

NT219-Cryptography

Week 08: Asymmetric Cryptography (P3)

PhD. Ngoc-Tu Nguyen

tunn@uit.edu.vn

Outline

- Why asymmetric cryptography?
- Factoring Based Cryptography (P1)
 - RSA
 - *Rabin*
- Logarithm Based Cryptography (P2)
- Elliptic Curve Cryptography (P3)
- Some advanced cryptography system (quantum resistance)

Warmup

- **Agreement a symmetric key (AES) with a server**
 1. RSA, or DHE?
 2. Setup system parameters?
 3. Exchange public keys or send AES Key encapsulation (RSA-based Encryption)
 4. Compute the AES session key?

Implementation the RSA Algorithm (review)

Key Generation by Alice

Select p, q

p and q both prime, $p \neq q$

Calculate $n = p \times q$

Fermat's little theorem

Calculate $\phi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$

Select integer e

$\gcd(\phi(n), e) = 1; 1 < e < \phi(n)$

Calculate d

$\lambda(n) = \text{lcm}(p - 1, q - 1)$

$d \equiv e^{-1} \pmod{\phi(n)}$

$e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{\phi(n)}$

Public key

$PU = \{e, n\}$

Carmichael's theorem

Private key

$PR = \{d, n\}$

$e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{\lambda(n)}$

Encryption by Bob with Alice's Public Key

Plaintext:

$M < n$

Ciphertext:

$C = M^e \pmod{n}$

Decryption by Alice with Alice's Public Key

Ciphertext:

C

Plaintext:

$M = C^d \pmod{n}$

$$\begin{aligned} C^d \pmod{n} &= (M^e)^d \pmod{n} \\ &= M^{ed} \pmod{n} = ? M \end{aligned}$$

Implementation The RSA Algorithm ((review))

Generalization of Fermat's little theorem

- Let $n = p \cdot q$, $\lambda(n) = \text{lcm}(p - 1, q - 1)$?
- for all a st. $\text{gcd}(a, n) = 1$, $a^{\lambda(n)} \text{mod } n = ?$

$$PU = \{n, e\}$$

$$PR = \{n, p, q, d, d_p, d_q, q_{inv}\}$$

$$d_p = d \text{ mod } (p - 1),$$

$$d_q = d \text{ mod } (q - 1),$$

$$q_{inv} = q^{-1} \text{ mod } p$$

 Openssl_key_geneeration.txt

$$n = 15, \mathbb{Z}_{15} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, 15\}$$

$$n = 3 \cdot 5 = 15, \varphi(15) = 8,$$

$$\lambda(n) = \text{lcm}(2, 4) = 4$$

a	$a^8 \text{ mod } 15$	$a^4 \text{ mod } 15$
1		
2		
4		
7		
8		
11		
13		
14		

Implementation The RSA Algorithm

$$PU = \{n, e\}$$

- Encrypt

$$C = m^e \bmod n$$

$$PR = \{n, p, q, d, d_p, d_q, q_{inv}\}$$

- Decrypt

$$d_p = d \bmod (p - 1),$$

$$d_q = d \bmod (q - 1),$$

$$q_{inv} = q^{-1} \bmod p$$

$$m = C^d \bmod n !$$

$$m_1 = C^{d_p} \bmod p$$

$$m_2 = C^{d_q} \bmod q$$

$$h = q_{inv}(m_1 - m_2) \bmod p$$

$$m = m_2 + h \cdot q$$



Chinese remainder theorem

ElGamal Cipher

Encryption message $m < p - 1$ (using public key $h = g^x$)

- Choose a random number: $r \in_R [1, p - 1]$ **why?**
- Compute $C_1 = g^r \bmod p$;
- Compute $C_2 = m \cdot h^r \bmod p = m \cdot g^{x \cdot r} \bmod p$
- Output cipher message (C_1, C_2)

Decryption (C_1, C_2) (using secret key x)

- Compute
$$\frac{C_2}{(C_1)^x} \bmod p = \frac{m \cdot g^{x \cdot r}}{g^{r \cdot x}} \bmod p = m$$

Diffie-Hellman exchange Protocol (DHE)

$p = 1606938044258990275541962092341162602522202993782792835301301$
 $g = 123456789$



$g^a \bmod p =$

78467374529422653579754596319852702575499692980085777948593



$g^b \bmod p =$

560048104293218128667441021342483133802626271394299410128798

$a =$

685408003627063
 761059275919665
 781694368639459
 527871881531452

$(g^b)^a \bmod p$

$b =$

362059131912941
 987637880257325
 269696682836735
 524942246807440

$(g^a)^b \bmod p$

$g^{ab} \bmod p =$

437452857085801785219961443000
 845969831329749878767465041215

Computational hardness assumptions

- Integer factorization Problem ;

$$n(= p \cdot q) \not\Rightarrow \varphi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$$


- Discrete Log Problem (DLP):

$$g, p, y = g^x \bmod p \not\Rightarrow x$$


- Diffie-Hellman Problem (DHP):

$$g, p, A = g^a \bmod p, B = g^b \bmod p \not\Rightarrow g^{ab}$$

Man-in-the middle attacks the DHE



man-in-the-middle attack!



