in the Lives of Ordinary Citizens*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, USA, pp. 141-173, here p. 170; see J.-B. Vuillerod, *La Naissance de l'anti-hégelianisme*, op. cit., p. 13; Pierre Macherey, 'Foucault serait-il sorti de Hegel?', in Alain Brossat and Daniele Lorenzini (dir.), *Foucault et... Les liaisons dangereuses de Michel Foucault*, Paris, Vrin, 2021, pp. 9-34.

<sup>273</sup> M. Foucault, 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism', art. cit., p. 439.

<sup>274</sup> Id., 'Dream, Imagination and Existence' (Williams F trans), in Binswanger L and Foucault M (1986), *Dream and Existence* (K Hoeller ed), Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, Seattle, USA, pp. 29-78; id., *Binswanger et l'analyse existentielle*, ed. by Elisabetta Basso, Paris, Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, 2020; see also E. Basso, *Young Foucault: The Lille Manuscripts on Psychopathology, Phenomenology, and Anthropology, 1952-1955*, trans. by Marie Satya McDonough, pref. by B. E. Harcourt, New York, Columbia University Press, 2022.

apply Pavlov's theories to the problems of psychopathology".<sup>275</sup> Although he left the French Communist Party (PCF) in 1953, which he had joined at the beginning of 1950,<sup>276</sup> Foucault nevertheless remained committed to a certain materialism for a few more years, which can be seen in the last two chapters of his first monograph, *Maladie mentale et Personnalité* (1954). This textbook, intended for psychology students and published on Althusser's recommendation, contains two chapters which draw a connection between mental alienation and social alienation, in a fundamentally Marxist manner. So much so that five years later, in 1959, in the first proper review of Foucault's writings, the philosopher Robert Misrahi referred to him as a "Marxist philosopher".<sup>277</sup>

Foucault also read and experimented with Husserl, after coming out of Binswanger — or one could say, to come out of him — and wrote another long manuscript, this time on Husserlian phenomenology.<sup>278</sup> He read Gaston Bachelard, Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, William Faulkner, Jean Genet, Franz Kafka, Søren Kierkegaard, and Richard von Krafft-Ebing.<sup>279</sup> His first publications were all devoted to psychology (always from a philosophical-epistemological point of view). In fact, at this time, Foucault specialised in psychology, obtaining a diploma in psychopathology in June 1952, then a diploma in experimental psychology in June 1953 at the Institut de psychologie de Paris. He worked in electroencephalography laboratories, including at the Fresnes prison and the Sainte-Anne psychiatric hospital in Paris. He began his career teaching psychology at the University of Lille in October 1952, as

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an assistant; it was under this same title that he also taught at the ENS. A few years later, in 1957, he published two articles on the history of psychology, written in 1952-1953.<sup>280</sup> In all these works, Nietzsche's name is never mentioned. And yet he was in the process of discovering Nietzsche.

#### **When Foucault encountered Nietzsche**

Foucault often said that he discovered Nietzsche through the writings of Martin Heidegger; at other times he said that he discovered Nietzsche through Georges Bataille, and Bataille through Maurice Blanchot.<sup>281</sup> Heidegger and Bataille are indeed two of the four readers of Nietzsche who counted for Foucault — the other two being Karl Jaspers and Karl Löwith.<sup>282</sup>

So Heidegger, first of all. Foucault read him closely in the early 1950s, in German, and wrote hundreds of pages of reading notes — "tons!"<sup>283</sup> He states:

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<sup>275</sup> Maurice Pinguet, 'Les années d'apprentissage', *Le Débat*, n° 41, 1986, pp. 122-131, ici p. 127; see also D. Eribon, *Michel Foucault, op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

<sup>276</sup> D. Eribon, *Michel Foucault, op. cit.*, p. 77.

<sup>277</sup> Robert Misrahi, 'Le rêve et l'existence: selon M. Binswanger', *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, vol. 64, n° 1, 1959, pp. 96-106, here p. 106; see also S. Elden, 'Foucault as Translator of Binswanger and von Weizsäcker', *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 40, n°s 1-2, 2020, pp. 91-116, here p. 111.

<sup>278</sup> M. Foucault, *Phénoménologie et Psychologie*, ed. by Philippe Sabot, Paris, Éditions de l'EHESS-Gallimard-Seuil, 2021.

<sup>279</sup> D. Defert, 'Chronologie (1926-1967)', art. cit., p. xxxix; D. Eribon, *Michel Foucault, op. cit.*, pp. 47-48.

<sup>280</sup> M. Foucault, 'La psychologie de 1850 à 1950' [1957] and 'La recherche scientifique et la psychologie' [1957], in *DE I*, n° 2, pp. 120-137, and n° 3, pp. 137-158.

<sup>281</sup> *Id.*, 'The Return of Morality', art. cit., p. 470 (on Heidegger); *id.*, 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism', art. cit., p. 439 (on Bataille); D. Defert, 'Chronologie (1926-1967)', art. cit., p. xli.

<sup>282</sup> In Gérard Simon's notes from Foucault's course at the ENS, we find a reference to the "four great interpreters" of Nietzsche's thought, who are Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Karl Löwith, and Walter A. Kaufmann (author of *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1950).

<sup>283</sup> M. Foucault, 'The Return of Morality', art. cit., p. 470; S. Elden, *Foucault: The Birth of Power*, Cambridge, Polity, 2017, p. 36.

I probably wouldn't have read Nietzsche if I hadn't read Heidegger. I tried to read Nietzsche in the 1950s, but Nietzsche by himself said nothing to me. Whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger — that was the philosophical shock!<sup>284</sup>

Heidegger had turned his attention to Nietzsche in the mid-1930s, after the publication of his book *Being and Time* in 1927, when he was appointed to the commission responsible for the complete publication of the Nietzsche archives collected by his sister, Elisabeth.

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Förster-Nietzsche.<sup>285</sup> He gave four courses on Nietzsche at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau, from 1936 and during the Second World War, and continued to study Nietzsche throughout the war. Heidegger reworked all these texts during the 1950s and published them in two volumes, titled *Nietzsche*, in 1961 (translated into French for the first time in 1971 by Pierre Klossowski). Foucault took copious notes on these texts, which he stored in a *carton* titled 'Heidegger sur Nietzsche'. Heidegger and Nietzsche are the two authors he had, in his own words, "read the most".<sup>286</sup> Foucault was not the only one to rediscover Nietzsche in this way; as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe shows, Heidegger's role in the reception of Nietzsche by post-war French philosophy was decisive.<sup>287</sup>

But it was Bataille above all who 'recovered' Nietzsche from the fascists and made him acceptable to the French readership. In January 1937, Bataille and his close collaborators — Jean Wahl, Pierre Klossowski, and the artist André Masson — published an issue of their new journal, *Acéphale. Religion, Sociologie, Philosophie*, titled 'Nietzsche et les fascistes. Réparation à Nietzsche'. The principal article, 'Nietzsche et les fascistes', is a violent diatribe against Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and the thinkers who allegedly distorted Nietzsche's writings. György Lukács was targeted on the left, but Alfred Rosenberg, Alfred Bäumler, and various fascist authors of the Nazi era were especially targeted on the right. Through other collective projects, such as the Collège de sociologie (1937-1939) and later the journal *Critique*, as well as his diaries and personal journals, which appeared in 1944 under the title *On Nietzsche*, Bataille helped to reintroduce Nietzsche's thought to France, not so much as a systematic philosophy, but rather as an existential experience of what he called the "entire man".<sup>288</sup>

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Karl Jaspers should also be mentioned. His *Nietzsche: Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity* came out in German in 1936.<sup>289</sup> Translated into French by Henri Niel and published in 1950, with a letter-preface by Jean Wahl, this book had a formative role for Foucault, who read it closely and used it for many of his translations of Nietzsche and for his clarifications.<sup>290</sup> Wahl discusses the way in which Jaspers revisits, rethinks, re-experiences, and re-appropriates Nietzsche (as well as Kierkegaard),

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<sup>284</sup> M. Foucault, 'The Return of Morality', art. cit., p. 470.

<sup>285</sup> Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche founded the archives in 1894 at Naumburg, after the death of her extreme-right husband in Paraguay, where he had gone to found an "Aryan" colony; they were moved to Weimar in 1896.

<sup>286</sup> M. Foucault, 'The Return of Morality', art. cit., p. 470.

<sup>287</sup> On this subject, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typographies*, vol. 1, *Le Sujet de la philosophie*, Paris, Aubier-Flammarion, 1979, pp. 113-115; Douglas Smith, *Transvaluations: Nietzsche in France, 1872-1972*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, pp. 186-188 and 225-226.

<sup>288</sup> See Jacques Le Rider, 'Nietzsche et la France. Présences de Nietzsche en France', in F. Nietzsche, *Œuvres*, ed. by Jacques Le Rider and Jean Lacoste, Paris, Robert Laffont, 1993, pp. xi-cxii, here p. lxx-xc; L. Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra*, op. cit., pp. 110-119; D. Smith, *Transvaluations*, op. cit., pp. 88-98. Henri Lefebvre (1901-1991), philosopher, Marxist, and member of the PCF, also contributed to the "denazification" of Nietzsche, with his work *Nietzsche* published in 1939 (Paris, Éditions sociales internationales). See D. Smith, *Transvaluations*, op. cit., pp. 81-88.

<sup>289</sup> Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche. Einführung in das Verständnis seines Philosophierens* [1936]; Fr. trans.: *Nietzsche. Introduction à sa philosophie*, trans. by Henri Niel, letter-preface by Jean Wahl, Paris, Gallimard, 1950 [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, op. cit. Harcourt adds here that the title is mistranslated in the French version, and provides his own translation of the title in the text, which aligns quite well with the title of the English translation — Tr.]

<sup>290</sup> See *supra*, note 6, p. 129. Jules Vuillemin, who would become close to Foucault, published a long review of Jaspers' book in 1951, under the title 'Nietzsche aujourd'hui', *Les Temps modernes*, n° 67, 1951, pp. 1921-1954.

developing his own "method of philosophising" beyond Nietzsche — an inspiration for the young Foucault. Of course, other interpretations of Nietzsche were important to Foucault: those of Karl Löwith in his 1935 book *Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, and 1941's *From Hegel to Nietzsche*, which Foucault read in German and took copious notes on (the French translations did not appear until 1994 and 1969 respectively); as well as that of Maurice Blanchot's in his text 'On Nietzsche's Side', which first appeared in 1945 in the journal *L'Arche* and was later reprinted in *The Work of Fire*.<sup>291</sup>

So it was more or less in 1953 that Foucault really immersed himself in Nietzsche's writings. His friend Maurice Pinguet recalls:

Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Freud: these were his points of reference in 1953, when he encountered Nietzsche, who *more* than any other thinker embodied the very adventure

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of thought. I remember Michel Foucault reading the *Unfashionable Observations* in the sun on the beach at Civitavecchia.<sup>292</sup>

And from that moment on, he took up Nietzsche's challenge:

The actual history of Nietzsche's thought interests me less than the challenge I felt one day, a long time ago, reading Nietzsche for the first time. When you open *The Joyful Science* or *Dawn* after you have been trained in the great, time-honoured university traditions — Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl — and you come across those rather strange, witty, cheeky texts, you say: Well, I won't do what my contemporaries, colleagues, or professors are doing; I won't just dismiss this. What is the maximum of philosophical intensity, and what are the current philosophical effects to be found in these texts? That, for me, was the challenge of Nietzsche.<sup>293</sup>

#### Nietzsche's reception in France (circa 1950)

The post-war period was marked by a certain retreat from Nietzschean thought in France. Nietzsche first made his mark on the French literary and journalistic world in the 1890s, triggered by interest in Richard Wagner: this first Nietzschean 'moment' in France lasted until the First World War.<sup>294</sup> It began in 1877

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with the very first translation of *Richard Wagner in Bayreuth*, which only reached a few French Wagnerians; the following translation, *The Case of Wagner* in 1893, was more widely distributed; it was then that the

<sup>291</sup> Karl Löwith, *Nietzsche. Philosophie de l'éternel retour du même*, Fr. trans. by Anne-Sophie Astrup, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1994 [1935] [See Löwith K (1965) *From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought* (Green DE trans), Constable, London, UK — Tr.]; *id.*, *De Hegel à Nietzsche*, Fr. trans. by Rémi Laureillard, Paris, Gallimard, 1969 [1941] [See Löwith K (1997) *Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same* (Harvey Lomax J trans), University of California Press, Berkeley, USA — Tr.]; Maurice Blanchot, 'Du côté de Nietzsche', *L'Arche*, n° 12, 1945-1946, pp. 103-112; reprinted in *La Part du feu*, Paris, Gallimard, 1949, pp. 278-290 [See Blachot M (1995) *The Work of Fire* (Mandell C trans), Stanford University Press, Stanford, USA, 'On Nietzsche's Side', pp. 287-299 — Tr.]

<sup>292</sup> M. Pinguet, 'Les années d'apprentissage', art. cit., pp. 129-130, *emphasis in the original*. Foucault and his biographers often mention summer 1953 as the date of the encounter with Nietzsche. See M. Foucault, 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism', art. cit., p. 436; D. Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, op. cit., p. 72; D. Defert, 'Chronologie (1926-1967)', art. cit., pp. xxxix and xl. See S. Elden, *The Early Foucault*, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

<sup>293</sup> M. Foucault, 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism', art. cit., p. 447.

