

Programming Paradigms

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1 Introduction

As science developed, the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) has emerged in order to protect cryptographic systems from quantum computing attack. SVP is crucial foundation for secure lattice-based cryptographic systems and post-quantum cryptography. The main focus of SVP is to efficiently find shortest vector with a given lattice. This report delves into run-time and memory requirements using C language.

2 Approach

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Algorithm: The basic Schnorr–Euchner enumeration Schnorr and Euchner (1994)
Input: A basis  $\mathbf{B} = (\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_n)$  of a lattice  $L$  and a radius  $R$  with  $\lambda_1(L) \leq R$ 
Output: The shortest non-zero vector  $\mathbf{s} = \sum_{i=1}^n v_i \mathbf{b}_i$  in  $L$ 
1: Compute Gram–Schmidt information  $\mu_{i,j}$  and  $\|\mathbf{b}_i^*\|^2$  of  $\mathbf{B}$ 
2:  $(\rho_1, \dots, \rho_{n+1}) = \mathbf{0}$ ,  $(v_1, \dots, v_n) = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$ ,  $(c_1, \dots, c_n) = \mathbf{0}$ ,  $(w_1, \dots, w_n) = \mathbf{0}$ 
3:  $k = 1$ ,  $\text{last\_nonzero} = 1$  // largest  $i$  for which  $v_i \neq 0$ 
4: while true do
5:    $\rho_k \leftarrow \rho_{k+1} + (v_k - c_k)^2 \cdot \|\mathbf{b}_k^*\|^2$  //  $\rho_k = \|\pi_k(\mathbf{s})\|^2$ 
6:   if  $\rho_k \leq R^2$  then
7:     if  $k = 1$  then  $R^2 \leftarrow \rho_k$ ,  $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n v_i \mathbf{b}_i$ ; // update the squared radius
8:     else  $k \leftarrow k - 1$ ,  $c_k \leftarrow -\sum_{i=k+1}^n \mu_{i,k} v_i$ ,  $v_k \leftarrow \lfloor c_k \rfloor$ ,  $w_k \leftarrow 1$ ;
9:   else
10:     $k \leftarrow k + 1$  // going up the tree
11:    if  $k = n + 1$  then return  $\mathbf{s}$ ;
12:    if  $k \geq \text{last\_nonzero}$  then  $\text{last\_nonzero} \leftarrow k$ ,  $v_k \leftarrow v_k + 1$ ;
13:    else
14:      if  $v_k > c_k$  then  $v_k \leftarrow v_k - w_k$ ; else  $v_k \leftarrow v_k + w_k$ ; // zig-zag search
15:       $w_k \leftarrow w_k + 1$ 
16:    end if
17:  end if
18: end while
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Figure 1: SE algorithm pseudocode (Schnorr and Euchner 1994)

To tackle the coursework problem, I initially approached it by devising a Brute Force algorithm, leading me to formulate a structure where the range




Figure 2: performance of runtime for 16-bit and 32 bit before LLL with normal and bad basis

is fixed and multiplied by 2 if we find a shortest vector. Reading advanced algorithm parts on a coursework instruction enabled me to research papers on online and find two basic enumeration algorithms: sieve and enumeration (Basic Schnorr-Euchner Enumeration) (Yasuda et al. 2021). There are several reasons I opted enumeration over sieve. Enumeration method has polynomial space, meaning that the memory required for enumeration algorithm will be $O(n^k)$ for some integer k . On the other hand, sieve method seeks for the shortest vector with exponential space, which implies $O(2^n)$. In general, when dimension n is low, polynomial space is more manageable compared to exponential space. Therefore, enumeration method is more pragmatic considering dimension of test will be less than 10. Furthermore, sieve is faster for higher dimension because it utilises the probabilistic approach to generate and filter through a large set of lattice points to find short vectors (Ajtai 1996). However, by enumeration's nature (deterministic step) as dimensions increase, the run-time performance decreases. The SE algorithm implemented is 1. Here 'bad' basis implies that basis is almost parallel. The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates the run-time performance of both 32-bit and 16-bit computations across dimensions 1 to 30 when using a normal basis. It is evident that the 16-bit computations exhibit faster run-time. This speed advantage can be attributed to the fact that arithmetic operations on 32-bit numbers generally take longer to execute compared to 16-bit numbers. Although the difference in run-time between the 16-bit and 32-bit normal basis computations is relatively small, the right panel of Figure 2 displays a significant difference in performance between 16-bit and 32-bit

computations when using a ‘bad’ basis.