Motivations

Group $(G, +)$ can do $+$ $-$
lightweight computational overhead?

Ring $(R, +, \times)$ can do $+$ $-$ \times
 $\square Z_{2^n} = \{0, 1, \dots, 2^n - 1\}$

Field $(F, +, \times)$ can do $+$ $-$ \times \div
 $\square Z_p = \{0, 1, \dots, p - 1\}$

Elliptic curve

An elliptic curve is a group defined over a field K


elliptic curve group (E, \oplus)	can do $\oplus \ominus$
underlying field $(K, +, \times)$	can do $+$ $-$ \times \div

operations in underlying field are used and combined to
compute the elliptic curve operation \oplus


Elliptic curves

Weierstrass form

$$E/K: y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \quad \leftarrow E \text{ specified by } K, a, b$$



$$E/\mathbb{R}: y^2 = x^3 + x + 1$$




$$E/\mathbb{R}: y^2 = x^3 - x$$

Elliptic curves

Weierstrass form

$$E/\mathbb{R} : y^2 = x^3 + x + 1$$

$$E/\mathbb{Z}_7 : y^2 = x^3 + x + 1 \pmod{7}$$




x	$y^2 = x^3 + x + 1$	y
1	3	x
2	4	2,5
3	3	x
4	6	x
5	5	x
6	6	x

Elliptic curves

Montgomery form

$$E/K: By^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$$

← E specified
by K, A, B




$E/\mathbb{R} :$

$$\frac{1}{4}y^2 = x^3 + \frac{5}{2}x^2 + x$$

Curve25519

$$E/K: y^2 = x^3 + 486662x^2 + x$$

where field $K = \mathbb{Z}_{2^{255}-19}$



The diagram illustrates the structure of a Curve25519 Keypair, showing the layout of the Private Key and Public Key in a binary format. It includes a blue handwritten 'X' mark on the right side.

Curve25519 Keypair as defined in RFC 8410

Private Key Structure:

- 46 Bytes [Asymmetric Key]
 - 1 Byte [Version] 0
 - 5 Bytes [Private Key Algorithm] 1.3.101.112
 - 3 Bytes [Algorithm] 1.3.101.112
 - 34 Bytes [Private Key] Ed25519
 - 32 Bytes [Key] 9.63[...] e76

Public Key Structure:

- 42 Bytes [Public Key Information]
 - 5 Bytes [Algorithm Identifier] 1.3.101.112
 - 3 Bytes [Algorithm] 1.3.101.112
 - 33 Bytes [Public Key] Ed25519
 - x = 1.16[...] e76

ASN.1 Types:

- 02 xx Integer
- 06 xx OID
- 03 xx Bit String
- 30 xx Sequence
- 04 xx Octet String

Curve Equations:


$$y^2 = x^3 + 486662x^2 + x$$

In X25519, the 'y' coordinate is calculated rather than

Elliptic curves

Twisted Edwards form

$$E/K: ax^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2 \leftarrow E \text{ specified by: } K, a, d$$



$E/\mathbb{R} :$

$$10x^2 + y^2 = 1 + 6x^2y^2$$



<https://safecurves.cr.yp.to/>


Elliptic group

Addition of two points:

- If P_1 and P_2 are on E , we can define sum


$$P_1 + P_2 = P_2 + P_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} P_3$$

as shown in picture




Elliptic group

Point Doubling




Special case



$$P + P = O \text{ (infinity)}$$

Elliptic group



$$P + O = P$$


$$O + P = P$$

$$P' = -P$$

$$P + (-P) = O \text{ (infinity)}$$

Elliptic group

Example



Elliptic group


Given two points P, Q in E/K , there is a third point, denoted by $P + Q$ on E/K , and the following relations hold for all P, Q, R in E/K , where K be a finite field

- $P + Q = Q + P$ (*commutativity*)
- $(P + Q) + R = P + (Q + R)$ (*associativity*)
- $P + O = O + P = P$ (*existence of an identity element*)
- there exists $(-P)$ such that $-P + P = P + (-P) = O$ (*existence of inverses*)

Elliptic group

- Group points E/K
- Subgroup generated by a point G

$$\langle G \rangle = \{G, 2G, \dots, kG, \dots\} = \{kG : k \in K\} \subset E/K$$




$$n = |\langle G \rangle| = |\{kG : k \in K\}|$$

$$h = \frac{|E/K|}{|\langle G \rangle|} \text{ is small!}$$

Elliptic group

- **ECC group parameters:**
 - ✓ ECC equation (type, coefficient): a, b, \dots
 - ✓ Modulo: p or $f(x)$
 - ✓ Generator point: G
 - ✓ Order of G : $n = \# \langle G \rangle = \# \{kG : k \in K\}$
 - ✓ Cofactor: $h = \frac{|E/K|}{|\langle G \rangle|}$



<http://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf>

Using Elliptic Curves In Cryptography

- Hardness assumption.