<sup>294</sup> On the reception of Nietzsche in France, see: J. Le Rider, 'Nietzsche et la France', art. cit.; L. Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra*, op. cit.; Alan D. Schrift, *Nietzsche's French Legacy: A Genealogy of Poststructuralism*, New York, Routledge, 1995; D. Smith, *Transvaluations*, op. cit.; Anne Staszak, 'Sociologie de la réception de Nietzsche en France', *L'Année sociologique*, 3<sup>rd</sup> series, vol. 48, n° 2, 1998, pp. 365-384; J. Le Rider, *Nietzsche en France. De la fin du xixe siècle au temps présent*, Paris, PUF, 1999; Angelika Schober, 'Présences de Nietzsche en France', *Revue internationale de philosophie*, vol. 54, n° 211, 2000, pp. 99-118; Laure Verbaere, 'L'histoire de la réception de Nietzsche en France. Bilan critique', *Revue de littérature comparée*, n° 306, 2003, pp. 225-233. See also A. Schober, *Nietzsche et la France. Cent ans de réception française de Nietzsche*, doctoral thesis, 3 vol., dir. by Francis Muller, Université Paris X-Nanterre, 1990; A. Staszak, *Les Usages de Nietzsche dans les sciences sociales en France. Étude sur la diffusion du nietzschéisme de 1889 à 1993*, doctoral thesis, dir. by Raymond Boudon, Université Paris IV-Sorbonne, 1994.

Germanist Henri-Albert Haug (known as Henri Albert) launched the translations at Mercure de France, with his own translation of *Zarathustra* in 1898, and then with the complete editions that he edited.<sup>295</sup>

After a marked drop in interest in the immediate post-1918 period — not entirely surprising, given that Nietzsche's *Zarathustra* had been distributed to German soldiers in a military edition and was associated with the enemy — the inter-war period gave rise to a second Nietzsche 'moment' in France. But, once again, the reception was more literary than philosophical.<sup>296</sup> The success of Hegel and phenomenology affected Nietzsche's place in academic philosophical circles; the conflictual and violent reading of the dialectic, particularly by Kojève, attenuated his singularity.<sup>297</sup> Hegel, Heidegger, and Husserl played a more central role, particularly for Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. Moreover, with the rise of fascism and its appropriation of Nietzsche in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as his rejection by Marxist philosophers such as Lukács, who called him "the first great precursor of imperialist ideology in Germany",<sup>298</sup> Nietzsche lost his appeal. This does not mean, however, that certain philosophical thinkers were not beginning to

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dive back in to Nietzsche — we have already mentioned Bataille, Klossowski, and Wahl, but there are others, such as Charles Andler, Geneviève Bianquis, Jules Monnerot, and Gustave Thibon.<sup>299</sup> But this second 'Nietzsche moment' ended badly. Nietzsche found himself on the bench at the Nuremberg trials in 1946, when François de Menthon, chief prosecutor for France, accused him of having been Hitler's precursor, of having believed in the "sovereign race", and of having given "primacy to Germany, to which he recognised a young soul and imperial reserves".<sup>300</sup>

With the onset of the Cold War, Nietzsche became not only a pariah among thinkers linked to post-war communism (with the notable exception of Henri Lefebvre), but also useless to liberals. "If you have to choose between communism and liberalism, using Nietzsche won't get you very far,"<sup>301</sup> notes Anne Staszak. Philosophy remained reticent. In the early 1950s, the French academic philosophical world was not very favourable to Nietzsche. His philosophical status was "extremely ambiguous".<sup>302</sup> Foucault explained: "God knows in 1945 Nietzsche appeared to be completely disqualified..."<sup>303</sup>

And yet, faced with the ultimatum posed by Althusser — Hegel or Marx — Foucault, who was very close to Althusser at the time, turned to Nietzsche. In October 1953, he gave courses on Nietzsche at the ENS and the University of Lille. It was during this period that Foucault wrote the texts on Nietzsche that are collected in the annex to this volume. More generally, Nietzsche became increasingly explicit in his courses

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<sup>295</sup> J. Le Rider, 'Nietzsche et la France', art. cit., pp. xxxiii-xli; L. Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra*, op. cit., p. 25 and note 1.

<sup>296</sup> Using a bibliographic tool dealing with Nietzsche's books and articles from 1889 to 1993, Anne Staszak calculates the percentage of works in the philosophical discipline: only 14% of the total during the first moment (1889-1924), 19% during the second (1925-1954), in contrast to the 63% of the third moment (1955-1993). The trend is the opposite for the literary field, which goes from 34% and 43%, for the first two moments, to 18% for the third. See A. Staszak, 'Sociologie de la réception de Nietzsche en France', art. cit., pp. 371-372, notes 6-8; see also J. Le Rider, 'Nietzsche et la France', art. cit., pp. lxix-xc.

<sup>297</sup> See D. Smith, *Transvaluations*, op. cit., pp. 71-72; L. Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra*, op. cit., pp. 91-94.

<sup>298</sup> György Lukács, 'Nietzsche', in *L'Encyclopédie littéraire* (in Russian), vol. 8, 1933-1934, pp. 91-108.

<sup>299</sup> A. Staszak, 'Sociologie de la réception de Nietzsche en France', art. cit., p. 373, note 11; L. Verbaere, 'L'histoire de la réception de Nietzsche en France', art. cit., pp. 226-229.

<sup>300</sup> Telford Taylor, *The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir*, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1992, p. 295; *Procès des grands criminels de guerre devant le Tribunal militaire international*, Paris, T. Mage, 1994 [1947], t. V, *Nuremberg, débats du 17 janvier 1946*, cited in A. Schober, 'Présences de Nietzsche en France', art. cit., p. 108; see also Robert E. Conot, *Justice at Nuremberg*, New York, Harper and Row, 1983, pp. 284-285.

<sup>301</sup> A. Staszak, 'Sociologie de la réception de Nietzsche en France', art. cit., p. 381; see also A. Schober, 'Présences de Nietzsche en France', art. cit., p. 99.

<sup>302</sup> L. Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra*, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

<sup>303</sup> M. Foucault, 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism', art. cit., pp. 457-458.

and unpublished works of the period. In *La Question anthropologique*, in 1954-1955, the writings on Nietzsche form

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a good third of the manuscript. Although he had distanced himself from Marxism, Foucault did not depart from an emancipatory ambition, which he now described as "Nietzschean".<sup>304</sup>

#### Foucault's sheets and manuscripts from the 1950s

The writings we are publishing in the annex, ranging from one to fifteen pages, date from this period, the first half of the 1950s. They are grouped by themes. A first set on Nietzsche and philosophy contains works on the metaphysics of will (*vouloir*), the metaphysics of will (*volonté*), German philosophy, the notion of repetition, and the idea "to perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*)"; there are also texts on Zarathustra and on the German philosophy of Hegel, Hölderlin, and others. A second set, somewhat slimmer but coherent, concerns psychology: there are writings on reason and unreason, on Freud, on the vocation of psychology, and on the nature of the festival. A third set bears on Greek thought across various subjects: Homer, tragedy, Heraclitus, the theatre, Nietzsche's *The Origin of Tragedy*, Dionysus, lyricism, and the notion of "becoming Greeks". A fourth and final set of miscellaneous works, all inscribed on the back of the typescript of *Maladie mentale et Personnalité* (which must date from autumn 1953, since the book appeared in April 1954): texts on Zarathustra, Socrates, Descartes, tragedy, truth-telling, and madness.

Among these manuscripts is a more developed text, titled 'To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) may even be part of the foundation of Being'. It is based on paragraph 39 of *Beyond Good and Evil*, in which Nietzsche contests the link between philosophy and pleasure in the utilitarianism of English philosophical thought, and that between knowledge (*connaissance*) and virtue in Aristotle.<sup>305</sup> Knowledge (*connaissance*) can be ugly, mean, and hard, Nietzsche tells us; and violence can be pleasure. It is in this context that we find that phrase from Nietzsche which Foucault reprises as a title. Jaspers had studied it in a discussion on truth and death, in which Nietzsche, as Dionysian philosopher, "becomes the truth that transcends death

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and life".<sup>306</sup> Heidegger also commented on this passage, shifting it to a discussion on the subject of art and the artist; for him, it is art that serves as rescue against final decay.<sup>307</sup>

Foucault turned it to theatre, beauty, and aesthetics, and then quite quickly to philology, questioning the etymology of the word "savoir", which comes down to "being seen", perception and representation. To arrive at the importance of language, Foucault drew on three phenomena that were important to him at the time: intoxication, the dream, and unreason. The dream, because he was in the process of writing an introduction to Binswanger's book, *Dream and Existence*; unreason, which he made the theme of his thesis, *History of Madness*; and intoxication, a theme of youth from which he soon distanced himself. He compared the dream to the invisible continuity between existence and unreason, to the experience of that which is radically other. For him, intoxication is the closest thing to absolute knowledge (*connaissance*), which lies between the dream and unreason.<sup>308</sup> Foucault opposes classical philology to intoxication. He draws a parallel between the experience of intoxication and transgression on the one hand, and that of absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) on the other, to distinguish the latter from what he calls 'sober' philology, classical philology. He then goes on to differentiate this classical philology from a philology of "hammer blows", following the example of Nietzsche. For him, this other way of doing things is the means to rediscover a radical experience of language, which would be a critical experience, an

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<sup>304</sup> *Id.*, 'Interview with Michel Foucault', art. cit., p. 249: "Being a "Nietzschean communist" was really untenable [...]."

<sup>305</sup> Foucault develops this same passage in *La Question anthropologique* (*op. cit.*), as well as in 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx' (art. cit.). See *supra*, note 33, p. 131.

<sup>306</sup> K. Jaspers, *Nietzsche*, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-231. [See Jaspers, *Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity*, *op. cit.*, p. 226 — Tr.]

<sup>307</sup> M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, 2 vol., Fr. trans. by Pierre Klossowski, Paris, Gallimard, 1971 [1961], here vol. 1, p. 74. [I have not been able to locate this in the English translation — Tr.]

<sup>308</sup> See *supra*, p. 219.

experience that would not try to immobilise language, but rather to use it in a dynamic way.<sup>309</sup> For Foucault, Nietzsche works words in a way that comes close to this experience of intoxication and the limits of absolute knowledge (*connaissance*). It is on this theme that he ends his text:

Perhaps philology, as learned (*savant*) and memorable love of language, sustained Nietzsche's thought from beginning to end, right up to the final intoxication of the identification between Christ and Dionysus, to which it was already and from the outset profoundly linked.<sup>310</sup>

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Foucault placed language at the centre of his philosophy, around which he oriented questions of truth. He developed a method for analysing discourse or, more precisely, literary language as transgressive experience of the limits of discourse. In a text titled 'Philosophy, Language, and Image', Foucault wrote that "philosophy must find its path in the horizons of language" and "the history of being is finally only as thick as a *philology*". This pushed him towards what he called the "ground of the image". In another text, 'Philosophy and Exegesis', Foucault takes up the question of truth through the prism of philology and the interpretation of texts. He questions both words and images. It is not solely a question of naming, but also of providing an image that one can utilise. Words, language, and images are at the heart of his work. His interest in Georges Canguilhem's work on the problems of madness and the boundaries between the normal and the pathological is already evident in his numerous reflections on unreason.

In his manuscripts, Foucault privileges the Nietzschean concept of 'becoming'. While Heidegger tries to insert Nietzschean becoming (and Nietzsche with it) into the analysis of being and beingness — notably in his book *Being and Time* — Foucault resists this. He adheres to a Nietzsche who remains faithful to becoming. In this, he follows Jaspers, who sees becoming as essential in Nietzsche: "the becoming of philosophy would find its space of play only in the existence, now rooted in time, of philology".<sup>311</sup>

#### **From one decade to the next: 1955-1969**

Foucault continued to work on Nietzsche in his unpublished manuscripts of the following decade. During this period, Nietzsche served as rupture, breach, point of inflection — in his words, "fracture", "caesura", "wound".<sup>312</sup> We have already mentioned *La Question anthropologique*, a course that Foucault gave at the ENS during the 1954-1955 academic year, and which he might have given in Lille

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in 1952-1953 or again at the ENS before 1954.<sup>313</sup> As Arianna Sforzini shows, this is the first time Foucault's pen has attempted to periodise eras of thought. In this division into three times, Nietzsche marks the third, which Foucault calls the end of anthropology — which is also the end of metaphysics and of a whole way of philosophising.<sup>314</sup>

A few years later, in the introduction to his translation of Kant's *Anthropology* — written in 1959-1960, accepted as secondary doctoral thesis in 1961, but not fully published until 2008 —, Foucault uses Nietzsche's discourse to open a space beyond anthropological illusions, not only those of Kant, but more generally those of post-Kantian and existential phenomenological thought (Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty). In the tenth and final section, Foucault uses Nietzsche's words to invent a way out: "The trajectory of the question *Was ist der Mensch?* in the field of philosophy reaches its end in the response

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<sup>309</sup> See *supra*, p. 226.

<sup>310</sup> See *supra*, p. 227.

<sup>311</sup> See *supra*, p. 289.

<sup>312</sup> M. Foucault, 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism', art. cit., p. 438 [The English translation simply gives 'rupture' — Tr.]; Michel Foucault et Gilles Deleuze, 'Michel Foucault et Gilles Deleuze veulent rendre à Nietzsche son vrai visage' [1966], in *DE I*, no 41, pp. 549-552, here p. 551.

<sup>313</sup> A. Sforzini, 'Situation du cours', in M. Foucault, *La Question anthropologique*, op. cit., pp. 227-278, here pp. 229-230 and p. 230, note 5.

