

### **Notes**

Very early stage draft - Contents not considered reliable.

### **Contact**

### **Brian Wilson Dew**

■ brian.w.dew@gmail.com

@bd\_econ

bdecon/US-chartbook

# **Contents**

Overview

**Overall Economic Activity** 

**Overall Financial Activity** 

Households

Businesses

Government

**External Sector** 

**Labor Markets** 

Capital Markets

Prices

**International Comparisons** 

References

# **Overview**


The US Chartbook aims to be comprehensive, but not arbitrary, in presenting charts, tables, and analysis. The results are fairly detailed, but hopefully well-curated and well-organized.

This first section discusses high-level indicators of the health of the US economy. Subsequent sections offer more detail on types of activity, sectors, and markets. Finally, some international comparisons are presented.

# **Overall Economic Activity**

This analysis of the United States economy begins with the most popular measure of economic activity, Gross Domestic Product (GDP). According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP-the seasonally-adjusted annualized value of goods and services produced in the US-was \$21,726 billion in the fourth quarter of 2019, compared to an inflation-adjusted equivalent of \$9,862 billion in the first quarter of 1989.

The US population is growing by about sixth-tenths of a percent per year. GDP per capita (see - ), adjusted for inflation to 2019 Q4 dollars, has increased to \$66,001 in 2019 Q4 from \$40,386 in 1989 Q1.




Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

### **Economic Growth**

GDP (see •) increased at an annual rate of 2.1 percent during the fourth quarter of 2019, compared to an increase of 2.1 percent in the third quarter of 2019. Quarterly growth has averaged 2.5 percent over the past three years, 2.3 percent over the past 10 years, and 2.5 percent over the past 30 years.


#### **Real Gross Domestic Product Growth**



### **Components of Growth**

The **expenditure approach** compiles GDP from the sum of spending on domestic goods and services. Major spending categories are consumer spending (see ■ ), private investment (gross spending on capital goods) and changes in private inventories (see ■ ), government spending and investment (see ■ ), and net exports (see ■ ) which is measured as foreign spending on US goods and services less US spending on goods and services produced by the rest of the world.


### Real GDP Growth by Expenditure Type



The **production approach** calculates GDP as the sum of gross value added-output minus inputs-in each sector. This identifies contributions from: goods-producing sectors combined with trade, transportation, and utilities (see ), finance, insurance, and real estate (see ), other service-providing sectors (see ), and government (see ).


### Real GDP Growth by Industry Group

percentage point contribution to GDP growth



The **income approach** calculates GDP as the sum of market income to persons (in exchange for labor (see  $\blacksquare$ ) or from returns on capital (see  $\blacksquare$ )), indirect taxes such as sales taxes or tariffs (see  $\blacksquare$ ), and depreciation (see  $\blacksquare$ ).


#### Real Gross Domestic Income Growth



Changes to GDP can be assigned to changes in **household inputs**: population (see ■), employment rates (see ■), average hours worked (see ■), and total economy productivity (see ■).

### **Real GDP Growth by Inputs**

percentage point contribution to GDP growth



**Components of Economic Growth** 

	Components of Economic Growth  percentage point contribution to real GDP/GDI growth moving averages										
p 0.00.	reage point contribution to roa.	2019	'19	'19	'19	'18	3-	10-	30-		
		Q4	Q3	Q2	Q1	Q4	year	year	year		
	Gross Domestic Product	2.1	2.1	2.0	3.1	1.1	2.5	2.3	2.5		
	Consumer Spending	1.17	2.12	3.03	0.78	0.97	1.84	1.64	1.81		
	Durable Goods	0.18	0.56	0.87	0.02	0.09	0.41	0.41	0.42		
	Non-durable Goods	-0.04	0.53	0.87	0.30	0.24	0.40	0.32	0.33		
	Services	1.03	1.02	1.29	0.46	0.65	1.04	0.91	1.06		
	Gross Investment	-1.06	-0.17	-1.16	1.09	0.53	0.54	0.91	0.59		
	Non-residential	-0.31	-0.31	-0.14	0.60	0.64	0.45	0.61	0.52		
	Residential	0.22	0.17	-0.11	-0.04	-0.18	0.03	0.12	0.03		
	Change in inventories	-0.98	-0.03	-0.91	0.53	0.07	0.05	0.18	0.04		
	Government	0.46	0.30	0.82	0.50	-0.07	0.30	-0.01	0.23		
	Federal	0.25	0.22	0.53	0.14	0.07	0.18	-0.01	0.07		
	State and Local	0.21	0.08	0.29	0.36	-0.14	0.12	-0.00	0.16		
	Net Exports	1.53	-0.14	-0.68	0.73	-0.35	-0.18	-0.21	-0.15		
	Exports	0.24	0.11	-0.69	0.49	0.18	0.21	0.44	0.49		
	Imports	1.29	-0.26	0.01	0.23	-0.53	-0.38	-0.65	-0.65		
	Goods and TTU	-	0.87	0.20	0.48	0.73	0.84	0.79	0.90		
	Manufacturing	-	0.47	0.05	-0.40	0.25	0.27	0.22	0.33		
	Construction	-	-0.09	-0.01	0.16	-0.14	0.06	0.05	-0.01		
	Retail Trade	-	0.43	0.01	0.46	-0.14	0.20	0.14	0.19		
•	FIRE	-	-0.31	0.51	1.55	-0.54	0.30	0.35	0.48		
	Other Services	-	1.49	0.93	1.24	0.92	1.25	1.04	0.89		
	Education & Healthcare	-	0.28	0.06	0.37	0.24	0.20	0.18	0.19		
	Professional & Business	-	0.68	0.78	0.85	0.31	0.61	0.47	0.35		
	Information	-	0.29	0.22	0.08	0.25	0.32	0.27	0.25		
	Government	-	0.01	0.37	-0.19	-0.02	0.10	0.02	0.10		
	Population	0.56	0.57	0.43	0.40	0.54	0.55	0.68	0.96		
	Employment Rate	1.41	2.53	-0.36	0.29	1.17	0.90	0.60	0.06		
	Average Hours	0.73	0.98	0.56	-0.14	-0.21	0.38	0.35	0.03		
	Productivity	-0.62	-1.97	1.39	2.55	-0.41	0.68	0.71	1.43		
(	Gross Domestic Income	-	1.2	0.9	3.2	0.8	2.2	2.4	2.5		
	Labor	-	0.13	0.15	4.41	0.28	1.34	1.13	1.28		
	Profit	_	0.60	0.14	-1.95	-0.11	0.21	0.78	0.65		
	Depreciation	_	0.47	0.43	0.73	0.53	0.46	0.33	0.42		
	Indirect Taxes	_	0.03	0.16	0.06	0.07	0.16	0.15	0.17		

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Author's Calculations

### **Real GDP Growth by State**

percentage point change in real GDP



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

\*For the year ending 2019 Q3, no states had real GDP growth of more than five percent, 22 states had real GDP growth between two and five percent, 27 states had less than two percent GDP growth, and two states had negative GDP growth.

Real GDP Growth by State

quarterly growth at seasonally adjusted annualized rate total growth, 2019 Q								9 Q3
	2019 Q3	'19 Q2	'19 Q1	'18 Q4	'18 Q3	1-year*	3-year	10-year
United States	2.9	1.1	3.1	2.0	2.1	2.1	8.4	26.3
Pacific	2.6	2.7	3.0	2.1	2.2	2.5	12.9	37.5
Washington	6.0	1.2	5.0	3.2	3.1	3.1	17.0	43.4
California	1.8	3.0	2.8	1.9	2.1	2.4	12.6	38.4
Oregon	4.3	2.7	2.9	2.0	1.8	2.4	11.2	34.1
Hawaii	8.0	1.8	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.7	6.0	20.7
Alaska	3.6	2.5	1.8	4.1	2.4	2.7	3.7	-3.3
West South Central	3.3	3.5	4.3	4.1	3.6	3.9	10.9	34.3
Texas	4.0	3.9	5.3	4.7	4.0	4.5	12.8	42.5
Oklahoma	1.1	3.8	2.6	2.7	1.9	2.7	6.0	27.2
Arkansas	0.9	1.3	1.6	1.8	2.9	1.9	4.4	18.8
Louisiana	1.7	1.2	-0.0	1.7	2.9	1.4	5.7	2.0
Mountain	3.7	2.9	4.0	3.0	2.5	3.1	11.4	27.0
Utah	2.8	1.7	7.0	3.0	3.2	3.7	13.3	37.1
Colorado	3.0	2.2	5.5	2.9	2.6	3.3	12.8	36.2
Idaho	2.9	4.4	2.1	2.4	2.5	2.8	11.2	28.4
Arizona	5.4	2.3	3.2	2.9	2.4	2.7	11.8	26.8
Nevada	3.7	5.8	1.0	2.6	2.3	2.9	12.2	21.6
Montana	2.3	4.2	-0.5	2.5	2.3	2.1	7.9	21.1
New Mexico	4.2	3.3	4.1	4.1	2.6	3.5	6.6	11.7
continued on next page								

	2019 Q3	'19 Q2	'19 Q1	'18 Q4	'18 Q3	1-year*	3-year	10-year
continued from previous	page							
Wyoming	1.8	3.5	5.6	4.2	1.3	3.6	3.7	-5.4
South Atlantic	3.6	1.0	2.8	1.7	1.9	1.8	8.1	21.7
South Carolina	3.6	3.8	3.5	1.8	2.0	2.8	9.8	29.0
Georgia	5.0	1.2	1.5	1.1	2.3	1.5	9.0	26.9
Florida	4.6	0.6	4.7	2.0	2.4	2.4	10.5	26.2
North Carolina	1.2	1.7	3.3	1.6	2.0	2.1	7.8	20.3
Maryland	0.7	0.9	1.8	1.5	1.0	1.3	5.1	19.6
District of Columbia	4.6	-0.0	1.1	2.1	1.4	1.2	5.5	18.3
Virginia	3.7	0.5	2.0	1.9	1.6	1.5	7.0	14.7
West Virginia	6.0	-0.1	-2.2	1.7	0.5	-0.0	4.9	6.9
Delaware	5.5	-2.6	0.5	1.8	-0.0	-0.1	-0.0	3.9
West North Central	2.0	-0.1	0.9	1.9	2.0	1.2	5.6	20.0
North Dakota	6.0	0.2	2.2	1.8	1.1	1.3	6.8	56.6
Minnesota	4.1	0.2	-0.4	2.0	2.0	0.9	7.3	24.0
Nebraska	-3.1	2.2	-0.5	2.4	2.3	1.6	4.5	24.0
lowa	1.0	-2.0	2.0	1.1	1.3	0.6	3.6	20.9
South Dakota	3.8	-0.4	-1.6	1.7	1.8	0.4	3.4	18.3
Kansas	1.6	-0.3	-1.1	2.2	2.2	0.7	4.5	18.0
Missouri	1.3	0.1	3.3	2.0	2.4	2.0	6.0	10.5
East North Central	3.1	-0.2	1.4	1.1	1.6	1.0	5.2	20.0
Michigan	2.0	-1.1	0.1	1.1	1.3	0.4	4.7	25.4
Ohio	3.9	-0.5	2.3	1.3	1.7	1.2	5.6	21.8
Indiana	2.2	0.2	-0.2	1.0	2.3	0.8	5.5	21.6
Wisconsin	2.2	1.4	1.1	1.1	1.5	1.3	5.5	19.8
Illinois	3.9	-0.0	2.2	1.1	1.4	1.2	4.8	15.2
Middle Atlantic	2.2	-1.2	4.5	1.5	1.3	1.5	5.2	18.2
Pennsylvania	3.2	0.4	3.3	1.7	2.1	1.9	6.0	21.6
New York	1.7	-2.6	6.0	1.7	0.5	1.4	4.9	19.4
New Jersey	2.2	0.5	2.1	0.7	2.3	1.4	5.0	11.5
East South Central	3.0	0.5	2.0	1.5	2.0	1.5	6.2	18.0
Tennessee	5.0	-1.2	3.3	1.3	2.4	1.4	8.2	26.5
Kentucky	1.3	1.5	0.1	1.0	1.5	1.0	4.0	16.2
Alabama	2.9	2.7	2.2	1.8	1.7	2.1	6.4	14.4
Mississippi	0.2	0.0	1.0	2.3	1.9	1.3	3.8	4.8
New England	2.4	0.1	4.8	1.3	2.1	2.1	6.4	17.2
Massachusetts	2.0	1.2	4.4	1.5	2.2	2.3	8.8	28.1
New Hampshire	2.3	-2.2	8.6	1.4	2.2	2.4	7.1	22.8
Vermont	0.3	1.1	5.7	1.3	1.8	2.5	4.2	14.3
Maine	2.8	-1.8	4.8	0.6	2.1	1.4	6.4	11.0
Rhode Island	-3.0	5.9	4.8	1.5	1.6	3.4	3.8	10.3
Connecticut	4.6	-2.4	4.3	1.0	2.1	1.2	2.5	0.9

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

# **Financial Accounts**


The Federal Reserve reports the balances and transactions in the US financial accounts. This includes the flow of funds between sectors in the economy and the various components of balance sheets by sector, such as for households, businesses, and government. The sector-specific data are covered in the section of the chartbook that corresponds to the sector, however, the overall financial activities of the US are discussed in this section.