3 Optimization

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INPUT
a lattice basis  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n$  in  $\mathbb{Z}^n$ 
a parameter  $\delta$  with  $1/4 < \delta < 1$ , most commonly  $\delta = 3/4$ 

PROCEDURE
 $B^* \leftarrow \text{GramSchmidt}(\{b_1, \dots, b_n\}) = \{b_1^*, \dots, b_n^*\}$ ; and do not normalize
 $\mu_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{InnerProduct}(b_j, b_i^*) / \text{InnerProduct}(b_j^*, b_j^*)$ ; using the most current values of  $b_i$  and  $b_j^*$ 
 $k \leftarrow 2$ ;
while  $k \leq n$  do
  for  $j$  from  $k-1$  to  $1$  do
    if  $|\mu_{k,j}| > 1/2$  then
       $b_k \leftarrow b_k - \lfloor \mu_{k,j} \rfloor b_j$ ;
      Update  $B^*$  and the related  $\mu_{i,j}$ 's as needed.
      (The naive method is to recompute  $B^*$  whenever  $b_i$  changes:
        $B^* \leftarrow \text{GramSchmidt}(\{b_1, \dots, b_n\}) = \{b_1^*, \dots, b_n^*\}$ )
    end if
  end for
  if  $\text{InnerProduct}(b_k^*, b_k^*) > (\delta - \mu_{k,k-1}^2) \text{InnerProduct}(b_{k-1}^*, b_{k-1}^*)$  then
     $k \leftarrow k + 1$ ;
  else
    Swap  $b_k$  and  $b_{k-1}$ ;
    Update  $B^*$  and the related  $\mu_{i,j}$ 's as needed.
     $k \leftarrow \max(k-1, 2)$ ;
  end if
end while
return  $B$  the LLL reduced basis of  $\{b_1, \dots, b_n\}$ 

OUTPUT
the reduced basis  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_n$  in  $\mathbb{Z}^n$ 

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Figure 3: LLL algorithm pseudocode (Hoffstein, Pipher, and Silverman 2008)

In terms of improving run-time, I chose the Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász (LLL) over the Block Korkin-Zolotarev (BKZ) algorithm. LLL is advantageous in smaller dimension in an aspect of complexity which makes more efficient and faster for smaller dimension. Whereas, BKZ is computationally intensive for larger block sizes (Yasuda et al. 2021). In light of evaluating our coursework under dimension 10, it is more appropriate to implement LLL algorithm. I also chose δ as 0.75 because the smaller delta results in higher precision but could take longer to obtain reduced basis. Therefore, LLL is suitable under circumstance with smaller n .

The left panel of Figure (4) demonstrates that the run-time performance before applying the LLL (Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovász) algorithm to a normal basis is faster compared to the run-time after applying the LLL algorithm to the same normal basis. This difference in run-time arises because the application of the LLL algorithm to a normal basis is not particularly effective in terms of reducing computational time to make the basis nearly orthogonal. Conversely, in the case of a 32-bit ‘bad’ basis, applying the LLL algorithm results in a dramatic improvement. The LLL algorithm has a substantial positive impact on the computational efficiency of the ‘bad’ basis. In terms of memory requirements, I have organized three two-dimensional arrays: basis, orthogonal basis, and Gram-Schmidt information μ . To optimize memory usage I have implemented an approach where I update the originally existing orthogonal basis rather than creating a new one each time it needs updating. This has resulted in reduced memory allocation. For dimension 1 and 30, allocated memories are 8,784 bytes and 29,432 bytes respectively.[figure (5)].




Figure 4: performance of runtime for 16-bit and 32 bit before LLL with normal and bad basis




Figure 5: Memory usage

4 Error handling

Regarding input validation, I've implemented an algorithm that filters out specific cases. It also examines inputs for missing brackets, double bracket occurrences ([12]), and wrong dimension formats ([1 2 3 4] [5 6] [7 8 9]). In terms of independence check, as it is hard to obtain determinant of given input basis in C, I have devised method to check if at least one of orthogonal basis elements is zero or not by introducing $\epsilon = 10^{-10}$ to avoid potential floating point errors.

References

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