<sup>314</sup> M. Foucault, *La Question anthropologique*, op. cit., p. 205. Moreover, we also find in this book two in-depth treatments of readings of Nietzsche by Jaspers and Heidegger (*ibid.*, pp. 195-207 on Jaspers; pp. 207-217 on Heidegger).

which both challenges and disarms it: *der Übermensch*".<sup>315</sup> By killing God and man with him, by surpassing man, not by making him an overman, but by situating him beyond men, Nietzsche offers the possibility of surpassing the natural idea of man.

Then in 1964, in his presentation 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx' at the Royaumont colloquium, Foucault used Nietzsche to open a space of infinite interpretation, a space for critical thought, at the limits of the imagination. It is Nietzsche who shatters the space of distribution in which signs operate and who transforms the spatial relationship inherent in the interpretation of signs — the infinite task of interpretation which, Foucault tells us, comes closest to the "experience of madness".<sup>316</sup> And it was Nietzsche who put an end to semiology, dominant at the time.<sup>317</sup>

Then in 1966, Foucault opened *Le Discours philosophique* with Nietzsche, from the very first line. He devoted most of the last

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third of the manuscript to him.<sup>318</sup> As in *La Question anthropologique*, Nietzsche plays the role of mutation, transformation, denuding of philosophy, not here to put an end to the anthropological question in Western philosophy, but this time to turn philosophical discourse itself upside down. Nietzsche destroys the coherence born with Kant around the diagnosis of the present:

What the Nietzschean mutation has prepared for us are the difficulties inherent in a philosophical discourse which, in losing its criteria of distinction, has at the same time lost its essential modes of functioning.<sup>319</sup>

Throughout this period, Nietzschean themes also featured prominently in the major published books. Foucault reflected on his books with Nietzsche. This can be seen clearly in his reading notes. Among the many devoted to German philosophy, for example, there is one where Foucault reproduces a passage from *The Joyful Science* on the importance of naming things.<sup>320</sup> At the top of the page, underlined, Foucault gives this sheet the title '*Les mots et les choses*'.<sup>321</sup> On another, he takes up a passage from *The Will to Power* about philosophers and men of science.<sup>322</sup> At the top of this one, he writes and underlines: '*La volonté de savoir*'.<sup>323</sup> Foucault thought his books by confronting Nietzsche, but he published little directly about him and even less in his books:

I think it's important to have a small number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but on whom one doesn't write.<sup>324</sup>

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The shadow of Nietzsche is very much present in the *History of Madness*, which must take place, as Foucault writes in the first preface, "beneath the sun of the great Nietzschean quest".<sup>325</sup> It is principally the

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<sup>315</sup> *Id.*, *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, op. cit., p. 124.

<sup>316</sup> *Id.*, 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx', art. cit., p. 275.

<sup>317</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 277-278.

<sup>318</sup> *Id.*, *Le Discours philosophique*, op. cit., pp. 13 and 169-207.

<sup>319</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 180.

<sup>320</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir*, Fr. trans. by P. Klossowski, Paris, Club français du livre, 1965 [1882], §58, pp. 122-123 [See CW, vol. 6, §58, p. 80 — Tr.]; BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33b, chemise 4, 'Le langage'.

<sup>321</sup> [The French title of *The Order of Things* — Tr.]

<sup>322</sup> F. Nietzsche, *La Volonté de puissance*, 2 vol., 13<sup>th</sup> ed., ed. by Friedrich Würzbach, Fr. trans. by Geneviève Bianquis, Paris, Gallimard, 1942 [1935-1937], here vol. 2, livre III, §584, pp. 179-180; see BNF, Fonds Foucault, Boîte 33a, chemise 1, 'Nietzsche 1'.

<sup>323</sup> [The French title of *The Will to Know*, the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* — Tr.]

<sup>324</sup> M. Foucault, 'The Return of Morality', art. cit., p. 470.

<sup>325</sup> *Id.* (2009) 'Preface to the 1961 edition', in *History of Madness* (Murphy J and Khalfa J trans), Routledge, London, UK, pp. xxvii-xxxvi, here p. xxx.

madness of the man, Friedrich Nietzsche, that he develops, alongside Bosch, Artaud, Sade, and Van Gogh.<sup>326</sup> Zarathustra also made an appearance in the first edition of *Birth of the Clinic* in 1963, but disappeared from the second edition in 1972.<sup>327</sup> There are clear echoes of the Royaumont presentation of 'Nietzsche, Freud, Marx' (1964) in *The Order of Things*. The latter is the book in which Nietzsche makes the clearest appearance, though more briefly than in the article taken from the presentation, which ends with Nietzsche's name. In *The Order of Things*, it is Nietzsche who "marks the threshold beyond which contemporary philosophy can begin thinking again".<sup>328</sup> These passages from the book offer the most scintillating reflections of the manuscripts of youth unpublished in his life.

But the fact that Foucault eliminated Zarathustra's name from the second edition of *Birth of the Clinic* clearly shows that he attached an extreme importance to the evocation of Nietzsche, as well as to his absences.<sup>329</sup> These are not simple errors by the wayside or lapses of attention. In the books published in his life, the use of Nietzsche's name is precise, contained, controlled, regulated, and disciplined.

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### **Around The Order of Things (1964-1966)**

It was precisely during this period, 1964-1966 — with the writing, publication, and reception of *The Order of Things* — that Foucault developed a whole series of problematics that would guide his researches and works on Nietzsche. Firstly, a questioning of history, which occupied a central position in *The Order of Things*: how can a history be made without subject, without teleology? Secondly, a reflection on truth, which was not yet fully developed in the 1966 book, but became clearer in the first version of *The Archaeology of Knowledge*: how can a history of truth be made without truth? It is precisely this problematic that gives rise to the distinction between 'knowledge (*connaissance*)', linked to a subject, and 'knowledge (*savoir*)', independent of the subject. Thirdly, a question about the desire for truth: how can a history of truth be made which is a history of a knowledge-power (*savoir-pouvoir*)? In confronting Nietzsche, Foucault finds a confirmation of his problematic and an incentive to rethink himself.

In his lectures on *The Order of Things* at the University of São Paulo in 1965, just before the publication of the book, the place of Nietzsche remained restricted, even more so than in the book that appeared in April 1966. However, Foucault had already proposed a course on Nietzsche for 1966 at the University of São Paulo, and presented it as follows:

Based on Nietzsche's works on ethics (*Beyond Good and Evil*, *On the Genealogy of Morality*), we will analyse the relationship between Nietzsche and utilitarianism in the 18<sup>th</sup> century — and more generally, the birth of the notion of value between the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, and its ambiguity. We will show why the critique of, and the attempts at a

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<sup>326</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xxix. Nietzsche's relation to madness was a theme which interested Foucault since the early 1950s. See *supra*, note 48, p. 264; see also Foucault's remarks in Serge Jouhet's program, entitled 'Analyse spectrale de l'Occident', devoted to Nietzsche and broadcast on France Culture on 8 January 1966 (to be published).

<sup>327</sup> M. Foucault, *Naissance de la clinique. Une archéologie du regard médical*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., Paris, PUF, 1963, p. 199 ("From Hölderlin's *Empedocles* to Zarathustra then to Freudian man"); *ibid.*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., 1972, p. 201 ("From Bichat's open cadavers to Freudian man"); *ibid.*, ed. by François Delaporte, in *Œuvres*, t. I, *op. cit.*, p. 889 and p. 1551, note 5. [The English translation of this book, by Sheridan, switches between the two editions inconsistently. A critical edition in English translation is to be published by Routledge in 2026/2027, edited by Stuart Elden and Stefanos Geroulanos, translated by Marie Satya McDonough — Tr.]

<sup>328</sup> *Id.* (2002) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (Sheridan A trans), Routledge, London, UK, p. 373; see also, page 286: "It was Nietzsche, in any case, who burned for us, even before we were born, the intermingled promises of the dialectic and anthropology."

<sup>329</sup> Foucault refers to Zarathustra in a footnote in *Folie et Déraison. Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (Paris, Plon, 1961, p. 620), but removes this reference in the new edition of 1972 (*Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique*, new ed., Paris, Gallimard, 1972, p. 537). [*History of Madness*, *op. cit.*, pp. 642-643, note 8 — Tr.] See S. Elden, *The Early Foucault*, *op. cit.*, p. 188 and p. 263, note 84.

genealogy of, values in the nineteenth century do not have the naturalistic sense that was attributed to them.<sup>330</sup>

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A few months later, in February 1966, Michel Foucault agreed with Gilles Deleuze to edit the French edition of Nietzsche's *Œuvres philosophiques complètes*, published by Gallimard and edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. The first volume — *The Joyful Science* and the fragments of 1881-1882 — appeared in May 1967, along with the 'Introduction générale' to Nietzsche's philosophical works written by Deleuze and Foucault.<sup>331</sup>

Then, in the summer of 1967, Foucault began a new reading of Nietzsche.<sup>332</sup> Daniel Defert reports that, on his return from Tunis to the family home in Vendeuvre-du-Poitou, Foucault wrote him a letter, dated 16 July 1967:

I've been reading Nietzsche; I think I'm beginning to realise why he's always fascinated me. A morphology of the will to know in European civilisation that we've left aside in favour of an analysis of the will to power.<sup>333</sup>

Thus Foucault returns to Nietzsche, this time as 'morphology of the will to know'. Morphology is the study of forms, in biology the structure of living beings, in linguistics the forms present in a language. For Foucault, then, morphology would be the study of the forms that the will to know (*volonté de savoir*) could take — a hypothesis that illuminates the courses and lectures to come, as well as the first volume of the *History of Sexuality* published in 1976: *The Will to Know (La Volonté de savoir)*.

## **The 1968 uprisings**

But shockwaves soon followed. In Tunis, where Foucault taught philosophy, major anti-imperialist student

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demonstrations broke out at the beginning of June 1967, on the occasion of the Six Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. According to Defert, "politicised students more and more frequently held their meetings at Foucault's house".<sup>334</sup> Many of them were arrested and imprisoned. Foucault mobilised to help them. New demonstrations broke out at the University of Tunis in mid-March 1968, largely to secure the release of comrades detained since the previous year. Foucault supported the students, hid their roneo and provided them with a logistical and financial support.

Then uprisings broke out throughout the spring of 1968, from Warsaw to London, culminating in May 1968 in Paris. Foucault was not in Paris, except for a short trip on 27 May; he stayed in Tunis to support his students. The Tunisian police harassed him. Finally, he left the country in October, initially attached administratively to the University of Nanterre, and then to take part in the creation of a new experimental university institution in Vincennes.

## **Courses and lectures from Vincennes,**

## **Buffalo, and McGill: 1969-1971**

Back in Paris in October 1968, Michel Foucault was part of the "co-opting core" that selected and recruited teachers for the new Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes (CUEV). On 16 November, he was elected to the chair of philosophy. He directed the philosophy department, which took on two senior lecturers, two assistant lecturers, and three assistants — eight teaching posts in all. He assisted in the

<sup>330</sup> Archives of the University of São Paulo; see P. Sabot, 'Situation', in M. Foucault, *Archéologie des sciences humaines. Cours à São Paulo, 1965* [prov. title], to be published in 2025 in this series of 'Cours et travaux de Michel Foucault avant le Collège de France'.

<sup>331</sup> G. Deleuze et M. Foucault, 'Introduction générale', in F. Nietzsche, *Le Gai Savoir. Fragments posthumes. 1881-1882*, OPC, t. V, pp. i-iv, here p. i; reprinted in DE I, n° 45, pp. 561-564; see also *id.*, 'Michel Foucault et Gilles Deleuze veulent rendre à Nietzsche son vrai visage', art. cit. Foucault did not play a large role in the following volumes of the edition by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. See S. Elden, *The Archaeology of Foucault*, op. cit., p. 187.

<sup>332</sup> See notes extracted from the BNF's Fonds Foucault, dossiers containing the manuscript project; Daniel Defert notes: "Nietzsche 1967-1970: relecture de Nietzsche, été 1967."

<sup>333</sup> See D. Defert, 'Chronologie (1926-1967)', art. cit., p. liii.

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.*

creation of a new psychoanalysis department, the first of its kind. The criteria emphasised openness to a new way of thinking in the aftermath of May 1968.<sup>335</sup> For philosophy, Foucault and the co-opting core hand-picked a cohort of young teachers open to the thinking of 1968 — Alain Badiou, André

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Glucksmann, Judith Miller, Jacques Rancière, François Regnault; and to 'counterbalance' these representatives of the Maoist tendency, they recruited member of the PCF Étienne Balibar, Trotskyist thinker Henri Weber, and François Châtelet, who was more moderate politically.<sup>336</sup> Intellectual circles abounded in Marxism-Leninism, Freudo-Marxism, psychoanalysis, Maoism with a Gauche prolétarienne tendency, and Trotskyism.

