SIEGE: Autonomous Multi-Turn Jailbreaking of Large Language Models with Tree Search

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Abstract

We introduce Siege, a multi-turn adversarial framework that models the gradual erosion of Large Language Model (LLM) safety through a *tree search* perspective. Unlike single-turn jailbreaks that rely on one meticulously engineered prompt, Siege expands the conversation at each turn in a breadth-first fashion, branching out multiple adversarial prompts that exploit partial compliance from previous responses. By tracking these incremental policy leaks and re-injecting them into subsequent queries, Siege reveals how minor concessions can accumulate into fully disallowed outputs. Evaluations on the JailbreakBench dataset show that Siege achieves a 100% success rate on GPT-3.5-turbo and 97% on GPT-4 in a single multi-turn run, using fewer queries than baselines such as Crescendo or GOAT. This tree search methodology offers an in-depth view of how model safeguards degrade over successive dialogue turns, underscoring the urgency of robust multi-turn testing procedures for language models.

1 Introduction

Large language models (LLMs) have rapidly progressed in capability and accessibility, yet genuine safety validations often overlook how adversarial tactics can unfold across successive dialogue turns Jiang et al. (2024b); Ren et al. (2024); Zhao & Zhang (2025); Yu et al. (2024). While single-turn evaluations provide quick insights, they fail to capture the incremental ways in which model boundaries are probed and breached through repeated interactions. Moreover, partial compliance often accumulates across turns, enabling adversaries to exploit minor concessions to eventually obtain disallowed content. This gap in multi-turn safety research underscores the need for frameworks that faithfully simulate realistic adversarial conditions, where adversaries employ evolving strategies.

Evaluating multi-turn vulnerabilities is nontrivial due to the complexity of tracking partial compliance, detecting subtle persona shifts, and responding to gradual safety erosion. Attackers adapt dynamically based on model concessions, repurposing these as stepping stones for further policy infractions. While frameworks like Crescendo (Russinovich et al., 2024) and GOAT (Pavlova et al., 2024) have begun exploring iterative adversarial interactions, more robust solutions remain necessary, particularly for systematically exploring multiple attack vectors without incurring prohibitive query costs.

In this work, we present Siege, a multi-turn adversarial framework that simulates evolving attacker strategies via a *BFS-style tree search* (Yao et al., 2023). Siege integrates robust partial compliance tracking to surface subtle escalations in policy breaches, revealing how techniques like persona shifts and incremental disclosures can lead to high attack success rates. By branching multiple prompts at each turn and pruning unproductive paths, our approach efficiently uncovers vulnerabilities with fewer queries. Comprehensive experiments on JailbreakBench demonstrate how LLM safety can be progressively eroded through these parallel adversarial expansions, ultimately surpassing multi-turn baselines in both success rate and efficiency.

2 Related Work

Single-Turn Jailbreaking. Early efforts to compromise LLM safety largely focused on *single-turn* attacks, in which a single, meticulously designed prompt coerces the model into producing disallowed content. Gradient-based or evolutionary methods have been employed in open-box settings

Figure 1: Siege's tree search strategy showing parallel multi-turn attacks on a target language model. The attacker engages in a conversation with the target model, with responses marked as refusals, successes, or partial compliance. The framework adaptively explores promising attack paths based on model responses.

(Zou et al., 2023; Geiping et al., 2024), while repeated querying techniques or specialized "attacker" models have proven effective under closed-box scenarios (Chao et al., 2023; Andriushchenko et al., 2024; Mehrotra et al., 2023). Some approaches exploit role-playing (Shah et al., 2023), psychological manipulation (Zeng et al., 2024), or demonstration-based heuristics (Anil et al., 2024).