### **Sectoral Balances**

A high-level overview of US financial activities can be provided by dividing the world economy into three sectors: the US private sector (see ■), the US government (see ■), and the rest of the world (see ■), then examining the net lending and borrowing between the groups, which must sum to zero at an aggregate level. That is, if one sector is running a deficit, another sector must be running a surplus.

#### Sectoral Financial Balance

net lending (+) or borrowing (-), NIPA basis, by sector, as share of GDP




In 2019 Q3, the US private sector was a net lender (running a surplus) of the equivalent of 5.1 percent of GDP, compared to 2.3 percent in 2015 Q1. The rest of the world was a net lender to the US, to the equivalent of 2.4 percent of GDP in 2019 Q3 compared to 2.4 percent in 2015 Q1. Balancing these transactions, the government (federal, state, and local combined) was a net borrower (running a deficit) of the equivalent of 7.4 percent of GDP, compared to 4.7 percent in 2015.

Within the private sector, households were net lenders of the equivalent of 4.5 percent of GDP in 2019 Q3, while the net financial balance of private businesses-corporate and noncorporate-was 0.5 percent of GDP.

### **Domestic Private Sector Financial Balance**

net lending (+) or borrowing (-), NIPA basis, by sector, as share of GDP




### Liabilities

The contribution of different sectors to the **total change in borrowing** can identify potential risks in the domestic economy. For example, the tech bubble of the late 1990s and early 2000s shows up as a large increase in corporate borrowing. The housing bubble from the 1990s to 2007 shows up as an increase in household borrowing. Government borrowing increased following the collapse of the housing bubble, in an effort to compensate for the massive fall in wage income. Keep in mind, however, that the vast majority of liabilities in the domestic economy are to other domestic parties.

Domestic liabilities increased by 4.4 percent over the year ending 2019 Q4, after adjusting for inflation. Over the past three years, total domestic liabilities increased at an average annual rate of 3.0 percent. The federal government contributed 0.8 percentage points per year on average (see ), while the state and local government subtracted 0.1 percentage points per year on average (see ). Households and nonprofits contributed 0.3 percentage points per year on average over this three year period (see ), corporate businesses contributed 1.5 percentage points per year on average (see ) and non-corporate businesses contributed 0.5 percentage points per year on average (see ).

#### **Real Debt Growth**



### **Real Debt Growth**

contribution to one-year real grow	th					movi	ing aver	ages
	2019 Q4	'19 Q3	'19 Q2	'19 Q1	'18 Q4	3- year	10- year	30- year
Total	4.37	3.86	4.03	3.99	1.89	3.11	3.10	3.89
Corporate Business	2.90	1.77	2.27	1.93	-0.32	1.57	1.48	1.32
Debt Securities	0.21	0.26	0.21	0.13	0.03	0.19	0.33	0.32
Loans	0.20	0.23	0.25	0.64	0.53	0.32	-0.01	0.07
■ Non-corporate Business	0.46	0.56	0.50	0.58	0.48	0.51	0.24	0.39
Commercial Mortgages	0.10	0.09	0.05	0.08	0.06	0.08	0.04	0.06
Household & Nonprofit	0.41	0.33	0.34	0.31	0.24	0.32	-0.10	0.88
Home Mortgages	0.19	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.10	0.12	-0.30	0.60
Consumer Credit	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.18	0.14	0.17	0.15	0.20
State & Local Government	-0.52	0.06	-0.05	0.10	0.35	-0.12	0.13	0.40
Federal Government	1.12	1.13	0.97	1.07	1.13	0.82	1.36	0.91

Source: Federal Reserve, Bureau of Economic Analysis

### Wealth

Total US wealth is the tangible assets of all non-corporate sectors of the US, plus the market value of domestic corporate equities, less US financial obligations to the rest of the world. The ratio of US total wealth, excluding public lands, to GDP increased to 4.82 in 2019 Q4 from 3.65 in 1989 Q1. The market value of corporate equities (see ■) increased to a 2.09 multiple of GDP in 2019 Q4 from 0.56 in 1989 Q1. The market value of residential real estate (see ■) increased to 1.51 times GDP from 1.33 in 1989. The other category (see ■), which includes tangible assets other than residential real estate less US financial obligations to the rest of the world, decreased to 1.22 from 1.76 in 1989.

### **Total US Wealth to GDP Ratio**




### **Investment**

Private fixed investment, as measured in the national accounts, includes construction and improvement of houses, apartment buildings, and other residential property (see ■), but not automobiles, appliances, or furniture. Non-residential private fixed investment includes the construction and improvement of offices, warehouses, factories, and other commercial and industrial property (see ■), as well as purchases of equipment and intellectual property products. The change in private inventories (see ■) at the end of the accounting period, whether intentional or unintentional, affects GDP growth in the period. Inventory investment is grouped in the national accounts with gross private investment, but is not fixed investment.

In the fourth quarter of 2019, private fixed investment, which does not include inventory investment, totals \$3.7 trillion, equivalent to 16.9 percent of GDP. Non-residential (business) fixed investment totals \$2.9 trillion, or 13.2 percent of GDP, while residential fixed investment totals \$817.6 billion (3.8 percent of GDP). During the quarter, private fixed investment subtracted 0.09 percentage points from real GDP growth. Non-residential fixed investment subtracted 0.31 percentage points, while residential fixed investment contributed 0.22 percentage points. The change in private inventories subtracted 0.98 percentage points.

### **Private Fixed Investment**



# Households

This section covers the household sector of the economy loosely defined, and touches on demographics, personal income and outlays, residential fixed investment, household balance sheets, home ownership, housing prices, and housing construction and permitting.

### **Demographics and Household Formation**

The **total US population** is 329 million. The Census divides the population into those living in households (about 97 percent of the total) and those living in **group quarters**, such as prisons (1.5 million people), jails (750,000 people, of which 480,000 are pre-trial), nursing homes (1.3 million people), barracks (around 300,000), dormitories (around 2.6 million), group homes (300,000), and shelters (200,000). The numbers for group quarters populations are likely low estimates, as they are derived from older sources than the population estimate. The 2020 Census will provide detailed information on the exact share of each population in each category of living arrangement.

Among those living in **households**, roughly 74 million are children under the age of 18, 198 million are age 18 to 64, and 53 million are age 65 or older. These numbers and the group quarters populations do not sum to the total population because of differences in sources as well as some overlap between the two categories, particularly for those in school dormitories.

### Age

In discussions on demographics, **aging** is often described as a serious headwind to economic growth in major advanced economies. The increased share of many countries' population that is of retirement age means a smaller share are working and borrowing and a larger share are receiving pension benefits and lending to the financial system. These trends can be overcome by a workforce that is more efficiently able to provide goods and services. In part due to a shorter life-expectancy in the US, this problem is more pronounced in Japan and western Europe, but is still a important issue for the US.



The CPS civilian non-institutionalized population is 324 million in the year ending January 2020, with growth of 0.3 percent over the past year, though other Census population growth estimates are around 0.6 percent. By age, 22.7 percent are under the age of 18 and 16.4 percent are age 65 or older. In 1989, the US population was 244 million, with 26.3 percent under 18 and 12.0 percent 65 or older. The pre-retirement age (45–64) share of the population has increased to 25.5 percent in the year ending January 2020 from 18.9 percent in 1989.

Mapping American Community Survey data to commuter zones gives insight on the age of the population in local labor markets. In 2018, among commuter zones with a population of at least 100,000, the commuter zone (listed by largest city) with the highest share of its population under 18 is Provo, UT (33.1 percent), followed by Laredo, TX (32.6 percent), and Brownsville, TX (31.6 percent). The commuter zones with lowest share of the local population under 18 were Sarasota, FL (15.6 percent), Ocala, FL (16.7 percent), and State College, PA (17.1 percent).

The age 65 or older population is disproportionately concentrated in Florida. The commuter zone with the highest share of its population over 64 is Sarasota, FL (33.4 percent), followed by Ocala, FL (32.8 percent), and Cape Coral, FL (29.9 percent). The commuter zones with lowest local over 64 population share were Provo, UT (8.3 percent), Laredo, TX (9.7 percent), and Odessa, TX (10.4 percent).

#### Age Group Share of Commuter Zone Population, 2018




#### **Household Formation**

Household formation, measured here as the one-year change in total occupied housing units, can result from a net increase in renters or a net increase in homeowners. Household formation should keep pace with population growth, all else equal. During the housing bubble, the home-ownership rate increased and household formation exceeded population growth. Following the collapse of the housing bubble, housing formation was often below population growth. Additionally, home ownership decreased as foreclosures converted homeowners into renters.

As of 2019 Q4, there are 124.0 million total occupied housing units in the US, of which 43.3 million (34.9 percent) are rented, and 80.7 million (65.1 percent) are owneroccupied. There was an average annual net total increase of 1.4 million housing units over the year ending 2019 Q4, the result of 298 thousand net new renter households and 1.1 million net new owner-occupied households. Over the year ending 2019 Q4, the total number of occupied housing units increased by 1.1 percent, compared to an increase of 1.2 percent in 2019 Q3. Owner-occupied units contributed 0.9 percent to total household formation on average over the year (see ], compared to a a contribution of 0.2 percent from rented units (see ■).

### **Household Formation by Type**

92



'04 '06 60% 10 12

118

'20

'02

### Homeownership

The homeownership rate measures the percent of housing units that are owner-occupied, as opposed to rented. In 2004, near to the peak of the housing bubble, the overall homeownership rate reached 69.2 percent. As of 2019 Q4, the Census Bureau reports a rate of home-ownership of 65.1 percent (see —). Over the past three years, the overall US homeownership rate increased by a total of 1.4 percentage points.

### Homeownership Rate



As seen during the collapse of the housing bubble, it is possible for a "homeowner" to have little or no equity in their home, for example if the market price of the home falls below the principal remaining on the mortgage. Trends in **owner's equity as a share of the market value of real estate** show substantial improvement since the lows following the collapse of the housing bubble, when millions of homes were in foreclosure. As of 2019 Q4, the Federal Reserve reports an owner equity share of real estate (see —) of 63.8 percent. Over the past three years, the share increased by a total of 2.9 percentage points.