#### The intellectual milieu of 1969

When he returned to France, his intellectual milieu was even more in the grip of Marxist critique, particularly Maoist. To Althusser's ultimatum of 1950, it was Marx who seemed to have triumphed at the end of 1960. Althusser himself had a growing influence, with his new scientific reading of Marx and his notes on the "ideological apparatuses of the State".<sup>337</sup> His collection of articles *For Marx*, which had just appeared in 1965, argued for the epistemological split between the young humanist Marx and the scientific Marx, the founder of a science on a par with "Galileo or Lavoisier". That same year, the seminar on Marx's *Capital*, which he had held during the 1964-1965 academic year, led to the publication of the collective work *Reading Capital*, written with his students Étienne Balibar, Roger Establet, Pierre Macherey, and Jacques Rancière. Although he too was not present during the May 68 uprisings, his theories of social reproduction and ideology dominated Foucault's intellectual milieu. In other circles, Herbert Marcuse and the sexual liberation movements contributed to the development of a whole new Freudo-Marxist strand, inspired in part by Wilhelm Reich; following on from this, Gilles Deleuze met Félix Guattari at Vincennes, and they began writing their *Anti-Oedipus*, inventing an approach of "schizo-analysis" approach. Jean Genet turned to George Jackson and the Black Panthers. Franco-Maoist thought spread and took hold of Foucault's close friends, who joined the Gauche prolétarienne — Daniel Defert, Danielle Rancière, Jacques Rancière, and others. Further afield, in Frankfurt,

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the young radical Hans-Jürgen Krahl challenged his master Theodor Adorno and proposed a "new" unorthodox reading of Marx.<sup>338</sup> In this teeming intellectual and political world, very different from that of the 1950s, Foucault seemed like a fish in water:

[I]n 1968, all of a sudden, these problems of health, madness, sexuality, and the body came directly into the political arena. Suddenly, the status of the insane was of interest to the entire population. These books were suddenly over-consumed, whereas they had been under-consumed in the previous period. So I went back to the drawing board after that, with a calmer mind and more certainty that I hadn't made a mistake.<sup>339</sup>

When Vincennes opened its doors on 13 January 1969, in the intellectual, political, and militant turmoil of the post-May 68 period, more than four hundred students enrolled in philosophy.<sup>340</sup> Foucault's young colleagues embarked on a politically committed teaching. Rancière began teaching courses on

<sup>335</sup> Charles Soulié, 'Le destin d'une institution d'avant-garde. Histoire du département de philosophie de Paris VIII', *Histoire de l'éducation*, n° 77, 1998, pp. 47-69; on this subject, see Guy Berger, Maurice Courtois, and Colette Perrigault, *Folies et raisons d'une université, Paris 8. De Vincennes à Saint-Denis*, Paris, Pétra, 2015; C. Soulié (dir.), *Un mythe à détruire ? Origines et destin du Centre universitaire expérimental de Vincennes*, pref. by Christophe Charle, Saint-Denis, Presses universitaires de Vincennes, 2012.

<sup>336</sup> C. Soulié, 'Le destin d'une institution d'avant-garde', art. cit., pp. 48-49 and 50-51.

<sup>337</sup> L. Althusser, *Sur la reproduction*, introd. by Jacques Bidet, Paris, PUF, 1995, text of a manuscript from which extracts were published, in 1970, in the review of the Communist Party, *La Pensée*, under the title: 'Les appareils idéologiques d'État.'

<sup>338</sup> Hans-Jürgen Krahl, *Konstitution und Klassenkampf. Zur historischen Dialektik von bürgerlicher Emanzipation und proletarischer Revolution*, Francfort-sur- le-Main, Neue Kritik, 2008 [1971].

<sup>339</sup> Foucault M (1996) 'Sorcery and Madness' (Johnston J trans) in *Foucault Live, op. cit.*, pp. 200-202, here p. 202.

<sup>340</sup> C. Soulié, 'Le destin d'une institution d'avant-garde', art. cit., pp. 50-51 and 57.

'Révisionisme, gauchisme' and the 'Formation du concept d'idéologie', to then teach 'Théorie de la deuxième étape du marxisme-léninisme: le stalinisme'; Judith Miller began with courses on 'Révolutions culturelles', and then 'La troisième étape du marxisme-léninisme: le maoïsme'; Étienne Balibar offered a course on 'Sciences des formations sociales et philosophie marxiste'; Alain Badiou developed courses on 'La dialectique marxiste' and 'La Science dans la lutte des classes'; Henri Weber, for his part, offered an 'Introduction aux marxistes du xxe siècle: Lénine, Trotski et le courant bolchevique', as well as 'Les écrits de Mao Tsé-toung'.<sup>341</sup>

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Almost immediately, Foucault found himself at the centre of political controversy. Even before the first semester got underway, there was unrest, strikes, incidents, and confrontations. At Vincennes, Foucault recognised the importance of the student movement.<sup>342</sup> On 23 January 1969, students and professors barricaded and occupied the campus. Foucault took part, was arrested by the police and taken away with around two hundred students, then released the following morning. A few dozen students were expelled from the university. Later, on Monday 10 February 1969, Foucault went to the Maison de la Mutualité alongside Jean-Paul Sartre, in front of more than three thousand students and teachers, to protest against the "police University". According to *Le Monde*, Foucault was one of the two speakers "most virulent against the measures taken against students excluded from university".<sup>343</sup>

Then, almost a year to the day after the philosophy department opened, on 15 January 1970, the National Minister for Education, Olivier Guichard, revoked the department's authorisation to award diplomas on the grounds that the teaching was Marxist-Leninist.<sup>344</sup> Foucault replied in *Le Monde*:

Philosophy must not consist merely in a commentary on "canonical and scholastic" texts, but must be "a reflection on the contemporary world, therefore necessarily on politics".<sup>345</sup>

It was in this tumultuous context that Foucault returned to Nietzsche in 1969 — the "accursed"<sup>346</sup> philosopher who had been a

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constant reference for him since the early 1950s, a personal reference, but until then a private one. At Vincennes, Foucault offered two courses for the first academic year, 1968-1969 (which began in February 1969), entitled 'La fin de la métaphysique' and 'The Discourse of Sexuality'.<sup>347</sup> The courses were interrupted by months of strikes and demonstrations, and very few sessions were held.<sup>348</sup> The following year

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<sup>341</sup> See *infra*, Annexes A and B, pp. 389 and 391; C. Soulié, 'La pédagogie charismatique de Gilles Deleuze à Vincennes', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, n°s 216-217, 2017, pp. 42-63, here p. 47-48.

<sup>342</sup> Foucault M (1977) 'Revolutionary Action: "Until Now"' (Bouchard DF and Simon S trans) in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews* (DF Bouchard ed), Cornell University Press, New York, USA, pp. 218-233, here p. 218.

<sup>343</sup> "M. Michel Foucault, referring to the evening of 23 January in Vincennes, said that there had been no deterioration on the part of the students; that there had been provocation by the police that day; that we were finally faced with a "calculated repression"" ('Plus de trois mille étudiants affirment leur solidarité avec leurs camarades exclus', *Le Monde*, 12 February 1969); D. Eribon, *Michel Foucault, op. cit.*, p. 218; G. Berger, M. Courtois, and C. Perrigault, *Folies et raisons d'une université, Paris 8, op. cit.*, pp. 59 and 65.

<sup>344</sup> C. Soulié, 'Le destin d'une institution d'avant-garde', art. cit., p. 52; G. Berger, M. Courtois, and C. Perrigault, *Folies et raisons d'une université, Paris 8, op. cit.*, p. 71.

<sup>345</sup> 'L'enseignement de la philosophie est-il trop orienté à Vincennes?', *Le Monde*, 27 January 1970, p. 10 (reproduced in C. Soulié, 'La pédagogie charismatique de Gilles Deleuze à Vincennes', art. cit., p. 56).

<sup>346</sup> G. Deleuze and M. Foucault, 'Introduction générale', art. cit., p. 561.

<sup>347</sup> The 1968-1969 course on sexuality has already been published, see Foucault M (2021) *Sexuality: The 1964 Clermont-Ferrand and 1969 Vincennes Lectures* (Burchell G trans, C-O Doron ed), Columbia University Press, New York, USA.

<sup>348</sup> Interview with François Regnault, 30 June 2023.

(1969-1970), Foucault threw himself fully into Nietzsche, with a course titled 'Nietzsche', as well as another course on the 'Épistémologie des sciences de la vie'.<sup>349</sup>

But it is henceforth a different Nietzsche that interests him — no longer the philologist Nietzsche of *The Birth of Tragedy*, but rather the historian and genealogist Nietzsche of *Beyond Good and Evil*, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, and eventually *The Will to Power*. The context of Nietzsche's reception also changed considerably in France.

### **Nietzsche's reception in France (circa 1969)**

Although Nietzsche was "virtually unknown in the educational establishment"<sup>350</sup> in the 1950s, things changed rapidly in just a few years. At the Sorbonne, Jean Wahl devoted two classes to Nietzsche, on 2 and 9 December 1958, which were distributed in the form of handouts to students.<sup>351</sup> The philosopher Angèle Kremer-Marietti devoted her doctoral thesis to Nietzsche in 1957, inspiring her first book, of many to follow, *Thèmes et Structures dans l'œuvre de Nietzsche* in 1957.<sup>352</sup> Gilles Deleuze published his book *Nietzsche and Philo*

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sophy in 1962, followed by a shorter monograph in 1965, simply titled *Nietzsche*. In 1964, he organised the Royaumont colloquium, which brought together leading figures in French philosophy, including academics. Professor Martial Gueroult of the Collège de France chaired the colloquium, and a number of established academics took part, including Jean Beaufret, Henri Birault, Karl Löwith, Gabriel Marcel, and Jean Wahl, as well as Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault, and Pierre Klossowski.<sup>353</sup> Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari had just begun their new edition of Nietzsche's complete works, published by Gallimard, which would cleanse the work of his sister's Nazi imprint by bringing together the posthumous fragments as faithfully as possible. As we have seen, Deleuze and Foucault agreed to direct the edition to support the reconstruction work, and published their 'Introduction Générale'. Deleuze published the *Nietzsche* of the Royaumont colloquium with Minuit in 1967; then, in 1968, he published his most Nietzschean work, *Difference and Repetition*. In the meantime, Jean Granier, attached to the CNRS, worked meticulously on the question of truth in Nietzsche and, in 1966, published a 650-page volume entitled *Le Problème de la vérité dans la philosophie de Nietzsche* with Editions du Seuil. Foucault read Granier's book, which made a deep impression on him.<sup>354</sup> Pierre Klossowski published *Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle* in 1969.

This third Nietzsche 'moment' this time clearly affected the philosophical domain: marked by "a quasi-monopoly of the left, an almost complete disappearance of polemics, and an ousting of practically all professional sectors in favour of philosophy alone".<sup>355</sup> The coronation of this third moment was the Cerisy-la-Salle colloquium on Nietzsche in 1972. Cerisy brought together the *who's who*<sup>356</sup> of contemporary French

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<sup>349</sup> See *infra*, Annex A to the 'Context', p. 389.

<sup>350</sup> L. Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra*, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-132.

<sup>351</sup> See the notes taken from attendees conserved by l'INA-Radio France of the classes of 2 and 9 December 1958 by Pierre Pénisson, in J. Le Rider (dir.), *Nietzsche. Cent ans de réception française*, Paris, Éditions Suger, 1999, pp. 139-147; L. Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra*, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-132.

<sup>352</sup> Angèle Kremer-Marietti, *Thèmes et Structures dans l'œuvre de Nietzsche*, foreword by Joseph Müller-Blattau, Paris, Lettres modernes, 1957; see L. Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra*, *op. cit.*, p. 132; A. Schober, 'Présences de Nietzsche en France', *art. cit.*, p. 102, note 11.

<sup>353</sup> L. Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra*, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-133.

<sup>354</sup> Conversation with Daniel Defert, 9 June 2019.

<sup>355</sup> A. Staszak, 'Sociologie de la réception de Nietzsche en France', *art. cit.*, p. 372; Vincent Descombes, 'Le moment français de Nietzsche', in Alain Boyer et al., *Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas nietzschéens*, Paris, Grasset, 1991, pp. 105-134, here p. 101.

<sup>356</sup> [In English in the original — Tr.]

philosophy — Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Sarah Kofman, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-François Lyotard, Jean-Luc Nancy, Paul Valadier (but not Foucault).<sup>357</sup> Nietzsche entered the canon of

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university philosophy, appearing for the first time on the syllabus for the agrégation in philosophy in 1970:<sup>358</sup> this was the "academic consecration of Nietzsche".<sup>359</sup> Numerous philosophical books followed in the 1970s, including *Spurs: Nietzsche's Styles* (1972) by Jacques Derrida, several books by Sarah Kofman, such as *Nietzsche and Metaphor* (1972) and *Nietzsche et la Scène philosophique* (1979), and Bernard Pautrat's *Versions du soleil. Figures et système de Nietzsche* (1971).

But despite being rated among certain critical philosophers, Nietzsche remained cursed by Marxist thinkers such as György Lukács, who still called him a reactionary or, worse, "the philosopher-in-chief of imperialist reaction".<sup>360</sup> In his work *The Destruction of Reason*, Lukács directly attacks both the idea of "desubjectification" and the lie of truth. In his view, Nietzsche helps to "reinforce the sweet moral sensation of being a rebel, by seductively opposing the 'superficial' and 'external' social revolution to a 'deeper', 'cosmic and biological' revolution", thus self-transformation, which ends up maintaining all the privileges of the bourgeois.<sup>361</sup> On the question of knowledge (*connaissance*) and truth, Lukács is equally caustic:

Nietzsche's theory of knowledge (*connaissance*) appeals to the most blatant irrationalism, it absolutely denies that the world is knowable (*connaissable*), it denies reason, it appeals to all the barbaric and bestial instincts, and thus admits the situation in which it finds itself, without ever being aware of it.<sup>362</sup>

Other thinkers on the left, such as Althusser, Balibar and the group around *Reading Capital*, neglected Nietzsche. According to Balibar,

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"Nietzsche was in no way part of our references at the time of *Reading Capital*"; he "was not at all one of [Althusser's] references".<sup>363</sup> On the right, Nietzsche the irrationalist was suspect, and anti-Nietzscheanism only grew, culminating in the publication of the collection *Pourquoi nous ne sommes pas nietzschéens*, directed by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut and published by Grasset in 1991.

