

Foundations of Geopolitics

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From the editors

The history and fate of geopolitics as a science is paradoxical. On the one hand, the concept itself seems to have become commonplace, actively used in contemporary politics. Geopolitical journals and institutions are proliferating. The texts of the founders of the discipline are published and republished, conferences and symposia are held, and geopolitical committees and commissions are established.

Nevertheless, geopolitics has so far failed to make it into the category of the conventional conventional conventional sciences. The first geopolitical works of the German Ratzel, the Swede Chellen, and especially of the Englishman Mackinder were all greeted with hostility by the scientific community. Classical scholarship, inheriting the hypercritical spirit of early positivism, believed that geopolitics pretended to overgeneralise and was therefore only a form of “quackery”.

In a way, the sad fate of geopolitics as a science was also linked to the political side of the issue. It has been argued that the war crimes of the Third Reich - expansion, wars, deportations, etc. - were largely theoretically prepared by German geopoliticians, who allegedly provided Hitler’s regime with a pseudoscientific basis. (This referred primarily to Karl Haushofer, a German geopolitical scientist who was at one time quite close to the Führer.)

However, on a theoretical level German geopolitics was essentially no different from Anglo-Saxon (Mackinder, Mahan, Speekman), French (Vidal de la Blanche), Russian “military geography” (Miliutin, Snegarev), etc. The difference lay not in the specific views of Haushofer, which were perfectly logical and adequate to the discipline itself, but in the methods by which a number of his geopolitical positions were implemented. Moreover, the specificity of German international policy in the 30s and 40s in its most repellent manifestations sharply contradicted the ideas of Haushofer himself. Instead of a “continental bloc” on the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis, an attack on the USSR, instead of an organicist (in the spirit of the Schmittian theory of “rights of nations”) understanding of the doctrine of Lebensraum, “living

space”, vulgar nationalism and imperialism, etc. It should also be noted that the Haushofer School and its journal “Zeitschrift für Geopolitik” were never elements of the official Nazi system. Like many intellectual groups of the so-called “conservative revolutionaries” in the Third Reich, they led an ambiguous existence and were simply tolerated, a tolerance which varied according to the current political situation.

However, the main reason for the historical oppression of geopolitics is the fact that it is too explicit in showing the fundamental mechanisms of international politics, which various regimes most often prefer to hide behind vague rhetoric or abstract ideological schemes. In this sense, a parallel can be drawn with Marxism (at least in its purely scientific, analytical part). Just as Marx more than convincingly reveals the mechanics of production relations and their relationship to historical formations, geopolitics exposes the historical demagoguery of foreign policy discourse, showing the real underlying levers that influence international, interstate and interethnic relations. But while Marxism is a global revision of classical economic history, geopolitics is a revision of the history of international relations. This last point explains the ambivalent attitude of society towards geopolitical scientists. The scientific community stubbornly rejects them in its environment, harshly criticising them and, more often than not, overlooking them, while the authorities, on the contrary, actively use geopolitical concepts to formulate international strategy. This was the case, for example, with one of the first geopoliticians, Sir Halford Mackinder, the true founding father of the discipline. His ideas were not accepted in academic circles, but he himself was directly involved in shaping British policy in the first half of the twentieth century, laying the theoretical foundation for England’s international strategy, taken over by the United States by mid-century and developed by Mackinder’s American (more broadly, Atlanticist) followers.

The parallel with Marxism is, in our view, apt. The method can be borrowed and assimilated by different poles. Marxist analysis is equally important to the representatives of Capital and the fighters for the emancipation of Labour. So too is geopolitics: it instructs the representatives of big

states (empires) on how best to maintain territorial domination and carry out expansion, while their opponents find in it the conceptual principles of a revolutionary theory of “national liberation”. The Treaty of Versailles, for example, was the work of the geopolitical school of Mackinder, expressing Western interests and aiming to weaken the states of Central Europe and suppress Germany. The German disciple of Mackinder, Karl Haushofer, based on the same premises, developed the exact opposite theory of “European liberation”, which was a complete negation of the logic of Versailles and formed the basis of the ideology of the nascent National Socialism.

Recent considerations show that even without being accepted in the commonwealth of classical sciences, geopolitics is extremely effective in practice, and its importance in some respects surpasses many conventional disciplines.

Nevertheless, geopolitics exists today and is slowly gaining official recognition and status. However, not everything is smooth in this process either. We are very often confronted with a substitution of the very notion of geopolitics. We have seen an increasing substitution of the term geopolitics, which is becoming increasingly commonplace among laypeople. Emphasis is being shifted from the comprehensive and global picture developed by the founding fathers to private regional aspects or geo-economic schemes. The original postulates of geopolitical dualism, competition of strategies, civilizational differentiation, etc. are either ignored, glossed over or denied altogether. It is difficult to imagine something similar in any other science. What would happen to classical physics if, operating with the concepts of “mass”, “energy”, “acceleration”, etc., scientists began to implicitly, gradually deny the law of universal gravitation, forget about it, and then simply recognized Newton as a “mythological figure who did not exist in reality” or a “dark religious fanatic”. But that, *mutatis mutandis*, is what is happening to geopolitics these days.

The aim of this book is to present basic geopolitics objectively and impartially, beyond preconceived notions and ideological sympathies and antipathies. No matter how we feel about this science, we can only make a definitive judgment about it after becoming familiar with its principles,

history and methodology.

INTRODUCTION

The definition of 'geopolitics'

The works of numerous representatives of geopolitical schools, despite all their differences and often contradictions, form a common picture, which allows us to speak about the subject itself as something complete and definite. Various authors and dictionaries differ in their definition of the main subject matter of this science and its main methodological principles. This divergence stems from historical circumstances as well as from the close connection of geopolitics with global politics, issues of power and dominant ideologies. The synthetic nature of the discipline implies the inclusion of many additional subjects in geography, history, demography, strategy, ethnography, religious studies, ecology, military studies, history of ideology, sociology, political science, etc. Since all these military, natural sciences and humanities have many schools and trends, we cannot speak of any strictness and unambiguity in geopolitics. But what definition should we give to this discipline, which is so vague and at the same time expressive and impressive?

Geopolitics is a worldview, and as such is better compared not with sciences, but with systems of sciences. It is on the same level as Marxism, liberalism, etc., i.e. systems of interpretations of society and history that single out one crucial criterion as the main principle and reduce all other myriad aspects of man and nature to it.

Marxism (1) and liberalism equally put the economic side of human existence, the principle of “economy as destiny”, at the core. Never mind that the two ideologies draw opposite conclusions Marx arrives at the inevitability of the anti-capitalist revolution, while Adam Smith’s followers regard capitalism as the most perfect model of society. In both cases an extended method of interpreting the historical process, a particular sociology, anthropology and political science are offered. And despite the constant criticism

of these forms of “economic reductionism” by alternative (and marginal) scientific circles, they remain the dominant social models on the basis of which people do not simply make sense of the past, but also create the future, i.e. plan, design, conceive and carry out large-scale acts which directly affect all humanity.

The same is true of geopolitics. But unlike “economic ideologies”, it is based on the thesis: “geography as destiny”. Geography and space appear in geopolitics in the same function as money and production relations in Marxism and liberalism, they reduce all fundamental aspects of human existence to them; they serve as a basic method of interpretation of the past, they act as major factors of human existence, organizing around themselves all other aspects of existence. Like economic ideologies, geopolitics is based on approximation, on reductionism, on reducing the diverse manifestations of life to a few parameters, but despite the inherent fallacy of such theories, they have proved impressively coherent in explaining the past and extremely effective in organizing the present and projecting the future.

If we continue the parallel with Marxism and classical bourgeois political economy, we can say that, like economic ideologies, which affirm the special category of “human economic” (*homo economicus*), geopolitics speaks about “human space”, predetermined by space, shaped and conditioned by its specific quality of relief, the landscape. But this conditionality is especially evident in large-scale social manifestations of man in states, ethnic groups, cultures, civilizations, etc. The dependence of each individual on the economy is evident in both small and large proportions. Therefore, economic determinism is understandable both to ordinary people and to the authorities operating with big social categories. This may be the reason why economic ideologies have become so popular and have performed a mobilising function up to and including revolutions based on the personal engagement in the ideology of a multitude of individuals. The dependence of the individual on space is the main thesis of geopolitics, seen only at some distance from the individual. This is why, despite its premises, geopolitics has not become an ideology proper or, more precisely, a “mass ideology”. Its conclusions and

methods, subjects of study and basic theses are intelligible only to those social authorities who are engaged in large-scale problems of strategic planning, comprehension of global social and historical regularities, etc. Space manifests itself in large dimensions, and therefore geopolitics is reserved for social groups dealing with generalised realities of countries, nations, etc.

Geopolitics is a worldview of power, a science of power and for power. Only as one gets closer to the social top does geopolitics begin to reveal its significance, its meaning and its usefulness for one, whereas before that it is perceived as an abstraction. Geopolitics is the discipline of political elites (both actual and alternative), and its entire history provides convincing evidence that it has been practiced exclusively by people actively involved in the process of governing countries and nations, or preparing for this role (if alternative, oppositional ideological camps have been removed from power due to historical conditions).

Without claiming scientific rigour, geopolitics at its own level determines what is of value to it and what is not. The humanities and the natural sciences are only involved when they do not contradict the basic principles of the geopolitical method. Geopolitics, in a way, selects those sciences and branches of science that seem useful to it, leaving out the rest. In today's world, it is a "ruler's quick reference book", a textbook of power, which gives a summary of what should be considered when making global (momentous) decisions such as making alliances, starting wars, implementing reforms, restructuring society, imposing massive economic and political sanctions, etc.

Geopolitics is the science of ruling.

Tellurocracy and Thalassocracy

The main law of geopolitics is the assertion of a fundamental dualism, reflected in the geographical structure of the planet and in the historical typology of civilisations. This dualism is expressed in the opposition between "tellurocracy" (land power) and "thalassocracy" (maritime power). The nature

of this opposition is reduced to the opposition of a mercantile civilization (Carthage, Athens) and a military-authoritarian civilization (Rome, Sparta). In other terms, the dualism between “democracy” and “ideocracy”.

Already from the outset this dualism has the quality of hostility, of the alternativity of its two constituent poles, although the degree may vary from case to case. The entire history of human societies is thus seen as consisting of two elements “aqueous” (“liquid”, “fluid”) and “terrestrial” (“solid”, “permanent”).

“Tellurocracy”, “land power” is associated with the fixity of space and the stability of its qualitative orientations and characteristics. At the civilizational level, it is embodied in sedentarism, in conservatism, in strict legal norms, to which large associations of kin, tribes, nations, states, empires are subjected. The hardness of the Dryland is culturally embodied in the firmness of ethics and the stability of social traditions. The dryland peoples (especially sedentary ones) are alien to individualism and entrepreneurial spirit. They are characterised by collectivism and hierarchy.

“Thalassocracy”, “maritime power” represents a type of civilisation based on opposing attitudes. This type is dynamic, mobile and inclined towards technical development. Its priorities are nomadism (especially navigation), trade, and the spirit of individual entrepreneurship. The individual, as the most mobile part of the collective, is elevated to the highest value, while ethical and legal norms become diluted, relative and mobile. This type of civilization develops rapidly, evolves actively, easily changes external cultural attributes, keeping unchanged only the internal identity of the general attitude.

Most of human history unfolds in a situation of limited scale of both orientations under the global dominance of “tellurocracy”. The Earth element (Land) dominates the entire ensemble of civilisations, while the Water element (sea, ocean) appears only fragmentarily and sporadically. The dualism remains geographically localised up to a certain point - seashores, estuaries and river basins, etc. The opposition develops in different zones of the planet

with different intensity and in different forms.

The political history of the peoples of the earth shows a gradual growth of political forms becoming more and more extensive. This is how states and empires emerge. This process on the geopolitical level means the strengthening of the factor of space in human history. The nature of large political formations of states and empires expresses the duality of the elements more impressively, reaching the level of more and more universal civilizational types.

At a certain point (the ancient world) a rather stable picture emerges, reflected in the “Mackinder map”. The Tellurocracy zone is steadily identified with the inland expanses of NorthhEastern Eurasia (which in general terms coincide with the territories of Tsarist Russia or the USSR). Thalassocracy is increasingly being identified as the coastal zones of the Eurasian continent, the Mediterranean area, the Atlantic Ocean and the seas that bathe Eurasia from the South and West.

This is how the world map becomes geopolitically specific:

1) Intra-continental spaces become a “fixed platform”, a “heartland”, a “geographical axis of history” which steadily preserves the telluric civilisational specificity.

2) The “inner or continental crescent”, the “coastal zone”, the rimland represents a space of intense cultural development. Features of “Thalassocracy” are evident here. Although they are counterbalanced by many “telluric” tendencies.

3) The “outer or island crescent” represents “uncharted lands” with which only maritime communication is possible. It first makes itself known in Carthage and the trading Phoenician civilisation, affecting the “inner crescent” of Europe from outside.

This geopolitical picture of the relationship between thalassocracy and tellurocracy is revealed potentially at the beginning of the Christian era, after

the Punic Wars. But it finally makes sense in the period when England became a great maritime power in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The era of great geographical discoveries, which began at the end of the fifteenth century, entailed the final establishment of Thalassocracy as an independent planetary entity that broke away from Eurasia and its shores and concentrated entirely in the Anglo-Saxon world (England, America) and the colonies. The “New Carthage” of Anglo-Saxon capitalism and industrialism took shape as a single entity, and from then on geopolitical dualism acquired clearly distinguishable ideological and political forms.

England’s positional struggle with the continental powers of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Germany and Russia was the geopolitical content of the 17th and 19th centuries (+ second half of the 20th century), and since the middle of our century, the main stronghold of Thalassocracy has been the USA.

In the Cold War of 1946-1991, the perennial geopolitical dualism reached maximum proportions, Thalassocracy identified with the USA and Tellurocracy with the USSR.

The two global types of civilisation, culture and meta-ideology have developed into complete geopolitical outlines, summarising the entire geopolitical history of the confrontation of the elements. However, it is striking that these forms of complete geopolitical dualism on the ideological level were matched by two equally synthetic realities, the ideology of Marxism (socialism) and the ideology of liberal-capitalism.

In this case, we can speak of the realisation in practice of two types of “reductionism”: economic reductionism was reduced to the opposition between Smith’s ideas and Marx’s ideas, and geopolitical reductionism to the division of all sectors of the planet into zones controlled by thalassocracy (New Carthage, USA) and tellurocracy (New Rome, USSR).

The geopolitical vision of history is a model of the development of planetary dualism to maximum proportions. Land and Sea extend their original

opposition to the entire world.

Human history is nothing more than an expression of this struggle and a path to its absolutisation.

This is the most general expression of the main law of geopolitics, the law of dualism of the elements (Land versus Sea).

Geopolitical teleology

Until the final victory of the United States in the Cold War, geopolitical dualism had been developing within an inherently pre-determined framework: thalassocracy and tellurocracy were gaining maximum spatial, strategic and force volume. As both sides were building up their nuclear capabilities, to some pessimistic geopoliticians the outcome of this process seemed catastrophic, since, having fully mastered the planet, the two powers would either have to transfer the confrontation beyond the earth (Star Wars theory) or mutually destroy each other (nuclear apocalypse).

If the nature of the main geopolitical process of history the maximum spatial expansion of thalassocracy and tellurocracy is clear to this discipline, its outcome remains in question. There is no determinism in this respect.

Consequently, geopolitical teleology, i.e. thinking about the purpose of history in geopolitical terms, only reaches the point of globalising dualism and stops there.

Nevertheless, on a purely theoretical level, a number of hypothetical versions of developments can be deduced, once one of the two systems of thalassocracy has triumphed.

Option 1 . The victory of Thalassocracy completely abolishes Tellurocracy civilisation. A homogeneous liberal-democratic order is established on the planet. Thalassocracy absolutizes its archetype and becomes the only system of organization of human life. This variant has two advantages: firstly, it is logically consistent, because one can see in it the natural completion of

the unidirectional (in general) flow of geopolitical history from the complete domination of the Land (traditional world) to the complete domination of the Sea (modern world); and secondly, this is what is happening in reality.

Option 2 . The victory of thalassocracy ends the cycle of confrontation between the two civilisations, but it does not extend its model to the whole world, but simply ends geopolitical history, cancelling its problematics. Just as the theories of post-industrial society prove that the basic contradictions of classical political economy (and Marxism) are removed in this society, so some monist theories argue that in the coming world the land-sea confrontation will be removed altogether. This too is the “end of history”, only further developments do not lend themselves to the same rigorous analysis as in the first version.

Both of these analyses treat the defeat of the Tellurocracy as an irreversible and fait accompli. Two other analyses treat it differently.

Option 3 . The defeat of the tellurocracy is a temporary phenomenon. Eurasia will return to its continental mission in a new form. The geopolitical factors that led the continentalist forces to catastrophe will be taken into account (the new continental bloc will have maritime borders to the South and West, i.e. the “Monroe Doctrine for Eurasia” will be implemented). In that case, the world would return to bipolarity. But of a different quality and level.

Option 4 (which is a development of the previous one). In this new confrontation, tellurocracy wins. It seeks to transfer its own civilisation model to the entire planet and “close history” on its chord. The whole world will typologically become Dryland and “ideocracy” will reign everywhere. A foretaste of this outcome was the idea of a “World Revolution” and the planetary domination of the Third Reich.

Since the role of the subjective and rational factor in the development of historical processes is greater than ever before, the four options should not be seen simply as an abstract statement of the likely development of the

geopolitical process, but as active geopolitical positions that can guide action on a global scale.

But in this case, geopolitics cannot offer any deterministic version. It comes down to a set of possibilities, the realisation of which will depend on a variety of factors that no longer fit into a purely geopolitical analysis.

Rimland and 'border zones'

The entire methodology of geopolitical research is based on the application of the principles of the global geopolitical dualism of Land and Sea to more local categories. In the analysis of any situation, it is the planetary model that remains central and fundamental. Those relations that are characteristic of the overall picture are also repeated at a more private level.

After highlighting the two basic principles of thalassocracies and tellurocracy, the next most important principle is rimland, the "coastal zone". This is a key category underlying geopolitical research.

Rimland is a composite space that potentially carries the possibility of being a fragment of either thalassocracy or tellurocracy. It is the most complex and culturally saturated region. The influence of the marine element, Water, provokes an active and dynamic development in the "coastal zone". The continental mass presses, forcing the structuring of energy. On the one hand, rimland passes into Island and Ship. On the other side into Empire and Home.

Rimland is not, however, merely an intermediate and transitional environment in which the opposition between the two impulses plays out. It is a very complex reality, with a logic of its own and with an enormous influence on both Thalassocracy and Tellurocracy. It is not the object of history, but its active subject. The struggle for the rimland of Thalassocracy and Tellurocracy is not a contest for the possession of a mere strategic position. Rimland has a destiny of its own and its own historical will, which, however, cannot be resolved outside of a basic geopolitical dualism. Rimland is

largely free to choose, but not free in the structure of the choice, because apart from the thalassocratic or telluric path it has no third one.

Because of this quality, the 'inner crescent' is often identified with the areal extent of human civilisation in general. In the interior of the continent conservatism reigns, outside its borders the challenge of fluid chaos.

"Coastal zones, by their very position, are confronted with the need to provide an answer to the problem posed by geography.

Rimland is a border zone, a belt, a strip. At the same time it is a borderland. This combination leads to a geopolitical definition of the border.

In contrast to borders between states, geopolitics understands the term differently, starting from the original model in which the first border or archetype of all borders is a specific historical-geographical and cultural concept of rimland.

The spatial extent of the coastal zones is a consequence of looking at the mainland from outside, "from the face of the sea aliens". It is for the "forces of the sea" that the coast is *a strip* extending inland. For the mainland itself, by contrast, the shore is the limit, the *line*.

The border as a line (which is how it is understood in international law) is a vestige of "land jurisprudence" inherited by modern law from ancient traditions. It is a purely land-based view.

But the maritime view, external to the mainland, sees coastal territories as potential colonies, as strips of land which can be torn away from the rest of the continent, turned into a base, a strategic space. At that, the coastal zone is never completely "one's own"; if necessary, one can take a ship and sail away to one's home, to the "island". The shoreline becomes a strip precisely because it is unsafe for aliens from the sea to go only a certain distance into the interior of the continent.

Since geopolitics combines both views of space maritime and land, it understands the rimland as a special reality, as a border-band, with its qualitative

volume depending on which impulse dominates the sector, land or sea. The giant and quite navigable ocean shores of India and China are lines, strips of minimal volume. The cultures concerned are land-oriented, and the volume of the coastal strips gravitates towards zero, towards being simply the end of the continent. In Europe and particularly in the Mediterranean the coastal zones are broad strips extending far inland. Their volume is at its maximum. However in both cases we are talking about a geopolitical frontier. It is therefore a variable category, varying from line to line, depending on the circumstances.

This approach is also projected by geopolitics into the analysis of more specific problems related to borders. It views borders between states as "zones of variable volume". This volume its contraction or expansion depends on general continental dynamics. Depending on it, these zones change shape and trajectory within given limits. The notion of "geopolitical frontier" may include entire states. For example, the British idea of a "cordon sanitaire" between Russia and Germany envisaged the creation of a "no-man's zone" (semi-colonial and oriented towards England) consisting of the Baltic and Eastern European states. By contrast, the continentalist policies of Russia and Germany gravitated towards turning this zone into a line (Brest-Litovsk, Rappalo, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact). The Thalassocrats-Atlanteans sought to extend it as far as possible by creating artificial "pro-strategic states" (etats-tampons).

In this case, the complete and perfect thalassocracy (England, the United States) applies a double standard: the thalassocrats seek to reduce the borders of their own islands to a line, and the coastal zones of Eurasia to the maximum extent possible. For continentalist geopolitics, it is logical to use exactly the same principle in the opposite direction: Eurasian borders line, American borders strip.

The analogy with the historical rimland as the 'cradle of civilisation' shows the crucial importance of 'frontier zones' in more specific cases as well. Free from the need to bear the weight of the geographical charge of history, 'frontier zones' often channel their energy into cultural-intellectual spheres. And

the skilful use of this "easy" geopolitical potential constitutes the art of the geopolitical strategy of the opposing sides.

It was the "maritime force" that had mastered this to perfection, as it had always been based on the principle of making the most of colonised territories as quickly as possible. This distinguished them from land invaders who, once they had conquered a territory, immediately began to regard it as their own and, therefore, were in no hurry to squeeze what they could out of it.

Geopolitics as destiny

The laws of geopolitics are extremely useful for analysing political history, the history of diplomacy and strategic planning. This science has many intersections with sociology, political science, ethnology, military strategy, diplomacy, history of religions, etc. Indirectly, but at times very clearly, it is also linked to economics, to the extent that some geopoliticians have proposed the establishment of a new science of geoeconomics. In any case, in some aspects of the geopolitical method, reference to economic realities is necessary.

At present, with all kinds of sciences gravitating towards synthesis, towards fusion, towards creation of new interscientific macro-disciplines and multi-dimensional models, geopolitics reveals its importance both for purely theoretical research and for practical steps in managing complex civilizational processes on a planetary scale or on the scale of individual states or blocs of states. This is a science of the future, the foundations of which will soon be taught not only in special institutions of higher education and academies, but also in elementary schools. With the help of geopolitical analysis we may easily comprehend entire epochs of historical development of nations and peoples. With the expansion of information zones inherent in our time, the emergence of such simple and clear reductionist methodologies is inevitable, because otherwise one risks finally losing all reference points in the diverse and multidimensional chaos of flows of heterogeneous knowledge.

Geopolitics is an invaluable aid to education. Its structure is such that it could become an axial discipline in the new stage of school development.