### Owner's Equity Share of Real Estate



#### **Education**

Education is central in many discussions of the future of the US economy. Though very expensive in forgone years of earnings and often also expensive in tuition and textbooks costs, education typically results in higher earnings. In response to changing job opportunities from globalization and other policy decisions, household spending on education has increased considerably, resulting in a much more educated population.

Over the year ending February 2020, 80.2 million people over the age of 25, or 36.2 percent of the total, have at least a bachelor's degree, with 29.9 million of those, or 13.5 percent of the total, holding an advanced degree such as a master's degree, medical or law degree, or PhD. An additional 57.6 million people have some college coursework but no degree or have an associate degree. A total of 62.4 million have a high school diploma but no college, while 21.4 million have no high school diploma.




The share of the population with a bachelor's degree or advanced degree increased by 10.3 percentage points since 2000. The increase is even more pronounced among those who are employed; 41.9 percent have a college degree or advanced degree in February 2020, an increase of 10.9 percentage points since 2000. One argument is that households were compensating for a weak labor market and lack of bargaining power by borrowing large sums of money for education. However, given the extent of the increase in education, and the typical wage premium of education, labor income should have increased much more than it actually did.



### **Income to Persons**

This section looks at **income received by people**, by type of income, adjusted for inflation using the PCE implicit price deflator. Income is divided into labor income (see ■), which is measured as compensation of employees, capital income (see ■), measured as the sum of proprietor income, rental income, and dividend and interest income, and welfare income (see ■), which is measured as transfers to persons less contributions to social insurance.

#### **Personal Income**



Aggregate real personal income increased at an annualized rate of 1.71 percent in 2019 Q4. Labor income contributed 1.45 percentage points to overall growth, capital income contributed 0.12 percentage points, and welfare income contributed 0.14 percentage points.

### **Personal Income by Source**

percentage point contribution to real personal income growth						movi	ng aver	ages
	2019 Q4	'19 Q3	'19 Q2	'19 Q1	'18 Q4	3- year	10- year	30- year
Personal income	1.71	1.13	2.01	5.75	2.13	3.00	2.93	2.75
Labor	1.45	0.27	0.30	5.38	0.60	1.72	1.51	1.57
Wages and salaries	1.18	0.03	0.17	4.80	0.41	1.43	1.27	1.26
Supplements	0.27	0.23	0.13	0.58	0.19	0.28	0.23	0.31
Capital	0.12	0.30	1.13	-1.18	1.35	1.02	1.20	0.79
Proprietors' income	0.11	0.96	0.05	-0.11	0.65	0.32	0.39	0.30
Rental income	0.14	-0.01	0.12	0.05	-0.08	0.12	0.25	0.20
Personal interest income	-0.16	-0.87	0.90	-0.67	0.05	0.31	0.11	0.04
Personal dividend income	0.03	0.22	0.06	-0.46	0.72	0.27	0.45	0.26
Welfare	0.14	0.56	0.58	1.56	0.18	0.27	0.23	0.39
Social security	0.14	0.07	0.03	0.83	0.13	0.17	0.16	0.16
Medicare	0.24	0.29	0.31	0.44	0.35	0.21	0.14	0.16
Medicaid	-0.11	0.22	0.38	0.27	-0.16	0.07	0.12	0.14
Unemployment insurance	0.00	-0.00	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.09	0.00
Veterans' benefits	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.02
Less welfare contributions	-0.15	0.01	-0.01	-0.85	-0.04	-0.21	-0.17	-0.19

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Earnings, which include wages and salaries as well as self-employment income, comprise the majority of personal income. Yet only 52 percent of people have any earnings in 2018 (see ■). Only 43 percent of people have earnings above the single-person poverty threshold.

Total income, including taxes, welfare, and capital income, reaches 71 percent of people (see ■). The remainder live with people with income or receive private transfers. Values of high-earners are not show because of space constraints. The top one percent income threshold is around \$420,000, which would overflow the page at the current scale.

### Distribution of Personal Income, 2018

thousands of US Dollars, by percentile



### **Household Income**

### Real Median Household Income

thousands of US dollars




Source: Economic Policy Institute, Census

Black median household income in 2018 was \$41,692, compared to an inflation adjusted equivalent of \$40,963 in 2017. White, non-Hispanic median household income was \$70,462 compared to \$69,851 in 2017. Hispanic median household income in 2018 was \$51,450 compared to \$51.390 in 2017. Asian median household income was \$87.194 in 2018 and \$83,376 in 2017. Data for 2000-2013, shown with dashed lines, are calculated by EPI, to be more-comparable over time despite changes to the survey design in 2013 and to the processing of survey data in 2017.

### **Household Expenditures**

This section covers household spending on goods (see ■), services excluding housing and utilities (see ■), and shelter (see ■, calculated as housing services and utilities combined with residential fixed investment). These categories contributed 1.05 percentage points to GDP growth in 2019 Q4 compared to an average contribution of 1.82 percentage points over the past three years.

### **Consumer Spending and Residential Investment**



In the fourth quarter of 2019, household spending on goods contributed 0.14 percentage points to GDP growth, household spending on services other than housing and utilities contributed 0.88 percentage points, and shelter spending and investment contributed 0.25 percentage points. Spending on health care services contributed 0.44 percentage points to GDP growth in 2019 Q4 and has contributed 0.34 percentage points, on average, over the past three years.

### **Consumer Spending and Residential Investment**

ре	percentage point contribution to real GDP growth moving averages									
		2019 Q4	'19 Q3	'19 Q2	'19 Q1	'18 Q4	3- year	10- year	30- year	
	Total	1.05	2.14	3.00	1.32	0.56	1.82	1.58	1.72	
	Goods	0.14	1.09	1.74	0.32	0.33	0.80	0.73	0.75	
	Motor Vehicles and Parts	0.13	0.06	0.37	-0.27	0.07	0.09	0.10	0.08	
	Furniture and HH Equipment	0.02	0.10	0.14	0.03	-0.09	0.09	0.10	80.0	
	Recreational Durable Goods	0.03	0.31	0.32	0.23	0.04	0.17	0.17	0.21	
	Groceries	-0.04	0.26	0.25	-0.08	0.07	0.13	0.09	0.08	
	Clothes and Shoes	0.09	-0.04	0.25	-0.07	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.07	
	Services (ex. Shelter)	0.88	0.76	1.12	0.99	0.12	0.90	0.71	0.74	
	Health Care Services	0.44	0.07	0.38	0.72	-0.22	0.34	0.29	0.27	
	Transportation	0.00	0.10	0.17	0.01	-0.02	0.06	0.07	0.06	
	Recreational	0.07	0.00	0.17	-0.03	0.09	0.05	0.06	0.07	
	Food and Accommodations	0.06	0.16	0.22	-0.06	-0.12	0.13	0.12	0.09	
	Financial and Insurance	0.14	0.12	0.05	0.15	0.10	0.09	0.04	0.13	
	Shelter	0.25	0.45	0.03	-0.03	-0.06	0.15	0.27	0.26	
	Housing Services and Utilities	0.03	0.28	0.14	0.01	0.12	0.11	0.15	0.23	
	Residential Fixed Investment	0.22	0.17	-0.11	-0.04	-0.18	0.03	0.12	0.03	

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Consumer spending is also reported on a monthly basis. Inflation- and population-adjusted consumer spending increased by 2.2 percent over the year ending January 2020 (see —), compared to an equivalent increase of 1.9 percent for the year ending January 2019.


### **Consumer Spending Growth**



Changes to consumer spending (see —) are largely the result of changes to income (see ■) and changes to the rate at which income is saved (see ■). Changes to other outlays (see ■) reflect changes in interest payments, fines and fees, and charitable giving.


Real per capita consumer spending increased at an average rate of 2.1 percent over the four quarters ending 2019 Q4. Changes to disposable income added 2.2 percentage points, changes to saving didn't affect the total, and changes to other outlays didn't affect the total. Over the past three years, real per capita consumer spending growth has averaged 2.2 percent, with income growth contribuing an average of 3.0 percentage points and saving subtracting an average of 0.7 percentage points.

### **Contributions to Consumer Spending**



### **Consumer Sentiment**

The University of Michigan conducts a regular monthly survey used to gauge individuals' consumer sentiment. The measure is based on questions related to personal finances, business conditions, and buying conditions. An increase in consumer sentiment means individuals feel more confident about economic conditions and are more willing to make large purchases or take on debt. As of February 2020, the latest value of the consumer sentiment index is 101.0, compared to 99.8 in January 2020 and 93.8 in February 2019.



#### **Household Balance Sheets**


#### Liabilities

The Federal Reserve reports total liabilities of households and nonprofits of \$16.58 trillion in 2019 Q4. The vast majority-\$10.61 trillion or 64.0 percent of the total–are home mortgages (see ■). Consumer credit liabilities (see ■) which include auto loans, credit card debt, student loans, and other personal loans, total \$4.19 trillion (25.3% of the total). The remaining liabilities (see ■) are primarily attributable to nonprofits.

The ratio of household and nonprofit debt to disposable personal income has fallen to 99.7 percent in 2019 Q4 from its housing-bubble peak of 136.0 percent in 2007 Q4. Over the past three years, nominal household and nonprofit debt has increased 10.7 percent while nominal disposable personal income has increased 15.8 percent. As a result, the ratio of household and nonprofit debt to disposable personal income has fallen by 4.6 percentage points.

### **Household and Nonprofit Debt**


by type, as share of disposable personal income



Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) analysis of Equifax data shows \$14.145 trillion in total consumer debt in 2019 Q4, which is equivalent to 85.1 percent of disposable personal income. Over the past three years, total consumer debt has increased by \$1.57 trillion compared to an increase of \$2.27 trillion in disposable personal income. As a result, the ratio of total consumer debt to disposable personal income has fallen by 2.5 percentage points over this period.

### **Mortgages and Consumer Credit**

share of disposable personal income, percent



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York and Bureau of Economic Analysis

Trends in **household debt** over the past three years, measured in both the US Financial Accounts and the New York Fed Consumer Credit Panel, show consumer credit growing in line with income while mortgage debt falls relative to income. The two series below, Mortgage Debt Total and Consumer Credit, are comparable between both data sources. Discrepancies arise because the Financial Accounts include debt of nonprofit institutions and the Consumer Credit Panel does not include persons without a social security number.

According to the same FRBNY data, mortgage debt, including home equity lines of credit, totalled \$9,947 billion in 2019 Q4, equivalent to 59.8 percent of disposable personal income (DPI). Student loans totalled \$1,508 billion, or 9.1 percent of DPI; auto loans totalled \$1,331 billion (8.0 percent of DPI); and credit card debt totalled \$927 billion (5.6 percent of DPI).