In this tense context of the reception of Nietzsche, Foucault himself changed his reading of him: from philology to history, knowledge (*savoir*), and power. This shift produced both his genealogical method, which we find in *Discipline and Punish*, and his political commitment to the abolition of prison and all his work with his comrades on the Groupe d'information sur les prisons (GIP). In fact, it was at the very heart of the GIP that Foucault taught Nietzsche — and a number of Vincennois were to become members of the GIP (Robert Castel, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Donzelot, Jean-Claude Passeron, Danielle Rancière, Jacques Rancière).<sup>364</sup> Foucault and Defert became involved in the struggle for incarcerated people and invited their comrades to an initial meeting to set up an organisation at the end of 1970,<sup>365</sup> a few months after the Vincennes course and the Buffalo conference. Michel Foucault, Jean-Marie Domenach, and Pierre Vidal-

<sup>357</sup> The programme is available online: [www.ccic-cerisy.asso.fr/nietzsche1TM73.html](http://www.ccic-cerisy.asso.fr/nietzsche1TM73.html) (consulted on 5 February 2024). The talks were published in Centre culturel international de Cerisy-la-Salle, *Nietzsche aujourd'hui?* [colloquium, July 1972], 2 vol., Paris, Union générale d'éditions, 1973.

<sup>358</sup> A. D. Schrift, 'The Effects of the Agrégation de Philosophie on Twentieth-Century French Philosophy', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, vol. 46, n° 3, 2008, pp. 449-473.

<sup>359</sup> L. Pinto, *Les Neveux de Zarathoustra*, op. cit., p. 177.

<sup>360</sup> G. Lukács, *La Destruction de la raison. Nietzsche*, Fr. trans. by Aymeric Monville, Paris, Delga, 2012 [1954], p. 67.

<sup>361</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>362</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 174.

<sup>363</sup> Correspondence with Étienne Balibar, 14 February 2016.

<sup>364</sup> D. Eribon, *Michel Foucault*, op. cit., p. 243.

<sup>365</sup> *Le Groupe d'information sur les prisons. Archives d'une lutte, 1970-1972*, ed. by Philippe Artières, Laurent Quéro, and Michelle Zancarini-Fournel, postf. by D. Defert, Paris, Éditions de l'IMEC, 2003, p. 30; on this subject, see also D. Defert, *Une vie politique. Entretiens avec Philippe Artières et Éric Favereau, avec la collab. de Joséphine Gross*, Paris, Seuil, 2014, pp. 36-76.

Naquet announced the creation of the GIP on 8 February 1971, two months before his lectures on Nietzsche at McGill University in Montreal. One could say that his militancy was framed by his reading of Nietzsche — or that his reading of Nietzsche gave rise to his most militant period. At the same time, Foucault began to adopt a more Marxist language, which can be heard in his course on sexuality at Vincennes, in his debate with Noam Chomsky, then in his lectures at the Collège de France, *Penal Theories and Institutions* and *The Punitive Society*.<sup>366</sup> He was immersed in militant circles, with

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his companion Daniel Defert, who joined the Gauche prolétarienne. Some of his course notes on Nietzsche bear witness to this.<sup>367</sup>

### ***Course from Vincennes (1969-1970)***

Foucault opens his course 'Nietzsche' at Vincennes with the second of the *Unfashionable Observations* and the use of history, a rather militant text by the young Nietzsche in which he placed the historical sense at the service of life and its own transformation. From there, Foucault turns to a paragraph from *The Joyful Science*, §337, which also proposes putting the historical sense at the service of humanity; then to Nietzsche's writings on genealogy. Foucault studies Nietzsche's use of the vocabulary of origin as a laboratory for developing his theory of 'will to know (*vouloir savoir*)', and eventually of 'knowledge-power (*savoir-pouvoir*)'.

In 1969, one observes that Foucault's mutation was underway. One can hear it very clearly in the conclusion of the fourth lesson, the climax of the course: "We are in the era of revolutionary strategy",<sup>368</sup> declares Foucault. The world is no longer governed by a spiritual totality or religion, nor by a "transcendental destination that overhangs the West", but by aleatory, improbable forms of domination, of the order of "chance and play".<sup>369</sup> This is precisely the key Nietzsche offered him in 1969: history is not teleological or eschatological,

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it is not made up of spiritual totalities (Hegel and the phenomenology of spirit resonate here), but of a play of repetitions, recommencements, aleatory multiplicities, contingencies. In other words, it is a matter of forms of domination that repeat themselves, which are entangled in themselves, and which have no direction, the inverse of Marxism.

Foucault arrives at this observation — the eternal return of aleatory forms of domination — through a linguistic analysis of the words Nietzsche uses to translate the concept of 'origin' in his genealogy of morality. Origin, provenance, beginning, stock, birth — these are the terms Nietzsche uses in his texts to do genealogy. At Vincennes, after studying and discussing *Ursprung* (origin) and *Herkunft* (provenance), it is *Entstehung* (emergence) that Foucault selects and mobilises. The emergence of knowledge (*connaissance*) takes place in a context of plays of forces, disguises, reversals, chance, and the aleatory:

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<sup>366</sup> Foucault, *Sexuality*, *op. cit.*, pp. 191, 175-181, and *passim* (Foucault traces the emergence of capitalism from "primitive accumulation" to the "need for labour to serve as the reserve army of capitalism", discussing "forces of production", "ideology", and "ideological effects"); C.-O. Doron, 'Course Context', *ibid.*, pp. 297-357, here pp. 337-348; see also Noam Chomsky and Michel Foucault, *The Chomsky-Foucault Debate: On Human Nature*, New York, New Press, 2006 [1971]; see lastly B. E. Harcourt, 'Course Context', in Foucault M (2018) *The Punitive Society: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1972-1973* (Burchell G trans), New York, USA, pp. 278-279 and 283-285.

<sup>367</sup> At the top of the first sheet of his course notes at Vincennes appears a passage in a black pen, of a handwriting different from Foucault's, which is then stricken, probably from a student who was trying to communicate with Foucault without leaving oral traces. See BNF, Fonds Foucault, Box 65 (*supra*, p. 17): "1. The RG [renseignements généraux] knows things that have only been said here; 2. Comrades from the C.B.V. [Comité de Base de Vincennes] were arrested last week and have been able to verify that: — microphones in the 2 rooms, — student cops in the 2 departments, — all the leaflets out, the cops know who typed them — what typewriter they were [...]. 3. The cabinets have been forced."

<sup>368</sup> See *supra*, p. 75.

<sup>369</sup> *Ibid.*

The most stable and regular figures that emerge in culture are nothing other than dominations. Rules form violence. And systems are not serene structures that are gradually deciphered in nature, or from it; systems are forms of domination.<sup>370</sup>

Here, then, a completely new historical sense is presented, very different from the Marxian historicism dominant at the time: "the knowledge (*savoir*) of the eternal recommencement of aleatory multiplicities".<sup>371</sup> Foucault recognises (*reconnait*), of course, that the historian Marx is always in the background, omnipresent in philosophical and political debates. "It is within this general horizon defined and coded by Marx that the discussion begins."<sup>372</sup> But from this horizon, Foucault looks elsewhere to undermine historical sense with Nietzsche. In the end, his path leads him to a political task. This is how Foucault concludes his course:

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- Thus is outlined that which is our task today: to articulate one on top of the other an *épistémè* of chance, of the probable and the improbable, of the hazard and the game,
- and an analysis, a critique, a placing-in-question of forms of domination.<sup>373</sup>

#### **Course from SUNY Buffalo (1970)**

At Buffalo, Foucault continued his relay race. Right from the start, he took up the tension he had identified at Vincennes between the Nietzschean critique of history and its use by Nietzsche — a use of history he characterised as "a bit savage, a bit crude".<sup>374</sup> Foucault even uses the adjectives "naive", "simplistic" — "a rather simplistic Darwinism", "a dubious philological knowledge (*savoir*)".<sup>375</sup> He quickly retraces his steps through the *Second Unfashionable*, to reframe his problematic: understanding what knowledge (*connaissance*) is for Nietzsche.

And this is where the term *Erfindung*, invention, comes into its own. It had been mentioned at Vincennes,<sup>376</sup> but subordinated to the other three terms *Ursprung* (origin), *Herkunft* (provenance), and *Entstehung* (emergence). Henceforth, it is the fourth term, 'invention', that takes over and dominated Foucauldian analysis, both at Buffalo and the following year at McGill, but also in 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' — where he placed, as an exergue, the famous opening of *On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense* (1873).<sup>377</sup>

For Nietzsche, knowledge (*connaissance*) is an illusion, an invention, and it can only be articulated on the basis of a non-knowledge (*non-savoir*). Foucault draws out all the consequences: knowledge (*connaissance*) rests on rivalry, struggle, malice, lies, and is only possible on the basis of that fundamental illusion that is truth. "To know (*connaître*) is only possible on the basis of illusion", declares Foucault, and "this illusion is truth".<sup>378</sup>

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Assiduous critique of metaphysics: it would be difficult to equate Nietzsche with the last metaphysician, as Heidegger proposed. These are two fundamentally divergent interpretations:

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<sup>370</sup> See *supra*, p. 75.

<sup>371</sup> See *supra*, p. 76.

<sup>372</sup> Foucault M (1980) 'Prison Talk' (Gordon C trans) [1975], in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*, Vintage, New York, USA, pp 37-54, here p. 53.

<sup>373</sup> See *supra*, p. 75.

<sup>374</sup> See *supra*, p. 110.

<sup>375</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>376</sup> See *supra*, p. 64 ; and pp. 69-70.

<sup>377</sup> See *supra*, p. 116; F. Nietzsche, 'Introduction théorique sur la vérité et le mensonge au sens extra-moral (été 1873)', in *Le Livre du philosophe. Études théorétiques*, ed. and trans. by A. Kremer-Marietti, Paris, Aubier-Flammarion, 1969, pp. 168-215, here p. 171.

<sup>378</sup> See *supra*, p. 119.

Metaphysics — Platonic, Kantian, or Hegelian — is the founding illusion of knowledge (*connaissance*), reiterated in the very discourse of knowledge (*connaissance*).<sup>379</sup>

Foucault then addresses the consequences for truth of such a critique in the third part of the course, under the title 'The Fable of Truth'. He identifies three moments in Nietzsche's critique of truth: first, a close critique of the premise that truth is the source of good, that it should be sought, and that it merits more than the not-true; second, a reversal of the political and moral order which stipulates that it is not truth that has shown us the value of democracy, asceticism, or idealism, but rather these three inventions — "the three moral inventions of the soul, the world-beyond, and the city"<sup>380</sup> — that are responsible for our quest for truth. Consequently, one must study the "history of truth"<sup>381</sup> as a fable in several stages — Greek, Christian, Kantian, positivist, and, finally, nihilist. European nihilism, which for Nietzsche is the culmination of his history of truth, attacks our conception of self and objectivity. At the end of the course, Foucault meditates on the dangers of knowledge (*connaissance*), using a passage from *Dawn* which recalls the "to perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*)".<sup>382</sup>

### **Lectures at McGill University (1971)**

A year later, at McGill, new developments emerge on the 'birth' and 'invention' of truth, the 'will (*volonté*) to truth', as well as the 'delay', the 'event', and finally the 'end' of truth, with its 'destruction' and 'disappearance'. These concepts would be fundamental not only to his genealogical method of the 1970s, but also to his work on the history of truth and the telling of the truth

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in the 1980s. At the same time, certain developments were returns: at McGill in 1971, Foucault described Nietzsche as the one who transgresses, who "constantly crosses the limit",<sup>383</sup> reminiscent of his 'Preface to Transgression' in homage to Bataille in 1963.<sup>384</sup> At McGill and Buffalo, Foucault exhumed the passage on 'To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*)' from his 1953 manuscripts.<sup>385</sup> Two steps forward, one step back... then three steps forward.

At McGill, Foucault gave three lectures.<sup>386</sup> Once again, he takes up his own baton. The point of departure is the contradictions in classical thought on knowledge (*connaissance*) and truth — this tension, which also emerges in his lectures in Rio in 1973, stipulated that knowledge (*connaissance*) must exclude desire (and in Rio, power). From the outset, Foucault describes Nietzsche's propositions as hard to understand, paradoxical, and even contradictory — "very difficult to grasp (*saisir*)".<sup>387</sup> What's more, Nietzsche is positioned outside theories of knowledge (*connaissance*), whether those of Descartes, Spinoza, or Kant. And simultaneously, he never ceases to call himself a seeker after truth. These paradoxes characterise Nietzsche's writings:

Whereas Kant wanted to set limits and lock himself inside them, Nietzsche constantly crosses the limit [...] Not only transgresses the limit; but transgresses the very fact that there is a limit.<sup>388</sup>

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<sup>379</sup> See *supra*, p. 119.

<sup>380</sup> See *supra*, p. 122.

<sup>381</sup> See *supra*, p. 122.

<sup>382</sup> See *supra*, p. 127; Nietzsche, *Dawn*, §429, 'The new passion', CW, vol. 5, pp. 223-224.

<sup>383</sup> See *supra*, p. 138.

<sup>384</sup> Foucault, 'Preface to Transgression' [1963], in *EW* 2, pp. 69-87.

<sup>385</sup> See *supra*, p. 123 and p. 160.

<sup>386</sup> See D. Defert, 'Chronologie (1968-1984)', art. cit., p. xv. One part of the first lecture by Foucault at McGill was edited and published under the title 'Lecture on Nietzsche', in Foucault M (2013) *Lectures on the Will to Know: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1970-1971, and Oedipal Knowledge* (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA.