At the same time, the role of geopolitics in the wider social sphere is becoming increasingly evident. The level of information development, the active involvement of the common man in the events unfolding on the whole continent, the "monedialization" of the mass media all bring to the fore spatial thinking in geopolitical terms, which helps to "sort" nations, states, regimes and religions on a single simplified scale in order to make even the most basic TV or radio news at least approximately understandable. If one applies the simple geopolitical grid of heartland, rimland, World Island to any report concerning international events, a clear interpretative model is immediately built up, requiring no additional highly specialized knowledge. "NATO enlargement to the East" in this approach means "an increase in rimland in favour of Thalassocracy"; "an agreement between Germany and France regarding the creation of a special purely European military force" "a step towards the creation of a continental telluric construct"; "the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait the desire of the continental state to destroy the artificial Thalassocratic formation preventing direct control of the coastal zone", etc.

Finally, the impact of geopolitical methodology on domestic and foreign policy. If the geopolitical meaning of certain steps taken by political parties and movements as well as power structures is evident, it is easy to relate them to the system of global interests, and hence to decipher their far-reaching goals. For example, the integration of Russia with European countries (especially Germany) is a step of the tellurist (Eurasianist) forces, hence the strengthening of "ideocratic" ("socialist") tendencies within the country can automatically be predicted. On the contrary, Moscow's rapprochement with Washington means subordination to the Thalassocratic line and inevitably entails a positional strengthening of the "marketists", etc. Similarly, the internal political processes of separatism of peoples within Russia, bilateral or multilateral agreements of different administrative formations and regions among themselves can easily be interpreted in the light of the patterns of

internal geopolitics. Every event acquires a clear meaning in the light of geopolitics. This geopolitical meaning cannot be regarded as ultimo ratio of an event, but in any case it proves to be always highly expressive and useful for analysis and forecasting.

The lack of any textbook on the subject today prompted us to write and compile this book, which provides an introduction to geopolitics as a science.

**PART 1 FOUNDING
FATHERS OF
GEOPOLITICS**

Chapter 1

Friedrich Ratzel States as spatial organisms

1.1 Education: The German "Organizationalist School"

Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904) can be considered the "father" of geopolitics, although he himself did not use the term in his writings. He wrote about "political geography". His main work, published in 1897, is called "Politische Geographie".

Ratzel graduated from the Polytechnic University in Karlsruhe, where he took courses in geology, palaeontology and zoology. He completed his education at Heidelberg, where he became a student of Professor Ernst Haeckel (who was the first to use the term "ecology"). Ratzel's worldview was based on evolutionism and Darwinism and was coloured by a pronounced interest in biology.

Ratzel took part in the war of 1870, where he volunteered and was awarded the Iron Cross for bravery. In politics he gradually becomes a convinced nationalist and in 1890 joins the "Pan-Germanist League" of Karl Peters. He travelled extensively in Europe and America and added ethnological studies to his academic interests. He becomes a lecturer in geography at the Technical Institute of Munich, and in 1886 takes a similar chair in Leipzig.

In 1876, Ratzel defended his thesis on 'Emigration in China', and in 1882, Stuttgart published his fundamental work, 'Anthropogeographie', in which he formulates his main ideas: the connection between the evolution of peo-

ples and demography and geographic data, the influence of topography on the cultural and political formation of peoples, etc.

But his most important book was Political Geography.

1.2 States as living organisms

In this work Ratzel shows that soil is the fundamental, unchanging datum around which the interests of peoples revolve. The movement of history is predetermined by soil and territory. This is followed by the evolutionist conclusion that "the state is a living organism", but an organism "rooted in the soil". The state is constituted by territorial topography and scale and by the people's comprehension of them. The state thus reflects an objective geographical given and a subjective national comprehension of this given, expressed in policy. "Ratzel considers a 'normal' state to be the one which most organically combines the geographical, demographic and ethno-cultural parameters of a nation.

He writes

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"States, at all stages of their development, are seen as organisms which necessarily retain a connection with their soil and must therefore be studied from a geographical point of view. As ethnography and history show, states develop on a spatial basis, becoming more and more contiguous and merging with it, deriving more and more energy from it. Thus, states turn out to be spatial phenomena governed and animated by that space; and it is up to geography to describe, compare and measure them. States fit into the series of phenomena of the expansion of Life, being the highest point of these phenomena" ("Political Geography" (1)).

From this 'organicist' approach it is clear that the spatial expansion of the state is understood by Ratzel as a natural living process, similar to the growth of living organisms.

“Ratzel’s ‘organic’ approach is also reflected in the relation to space itself (Raum). This “space“ changes from a quantitative material category to a new quality, becoming a “*vital sphere*“, a “*vital space*“ (Lebensraum), a kind of “*geobio-environment*“. Hence Ratzel’s other two important terms “*spatial sense*“ (Raumsinn) and “*vital energy*“ (Lebensenergie). These terms are close to each other and denote a certain special quality inherent in geographical systems and predetermining their political formation in the history of peoples and states.

All these theses are the underlying principles of geopolitics, in the form in which it will be developed later by Ratzel’s followers. Moreover, the attitude towards the state as a “*living, natural organism rooted in the soil*“ is the main idea and axis of the geopolitical methodology. This approach focuses on the synthetic study of the whole complex of phenomena, whether they belong to the human or non-human sphere. Space, as a concrete expression of nature, the environment, is seen as a continuous vital body of the ethnos that inhabits this space. The structure of the material itself dictates the proportions of the final work of art.

In this sense, Ratzel is a direct heir to the whole school of German “organic“ sociology, of which Ferdinand Tönnies was the most prominent spokesman.

1.3. Raum political organisation of the soil

How Ratzel saw the relationship between ethnicity and space can be seen in the following fragment of Political Geography:

“The state is formed as an organism attached to a certain part of the surface of the earth, and its characteristics develop from the characteristics of the people and the soil. The most important characteristics are size, location and boundaries. Next are the types of soil together with vegetation, irrigation, and finally the relations with the rest of the conglomerates of the earth’s surface, and above all with the adjacent seas and uninhabited lands, which,

at first sight, are not of much political interest. The aggregate of all these characteristics constitutes a country (das Land). But when one speaks of "our country", to this is added all that man has created and all the memories associated with the land. This is how an initially purely geographical concept is transformed into a spiritual and emotional connection between the inhabitants of the country and their history.

The State is an organism not only because it articulates the life of the people on fixed ground, but because this bond is mutually reinforcing, becoming something unified, unthinkable without one of the two components. Uninhabited space, unable to nurture the State, is a historical field under steam. An inhabited space, on the contrary, is conducive to the development of the state, especially if this space is surrounded by natural borders. If a people feel its territory naturally, it will constantly reproduce the same characteristics that, originating from the soil, will be inscribed in it."(2)

1.4 The law of expansion

Treating the state as a living organism implied a rejection of the concept of "inviolability of borders". The state is born, grows and dies like a living being. Consequently, its spatial expansion and contraction are natural processes associated with its internal life cycle. Ratzel, in his book "On the Laws of Spatial Growth of States" (1901) distinguished *seven laws of expansion* :

- 1) The extent of the States increases as their culture develops;**
- 2) The spatial growth of the state is accompanied by other manifestations of its development: in the fields of ideology, production, commercial activity, powerful "attractional radiation", proselytism.**
- 3) The state expands by absorbing and absorbing political units of lesser importance.**
- 4) The border is an organ located on the periphery of the State**

(understood as an organism).

5) In its spatial expansion, the State seeks to cover the most important regions for its development: coasts, river basins, valleys and generally all rich territories.

6) The initial impetus for expansion comes from outside, as the State is provoked into expansion by a state (or territory) with a clearly inferior civilisation.

7) The general tendency to assimilate or absorb weaker nations pushes for even more territory in a movement that feeds on itself.⁽³⁾

Not surprisingly, many critics have reproached Ratzel for writing 'Catechism for Imperialists'. Yet Ratzel himself did not seek to justify German imperialism by any means, although he made no secret of his nationalist convictions. For him, it was important to create a conceptual tool for an adequate understanding of the history of states and peoples in their relation to space. In practice, however, he sought to arouse "Raumsinn" ("sense of space") in the German leaders, for whom the geographical data of dry academic science had often appeared as pure abstraction.

1.5 Weltmacht and the sea

Ratzel was greatly influenced by his familiarity with North America, which he studied well and to which he dedicated two books: *Maps of North American Cities and Civilization* (1874). (1874) and "The United States of North America" (1878 1880). He noted that the Americans had a "high sense of space" because they were confronted with the challenge of "empty" spaces, having a considerable "*politico-geographical*" experience in European history. Consequently, the Americans consciously carried out what the Old World had arrived at intuitively and gradually. Thus, in Ratzel we encounter the first formulations of another major geopolitical concept, that of '*world power*'

(Weltmacht). Ratzel noticed that large countries in their development have a tendency towards maximum geographical expansion, gradually reaching a planetary level.

Consequently, sooner or later, geographical development is bound to approach its continental phase.

Applying this principle, derived from the American experience of political and strategic continental unification, to Germany, Ratzel foresaw the fate of a continental power.

He also anticipated another major geopolitical theme, the importance of the sea in the development of civilisation. In his book "The Sea, Source of the Power of Nations" (1900)(4). (1900)(4) he pointed out the necessity for every powerful nation to especially develop its naval forces, as the planetary scale of full-fledged expansion demands it. What some nations and states (England, Spain, Holland, etc.) have done spontaneously, the land powers (Ratzel was naturally referring to Germany) must do deliberately: developing the navy is a prerequisite for approaching the status of "world power" (Weltmacht).

The sea and the "world power" are already linked in Ratzel's work, although it is only in later geopoliticians (Mahan, Mackinder, Haushofer, especially Schmitt) that this theme will gain completeness and centrality.

Ratzel's writings are a necessary basis for all geopolitical studies. In a condensed form, his writings contain almost all of the basic theses that will form the basis of this science. The Swede Chellen and the German Haushofer based their concepts on Ratzel's books. His ideas were taken into account by the Frenchman Vidal de la Blanche, the Englishman Mackinder, the American Mahan and the Russian Eurasians (P.Savitsky, L.Gumilev, etc.).

It should be noted that Ratzel's political sympathies are not accidental. The geopoliticians were almost all marked by a strong sense of nationality, whether it took the form of democracy (the Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians Mackinder and Mahan) or "ideocracy" (Haushofer, Schmitt, the Eurasians).

Chapter 2

Rudolf Schellen and Friedrich Naumann Middle Europe

2.1 The definition of new science

The Swede Rudolf Chellen (1864 1922) was the first to use the term "geopolitics".

He was a professor of history and political science at the universities of Uppsala and Gothenburg. He was also active in politics and a member of parliament, distinguished by an emphatically Germanophile orientation. He was not a professional geographer and regarded geopolitics, which he developed from Ratzel's work (he regarded him as his teacher), as part of political science.

Chellen defined geopolitics as follows

:

"It is the science of the State as a geographical organism embodied in space"
(5).

In addition to "geopolitics", Chellen proposed four other neologisms, which he thought would constitute the main sections of political science:

eco-politics ("the study of the State as an economic force");

Demopolitics (“the study of the dynamic impulses transmitted by the people to the State”; analogous to Ratzel’s “Anthropogeography”);

Sociopolitics (“the study of the social aspect of the State”);

Cratopolitics (“the study of forms of government and power in relation to problems of law and socio-economic factors”) (6).

But all of these disciplines, which Chellen developed in parallel to geopolitics, were not widely recognised, whereas the term ‘geopolitics’ became firmly established in a wide variety of circles.

2.2 The state as a form of life and Germany’s interests

In his major work *The State as a Form of Life* (1916)(7), Chellen developed the postulates of Ratzel’s work. Like Ratzel, Chellen saw himself as a follower of German “organism”, which rejected a mechanistic approach to the state and society. *The rejection of a strict division of subjects of study into “inanimate objects” (background) and “human subjects” (actors) is a hallmark of most geopoliticians.* In this sense, the very title of Chellen’s major work is indicative.

Pellen developed Ratzel’s geopolitical principles in relation to the specific historical situation in Europe today.

He took Ratzel’s idea of a “*continental state*” to its logical conclusion with regard to Germany. And he showed that in the context of Europe Germany is the space that possesses axial dynamism and that is meant to structure the other European powers around itself. Chellen interpreted World War I as a natural geopolitical conflict between the dynamic expansion of Germany (the “Axis countries”) and the countervailing peripheral European (and extra-European) states (the Entente). The different geopolitical dynamics of downward growth for France and England and upward growth for

Germany predetermined the basic balance of power. At the same time, in his view, the geopolitical identification of Germany with Europe was inevitable and inescapable, despite its temporary defeat in the First World War.

The geopolitical maximal interests of Germany (= the interests of Europe) are opposed to those of the Western European powers (especially France and England), as set out by Ratzel. But Germany is a “*young nation*” and the Germans are a “*young people*”. (This idea of “young nations”, which the Russians and Germans were considered to be, goes back to F. Dostoyevsky, quoted more than once by Chellen.) The “young” Germans, inspired by the “*middle European space*”, should move towards a continental state on a planetary scale at the expense of territories controlled by the “*old peoples*” the French and the English. The ideological aspect of the geopolitical confrontation was considered by Chellen to be of secondary importance.

2.3 Towards a Middle European concept

Although Chellen was himself a Swede, insisting on a rapprochement between Swedish and German politics, his geopolitical ideas about the independent integrating value of Germanic space closely followed Friedrich Naumann’s theory of “Middle Europe” (Mitteleuropa).

In his book “Mitteleuropa” (1915)(8) Naumann made a geopolitical diagnosis identical to that of Rudolf Chellen. From his point of view, in order to compete with such organized geopolitical entities as England (and its colonies), the USA and Russia, the peoples inhabiting Central Europe have to unite and organize a new integrated political-economic space. The axis of this space will of course be the Germans.

Mitteleuropa, unlike the pure Pan-Germanist projects, was no longer a national concept, but a purely geopolitical one, where the emphasis was not on ethnic unity, but on a common geographical destiny. Naumann’s project implied the integration of Germany, Austria, the Danubian states and, in

the distant future, France.

The geopolitical project was also supported by cultural parallels. Germany itself as an organic entity was identified with the spiritual concept of “*Mittellage*”, the “middle ground”. This was articulated by Arndt as early as 1818: “*God has placed us in the centre of Europe; we (the Germans) are the heart of our part of the world*”.

Through Chellen and Naumann, Ratzel’s “continental” ideas gradually acquired tangible features.

Chapter 3

Halford Mackinder "The geographical axis of history"

3.1 Scientist and politician

Sir Halford J. Mackinder (1861 1947) is the brightest figure among geopoliticians.

Educated in geography, he taught at Oxford from 1887 until he was appointed director of the London School of Economics. From 1910 to 1922 he was a member of the House of Commons and in between (1919 1920) as British envoy to southern Russia.

Mackinder is renowned for his high standing in the world of British politics, whose international orientations he has greatly influenced, and for his bold and revolutionary scheme of interpreting the political history of the world.

McInde's example highlights a typical paradox inherent in geopolitics as a discipline. Mackinder's ideas were not accepted by the scientific community, despite his high standing not only in politics, but also in the scientific community itself. Even the fact that for nearly half a century he was actively and successfully involved in constructing English strategy in international affairs on the basis of his interpretation of the political and geographical history of the world, could not make the sceptics recognize the value and effectiveness of geopolitics as a discipline.

3.2 The geographical axis of history

Mackinder's first and most brilliant presentation was his paper "The Geographic Axis of History" (9), published in the *Journal of Geography* in 1904. In it he set out the basis of his vision of history and geography, which he developed in later works. This text can be considered as the main geopolitical text in the history of the discipline, as it not only summarises all the previous lines of development of "political geography", but formulates the basic law of the discipline.

Mackinder argues that the most advantageous geographical position for the state would be the middle, central position. Centrality is relative, and may vary from one geographical context to another. But from a planetary point of view, at the centre of the world lies the *Eurasian continent*, and at its centre is the "heartland" or "*heartland*". Heartland is the concentration of the continental masses of Eurasia. It is the most favourable geographical base for controlling the world.

Heartland is a key territory in a more general context within *World Island*. In *World Island*, Mackinder includes the three continents of Asia, Africa and Europe.

In this way, Mackinder hierarchises planetary space through *a system of concentric circles*. At the very centre is the "*geographical axis of history*" or "*pivot area*". This geopolitical concept is geographically identical with *Russia*. The same "axial" reality is called heartland, "land of the heartland".

Next is the '*inner or marginal crescent*'. *This belt coincides with the coastal areas of the Eurasian continent*. According to Mackinder, the "inner crescent" represents *the zone of the most intensive development of civilization*. This corresponds to the historical hypothesis that civilization emerged originally on the shores of rivers or seas, the so-called "*Potamian theory*". It ought to be stressed that the latter theory is an essential point in all geopolitical

constructions. The intersection of land and water is a key factor in the history of nations and states. This theme will be specifically developed further by Schmitt and Spickman, however, it was Mackinder who first derived this geopolitical formula.

Then comes the outer circle: *the "outer or insular crescent"*. This is an area entirely *external* (geographically and culturally) to the mainland mass of World Island.

Mackinder believes that the entire course of history is determined by the following processes. From the centre of the land to its periphery there is constant pressure from so-called "*land robbers*". This is reflected especially clearly and vividly in the Mongol conquests. The Scythians, Huns, Alans and so on preceded them. Civilisations arising from the 'geographical axis of history', from the innermost spaces of the world, have, according to Mackinder, an 'authoritarian', 'hierarchical', 'undemocratic' and 'non-traditional' character. In the ancient world it is embodied in a society similar to that of Doric Sparta or ancient Rome.

From outside, from the regions of the "island crescent", pressure is exerted on the World Island by the so-called "*sea robbers*" or "islanders". These are colonial expeditions emanating from an extra-Eurasian centre, seeking to counterbalance overland impulses emanating from the inner limits of the continent. The civilisation of the "outer crescent" is characterised by a "trading" character and "democratic forms" of politics. In antiquity, the state of Athens or Carthage had this character.

Between these two polar civilisational-geographical impulses is the "inner crescent" zone, which, being dual and constantly experiencing opposing cultural influences, has been the most fluid and has thus become the site of the priority development of civilisation.

History, according to Mackinder, revolves geographically around the continental axis. It is in the space of the "inner crescent" that this history is most clearly felt, whereas in the heartland there is a "frozen" archaism

and in the “outer crescent” a kind of civilisational chaos.

3.3 Russia’s key position

Mackinder himself identified his interests with those of the Anglo-Saxon insular world, i.e. with the position of the “outer crescent”. In such a situation he saw the basis of the geopolitical orientation of the “insular world” in the maximum weakening of the heartland and the maximum possible expansion of the influence of the “outer crescent” on the “inner crescent”. Mackinder emphasised the strategic priority of the “geographical axis of history” in all world politics and thus formulated the most important geopolitical law :

“He who controls Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; he who dominates the heartland dominates the World Island; he who dominates the World Island dominates the world. ”(“Democratic Ideals and Reality”) (10)

On a political level, this meant recognising Russia’s leading role in a strategic sense. Makinder wrote :

“Russia occupies as central a strategic position in the whole world as Germany does with regard to Europe. It can launch attacks in all directions and is exposed to them from all sides except the north. It is only a matter of time before its railway capabilities are fully developed. ”(“The Geographic Axis of History”) (11)

On this basis, Mackinder believed that the main objective of Anglo-Saxon geopolitics was to prevent a strategic continental alliance from forming around the “geographical axis of history” (Russia). Consequently, the strategy of the “outer crescent” forces is to tear off as many coastal areas as possible from the heartland and place them under the influence of an “insular civilisation”.

“A shift in the balance of power in favour of the ”axis state“ (Russia A.D.), accompanied by its expansion into the peripheral spaces of Eurasia, would enable the huge continental resources to be used to create a powerful naval fleet: it would not be far off from being a world empire. This will be possible if Russia unites with Germany. The threat of such a development would force France into an alliance with the overseas powers, and France, Italy, Egypt, India and Korea would become coastal bases to which the flotillas of the external powers would dock in order to disperse the Axis forces in all directions and prevent them from concentrating all their efforts on building a powerful naval force. “(”The Geographic Axis of History“) (12)

Most interestingly, Mackinder was not just building theoretical hypotheses, but was actively involved in organising international support for the Entente ”white movement“, which he saw as an Atlanticist tendency aimed at weakening the power of the pro-German Eurasian Bolsheviks. He personally advised the leaders of the White cause, seeking maximum support from the British government. He seemed to have prophetically foreseen not only the Brest Peace Treaty, but also the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact...

In 1919, in his book *Democratic Ideals and Reality*, he wrote:

”What would become of the forces of the sea if one day a great continent politically united to become the basis of an invincible armada?“ (13)

It is not difficult to understand that it was Mackinder who laid the main trend in Anglo-Saxon geopolitics, which after half a century became the geopolitics of the USA and the North Atlantic Union: to prevent by all means the very possibility of creating a Eurasian bloc, the creation of a strategic alliance between Russia and Germany, and the geopolitical strengthening of Russia and its expansion. The steady Russophobia of the West in the twentieth century is not so much ideological as geopolitical. Although, taking into account the link between the civilizational type and geopolitical character of certain forces, as outlined by Mackinder, a formula can be derived whereby geopolitical terms are easily translated into ideological terms.

The "outer crescent" is liberal democracy; the "geographical axis of history" is undemocratic authoritarianism; the "inner crescent" is an intermediate model, a combination of both ideological systems.

Mackinder was involved in the preparation of the Treaty of Versailles, the main geopolitical idea of which reflects the essence of Mackinder's outlook. This treaty was designed to enshrine Western Europe as a coastal base for naval forces (Anglo-Saxon peace). At the same time, it envisaged the creation of Limitrophic States that would separate the Germans and Slavs, preventing them from entering into the continental strategic alliance so dangerous to the "island powers" and therefore to "democracy".

It is very important to trace the evolution of the geographical limits of heartland in Mackinder's writings. If in 1904 and 1919 (respectively, in the article "The geographical axis of history" and in the book "Democratic ideals and reality") the outlines of heartland coincided in general terms with the borders of the Russian Empire, and later the USSR, in 1943 in the text "Round Planet and the Conquest of the World"(14) he revised his earlier views and removed from the heartland the Soviet territory of Eastern Siberia, located beyond the Yenisei. He called this sparsely populated Soviet territory "Russia Lenaland" after the Lena River.

"Lenaland Russia has 9 million inhabitants, 5 of whom live along the transcontinental railway from Irkutsk to Vladivostok. The rest of the land has less than one inhabitant per 8 square kilometres. The natural riches of this land of timber, minerals, etc. are virtually untouched." ("Round Planet and the Conquest of the World")(15)

The removal of the so-called Lenaland from the geographical boundaries of the heartland meant that this territory could be seen as an "inner crescent" zone, i.e. as a coastal space that could be used by the "island" powers to fight against the "geographical axis of history". Mackinder, who was actively involved in organising the Entente intervention and the "White Movement", apparently considered the historical precedent of Kolchak resisting the Eurasian centre as sufficient ground to consider the territories

under his control as a potential "coastal zone".

3.4 Three geopolitical periods

Mackinder divides the entire geopolitical history of the world into three phases(16):

- 1) *The pre-Columbian era.* In it, the peoples belonging to the periphery of the World Island, such as the Romans, live under constant threat of conquest by the forces of the "heartland". For the Romans, these were the Germans, Huns, Alans, Parthians, etc. For the medieval oikumene the golden horde.
- 2) *The Columbus era.* During this period, representatives of the "inner crescent" (coastal zones) set out to conquer unknown territories of the planet, meeting no serious resistance anywhere.
- 3) *The post-Columbian era.* Unconquered lands no longer exist. The dynamic ripples of civilisations are doomed to collide, dragging the peoples of the earth into a universal civil war.