Over the past three years, the ratio of total mortgage debt to disposable personal income fell by 2.5 percentage points, compared to a decrease of 0.1 percentage points for student loans, a decrease of 0.1 percentage points for auto loans, and an increase of 0.1 percentage points for credit card debt

### **Household Debt Outstanding**

tr	illions of US Dollars	_		share o	of dispo	sable pei	rsonal in	come
		2019 Q4	2019 Q3	'19 Q4	'19 Q3	'16 Q4	'13 Q1	'03 Q1
	Financial Accounts Total*	\$16.58T	\$16.39T	99.7	99.3	104.3	112.3	108.5
	Mortgage Debt Total	\$10.61T	\$10.52T	63.8	63.8	68.0	77.1	74.8
	Consumer Credit	\$4.19T	\$4.13T	25.2	25.0	25.4	23.6	24.0
	Other	\$1.78T	\$1.74T	10.7	10.5	10.9	11.7	9.7
	Consumer Credit Panel Total	\$14.14T	\$13.95T	85.1	84.5	87.6	90.9	87.2
	Mortgage Debt Total	\$9.95T	\$9.83T	59.8	59.6	62.4	68.7	62.5
	Mortgage	\$9.56T	\$9.44T	57.5	57.2	59.1	64.2	59.6
	Home Equity Revolving	\$0.39T	\$0.40T	2.3	2.4	3.3	4.5	2.9
	Consumer Credit	\$4.20T	\$4.12T	25.3	25.0	25.2	22.2	24.7
	Auto Loan	\$1.33T	\$1.31T	8.0	8.0	8.1	6.4	7.7
	Credit Card	\$0.93T	\$0.88T	5.6	5.3	5.4	5.3	8.3
	Student Loan	\$1.51T	\$1.50T	9.1	9.1	9.1	8.0	2.9
	Other	\$0.43T	\$0.42T	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.5	5.8

Source: Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bureau of Economic Analysis


#### **Assets**

Assets of households and nonprofits were valued at \$134.9 trillion in 2019 Q4, equivalent to 621 percent-or 6.21 years-of GDP. Of this, \$39.3 trillion, or 29.1 percent of the total, are tangible assets and \$95.6 trillion, or 70.9 percent, are financial assets.

Tangible, or non-financial, assets include peoples' homes as well as consumer durable goods, such as cars, furniture, and appliances. The market value of owner-occupied real estate is \$29.3 trillion in 2019 Q4, equivalent to 1.35 years of GDP (see ■). Consumer durable goods have a replacement value of \$5.8 trillion, or 0.26 years of GDP. Tangible assets are reported for the combined household and nonprofit sector and include real estate and equipment belonging to nonprofits, which totals \$4.3 trillion in 2019 Q4.


Financial assets include equity in businesses-corporate and non-coporate-with a market value of \$47.7 trillion, or 2.20 years of GDP (see ■), in 2019 Q4. Debt securities and loan assets total \$11.8 trillion, or 0.54 years of GDP (see ■). Cash and deposits, including money market accounts, total \$13.6 trillion, or 0.63 years of GDP (see ■). All other financial assets total \$22.5 trillion.

### Selected Household and Nonprofit Assets



Household and nonprofit assets grew by 8.0 percent over the year ending 2019 Q4. Owner-occupied real estate contributed 0.4 percentage points to total growth, and business equity contributed 5.7 percentage points.

### Contributions to Real Growth in Household and Nonprofit Assets



### **Household and Nonprofit Assets**


vario	us measures:	trillions of USD	share	of GDP	real g	real growth rate		
		2019 Q4	2019 Q4	2018 Q4	One- year	Three- year	20- year	
	Total Assets	\$134.9	621.1	589.8	8.0	4.6	3.2	
	Non-financial assets	39.3	181.0	181.2	2.4	3.5	2.9	
•	Owner-occupied real estate	29.3	135.0	135.8	1.9	3.8	3.1	
	Consumer durable goods	5.8	26.5	26.4	2.8	2.0	1.5	
	Nonprofit assets	4.3	19.6	19.0	5.9	4.3	4.1	
	Financial assets	95.6	440.1	408.6	10.4	5.0	3.4	
	Deposits, incl. money market	13.6	62.6	61.8	4.0	3.1	3.8	
	Debt securities and loans	11.8	54.4	51.5	8.2	5.3	4.3	
	Business equity	47.7	219.6	191.6	17.5	7.5	3.2	
	Corporate equities	34.2	157.2	130.6	23.4	8.8	3.1	
	Noncorporate business equi	ty 13.5	62.3	60.9	4.9	4.4	3.7	

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

#### **Return on Assets**

The increase in assets as a share of GDP also means that the return on total household assets has fallen, as measured by disposable income as a share of household assets. As of 2019 Q4, disposable income was equivalent to 12.3 percent of total assets (see –), compared to an average rate of 16.0 percent during the 1990s.

### **Return on Household Assets**



### **Net Worth**


The market value of assets of households has risen much faster than their total liabilities, causing a substantial increase in net worth. Net worth is an aggregate measure of the financial position of households, measured as total assets minus total liabilities. In 2019 Q4, household and nonprofit institution net worth was \$118.4 trillion, equivalent to 7.1 years of disposable personal income; the result of total assets of \$134.9 trillion and total liabilities of \$16.6 trillion.

In 2019 Q4, inflation-adjusted net worth increased by 8.9 percent (see ), while inflation adjusted after-tax income increased by 2.4 percent (see –). Over the past three years, real net worth grew at an average rate of 4.7 percent, while real after-tax income grew at an average rate of 3.1 percent

### Net Worth and After-Tax Income Growth




one-year percent change in net worth and after-tax income, adjusted by PCE price deflator



Net worth changes come from the revaluation of assets and from net investment of income. Changes to the value of assets, for example capital gains from an increase in the market value of corporate equities, explain most of the changes in net worth (see ). Each period households also receive income and decide investment, saving, and borrowing. Net investment equals capital expenditures less depreciation plus net lending/borrowing; positive net investment results in an increase in net worth. Since 1989, household net investment has averaged 10 percent of disposable personal income. Income that goes to net investment at this historical-average rate (see ) can be separated from periods where the rate of net investment is above or below this historical average (see ). This distinction can identify how changes in disposable personal income, and changes in decisions about how to use that income, combine to affect net worth. Changes in data sources or from natural disasters are also identified as other volume changes (see ).


Data are used in the following chart are not adjusted for changes in prices because it's not clear how to attribute changes in prices to holding gains, which *are* changes in prices.

### **Net Worth Growth**



In the the fourth quarter of 2019, holding gains contributed 8.6 percentage points to overall nominal net worth growth. Income net invested at the 1989-onward average 10.1 percent rate contributed 1.5 percentage points; and an additional 0.4 percentage points were added as household net investment was 12.4 percent of disposable person income in 2019 Q4. Other volume changes did not contribute significantly. Over the past three years, holding gains have contributed 4.9 percentage points on average; net investment (combined) has contributed 1.9 percentage points; and other volume changes did not contribute significantly.

### **Housing**




The Census Bureau tracks the issuance of new residential building permits, which offer insight into planned residential construction. In February 2020, a seasonally-adjusted annual total of 1,464,000 new residential building permits were issued. Permits issued decreased by 86,000 (-5.5 percent over the previous month, increased by 177,000 (13.8 percent) over last February, and increased by 333,000 (29.4 percent) total over the past five years.

#### **Residential Construction** building permits issued, in thousands 2,000 1.500 1.000 500 '96 '98 '00 '02 '04 '06 60% '10 '12 '14 '16 '20 Source: Census Bureau $\blacksquare$

The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) **housing price** index data look useful primarily because they offer geographic specificity. Look into ways to use these. Ideally, I want to know about the ratio of housing prices to rental equivalent. For now, the chart below is more or less a placeholder, though I may keep it or some variation.

#### **House Price Index**



### Saving

The portion of after-tax income that is not spent by households is considered **personal saving**, from an economic accounting perspective. Personal saving as a share of disposable personal income is referred to as the *personal saving rate*. Households use savings to handle unexpected expenses or cover expenses when income falls. However, economists also point out that aggregate personal saving is a direct reduction in corporate profits, as it represents income to persons that was at some point a business expense, but that does not get returned to businesses as revenue through consumer spending.

As of January 2020, the Bureau of Economic Analysis reports a rate of personal saving of 7.9 percent. Over the past three years, the personal saving rate increased by a total of 1.1 percentage points.

#### **Personal Saving Rate**



### **Poverty**

In 2018, income from labor and capital ownership, called *market income*, was below the Census Bureau threshold for poverty for 77.9 million people in the US. After-tax income, or disposable income, includes income from various government programs and tax credits, such as social security and the child tax credit, and subtracts taxes paid. By disposable income, **41.3 million people are in poverty**. In other words, government programs and tax credits moved the income of 36.6 million people above the poverty threshold.



The Census Bureau reports 41.2 million people in poverty in the US in 2018, equivalent to more than the total population of Canada. For purposes of program eligibility and economic data, poverty is defined by having income below a certain threshold. The processes for calculating poverty vary, with the official measure being based on three times a price-adjusted 1963 minimal food budget, and the supplemental measure based on food, shelter, clothing, and utilities costs and additionally capturing program benefits and taxes, along with other adjustments.

While some fully-employed people are in poverty, the vast majority of poor people are children, elderly, disabled, caregivers, and students. That is, there is often a good reason why poor people are not working. Put another way, if the missing labor income required to keep a person out of poverty is not supplied in the form of capital income or welfare income, the person will be poor.

### In Poverty Population by Category



The share of a group whose combined labor, capital, and welfare income is below the poverty line is the poverty rate for the group. In 2018, students, caregivers, and the disabled had the highest rates of poverty. Those fully-employed have a very low rate of poverty. The elderly also have a much lower poverty rate as the result of Social Security.

### **Poverty Rate by Category**



By age, market income (see ) leaves the elderly particularly vulnerable to poverty, as they are not as likely to have labor income. After social benefits and taxes (disposable income [see )), the elderly have much lower rates of poverty than other age cohorts. Higher survivorship for the wealthy also has the effect of reducing poverty in very old ages. Disposable income still leaves young adults and those just below social security and medicare age (late 50s and early 60s) vulnerable to poverty, relative to other ages.



Share of local population in bottom third of housing-adjusted income, 2018 Share of commuting zone householders with after-housing-expense annual income below \$13,573



Source: American Community Survey

The Census Bureau reports the number of people taken out of poverty by various government programs, along with how many people are put in poverty by various expenses. In 2018, Social Security lifted income above the poverty line for 27.2 million people, by far the most effective program for reducing poverty. Refundable tax credits, such as the earned income tax credit and child tax credit, lifted nine million people out of poverty. These tax credits are phased-in (not fully-refundable), meaning they do not reach the poorest of poor people. As a result, phased-in tax credits have more impact on the poverty headcount than on poverty, relative to programs designed to help the poorest of the poor.

In terms of elements that add to the number of people in poverty, medical expenses are the most significant, and cause the disposable income of eight million people to fall below the poverty line. Work expenses additionally put 5.7 million people in poverty.

## Effect of Individual Elements on Poverty Headcount

individual element effect on number of people in poverty, millions, 2018




# **Businesses**

The factories, offices, and equipment that workers use to produce goods and services are all important to the economy. This section looks at the loosely defined business sector, with data covering business investment, retail sales, industrial production, corporate profits, and the financial activities of businesses.

### **Fixed Investment**

When businesses purchase items with a useful life of more than one year it is considered an investment in fixed assets, which is an exchange of assets rather than an expense. Investments in fixed assets make workers more productive, as they allow businesses to produce goods and services per hour of work. Business investments in fixed assets are grouped broadly as structures (see ), equipment (see ), and intellectual property products (see ).

#### **Business Fixed Investment**



Business investment subtracted 0.31 percentage points from GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2019 compared to an average contribution of 0.45 percentage points over the past three years. In 2019 Q4, investment in structures subtracted 0.24 percentage points from GDP growth, investment in equipment subtracted 0.26 percentage points, and investment in intellectual property products contributed 0.19 percentage points.

#### **Business Investment**

percentage point contribution to real GDP growth moving averages									
		2019 Q4	'19 Q3	'19 Q2	'19 Q1	'18 Q4	3- year	10- year	30- year
Total		-0.31	-0.31	-0.14	0.60	0.64	0.45	0.61	0.52
Structures		-0.24	-0.30	-0.36	0.12	-0.29	-0.02	0.01	-0.00
Equipment		-0.26	-0.22	0.05	0.00	0.42	0.21	0.37	0.31
Information	on processing	0.02	-0.13	0.13	0.17	-0.04	0.12	0.14	0.21
Comput	ers and peripherals	0.14	-0.19	0.17	0.05	-0.04	0.04	0.03	0.11
Industrial	equipment	-0.16	0.08	0.02	-0.04	0.08	0.04	0.05	0.02
Transport	ation equipment	-0.03	-0.17	-0.14	-0.06	0.29	-0.00	0.13	0.05
■ Intellectual	property products	0.19	0.22	0.17	0.48	0.51	0.26	0.22	0.21
Software		0.10	0.18	0.11	0.26	0.19	0.16	0.13	0.12
Research	and development	0.08	0.01	0.06	0.21	0.29	0.08	0.08	0.07

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Productive business investments also show up as **new orders for core capital goods**. The category excludes the more-volatile aircraft orders as well as defense-related orders, and is derived from a Census Bureau survey of shipments, inventories, and orders.