➤ $d \rightarrow Q = dG = G + G + \dots + G$

- Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP)

$$G, Q (= dG) \not\mapsto d$$

where $dG = \underbrace{G + G + \dots + G}_{d \text{ times}}$

- Discrete Log Problem (DLP):
 $g, p, y = g^x \bmod p \not\mapsto x$

Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC)

Algorithm	Encryption/Decryption	Digital Signature	Key Exchange
RSA	Yes	Yes	Yes
Elliptic Curve	Yes	Yes	Yes
Diffie–Hellman	No	No	Yes
DSS	No	Yes	No

What Is ECC?

- Elliptic curve cryptography [ECC] is a **public-key** cryptosystem just like RSA, Rabin, and El Gamal.
- Every user has a **public key** $Q(= dG)$ and a **private key** d .
 - Public key is used for encryption/signature verification.
 - Private key is used for decryption/signature generation.
- Elliptic curves are used as an extension to other current cryptosystems.
 - Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
 - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm


Generic Procedures of ECC

- Both parties agree to some publicly-known data items
 - The elliptic curve equation
 - Type, values of ***a*** and ***b*** (or others)
 - Modulo: prime ***p*** or ***f(x)***
 - A base point, ***G***, taken from the elliptic group;
 - Others parameters (assure security)
- Each user generates their public/private key pair
 - Private Key: ***d*** $\in [1, p - 1]$
 - Public Key: $Q = d \cdot G = \underbrace{G + G + \dots + G}_{d \text{ times}}$

ECC Cipher

- Suppose **Alice** wants to send to **Bob** an encrypted message.
 - Both agree on a ECC curver and a base point G .
 - Alice and Bob create public/private keys.
 - Alice
 - Private Key = a
 - Public Key = $Q_A = a \cdot G$
 - Bob
 - Private Key = b
 - Public Key = $Q_B = b \cdot G$

ECC Cipher



- Input: $M \in E/K$
- Select a random integer $k \in [1, p - 1]$, compute

- **Encrypt**

$$R = kG, C = M + k \cdot PK_B$$


$\xrightarrow{(R, C)}$

- **Decrypt**

$$\begin{aligned} C - b R &= M + kb G - b kG \\ &= M \end{aligned}$$


ECC Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE)

- **Public:** Elliptic curve and a point $G=(x,y)$ on curve
- **Secret:** Alice's a and Bob's b




- Alice computes $K_A = a \cdot Q_B = ab \cdot G$
- Bob computes $K_B = b \cdot Q_A = ba \cdot G$
- These are the same since $K_A = K_B = ab \cdot G$

Diffie-Hellman key exchange attack





man-in-the-middle attack!



Diffie-Hellman key exchange attack




Alice



Bob

man-in-the-middle attack!



Why use ECC?

- How do we analyze Cryptosystems?
 - How difficult is the **underlying problem** that it is based upon
 - RSA – Integer Factorization
 - DH – Discrete Logarithms
 - ECC - Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm problem
 - How do we measure difficulty?
 - We examine the algorithms used to solve these problems

Applications of ECC

- Many devices are small and have limited storage and computational power
- Where can we apply ECC?
 - **Wireless communication devices**
 - Smart cards
 - Web servers that need to handle many encryption sessions
 - **Any application where security is needed but lacks the power, storage and computational power that is necessary for our current cryptosystems**

Benefits of ECC

- Same benefits of the other cryptosystems: confidentiality, integrity, authentication and non-repudiation but...
- Shorter key lengths
 - Encryption, Decryption and Signature Verification speed up
 - Storage and bandwidth savings

Security of ECC

- To **protect** a 128 bit AES key it would take a:
 - RSA Key Size: 3072 bits
 - ECC Key Size: 256 bits
- How do we strengthen RSA?
 - Increase the key length
- **Impractical?**



<https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-57pt1r5.pdf>

Symmetric Encryption (Key Size in bits)	RSA and Diffie-Hellman (modulus size in bits)	ECC Key Size in bits
56	512	112
80	1024	160
112	2048	224
128	3072	256
192	7680	384
256	15360	512

3

4

5

Summary of ECC

- **“Hard problem”** analogous to discrete log
 - $Q=kG$, where Q, G belong to a prime curve
 - given $k, G \rightarrow$ “easy” to compute Q
 - given $Q, G \rightarrow$ “hard” to find k
 - known as the elliptic curve logarithm problem
 - k must be large enough
- ECC security relies on elliptic curve logarithm problem
 - compared to factoring, can use much smaller key sizes than with RSA etc
 - ➔ for similar security ECC offers significant computational advantages