This periodisation by Mackinder, with its corresponding geopolitical transformations, brings us right up to the latest trends in geopolitics, which we will examine in another part of the book.

Chapter 4

Alfred Mahan "Sea Power"

4.1 Sea Power

The American Alfred Mahan (1840-1914), unlike Ratzel, Chellen and Mackinder, was not a scientist but a military man. He did not use the term "geopolitics", but the methodology of his analysis and his main conclusions correspond exactly to a strictly geopolitical approach.

An officer in the American Union Navy, he taught Naval Warfare History at the Naval War College in New Port, Rhode Island, from 1885. In 1890 he published his first book, which became almost immediately a classic text on military strategy. "Naval Forces in History (1660-1783)"(17). This was followed, with a short interval, by other works: 'The Impact of Sea Power on the French Revolution and Empire (1793-1812)' (18), 'America's Interest in Sea Power Present and Future' (19), 'The Asian Problem and Its Impact on International Politics' (20) and 'Sea Power and its Relation to War'(21).

Virtually all of the books dealt with the same theme of *Sea Power*, *Sea Power*. Mahan's name has become synonymous with the term.

Mahan was not only a theorist of military strategy but was also active in politics. In particular, he had a strong influence on politicians such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt. Moreover, if we look retrospectively at the American military strategy throughout the twentieth century, we

see that it is built directly in line with Mahan's ideas. Moreover, if this strategy did not bring sufficient success to the USA in the World War I, then in the World War II it had a significant effect, and the victory against USSR in the Cold War finally sealed the success of the "Sea Power" strategy.

4.2 Maritime civilisation = commercial civilisation

For Mahan, the main instrument of politics is trade. Military action should only provide the most favourable conditions for the creation of a planetary trading civilisation. Mahan sees the economic cycle in three points
:

- 1) Production (exchange of goods and services via waterways)**
- 2) navigation (which implements this exchange)**
- 3) colonies (which circulate goods globally)(22).**

Mahan believes that the position and geopolitical status of a state should be analysed on the basis of 6 criteria.

- 1. The geographical position of the State, its openness to the sea and the possibility of maritime communications with other countries. Length of land borders, ability to control strategically important regions. The ability to threaten enemy territory with its fleet.**
- 2. The "physical configuration" of the State, i.e. the configuration of the coasts and the number of ports on them. Trade prosperity and strategic security depend on it.**
- 3. The extent of the area. It is equal to the length of the coastline.**
- 4. Statistical number of population. It is important for assessing a State's ability to build and maintain ships.**

5. National character. The ability of the people to engage in trade, as maritime power is based on peaceful and extensive trade.

6. The political nature of government. The reorientation of the best natural and human resources towards the creation of a powerful maritime force depends on it.”(23)

Already from this enumeration it is clear that Mahan builds his geopolitical theory on the basis of "Sea Power" and its interests alone. For Mahan, the model of Sea Power was ancient Carthage, and closer to us historically is England of the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.

He bases the notion of "Maritime Power" on the freedom of "maritime trade", with the navy serving merely as the guarantor of this trade. Mahan goes even further, seeing "Sea Power" as a particular type of civilisation (anticipating the ideas of Carl Schmitt) as the best and most effective, and therefore destined for world domination.

4.3 Conquering the world USA

Mahan's ideas were adopted around the world and influenced many European strategists. Even land and continental Germany, represented by Admiral Tirpitz, took Mahan's theses at face value and began to actively develop its navy. In 1940 and 1941 two of Mahan's books were published in the USSR.

But they were primarily intended for America and Americans. Mahan was an ardent supporter of the Monroe doctrine (1758 1831), which in 1823 declared the principle of mutual non-interference between America and Europe and also made the growth of American power conditional on territorial expansion into neighbouring territories. Mahan believed that America had a "*maritime destiny*" and that this "Manifest Destiny" (24) consisted firstly in a strategic integration of the whole American continent and later in the establishment of world domination.

Credit must be given to Mahan's almost prophetic vision. At his time, the US had not yet emerged as an advanced world power, and furthermore, not even its "maritime civilisational type" was evident. As early as 1905 Mackinder, in an article entitled "The Geographical Axis of History", classified the USA as a "land power", forming part of the "outer crescent" only as a semi-colonial strategic extension of maritime England. Mackinder wrote :

"The United States has just become the eastern power. They do not influence the balance of power in Europe directly, but through Russia"(25) .

But 10 years before Mackinder's text appeared, it was Admiral Mahan who predicted America's planetary destiny, to become a leading maritime power with a direct influence on the fate of the world.

In *The American Interest in Sea Power*, Mahan argued that in order for America to become a world power, it must fulfil the following points:

- 1) Actively cooperate with British maritime power;**
- 2) to thwart German maritime claims;**
- 3) keep a vigilant eye on and counter Japanese expansion in the Pacific;**
- 4) co-ordinate with the Europeans in joint actions against the peoples of Asia**(26).

Mahan saw the destiny of the US not to be passively complicit in the overall context of the peripheral states of the "outer crescent", but to take the lead economically, strategically and even ideologically.

Independently of Mackinder, Mahan came to the same conclusions regarding the main danger to "maritime civilisation". This danger is the continental states of Eurasia, firstly Russia and China, and secondly Germany. Fighting Russia, that 'continuous continental mass of Russian empire stretching from western Asia Minor to the Japanese meridian in the East', was a major

long-term strategic objective for the Maritime Force.

Mahan carried to the planetary level the “anaconda” principle applied by the American General McClellan in the North American Civil War of 1861-1865. This principle consists of blockading enemy territories from the sea and along the coastlines, leading gradually to the strategic exhaustion of the enemy. Since Mahan believed that the power of a state is determined by its capacity to become a Sea Power, in the case of confrontation the number one strategic objective is to prevent this becoming in the enemy’s camp. Hence, the task of America’s historical confrontation is to strengthen its position on the 6 main points (listed above) and to weaken the enemy on the same points. Its own coastal expanses must be controlled, while the respective zones of the enemy must be tried by all means to cut them off from the continental mass. And furthermore: as the Monroe Doctrine (in its part of territorial integration) strengthens the power of the state, the creation of similar integration formations in the adversary should not be allowed. On the contrary, the adversary or rival in Mahan’s case, the Eurasian powers (Russia, China, Germany) should be strangled in the “anaconda” rings of the continental mass, squeezing it at the expense of coastal zones taken out of its control and blocking, if possible, accesses to maritime spaces.

In World War I this strategy was implemented in the Entente’s support for the White Movement on the periphery of Eurasia (as a response to the Bolshevik peace deal with Germany), in World War II it was also turned against Central Europe, and in particular through naval operations against the Axis countries and Japan. But it is particularly visible in the Cold War era, when the confrontation between the US and the USSR reached global, planetary proportions that geopolitics had already been operating at the theoretical level since the end of the nineteenth century.

In fact, the main lines of strategy of NATO, as well as other blocs aimed at containing the USSR (the concept of “containment” is identical to the strategic and geopolitical concept of “anaconda”) ASEAN, ANZUS, CENTO are a direct development of the main theses of Admiral Mahan, who on this basis may well be called the intellectual father of all modern Atlantism.

Chapter 5

Vidal de la Blanche “France versus Germany”

5.1 A picture of the geography of France

Vidal de la Blanche (1845 1918) is considered the founder of the French geographical school. A professional geographer, he was fascinated by Ratzel’s “political geography” and based his theories on this source, although he was harshly critical of many aspects of the German geopolitical school.

In his book *The Picture of the Geography of France* (1903) he addresses the theory of the soil, so important to German geopoliticians

:

“The relationship between soil and man in France is marked by an original character of antiquity, of continuity (...). In our country we can often observe that people have lived in the same places since time immemorial. The springs, calcareous rocks originally attracted people as comfortable places for living and protection. Man is a faithful student of the soil. A study of the soil will help in ascertaining the character, manners and preferences of the population.” (27)

But despite this quite German attitude to the geographical factor and its influence on culture, Vidal de la Blas thought that Ratzel and his followers clearly overestimated the purely natural factor, considering it the determining factor.

Man, according to de la Blanche, is also "*the most important geographical factor*", but he is also "endowed with the initiative". He is not just a fragment of the set, but also the main actor in the play.

5.2 Possibilism

This criticism of Ratzel's excessive exaltation of the spatial factor led Vidal de la Blanche to develop a particular geopolitical concept of "*post-Sybilism*" (from the word "possible" "possible"). According to this concept, political history has two aspects - *spatial* (geographical) and *temporal* (historical). The geographical is reflected in *the environment*, the historical in the *individual* himself ("the bearer of the initiative") (28). Vidal de la Blanche thought that the mistake of German "political geographers" is that they consider topography as a determinant of the political history of states. This, according to de la Blanche, diminishes the factor of human freedom and historicity. He himself suggests that geographical spatial position is a "potentiality", an "opportunity" which may or may not be actualised and become a valid political factor. This largely depends on the subjective factor of the individual inhabiting that space.

This approach was also taken into account by the German geopoliticians of the Haushofer school, who considered de la Blanche's criticism to be well founded and important. In such a case, the role of ethnic or racial factors in considering the political history of states was obviously increasing, and this resonated with the general upsurge of racial issues in Germany in the 1920s.

"De la Blanche's 'Possibilism' was perceived by most geopolitical schools as a corrective to the rigid *geographical determinism* of previous geopolitical authors.

5.3 France for Sea Power

Vidal de la Blanche paid particular attention to Germany, which was France's main political opponent at the time. He believed that Germany was the only powerful European state whose geopolitical expansion was blocked by the other European advanced powers. If England and France had their vast colonies in Africa and around the world, if the United States could move almost freely to the south and north, if Russia had Asia, Germany was squeezed from all sides and had no outlet for its energies. De la Blanche saw this as a major threat to peace in Europe and considered it necessary to weaken the development of this dangerous neighbour in every possible way.

This attitude towards Germany logically entailed a geopolitical definition of France as part of a common front of the "Sea Force" oriented against the continental powers. This was not the only position among French geopolitical thinkers, as there was a parallel Germanophile trend, represented by Admiral Lavallee and General De Gaulle.

In 1917, Vidal de la Blanche published a book on 'Eastern France' in which he argues that the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine belonged to France and that German claims to these areas were ineligible. In doing so he appeals to the French Revolution, regarding its Jacobin dimension as an expression of the geopolitical tendencies of the French people, who sought the unification and centralisation of their state through geographical integration. He also explains political liberalism through people's attachment to the soil and their natural desire for private ownership of it. Vidal de la Blanche thus connects geopolitical realities with ideological realities in his own way: the spatial politics of Western Europe (France) is inextricably linked to "democracy" and "liberalism". Through this equation, it is easy to reconcile de la Blanche's geopolitical views with those of McIndar and Mahan.

De la Blanche's choice of a "maritime orientation" fits perfectly into this scheme.

Chapter 6

Nicholas Speakman “The McIndar revision, the centrality of rimland”

6.1 In the service of America

Dutch-born American Nicholas Speakman (1893 1943) is a direct descendant of Admiral Mahan. Spickman was a professor of international relations and later director of the Institute of International Affairs at Yale University. Unlike the early geopoliticians, he was not interested in geography as such, and was even less concerned with the relationship between people and the land, the influence of topography on national character, and so on. Spickman viewed geopolitics as the most important tool of concrete international politics, as an analytical method and a system of formulas to work out the most effective strategy. In this sense, he was harshly critical of the German geopolitical school (especially in *The Geography of the World*(29)), considering notions of “just or unjust boundaries as metaphysical nonsense”.

Like Mahan, Spickman is characterised by a utilitarian approach, a clear desire to provide the most effective geopolitical formula by which the US can achieve “world domination” as quickly as possible. This pragmatism informs all of his research.

6.2 McIndar correction

Spickman, who carefully studied Mackinder's writings, proposed his own version of the basic geopolitical scheme, somewhat different from Mackinder's model. Spickman's main idea was that Mackinder had allegedly overestimated the geopolitical significance of the heartland. This overestimation affected not only the actual position of forces on the world map, in particular the power of the USSR, but also the original historical scheme. Spickman believed that the geographical history of the "inner crescent", the rimland, the "coastal zones", had been carried out by itself and not under pressure from the "nomads of the land", as Makinder believed. From his point of view, heartland is just a potential space, receiving all the cultural impulses from the coastal zones and carrying in itself no independent geopolitical mission or historical impulse. Rimland rather than heartland is, in his view, the key to world domination.

Mackinder's geopolitical formula "*He who controls Eastern Europe dominates the heartland; he who dominates the heartland dominates the world; he who dominates the rimland dominates the world*" Spickman suggested replacing his "*He who dominates the rimland dominates Eurasia; he who dominates Eurasia holds the fate of the world in his hands*"(30).

In principle, Spickman said nothing new with this. And for McIndar himself, the "coastal zone", the "outer crescent" or rimland was a key strategic position in controlling the continent. But McIndar understood this zone not as an independent and self-sufficient geopolitical entity, but as a space of confrontation between the two impulses of "sea" and "land". At the same time, he never understood control over the land in the sense of power over Russia and the adjoining continental masses. Eastern Europe is an intermediate space between the "geographical axis of history" and the rimland and hence it is in the balance of power on the periphery of the heartland that the key to the problem of world domination lies. But Speakman presented the shift in emphasis in his geopolitical doctrine in relation to McIndar's views as something radically new. In fact, it was only

a matter of some nuance of concepts.

6.3 Power scales

In his books *American Strategy in World Politics* (31) and *The Geography of the World* (32) Spickman identifies 10 criteria to determine the geopolitical power of a state. These are an elaboration of the criteria first proposed by Mahan. They are as follows:

- 1) Surface area**
- 2) The nature of boundaries**
- 3) Population size**
- 4) The presence or absence of minerals**
- 5) Economic and technological development**
- 6) Financial strength**
- 7) Ethnic homogeneity**
- 8) Level of social integration**
- 9) Political stability**
- 10) National spirit**

If a state's geopolitical capacity aggregate score against these criteria is relatively low, it almost automatically means that the state in question is forced into a more general strategic alliance, giving up some of its sovereignty for the sake of global strategic geopolitical patronage.

6.4 Mid-Ocean

Apart from reassessing the meaning of rimland, Spickman made another important addition to the geopolitical picture of the world as seen from a 'maritime power' perspective. He introduced the extremely important notion of the '*Midland Ocean*'. This geopolitical view is based on an underlined analogy between the Mediterranean Sea in the history of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa in antiquity, and the Atlantic Ocean in the recent history of Western civilisation. As Spickman considered the "coastal zone", the rimland, to be the main historical territory of civilization, he saw the Mediterranean area of antiquity as a model for culture that spread later into the continent (domestication of land barbarians) and to distant territories reachable only by sea routes (domestication of Sea barbarians). Similarly to this Mediterranean model, in modern times, on an enlarged planetary scale, the same is happening to the Atlantic Ocean, both of whose American and European shores are the habitat of the most technologically and economically advanced Western civilization.

"In this perspective, the Midland Ocean becomes not a divisive, but a unifying factor, the *mare internum*. Thus, Spickman outlines a particular geopolitical reality, which may be called conventionally an "Atlantic continent", in the centre of which, like a lake in a land region, the Atlantic Ocean is situated. This theoretical 'continent', the 'new Atlantis', is linked by a common culture of Western European origin, the ideology of liberal capitalism and democracy, and the unity of political, ethical and technological destiny.

Spickman especially insisted on the role of the intellectual factor in this "*Atlantic continent*". Western Europe and the East Coast belt of North America (especially New York) become the brains of the new "*Atlantic community*". The nerve centre and power mechanism is the USA and its commercial and military-industrial complex. Europe turns out to be a thinking appendage of the USA, whose geopolitical interests and strategic line become the sole and overriding ones for all powers of the West. The political sovereignty of the European states must gradually diminish and power must shift to a

special institution that unites representatives of all "Atlantic" spaces and is subordinated to the primacy of the United States.

Spiekman foreshadowed the most important political processes of the creation of the "North Atlantic Union" (NATO). (NATO), the diminishing sovereignty of European powers in the post-war world, US planetary hegemony, etc.

6.5 The Architect of American Victory

Spickman based his doctrine not so much on a geopolitical understanding of the place of the US as a "Sea Power" in the wider world (like Mahan), perhaps because this was already a fact, but on the need to control the coastal territories of Eurasia: Europe, the Arab states, India, China, etc. for the final victory in the duel of continental and maritime powers. Whereas in Mackinder's picture planetary duality was seen as something 'eternal', 'irreducible', Spickman believed that the perfect control of rimland by 'maritime powers' would lead to a final and irrevocable victory over land powers, which would henceforth be entirely under the control of the land powers.

In fact, it was the ultimate development of the "anaconda tactics" already justified by Mahan. Spickman gave the whole concept a complete form.

The victory of the US as "Sea Power" in the Cold War demonstrated the absolute geopolitical correctness of Spickman, who could be called the "architect of the liberal-democratic world victory" over Eurasia.

For the time being, it seems that Spickman's theses on the strategic primacy of the rimland and the importance of the "Middle Ocean" have been proven by history itself. But Mackinder's theory of the permanence of the Eurasian centre's desire for political renaissance and continental expansion is also too early to be completely discarded.

On the other hand, some of Spickman's ideas (especially those of his fol-

lower Kirk, who developed the rimland theory in even greater detail) were supported by some European geopoliticians, who saw in his high strategic assessment of "coastal territories" an opportunity to re-establish Europe as the country that decides the fate of the world. But to do so, the concept of the "Middle Ocean" had to be discarded.

Despite this theoretical move by some European geopoliticians (which remains, however, highly ambiguous), Spickman belongs, without any doubt, to the brightest and most consistent "Atlanticists". Moreover, he can be called, along with Admiral Mahan, the "father of Atlantism" and the "mastermind of NATO".

Chapter 7

Karl Haushofer Continental Bloc

7.1 War and thought

It is to Karl Haushofer (1869 1946) that geopolitics owes much to the fact that for a long time it was seen not just as a "pseudo-science", but as a "misanthropic", "fascist", "cannibalistic" theory.

Karl Haushofer was born in Munich into a professor's family. He decided to become a professional soldier and served in the army as an officer for over twenty years. He served in Japan and Manchuria as a German military attache in 1908 and 1910. Here he became acquainted with the Japanese emperor's family and the high aristocracy.

His failing health forced Haushofer to abandon a fairly successful military career, and he returned to Germany in 1911, where he lived for the rest of his life. He took up science, earning a 'doctorate' at the University of Munich. Since then, Haushofer regularly published books on geopolitics in general, and the geopolitics of the Pacific in particular. His first book was *Dai Nihon* (33) on the geopolitics of Japan.

Through his pupil Rudolf Hess, Haushofer meets Hitler immediately after his imprisonment in the aftermath of the failed coup. There is an unconfirmed opinion among historians that Haushofer took part in the writing of *Mein Kampf*, in places devoted to certain geopolitical categories. But conceptual

analysis shows a significant difference between Haushofer's geopolitical views and Hitler's simplistic racist propaganda passages.

For 20 years, starting in 1924, Haushofer published *Geopolitik*, later renamed *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, a journal of great international importance.

He published most of his texts in this very edition. Haushofer's relationship with Nazism was complex. In some points his views converged with those of the National Socialists, in others they diverged radically. Depending on the periods of Nazi rule and personal relationships, Haushofer's position in the Third Reich also changed.

He was favoured (particularly by the patronage of his younger friend Hess) until 1936, when he began to cool down. After Hess' flight to England, Haushofer fell out of favour, and after his son Albrecht was executed on charges of taking part in an assassination attempt on Hitler in 1944, Haushofer himself was regarded as almost an 'enemy of the people'.

Despite this ambiguity in his position, he was ranked as an 'eminent Nazi' by the Allies. Unable to withstand so many blows of fate and the collapse of all his hopes, Karl Haushofer and his wife Martha committed suicide in 1946.

7.2 The New Eurasian Order

Haushofer carefully studied the works of Ratzel, Chellen, Mackinder, Vidal de la Blanche, Mahan and other geopoliticians. The picture of the planetary dualism of "maritime forces" versus "continental forces" or thalassocracy ("power through the sea") versus *tellurocracy* ("power through the land") was for him the key that unlocked all the mysteries of international politics, in which he was most directly involved. (In Japan, for example, he dealt with the powers that made the most crucial decisions about the picture of space.) It is indicative that the term 'New Order', which was actively used by the Nazis and, in modern times, in the form of the 'New World Order' by

the Americans, was first used in Japan in relation to the geopolitical scheme of redistribution of influence in the Pacific region proposed by Japanese geopoliticians.

The planetary duality of "Sea Power" and "Land Power" confronted Germany with the problem of geopolitical self-identification. The proponents of the national idea, of which Haushofer was undoubtedly one, sought to strengthen the political power of the German state, which implied industrial development, cultural advancement and geopolitical expansion. But Germany's very position in the centre of Europe, spatially and culturally *Mittellage*, made it a natural adversary to the western, maritime powers of England, France and, in the longer term, the United States. The "thalassocratic" geopoliticians themselves did not hide their negative attitude towards Germany either and considered it (along with Russia) as one of the main geopolitical opponents of the maritime West.

In such a situation it was not easy for Germany to count on a strong alliance with the 'outer crescent' powers, especially as England and France had historical territorial claims against Germany. Consequently, the future of a national Greater Germany lay in geopolitical opposition to the West and especially to the Anglo-Saxon world, with which Sea Power had in fact become identified.

The entire geopolitical doctrine of Karl Haushofer and his followers is based on this analysis. This doctrine is about the need for a "continental bloc" or Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis. There was nothing casual about such a bloc; it was the only full-fledged and adequate response to the strategy of the opposing camp, which made no secret of the fact that its greatest danger would be the creation of a similar Eurasian alliance. Haushofer wrote in "The Continental Bloc":

"Eurasia cannot be strangled as long as its two largest peoples Germans and Russians are trying by all means to avoid an internecine conflict like the Crimean War or 1914: this is an axiom of European politics." (34)

There he also quoted the American Homer Lee. *"The last hour of Anglo-Saxon politics will come when the Germans, the Russians and the Japanese unite."*

Hauschhofer pursued this idea in various ways in his articles and books. This line was called Ostorientierung, i.e. "Orientation towards the East", because it implied the self-identification of Germany, its people and its culture as a western extension of the Eurasian, Asian tradition. It is no accident that the British during the Second World War pejoratively referred to the Germans as "Huns". For the geopoliticians of the Haushofer school, this was perfectly acceptable.

In this regard, it should be stressed that Haushofer's concept of "*openness to the East*" did not mean "occupation of Slavic lands" at all. It was a joint civilizational effort of the two continental powers, Russia and Germany, to establish a "*New Eurasian Order*" and to restructure the continental space of the World Island in order to remove it completely from the influence of the "Sea Power". The expansion of the German Lebensraum was planned by Haushofer not through the colonisation of Russian lands, but through the development of the gigantic uninhabited spaces of Asia and the reorganisation of the lands of Eastern Europe.

7.3 Compromise with Thalassocracy

In practice, however, things did not look so straightforward. Haushofer's purely scientific geopolitical logic, which logically led to the need for a "continental bloc" with Moscow, collided with numerous tendencies of a different nature, also inherent in the German national consciousness. There was a purely racist approach to history, with which Hitler himself was infected. This approach considered the most important factor to be racial proximity and not geographical or geopolitical specificity. The Anglo-Saxon nations of England and the USA were then seen as natural allies of the Germans, because they were the closest to them ethnically. Slavs and especially non-

white Eurasian peoples were transformed into racial opponents. Added to this was ideological anti-communism, based on the same racial principle Marx and many communists were Jews, which means that in the eyes of anti-Semites, communism itself is an anti-German ideology.