<sup>387</sup> See *supra*, p. 136.

<sup>388</sup> See *supra*, p. 138.

In his turn, Foucault ventured outside the limits, in an act of transgression. He begins with the invention of knowledge (*connaissance*), highlighting the passage from *Truth and Lies* in 1873. It is *Erfindung*, invention, that is now at the head and drives the whole movement of the analysis. This concept of invention unfolds the argument:

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knowledge (*connaissance*) is in a space of struggle, of play, of instinct, and of interest, it is manufactured and not natural, without model or external guarantee; it does not find the true, nor does it decipher the hidden; it creates with malice, with contempt. What's more, knowledge (*connaissance*) is "murderous, devaluing, differentiating".<sup>389</sup> From there, Nietzsche represents the rupture: "the two great cuts: in relation to being and in relation to the good",<sup>390</sup> in other words in relation to metaphysics and morality.

The upheavals are all the more profound for the concept of truth, which "was invent[ed] even later".<sup>391</sup> This means that it is not the search for knowledge (*connaissance*) that leads to truth, but that it emerges later, as event, which allows us to make its history. This collapses the foundations of traditional theories of knowledge (*connaissance*), in particular the theory of truth-correspondence, which implies an exact correlation between subject and object. According to Foucault, Nietzsche stretches the relationship between subject and object as far as possible to introduce the imposition of signification, of the mark, of the sign, thanks to the will to power.<sup>392</sup> And in a dazzling passage, Foucault articulates his thesis in the form of a repudiation, between the lines, of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, the structuralism of Roland Barthes, the existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, and the analysis of power in traditional Marxism; he then defines the distinction that will become so important, but so misunderstood, between "knowledge (*connaissance*)" and "knowledge (*savoir*)".<sup>393</sup> Truth thus emerges separately, product of a will to truth: "Nietzsche places in the will (*volonté*) the root and *raison d'être* of truth."<sup>394</sup>

All this leads, ultimately, to the "Nietzschean task": "to think the history of truth, without relying on truth. In an element where truth does not exist. This element is appearance".<sup>395</sup> It would also become the Foucauldian task, the critical task, the heart of his method during the 1980s. Foucault set out this task clearly in

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his course at Louvain in 1981, when he developed a critical philosophy of veridictions.<sup>396</sup> We can also hear it clearly in the first lesson of his last course, *The Courage of Truth*: distinction between the study of epistemological structures and that of ""alethurgic" forms".<sup>397</sup> This separation runs through his work of the 1980s, particularly his last three courses at the Collège de France.<sup>398</sup>

## **The "Nietzsche moments" in Foucault's work**

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<sup>389</sup> See *supra*, p. 141.

<sup>390</sup> See *supra*, p. 143.

<sup>391</sup> See *supra*, p. 143.

<sup>392</sup> See *supra*, pp. 149-150.

<sup>393</sup> See *supra*, pp. 152-153.

<sup>394</sup> See *supra*, p. 153.

<sup>395</sup> See *supra*, p. 156.

<sup>396</sup> Foucault, *Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling*, op. cit., p. 20; id. (2019) *Discourse and Truth & Parrēsia* (H-P Fruchaud and D Lorenzini eds, English edition established by N Luxon), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA, p. 212-213.

<sup>397</sup> Id. (2012) *The Courage of Truth (The Government of Self and Others II): Lectures at the Collège de France, 1983-1984* (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA, pp. 2-3.

<sup>398</sup> Id. (2005) *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1981-1982* (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA; id. (2011) *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982-1983* (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA; id., *The Courage of Truth*, op. cit.

The courses, lectures, and works on Nietzsche presented here help us to understand the transformations in Foucault's thinking. We find in these manuscripts an armature for grasping the Nietzsche effect, the "Nietzschean task",<sup>399</sup> this "Nietzschean mutation".<sup>400</sup>

### **Nietzsche in the early 1950s**

At the beginning of the 1950s, the encounter with the "philologist Nietzsche" led to forms of experimentation that participated in what Foucault called experiments<sup>401</sup> in "de-subjectification". Foucault was irritated by the subjectivism of Husserlian and Sartrean phenomenology, and rebelled against the idea of being able to give a signification to things oneself. In Nietzsche he found more ambiguity, more discontinuity and radicalism, which led him towards experience:

[The] function of experience in Nietzsche, Blanchot, and Bataille is to tear the subject away from itself, to ensure that it is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or dissolution.<sup>402</sup>

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We can see how Foucault first approaches, then moves away from, in short how he confronts the philosophy of the subject in his manuscripts of the time, which he approaches in Ludwig Binswanger's existential and Husserlian psychoanalytical approach (*Binswanger et l'analyse existentielle*, op. cit., 1953-1954), the thought of Edmund Husserl (*Phénoménologie et psychologie*, op. cit., 1953-1954), and that of Wilhelm Dilthey (*La Question anthropologique*, op. cit., 1954-1955). In these texts of youth, we hear Foucault grappling with phenomenology and existential analysis, which he had worked on and admired as sources of a philosophy of experience, but which he had also overcome, and finally rejecting the anthropological approach that underpinned these philosophies, to turn towards language, signs, discourse. It is through this confrontation with Binswanger, Husserl, and Heidegger that Foucault develops his own method of the experience and analysis of discourse.

With the manuscripts and sheets from the first half of the 1950s that we are publishing, such as 'To perish through absolute knowledge (*connaissance*)...', 'Metaphysics of Will (*volonté*)', 'Depth', 'Dialectics and Tragedy, or Truth and Veracity', or 'Theatre and the Death of God', Foucault is in the midst of experimentation, whether with the concept of intoxication, the experience of feeling oneself perish, the idea of becoming Greeks — "We are becoming more Greek day by day"<sup>403</sup> —, madness and unreason, the truth-telling of *Wahrsagen*, tragedy, lyricism, or the festival of Rolandseck, etc. Foucault works here on experience and transgression. We see him on the brink of danger, death, madness. He is plainly inscribed within *The Birth of Tragedy*, which he rearticulates by confronting phenomenology and the Hegelian dialectic:

A metaphysics of the will (*vouloir*) is the philosophical experience that renders useless a phenomenology — Hegelian or Husserlian —, i.e. any form of reflection that seeks to fill in the ground of positivity of any manifestation, even if, taken to its extreme, this form of reflection paradoxically unveils this ground as the ether of spirit or the transcendental flux of becoming.<sup>404</sup>

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Foucault favoured transgression and experience in order to confront the dominant philosophical thinking of the time. The writings of the 1950s helped him to develop a philological approach, culminating in the analysis of discourse in *The Order of Things*. In his files and manuscripts, Foucault takes up the masterly conclusion of the young Nietzsche's inaugural speech at the University of Basel (1869) and Seneca's famous phrase, "*Itaque quæ philosophia fuit, facta philologia est*" ("Hence what used to be

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<sup>399</sup> See *supra*, p. 156.

<sup>400</sup> M. Foucault, *Le Discours philosophique*, op. cit., p. 180.

<sup>401</sup> [The French 'expérience' can mean both 'experiment' and 'experience', which in this case are closely linked — Tr.]

<sup>402</sup> *Id.*, 'Interview with Michel Foucault', art. cit., p. 241.

<sup>403</sup> See *supra*, p. 277.

<sup>404</sup> See *supra*, p. 245.

philosophy has now become mere philology").<sup>405</sup> He builds on the Nietzschean reversal<sup>406</sup> — "Philosophia facta est quæ philologia fuit", so "What was once philology has now been made into philosophy" — and pushes it in the direction of experience:

[T]he profound sense of philology will no longer be to seek the form of objective positivity in which the contradictions of its project are overcome, but to reach systematically the level of experience where, without abandoning anything of these contradictory elements, it will illuminate its own contradictions from within.<sup>407</sup>

This confrontation between philosophy and philology orients the questions of truth around language and its interpretation, and the interpretation of discourse.

It was also a period of a kind of liberation for Foucault — a word he would later reject, but which is useful here — a liberation from the world of academia and its political insulation. Nietzsche represented the outside, as did other authors to whom Foucault felt close — Georges Bataille, Maurice Blanchot, and, from 1957 onwards, Raymond Roussel. His interest in Nietzsche reflects an ambivalence towards the university and the academic world. Foucault expressed his resistance to teaching, which he felt was too intellectually narrow and lacking in ambition. "Becoming a bourgeois intellectual, professor,

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journalist, writer or whatever in a world like that was intolerable," he said in 1980 about the post-war period: "The experience of the war had shown us the necessity and urgency of a society radically different from the one we were living in."<sup>408</sup> It was precisely in this context that he declared that he did not consider himself a "philosopher", did not want to engage in an academic discourse, but wanted to work with thinkers like Nietzsche who were not *professional* philosophers.

Foucault therefore turned to the transgressive Nietzsche of the *Dionysos philosophos* in these manuscripts of the 1950s, reading and confronting also the Nietzsche of Heidegger and that of Jaspers, to rediscover a discourse on discontinuity, on the *Übermensch* of Zarathustra, on the Dionysian and tragedy, on the idea of becoming Greeks.<sup>409</sup> With a certain hindsight, in 1984, when he was writing the English preface to the second volume of the *History of Sexuality*, Foucault remarked:

It is easy to see how reading Nietzsche in the early 1950s gave access to this kind of question, by breaking with the dual tradition of phenomenology and Marxism.<sup>410</sup>

#### **Nietzsche in 1969-1971**

The political struggles and issues that Foucault confronted in 1969-1971 had largely evolved since 1951-1955, and a completely different Nietzsche appeared in Foucault: the 'historian Nietzsche'. He puts Nietzschean historical sense to the test in order to understand his historical present, to diagnose the eternal return of aleatory forces of domination, and to respond to them by a genealogical method and a political practice. In order to refute criticism of the overly strictly synchronic aspect of his own historical work, for example in *The Order of Things*, Foucault turned to Nietzsche's genealogy to articulate historical transformations.

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Of course, the courses and lectures we are publishing here serve as a prolegomena to the article 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', published as a tribute to Jean Hyppolite in 1971. At Vincennes, Foucault was not yet talking about *Abkunft* (familial origin) or *Erbschaft* (inheritance, succession, patrimony); the 1971 article accentuated the transfers already operated with Nietzsche's language. From a broader point of view, however, the courses and lectures correspond to a Foucauldian mutation that can be situated on three levels: epistemological, political, and practical.

<sup>405</sup> Seneca (2015) *Letters on Ethics: To Lucilius*, (Graver M and Long AA trans), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA, Letter 108, §23, p. 431.

<sup>406</sup> Nietzsche F (2012) *Homer and Classical Philology* (trans unnamed), The Nietzsche Channel, p. 25.

<sup>407</sup> See *supra*, pp. 296-297.

<sup>408</sup> Foucault, 'Interview with Michel Foucault', art. cit., p. 247.

<sup>409</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>410</sup> Foucault, 'Preface to *The History of Sexuality, Volume II*' (Smock W trans) [1984], in *EW 1*, pp. 199-205, here p. 202; see also *id.*, 'Interview with Michel Foucault', art. cit., p. 246.

*Firstly, epistemological.* As we have seen, Foucault's work on Nietzsche and knowledge (*connaissance*) led him to develop his own theses on the will to know (*volonté de savoir*), on knowledge-power (*savoir-pouvoir*), on truth-telling and *parrésia*. This work led him to trace the history of truth in the juridical and historical domains, and to analyse the practices of the self in Antiquity and Christianity. Foucault himself emphasised the role of Nietzsche in this evolution.<sup>411</sup>

*Secondly, political.* The argument that knowledge (*connaissance*) and even truth are invented implies that they are so in an environment of contestation and struggles. Truth is not simply the product of research. It is not as if truths are arrived at through a process of testing hypotheses, working with data, reflection, and logic. No, truth is the result of a battle, an imposition, a struggle, conflicts. These ideas were to shape his understanding of social relations on the matrix of civil war, which emerged with his work on *Penal Theories and Institutions* and *The Punitive Society*. The source of this method is his Nietzschean analysis of knowledge (*connaissance*) and truth. That is why the terms are so important: invention, of course, but others too, such as provenance. In 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', he shows that if the origins of knowledge (*connaissance*) are provenance, inheritance, then we have to take into account all the conflicts that go with heirs, and with inheritance — which always conceal the bitterest struggles, the war of races, colonialism. It is the source of the most violent interpersonal and societal struggles.

If in the summer of 1967 it was the morphology of the will to know (*volonté de savoir*) that was important to Foucault, the courses and lectures at Vincennes,

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Buffalo, and McGill sent him back to the will to power (*volonté de pouvoir*) — not only the concept, but also the book itself. Indeed, in his last lectures at McGill University, in 1971, Foucault took a particular interest in *The Will to Power*. At the time, the French translation used by the philosophers was not that of the falsified edition by Elisabeth Förster-Nietzsche and Heinrich Köselitz (alias Peter Gast), but, worse, that of a second attempt to reconstitute the fictitious book, carried out by Friedrich Würzbach without consulting the Nietzsche archives.<sup>412</sup> It was this edition that Foucault consulted most often when quoting from *The Will to Power* — once in the 1950 manuscripts, once at Vincennes, twice at Buffalo, then more than fifty times at McGill. As Foucault explains: "Nietzsche is the one who gave as an essential target, let's say to philosophical discourse, the relationship of power. For Marx, it was the relation of production."<sup>413</sup>

Foucault's work on Nietzsche during the years 1969-1971 was to open up this aspect of power, as can be seen in the courses that follow. Foucault's Nietzsche did not end there. The following year, in his second lecture at the Collège de France, *Penal Theories and Institutions* (1971-1972), there was a clear shift from the will to know (*volonté de savoir*) to power. In his supplementary remarks to the lecture of 8 March 1972, Foucault declared that, behind knowledge (*connaissance*), "relations of power" were at play:

What lies behind the 'form' of knowledge (*connaissance*), the subject of knowledge (*connaissance*), the open field of what is to be known (*connaître*), the corpus of acquired knowledges (*connaissances*), what lies behind all this are relations of power: it is the bringing into play of forms of power that create knowledge (*savoir*), which in turn increases power: an indefinite play of formation, displacement, circulation, concentration, in which supplements, excesses, reinforcements of power are constantly produced, and the increase of knowledge (*savoir*), more knowledge (*savoir*), surplus knowledge (*savoir*). This is the level of 'power-knowledge (*pouvoir-savoir*)'.<sup>414</sup>

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<sup>411</sup> *Id.*, 'Interview with Michel Foucault', art. cit., p. 253.