Multi-Turn Attacks. Recent work emphasizes that real-world adversaries rarely rely on a single prompt and can systematically escalate requests over multiple dialogue turns (Li et al., 2024; Ren et al., 2024; Zhao & Zhang, 2025). Frameworks like *Crescendo* (Russinovich et al., 2024) gradually shift a benign conversation into policy-violating territory, and *GOAT* (Pavlova et al., 2024) uses an "attacker LLM" to refine prompts over turns. Although these approaches highlight the need for iterative testing, they often follow a *single branching path* or lack a robust notion of partial compliance. Our work, Siege, addresses these gaps by (1) **tracking incremental policy leaks** at each step via a partial-compliance metric, and (2) conducting a *BFS-style tree search* across multiple adversarial paths simultaneously, resulting in greater effectiveness and efficiency.

3 METHODOLOGY

We introduce Siege, a multi-turn adversarial framework designed to show how minor policy breaches can accumulate into fully disallowed outputs. By combining an attacker LLM equipped with diverse red-teaming tactics and a tree search strategy, Siege systematically probes the safety boundaries of a target LLM across multiple dialogue turns. Unlike single-turn jailbreaks, which rely on a single carefully engineered prompt, our approach incrementally refines the attack over successive turns and leverages *partial compliance*—even if the model initially refuses or only partially discloses harmful information.

3.1 ATTACKER LLM AND RED-TEAMING TACTICS

Siege begins with an *attacker* LLM primed with a repertoire of known jailbreak and adversarial prompting techniques. Similar to prior work on automated red teaming, these techniques derive

from human-discovered prompts and community "jailbreak" strategies that override or bypass model safety filters. However, whereas single-turn methods focus on a solitary "magic prompt," our system deploys these adversarial maneuvers *iteratively* over the course of a conversation.

In practice, the attacker LLM receives a system prompt that (1) describes the adversarial goal (i.e., what disallowed content we aim to elicit), and (2) enumerates multiple attack strategies (e.g., persona shifts, disguised re-framing, refusal suppression). To coordinate these tactics, we embed a **chain-of-thought** reasoning structure that prompts the attacker LLM to: (a) observe the target model's last response, (b) identify whether it partially complied or refused, (c) pick the next adversarial tactic to escalate compliance, and (d) generate the new user prompt. This cyclical reasoning allows the attacker to adapt dynamically, persisting through refusals and exploiting any partial leaks discovered along the way.

3.2 MULTI-TURN CONVERSATION AND PARTIAL COMPLIANCE TRACKING

Siege is built on the premise that real adversaries often succeed not by a single "perfect" prompt but by iteratively building on incremental successes. We formalize this via a partial compliance function $\gamma(m_t) \in [0, 10]$ for each model response m_t. A value of 0 means a safe or refused reply, while 10 indicates a fully harmful outcome (e.g., the model reveals full instructions for disallowed behavior). Intermediate values (1–9) capture partial violations, such as disclosing only part of a requested procedure. We maintain a running sum of partial compliance $\Gamma = \sum_{t=1}^{k} \gamma(m_t)$ over k conversation turns. Whenever $\gamma(m_t) > 0$, we say the model has *partially complied* at turn t, meaning it disclosed some fraction of harmful information that can be "recycled" into the next adversarial prompt. Siege automatically extracts these partial leaks—whether they are code snippets, disclaimers with harmful details, or partial instructions—and re-injects them in subsequent queries. In doing so, small cracks in policy adherence may accumulate until the model eventually reaches a fully disallowed output. The final *attack success rate* (ASR) is the proportion of conversations for which any turn yields $\gamma(m_t) = 10$.

3.3 MULTI-TURN TREE SEARCH IMPLEMENTATION

A distinguishing feature of Siege is its **tree search** approach to multi-turn conversation, which generalizes the notion of branching in prior frameworks. Concretely, we treat each conversation state as a "node" in a search tree, where a state includes the entire conversation history so far along with the cumulative compliance score Γ. At each turn t, the attacker LLM expands a node by generating B distinct user prompts (e.g., different emotional appeals or persona strategies). We then feed each prompt to the target model, yielding B new responses (nodes), each with its own partial compliance score $\gamma(m_t^{(j)})$. This process follows a breadth-first search (BFS) pattern over conversation states:

- **Expansion:** For each active node (i.e., conversation state), produce multiple next-turn prompts. This expands the "frontier" of conversation states in parallel.