National Socialist racism was in direct conflict with geopolitics or, more precisely, implicitly pushed the Germans towards a reverse, anti-Eurasian, Thalassocratic strategy. From the point of view of consistent racism, Germany should have originally formed an alliance with England and the USA, in order to jointly oppose the USSR. But on the other hand, the humiliating experience of Versailles was still too fresh. From this ambiguity flows all the ambiguity of the international policy of the Third Reich. This policy was constantly balancing between a Thalassocratic line, outwardly justified by racism and anti-communism (anti-Slav attitude, attack on the USSR, encouragement of Catholic Croatia in the Balkans, etc.), and a Eurasian Tellurocracy based on purely geopolitical principles (war with England and France, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, etc.).

Since Karl Haushofer was engaged, to a certain extent, in solving specific political problems, he was forced to adjust his theories to political specifics. Hence his contacts in high places in England. Furthermore, the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact, i.e. the creation of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, was externally welcomed by Haushofer, who tried to present it as a preliminary step towards the creation of a full-fledged “*Eurasian bloc*”. He could not fail to realise that the anti-communist orientation of this alliance and the emergence of a peninsular secondary power belonging to the rimland instead of the heartland (Moscow) was a contradictory caricature of a genuine “*continental bloc*”.

Still, such steps dictated by political conformism are not indicative of the totality of Haushofer’s geopolitics. His name and ideas are most fully embodied in the concepts of Germany’s “*eastern destiny*”, based on a strong and lasting Eurasian alliance.

Chapter 8

Karl Schmitt “Hippo versus Leviathan”

8.1 Conservative revolutionary

The German Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) is known as a prominent lawyer, political scientist, philosopher and historian. However, all his ideas are inseparably linked to geopolitical concepts, and his main works “Nomos of the Earth”(35), “Land and Sea”(36), etc. are devoted to the understanding of geopolitical factors and their impact on civilisation and political history.

Karl Schmitt was close to the German representatives of the Conservative Revolution, a paradoxical current which combined national conservative and social revolutionary elements. Schmitt’s fate is that of his books, his legal-philosophical school. Like many other conservative revolutionaries, his relationship with the National Socialist regime was ambivalent. On the one hand, his theories certainly influenced Nazi ideology. Particularly successful were his political science books, *Political Theology* (37) and *The Concept of the Political* (38), in which Schmitt offered a detailed critique of liberal law and the idea of the ‘rule of law’. In these texts the outlines of all Schmitt’s later intellectual work are already given, in them the ultimate political realism, the desire to free the political problems from humanitarian rhetoric, sentimental pathos, social demagoguery is noticeable. This was entirely in keeping with the National Socialist spirit.

However, Schmitt’s entire concept was based on the fundamental idea of

the “*rights of the people*” (Volksrechte), which he contrasted with the liberal theory of “human rights”. In his understanding, every people had the right to cultural sovereignty, to preserve its spiritual, historical and political identity. The same approach was characteristic of some National Socialists, who saw this ideology as universal and applicable to all peoples of the earth. But it was Pan-Germanism, based on chauvinism and a narrowly nationalistic approach, that became the dominant line of the regime. This is why Schmitt, with his theory of the “rights of peoples”, was severely criticised, especially by SS ideologists (in 1936 the SS organ *Schwarze Korps* published an aggressively threatening article against him).

Schmitt’s ideological formation took place in the same atmosphere of “organicist sociology” ideas as Ratzel and Chellen, but he was also influenced by the romantic theories of *the Nordlicht*, according to which social and political forms and state formations are not rooted in the mechanical functioning of atomic personalities combined into mathematical conglomerates, but in mythology, in the sacred world of the “elements and spirits”(39). Throughout Schmitt’s theories there is a paradoxical combination of “political romanticism” and “strict rationalism”. A refined mental apparatus serves to express spiritual mythologemes.

The Nuremberg Trials attempted to classify Carl Schmitt as a “war criminal” on the basis of his collaboration with Hitler’s regime. In particular, he was charged with “theoretical justification of the legitimacy of military aggression”. After the judges were thoroughly familiarised with the merits of the case, the charge was dropped. Nevertheless, like Heidegger, Jünger and other “conservative revolutionaries”, Schmitt became persona non grata in the international academic community and his writings were completely ignored.

It was only in the 1970s, thanks to the enormous influence on legal thought of some left-wing, socialist thinkers, that Schmitt’s writings were gradually rehabilitated.

He is now recognised as a classic of political science and jurisprudence.

8.2 Nomos of the earth

Schmitt, quite in the spirit of the geopolitical approach, argued for the primordial link between political culture and space. Not only the State, but all social reality and especially law derives from the qualitative organisation of space.

From this Schmitt derived the concept of “*nomos*”. This Greek term “*nomos*” means “something taken, shaped, ordered, organised” in the sense of space. This term is close to Ratzel’s notion of ‘relief’ and the Russian Eurasians’ (Savitsky) notion of ‘place-development’. Schmitt shows that “*nomos*” is that form of organisation of being which establishes the most harmonious relations both within a social ensemble and between these ensembles. “*Nomos* is an expression of a particular synthesis of subjective and objective factors, which manifests itself organically in the creation of political and juridical systems. *Nomos* manifests the natural and cultural characteristics of the human collective in combination with the environment.

In his book *Nomos of the Land*, Schmitt shows how the specificity of a particular terrestrial space influenced the cultures and states that developed there. He compares the different historical “*nomos*” with one another, particularly highlighting the fundamental dualism between the attitudes to space of nomadic and sedentary peoples.

But the most important conclusion from the analysis of the ‘*nomos* of the Earth’ was that Schmitt came close to the notion of a global historical and civilisational confrontation between the civilisations of the Land and the civilisations of the Sea. In exploring the “*nomos*” of the Earth, he encountered its qualitative, essential opposition to the “*nomos*” of the Sea. This led him to create a special geopolitical methodology to comprehend the political history of the world.

8.3 Land and Sea

In 1942 Schmitt produced the crucial work *Land and Sea*(40). Together with a later text, *The Planetary Tension between East and West and the Confrontation of Land and Sea*(41), this constitutes the most important document of geopolitical scholarship.

In Schmitt's view, *the Land and Sea divide* is about two completely different, irreducible and hostile civilisations, rather than about variants of a single civilisational complex. This division is almost exactly the same as the picture painted by Mackinder, but Schmitt gives the main elements of thalassocracy (Sea Power) and tellurocracy (Land Power) an in-depth philosophical interpretation, linked to basic legal and ethical systems. Interestingly, Schmitt uses the name '*Behemoth*' for the Land Powers and '*Leviathan*' for the Sea Powers as a reminder of the two Old Testament monsters, one of which embodies all land creatures and the other all water creatures.

"Nomos" of the Earth exists without alternative throughout most of human history. All varieties of this "nomos" are characterised by the presence of a strict and stable legislative (and ethical) form, which reflects the immobility and fixity of the Land, the Earth. This connection with the Earth, the space of which is easily structured (the fixity of borders, the constancy of communication routes, the invariability of geographical and relief features), gives rise to an essential conservatism in the social, cultural and technical spheres. The totality of the Earth's versions of "nomos" constitutes what is commonly referred to as the history of "traditional society".

In such a situation, the Sea, the Water are only peripheral civilisational phenomena, not intruding into the realm of the "ethical" (or intruding episodically). It is only with the discovery of the World Ocean at the end of the 16th century that the situation changes radically. Mankind (and above all the island of England) begins to get used to "being at sea", begins to realise itself as an Island in the midst of the waters, *a Ship* .

But water space is sharply different from land space. It is impermanent,

hostile, alienated, subject to constant change. There are no fixed paths, no obvious differences of orientation. The "nomos" of the sea entails a global transformation of consciousness. Social, legal and ethical norms become "*fluid*". A new civilisation is born. Schmitt believes that the New Age and the technical breakthrough that ushered in the era of industrialisation owe their existence to the geopolitical phenomenon of humanity's transition to the "nomos" of the sea.

Thus the geopolitical opposition of the Anglo-Saxon world to the "outer crescent" takes on a socio-political definition with Schmitt. The "nomos" of the sea is a reality hostile to traditional society. The geopolitical confrontation of land powers with maritime powers takes on a major historical, ideological and philosophical meaning.

8.4 Grossraum

Schmitt developed another important geopolitical theory, *that of* "Grossraum". This concept sees the process of development of states as a quest to acquire the largest territorial volume. The principle of imperial integration is an expression of a logical and natural human desire for synthesis. The stages of territorial expansion of the state thus correspond to the stages of the human spirit's movement towards universalism.

This geopolitical law extends to both the technical and economic spheres. Schmitt shows that from a certain point in time the technical and economic development of a state requires a quantitative and qualitative increase in its territories. This does not necessarily mean colonization, annexation or military invasion. The formation of the Grossraum can also take place according to other laws on the basis of the adoption by several states or peoples of a single religious or cultural form.

According to Schmitt, the development of the Earth's "nomos" should lead to the emergence of the Continent State. The stages of movement towards

a Continental State proceed from city-states through territory states. The emergence of a land-based Continental State, a mainland grossraum, is a historical and geopolitical necessity.

In his 1940 text "Space and the Big Space in the Law of Nations" (1940) (42) Schmitt defined "Big Space" as follows: "*A sphere of planning, organisation and human activity, rooted in an actual and voluminous trend of future development*" (43). Clarifying this somewhat vague formulation, Schmitt pointed to the implementation of the American Monroe Doctrine as an example of the willful creation of "Big Space".

Although the Grossraum can, in a sense, be identified with the State, or more precisely with the Empire (das Reich), the concept goes beyond the framework of the ordinary State. It is a new form of supranational unification based on a strategic, geopolitical and ideological factor.

In contrast to Hitler's unificationist Pan-Germanist model and Schmitt's Soviet internationalism, Grossraum is based on cultural and ethnic pluralism, on broad autonomy, limited only by strategic centralism and total loyalty to a higher authority. However, Schmitt emphasised that the creation of a new Greater Space did not depend on the scientific value of the doctrine itself, nor on cultural competence, nor on the economic development of the constituent parts or even the territorial and ethnic centre that gave the impetus for integration. Everything depends only on the political will recognising the historical necessity of such a geopolitical move.

Schmitt anticipated in this doctrine the main lines of modern integration policy.

8.5 Total war and the figure of the "guerrilla"

Schmitt's geopolitical motifs are discernible in virtually all of the topics he addresses. In particular, he explored the connection between the three concepts of "*total enemy, total war, total state*". From his perspective, the "total

state“ is the most perfect form of state of the traditional type, i.e. the peak of the development of the land-based ”nomos“. Despite the possibility of historical evolution of such a state up to the scale of Grossraum, its essential quality remains unchanged. The ”total state“ excludes the principle of ”total enemy“ and ”total war“ because the concept of the enemy, the ”enemy“ (and Schmitt attached great importance to the formulation of the concepts ”friend“/”enemy“, amicus/hostis) it builds on itself and consequently puts forward the concept of ”form war“ in which Jus bellum operates and only limited contingents of professional military personnel are involved. Civilians and private property, in turn, are protected by law and eliminated (in theory at least) from the course of military action.

The liberal doctrine, which Schmitt explicitly associated with the New Age and therefore with ”maritime civilisation“, with the ”nomos“ of the sea, by denying the ”total state“, thus opens the way for ”total war“ and the concept of the ”total enemy“. In 1941, in the article ”State sovereignty and the high seas“, he wrote:

“War on land was subordinated to legal norms because it was a war between states, i.e. between the armed forces of hostile states. Its rationalisation manifested itself in its restriction and in the desire to remove civilians and private property from it. War at sea, by contrast, is not a war between strictly defined and legally subjected adversaries, as it is based on the concept of a total enemy.”(44)

The overall geopolitical picture described by Schmitt boiled down to a tense civilizational dualism, a confrontation between two Grossraums - the Anglo-Saxon (England + America) and the continental-European, Eurasian. These two ”Greater Spaces“ - Thalassocratic and Tellurian - are engaged in a planetary battle to take the final step towards universalisation and move from continental to world domination. Schmitt, however, was pessimistic about the possibility of reducing this conflict to some strict legal basis, since the civilisational macro-concepts of both ”Great Spaces“ are based on mutually exclusive ”nomos“ ”nomos of the Earth“ and ”nomos of the Sea“. The latter destructive element is introduced by the development of aeronautics, as

“airspace” is even less amenable to ethico-legal structuring than is sea space.

At the end of his life Schmitt focused on the figure *of the “partisan”*. This figure, according to Schmitt, is the last representative of the Earth’s “nomos” who remains faithful to his original vocation in spite of the “dilution of civilisation” and the dissolution of its juridical-cultural foundations. “Partisan” is bound to his native land by informal ties, and the historical nature of this bond dictates to him the foundations of the ethics of war, sharply different from more general and abstract norms. As the “maritime model” and the “trade ethic” become universalized, which naturally encompass the sphere of warfare as well, the figure of the “guerrilla” acquires, according to Schmitt, an increasing civilizational significance as the “guerrilla” remains the last actor in history who defends (by all means) the “land order” in the face of the total offensive of thalasso cratia. Hence its almost “soteriological” historical function.

Chapter 9

Pyotr Savitsky “Eurasia the Middle Earth”

9.1 The fate of the Eurasian

Peter Nikolayevich Savitsky (1895–1968) is probably the first (and only) Russian author who, in the full sense of the word, can be called a geopolitician. An economist by training, a pupil of Vernadsky and P. Struve. Before the war, he was close to the Cadets. After the revolution, he emigrated to Bulgaria, then moved to Czechoslovakia. In 1921, together with Prince Trubetskoy, he led the Eurasian movement, in which geopolitical factors played a central role. It was Savitsky who was the most interested in geopolitics of all Eurasians.

Savitsky’s worldview, like that of most other Eurasians, was influenced by the writings of the Slavophiles, Danilevsky and especially Leontiev. It was a kind of revolutionary Slavophilism, coupled with the central idea of the special historical identity of “Great Russians”, not reducible to either religious or ethnically Slavic essence. In this aspect, they were closest to Konstantin Leontiev, who formulated the most important thesis “*Slavism is, Slavism is not*”, i.e. “the ethnic and linguistic closeness of Slavic peoples is not a sufficient basis to speak of their cultural and characteristic unity”. The Eurasian movement was remarkably close to the German conservative revolutionaries in its set of favoured themes and concepts. Just like the conservative revolutionaries, the Eurasians sought to combine fidelity to origins with a creative impulse towards the future, rooted in the Russian national tradition with so-

cial modernism, technical development and a policy of unconventional forms. The cautiously positive attitude of the Eurasians to the Soviet state and to the October Revolution was also based on this.

Despite the sympathies for the Soviets, which were characteristic not only of the openly pro-Soviet wing of the Eurasians (the Paris Circle that published the newspaper Eurasia), with whom Savitsky officially broke off relations, but also of the most moderate and 'conservative' elements. Following the capture of Prague by the Soviets in 1945, Savitsky was arrested and sentenced to 10 years in camps. While in the camps he met the son of the poet Nikolai Gumilev, Lev, who became his pupil and later one of the best contemporary Russian ethnographers and historians.

In 1956, Savicki was rehabilitated and returned to Prague, where he died 12 years later.

9.2 Russia-Eurasia

Savitsky's main idea is that Russia is a special civilisational formation, defined through the quality of "middleness". One of his articles "Geographical and Geopolitical Foundations of Eurasianism" (1933) begins with the words "*Russia has much more reason than China to be called a "Middle State" (45).*

Whereas Germany's 'middle ground', the Mittellage, is limited to the European context and Europe itself is only the '*western cape*' of Eurasia, Russia occupies a central position within the entire continent. For Savitsky, Russia's "centrality" is the basis of its historical identity: it is neither part of Europe nor an extension of Asia. It is an independent world, an independent and special spiritual-historical geopolitical reality, which Savitsky calls "Eurasia".

This concept denotes not a continent or a continent, but an idea reflected in Russian space and Russian culture, a historical paradigm, a particular civilisation. Savitsky from the Russian pole puts forward a concept that is

strictly identical with McIndar's geopolitical picture, only abstract "robbers of the land" or "centripetal impulses coming from the geographical axis of history", acquire in him a clearly defined outline of Russian culture, Russian history, Russian statehood, Russian territory. Savitsky presents Russia and Eurasia in the same light as Ratzel's Raum and, even more accurately, Schmitt's Grossraum.

If Mackinder believes that from the deserts of the heartland emanates a mechanical push, forcing the coastal areas ("inner crescent") to create culture and history, Savitsky argues that Russia-Eurasia (= heartland Mackinder) is a synthesis of world culture and world history, unfolding in space and time. At the same time, Russia's nature is complicit in its culture.

Savitsky understands Russia geopolitically, not as a nation state, but as a special type of civilisation formed on the basis of several components of Aryan-Slavic culture, Turkic nomadism and the Orthodox tradition. All together they form a unique, "middle" formation, representing a synthesis of world history.

Savitsky sees the Velikorosses not simply as an offshoot of the Eastern Slavs, but as a special imperial ethnic entity which combines Slavic and Turkic substrates. This point leads him to the important theme of *Turan*.

9.3 Turan

The appeal to Turan as a positive orientation was scandalous for many Russian nationalists. For example, Savitsky indirectly justified the Mongol-Tatar yoke, through which "*Russia gained its geopolitical independence and preserved its spiritual independence from the aggressive Romano-Germanic world*". This attitude towards the Turkic world was intended to sharply separate Russia-Eurasia from Europe and its fate, and to justify the ethnic uniqueness of Russians.

"*Without the Tatars there would be no Russia*" this thesis from Savitsky's

article "Steppe and sedentarisation" (46) was the key formula of Eurasianism. From here, there is a direct transition to a purely geopolitical assertion :

"Let us say bluntly: in the space of world history, the Western European sense of the sea, as equal, though polar, is opposed by the only Mongolian sense of the continent; meanwhile in the Russian "pathfinders", in the scope of Russian conquests and explorations the same spirit, the same sense of the continent. " (47)

And so on
:

"Russia is the heir to the Great Khans, the successor to the cause of Chingiz and Timur, the unifier of Asia. (...) It combines simultaneously the historical "sedentary" and "steppe" elements". (48)

The fundamental duality of the Russian landscape, its division into Forest and Steppe, was already noticed by the Slavophiles. In Savitsky, the geopolitical sense of Russia-Eurasia appears as a synthesis of these two realities of the European Forest and the Asian Steppe. This synthesis is not a simple superimposition of two geopolitical systems, but something integral and original, with its own measure and methodology of assessment.

Russia-Eurasia is not all about Turan. It is more than that. But in relation to Europe, which considers everything beyond its "coastal" consciousness to be "barbaric", the self-categorisation of Russians as "bearers of the Mongolian spirit" is a provocation which reveals the historical and spiritual superiority of Eurasians.

9.4 Place-based development

The concept of "place-development" plays a crucial role in Savitsky's theory. This term is a precise counterpart to the notion of Raum, as interpreted

by Ratzel's "political geography" and German geopolitics (+ Chellen) in general. This notion reflects the "organicism" of the Eurasians, which corresponds exactly to the German "organicist" school and contrasts sharply with the pragmatism of the Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians. Had Spickman been familiar with Savitsky's writings, his indignation at the 'metaphysical nonsense' was even stronger than in the case of Haushofer. Thus, Savitsky, in his text 'A Geographical Survey of Russia-Eurasia', writes

:

"The socio-political environment and its territory "must merge for us into a whole, a geographical individual or landscape". (49)

This is the essence of "place-development", in which the objective and the subjective merge into an inseparable unity, into something whole. It is a conceptual synthesis. In the same text, Savitsky continues

:

"A synthesis is needed. It is necessary to be able to look at the socio-historical environment and the territory it occupies at once". (50)

In this, Savitsky is close to Vidal de la Blanche. Like the French geopolitician, who justified the indivisibility of France by the unity of the cultural type regardless of the ethnicity of the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, Savitsky believes that

"Russia-Eurasia is a "place-development", a "whole", a "geographical individual", at the same time a geographical, ethnic, economic, historical, etc., "landscape". (51)

Russia-Eurasia is a "place-development" which is an integral form of the existence of many smaller "place-developments". This is Schmitt's Grossraum, consisting of a whole hierarchy of smaller Raums.

By introducing the notion of "place-development", Eurasians avoided the positivist need to analytically decompose historical phenomena into mechanical systems, applying them not only to natural, but also to cultural phenom-

ena. The appeal to "place-development", to the "geographical individual" allowed Eurasians to avoid too specific prescriptions for national, racial, religious, cultural, linguistic, and ideological problems. The geopolitical unity felt intuitively by all the inhabitants of the "geographical axis of history" thus acquired a new language, "synthetic", not reducible to inadequate, fragmentary, analytical concepts of Western rationalism.

This also reflected Savitsky's continuity with the Russian intellectual tradition, which had always gravitated towards an understanding of "wholeness", "sobornost", "omnity" and so on.

9.5 Ideocracy

A very important aspect of Savitsky's theory is the principle of "ideocracy". Savitsky believed that the Eurasian state should be built from the original spiritual impulse, from the top down. Consequently, its entire structure should be built in accordance with an a priori Idea, and this structure should be headed by a special class of "spiritual leaders". This position is very close to Schmitt's theories of the "volitional", "spiritual" impulse at the origin of the Grossraum.

Ideocracy presupposed the supremacy of a nonpragmatic, intangible and noncommercial approach to state structure. The dignity of the "geographical individual", according to Savitsky, lies in the ability to rise above material necessity, organically incorporating the physical world into the single spiritual-creative impulse of the global historical endeavour.

Ideocracy is a term that unites all forms of non-democratic, illiberal government based on non-materialistic and non-utilitarian motivations. Moreover, Savitsky deliberately avoids specifying this concept, which can be embodied in theocratic sobornost, popular monarchy, national dictatorship and Soviet-type party state. This breadth of the term corresponds to the purely geopolitical horizons of Eurasianism, which encompass vast historical and

geographical volumes. It is an attempt to express the intuitive will of the continent in the most precise way.

Obviously, ideocracy is directly opposed to the pragmatic-commercial approach that dominated the doctrines of McInder, Mahan and Speakman. Thus, the Russian Eurasians brought to final clarity the ideological terms in which the opposition between Sea and Land was historically manifested. Sea liberal democracy, "mercantile system", pragmatism. Dry land ideocracy (of all varieties), "hierarchical rule", domination of the religious ideal.

Savitsky's views on ideocracy resonate with the ideas of the German sociologist and economist Werner Sombart, who divided all social models and types into two general classes - "heroes" and "merchants". On a geopolitical level, the term "hero", "heroism" loses its metaphorical, pathetic meaning and becomes a technical term for the legal and ethical specificity of ideocratic rule.

9.6 The USSR and Eurasianism

The role of Pyotr Savitsky and, more broadly, of Russian Eurasianism in the development of geopolitics as a science is enormous. And it is strange how little attention is paid to this direction in Western textbooks. In Savitsky we have a completely conscious, responsible and competent geopolitician, who fully and validly expresses the position of the Russian Eurasianism, and does so with reference to its most profoundly Russian areas. Savitsky's geopolitical doctrine is a direct antithesis to the views of Mahan, McInder, Speakman, Vidal de la Blanche and other "Thalassocrats". It is only here that we are talking about a complete and detailed presentation of an alternative doctrine, dealing in detail with ideological, economic, cultural and ethnic factors. To use Carl Schmitt's terminology, Savitsky and the Eurasians are the exponents of the "nomos of the Earth" in its current state, consistent ideologues of "tellurocracy", thinkers of a Grossraum alternative to the Anglo-Saxon Grossraum.

Comparing the ideas of the Russian Eurasians with the theories of German geopolitical continentalists (Hauschofer, Schmitt, etc.), who also tried to build their own geopolitical theory as the antithesis of the "Sea Force" strategy, shows that with the Germans in this direction only halfway through, but with the Russians (primarily Savitsky) we are dealing with a complete and consistent, complete picture of the world. In this sense, we can deduce a certain law: "The closer the views of German continentalists to Russian Eurasianism, the more fully they accept Ostorientierung, the more consistent and logical are their doctrines, more effective are their political projects, created on a geopolitical basis.