<sup>412</sup> M. Montinari, «*La Volonté de puissance* n'existe pas», ed. by P. D'Iorio, Fr. trans. by Patricia Farazzi and Michel Valensi, Paris, Éditions de l'Éclat, 1996, pp. 20-27 and 169-179.

<sup>413</sup> Foucault, 'Prison Talk', art. cit., p. 53.

<sup>414</sup> *Id.* (2021) *Penal Theories and Institutions: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1971-1972* (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA, p. 213.

From then on, his entire genealogical method was based on power-knowledge (*pouvoir-savoir*) — first using the expression 'dynastics of knowledge (*savoir*)',<sup>415</sup> and then systematically using the word 'genealogy' from the lectures on *Psychiatric Power* (1973-1974) onwards.

But what is important here is that power lurks behind knowledge (*connaissance*): the whole subject of his earlier analyses — knowledge (*connaissance*), truth, will (*volonté*), etc. — is linked to *relations of power*. It is the bringing into play of forms of power that creates knowledge (*savoir*). This explains why, in his 1971-1972 course, *Penal Theories and Institutions*, Foucault launched into a series of seven lessons on the history of the repression of the Nu-pieds (1639), with a strictly historical study in which he described the repression of Richelieu and the chancellor Pierre Séguier, and developed a new theorisation of repressive power.<sup>416</sup>

With knowledge-power (*savoir-pouvoir*), his genealogical method comes into its own. The following year, in *The Punitive Society* (3 January 1973-28 March 1973), Foucault wrote his own genealogy of morality, drawing on Patrick Colquhoun, the founder of the English police force, and the Quakers, "those little men [in] black, who never took off their hats, [who] can be seen as ancestors in the genealogy of our morality".<sup>417</sup> Still more explicit abroad, a few months later in Rio de Janeiro in May 1973, in his lectures on 'Truth and Juridical Forms', Nietzsche became the person who liquidated the great myth that had dominated the West since Plato: the antinomy between knowledge (*savoir*) and power.<sup>418</sup> Then in São Paulo in October 1975, in a university course on sexuality, Foucault explicated the link between Nietzsche and relations of power:

[W]e are perhaps currently *a bit* forced to be *a bit* Nietzschean, given that, for me at least, Nietzsche is nothing more than a poorly ordered reserve of still

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recent and, to tell the truth, unused instruments for thinking relations of power — relations of power about which, it has to be said, Marx leaves us embarrassed and Freud leaves us speechless.<sup>419</sup>

Then in 1976, in the first lesson of *Society Must Be Defended*, Foucault developed his "Nietzsche hypothesis": a rupture in the way of thinking social relations, under the aegis of struggle and violence. With the publication of his book *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault's genealogy reached its purest form — ending with the roar of battle, so in politics. After reading these courses, Étienne Balibar wrote:

Foucault proceeded in three stages to a great settling-of-accounts with Marxism (underpinned, of course, by the debates of the time, and 'arbitrated' in a way by the youth of my generation, the Maoists he rubbed shoulders with in the GIP in particular, and others too).<sup>420</sup>

Whether this is an anti-Marx settling of scores, or a "counter-Marxism" as we then proposed in the 'Context', it is clear that we are dealing with a whole political section of his work, produced by his readings of the historian Nietzsche.

*Thirdly, practical.* The courses and manuscripts shed light on Foucault's direct action during this turbulent period. In 1971, with the formation of GIP and his political commitment, Foucault put into practice his reflections on Nietzsche, on the invention of truth, on the importance of discourse. According to

<sup>415</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 7 and 199; see *ibid.*, pp. 51-53, note 16 [I suspect that when Harcourt cites p. 7 (of the French) he means to refer to p. 45 (of the English) — Tr.]; *id.*, *The Punitive Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 86; B. E. Harcourt, 'Course Context', art. cit., *ibid.*, p. 292.

<sup>416</sup> See F. Ewald and B. E. Harcourt, 'Course Context', in M. Foucault, *Penal Theories and Institutions*, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-278.

<sup>417</sup> M. Foucault, *The Punitive Society*, *op. cit.*, p. 101, note ‡.

<sup>418</sup> *Id.*, 'Truth and Juridical Forms', art. cit., p. 32; on the Rio lectures and their relations to the lectures at the Collège de France of this period, see S. Elden, *The Archaeology of Foucault*, *op. cit.*, pp. 193-194.

<sup>419</sup> *Id.*, 'La généalogie du savoir moderne sur la sexualité', course given at the university of São Paulo in October 1975, ed. by H.-P. Fruchaud and D. Lorenzini, Première leçon, p. 4 of the typescript (forthcoming with Vrin).

<sup>420</sup> Étienne Balibar, 'Letter from Étienne Balibar to the Editor', in Foucault, *Penal Theories and Institutions*, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

Gilles Deleuze,<sup>421</sup> the formation of GIP was more than just an action, it was also an act of thought. All the GIP's actions — giving speech to detained persons, replacing the people's court with "intolerance enquiries", not

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occupying the forefront of the movement itself — can be understood through this Nietzschean analysis of knowledge (*savoir*).

For Foucault, the practice of GIP was a philosophical act linked to his reading of Nietzsche. In this, Gilles Deleuze and François Ewald are entirely right. It is a matter of philosophical acts that represent 'theoretical revolutions', to use Deleuze's terms, acts in relation to political actuality, as Ewald suggests.<sup>422</sup> They constitute a form of practice. Foucault's philosophical method evolves according to the political context:

Actuality is what interests Foucault, though it's what Nietzsche called the *inactual* or the *untimely*; it's what is *in actu*, philosophy as the act of thinking.<sup>423</sup>

Foucault had this in common with Nietzsche.<sup>424</sup> Ultimately, his reading of Nietzsche constitutes a political commitment. This is particularly true for a philosopher like Foucault, who believed so strongly, with Nietzsche, that knowledge (*connaissance*) can never be separated from power relations in society.

\*

In 1975, when *Discipline and Punish* — still his most widely read and quoted work — was published, Nietzsche's name had disappeared. But his shadow was omnipresent. In an interview with *Magazine littéraire*, Foucault said that from now on he would no longer comment on Nietzsche: "Now, I remain silent when it comes to Nietzsche. When I was a teacher, I often gave lectures on him, but I wouldn't do it today."<sup>425</sup>

For a few years, he was almost never heard to mention Nietzsche's name. Although the "Nietzsche hypothesis" appeared in *Society Must*

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*Be Defended*, Nietzsche was not mentioned in the subsequent courses at the Collège de France. There was no mention in *Security, Territory, Population* (1977-1978), in *Birth of Biopolitics* (1978-1979) or in *On the Government of the Living* (1979-1980). Nietzsche reappeared a little later, as if in the detour of a thought: two references at the beginning of *Subjectivity and Truth* (1980-1981) — alongside Hegel on the one hand, and Kant and Schopenhauer on the other; a few quick allusions among enumerations of German philosophers in *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (1981-1982), without any real engagement; four quick mentions in *The Government of Self and Others* (1982-1983).<sup>426</sup>

However, the work on *parrēsia* brings him even closer to Nietzsche. Foucault notes this on several occasions. On 2 April 1981 at Louvain, in his inaugural lecture on *Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling*, when he juxtaposes his concept of veridiction with Nietzsche's *Wahrsagen*.<sup>427</sup> Or in *The Government of Self and*

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<sup>421</sup> Deleuze G (2006) 'Foucault and Prisons' [1986], in *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews, 1975-1995* (Hodges A and Taormina M trans), Semiotext(e), South Pasadena, USA, pp. 272-281.

<sup>422</sup> Id., 'Écrivain non. Un nouveau cartographe', *Critique*, n° 343, 1975, pp. 1207-1227, here p. 1212; F. Ewald, 'Foucault et l'actualité', in Dominique Franche et al. (dir.), *Au risque de Foucault*, Paris, Éditions du Centre Georges Pompidou-Centre Michel Foucault, 1997, pp. 203-212.

<sup>423</sup> Deleuze G (1995) *Negotiations: 1972-1990* (Joughin M trans), Cambridge University Press, New York, USA, p. 95, emphasis in the original.

<sup>424</sup> M. Foucault, 'Le monde est un grand asile' [1973], in *DE II*, n° 126, pp. 433-434, here p. 434.

<sup>425</sup> Id., 'Prison Talk', art. cit., p. 53.

<sup>426</sup> Id. (2019) *Subjectivity and Truth: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1980-1981* (Burchell G trans), Picador, New York, USA, pp. 40 and 48; id., *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, op. cit., pp. 28 and 251; id., *The Government of Self and Others*, op. cit., pp. 21, 66, 368 and 369.

<sup>427</sup> Id., *Wrong-Doing, Truth-Telling*, op. cit., p. 20: "one must distinguish the assertion (which is true or false) from the act of truth-telling, from the veridiction (the *Wahrsagen*, as Nietzsche would say)".

*Others*, when he is in the process of laying the foundations of his analysis of the ethics of truth-telling, the outspokenness and free courage that is *parrēsia*. In a brief parenthesis, Foucault adds:

And (perhaps we can come back to this, I don't know if I'll have the time) it seems to me that Nietzschean veridicity is a certain way of bringing into play this notion whose distant origin is to be found in the notion of *parrēsia* (of truth-telling) as risk for the very one who enunciates it, as risk accepted by the one who enunciates it.<sup>428</sup>

Foucault did not return to Nietzsche, nor did he have the time to do so. Other philosophers would take it upon themselves to make the critical link between Nietzschean veridicity and Foucault's work on truth-telling and *parrēsia*.<sup>429</sup> In an interview published in 1983, Foucault declared: "It's been years since I re-read Nietzsche".<sup>430</sup>

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Except at the last moment. In his last course at the Collège de France, *The Courage of Truth*, on 15 February 1984, a few months before his death, Foucault returned to Nietzsche and his *Joyful Science* to interpret Socrates' last words. Just before he died, Socrates said to Crito, in a passage of the *Phaedo* that has given rise to much confusion: "Crito, we owe Asclepios a rooster. Pay my debt, don't forget."<sup>431</sup> Of course, the offering to Asclepios was made in gratitude for the cure of an illness. The dominant interpretation of this passage is based on the idea that life is an illness, from which Socrates claims he was finally cured when he died. Foucault, along with Georges Dumézil and others, contested this reading, which made no sense at all in his eyes. And that's where Nietzsche comes in — again. Foucault had already given a talk at Vincennes on history as "principle of healing" in Nietzsche, to remedy the sickly forms of historical sense.<sup>432</sup> He returned to these questions in his last lecture.

Nietzsche, too, rejected the idea that Socrates could have seen life as an illness. He even considered that Socrates had said and done exactly the opposite throughout his life. It's laughable, said Nietzsche. The correct interpretation, according to Nietzsche, is that Socrates collapsed at the end of his life: "Socrates cracked and revealed his secret at the last moment."<sup>433</sup> What secret? That Socrates was a pessimist:

Socrates, Socrates suffered from life! And he even took his revenge for this — with those disguised, horrible, pious and blasphemous words! Did a Socrates have to avenge himself too? Was there one ounce too little of magnanimity in his super-rich virtue? Oh my friends!

We will have to overcome the Greeks too!<sup>434</sup>

Here, Foucault does not totally follow Nietzsche — or Dumézil, for that matter, who had also proposed an ingenious interpretation. According to

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Dumézil, this homage to Asclepios meant that Socrates and his disciples had been cured of an illness, that which consisted of listening to public opinion rather than seeking the truth. For Foucault, by contrast, the offering is a recognition (*reconnaissance*) that by looking after himself, Socrates is on the right path: the path that will lead him to accept the key principle of Socratic philosophy, 'care for yourselves'. This is the principle and last lesson, the finale of the *Phaedo*. Socrates bathed at the end of his life so that others would not need to bathe him after his death. He looked after himself, he spent his life that way. And the offering is in recognition (*reconnaissance*) of the fact that, by taking care of himself, by developing his philosophy of life, Socrates cured human illness.

<sup>428</sup> *Id.*, *The Government of Self and Others*, op. cit., p. 66.

<sup>429</sup> See, for example, D. Lorenzini, *La Force du vrai. De Foucault à Austin*, Lormont, Le Bord de l'eau, 2017. [A revised version of this was published in English as Lorenzini D (2023) *The Force of Truth: Critique, Genealogy, and Truth-Telling in Michel Foucault*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, USA — Tr.]

<sup>430</sup> Foucault, 'Structuralism and Post-structuralism', art. cit., p. 447.