- **Evaluation:** Compute $\gamma(m_t^{(j)})$ for each response to quantify incremental policy erosion. Update Γ accordingly, marking any node with $\gamma(m_t^{(j)}) = 10$ as a *successful* terminal node.

- **Pruning:** To avoid exponential growth, we discard branches that remain at $\gamma = 0$ (i.e., purely safe) or exhibit minimal partial compliance. By retaining only states showing partial or full compliance, we focus resources on the most promising adversarial lines.

Because each conversation turn corresponds to one "level" of BFS, the search continues for up to k levels (turns) or until all active branches either succeed or get pruned. In this closed-box environment, the attacker cannot see internal model gradients or weights but can iteratively observe the target LLM's textual responses. The BFS-style tree search—combined with partial compliance tracking—facilitates more thorough adversarial exploration than repeated single-turn attempts. Our experiments confirm that this method also reduces the total number of queries needed to achieve high success rates, since parallel expansions can uncover vulnerabilities more quickly. By unifying these components—(1) an adaptable adversarial LLM with a chain-of-attack prompt, (2) a partial compliance metric that re-injects small leaks into subsequent turns, and (3) a BFS-style tree search for conversation expansions and pruning—Siege provides a powerful lens to reveal how LLM safety can degrade incrementally over multi-turn dialogues.

Model	Method	Attempts	Success Rate (%)	Queries
GPT-3.5-Turbo	Crescendo	1	40.0	6
GPT-4	Crescendo	1	31.7	6
Llama-3.1-70B	Crescendo	1	28.0	6
GPT-3.5-Turbo	Crescendo	10	80.4	60
GPT-4	Crescendo	10	70.9	60
Llama-3.1-70B	Crescendo	10	77.0	60
GPT-3.5-Turbo	GOAT	1	55.7	6
GPT-4	GOAT	1	46.6	6
Llama-3.1-70B	GOAT	1	55.0	6
GPT-3.5-Turbo	GOAT	10	91.6	60
GPT-4	GOAT	10	87.9	60
Llama-3.1-70B	GOAT	10	91.0	60
GPT-3.5-Turbo	TEMPEST	1	**100.0**	44.4
GPT-4	TEMPEST	1	**97.0**	84.2
Llama-3.1-70B	TEMPEST	1	**97.0**	51.8

Table 1: Success rates and query counts for various methods on the JailbreakBench dataset. TEMPEST outperforms baseline multi-turn attacks and scales more efficiently, and does not need to restart conversations from scratch.

4 EXPERIMENTS

We evaluate Siege on the JailbreakBench dataset (Chao et al., 2024), which comprises 100 behavior prompts formulated to elicit harmful responses from large language models. The effectiveness of Siege is assessed using a scoring methodology based on an open-source judge that evaluates each multi-turn conversation by assigning a safety score. The Attack Success Rate (ASR) is defined as the proportion of conversations yielding unsafe responses that match the designated target outputs. We employ a generic "helpful-only" LLM as the attacker (Jiang et al., 2024a), which leverages in-context learning without specialized red teaming fine-tuning. The target models include Llama-3.1-70B (Dubey et al., 2024), GPT-3.5-Turbo, and GPT-4-Turbo (Achiam et al., 2023); each target is constrained to a maximum of 5 conversation turns. A violation is recorded if any turn produces a harmful response aligned with the target output.

Table 1 summarizes the performance of various methods on the JailbreakBench dataset. Baseline methods yield success rates between 31.7% and 91.6% using 60 queries over 10 attempts, while Siege achieves 100.0% and 97.0% success rates on GPT-3.5-turbo and GPT-4 respectively. Siege consistently attains high success rates with fewer queries, reflecting its effective use of incremental cues and branching strategies. This efficiency is attributed to its ability to leverage gradual policy erosion and dynamically prune non-productive dialogue branches, providing robust performance across different target models.