In this sense, the closest to Savitsky were the German National-Bolsheviks, in particular Ernst Nikisch, who were well aware of the duality of Germany's geopolitical position, whose "middleness" was relative and secondary in comparison to the absolute cultural and continental "middleness" of the Russians. Hence they concluded that Germany could not claim to be a geopolitical synthesis, that it had to choose between a south-western, Slavophobic, Catholic and, in some aspects, "Thalassocratic" (bourgeois) Germany (together with Austria) and a north-eastern German-Slavic, socialist, Russophile, Protestant and Spartan Prussia. Nikisch's famous geopolitical thesis "Europe from Vladivostok to Flessin" is his own, and only such an approach on the German side fits harmoniously into a coherent continental Eurasianism. Naturally, the line of the Austrian Catholic, anti-communist and Slavophobe Hitler, however much more historically responsible conservative revolutionaries and geopoliticians tried to correct it, could not but lead to Germany's long-term loss of its historical existence in a nightmarish defeat, inflicted by those very forces with which an "eternal alliance" could only ensure the German complicity in the world domination of Tellurocracy.

The Soviet reality in a geopolitical sense largely coincided with the concepts of Savitsky and other Eurasians, although there is no reliable evidence of their direct influence on the Soviet leadership. In many ways, the Shmenovkhovtsy and National Bolsheviks, especially Nikolai Ustryalov, who were close to the Eurasians, clearly influenced the Bolsheviks and especially Stalin,

although they never held high positions and often ended up in camps. Some Eurasianists Efron, Karsavin, etc. openly collaborated with the USSR, but did not receive any thanks either. However, an analysis of Soviet foreign policy up to the beginning of perestroika leads to the conclusion that it consistently followed the Eurasian course without ever explicitly declaring it.

And here we can only speculate: either there was some unknown organisation within the Soviet regime that was guided by Savitsky's ideas, adapting them to current political realities and packaging them in the official "Marxist" vocabulary, or the objective position of the Soviet Union was forcing the USSR by inertia to take those steps that a geopolitically conscious continental Eurasian state would have to take.

Chapter 10

Geopolitics as an instrument of national policy

10.1 Planetary dualism basic law of geopolitics

To sum up a brief introduction to the ideas of the founders of geopolitical science, a few general conclusions can be drawn.

Despite the diversity of viewpoints, we are still dealing with a certain unified picture of the world, which can be called geopolitical. This picture of the world seeks to incorporate several disciplinary approaches - geographical, political, ideological, ethnographic, economic, etc. - into the analysis of historical processes and international and inter-state relations. This is the main characteristic of all geopolitical doctrines, which strive for interdisciplinary synthesis.

The most common and shared methodological formula among all geopoliticians is the assertion of a fundamental historical dualism between the Land, tellurocracy, the “nomos” of the Earth, Eurasia, heartland, the “middle land”, ideocratic civilisation, the “geographical axis of history” on the one hand, and the Sea, thalassocracy, Sea Power, the “nomos” of the Sea, Atlantia, the Anglo-Saxon world, the trading civilisation, the “outer or island crescent” on the other. This can be seen as a basic law of geopolitics. Outside the postulation of this dualism, all other conclusions are meaningless. Not one of the founders of geopolitics has questioned the fact of such opposition, despite the divergence in particular aspects.

It is comparable in importance to the law of universal gravitation in physics.

10.2 A geopolitician cannot help but be engaged

Another peculiarity of the views of the founders of geopolitics is their unwavering political engagement. There is practically no geopolitician who has been excluded from the political life of his state. Hence the obvious partiality of all without exception. The geopolitician, starting his scientific research, must determine his own place on the map of geopolitical poles; this will determine the angle from which he will analyse all world processes. In the entire history of geopolitics, we do not meet a single author who is indifferent to the fate of his state and his people, who does not share its basic ethical and historical orientation. This is particularly evident at the extreme poles Anglo-Saxon authors impeccably and unambiguously follow the logic and value system of Sea Power, Thalassocracy, formulating their theories from the position of unconditional supporters of Atlantism; Russian Eurasians are equally consistent in their loyalty to the ideals of heartland they do not even question the absolute ethical and historical superiority of ideocracy and Russia-Eurasia.

It is more difficult with the French, who have a theoretical choice of self-identification either thalassocracy or tellurocracy. In the first case, solidarity with the Anglo-Saxon world, with Sea Power, follows; in the second, Germanophilia. Both imply unconditional national sympathies. Theoretically both are present among French geopoliticians, but the most coherent geopolitical concept has been developed by the Atlanticist group, the followers of Vidal de la Blanche, who remains the central figure in the field. His geopolitical antipodes Lavalley and De Gaulle are much inferior to him from a theoretical point of view.

Germany is also in a dual situation. While its overall geopolitical thought is predominantly continental and “Eurasian” oriented, this orientation is limited to a complex relation to the Slavic world, to Asia and especially to

Russia. This limitation is so essential, and Germany's attempts to voluntarily equate its middle-European position with its middle-Eurasian position, thus ignoring the historical significance of Russia-Eurasia, are so persistent, that in both World Wars Germany had to fight not only against the Thalassocratic powers, but also against its logical Eurasian ally Russia (USSR). German geopolitics can be said to be characterised by a "non-Eurasian" continentalism. This attitude summarises the entire German history in a geopolitical formula and predetermines the very structure of the German national consciousness.

The need for the geopolitician to initially define his own position on the geopolitical map of the world and its belts (Mackinder's diagram in this sense is a very clear illustration) has influenced the fact that this science has developed almost exclusively among representatives of major powers with ambitions to become "world power" (Weltmacht), "superpowers", to achieve planetary domination.

The Americans Mahan and Speakman and the Englishman McIndoe represent the "insular crescent". They are "spokesmen" for Atlanticism, Thalassocracy.

Vidal de la Blanche (and his school) represent Atlanticist France. Laval and De Gaulle lean towards continentalism, "Europeanism", anti-Atlanteanism. Hence their mutual Germanophilia, which brings them geopolitically closer together despite the fact that they belonged to two hostile camps: Laval was the head of the collaborationist Vichy government and De Gaulle the head of the anti-fascist French army.

The Germans Ratzel, Haushofer and Schmitt identify Germany with the axis of the Land, the Tellurocracy, and seek to create a "Great Space" out of Germany, which should oppose Anglo-Saxon Thalassocracy. Joining them, however, is the Swede Rudolf Schellen who thinks in terms of a Middle European, Germanic European space rather than as a narrow Swedish nationalist. The most radical Continentalists Ernst Nikisch, Friedrich Georg Jünger, Arthur Müller van den Broek etc. go even further and believe that

Germany's future lies only in a strategic integration with Eurasian Russia.

Finally, the Russian Eurasians (Savitsky, Trubetskoy, etc.) express the most complete version of continentalism, expressing the most radical position of Sushi "nomos", tellurocracy.

The lack of any prominent names among geopoliticians in other countries (although there were some in Italy, Spain, Belgium, Romania, the Netherlands, etc.) is explained by the fact that the fundamental geopolitical dualism concerns minor states only indirectly, their influence on the course of global confrontation is insignificant, and therefore the very essence of geopolitics, its acuteness, its relevance, its "fateful" dimension are not relevant to them at all.

10.3 The fate of scholars The fate of powers

The nationality of geopolitical scientists has a direct impact on their views. Here the connection is obvious. Geopoliticians, in essence, are the people with the greatest insight and responsibility to recognise the historical trends of global development in the spatial sphere, to understand the place of their state and their people in this context and to formulate a sound and most effective project for the future. That is why so often they directly or indirectly influence world history, which is carried out, however, by completely different forces, groups, parties, leaders, acting under completely different, momentarily relevant slogans.

But there is another interesting pattern. The degree to which geopoliticians have direct influence on power, the feedback between scientific developments and the political course in the international relations of the states concerned varies sharply.

Mahan, Speakman and McIndeer held high offices in their respective states, their political activism had most immediate results, and their direct influence on Anglo-Saxon politics is obvious and enormous. Despite some friction

with the scientific world in their own countries and some (tactical) silence on the importance of their ideas to 'maritime civilisation' as a whole, they were honoured and supported in their lifetime, and their fortunes and careers were exemplarily successful.

This is not the case with continental geopolitics. Vidal de la Blanche was regarded only as a geographer seeking to broaden the scope of his research to a political scale. He is treated by the government with respect but on the whole with indifference, although many of his practical principles (especially those set out in *Eastern France*) are taken up. He does not enjoy the prestige of the Anglo-Americans, but his theoretical legacy is taken into account.

With the Germans, especially Haushofer and Schmitt, the situation is already more serious. Both in the Weimar Republic and under Hitler, attitudes to them change in waves, moving from a certain attention from the authorities to outright repression. Compared with the "thalassocratic" geopoliticians, their fate is tragic; their careers are zigzagging; at certain moments they become victims even of regimes whose national aims broadly coincide with their own. Here it is no longer honour and respect, but hysterical attention alternating with persecution.

With the Eurasians, the picture is even more tragic. There is no direct attention, not a single mention in official sources, only camps, exiles, arrests, persecution and total neglect. Although up to a certain point in Soviet history, one gets the impression that major decisions at the international level are made by the followers of Pyotr Savitsky, checking every step with the Eurasianist publications, the turning point comes in 1989, when it turns out that no one in the Soviet leadership can coherently explain the logic of traditional foreign policy, and the result is the lightning destruction of the giant Eurasian body, created with so much effort by three generations, who endured war, hardship, suffering, and incapacity.

The role of geopolitical personalities in terms of their influence on power is sharply reduced along the West-East axis. The reverence for Mahan and Speakman is contrasted by the constant threats to Schmitt by the SS and the

persecution of Haushofer (his son was shot) and, to an even greater extent, the camp of Savitsky and Karsavin. It is striking that, in the end, it was those countries which listened to and valued their geopoliticians the most that achieved stunning results and came close to finally achieving sole world domination. In contrast, Germany paid the price for its inattention to the “continental bloc” thesis of Haushofer by falling out of history for half a century, suffering a monstrous defeat and lapsing into political non-existence. The USSR, which did not pay attention to the writings of the most responsible, profound and insightful Russian patriots, found itself in almost the same situation as post-war Germany, without a fight or resistance World influence waned, spaces shrank dramatically, economy and social sphere turned into ruins.

PART 2 Modern geopolitical theories and schools (second half of the twentieth century)

Chapter 1

Overview

The development of geopolitical thought in the second half of the twentieth century generally followed the paths outlined by the founders of the discipline. The history with Haushofer and his school, over which the ominous shadow of intellectual collaboration with the Third Reich hung, led authors in the discipline to seek a detour so as not to be accused of 'fascism'. For example, the American Colin S. Gray generally suggested using two words for geopolitics: English "geopolitics" and German "Geopolitik". The first should denote the Anglo-Saxon and pragmatic version of this phenomenon, i.e. the writings of those authors who succeed the approach of Mahan, McInder and Speakman, while the second is the "continental version", the legacy of the Haushofer school, which takes into account some "spiritual" or "metaphysical" factors. Of course, this division is very arbitrary and serves only as a demagogical move dictated by considerations of "political correctness".

The American and more broadly the Atlanticist (Thalassocratic) line in geopolitics developed in practice without any break with tradition. As the American projects to become a "world power" unfolded, the post-war Atlanticist geopoliticians only refined and elaborated the particular aspects of the theory and developed the applied areas. The underlying model of "maritime power" and its geopolitical prospects, evolved from the academic developments of individual schools of military and geography into official US international policy.

At the same time, the emergence of the USA as a superpower and reaching the last stage, preceding the final planetary hegemony of Thalassocracy, made American geopoliticians consider a completely new geopolitical model, in which there were not two major forces, but only one. There were essentially two options, either the West would ultimately win the geopolitical duel with the East, or the two ideological camps would converge and establish the World Government (this project was called “*mondialism*” from the French word “monde”, “peace”). In both cases a new geopolitical understanding of this possible outcome of the history of civilizations was required. This situation gave rise to a special direction in geopolitics, “*geopolitics of mondialism*”. This theory is otherwise known as the doctrine of *the “New World Order”*. It has been developed by American geopoliticians since the 1970s, and was first announced by U.S. President George W. Bush at the time of the Gulf War in 1991.

European geopolitics as a separate entity hardly existed after the end of the Second World War. It was only during the rather brief period of 1959–1968, when the “continentalist” Charles De Gaulle was President of France, that the situation changed somewhat. Beginning in 1963, De Gaulle took some decidedly anti-Atlanticist measures that led France to withdraw from the North Atlantic alliance and to attempt to develop a geopolitical strategy of its own. But as the country could not face the Thalassocratic world alone, intra-European Franco-German cooperation and stronger ties with the USSR were on the agenda. Hence the famous Gaullist thesis of “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals”. This Europe was conceived as a sovereign and strategically continental entity in the spirit of moderate “*European continentalism*”.

At the same time, by the beginning of the 1970s, when geopolitical studies became extremely popular in the USA, European scholars also start to be included in this process, but their connection with the pre-war geopolitical school is in most cases severed and they are forced to adjust to the Anglo-Saxon approach. Thus, the European academics act as technical experts for international organizations such as NATO, the United Nations,

etc., dealing with applied geopolitical research and not going beyond narrow, specific issues. Gradually, this research has evolved into a “*regional geopolitics*” that has developed in France (“the school of Yves Lacoste”, publisher of the journal *Herodotus*). This “regional geopolitics” abstracts from the global schemes of Mackinder, Mahan or Haushofer, pays little attention to the underlying dualism, and only applies geopolitical methodologies to describe interethnic and interstate conflicts, demographic processes and even the “*geopolitics of political elections*”.

The only continuous tradition of geopolitics that has survived in Europe since pre-war times has been the domain of rather marginal groups, in varying degrees associated with post-war nationalist parties and movements. In these narrow and politically peripheral circles, geopolitical ideas, directly derived from “continentalism”, the Haushofer school, etc., developed. This movement collectively came to be known as the European New Right. Up to a certain point, public opinion simply ignored them, considering them “vestiges of fascism”. It was only in the last decade, particularly thanks to the educational and journalistic work of French philosopher Alain de Benoît, that this movement began to be heeded in serious academic circles. Despite the considerable distance separating the intellectual circles of the European New Right from the authorities and their “dissidence”, from a purely theoretical point of view, their writings constitute an enormous contribution to the development of geopolitics. Free from the framework of political conformism, their thought evolved in a relatively independent and impartial manner. Moreover, at the turn of the 1990s the situation was such that the official European geopoliticians (most often coming from the left or extreme left parties) were forced to turn to the “new right”, their works, translations and research to restore the fullness of the geopolitical picture.

Finally, Russian geopolitics. Officially recognised as “fascist” and a “bourgeois pseudo-science”, geopolitics as such did not exist in the USSR. Its functions were performed by several disciplines of strategy, military geography, theory of international law and international relations, geography, ethnography, etc. At the same time, the overall geopolitical behavior of the

USSR on the planetary arena betrays a rather rational behavior model, from the geopolitical point of view. The USSR sought to strengthen its position in southern Eurasia, in the “coastal zone”, penetration into Africa, destabilising actions in South America (designed to split the space controlled by the North American states under the Monroe Doctrine) and even invasion of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (in order to split the American “anaconda”, which sought to bring the strategic borders of Thalassocracy close to the southern borders of the “geographical axis of history”), etc. Such a consistent and geopolitically grounded policy of the USSR points to the existence of a “decision-making centre”, where the results of many traditional sciences were to be brought together and the most important strategic steps were to be taken on the basis of this “synthesis”. However, the social localization of this “crypto-geopolitical” centre is problematic. There is a version that it was a secret department of the Soviet GRU.

Geopolitics itself was developed exclusively by marginal “dissident” circles. The most prominent representative of this trend was the historian Lev Gumilev, although he never used the term “geopolitics” or “Eurasianism” in his works and, moreover, sought to avoid direct reference to socio-political realities. This “cautious” approach enabled him to publish several books on ethnographic history, even under the Soviet regime.

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR, geopolitics became relevant again in Russian society. The abolition of ideological censorship made it finally possible to call things by their proper names. It is not surprising that the national-patriotic circles (the *Den* newspaper and the magazine *Elements*) were the first to take part in the revival of geopolitics. The methodology proved so impressive that the initiative was taken over by some “democratic” movements. Soon after perestroika, geopolitics became one of the most popular themes throughout Russian society.

The increased interest in the Eurasianists and their legacy in contemporary Russia is related to this.

Chapter 2

Modern Atlanticism

2.1 Spickman followers D.W. Maynig, W. Kirk, S.B. Cohen, C. Gray, G. Kissinger

The development of the American, purely Atlanticist line in geopolitics after 1945 was largely a development of Nicholas Spickman's theses. Just as he himself began the development of his theories with corrections by Mackinder, so his followers have largely corrected his own views.

In 1956, Spickman's disciple D. Maynig published a text entitled "Heartland and Rimland in Eurasian History". Maynig specifically emphasises that "*geopolitical criteria must take particular account of the functional orientation of the population and the state and not just the purely geographical relation of the territory to Land and Sea*".⁽¹⁾ The influence of Vidal de la Blanche is evident in this.

Maynig argues that the entire space of the Eurasian rimland is divided into three types according to its functional and cultural predisposition.

"China, Mongolia, North Vietnam, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Eastern Europe (including Prussia), the Baltics and Karelia are spaces organically drawn towards heartland.

South Korea, Burma, India, Iraq, Syria, Yugoslavia are geopolitically neutral.

Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand tend towards a Thalassocratic bloc.”(2)

In 1965, another Spickman follower, W. Kirk, published a book⁽³⁾ reproducing the title of Mackinder’s famous article “The Geographical Axis of History“. Kirk developed Spickman’s thesis regarding the centrality of rimland to the geopolitical balance of power. Drawing on Maynig’s cultural-functional analysis and his differentiation of “coastal zones“ in relation to “telluric“ or “thalassocratic“ predisposition, Kirk constructed a historical model in which coastal civilizations play a central role, from which cultural impulses flow with greater or lesser intensity inland. In this case “higher“ cultural forms and historical initiative are recognised for those sectors of the “inner crescent“, which Maynig defined as “thalassocratically oriented“.

The American Sol Cohen in his book “Geography and Politics in a Divided World“⁽⁴⁾ proposed an additional classification to the geopolitical method based on the division of major geopolitical realities into “*nucleus*“ and “*discontinuous belts*“. From his point of view, each particular region of the planet can be decomposed into 4 geopolitical components:

”(1) The external maritime (water) environment, dependent on merchant fleets and ports;

2) a continental core (nucleus), identical to “Hinterland“ (a geopolitical term meaning “inland regions away from the coast“);

3) the discontinental belt (coastal sectors oriented either inwards or outwards from the continent);

4) regions geopolitically independent of this ensemble.” (5)

The concept of “discontinuous belts” was picked up by leading US strategists such as Henry Kissinger, who believed that the US political strategy regarding “discontinuous” coastal zones was to link the fragments into a single whole and thereby ensure full control of Soviet Eurasia by Atlantism. This doctrine is called “*Linkage*” from the English “link”, “connection”, “link”.

For the “anaconda” strategy to be fully successful, special attention had to be paid to those “coastal sectors” of Eurasia that either remained neutral or gravitated towards the interior of the continent. In practice, this policy was implemented through the Vietnam War, the intensification of US-China relations, US support for the pro-American regime in Iran, support for the nationalist dissidents of Ukraine and the Baltics, etc.

As in previous eras, the post-war American Atlanticist geopolitical school has maintained a constant feedback loop to power.

Another representative of the same American school, Colin Gray, develops geopolitical views on the “nuclear era”. In his book “The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Age”(6) he outlines the military strategy of the US and NATO, in which he puts the planetary location of nuclear facilities in relation to the geographical and geopolitical features of the regions.

2.2 The Atlantists won the Cold War

The geopolitical development of Atlanticism reaches its climax by the early 1990s. The “anaconda” strategy demonstrates absolute efficiency. During this period one can observe the almost “prophetic” correctness of the first Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians Mackinder and Mahan, corrected by Spickman.

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the USSR marks the triumph of the orientation of the Atlanticist strategy pursued throughout the 20th century. The West wins the Cold War with the East. Sea Power celebrates its victory over heartland.

Geopolitically, this event is explained as follows:

The confrontation between the Soviet bloc and NATO was the first pure and unadulterated form of opposition between Land and Sea, Behemoth and Leviathan. The geopolitical balance of power reflected not just ideological but also geopolitical constants.

The USSR as a heartland, as Eurasia, embodied a Soviet-style ideocracy. Geographically, it was a rather integrated “Big Space” with enormous natural resources and advanced strategic weaponry. The main advantage of the USSR was the “cultural and functional” inclinations of the population living in its expanse or adjacent to Soviet territory, and the availability of hard-to-reach inland expanses allowing the creation of reliable defence and technological bridgeheads. In addition, the USSR had maritime borders on two sides from the North and East, which were much easier to defend than land borders.

Through a centralised economy, the USSR achieved commodity and food autarchy and military superpower status. To the extent possible, it sought to extend its influence to other continents.

But the Eastern Bloc had several fundamental geopolitical disadvantages. The most important was the vast length of the land borders. While in the South the border coincided with the ridge of Eurasian mountains, from Manchuria to the Tien Shan, Pamir and Caucasus, in the West the border ran in the middle of flat Europe, which was a strategic springboard for Atlanticism, while its central base was on the western shore of the “Midland Ocean”. Even to the south, however, the mountains served not only as a defence, but also as an obstacle, blocking the way for possible expansion and access to the southern seas.

In doing so, the Eastern bloc was forced to concentrate military-strategic, economic, intellectual, productive forces and natural resources in the same geopolitical centre.

This was in stark contrast to the geopolitical position of the West at the heart of the United States. (This was particularly important, since Western Europe had an unenviable position in this balance of power; it was given the role of a land base for the United States, adjacent to the borders of the opposing camp, a kind of “*cordon sanitaire*”). America was fully protected by its “*maritime frontiers*”. Moreover, by strategically integrating its continent, it gained control over a huge part of the Eurasian coastline, the

rimland. From Western Europe through Greece and Turkey (NATO member states), Atlanticist control extended to the Far East (Thailand, South Korea, strategically colonised Japan) and this zone moved smoothly into the Indian and Pacific Oceans crucial military bases in San Diego Island, the Philippines, and onwards to Guam, the Caribbean and Haiti. Consequently, all potential conflicts were moved outside the core strategic area.

In doing so, the Atlanticists created a complex differentiated system of geopolitical distribution of power “cores”. The U.S. directly provided the military and strategic power. Intellectual, financial and production structures, as well as high-tech development centres, were concentrated in Western Europe, free from the burden of ensuring its own military security (apart from police and purely decorative armed forces).

Natural resources came from economically underdeveloped regions of the Third World, from where cheap labour also came to a large extent.

Maintaining the status quo established immediately after the Second World War was an offensive position, as Atlanticist geopoliticians predicted that such a situation would inevitably lead to the exhaustion of the continental bloc, doomed to complete autarchy and forced to develop all strategic directions simultaneously on its own.

The heartland had only two choices in such a situation. The first was to carry out military expansion into the West with the aim of conquering Europe as far as the Atlantic. The USSR could then secure its maritime borders and its industrial-intellectual and technological potential. In parallel, a similar effort should have been made in the southern direction to finally reach the warm seas and break up the Sea Power “anaconda ring”. It is a hard road that could lead, if successful, to a stable continental world and, in the short term, to the collapse of a rimland-deprived America.