<sup>431</sup> M. Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, op. cit., p. 98. There are two or three other references to Nietzsche in this course: page 178 (in the context of a discussion of Paul Tillich's text, *Der Mut zum sein*, 1852); page 192 (short discussion of German texts on Nietzsche's cynicism); page 320 ("in the manner of Nietzsche, if you will").

<sup>432</sup> See *supra*, p. 47.

<sup>433</sup> M. Foucault, *The Courage of Truth*, op. cit., p. 102.

<sup>434</sup> F. Nietzsche, *The Joyful Science*, §340, CW, vol. 6, pp. 203-204, here p. 204.

We could stop there, at that last moment in 1984 when Foucault rethought Nietzsche through the prism of debt — that of Socrates, certainly, but not only. For it was in confrontation, in dialogue, in relation with the philologist and historian Nietzsche that Foucault invented his own way of philosophising. And in doing so, he may well have incurred a debt to Nietzsche. Some philosophers say that Foucault was 'influenced' by Nietzsche. Others say he was 'Nietzschean'. But the reality is entirely other. For Foucault, Nietzsche's texts were objects of study, interrogation, dialogue, and confrontation. They constituted a privileged object for him, just as fertile as other discourses — those of madness, clinical medicine, the human sciences, disciplinary practices, or the experience of sexuality — that nourish his philosophy. Warned by this critical method, we could approach the courses, lectures, and works on Nietzsche that we publish here in the same way: aware that we are indebted to Foucault for having left us this remarkable body of ideas, propositions, provocations, which helps us to confront the most urgent questions of philosophical critique and praxis.

B. E. H.

ANNEX A

***Programme of the Vincennes Department of Philosophy for the Year 1969-1970***

<u>CENTRE UNIVERSITAIRE EXPERIMENTAL DE VINCENNES</u>		
<u>Année 1969-70</u>		
<u>Semestre d'automne</u>		
<u>DEPARTEMENT DE PHILOSOPHIE</u>		
Code U.V.	Intitulé	Enseignant
1728	la troisième étape du marxisme-léninisme : le maoïsme	Judith MILLER
1729	problèmes concernant l'idéologie I	" "
1730	" " " II	" "
1731	théorie de la deuxième étape du marxisme-léninisme : le stalinisme	Jacques RANCIERE
1732	introduction aux marxistes du 20 <sup>e</sup> siècle : Lénine, Trotsky et le courant bolchévique	Henri WEBER
1733	les écrits de Mao-Tsé-Toung	" "
1734	la dialectique marxiste	Alain BADIOU
1735	la science dans la lutte des classes	" "
1737	l'idéologie pédagogique	René SCHERER
1738	logique	Houri SINACEUR
1740	épistémologie des sciences de la vie	Michel FOUCAULT
1741	problèmes épistémologiques des sciences historiques	François CHATELET
1742	critique de la pensée spéculative grecque	" "
1743	Nietzsche	Michel FOUCAULT
1744	les idéologies morales d'aujourd'hui à propos de la littérature et de l'art	François REGNAULT
1745		" "



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## ANNEX B

### ***Programme of the Vincennes Department of Philosophy for the Year 1968-1969***

<u>CENTRE UNIVERSITAIRE EXPERIMENTAL DE VINCENNES</u>		
<u>Année 1968-69</u>		
<u>Semestre d'automne et de printemps</u>		
<u>DEPARTEMENT DE PHILOSOPHIE</u>		
Code U.V.	Intitulé	Enseignant
17 001	formation du concept d'idéologie (2 U.V.)	Jacques RANCIERE
17002	fin de la métaphysique	Michel FOUCAULT/ François REGNAULT
17003	fonctionnement idéologique de l'enseignement de la philosophie	François CHATELET
17004	théorie de la littérature (2 U.V.)	Alain BADIOU/ François REGNAULT
17005	identité et contradiction dans la philosophie grecque (2 U.V.)	François CHATELET
17006	lutte idéologique	Alain BADIOU
17007	la contradiction chez Hegel (2 U.V.)	Alain BADIOU
17008	révolutions culturelles (2 U.V.)	Judith MILLER
17009	révolutions culturelles (2 U.V.)	Judith MILLER
17010	écriture politique	André GLUCKSMANN
17012	Logique (2 U.V.)	Mohammed A. SINACEUR
17013	nihilisme et contestation	Jeannette COLOMBEL
17014	la rationalité grecque et les mathématiques (2 U.V.)	Michel SERRES
17015	la révolution scientifique au 17 <sup>e</sup> siècle (2 U.V.)	François REGNAULT
17016	concept scientifique et mathématiques au 19 <sup>e</sup> siècle	Mohammed A. SINACEUR
17017	discours de la sexualité (2 U.V.)	Michel FOUCAULT
17018	sciences des formations sociales et philosophie marxiste (2 U.V.)	Etienne BALIBAR
17019	la pensée politique grecque (2 U.V.)	François CHATELET
17020	théorie de la conscience et théorie de de l'idéologie	Stanley PULLBERG
17021	le positivisme (2 U.V.)	Michel SERRES
17022	Centre d'études politiques I	Henri WEBER
17023	" " " II	" "
17024	" " " III	" "
17025	" " " IV	" "
17026	révisionnisme, gauchisme (2 U.V.)	Jacques RANCIERE
17027	Epistémologie régionale	Alain BADIOU

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Source: Université de Paris, Bibliothèque de documentation internationale contemporaine; reprinted in Charles Soulié, 'La pédagogie charismatique de Gilles Deleuze à Vincennes', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, nos 216-217, 2017, pp. 42-63, here p. 47 (online: doi.org/10.3917/arss.216.0042).

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## ANNEX C

### ***Université Paris 8, 'Liste des UV — 1968-1972'***

DÉPARTEMENT PHILOSOPHIE

ANNEE 1969-1970

17 028	La III <sup>e</sup> étape du marxisme-léninisme : le maoïsme
17 029-17 052	Problèmes concernant l'idéologie I et II
17 030	" " "
17 031	Théorie de la 2 <sup>e</sup> étape du marxisme-léninisme : le stalinisme I
17 032	Lénine, Trotsky et le courant bolchevique I
17 033	Les écrits de Mao-Tsé-Toung I
17 034-17 056	La dialectique marxiste I et II
17 035	La science dans la lutte des classes
17 036	Problèmes de la pratique révolutionnaire
17 037	L'idéologie pédagogique I
17 038-17 060	Logique I
17 039-17 061	Epistémologie des sciences exactes et des mathématiques II
17 040	Epistémologie des sciences de la vie
17 041-17 062	Problèmes épistémologiques des sciences historiques I et II
17 042	Critique de la pensée spéculative grecque I
17 043-17 064	Les idéologies morales d'aujourd'hui I
17 045-17 066	A propos de la littérature et de l'art I et II
17 047	Héraclite
17 048	Epistémologie des sciences biologiques
17 049	Autorité et répression
17 050	Philosophie et langage
17 051	Me signe chez Nietzsche
17 053	Le concept de Staline
17 054	Introduction au marxisme : Lénine, Trotsky
17 055	Introduction au marxisme : Mao-Tsé-Toung
17 057	La science dans la lutte des classes
17 058	Culture et lutte de classes
17 059	Critique de la l'idéologie pédagogique
17 063	Critique de la pensée spéculative classique
17 065	Hégel et les idéologies morales d'aujourd'hui
17 067	Introduction au gauchisme théorique
17 068	Conscience de classe et histoire

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<sup>435</sup> [I do not translate these. My reasoning is that if one is looking for the English terms the search function can be used, but that is not an option for many of the French terms. I therefore include the index in French as a key for those who may find it useful — Tr.]

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Lecture 1. [The Second Unfashionable and the Historical Sense] .....	17

*Introduction. I. The Second Unfashionable: 1. The non-historical individual, the historical individual, the supra-historical individual; 2. The three types of history (monumental, antiquarian, critical); 3. The five disadvantages (weakening of the personality; belief in justice; suppression of illusion; the last moment; scepticism). II. Historical sense: sixth sense; First question: what is historical sense as opposed to history?; Second question: where does this historical sense come from and how was it formed?; Third question: what are the dangers of this semi-barbaric sense?; Fourth question: how to ensure that semi-barbarism gives rise to a high culture?*

Lecture 2. The Joyful Science, §337 .....	39
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*Introduction. I. Elements regrouped in a single text: a. The recurring elements; b. The inconsistently recurring elements; c. The new elements. II. Analysis of the text itself: 1. The point of view of the analysis; 2. Tugend und Krankheit.*

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Lecture 3. The Joyful Science, §337 (continued) .....	47
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*Second part of the text: the two false historical interpretations; I. The first misinterpretation: history is new only as weakening of the old; II. Second misinterpretation: that of others. Third part of the text: the foundation-deepening of the historical sense is established by a series of oppositions; feeling/bearing; generalisation/particular; evening/dawn; affliction/happiness.*

Lecture 4. The Usage of Genealogy .....	61
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*Introduction: Historical sense, three levels: a. in its origin: product of European decadence; b. in its ambiguity: form of sensibility which is born as the symptom of an illness; c. in its right use: instrument of a knowledge (savoir). History, two senses: a. the history of historians; b. history as form of knowledge (savoir). I. Genealogy and the search for the origin. II. Ursprung (origin). III. Herkunft (provenance). IV. Entstehung (emergence). Conclusion.*

Annex 1. General Definition of Genealogy.....	81
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*I. Knowledge (connaissance) of the beginning: the notion of genealogy is not easy in Nietzsche; he lacks a definition of the concept and the methods which are its own. II. The Preface to On the Genealogy of Morality: 1. Genealogy is placed in the dimension of knowledge (connaissance): a. the knowledge (connaissance)/consciousness (conscience) dissymmetry; b. the knowledge (connaissance)/exposition dissymmetry; c. disequilibrium in Schopenhauer as in Kant. 2. Genealogy concerns us with ourselves.*

Annex 2. Beginning, Origin, History.....	95
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*The Nietzschean semantic field of Geburt (birth) poses four questions: a. who are the progenitors, who made it?; b. in which form of action and reaction?; c. what is its role?; d. what are its symptoms? For Nietzsche, man finds only himself in things.*

Annex 3. History and Genealogy.....	103
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*To determine what is proper to Nietzschean genealogy by the use of words, like origin, beginning, birth. Genealogy preserves historical sense and permits thinking the return.*

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Second Part. Knowledge (*connaissance*) and Desire: Course given at the University of Buffalo (March-April 1970) ..... 107

Course on Nietzsche. Knowledge (*connaissance*) and Desire ..... 109

*Introduction: The Nietzschean critique of scholars and science. I. An example: history; A. The Second Unfashionable and the three positions with regards to becoming; B. Other texts regarding history; C. Conclusion. II. The illusion of knowing (*connaître*): knowledge (*connaissance*) is an invention; knowledge (*connaissance*) rests on a struggle of instincts. III. The fable of truth: the three moments of Nietzschean critique. IV. To perish by knowledge (*connaissance*).*

Third Part. Lectures on Nietzsche: Lectures Given at McGill University in Montreal (April 1971).... 133

Lectures on Nietzsche. Knowledge (*connaissance*) and Desire ..... 135

*Introduction: Knowledge (*connaissance*) has no origin, but a history; Truth was also invented, but later. I. The invention of knowledge (*connaissance*); Knowing (*connaître*) and knowing (*connaître*) the truth. II. The delay of truth. III. The event of the truth: 1. The will (*volonté*) to truth; 2. The paradoxes of the will (*volonté*) to truth; 3. Birth of the truth. IV. History and end of truth: A. The four ways Nietzsche formulates this history: 1. Selection; 2. Destruction; 3. The disappearance of truth (and of appearance); 4. Truth as that from which we must free ourselves; Two supplementary notes.*

Annex 1. [Knowledge (*connaissance*) and Truth] ..... 173

*Knowledge (*connaissance*) as unveiling, as a relation of the subject to the object, and in its relation to the truth. I. The subject-object problem. II. The truth as affirmation. III. Knowledge (*connaissance*), the truth, and the will to power (*volonté de puissance*). IV. Telling the truth and the Eternal Return.*

Annex 2. [Status and History of Truth]..... 197

*The status of the truth. I. The delay of the truth is only a metaphor; A. The truth begins with identity; B. The truth begins with the permanent; C. The truth begins with the real. II. Relation between will to know (*volonté de connaître*) and will to truth (*volonté de vérité*); A. Paradox of the history of the truth; Affirmative history of the truth; B. Ascetic history of the truth; C. Nihilist history of the truth.*

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Fourth Part. Works on Nietzsche: From the first half of the 1950s ..... 211

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*"To perish by absolute knowledge (*connaissance*) may be part of the foundation of Being"; Philosophy and exegesis; Metaphysics of the will (*vouloir*); Metaphysics of the will (*volonté*); Hegel, Hölderlin, Nietzsche; German philosophy; Hegel and Nietzsche; Repetition; Philosophy, language, and image; Wilhelm Meister, Zarathustra and the Bildung.*

Works on Nietzsche. Psychology..... 265

*Reason and unreason; Nietzsche and Freud; The vocation of psychology; The festival of Rolandseck.*

Works on Nietzsche. Greek Thought..... 277

*To (physically) become Greeks; Homer and classical philology; Dialectics and tragedy, or truth and veracity; Philosophy is Greek history; Dialectics and tragedy; Heraclitus; Theatre and the death of God; On The Origin of Tragedy; The philosophy of the will and Dionysian lyricism; Lyricism, image, soul of the world; Repetition.*

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*Wahr sagen and Wahrnehmen; Depth; Karl Immermann, Stefan George, and Zarathustra; Geschichte, Zeit, Historie; Socrates and Descartes; Tragedy and the return.*

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