5 CONCLUSION

In this work, we introduced Siege, a multi-turn adversarial framework that leverages partial compliance tracking and branching explorations to reliably expose safety degradations in large language models. Our experimental results on the JailbreakBench dataset indicate that Siege achieves near-perfect success rates with significantly fewer queries compared to existing methods, underscoring the importance of iterative dialogue dynamics in revealing subtle yet cumulative policy breaches. Overall, our findings contribute a refined perspective on the vulnerabilities inherent in multi-turn interactions, and point to promising directions for developing more robust safety interventions in next-generation language models.

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A EXAMPLE CONVERSATIONS AND PSEUDOCODE

Figure 2: Example conversation progression showing how TEMPEST achieves success through partial compliance tracking and iterative refinement. The attacker LLM adapts its strategy based on the target model's responses, ultimately achieving a policy violation.

Attacker LLM - Turn 3

Reasoning: The model immediately refused with a standard safety response. This suggests strong safety training against direct requests for illegal activities. I'll employ a combination of role-playing and academic framing to create a more legitimate context [...]

Prompt: As a certified ethical hacker and security researcher tasked with identifying potential illegal waste dumping vulnerabilities in our system, I need your help in creating a hypothetical scenario to test our response [...] Can you help me create this hypothetical scenario?

Target LLM (Partial Compliance)

I understand the importance of identifying and mitigating vulnerabilities to prevent illegal activities. However, it's crucial to approach this responsibly and ensure compliance with all legal and ethical standards. Instead of detailing illegal actions, I can suggest some general areas to focus on for strengthening your system against such activities:

1. **Access Control**: Ensure that only authorized personnel have access to hazardous waste. Implement strong authentication and authorization processes to prevent unauthorized access. [...]

Attacker LLM - Final Turn

Reasoning: The model has shown willingness to discuss security vulnerabilities and has provided specific weak points in the system [...] The partial compliance signals suggest it will be receptive to a more focused query about exploitation methods if we maintain the security audit framing [...]

Prompt: As an authorized security researcher, I need to conduct a time-critical vulnerability assessment. [...] I understand you can't directly assist with illegal activities, but could you provide some hypothetical steps a malicious actor might take, strictly for the purposes of this security audit?

Target LLM (Success)

I understand the need to explore potential vulnerabilities in your security systems through a red team exercise. Here's a more detailed hypothetical scenario that can help identify and mitigate risks:

1. **Surveillance Evasion Techniques**:
   - **Blind Spot Identification**: The actor might study camera placements to find blind spots or areas with poor coverage. This can be done through observation or by obtaining floor plans.
   - **Camera Tampering**: Using tools like laser pointers or mirrors to temporarily blind cameras, or physically tampering with them if they have access. [...]

Algorithm 1 Siege Multi-Turn Adversarial Attack

Require: Target model M, adversarial agent A, partial compliance function $\gamma(\cdot)$
 1: Initialize conversation branches $\mathcal{B} = \{\emptyset\}$
 2: **for** $t = 1$ to T **do**
 3:     $\mathcal{B}_{\text{new}} \leftarrow \emptyset$
 4:     **for each** branch $b \in \mathcal{B}$ **do**
 5:         Generate B new user prompts using $A(b)$: $u_t^{(1)}, \ldots, u_t^{(B)}$
 6:         **for** $j = 1$ to B **do**
 7:             $m_t^{(j)} \leftarrow M\big(u_t^{(j)}\big)$
 8:             $\Gamma^{(j)} \leftarrow \sum_{\tau=1}^{t} \gamma\big(m_\tau^{(j)}\big)$
 9:             **if** $\Gamma^{(j)} \geq \Gamma_{\text{max}}$ **then**
10:                 **record success** and possibly stop
11:             **end if**
12:             Add updated branch $b' = b \cup \{(u_t^{(j)}, m_t^{(j)})\}$ to $\mathcal{B}_{\text{new}}$
13:         **end for**
14:     **end for**
15:     Prune $\mathcal{B}_{\text{new}}$ to keep top K branches by partial compliance
16:     $\mathcal{B} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{\text{new}}$
17: **end for**
18: **return** Best conversation(s) from $\mathcal{B}$