New orders for manufactured core capital goods excluding aircraft totalled \$70 billion in January 2020, equivalent to 3.8 percent of GDP (see —). New orders increased by 0.9 percent over the past year.





The Energy Information Administration reports that US has seen a massive increase in **crude oil production** over the past six years. The infrastructure for much of this production was put in place when oil prices were higher, and the profitability of the sector depends on oil maintaining a certain price. A large portion of the increase in oil production comes from New Mexico, South Dakota, and Colorado.


### **Crude Oil Production**



## **Corporate Profits**


The national accounts include detailed information on aggregate corporate profits, which are an important determinant in the business cycle. In the fourth quarter of 2019, aggregate corporate profits were \$1.35 trillion, or nan percent of net national income. Of this, \$1.35 trillion, equivalent to nan percent of net national product, were paid out as dividends (see  $\blacksquare$ ), \$nan billion were retained (see  $\blacksquare$ ), and \$nan billion went to corporate income tax (see  $\blacksquare$ ).

#### **Destination of Corporate Profits**



Aggregate corporate savings (corporate profits less dividends and corporate profit tax) are the result of net investment and non-business saving. Investment (see 
output) is a source of aggregate profit because it is revenue for one party but not an expense for the other. Non-business saving, which includes household (see 
output), government (see 
output), and rest of world saving (see 
output), necessarily reduces aggregate corporate profits because it is money that did not return to businesses as revenue.


#### **Sources of Corporate Saving**



#### **Business Debt**

As of 2019 Q4, nonfinancial business debt-the debt security and loan liabilities of nonfinancial businesses-both corporate and non-corporate-totals \$16,058 billion, with \$10,117 billion (63.0%) held by corporate businesses. Over the past three years, nonfinancial business debt has increased faster than overall economic activity. As a share of GDP, nonfinancial business debt increased by 3.1 percentage points to 73.9 percent in 2019 Q4 from 70.8 percent in 2016 Q4. The vast majority of the increase, 2.7 percentage points, comes from nonbank loans (see ).


#### **Nonfinancial Business Debt**



The debt of the domestic financial sector includes agency and government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) backed securities (see ■), corporate and foreign bonds, loans (see ■), and open market paper. The long-term increase in financial sector debt reflects the emergence and growth of various asset-backed securities. In addition to home mortgage-backed securities, the domestic financial sector issues debt securities based on commercial mortgages, auto loans, credit card, student debt, and even restaurant revenue.

Domestic financial sector debt has fallen as a share of GDP to 76.9 percent in 2019 Q4 from a housing-bubble peak of 124.3 percent in 2009 Q1.


#### **Financial Sector Debt**



#### **Industrial Production**

Manufacturing production increased at an annual rate of 0.9 percent over the past three years, as of February 2020, but remains 4.7 percent below its December 2007 rate. Total industrial production increased at an annual rate of 2.2 percent over the same period. Mining production increased at an annual rate of 7.6 percent, while production of electric and gas utilities increased at an annual rate of 4.0 percent.

By market group, production of consumer goods increased at an annual rate of 1.2 percent over the past three years, as of February 2020. Production of business equipment increased at an annual rate of 1.7 percent, production of nonidustrial supplies increased at an annual rate of 1.1 percent, and production of materials increased at an annual rate of 3.3 percent.




#### **Industrial Production Growth**

	recentage point contribution to one-year growth of total index						moving averages			
		Feb 2020	Jan 2020	Dec 2019	1- year	3- year	10- year	30- year		
Total inde	ex	0.04	-1.02	-0.90	0.26	2.34	2.07	1.91		
Manufa	acturing	-0.30	-0.74	-1.00	-0.42	0.95	1.15	1.53		
Dural	ole manufacturing	-0.16	-0.43	-0.52	0.04	0.75	1.10	1.49		
Mot	or vehicles & parts	0.08	-0.02	-0.47	-0.10	0.04	0.36	0.24		
Nond	urable manufacturing	0.02	-0.18	-0.34	-0.32	0.34	0.20	0.17		
Mining		0.29	0.32	0.12	0.76	1.36	0.95	0.30		
Utilities	5	0.04	-0.56	-0.01	-0.13	0.12	0.06	0.13		
Consun	ner goods	0.05	-0.31	-0.38	-0.24	0.17	0.16	0.25		
Consu	umer durables	0.12	0.05	-0.25	-0.07	0.04	0.19	0.17		
Auto	omotive products	0.13	0.10	-0.19	-0.03	0.02	0.16	0.12		
Consu	umer nondurables	-0.07	-0.36	-0.12	-0.16	0.13	-0.01	0.11		
Foo	ds and tobacco	0.25	0.10	0.18	0.01	0.10	0.07	0.06		
Che	mical products	-0.18	-0.11	-0.13	-0.04	0.03	-0.06	0.05		
Con	sumer energy products	-0.01	-0.27	-0.09	-0.06	0.08	0.05	0.06		
Equipm	ent & nonindustrial supplies	-0.26	-0.54	-0.23	0.02	0.56	0.46	0.52		
Equip	ment	-0.33	-0.45	-0.14	0.05	0.38	0.27	0.36		
Indu	ıstrial equipment	-0.10	-0.14	-0.09	-0.04	0.10	0.09	0.04		
Nonir	ndustrial supplies	0.09	-0.07	-0.08	-0.03	0.18	0.21	0.18		
Con	struction supplies	0.11	0.04	-0.02	0.06	0.13	0.12	0.04		
Busi	iness supplies	-0.02	-0.11	-0.06	-0.09	0.06	0.09	0.14		
Materia	als	0.24	-0.17	-0.29	0.48	1.63	1.49	1.16		
Consu	umer parts	-0.11	-0.12	-0.26	-0.15	-0.02	0.14	0.10		
Equip	ment parts	-0.03	-0.01	0.05	0.08	0.15	0.25	0.66		
Chem	ical materials	-0.02	-0.01	-0.13	-0.04	0.17	0.07	0.05		
Energ	y materials	0.49	0.13	0.31	0.73	1.25	0.89	0.33		

Source: Federal Reserve


Market group data show the lack of growth in the production of consumer goods, equipment, and nonindustrial supplies over the past decade.

#### **Industrial Production Growth, Market Group**




Industry group data show a change in the composition of new industrial activity, towards mining and away from manufacturing.

#### **Industrial Production Growth, Industry Group**



The most recent slowdown has been broad-based. The monthly data are shown in detail below.

#### Recent data in detail




Of a subset of 12 industries that contribute the majority of industrial production, nine increased production over the past three years, two decreased production, and one was unchanged (see ■). Mining production increased by 24.6 percent in total over the three years ending February 2020. Computer & electronic product production increased by 18.4 percent, and electric & gas utilities production increased by 12.5 percent. In contrast, aerospace & miscellaneous transportation eq. production decreased by 7.8 percent over the same period.

Over the three years ending February 2020, nine of the 12 industries increased capacity, three decreased capacity, and none were unchanged (see ). The most significant change over the period was an increase of 15.5 percent in mining capacity, follwed by an increase of 11.0 percent in computer & electronic product capacity.


## Industrial Production and Capacity

total three-year growth, percent, February 2020



The Federal Reserve's monthly industrial production report also measures the economy's total industrial capacity. The extent to which the economy is using its industrial capacity is called **capacity utilization**, and calculated as industrial production as a share of total industrial capacity. Long-term, capacity utilization has fallen as many US factories and industrial production facilities closed. In February 2020, the industrial capacity utilization rate was 77.0 percent (see —), and the manufacturing capacity utilization rate was 75.0 percent (see —). Total capacity utilization has fallen by 8.2 percentage points since January 1989.

#### **Capacity Utilization**




#### **Retail Sales**

According to the Census Bureau, retail and food service sales totalled \$528.1 billion in February 2020, equivalent to roughly 29.2 percent of GDP on an annualized basis. Over the past year, retail and food service sales increased by 4.3 percent, without adjusting for prices (see —). Nonstore sales, which include online retailers, have increased by 7.5 percent over the same period (see —), and total \$66.6 billion, or roughly 3.7 percent of GDP.

#### **Retail Sales and Food Services**



#### Retail sales




## Government

Public institutions are collectively referred to as the *public-sector* or the *government*. In the United States, the government has the authority to spend, tax, and create money, as well as to regulate private sector activities. The government also enforces policies that determine the ownership of property. These activities are all extremely important in determining production and distribution in the economy.

## **Government Spending and Investment**

Government consumption expeditures and gross investment, which provide services and infrastructure, contributed 0.46 percentage points to real GDP growth in 2019 Q4, compared to an average contribution of 0.52 percentage points over the past year and an average of 0.24 percentage points since 1989. In 2019 Q4, federal defense (see ) contributed 0.21 percentage points, federal nondefense (see ) contributed 0.05 percentage points, and state and local government (see ) contributed 0.21 percentage points.

#### **Government Consumption and Investment**



#### **Government Consumption and Investment**

percentage point contribution to GDP growth						moving averages		
	2019 Q4	'19 Q3	'19 Q2	'19 Q1	'18 Q4	3- year	10- year	30- year
Total	0.46	0.30	0.82	0.50	-0.07	0.30	-0.01	0.23
Federal total	0.25	0.22	0.53	0.14	0.07	0.18	-0.01	0.07
National defense	0.21	0.09	0.13	0.29	0.20	0.12	-0.04	0.01
Consumption expenditures	0.09	0.01	0.13	0.25	0.07	0.07	-0.03	0.01
Gross investment	0.11	0.08	-0.01	0.04	0.12	0.05	-0.01	-0.00
Nondefense	0.05	0.13	0.40	-0.15	-0.12	0.06	0.03	0.06
Consumption expenditures	0.04	0.10	0.36	-0.16	-0.14	0.04	0.02	0.04
Gross investment	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02
■ State & local	0.21	0.08	0.29	0.36	-0.14	0.12	-0.00	0.16
Consumption expenditures	0.11	0.15	0.07	0.10	0.06	0.08	0.01	0.13
Gross investment	0.10	-0.08	0.23	0.26	-0.20	0.04	-0.01	0.04


Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Government current expenditures include consumption and investment as well as transfers such as government social benefits to persons. Government spending provides services and income to people. Government current receipts, mostly tax receipts, remove demand from the economy. When government expenditures exceed receipts, it is referred to as a *government deficit*, and corresponds to a private sector surplus. The size of the government deficit relative to GDP gives insight into the extent to which the government is stimulating the economy by increasing household income and corporate profits.

In 2019 Q3, federal government expenditures total \$4.8 trillion, equivalent to 22.4 percent of GDP, and receipts total \$3.6 trillion, or 16.7 percent of GDP. The federal deficit was therefore \$1.2 trillion or 5.7 percent of GDP. Over the past three years, the ratio of expenditures to GDP increased by a total of 0.3 percentage points, and the ratio of receipts to GDP has decreased by a total of 1.7 percentage points, causing the deficit to widen by 2.0 percent of GDP.