The other option was, on the contrary, the withdrawal of the USSR and its armed forces from Eastern Europe in exchange for the withdrawal of NATO forces from Western Europe and the creation of a single, strictly neutral Eu-

ropean bloc (possibly with a limited “dissuasive” nuclear capability). This option was seriously discussed during the De Gaulle era.

The same could be done with Asia. The idea of relinquishing direct political control over some of the Central Asian republics in exchange for the creation, with Afghanistan, Iran and India (possibly China), of a powerful strategic anti-American bloc oriented intra-continently.

It would finally be possible to combine the two options and go the peaceful way in the West and the forceful way in the East (or vice versa). The important thing was to start both of these geopolitical actions in sync. Only then could one hope to change the planetary balance of power from a clear positional loss of the Land to its gain. It was necessary to break through “*containment*” as the geopolitical tactics of “anaconda” were called during the Cold War.

But since the USSR never dared to take this radical geopolitical step, the Atlanticist powers were left to reap the results of their strictly calculated and geopolitically verified long-term positioning strategy.

The autarchic Soviet power failed from the comprehensive overstretch and collapsed. And the military invasion of Afghanistan without a parallel strategic move in Western Europe (peaceful or non-peaceful), instead of saving the day, finally made things worse.

2.3 Aerocracy and etherocracy

Traditional Atlanticist geopolitics, assuming Sea Power at the centre of its concept, is the “geopolitics of the sea”. A global strategy based on this geopolitics led the West to establish planetary power. But the development of technology led to the development of airspace, which made the development of “*air geopolitics*” relevant.

Unlike “geopolitics of the sea”, which is complete and fully developed, there is no full-fledged “geopolitics of the air”. The aeronautics factor is added to the overall geopolitical picture. But some of the correlations in the actualisation of the air environment and the related new types of weapons of strategic aviation, intercontinental missiles and nuclear weapons have changed considerably.

The development of airspace has to some extent equalised Land and Sea, since for aircraft and missiles the difference between these spaces is not so significant. (A particularly important step was the creation of aircraft carriers, as this finally decoupled air bases from Land, making them independent of the quality of the land surface.)

At the same time, the development of aviation has changed the proportions of the planetary scale, making the Earth much “smaller” and distances “shorter”. At the same time, rocket science and the development of strategic aviation have largely relativised the traditional geopolitical factors of sea and land borders, intra-continental bases, etc.

The transfer of weapons to Earth orbit and the strategic development of outer space was the final stage in the “shrinking” of the planet and the final relativisation of spatial differences.

In addition to Land and Sea, current geopolitics has to take into account the two elements of air and ether (outer space). Nuclear weapons (air) and the Star Wars programme (space) correspond to these elements at the military level. By analogy with tellurocracy (land power) and thalassocracy (sea power), these two latest modifications of geopolitical systems may be called aerocracy (air power) and etherocracy (ether power).

Karl Schmitt gave a sketchy outline of these two new spheres. His most important and fundamental observation is that both “aerocracy” and “etherocracy” represent the further development of “nomos” of the Sea, the advanced phases of “thalasso cratia”, since the entire technical process of mastering the new spheres is directed towards “liquefaction” of the environment, This,

according to Schmitt, is accompanied by corresponding cultural and civilizational processes of a progressive departure from the “nomos” of Dryland, not only strategically, but also in ethical, spiritual and socio-political senses.

In other words, the development of the air and space environment is a continuation of purely Thalassocratic tendencies, and can therefore be seen as the highest stage of a purely Atlantic strategy.

From this perspective, the nuclear confrontation of the blocs in the Cold War is presented as competition under conditions imposed by “Sea Power” on the heartland, forced to accept the conditions of a strategic positional duel dictated by the opposing side. Such a process of active “liquefaction of the elements”, associated with the logic of the development of the Western world in the technological and strategic sense, parallels the offensive position of the Atlanticists in their policy of detaching coastal zones from the continental centre in both cases there is an offensive initiative of one geopolitical camp and a defensive response of the other.

Intellectually, this translates into the fact that Atlantists are developing “active geopolitics” on a theoretical level, engaging in this science openly and systematically.

Geopolitics, in the case of the West, acts as a discipline that dictates the general contours of international strategy. In the case of the Eastern Bloc, however, it has not been officially recognised for a long time and still exists as a “*reaction*” to the moves of a potential adversary. It was and is a “*passive geopolitics*”, responding to the strategic challenge of atlantism more by inertia.

While in the case of nuclear weapons and aviation (in the sphere of aerocracy) the USSR was able to achieve relative parity at the cost of straining all domestic resources, in the next stage, there was a structural breakdown in the sphere of aerocracy and the competition in the field of Star Wars technology led to a final geopolitical loss and to defeat in the Cold War.

To understand the essence of geopolitical processes in a nuclear world

and in the development of orbital space, Carl Schmitt's observation that aerocracy and etherocracy are not independent civilisational systems, but only the development of the "nomos" of the Sea, is fundamental.

2.4 Two versions of recent Atlanticism

The victory of the Atlanticists over the USSR (heartland) meant entry into a radically new era, which required original geopolitical models. The geopolitical status of all traditional territories, regions, states and alliances changed dramatically. The understanding of the planetary reality after the end of the Cold War led Atlanticist geopoliticians to two fundamental schemes.

One of them can be called "pessimistic" (for Atlantism). It inherits the traditional Atlanticist line of confrontation with the heartland, which is considered to be unfinished and not removed from the agenda with the fall of the USSR, and foreshadows the formation of new Eurasian blocs based on civilizational traditions and stable ethnic archetypes. This option could be called "neo-Atlanticism", and its essence is ultimately reduced to continuing to consider the geopolitical picture of the world from the perspective of fundamental dualism, which is only nuanced by singling out additional geopolitical zones (other than Eurasia), which could also become pockets of confrontation with the West in the future. The most prominent representative of this neo-Atlantic approach is Samuel Huntington.

The second scheme, based on the same original geopolitical picture, by contrast, is optimistic (for Atlanticism) in the sense that it considers the situation resulting from the Western victory in the Cold War to be final and irreversible. This is the basis of the theory of "Mondialism", the concept of *the End of History* and *One World*, which argues that all forms of geopolitical differentiation - cultural, national, religious, ideological, state, etc. - are about to be finally overcome and an era of a common human civilisation based on the principles of liberal democracy is about to dawn. History will end along with the geopolitical confrontation that initially gave the main

impetus to history. This geopolitical project is associated with the name of American geopolitician Francis Fukuyama, who wrote a program article with the expressive title “The End of History”. This Mondialist theory is discussed in the next chapter.

Let us examine the main points of Huntington’s concept, which is an ultramodern development of traditional Western Atlanticist geopolitics. It is important that Huntington constructs his program article “Clash of civilizations” as a response to Fukuyama’s thesis. (Clash of civilizations is a response to Fukuyama’s “End of History” thesis. Tellingly, on the political level, this polemic corresponds to the two leading political parties in the US: Fukuyama expresses the Democrats’ global strategic position, while Huntington is a mouthpiece for the Republicans. This rather accurately expresses the essence of the two newest geopolitical projects Neo-Atlanticism follows a conservative line, while “Mondialism” prefers an entirely new approach, in which all geopolitical realities are subject to a complete revision.

2.5 The Clash of Civilisations: Huntington’s Neo-Atlantism

The meaning of the theory of Samuel P. Huntington, Director of the John Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. The point of Samuel P. Huntington’s theory as formulated in his article “The Clash of Civilizations” (7) (which appeared as a summary of a major geopolitical project, “Changes in Global Security and American National Interest (7) (which appeared as a summary of the great geopolitical project ”The Change in Global Security and the American National Interest“), is as follows:

The apparent geopolitical victory of Atlantism across the planet with the fall of the USSR disappeared as the last stronghold of continental power in fact touches only a superficial slice of reality. The strategic success of NATO, accompanied by ideological framing, the abandonment of the main competitive communist ideology, does not touch the underlying civilizational layers.

Huntington argues, contrary to Fukuyama, that strategic victory is not a civilisational victory; the Western ideology of liberal democracy, the market, etc. have only temporarily become non-alternative, as non-Western peoples will soon begin to have civilisational and geopolitical features, analogous to the "geographical individual" of which Savitsky spoke.

The abandonment of the ideology of communism and shifts in the structure of traditional states, the disintegration of some entities, the emergence of others, etc. will not lead to the automatic alignment of all humanity with a universal system of Atlantean values, but will, rather, make deeper cultural layers liberated from superficial ideological clichés relevant again.

Huntington quotes George Weigel: "*Desecularisation is one of the dominant social factors at the end of the twentieth century*". And consequently, instead of discarding religious identification in the One World, as Fukuyama suggests, nations will, on the contrary, feel religious affiliation even more vividly.

Huntington argues that along with the Western (= Atlantean) civilisation, which includes North America and Western Europe, the geopolitical fixation of seven other potential civilisations can be foreseen:

1) Slavic-Orthodox,

2) Confucian (Chinese),

3) Japanese,

4) Islamic,

5) Hindu,

6) Latin American

and possibly (7) African (8).

Of course, these potential civilizations are by no means equal. But all of them are united in the fact that the vector of their development and forma-

tion will be oriented in a different direction from the trajectory of Atlantism and Western civilization. Thus, the West will once again find itself in a situation of confrontation. Huntington believes that this is practically inevitable and that already now, despite the euphoria of mondialist circles, a realistic formula should be adopted: "*The West and The Rest*" (9).

The geopolitical conclusions from this approach are obvious: Huntington believes that Atlantists should strengthen the strategic position of their own civilisation in every possible way, prepare for confrontation, consolidate strategic efforts, restrain anti-Atlantic tendencies in other geopolitical entities and prevent them from merging into a continental alliance dangerous to the West.

He makes these recommendations:

"The West should

Ensure closer cooperation and unity within their own civilisation, especially between its European and North American parts;

Integrate into Western civilisation those societies in Eastern Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the West;

ensure closer relations with Japan and Russia;

prevent local conflicts between civilisations from escalating into global wars;

limit the military expansion of Confucian and Islamic states;

To halt the curtailment of Western military power and ensure military superiority in the Far East and Southwest Asia;

exploit difficulties and conflicts in relations between Islamic and Confucian countries;

support groups oriented towards Western values and interests in other civilisations;

strengthen international institutions that reflect and legitimise Western interests and values, and ensure the involvement of non-Western states in these institutions". (10)

This is a concise and succinct formulation of the doctrine of neo-Atlanticism.

In terms of pure geopolitics, this means following closely the principles of Mahan and Speakman, with Huntington's emphasis on culture and civilizational differences as crucial geopolitical factors indicating that he belongs to the classical school of geopolitics, which dates back to an 'organicist' philosophy that originally viewed social structures and states not as mechanical or purely ideological entities, but as 'life forms'.

Huntington points to China and Islamic states (Iran, Iraq, Libya, etc.) as the most likely adversaries of the West. This is directly influenced by the doctrines of Maynig and Kirk, who believed that the orientation of "coastal zones", rimland and "Confucian" and Islamic civilizations are geopolitically predominantly rimland rather than heartland positions. Therefore, unlike other representatives of neo-Atlantism such as Paul Wolfowitz, Huntington does not see the main threat in the geopolitical revival of Russia-Eurasia, the heartland or some new Eurasian continental entity.

The March 1992 report by American Paul Wolfowitz (Security Advisor) to the US government, however, states "the need to prevent the emergence on the European and Asian continents of a strategic force capable of confronting the United States"(11), and goes on to explain that the most likely force in question is Russia, and that a "cordon sanitaire" based on the Baltic States should be established against it. Here the American strategist Wolfowitz is closer to McIndoe than to Spickman, which distinguishes his views from Huntington's theory.

In all cases, regardless of the definition of a particular potential enemy, the position of all neo-Atlantists remains essentially the same: the victory in the Cold War does not cancel the threat to the West coming from other geopolitical formations (present or future). Consequently, it is premature

to talk about “One World”, and the planetary dualism of thalassocracy (reinforced by aerocracy and etherocracy) and tellurocracy remains the main geopolitical scheme for the 21st century.

A new and more general formula for this dualism is Huntington’s thesis The West and The Rest.

Chapter 3

Mondialism

3.1 Prehistory of Mondialism

The concept of “Mondialism” emerged long before the final victory of the West in the Cold War.

The point of monialism is to postulate the inevitability of full planetary integration, the transition from a plurality of states, peoples, nations and cultures to a unified One World.

The origins of this idea can be discerned in certain utopian and chiliastical movements dating back to the Middle Ages and, later, to antiquity. It is based on the notion that at some culminating point in history there will be a gathering of all the peoples of the earth into one kingdom that will no longer know the contradictions, tragedies, conflicts and problems inherent in ordinary earthly history. In addition to the purely mystical version of the Mondialist utopia, there were also rationalist versions, one of which is the “Third Age” of the positivist Auguste Comte or Lessing’s humanist eschatology.

The Mondialist ideas were most often shared by moderate European and especially English socialists (some of whom were grouped together in the Fabian Society). Communists also spoke of a One World State. On the other hand, similar mondialist organisations were set up from the late 19th century

by major figures in world business, such as Sir Cecil Rhodes, who organised the Round Table, whose members were to “promote a system of unimpeded trade throughout the world and the establishment of a One World Government”. Often, socialist motives intermingled with liberal-capitalist ones, and communists were neighbours in these organisations with representatives of the largest financial capital. All were united in their belief in the utopian idea of planetary unification.

It is telling that such well-known organisations as the League of Nations, later the UN, and UNESCO were extensions of such mondialist circles that had great influence on world politics.

During the twentieth century, these Mondialist organisations, which avoided unnecessary publicity and often even had a “secret” character, changed many names. There was the “Universal Movement for World Confederation” by Harry Davies, the “Federal Union” and even the “Crusade for World Government” (organised by the English parliamentarian Henry Asborne in 1946).

As all conceptual and strategic power over the West was concentrated in the United States, it became the main headquarters of monialism, whose representatives formed a parallel power structure of advisers, analysts and centres of strategic research.

This is how the three main Mondialist organisations emerged, the very existence of which was only relatively recently made known to the public in the West. In contrast to formal structures, these groups enjoyed much greater freedom of design and research, as they were freed from the fixed and formal procedures governing UN commissions, etc.

The first was the Council on Foreign Relations (*C.F.R.*). It was founded by Morgan, a major American banker. This informal organisation was engaged in formulating an American strategy on a planetary scale, with the ultimate goal being the complete unification of the planet and the creation of a World Government. It was founded in 1921 as an offshoot of the Carnegie Endowment for Universal Peace, and all high-ranking politicians who belonged to

it were initiated into the Mondialist vision of the future of the planet. Since most members of the C.F.R. were at the same time high dignitaries of Scottish Freemasonry, it can be assumed that their geopolitical projects also had some humanistic-mystical dimension.

In 1954 a second Mondialist structure, *the Bilderberg Club* or *Bilderberg Group*, was created. It no longer united only American analysts, politicians, financiers and intellectuals, but also their European counterparts. On the American side, it was represented exclusively by members of the C.F.R. and was seen as its international extension.

In 1973 the Bilderberg Group created a third major monetary institution, the “*Trilateral Commission*” or “*Trilateral*”. It was headed by Americans in the C.F.R. and the Bilderberg Group and had two headquarters in Europe and Japan in addition to the United States, where its headquarters were located (345 East 46th Street, New York).

“The Trilateral Commission is named for fundamental geopolitical reasons. It is intended to unite, under the umbrella of Atlanticism and the US, the *three* 'big spaces' leading in technological development and market economies:

- 1) The Americas, which includes North and South America;**
- 2) European space;**
- 3) The Pacific space controlled by Japan.**

At the head of the most important Bilderberg and Trilateralist groups is a high-ranking member of the C.F.R. the biggest banker, David Rockefeller, owner of Chase Manhattan Bank.

Apart from him, at the heart of all the Mondialist projects are the unfailing analysts, geopoliticians and strategists of Atlanticism, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger. This also includes the famous George Ball.

The main line of all monialist projects was the transition to a single world

system, under the strategic dominance of the West and "progressive", "humanist", "democratic" values. For this purpose, parallel structures consisting of politicians, journalists, intellectuals, financiers, analysts, etc. were developed to prepare the ground before this monialist project of World Government could be made public, since without preparation it would encounter powerful psychological resistance from peoples and states unwilling to dissolve their identities in a planetary *melting pot*.

The Mondialist project developed and pursued by these organisations was not homogeneous. There were two main versions of it, which, while differing in methods, were supposed to lead theoretically to the same goal.

3.2 Convergence theory

The first most pacifist and "conciliatory" version of monialism is known as the "convergence theory". Developed in the 1970s within the C.F.R. by a group of "leftist" analysts led by Zbigniew Brzezinski, this theory suggested the possibility of overcoming the ideological and geopolitical dualism of the Cold War by creating a new cultural and ideological type of civilisation, which would be intermediate between socialism and capitalism, between pure Atlanticism and pure Continentalism.

Soviet Marxism was seen as an obstacle which could be overcome by moving to its moderate, social democratic, revisionist version through the rejection of the theses of "dictatorship of the proletariat", "class struggle", "nationalisation of the means of production" and "abolition of private property". In turn, the capitalist West would have to restrict market freedom, introduce partial state regulation of the economy, etc. A common cultural orientation could be found in the traditions of the Enlightenment and humanism, to which both Western democratic regimes and the social ethics of communism (in its softened social-democratic versions) can be traced.

A world government, which could emerge on the basis of "convergence theory", was envisaged as allowing Moscow to take over Atlantic governance of

the planet in cooperation with Washington. In this case, an era of universal peace would begin, the Cold War would end, and nations would be able to relieve the burden of geopolitical tension.

It is important to draw a parallel here with the transition of technological systems from "Thalassocracy" to "Etherocracy": the Mondialist politicians began to look at the planet not through the eyes of the inhabitants of a western continent surrounded by the sea (like the traditional Atlanteans), but through the eyes of "astronauts in space orbit". In this case, they were really looking at One World, the One World.

The Mondialist centres also had correspondents in Moscow. A key figure here was Academician Gvishiani, Director of the Institute for Systems Research, which was something like a branch of Trilaterals in the USSR. However, they were particularly successful amongst the extreme left-wing parties in Western Europe, most of whom had taken the path of "Eurocommunism", which was seen as the main conceptual basis for global convergence.

3.3 A planetary victory for the West

Convergence theories were the ideological basis on which Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisers relied for perestroika. A few years before Soviet perestroika began, however, a similar project had begun in China, with which the Trilateral Commission had established close relations since the late 1970s. But the geopolitical fate of the Chinese and Soviet "perestroika" were different. China insisted on a "fair" distribution of roles and a corresponding shift in Western ideology towards socialism. The USSR went much further down the road of concessions.

Following the logic of the American monialists, Gorbachev began a structural transformation of the Soviet space towards 'democratisation' and 'liberalisation'. First of all, this affected the Warsaw Pact countries and then the

republics of the USSR. Strategic arms reduction and ideological rapprochement with the West began. But in this case, attention should be paid to the fact that Gorbachev's years in power coincided with the presidency of extreme Republicans Reagan and Bush in the United States. And Reagan was the only president in recent years to consistently refuse to participate in all Mondialist organisations. He was a rigid, consistent and uncompromising Atlanticist, a liberal marketeer, not inclined to compromise with "leftist" ideologies, even the most moderate democratic or social-democratic ones. Consequently, Moscow's moves towards convergence and the creation of a World Government with a significant weight of Eastern bloc representatives in it had the most unpalatable ideological obstacles at the opposite pole. Atlantist Reagan (later Bush) simply used Gorbachev's monetary reforms for purely utilitarian purposes. Voluntary concessions from the heartland were not matched by corresponding concessions from Sea Power, and the West made neither geopolitical nor ideological compromises with a self-liquidating Eurasia. NATO has not disbanded and its forces have not left either Europe or Asia. Liberal-democratic ideology has further strengthened its position.

In this case, monialism emerged not as an independent geopolitical doctrine put into practice, but as a pragmatically used tool in the Cold War, from whose logic, based on the theses of Mackinder and Mahan, the US never abandoned.

3.4 Francis Fukuyama's The End of History

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the victory of the West, the monialist projects had to either die out or change their logic.

A new version of monialism in the post-Soviet era was the doctrine of Francis Fukuyama, who published his feature article 'The End of History' in the early 1990s. It can be seen as the ideological basis of neo-mondialism.

Fukuyama offers the following version of the historical process. Humanity

moved from a dark age of 'law of force', 'obscurantism' and 'irrational management of social reality' to the most rational and logical system embodied in capitalism, modern Western civilisation, market economy and liberal democratic ideology. History and its development lasted only at the expense of irrational factors, which little by little gave way to the laws of reason, the common monetary equivalent of all values, etc. The fall of the USSR marks the fall of the last bastion of "irrationalism". This marks the end of History and the beginning of a special planetary existence, which will take place under the sign of the Market and Democracy, which will unite the world into a coherent, rationally functioning machine.

This New Order, although based on the universalisation of a purely Atlanticist system, goes beyond Atlantism and all regions of the world begin to reorganise according to a new model, around its most economically developed centres.

3.5 Jacques Attali's Geoeconomics

There is a counterpart to Fukuyama's theory among European authors as well. Jacques Attali, who was for many years personal adviser to French President François Mitterrand and for a time director of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, developed a similar theory in his book *Horizon Lines*.

Attali believes that a third era of "money" has now arrived, which is the universal equivalent of value because, by equating all things to a material digital expression, it is extremely easy to manage in the most rational way. Attali himself links this approach to the coming of the Messianic Era, understood in a Jewish-Cabbalist context (he develops this aspect in more detail in another book specifically devoted to messianism, "He Will Come"). This distinguishes him from Fukuyama, who stays within the framework of strict pragmatism and utilitarianism.

Jacques Attali offers his version of a future that has "already arrived". The dominance of a single liberal-democratic ideology and market system across the planet, together with the development of information technology, means that the world becomes unified and homogeneous, the geopolitical realities that have dominated throughout history recede into the background in the "third era". Geopolitical dualism is abolished.

But the unified world is still receiving a new geopolitical structuring, this time based on the principles of "*geoeconomics*". The concept of "geoeconomics" was first proposed by historian Fritz Roerig and popularised by Fernand Braudel.

"Geoconomics" is a particular version of monodialist geopolitics which does not prioritise geographical, cultural, ideological, ethnic, religious, etc. factors which are the essence of the geopolitical approach itself, but purely economic reality in its relation to space. For "geoconomics" it does not matter at all what people live there and there, what their history, cultural traditions, etc. are. It all comes down to where the centres of world exchanges, minerals, information centres and major industries are located. "Geoconomics" approaches political reality as if a World Government and a single planetary state already existed.

Attali's geo-economic approach leads to the identification of three crucial regions that will become centres of new economic spaces in the One World.

1) The American space, which finally united the two Americas into a single financial and industrial area.

2) The European space that emerged after the economic unification of Europe.

3) The Pacific, a "new prosperity" zone with several competing centres Tokyo, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.(12)

Between these three monetary spaces, according to Attali, there will be no special differences or contradictions, as both the economic and ideological type will in all cases be strictly identical. The only difference would be the

purely geographical location of the most developed centres, which would concentrically structure around themselves the less developed regions located in spatial proximity. Such concentric restructuring can only take place at the "end of History" or, in other terms, at the abolition of traditional realities dictated by geopolitics.

Civilizational and geopolitical dualism is abolished. The absence of an opposite pole to Atlanticism leads to a radical redefinition of space. The era of geoeconomics is dawning.

Attali's model gives full expression to the ideas behind the Tripartite Commission, which is the conceptual and political tool that develops and implements such projects.

