



# Protocol Audit Report

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*New Era Ventures*

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# Protocol Audit Report

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Protocol Summary

PasswordStore is a protocol dedicated to storage and retrieval of a user’s passwords. The protocol is designed to be used by a single user, and is not designed to be used by multiple users. Only the owner should be able to set and access this password.

Disclaimer

The New Era Ventures team makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

		Impact		
		High	Medium	Low
Likelihood	High	H	H/M	M
	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

1 2e8f81e263b3a9d18fab4fb5c46805ffc10a9990

## Scope

```
1 src/  
2 --- PasswordStore.sol
```

## Roles

- Owner: Is the only one who should be able to set and access the password.

For this contract, only the owner should be able to interact with the contract.

## Executive Summary

The team spent 2 hours auditing the contract. During this time, we found 2 high severity issues, 0 medium severity issues, 0 low severity issues, and 1 informational issue.

## Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Gas Optimizations	0
Total	3

## Findings

### High

#### [H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to anyone, and no longer private

**Description:** All data stored on-chain is visible to anyone, and can be read directly from the blockchain. The `PasswordStore:: s_password` variable is intended to be a private variable and only ac-

cessed through the `PasswordStore:: getPassword` function, which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract.

We show one such method of reading any data off chain below

**Impact:** Anyone can read the private password, severely breaking the functionality of the protocol.

### Proof of Concept: (Proof of Code)

The below test case shows how anyone can read the password directly from the blockchain.

- ## 1. Create a locally running chain

```
1 make anvil
```

- ## 2. Deploy the contract to the chain

```
1 make deploy
```

- ### 3. Run the storage tool

We use 1 because that's the storage slot of `s_password` in the contract.

```
1 cast storage <ADDRESS_HERE> 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

You'll get an output that looks like this:

[illegible]

You can then parse that hex to a string with:

[illegible]

And get an output of:

```
1 myPassword
```

**Recommended Mitigation:** Due to this, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. One could encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain. This would require the user to remember another password off-chain to decrypt the password. However, you'd also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a transaction with the password that decrypts your password.

## [H-2] PasswordStore::setPassword is callable by anyone

**Description:** The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function is set to be an `external` function, however the natspec of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that `This function`

allows only the owner to set a **new** password.

```
1 function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
2   @> // @audit - There are no access controls here
3     s_password = newPassword;
4     emit SetNetPassword();
5 }
```

**Impact:** Anyone can set/change the password of the contract, severely breaking the contract's functionality.

**Proof of Concept:** Add the following to the `PasswordStore.t.sol` test suite.

```
1 function test_anyone_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public {
2   vm.prank(randomAddress);
3   string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
4   passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);
5   vm.prank(owner);
6   string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
7   assertEq(actualPassword, expectedPassword);
8 }
```

**Recommended Mitigation:** Add an access control modifier to the `setPassword` function.

```
1 if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
2   revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
3 }
```

## Informational

**[I-1] The PasswordStore::getPassword natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist, causing the natspec to be incorrect**

**Description:** `javascript /** @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password. @> * @param newPassword The new password to set. */function getPassword()external view returns (string memory){`

The natspec for the function `PasswordStore::getPassword` indicates it should have a parameter with the signature `getPassword(string)`. However, the actual function signature is `getPassword()`.

**Impact:** The natspec is incorrect.

**Recommended Mitigation:** Remove the incorrect natspec line.

```
1 - * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```