Consolidated state and local government expenditures total \$3.0 trillion, or 13.8 percent of GDP, in 2019 Q3, and receipts total \$2.7 trillion, equivalent to 12.7 percent of GDP. The combined state and local government deficit was \$227 billion or 1.06 percent of GDP. Over the past three years, the expenditures to GDP ratio decreased by a total of 0.54 percentage points at the consolidated state and local level, and the ratio of receipts to GDP has decreased by a total of 0.30 percentage points, causing the deficit to shrink by 0.24 percent of GDP.

#### Receipts and Expenditures as Share of GDP



In the third quarter of 2019, total public debt was \$22.7 trillion, equivalent to 105.5 percent of GDP. Of this, \$7.9 trillion, or 34.9 percent of the total, is held by private domestic investors (see 
). An additional \$6.8 trillion, or 29.8 percent of the total, is held by foreign investors (see ). The remainder is held by the Federal Reserve (see ) and various government agencies and trusts (see ), such as the Social Security Trust Fund.

#### **Total Public Debt By Holder**



The ratio of public debt to GDP is fairly stable, and the interest income from holding public debt is lower than in the past because of lower interest rates. Treasuries and other government debt securities provide a safe asset for the balance sheets domestic households and businesses, and for foreign investors.

#### **Interest Expense**

The Office of Management and Budget reports federal interest outlays of \$375.2 billion in fiscal year 2019, compared to \$325.0 billion in fiscal year 2018. Put into the context of the size of the economy, federal interest outlays in 2019 were equivalent to 1.8 percent of GDP, 1.6 percent of GDP in 2018, and an average of 2.9 percent in the 1990s, when interest rates were substantially higher.

#### Federal Interest Outlays



While debt levels are much lower for the consolidated state and local government sectors, interest rates on municipal bonds are higher, and interest paid to investors is a larger share of government expenses at the state and local level.


## **International Transactions**

Transactions between the US and the rest of the world are recorded in the balance of payments as either current account transactions (which measure income) or capital and financial account transactions (which measure change in ownership of assets). This section details imbalances in international transactions, changes in trade by goods and by partner, international investment positions, and exchange rates.

## **Balance of Payments**

The **current account balance** can be decomposed into the balance on trade in goods (see ■), the balance on trade in services (see ■), the balance on primary income (such as wages or income from assets, referred to here as income [see ■]), and secondary income (such as remittances and taxes, referred to here as transfers [see ■]). As of 2019 Q3, the US runs a current account deficit of 2.4 percent of GDP, primarily as the result of a trade deficit on goods of 4.2 percent of GDP.


#### **Current Account Balance**



Financial account transactions include the net domestic acquisition of foreign assets and the net domestic incurrence of foreign liabilities. The US financial account balance (see ) is the net lending or borrowing of the combined domestic sectors with the rest of the world. The timing of payments lead to a statistical discrepancy (see ), but the financial and capital account balance and current account balance otherwise sum to zero.

Over the year ending 2019 Q3, net domestic acquisitions of foreign assets were equivalent to 2.4 percent of GDP, while net domestic incurrence of foreign liabilities total 4.3 percent of GDP. Domestic net borrowing totals 1.9 percent of GDP.

#### **Financial Account Balance**




#### **Trade**

The **trade balance** (exports of goods ■ and services ■ minus imports of goods ■ and services ■ ) acts as an adjustment to consumption and investment in GDP calculations. As the US runs a persistent trade deficit, trade will generally subtract from GDP growth. In the income approach, the expanded trade deficit reduced nominal compensation of employees (extensive margin through outsourcing, intensive margin through lower wages from labor market slack) and reduced prices.

Goods exports subtracted 0.04 percentage points from GDP growth in the fourth quarter of 2019 while services exports contributed 0.27 percentage points. Good imports contributed 1.42 percentage points to GDP growth and services imports subtracted 0.13 percentage points.


#### **International Trade**



Nonpetroleum goods and services imports (see —) were equivalent to 13.2 percent of GDP in the fourth quarter of 2019, while exports of nonpetroleum goods and services (see —) were equivalent to 10.6 percent of GDP.

#### Imports and Exports, Nonpetroleum

includes goods and services, but excludes petroleum products, share of GDP



Changes to the trade balance come from a myriad of potential sources, such as changes in demand or relative supply of other countries, changes in exchange rates, changes in preferences for categories of goods, changes in trade policy, and changes in domestic demand. The following table captures the nominal value of major categories of goods and services as a share of nominal gross domestic product at various points over the past 30 years.

## **Exports and Imports by Type**percentage point share of GDP


percentage point share of GDP	period averages							
	2019 Q4	'19 Q3	'18 Q4	2016	2012 -13	2005 -06	1998 -99	1989 -93
Exports of goods and services	11.50	11.58	12.01	11.86	13.54	10.33	10.41	9.42
Exports of goods	7.50	7.60	7.94	7.72	9.34	7.32	7.52	6.84
Foods, feeds, and beverages	0.59	0.65	0.57	0.70	0.82	0.46	0.50	0.60
Industrial supplies & materials	2.46	2.41	2.60	2.07	2.96	1.92	1.55	1.65
Petroleum and products	0.94	0.89	0.96	0.53	0.90	0.28	0.11	0.12
Capital goods, except automotive	2.50	2.51	2.72	2.78	3.22	2.84	3.27	2.61
Automotive vehicles, & parts	0.71	0.77	0.72	0.80	0.91	0.77	0.79	0.67
Consumer goods, ex. food & auto	0.92	0.96	0.99	1.03	1.12	0.91	0.86	0.74
Durable goods	0.49	0.49	0.54	0.56	0.61	0.50	0.44	0.39
Nondurable goods	0.43	0.48	0.46	0.48	0.51	0.41	0.42	0.35
Exports of services	4.00	3.98	4.07	4.15	4.19	3.02	2.90	2.58
Transport	0.42	0.42	0.44	0.45	0.52	0.41	0.48	0.59
Travel	1.00	0.99	1.02	1.10	1.03	0.77	0.95	0.90
Intellectual property charges	0.57	0.57	0.60	0.66	0.77	0.59	0.44	0.29
Other business services	1.81	1.79	1.80	1.73	1.67	1.04	0.85	0.60
Imports of goods and services	14.15	14.61	15.29	14.64	16.76	15.89	12.63	10.38
Imports of goods	11.32	11.79	12.45	11.87	13.95	13.44	10.59	8.45
Foods, feeds, and beverages	0.68	0.71	0.72	0.70	0.69	0.54	0.46	0.43
Industrial supplies & materials	2.32	2.39	2.73	2.34	4.26	4.24	2.22	2.16
Petroleum and products	0.92	0.94	1.08	0.85	2.50	2.15	0.65	0.87
Capital goods, except automotive	3.11	3.15	3.35	3.17	3.37	3.00	3.03	2.04
Automotive vehicles, & parts	1.64	1.78	1.84	1.87	1.84	1.84	1.74	1.46
Consumer goods, ex. food & auto	2.87	3.12	3.19	3.13	3.19	3.20	2.47	1.83
Durable goods	1.42	1.56	1.65	1.63	1.71	1.75	1.29	0.97
Nondurable goods	1.45	1.56	1.54	1.49	1.48	1.46	1.18	0.86
Imports of services	2.84	2.82	2.84	2.77	2.81	2.45	2.04	1.93
Transport	0.50	0.50	0.54	0.52	0.53	0.57	0.54	0.55
Travel	0.72	0.71	0.72	0.66	0.60	0.61	0.63	0.61
Intellectual property charges	0.28	0.27	0.28	0.25	0.24	0.19	0.13	0.06
Other business services	1.18	1.17	1.15	1.19	1.24	0.83	0.54	0.38

Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis

Goods can be produced domestically or imported or some combination of the two. The import share of the total US demand for goods, measured as US produced goods and imported goods less exported goods, is also referred to as *import penetration*. This measure has risen considerably over the past thirty years. The majority of the long-term increase has been concentrated in consumer goods, while the decrease since 2011 has come primarily from petroleum and products.

From 1989 to 2011, imports of consumer goods increased by the equivalent of 5.7 percent of domestic consumption of goods (see  $\blacksquare$ ); petroleum and products imports increased by the equilavent of 6.3 percent (see  $\blacksquare$ ); and all other goods, primarily capital good, industrial supplies, and materials, increased by the equivalent of 6.4 percent (see  $\blacksquare$ ). Since 2011, imports of consumer goods decreased by the equivalent of 0.8 percent of domestic goods demand; imports of petroleum and products decreased by the equivalent of 5.6 percent; and other imports decreased by the equivalent of 0.7 percent.

#### **Import Share of Goods**



## **Exchange Rates**

The strength or weakness of the dollar in an important determinant of trade and financial flows. When more Japanese Yen (JPY), British Pounds (GBP), Euros (EUR), or Canadian Dollars (CAD) are required to buy one US Dollar (USD), the dollar is said to be *strong*.


As of March 13, 2020, one US dollar buys approximately: 1.40 Canadian dollars (see —), 107 Japanese Yen (see —), 0.90 Euros (see —), and 0.81 British Pounds (see —). Over the past three years, the nominal exchange rate between the US dollar and the Canadian dollar increased by 5.1 percent, the USD-JPY rate decreased by 3.7 percent, the USD-EUR rate increased by 2.2 percent, and the USD-GBP rate increased by 6.6 percent.

#### **Selected Exchange Rates**



#### **Broad Dollar Index**

trade-weighted foreign exchange rate index January 2006=100




Fed trade-weighted dollar indices show weighted-average foreign exchange rates with US trading partners, which simplify thinking about the overall role of foreign exchange rates on the US external sector. The Broad Dollar Index (see —), which starts in 2006, summarizes foreign exchange rates between the US and trading partners, weighting rates by the amount of trade in both goods and services.

The latest index value, as of March 13, 2020, is 120.7, thus an increase of 20.7 percent since inception in 2006. Over the past three years, the index value has averaged 113.8, compared to an average of 106.9 over the previous three year period.

## **Labor Markets**

Labor is the primary source of income for US households and is essential to the production of goods and services. The portion of labor that is provided by a household member to others outside of the household or to other households is considered *employment*. As of February 2020, 158.4 million people are employed (including self-employment).


Labor provided within a household is not captured by GDP compilation methods (expenditures, output, or income), though household surveys offer some insight into this important category of labor. The number of people who are considered employed divided by the total population is the employment rate or employment-to-population ratio, which is 48.9 percent as of February 2020.



When a member of a household is not employed but looked for a job during the past four weeks and is available to work, they are considered **unemployed**. As of February 2020, there are 6.4 million unemployed people. The combined group of employed and unemployed people is the labor force. The number of unemployed people divided by the number of people in the labor force is the unemployment rate, currently 3.9 percent. The number of people in the labor force divided by the total population is the labor force participation rate, currently 50.8 percent.

People who are not employed and not unemployed are considered to be outside of the labor force. This category is about half of the population, on average, and totals 159.4 million in February 2020. The category is comprised of children (60.4 million), students (19.0 million), unpaid caregivers (12.0 million), those unable to work due to disability or illness (14.6 million), those who want a job but have given up looking (4.3 million), and retirees and the elderly (47.3 million).

#### **Labor Force Status Changes**



The labor force status of the US population varies by age, sex, and over time. Because very few people have capital income, the share of the population with labor income is particularly important to overall levels of economic activity.