It is telling that the leaders of the Trilateral (David Rockefeller, Georges Bertouin, then head of the European office, and Henry Kissinger) were in Moscow in January 1989 and were received by Soviet President Gorbachev, Alexander Yakovlev and other high-ranking Soviet leaders Medvedev, Falin, Akhromeyev, Dobrynin, Chernyaev, Arbatov and Primakov. And Jacques Attali himself had personal contacts with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

One thing is certain: the transition to a geo-economic logic and neo-mondialism was only possible after the geopolitical self-liquidation of the Eurasian USSR.

Neo-mondialism is not a direct continuation of historical monialism, which originally assumed the presence of left-wing socialist elements in the final model. It is an intermediate version between monodialism proper and Atlantism.

3.6 Professor Santoro's post-catastrophic mondialism

There are more detailed versions of neo-mondialism. One of the most prominent is the futurological geopolitical concept developed by the Institute for

International Political Studies (ISPI) in Milan, led by Professor Carlo Santoro.

According to Santoro's model, humanity is currently in a transitional phase from a bipolar world to a monetarist version of multipolarity (understood geo-economically, like Attali). International institutions (UN, etc.), which for Fukuyama's optimistic mondialism seem advanced enough to be the core of a "World Government", Santoro seems, on the contrary, ineffective and reflecting the outdated logic of bipolar geopolitics. Moreover, the entire world bears the lasting imprint of the Cold War, whose geopolitical logic remains dominant. Santoro foresees that such a situation is bound to end in a period *of civilisational catastrophe*.

He goes on to outline an alleged scenario for these disasters:

- 1) *Further weakening of the role of international institutions*
- 2) *Increasing nationalist tendencies among the Warsaw Pact and Third World countries. This leads to chaotic processes.*
- 3) *The disintegration of traditional blocs (this does not affect Europe) and the progressive disintegration of existing states.*
- 4) *The beginning of an era of low- and medium-intensity warfare, resulting in the emergence of new geopolitical entities.*
- 5) *The threat of planetary chaos is forcing the various blocs to recognise the need for new international institutions with enormous powers, which in effect means establishing a World Government.*
- 6) *The ultimate creation of a planetary state under the aegis of new international institutions (World Government).*(13)

This model is intermediate between Francis Fukuyama's Mondialist optimism and Samuel Huntington's Atlanticist pessimism.

Chapter 4

Applied geopolitics

4.1 "Domestic geopolitics" by the Yves Lacoste school

The geopolitical renaissance in Europe is linked to the work of geographer Yves Lacoste, who founded the journal *Herodotus* in 1976, where geopolitical texts began to be published regularly for the first time in post-war Europe. It is particularly noteworthy that the journal was headed by a man close to the political left, whereas until then geopolitics in Europe had only been practised by rather marginal right-wing, nationalist circles.

In 1983, *Herodotus* introduced the subtitle 'Journal of Geography and Geopolitics' into its title and from that moment on, geopolitics began its second life, henceforth officially recognised as a specific political science discipline that helps in the integrated analysis of the situation.

Yves Lacoste seeks to adapt geopolitical principles to the contemporary situation. Lacoste himself shares neither the 'organicist approach' of the Continentalist school nor the purely pragmatic and mechanistic geopolitical utilitarianism of Sea Power ideologues. In his view, geopolitical considerations serve only to "*justify the competing aspirations of the powers that be in relation to certain territories and the people who inhabit them*"(14). This can apply to both international relations and narrowly regional issues.

For Lacoste, geopolitics becomes merely a tool for analysing the concrete

situation, and all the global theories underlying the discipline are relegated to relative, historically conditioned concepts.

Lacoste thus offers an entirely new definition of geopolitics, in fact a new discipline. It is no longer continental thinking based on a fundamental planetary civilizational-geographical dualism and coupled with global ideological systems, but the use of some methodological models found in traditional geopoliticians in a general context, but taken here as something separate. This is the "deglobalisation" of geopolitics, reducing it to a narrow analytical method.

Such geopolitics is called "internal geopolitics" (la géopolitique interne), as it is often concerned with local issues.

4.2 Electoral "geopolitics"

A variation on this internal geopolitics is a special methodology developed to study the relationship between the political sympathies of a population and the territory in which that population resides. The precursor of this approach was the French politician and geographer André Siegfried (1875-1959). He was the first to try to study "internal geopolitics" in relation to the political preferences of certain regions. The first formulations of the regularities that formed the basis of "electoral geopolitics" of the new school of Yves Lacoste go back to him.

Siegfried wrote:

"Each party or, more precisely, each political tendency has its own privileged territory; it is easy to see that, just as there are geological or economic regions, there are also political regions. The political climate can be studied in the same way as the natural climate. I have noticed that despite the deceptive appearance, public opinion, depending on the regions, maintains a certain constancy. Beneath the ever-changing pattern of political elections one can discern deeper and more constant trends reflecting regional temperament."

(15)

At the Lacoste school, this theory was systematically developed and became a familiar sociological tool that is widely used in political practice.

4.3 Mediaocracy as a “geopolitical” factor

Yves Lacoste set out to bring the latest criteria of the information society into geopolitics. The most important among the information systems directly affecting geopolitical processes is the media, especially television. In modern society, it is not the conceptual and rational approach that dominates, but the vividness of the “image” (“image”). Political, ideological and geopolitical perceptions are shaped in a large part of society solely on the basis of telecommunications. The mediated “image” is an atomic synthesis, in which several approaches are concentrated at once - ethnic, cultural, ideological and political. The synthetic quality of the “image” brings it closer to the categories traditionally operated by geopolitics.

A news report from a hotspot, about which nothing is known, for example to a capitol dweller, should present the geographical, historical, religious, economic, cultural and ethnic profile of the region in the shortest possible time and should also set the accents in accordance with a narrowly defined political objective. Thus, the profession of a journalist (especially a TV journalist) is close to that of a geopolitician. In modern society, the media do not play a purely auxiliary role as before, but are becoming a powerful independent geopolitical factor capable of exerting a strong influence on the historical destiny of nations.

4.4 History of geopolitics

There is another strand within the general process of European geopolitics 'revival', the history of geopolitics. It is not in the full sense of the word geopolitical, as it aims at historical reconstruction of the discipline, work with sources, chronology, systematisation, bibliographic data, etc. In a sense, it is a "museum approach" which does not claim to draw any conclusions or generalisations in relation to the current situation. This line of history is represented primarily by the writings of Pierre-Marie Gollois and authors such as Hervé Coutteau-Bégary, Gérard Chalian, Hans-Adolphe Jacobsen, etc.

The initiative publishes and republishes the texts of the historical geopoliticians McInder, Mahan, Chellen, Haushofer, etc.

This kind of historical research is often published in the French journal *Herodotus* and in the new Italian geopolitical journal *Limes*, published by Lucio Caracciolo and Michel Korenmann with the participation of the same Lacoste.

4.5 "Applied geopolitics" not geopolitics

Applied or "domestic geopolitics", as developed by Yves Lacoste and other major specialists, Michel Corenmann, Paul-Marie de la Gorce, etc., is characteristic of modern European political science and deliberately avoids conceptual generalisations and futurological developments. This is the fundamental difference between this whole trend, especially developed in France and Italy, and the Atlanticist and Mondialist schools based in the USA and England.

Applied geopolitics retains far fewer links with historical, pre-war geopolitics than Atlanticism and Mondialism, not to mention the "continentalist" tradition. It is a purely analytical, political science, sociological methodology

and nothing more. Therefore, a distinction should be made between it and the planetary global projects of geopoliticians themselves. In essence, we are talking about two disciplines, which are similar only in terminology and some methods. By ignoring the geopolitical dualism, considering it either overcome or irrelevant, or simply out of the frame of the main subject of study, "applied geopolitics" ceases to be geopolitics in its proper sense and becomes only a kind of statistical-sociological methodology.

The real geopolitical decisions and projects related to the fate of Europe and its peoples are developed in other instances, linked to the strategic centres of Atlanticism and mondialism. Thus, the project of European integration was developed exclusively by intellectuals collaborating in the "Trilateral Commission", i.e. a mondialist supranational organisation, which had neither strict legal status nor political legitimacy. The Frenchman Jacques Attali developed his geopolitical theories on the basis of that very organisation, of which he was a member, rather than on the "applied" geopolitics of the modern European school.

Chapter 5

The geopolitics of the European New Right

5.1 Europe of the hundred flags Alain de Benoit

One of the few European geopolitical schools to retain an unbroken link to the ideas of the pre-war German continentalist geopoliticians is the *New Right*. This movement emerged in France in the late 1960s and is associated with the leader of the movement, the philosopher and publicist Alain de Benoit.

"The New Right differs sharply from the traditional French right-wing monarchists, Catholics, Germanophobes, chauvinists, anti-communists, conservatives, etc. on almost all counts. "New Right" supporters of "organic democracy", pagans, Germanophiles, socialists, modernists, etc. At first the "left-wing camp", traditionally extremely influential in France, considered this a "tactical manoeuvre" of the conventional right, but in time the seriousness of the evolution was proved and recognised by all.

One of the fundamental principles of the ideology of the New Right, whose counterparts soon emerged in other European countries, was that of 'continental geopolitics'. Unlike the Old Right and the classical nationalists, de Benoit believed that the centralist Etat-Nation principle had been historically exhausted and that the future belonged only to "Greater Spaces". And these "Greater Spaces" were not to be based on the merging of different states into a pragmatic political bloc, but on the incorporation of ethnic

groups on different scales into a unified “*Federal Empire*” on an equal footing. This “Federal Empire” must be strategically unified, while ethnically differentiated. The strategic unity should be underpinned by the unity of the original culture.

The “Big Space” that de Benoist was most interested in was Europe. “The New Right believed that the peoples of Europe had a common Indo-European origin, a common origin. This is the principle of a ‘*common past*’. But the circumstances of the contemporary era, in which the tendencies of strategic and economic integration, necessary for a true geopolitical sovereignty, are active, also dictate the need for unification in a purely pragmatic sense. The peoples of Europe are thus condemned to a “*common future*”. From this de Benoist concludes that the basic geopolitical principle should be the “One Europe of a hundred flags“(16) . In this perspective, as in all the concepts of the New Right, the desire to combine “conservative“ and “modernist“ elements, i.e. “right-wing“ and “left-wing“, is clearly visible. In recent years, the New Right has abandoned this definition, believing that it is “right-wing“ as much as it is “left-wing“.

De Benoist’s geopolitical theses are based on the assertion of a “*continental European destiny*“. In this he fully follows the concepts of the Haushofer school. From this follows the contrast between “*Europe*“ and “*the West*“ which is characteristic of the New Right. For them “Europe“ is a continental geopolitical entity based on an ethnic ensemble of Indo-European origin and having common cultural roots. It is a traditional notion. “West“, on the other hand, is a geopolitical and historical notion, linked to the modern world, denying ethnic and spiritual traditions, putting forward purely material and quantitative criteria of existence; it is a utilitarian and rationalistic, mechanistic bourgeois civilisation. The most complete embodiment of the West and its civilisation is the USA.

Out of this emerges a concrete project of the “New Right“. Europe must integrate itself into a “Federal Empire“, opposed to the West and the USA, with regionalist tendencies especially to be encouraged, as regions and ethnic minorities have retained more traditional features than metropolises and

cultural centres affected by the "spirit of the West". France should be orientated towards Germany and Central Europe. Hence the interest of the New Right in De Gaulle and Friedrich Naumann. On the level of practical policy, since the 1970s the New Right has advocated strict European strategic neutrality, withdrawal from NATO and the development of a self-sufficient European nuclear capability.

In relation to the USSR (later Russia), the position of the New Right evolved. Beginning with the classic thesis "Neither West, nor East, but Europe", they gradually evolved to the thesis "First of all Europe, but better even with the East than with the West". On a practical level, the initial interest in China and projects for a strategic alliance between Europe and China to counter both 'American and Soviet imperialisms' were replaced by a moderate 'sovietophilia' and the idea of an alliance between Europe and Russia.

The geopolitics of the New Right are radically anti-Atlantic and anti-Mondialist. They see Europe's destiny as the antithesis of Atlanticist and Mondialist projects. They are opposed to Thalassocracy and the concept of One World.

It should be noted that under the total strategic and political dominance of Atlanticism in Europe during the Cold War, de Benoit's geopolitical position (theoretically and logically impeccable) was so contrasted with the 'norms of political thinking' that it simply could not be widespread. It was a kind of "dissidence" and, like all "dissidence" and "non-conformism", had a marginal character. To this day, the intellectual level of the New Right, the high quality of their publications and editions, even the large number of their followers in the European academic environment, stand in stark contrast to the negligible attention paid to them by the authorities and analytical structures which serve the authorities with geopolitical projects.

5.2 Europe from Vladivostok to Dublin Jean Thiriar

A slightly different version of continentalist geopolitics was developed by another European "dissident" Belgian, Jean Thiriar (1922 1992). From the early 1960s he was the leader of the pan-European radical Young Europe movement.

Thiriard regarded geopolitics as the main political science discipline, without which no rational and farsighted political and state strategy could be built. A follower of Haushofer and Nikisch, he saw himself as a "European National Bolshevik" and builder of a "European Empire". It was his ideas that anticipated the more developed and sophisticated projects of the New Right.

Jean Thiriar based his political theory on the principle of "autarchy of large spaces". Developed in the mid-19th century by the German economist Friedrich List, this theory argued that a state can only develop strategically and economically if it has sufficient geopolitical scale and territorial capacity. Thiriar applied this principle to the present situation and came to the conclusion that the global importance of European states would be definitively lost if they did not unite into a single Empire opposing the United States. Thiriar believed that such an "Empire" should not be "federal" and "regionally oriented", but extremely unified, centralist, conforming to the Jacobean model. It should become a powerful unified continental State-Nation. This is the main difference between the views of de Benoit and Thiriard.

In the late 1970s, Thiriard's views underwent some change. His analysis of the geopolitical situation led him to the conclusion that the scale of Europe was no longer sufficient to free itself from American thalassocracy. Consequently, the main condition for "European liberation" is the unification of Europe with the USSR. He moved from a geopolitical scheme with three main zones, West, Europe, Russia (USSR), to a scheme with only two components West and Eurasian continent. In doing so, Thiriar came to the radical conclusion that it was better for Europe to opt for Soviet socialism than Anglo-Saxon capitalism.

Thus the "*Euro-Soviet Empire from Vladivostok to Dublin*" project was born (17). It almost prophetically described the reasons that would lead the USSR to collapse if it did not take active geopolitical steps in Europe and the South in the very near future. Thiriard believed that Haushofer's ideas about a "Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo continental bloc" were still highly relevant today. It is important that Thiriard put forward these theses 15 years before the collapse of the USSR, absolutely precisely predicting its logic and causes. Thiriard made attempts to bring his views to the Soviet leaders. But he failed to do so, although he had personal meetings with Nasser, Zhou Enlai and the highest Yugoslav leaders in the 1960s. Tellingly, Moscow rejected his project to organise underground "European Liberation Units" in Europe to fight terroristically against "agents of Atlanticism".

Jean Thiriard's views lie at the heart of the non-conformist movement of the European National Bolsheviks (Front for European Liberation), which is now gaining momentum. They come close to the projects of contemporary Russian neo-Eurasianism.

5.3 Thinking Continents by Jordis von Lothhausen

Very close to Thiriard is the Austrian general Jordis von Lothhausen. Unlike Thiriard or de Benoist, he does not engage in direct political activity and does not build specific social projects. He takes a strictly scientific approach and limits himself to a purely geopolitical analysis. His initial position is the same as that of the National Bolsheviks and the New Right, he is a continentalist and a follower of Haushofer.

Lothhausen believes that political power only has a chance to become durable and sustainable when rulers do not think in terms of the immediate and local, but in terms of "millennia and continents". The title of his main book is *The Courage to Rule. Thinking Continents* (18).

Lothhausen believes that global territorial, civilizational, cultural and so-

cial processes only become intelligible if they are seen from a 'far-sighted' perspective, which he contrasts with historical 'short-sightedness'. Power in human society, on which the choice of the historical path and the most important decisions depend, must be guided by very general schemes which enable one or another state or nation to find its place in a vast historical perspective. Therefore, the main discipline to determine the strategy of power is geopolitics in its traditional sense of operating with global categories, detached from analytical details (rather than the "in-house" applied geopolitics of the Lacoste school). Modern ideologies and the latest technological and civilizational shifts are certainly changing the topography of the world, but they cannot undo some of the basic patterns associated with natural and cultural cycles over millennia.

Such global categories are space, language, ethnicity, resources, etc.

Lohausen proposes this formula for power:

"Power = Strength x Location"

He elaborates:

"As Might is Power multiplied by location, only a favourable geographical location enables the full development of inner powers." (19)

Power (political, intellectual, etc.) is thus directly linked to space.

Lochhausen separates the fate of Europe from that of the West, seeing Europe as a continental entity temporarily under the control of Thalassocracy. But for political liberation, Europe needs a spatial (positional) minimum. This minimum can only be achieved through German unification, integration processes in Central Europe, the re-establishment of the territorial unity of Prussia (torn between Poland, the USSR and the GDR) and the further formation of the European powers into a new independent block, independent of Atlanticism. It is important to note the role of Prussia. Lochhausen (following Nikisch and Spengler) believes that Prussia is the most continental, "Eurasian" part of Germany, and that if Königsberg, rather than Berlin,

had been the capital of Germany, European history would have taken a different, more correct course, oriented towards an alliance with Russia against the Anglo-Saxon Thalassocracies.

Lochhausen believes that the future of Europe in a strategic perspective is inconceivable without Russia, and conversely, Russia (USSR) needs Europe, as without it geopolitically it is incomplete and vulnerable to America, whose location is much better and therefore whose power will sooner or later outstrip that of the USSR. Lochhausen stressed that the USSR could have four Europes in the West: *“a Europe hostile, a Europe subjugated, a Europe devastated and a Europe allied”*. The first three options are inevitable if the course of European policy pursued by the USSR during the Cold War is maintained. Only by striving to make Europe “allied and friendly” at all costs can the fatal geopolitical situation of the USSR be rectified and a new stage of geopolitical history - the Eurasian stage - begin.

Lochhausen’s position is deliberately limited to purely geopolitical statements. He omits ideological issues. For example, the geopolitics of boyar Russia, tsarist Russia or the Soviet Union is for him a single continuous process, independent of the change of ruling order or ideology. Russia is geopolitically a heartland, and hence, whatever regime it has, its fate is predetermined by its lands.

Lochhausen, like Thiriar, predicted in advance the geopolitical collapse of the USSR, which was inevitable if it had followed its usual course. Whereas Atlanticist geopoliticians saw such an outcome as a victory, Lochhausen saw it more as a defeat for continental forces. But with the nuance that the new opportunities that would open up after the fall of the Soviet system might create favourable prerequisites for the future creation of a new Eurasian bloc, a Continental Empire, since certain limitations dictated by Marxist ideology would then be removed.

5.4 The Eurasian Empire of the End by Jean Parvulesco

The romantic version of geopolitics is set out by the famous French writer Jean Parvulesco. Geopolitical themes in literature first emerge from George Orwell, who in his dystopia 1984 described the futurological division of the planet into three huge continental blocks “Eastasia, Eurasia, Oceania”. Similar themes can be found in Arthur Koestler, Aldous Huxley, Raymond Abellio, etc.

Jean Parvulesco makes geopolitical themes central to all his works, opening up a new genre of “*geopolitical fiction*”.

Parvulesco’s concept is this in a nutshell(20): the history of humanity is a history of Power. Access to the heart of civilisation, or The Mighty itself, is contested by various semi-secret organisations, whose cycles of existence far outstrip the duration of conventional political ideologies, ruling dynasties, religious institutions, states and nations. These organizations, which appear under different names in history, Parvulesco defines as “the Order of Atlantists” and “the Order of Eurasians”. There is a centuries-old struggle between them, involving popes, patriarchs, kings, diplomats, big financiers, revolutionaries, mystics, generals, scientists, artists, etc. All socio-cultural manifestations are thus reducible to the original, albeit extremely complex, geopolitical archetypes.

This is a geopolitical line taken to its logical limits, the preconditions of which can be clearly traced back to the very rational and alien to “mysticism” founders of geopolitics as such.

Central to Parvulesco’s subjects is General De Gaulle and the geopolitical structure he founded, which remained in the shadows after the end of his presidency. Parvulesco calls this “geopolitical Gaullism”. Such “geopolitical Gaullism” is the French equivalent of continentalism of the Haushofer school.

The main objective of the proponents of this line is to organise a European continental bloc “Paris Berlin Moscow”. In this respect, Parvulesco’s theo-

ries are in line with those of the New Right and the National Bolsheviks.

Parvulesco believes that the current historical phase is the culmination of centuries of geopolitical confrontation, when the dramatic history of the continental-civilizational duel comes to a denouement. It foresees the imminent emergence of a giant continental construct, the “Eurasian Empire of the End”, and then the final clash with the “Empire of the Atlantic”. This eschatological duel, which he describes in apocalyptic terms, he calls “End-kampf” (“The Final Battle”). Interestingly, Parvulesko’s texts juxtapose fictional characters with real historical figures, with many of whom he maintained (and with some of whom he still maintains) friendly relations. These include politicians from De Gaulle’s inner circle, British and American diplomats, the poet Ezra Pound, the philosopher Julius Evola, the politician and writer Raymond Abellio, the sculptor Arnaud Brecker, members of occult organizations, etc.

Despite their fictional form, Parvulesko’s texts have enormous geopolitical value in their own right, as a number of his articles, published in the late 1970s, are strangely accurate in describing the world’s situation only by the mid-1990s.

5.5 The Indian Ocean as a route to world domination

Robert Stokers

The exact opposite of Parvulesco’s “geopolitical visionary” is the Belgian geopolitician and publicist Robert Stokers, publisher of two prestigious journals, *Orientation* and *Vouloir*. Stokers approaches geopolitics from a purely scientific, rationalist position, seeking to free this discipline from all “accidental” strata. But following the logic of the “new right” in the academic direction, he reaches conclusions that are strikingly similar to Parvulesco’s “prophecies”.

Stokers also believes that socio-political and especially diplomatic projects of

various states and blocs, no matter what ideological form they are clothed in, are an indirect and sometimes veiled expression of global geopolitical projects. In this he sees the influence of the “Earth factor” on human history. Man is an earthly being (created from the earth). Consequently, the earth, space predetermine man in his most significant manifestations. This is a prerequisite for “geohistory”.

A continentalist orientation is a priority for Stojkers; he considers Atlantism hostile to Europe and links the fate of European welfare to Germany and Central Europe(21). Stojkers is an advocate of Europe’s active cooperation with the Third World and especially with the Arab world.

However, he stresses the enormous importance of the Indian Ocean for the future geopolitical structure of the planet. He defines the Indian Ocean as the ‘Mid-ocean’, situated between the Atlantic and the Pacific. The Indian Ocean is located strictly in the middle between the east coast of Africa and the Pacific zone, which includes New Zealand, Australia, New Guinea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Indochina. Maritime control of the Indian Ocean is a key position for geopolitical influence over three important “big spaces” at once: Africa, the South-Eurasian rimland and the Pacific region. Hence the strategic priority of certain small islands in the Indian Ocean especially Diego Garcia, equidistant from all coastal zones.

The Indian Ocean is the area where Europe’s entire strategy should focus, as through this zone Europe will be able to influence the U.S., Eurasia and Japan, Stojkers argues. In his view, the decisive geopolitical confrontation, which should predetermine the picture of the future of the XXI century, will unfold in this area.

Stojkers is active in the history of geopolitics and has articles on the founders of this science in the new edition of the *Encyclopaedia Brussels*.

5.6 Russia + Islam = Salvation of Europe by Carlo Terracciano

An active geopolitical centre of continentalist orientation also exists in Italy. In Italy, more than in other European countries, the ideas of Carl Schmitt were spread after the Second World War and this made the geopolitical way of thinking very widespread there. It was also in Italy that Jean Thiriard's Young Europe movement, and consequently the ideas of continental national Bolshevism, were most developed.