#### **Labor Force Status**

February 2020, thousands of people, not seasonally adjusted

	Total, 15+	Men, 15-29	Men, 30-59	Men, 60+	Women, 15-29	Women, 30-59	Women, 60+
Population	263,771	32,312	61,223	34,144	32,048	63,526	40,519
Employed	158,403	19,066	52,045	12,101	18,315	46,295	10,580
Multiple jobs	8,185	777	2,584	548	1,105	2,698	474
Full-time	118,159	13,147	44,975	8,525	10,774	34,555	6,183
Part-time	40,244	5,918	7,070	3,576	7,541	11,741	4,397
Economic reasons	4,619	868	1,158	298	805	1,258	232
Unemployed	6,376	1,436	1,841	399	1,099	1,325	277
Not in Labor Force	98,992	11,810	7,337	21,644	12,634	15,905	29,662
Discouraged	4,636	1,025	801	486	775	984	565
Disabled/III	14,334	943	3,601	2,258	626	4,169	2,737
Family/Care	12,184	322	694	72	2,204	7,974	918
School	18,401	8,816	425	34	8,565	531	31
Retirement	47,292	83	1,326	18,684	99	1,833	25,267

Source: Author's Calculations from CPS

Additionally, changes over time in labor force status are particularly important to understanding both secular and cyclical trends in the economy. For example, the US population is growing but it is also aging. Over the past year, there was a substantial shift towards full-time work.


#### **Labor Force Changes**

Change from February 2019 to February 2020 , thousands of people

	Total, 15+	Men, 15-29	Men, 30-59	Men, 60+	Women, 15-29	Women, 30-59	Women, 60+
Population	1,211	-271	-172	1,056	-271	-139	1,009
Employed	1,276	23	-238	525	395	476	95
Multiple jobs	330	-0	26	48	42	133	80
Full-time	2,086	-193	-66	512	375	1,221	236
Part-time	-809	216	-172	13	19	-745	-141
Economic reasons	28	8	18	48	42	-13	-75
Unemployed	-441	-214	1	24	-131	-109	-13
Not in Labor Force	376	-79	64	507	-535	-507	926
Discouraged	-292	-69	29	-111	-177	-17	53
Disabled/III	-231	1	-133	18	16	-233	101
Family/Care	-392	-41	25	-4	-79	-161	-133
School	-304	-121	83	15	-258	-25	3
Retirement	1,509	-17	104	611	-13	-48	871

Source: Author's Calculations from CPS

#### **Labor Share of Income** compensation of employees as share of gross domestic income, percent




The labor share of income measures how much labor is paid relative to the total income in the economy in a year. While the laborer share of the population has fallen, and an increasing share of income goes to depreciation of capital including housing, cyclical patterns suggest worker bargaining power also affects the labor share of income. As of the third quarter of 2019, labor receives 53.5 percent of gross domestic income, and the labor share increased by a total of 0.4 percentage points over the past year. The labor share is 2.0 percentage points above its 30-year low of 51.6 percent in 2014 Q3, but 3.9 percentage points below the 30-year high of 57.4 percent in 1992 Q3.

#### **Gross Labor Income**

In labor markets, unlike other markets, wages (the price of labor) tend not to be cut in response to a decrease in demand; businesses instead employ fewer workers and/or cut hours. As a result, wage data give only a partial picture of the labor income received by households.


Gross labor income (compensation of employees in the national accounts), which captures both the amount of employment (see ■) and the rate of compensation (see ■), increased at an annualized and inflation-adjusted rate of 2.37 percent in 2019 Q4. Changes in wages subtracted 0.75 percentage points, and changes in total hours worked contributed 3.12 percentage points.

#### **Gross Labor Income Growth**



## **Employment**

In February 2020, 80.5% of 25-54 years olds were employed, compared to 80.6 in January 2020. Over the past year, the age 25-54 employment rate has increased by 0.6 percentage points. The current age 25-54 employment rate is 0.8 percentage points (equivalent to 970.0 thousand workers) below the average during 1998–99, a period with a particularly tight labor market.



The employment rate shown above is based on a monthly survey that asks about employment during a specific week of the previous month. However, additional data is available on what share of a population works year-round rather than just during a specific week. This can be combined with data on hours worked to identify the *fully-employed*, or *full-time*, *full-year workers*, who are defined below as the those who usually work 35 hours per week or more for 50 weeks per year or more. The Census Bureau reports 118 million fully-employed people in 2018, equivalent to 36 percent of the population.

In 2018, fewer than half (43.0 percent) of commuter zones have at least a third of their population working full-time and full-year. A total of 18 commuter zones (out of 741), covering 2.6 million people, have a quarter of the population or less fully employed. Of commuter zones with 100,000 people or more, the top and bottom ten by fully-employed share of population are listed below.



## **Employment Rates of Largest Commuter Zones, 2018**


	all ages		age 2	5-54
	full-time & full-year	employed	full-time & full-year	employed
Los Angeles, CA	33.7	57.4	58.4	87.2
New York, NY	36.0	58.4	62.3	87.8
Chicago, IL	36.7	60.5	64.4	90.3
Houston, TX	36.2	57.4	63.2	88.0
Newark, NJ	37.7	59.9	65.1	89.7
Philadelphia, PA	35.1	60.6	62.0	89.8
Washington, DC	40.8	64.5	68.9	93.4
Boston, MA	36.7	64.4	63.6	91.9
San Francisco, CA	37.9	62.8	64.3	91.3
Atlanta, GA	38.0	60.0	66.6	90.9
Detroit, MI	32.9	58.0	59.6	88.1
Dallas, TX	39.1	60.3	67.1	89.8
Phoenix, AZ	34.4	58.0	62.2	89.0
Seattle, WA	37.3	63.0	62.6	91.5
Miami, FL	37.2	58.0	64.0	88.4

Source: American Community Survey

The establishment survey from the monthly jobs report identifies how many jobs have been added to the economy in a given month. The US economy added 273,000 jobs in February 2020, compared to 273,000 in January 2020, and an average of 243,000 over the past three months. Over the same three months, the US needed to add an average of 106,000 jobs per month to maintain the prior month employment rate.

#### **Nonfarm Payroll Growth**

one-month change in total employment, in thousands line = required for constant employment rate



Employment rates vary over time, but also by age, gender, and education. Over the 12 months ending February 2020, the employment rate for most education groups is lower than it was on average in the year 2000. Only older workers and women with advanced education have higher rates of employment than in 2000. Fix text...



#### Occupational Employment, February 2020

share of population employed, 12-month average, percent




## **Unemployment**

The conventional *unemployment rate* is measured as the number of people who do not have a job and looked for one during a reference week, divided by the labor force, which includes the unemployed and those with jobs.

Unemployment is currently very low. BLS reports 5.8 million unemployed persons in February 2020, and an unemployment rate of 3.5 percent. However, unemployment is much higher for disadvantaged groups, with the black or African American unemployment rate typically double the white unemployment rate. A very tight labor market may have the effect of reducing racial discrimination in hiring. Over the past year, the black or African American unemployment rate has fallen by 1.1 percentage points to 5.8 percent.

#### **Unemployment Rate**




#### **Reasons for unemployment**

There are multiple reasons for unemployment. During the trough of a business cycle, most unemployed are those who lost a job, for example from layoffs, or had a temporary job end (see .). In general, many of the unemployed are re-entrants to the labor market, meaning they were out of the labor force prior but are looking for a job again (see .). Some are new-entrants who are looking for their first job (see .). A small portion are also those who left a job voluntarily and are looking for a new one (see .).

In February 2020, 1.7 percent of the labor force were unemployed because of losing a job or having a job end, 0.5 percent were re-entrants, 1.1 percent new entrants, and 0.3 percent job leavers.

#### **Unemployment by Reason**



#### **Duration of unemployment**

When someone is unemployed for an extended period of time they risk running out of unemployment benefits, thereby having a sharp reduction in income. Additionally, people may have more trouble re-entering the labor market after a long period of unemployment.

As of February 2020, BLS reports that 0.46 percent of the age 16+ population have been unemployed for 27 weeks or longer, compared to 0.53 percent in February 2019. Long-term unemployment peaked at 2.96 percent of the population in April 2010. More concerning, however, is that among those who are unemployed the average (mean) duration of unemployment is 20.9 weeks, and the typical (median) duration of unemployment is 9.1 weeks, as of February 2020. Both measures of unemployment duration are elevated from the levels typically seen several years into an expansion.

#### **Long-term Unemployed**

95

Source: BLS

00



'05

'10

'15

'20

#### **Duration of Unemployment**



#### Unemployment by metro area

The Bureau of Labor Statistics combines data from the surveys that go into the jobs report with additional local data to produce local area estimates of unemployment, including the unemployment rate for metro areas. Will need to think about tables that show highlights, because there are too many MSAs to list all data. Perhaps I can list how many metro areas had the unemployment rate fall over the past year, and then talk about how many unemployed people that actually means—so that population is taken into consideration in some meaningful way.

## Change in Unemployment Rate by Metro Area

one-year change, in percentage points, December 2019



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics

#### **Reasons for non-participation**


The Current Population Survey asks people who are not employed or looking for work about their major activities and reasons for not participating in the labor market. The answers show a tendency to vary by age, in intuitive ways, but also a strong relationship to the business cycle. By age, those age 16–24 who are not in the labor force disproportionately cite school as the reason for non-participation, while those 55+ disproportionately cite retirement.

#### [CHART HERE - bar chart]

While the recession of 2001 appears mild in measures of expenditure, it was followed by a substantial reduction in the share of the population earning labor income. The economy was still losing jobs at an alarming rate long after the 2001 recession had officially ended, with some overall weakness masked by a major housing bubble. The burst of the housing bubble caused the great recession seven years after, pushing many more people out of the labor force.

From March 2001 to the latest available month, February 2020, an additional 2.4 percent of the age 18–64 population left the labor force. The larger-than-normal population cohort born after World War II is reaching retirement age in this period. Such demographic effects explain 1.2 percentage points of the cumulative decrease. Additionally, young people are staying in school longer, on average, reducing the age 18–64 labor force by 1.2 percent. Disability or illness reduce the labor force by another 0.7 percent. Less retirement among those age 18–64 increases the labor force by 0.8 percent.

# Contributions to Labor Force Participation Since March 2001 cumulative percentage point contribution to age 18-64 labor force participation,




#### Labor Force Flows

The current population survey interviews households up to eight times over 16 months, allowing insight into the labor force status of the same individual over time, and in particular, into flows between different employment, unemployment, and other categories. The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes many monthly indicators based on labor force flows, and others can be calculated directly from the public use data.

Among newly employed workers, the vast majority were considered to be out of the labor force the prior month, as opposed unemployed. In February 2020, 6.1 million people were newly employed (on a gross basis). Of these, 72.2 percent were not looking for work in the prior month (see —). Over the past three months, an average of 72.7 percent of the newly employed were not looking for work the month prior (see —). With low unemployment, new employees are being pulled from outside of the labor force and bypassing unemployment. Three years ago, in February 2017, 67.9 percent of the newly employed were not looking for work month prior.

#### Newly Employed, Not Previously Looking For Work

share of newly employed that were not looking for work in the prior month



The great recession worsened jobfinding prospects for those not in the labor force (NILF) due to disability or illness. As a result, the flow into employment for people age 25 to 54 who are out of the labor force due to a disability or illness slowed considerably. Only over the past few years have these prospects recovered. Over the year ending February 2020, 8.8 percent of persons age 25-54 who were out of the labor force due to disability or illnessin the prior year are now employed (see —). This one-year rate of job-finding has increased substantially from its 2010-2013 average of 5.8 percent

#### Flow, Disability to Work

NILF disability/illness, age 25 to 54, share employed one year later




#### **Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey**

Some types of **turnover** in the labor market are healthy and mean people are better able find a new job if they do not like the one they have. Additionally, the job prospects outside of a firm affect the bargaining power of the workers inside of the firm. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports the number of job openings, hires, and separations in several industry groups on a monthly basis. Within separations, these data distinguish voluntarily leaving a job as *quits*.


In January 2020, there were 7.0 million total job openings and 5.8 million hires completed. In the same month there were 5.6 million total separations, of which 3.5 million were voluntary. In comparison, there are 5.9 million unemployed persons in January 2020. The ratio of job openings to unemployed persons was 1.2 in the latest month, compared to 1.1 in the same month one year prior, and 0.7 in January 2017.




The number of people who voluntarily separate (quit) a job in a given month, divided by the total number employed is the *quits rate*. The rate typically increases when workers are confident enough to leave one job for another one, and a high quits rate, particularly in low-paying industries, can be a sign of a tight labor market.



The quits rate within the accommodations and food services industries (which includes restaurants), is highly cyclical, and tends to rise when a tight labor market pulls people out of restaurant jobs and into higher paying jobs in other industries. In January 2020, the total quits rate in all industries was 2.3 percent. The accommodations and food services quits rate was 4.9 percent; the series high for the industry group was 6.3 percent in January 2001.







#### **Initial Jobless Claims**

The Department of Labor reported 211,000 initial claims for unemployment insurance during the week ending March 7, 2020. Over the past three months, initial claims averaged 214,250 per week. During the same three month period three years ago, initial claims averaged 243,750 per week.

#### **New Unemployment Insurance Claims**






## **Wage Growth**


The usual wages of full-time workers can be measured at various points in the income distribution using the Current Population Survey. BLS reports these data by decile and quartile, with the most commonly used measure being the median usual weekly earnings. The first decile usual weekly earnings of full-time workers have increased rapidly over the past year, suggesting fewer people are working full-time for less than \$10 per hour.

BLS calculations (see —) for 2019 Q4 show nominal first decile usual weekly earnings of \$467.00, compared to \$444.00 in 2018 Q4, resulting in one-year growth of 5.2 percent. In the previous quarter, 2019 Q3, first decile usual weekly earnings grew by 7.0 percent over the year. Author's calculations from the CPS (see —) show three-month moving average first decile usual weekly earnings of \$461.00 in January 2020, \$463.00 in December 2019, and \$439.00 in January 2019. One-year growth was 6.0 percent for the three months ending January 2020, 7.0 percent for the three months ending December 2019, and 8.0 percent for the three months ending November 2019.



#### Weekly Earnings Growth, First Decile and Median

full-time, wage and salary earners, age 16+, one-year growth, percent




#### **Nominal Hourly Wages**

Over the year ending February 2020, nominal wages increased by 3.0 percent for all employees and increased by 3.3 percent for production and non-supervisory workers. Comparing the latest three months to the previous three months, nominal wages increased at an annual rate of 2.8 percent for all employees and increased at an annual rate of 2.3 percent for production and non-supervisory employees.



By industry, 9 of 12 groups experienced real wage growth (wage growth above the increase in prices indicated by the consumer price index). The mining & logging industry had the fastest nominal growth rate, at 5.8 percent, followed by 4.5 percent in leisure & hospitality and 4.0 percent in information.

#### **Average Hourly Earnings Growth by Industry**




## **Labor Productivity**

Labor productivity is reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and measured as real output per hour of work in the nonfarm business sector. Economic theory suggests that labor productivity is particularly important for long-term real economic growth. The measure captures the rate at which people, with all of the resources and equipment and infrastructure available to them, are able to produce goods and services with their work. An increase in labor productivity means real wages can increase without putting upward pressure on inflation. Alternatively, an increase in productivity means a society can meet its material needs with less work.

In 2019 Q4, labor productivity increased at an annual rate of 1.2 percent (see 1), as the result of an increase of 2.4 percent in real ouput and an increase of 1.2 percent in hours worked. In the prior quarter, 2019 Q3, labor productivity decreased at an annual rate of 1.2 percent, as real output increased at an annual rate of 2.3 percent and hours of work increased at an annual rate of 2.7 percent. Over the past five years, labor productivity growth has averaged 1.2 percent, compared to a 1989-onward average of 2.0 percent.

#### **Labor Productivity Growth**




There are two areas to investigate in understanding trends in productivity growth rates. The first is the theory that the level of business net investment in equipment and other capital goods, particularly relative to the size of the workforce, determines productivity growth. Such investment allows more goods and services to be produced by the same number amount of work. The second theory, sometimes called the *Kaldor-Verdoorn Law*, is that overall economic growth and capacity utilization determine productivity growth. In this scenario, an economy facing real resource constraints is more likely to find ways to produce goods and services more efficiently.


## **Union Membership**

Membership in unions and employee associations has diminished in the United States over the past fifty years. Unionized jobs typically offer higher wages and better benefits and union membership tends to increase wages and benefits even in nonunion jobs. Therefore, some research argues, less union membership increases income inequality.


Over the 12 months ending February 2020, the share of jobs held by union and employee association members averaged 10.3 percent. In levels, there were 14.6 million union jobs, and 127.4 million nonunion jobs, on average over the period. This union membership rate averaged 10.5 percent during the 12 months ending February 2019, and 10.7 percent during the 12 months ending February 2018. Union jobs decreased by 162,000 from February 2019 to February 2020, while nonunion jobs increased by 1,732,000.

#### **Union Membership and Coverage**





## Union Membership Rate by Industry




Union membership rates vary substantially by industry. Public administration has the highest union membership rate, at 34.2 percent as of February 2020, followed by education and health with 17.1 percent, and construction and mining with 12.8 percent. The leisure and hospitality industry experienced the largest overall percentage point decrease in union membership rates over the past 30 years, and is currently 15.1 percentage points below its January 1989 rate of 18.0 percent. The lowest union membership rate is in the leisure and hospitality (2.9 percent). The union membership rate of the industry was 18.0 percent at its 30year peak in January 1989.

## **Financial Markets**

The US equity markets and capital markets provide businesses and governments with funding for activities and fixed investments.

The S&P 500 is a market-cap-weighted stock market index based on 500 large companies listed on US exchanges. The index is a broad measure of price levels in US equity markets. The S&P 500 closed at 2398 on March 18, 2020. The index is currently 29.3 percent below its one-year high of 3394 on February 19, 2020, and 5.2 percent above its one-year low of 2281 on March 18, 2020. The average over the past year is 3007; the index is 20.2 percent below its one-year moving average.




## **Equity Markets**

According to historical stock market return data from Robert Shiller, the inflation-adjusted trailing twenty year annual rate of return of the S&P 500 was 3.8 percent as of December 2019. Real returns are currently low relative to the average trailing twenty year real annual return of 10.1 percent during 1995–2005.

#### S&P 500 Real Return




#### **Corporate Equity Payout**





The Chicago Board Options Exchange uses S&P 500 options data to identify expectations of future volatility. This volatility measure, VIX, was 75.9 on March 17, 2020, compared to an average of 17.4 over the past three years.

### S&P 500 Volatility Index



#### 10-Year - 3-Month Spread






#### **Interest Rates**

The US Federal Reserve System (Fed) has a congressional mandate to promote price stability and maximum employment. In practice, a Fed committee (FOMC) determines the federal funds rate, which aims to influence interest rates in the broader economy. Fed monetary policy can be neutral or be used to stimulate or slow the economy.

The effective fed funds (see —) rate is 0.25 percent, as of March 17, 2020. The FOMC cut interest rates three times in 2019, for a total reduction of 75 basis points.

#### **Effective Fed Funds Rate**



As of March 17, 2020, the constant maturity yield for a ten-year Treasury bond (see —) is 1.02 percent, compared to 2.57 percent one-year prior. The yield for a two-year Treasury (see —) is 0.47 percent, compared to 2.41 percent a year prior.

#### **Treasury Constant Maturity Yields**

percent, monthly average except for latest value



The **Treasury yield curve** shows the yield on different maturities of Treasury bonds and bills, usually from short-term, such as three-month, to long-term such as 30-year. This measure is at times described as *inverted*, which means the short-term-debt end of the curve is higher than the long-term-debt end. For example, if the yield on two-year treasuries is higher than the yield on ten-year treasuries.

## **Money and Monetary Policy**

The Federal Reserve reports the weekly average money stock, broadly, as M2, which includes cash and deposits such as savings accounts and checking accounts. In the week of March 2, 2020, the M2 measure of money averaged \$15.6 trillion, equivalent to 71.9 percent of GDP. Institution money market accounts, which are not included in M2, can be combined with M2 to create a slightly-broader-than-M2 measure of the money stock. These funds averaged \$2.3 trillion in the same week, equivalent to 10.5 percent of GDP.

A large increase in the amount of money held by individuals and institutions can be the result of a higher rate of saving, a larger government sector financial deficit, an increase in the money supply, a change in preferences for liquidity, or something else. In the first week of March 2020, the M2 plus institutional money funds measure increased over the equivalent previous year value by 8.7 percent, the fastest growth rate since July 2009.

#### M2 and Institutional Money Funds




## **Prices**

Changes in prices affect the amount of goods and services that can purchased by a fixed amount of income. When researchers try to measure changes in prices, they often look at both the quantity that can be purchased by a unit of currency, and also changes in quality of the item. To understand the overall change in prices faced by a certain group, such as consumers, researchers create a representative "basket" of the goods and services purchased by the group, and track the changes in the basket, and the price of the basket, over time.

#### **Consumer Price Index**

Consumer prices increased by 2.3 percent over the year ending February 2020, according to the CPI for all urban consumers. Core inflation, which does not include the more volatile food and energy prices, was 2.4 percent.



In February 2020, Housing contributed 1.16 percentage points to overall CPI inflation, compared to a contribution of 1.21 percentage points in February 2019. Medical care contributed 0.41 percentage points to overall inflation in February 2020, compared to a contribution of 0.15 percentage points in February 2019.

did not contribute significantly to overall CPI inflation in February 2020, compared to virtually no effect on inflation in February 2019. did not contribute significantly to overall inflation, compared to a reduction of 0.05 percentage points the previous year.




The consumer price index (CPI-U) is used in contracts that include cost adjustments. As a result, historical CPI-U data are not revised if there is a change to the way the CPI is calculated. For research purposes, however, it is ideal to have the most accurate measure of overall changes in prices faced by consumers. BLS also publishes a research series, the CPI-U-RS, which adjusts the historical data of the CPI-U to be consistent with the current methods of producing it.

### **Inflation Expectations**

Researchers gain insight on what inflation is expected in the future both through regular surveys of consumers and through market data. One market-based measure is known as the *inflation breakeven* and is calculated as the difference between the yield on a nominal treasury bond and the yield on a treasury inflation-protected bond of the same maturity. This difference represents the amount of inflation markets have priced-in, on average, for the maturity of the bond.

## 5-year Expected Average Inflation



As of February 2020, consumers expect an average inflation rate of 2.3 percent over the next five years, (see —), compared to an expected rate of 2.3 percent on February 2019. Consumers had expected inflation to average 2.7 percent over the past five years, while actual inflation over the period was 1.6 percent.

As of March 18, 2020, markets expect an average inflation rate of 2.3 percent over the next five years (see —), compared to an expected rate of 1.85 percent on March 19, 2019. Markets had expected inflation to average 1.41 over the past five years, five years ago.

## **Commodity Prices**

As of March 13, 2020, a barrel of west Texas intermediate (WTI) extbfcrude oil sells for \$31.72. Over the past year, this measure of oil prices has decreased by 45.5 percent. Over the past three years, the price decreased by 35.7 percent. Currently, the WTI price is \$102.16 per barrel below its June 2008 average.

#### Oil Price



# **International Comparisons**

## References

## Acknowledgments

Gabriel Mathy, Iordan Koulov, Lara Merling, Kevin Cashman, Rebecca Watts, Dean Baker, Eileen Appelbaum, John Schmitt, Mark Weisbrot, Yevgeniya Korniyenko, Magali Pinat, Teasri Thiruvadanthai, Rainer Köhler, Gersenda Varisco, Venkat Josyula, Tom Augspurger, Mike Sieferling, Matt Bruenig, Ernie Tedeschi, Adam Ozimek, and Vikas Sharma.