Among the many political science and sociology "new right-wing" journals and centres dealing with geopolitics, of particular interest is Milan's Orion, which has regularly published the geopolitical analyses of Dr Carlo Terracciano over the past ten years. Terracciano expresses the most extreme position of European continentalism, closely aligned with Eurasianism.

Terracciano fully accepts McIndeer and Mahan's picture and agrees with the strict civilizational and geographical dualism they have highlighted. At the same time, he unequivocally sides with heartland, believing that the fate of Europe depends entirely on the fate of Russia and Eurasia, on the East. The continental East is the positive, the Atlantic West the negative. Such a radical approach on the part of a European is an exception, even among continental geopoliticians, as Terracciano does not even emphasise the special status of Europe, considering it to be of secondary importance in the face of the planetary confrontation between thalassocracy and tellurocracy.

He fully embraces the idea of a single Eurasian State, a "Euro-Soviet Empire from Vladivostok to Dublin", which brings him closer to Thiriard, but he does not share Thiriard's characteristic "Jacobinism" and "universalism", insisting on ethno-cultural differentiation and regionalism, which in turn brings him closer to Alain de Benoist.

Terracciano's emphasis on the centrality of the Russian factor is coupled with another interesting point: he believes that the Islamic world, especially the clearly anti-American regimes: Iranian, Libyan, Iraqi, etc., plays a cru-

cial role in the fight against Atlanticism. This leads him to the conclusion that the Islamic world is the ultimate exponent of continental geopolitical interests. However, he considers the 'fundamentalist' version of Islam to be a positive one.

The final formula that summarises Dr Terracciano's geopolitical views is this:

Russia (heartland) + Islam versus the USA (Atlanticism, Mondialism) (22)

Terracciano sees Europe as a bridgehead for a Russian-Islamic anti-Mondialist bloc. In his view, only such a radical formulation of the question can objectively lead to a genuine European renaissance.

Other members of Orion and its intellectual centre (Prof. Claudio Mutti, Maurizio Murelli, sociologist Alessandra Colla, Marco Battarra, etc.) share similar views with Terracciano. This national-Bolshevik trend is also gravitated towards some left-wing, social-democratic, communist and anarchist circles in Italy by Umanita newspaper, Nuovi Angolazioni magazine, etc.

Chapter 6

Neo-Eurasianism

6.1 Eurasian passionarity Lev Gumilev

The most brilliant disciple of Savitsky was the famous Russian historian Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev. He did not touch upon geopolitical themes in his own works, but his theory of ethnogenesis and ethnic cycles clearly continues the line of “organicist” approach and partly “geographical determinism”, which constitute the essence of geopolitics already by Ratzel, Chellen, Haushofer, etc.

Gumilev’s research on the ancient periods of the ethnic map of Eurasia, the steppe, nomadic peoples and their civilisations, is particularly important. From his writings an entirely new vision of political history emerges, in which the Eurasian East emerges not simply as a barbaric land on the periphery of civilisation (equated with Western civilisation), but as an independent and dynamic centre of ethnogenesis, culture, political history, state and technical development. The West and its history are relativised, and Eurasian culture and the constellation of Eurasian ethnic groups are revealed as a multidimensional and completely unexplored world with its own scale of values, religious problems, historical patterns, etc.

Gumilev develops and takes to its logical limits the pan-Eurasian idea that ethnically Great Russians, Russians are not just a branch of Eastern Slavs, but a special ethnos formed on the basis of Turkic-Slavic fusion. Hence the

validity of Russian control over those Eurasian lands inhabited by Turkic ethnic groups indirectly follows. The Great Russian civilization was formed on the basis of Turkic-Slavic ethnogenesis, which was realized on the geographical plane as a historical alliance of the Forest and the Steppe. It is the geopolitical combination of the Forest and the Steppe that constitutes the historical essence of Russia, predetermining the nature of its culture, civilisation, ideology and political destiny.

Gumilev, following Spengler and Toynbee, singles out cycles of civilisations and cultures, as well as the corresponding ethnic groups. In his view, ethno-cultural formations of nations, states and religious communities are like living organisms. They undergo periods of birth, youth, maturity and aging and then disappear or turn into so-called “relics”. Here again, the influence of the “organist philosophy” common to all continentalist schools of geopolitics is evident.

Gumilev’s theories on the causes of ethnogenesis, i.e. the birth of a nation or state, are highly interesting. He introduces the term “passionarity” or “*passionary impulse*” to describe this process (23). It is an inexplicable synchronous outburst of biological and spiritual energy that suddenly sets in motion the sluggish historical existence of “old” peoples and cultures, capturing various established ethnic and religious groups in a dynamic burst of spatial, spiritual and technical expansion, resulting in the conquest and fusion of heterogeneous residual ethnic groups into new active and viable forms. High and full-fledged passionarity and the dynamic process of ethnogenesis lead normally to the emergence of a special super-ethnos, which corresponds not so much to a nation-state form of political organisation as to an empire.

Passionarity is gradually waning. ‘Passionism’ (for Gumilev it is a positive category, which he equates with ‘heroism’, an ethical desire for selfless creation in the name of loyalty to national tradition) is replaced by ‘actualism’, i.e. concern only with the present moment in isolation from tradition and without regard for the fate of future generations. In this phase, a “passionary fracture” occurs and ethnogenesis enters the negative stage of conservation and the beginning of disintegration. Next comes the “futuristic” phase,

dominated by the type of powerless "dreamers", "fantasists", "religious escapists", who lose faith in the surrounding existence and seek to escape into the "beyond". Gumilev sees this as a sign of ultimate decadence. Ethnos degrades, super-ethnoses disintegrate into components, empires collapse.

This situation continues until a new "passionary push" occurs, when a new fresh ethnos appears and provokes a new ethnogenesis, in which the remnants of the old constructions are melted down. Some ethnic groups remain in a 'relic' state (Gumilev calls them 'chimeras'), while others disappear in the dynamics of the new ethnogenetic process.

Of particular importance is Gumilev's assertion that the Great Russians are a relatively "fresh" and "young" ethnos, rallying the "super-ethnos" of Russia-Eurasia or the Eurasian Empire around itself.

From Gumilev's Eurasianism the following geopolitical conclusions emerge (which he himself did not draw for obvious political reasons, preferring to remain strictly within the framework of historical science).

1) *Eurasia is a full-fledged "place-development", a fertile rich ground of ethnogenesis and cultural genesis.* Consequently, we must learn to view world history not in a unipolar "West and everybody else" perspective (as is characteristic of Atlanticist historiography), but in a multipolar one, with northern and eastern Eurasia being of particular interest because they are an alternative source of the most important planetary civilizational processes to the West. In his writings, Gumilev gives a detailed picture of Mackinder's thesis of the "geographical axis of history" and gives this axis specific historical and ethnic content.

2) *The geopolitical synthesis of the Forest and Steppe, underpinning Great Russian statehood, is a key reality for cultural and strategic control over Asia and Eastern Europe.* And such control would contribute to a harmonious balance between East and West, whereas the cultural limitations of Western civilisation (the Forest) with its desire for dominance, accompanied by a total lack of understanding of the culture of the East (the Steppe), leads

only to conflict and upheaval.

3) *Western civilisation is in the last descending stage of ethnogenesis, being a conglomeration of "chimerical" ethnic groups.* Consequently, the centre of gravity is bound to shift to younger peoples.

4) *It is also possible that in the near future some unpredictable and unforeseeable "passionate push" will occur,* which will dramatically change the political and cultural map of the planet, as the dominance of "relic" ethnic groups cannot last long.

6.2 The New Russian Eurasians

Gumilev himself did not formulate geopolitical conclusions on the basis of his picture of the world. This was done by his followers at a time when Marxist ideological censorship was weakened (and then abolished). This trend is generally referred to as "*neo-Eurasianism*", which, in turn, has several varieties. Not all of them inherit Gumilev's ideas, but overall his influence on this geopolitical ideology is enormous.

Neo-Eurasianism has several varieties.

The first (and most basic and developed) is a complete and multi-dimensional ideology, which was formulated by some political circles in the national opposition to liberal reforms in the 1990s and 1994s. We are talking about a group of intellectuals united around the newspaper *Den* (later *Zavtra*) and the magazine *Elements* (24).

This neo-Eurasianism is based on the ideas of P. Savitsky, G. Vernadsky, Prince N. Trubetskoy and the ideologist of Russian national-bolshevism, Nikolai Ustryalov. The analysis of the historical Eurasians is considered highly relevant and quite applicable to the present situation. The thesis of a national ideocracy on an imperial continental scale is contrasted with both liberal Westernism and narrow ethnic nationalism. Russia is seen as the

axis of the geopolitical "big space" and its ethnic mission is unequivocally identified with empire-building.

At the socio-political level, this trend clearly gravitates towards Eurasian socialism, seeing liberal economics as a characteristic feature of the Atlanticist camp. The Soviet period of Russian history is seen in the Smoeverechian perspective as a modernist form of traditional Russian national aspiration for planetary expansionism and "Eurasian anti-Atlantist universalism". Hence the "pro-communist" tendencies of this version of Neo-Eurasianism.

Gumilev's legacy is accepted, but the theory of passionarity is coupled with Italian sociologist Wilfred Pareto's doctrine of the 'circulation of elites', while Gumilev's religious views are corrected on the basis of the European school of traditionalists (Henon, Evola, etc.).

The traditionalist ideas of "crisis of the modern world", "degradation of the West", "desacralisation of civilisation", etc. form an important component of Neo-Eurasianism, complementing and developing those points that were only intuitively and fragmentarily presented by Russian authors.

In addition, European continentalist projects (Haushofer, Schmitt, Nikisch, the New Right, etc.) are thoroughly examined, thereby extending the horizon of the Eurasian doctrine to Europe, understood as a potentially continental power. This motif is completely alien to the historical Eurasianists-emigrants, who wrote their main works at a time when the United States did not yet have an independent geopolitical significance and the thesis of the difference between Europe and the West had not yet been adequately developed. Neo-Eurasianism, paying attention to the European continentalists, recognizes the strategic importance of Europe for the geopolitical completeness and wholeness of the Eurasian "Greater Space", especially since it was the unstable division of the geopolitical map of Europe that led to the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War.

Another feature of neo-Eurasianism is the choice of Islamic countries (especially continental Iran) as a crucial strategic ally. The idea of a continental

Russian-Islamic alliance underlies the anti-Atlantic strategy on the southwestern coast of the Eurasian continent. At the doctrinal level, this alliance is justified by the traditional character of Russian and Islamic civilisations, which unites them in opposing the anti-traditional, secular-pragmatic West.

The Neo-Eurasian project is the most complete, consistent, complete and historically grounded opposite to all variants of the Western geopolitical projects (both Atlanticist and Mondialist), since ideologically, strategically, politically and positively, the Neo-Eurasian project is the most complete, consistent, complete and historically grounded opposite to all varieties of the Western geopolitical projects.

The two types of geopolitical ideology of the extreme West are expressed by Mondialism and Atlantism. Europeanism and moderate continentalism of European geopoliticians represent an intermediate reality. Finally, the neo-Eurasianism of Day and especially of Elements expresses a radically anti-Western point of view, converging with all other alternative geopolitical projects from European national Bolshevism to Islamic fundamentalism (or Islamic "socialism") through to national liberation movements in all corners of the Third World.

Other varieties of neoEurasianism are less consistent and represent an adaptation of the entire complex of the above ideas to the changing political reality: either it is only a pragmatic economic "Eurasianism" designed to recreate the economic interaction of the former Soviet republics (the project of Kazakh President Nazarbayev), or the justification of expansionist theses ("great power" project by Zhirinov). The Eurasian commonwealth" is a purely rhetorical appeal to preserve the unity of Russians and national minorities (mostly ethnic Turks and Muslims) within the Russian Federation (the project of some representatives of the Yeltsin government), or a purely historical interest in the heritage of the Savitsky, Trubetskoy, Suvchinsky, Karsavin circles, etc. in exile. But all these versions are necessarily artificial, fragmentary, inconsistent and cannot lay claim to an independent and serious geopolitical ideology and methodology. Therefore, there is little point in dwelling on them in detail.

We should only note that any appeals to Eurasianism and Eurasia, however limited the meaning of these concepts may be, refer directly or indirectly to that neo-Eurasian project, which was developed in opposition circles and formalized in the works of the authors of *Den'* and *Elements*. It is only in this context that the use of the word "Eurasianism" is justified by the continuity of the Russian geopolitical school and the correlation with the general fan of geopolitical projects on a planetary scale, existing outside Russia.

6.3 Towards a new bipolarity

Neo-Eurasianism, apart from its intellectual heritage and general principles of continental geopolitics, faces the latest challenges posed in the form of the West's latest geopolitical projects. Moreover, this geopolitical trend gains significance precisely insofar as it is capable not just to explain geopolitically the logic of current historical events, but to elaborate a coherent futurological project capable of countering the projects of the West.

The West's victory in the Cold War conceptually means the end of a bipolar world and the beginning of a unipolar world. However, while pure Atlanticists (Huntington) assume that this unipolarity will be relative, the West (The West) winning will have to constantly settle the growing inter-civilizational conflicts with "the rest of the world" (The Rest), the mondialists (Fukuyama, Attali) see unproblematic domination of the West over the whole planet as something that has already happened. Even Professor Santoro's most conflictual version suggests, in the end, the establishment of a World Government.

These are the projects of geopolitical victors, with today's undisputed advantages and strategic initiative to be reckoned with in the highest degree. They all agree on one thing: Western-type universalism must sooner or later prevail on the planet, i.e. the Atlanticist, Thalassocratic system of values must become dominant everywhere. The bipolar world of the Cold War is considered to have been completely overcome. Eurasia and Eurasianism simply have no place in such a picture. All this is logical and derives directly from

the work of the early Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians, who sought to weaken the land forces in every way, undermining their power and restraining their development by various strategic methods, especially the “anaconda” strategy, i.e. tight control over larger and larger sectors of the rimland.

Neo-Eurasianism cannot, while remaining itself, accept the legitimacy of such a state of affairs and is condemned to seek opportunities to reverse all these processes. And it begins with the most central issue with the question of unipolarity. Unipolarity (the domination of Atlantism in any form, either in its pure form or via mondialism) dooms Eurasia as a country to historical non-existence. Neo-Eurasianism insists that this unipolarity should be opposed.

This can only be realised through a *new bipolarity*.

This requires clarification. There is a view that after the end of the US confrontation with the USSR the world itself will shift to a multipolar order, China will rise, demographic processes will make Islamic countries geopolitically central, the Pacific region will assert its competitiveness with Europe and America, etc. All this is possible, but it does not take into account that such a new multipolarity will take place under the sign of the “Atlanticist system of values”, i.e. will represent only territorial variations of the Thalassocratic system, and in no way a genuine geopolitical alternative. The challenge of the West, the market and liberal democracy is universal. After the victory, all attempts of nations and states to follow some other path than the Western one have lost their main support. Both the pro-Soviet regimes and all the “non-aligned” countries who insisted on a “third way” existed only at the expense of bipolarity, at the expense of the gap that existed between the West and the East in their positional geopolitical struggle. The modern victorious West will henceforth dictate ideological and economic conditions to all who would claim to be a developed region. Therefore, any multipolarity while maintaining the status quo would be fictitious and mondialist.

This is well understood by Western strategists, who are well aware that

the main geopolitical task of the West at this stage is to prevent the very possibility of forming a large-scale geopolitical bloc of continental volume, which could be comparable in one way or another to the forces of Atlanticism. This is the main principle of US military-political doctrine, as articulated in Paul Wolfowitz's report. In other words, the West most of all does not want a return to bipolarity. That would be fatal for it.

Neo-Eurasianism, based on the interests of the "geographical axis of history", asserts the exact opposite of the West. The only way out of this situation can only be a new bipolarism, since only in this direction could Eurasia gain the prospect of genuine geopolitical sovereignty. Only a new bipolarity could subsequently open the way for a multipolarity that would go beyond the thalassocratic liberal-democratic system, i.e. a true multipolarity of the world, where each nation and each geopolitical bloc could choose its own system of values, has a chance to materialise only after liberation from global Atlanticist domination through a new planetary confrontation.

However, it is important that the Eurasian continental bloc cannot become a simple re-creation of the Warsaw Pact. The collapse of the former geopolitical continental structure is irreversible and rooted in its very structure. The new continental alliance must either include all of Europe as far as the Atlantic and several crucial sectors of the southern Eurasian coast, India, Iran, Indochina, etc., or ensure the friendly neutrality of these same spaces, i.e. take them out of the control of Atlanticism. A return to the old bipolarism is impossible for many reasons, including ideological ones. The new Eurasian bipolarism should be based on completely different ideological premises and methods.

This theory of "new bipolarism" is sufficiently developed in neo-Eurasian projects, being the theoretical justification for all non-conformist geopolitical theories of Europe and the Third World. Just as heartland is objectively the only point capable of being a springboard for a planetary alternative to thalassocracy, so neoEurasianism is the only theoretical platform on the basis of which a whole swirl of planetary strategies can be developed that deny the global dominance of Atlantism and its civilizational value system:

market, liberal democracy, secular culture, individualist philosophy, etc.

PART 3 RUSSIA AND SPACE

Chapter 1

Heartland

Russia, from a strategic point of view, represents a gigantic continental mass which is identified with Eurasia itself. Russia, after the development of Siberia and its integration, has clearly coincided with the geopolitical notion of Heartland, i.e. “Central Earth” of the continent. Mackinder defined the Russian Great Space as the “Geographic Axis of History”. Geographically, landscape, linguistically, climatically, culturally and religiously, Russia is a synthetic unity of the Eurasian West and the Eurasian East, and its geopolitical function is not limited to summing up or mediating Western and Eastern trends. Russia is something Third, independent and special neither to the East nor to the West. The Russian Eurasians, who culturally comprehended Russia’s “middle” position, spoke of a special culture of the “Middle Empire”, where geographical and geopolitical opposites are removed in a spiritual, vertical synthesis. From a purely strategic point of view, Russia is identical to Eurasia itself, if only because it is its lands, its population and its industrial and technological development that possess enough volume to be the basis of continental independence, autarchy and serve as the basis for full continental integration, which according to geopolitical laws should happen to every “island”, including the “World Island” itself (i.e. Eurasia).

In relation to Russia-Heartland, *all* other Eurasian states and lands are *coastal*, Rimland. Russia is the “Axis of History” because “civilisation” *revolves around* it, creating its most conspicuous, expressive and complete forms not in its life-giving continental source, but in the “coastal zone”,

the critical strip where the space of Land borders on that of Water, Sea or Ocean. From a strategic point of view, Russia is an autonomous territorial entity whose security and sovereignty are identical to those of the entire continent. This cannot be said of any other major Eurasian power, be it China, Germany, France or India. Whereas China, Germany, France, India, etc. can act as *continental* powers in relation to their coastal neighbours or to the states of other “Islands” or continents, in relation to Russia they will always remain “coastlines”, Rimland, with all the relevant strategic, cultural and political consequences. Only Russia can speak on behalf of Heartland with full geopolitical foundation. Only its strategic interests are not just close to those of the continent, but strictly identical to them (at least, this is the case at the current stage of development of the technosphere).

Chapter 2

The Rimland problem

Russia's relation to the neighbouring continental Romano-Germanic civilisations in the West and the three traditional civilisations in the East (Islamic, Hindu and Chinese) has at least two planes, which should by no means be confused, as this would inevitably lead to many misunderstandings. Firstly, Russia's cultural and historical essence, its spiritual self-determination, its "identity", is clearly defined by the formula "neither East, nor West" or "neither Europe, nor Asia, but Eurasia" (to quote Russian Eurasians). Russia is spiritually something Third, something independent and special, which has no expression in terms of either the East or the West. At this level, Russia's supreme interest is *to preserve* its uniqueness at all costs, defending its identity against the challenge of Western culture and the tradition of the East. This does not mean complete isolationism, but it does limit the range of possible borrowings. Historical realism requires us to recognise courageously that the affirmation of 'our own' always runs parallel to the negation of 'alien' and 'foreign'. Both affirmation and negation are fundamental elements of the national, cultural, historical and political independence of a people and a state. Therefore, the negation of both the West and the East in *cultural* terms is a historical imperative for Russia's independence. On this issue, of course, there can be a variety of nuances and discussions recognising identity, some believing that it is better to open up more to the East than to the West ("Asian trend"), others on the contrary ("Westernists"), others prefer a complete rejection of all dialogue ("isolationists"), while others suggest an

equal opening in both directions (some directions of “neo-Eurasianism”).

On the strategic and purely geopolitical levels, the situation is quite different. Since Russia-Eurasia, at the present historical stage, has not so much “coastal civilizations”, Rimland, as the opposing “Island”, the Atlanticist America, as its planetary opponent, the most important strategic imperative is *to turn the “coastal territories” into its allies, strategic penetration into the “coastal” zones, the conclusion of a pan-Eurasian pact or, at the very least, ensuring the complete and strict neutrality of as many Rimlands as possible in positional opposition to the Atlantic West*. Here, Russia’s strategic formula should unambiguously be “both East and West”, since only a continental integration of Eurasia with Russia at its centre can guarantee *all of its peoples and states real sovereignty and maximum political and economic autarchy*. At the strategic level today, there is only one opposition: either monodialism (planetary dominance of Americanism and Atlanticism) or continentalism (division of the planet into two or more Great Spaces, enjoying political, military, strategic and geopolitical sovereignty). Rimlands are necessary for Russia to become a truly sovereign continental geopolitical force. At present, with the current development of military, strategic and economic technologies, there can be no other, non-continental, sovereignty: all kinds of “ethnocratic”, purely “isolationist” projects to solve the state problem of Russia in the strategic sphere will result strictly corresponding with the mondialist plans for total control over the planet and complete strategic, political and economic occupation of Eurasia and Russia.

Obviously, the transfer of Russia’s cultural and historical issues to the strategic or geopolitical level (i.e. giving the formula “neither East nor West” a purely geopolitical meaning) is nothing short of *political subversion* aimed at strategically disorienting Russia’s foreign policy course. Whatever underlies the “narrow-ethnic”, “racial-nationalist”, “chauvinist” models of Russian statehood ignorance, naivety or consciously working against its people and their independence, the result is a complete identity with the mondialist agenda. Without turning Russia into an “ethnic reservation”, the U.S. will not gain *complete* control of the world.

The problem of Rimland is posed in this way only today, when we have the entire strategic history of the bipolar world and the planetary cold war of the USSR and the United States behind us. At the height of Russian Eurasian political activism, the strategic situation was quite different, and very few could see into the future. Therefore, some geopolitical projects of the Eurasians should be considered with caution. In particular, they interpreted the Rimland problem in cultural rather than strategic terms. All this should be taken into account in order for Russia to develop a serious and sound geopolitical programme, realistic and forward-looking, with the main geopolitical imperative of independence, sovereignty, autonomy, autarky and freedom of a Great Russia at the top of the agenda.

Chapter 3

Gathering the Empire

One of the main tenets of geopolitics is the claim that the geopolitical position of a state is much more important than the peculiarities of its political structure. Politics, culture, ideology, the nature of the ruling elite and even religion are seen in geopolitical optics as *important but secondary factors compared* to the fundamental geopolitical principle of *the relation of the state to space*. Often (especially in Russia) this specificity of geopolitics as a science is seen as almost “cynical” or even “anti-national”. This, of course, is completely untrue. Quite simply, geopolitics does not pretend to be the sole and supreme authority in determining the state and political interests of a nation. Geopolitics is one of several basic disciplines enabling adequate formulation of the international and military doctrine of a state, along with other equally important disciplines. Just as physics, in order to be an exact science, must abstract from chemistry and its laws (this does not mean that physics denies chemistry), so geopolitics, in order to be a rigorous discipline, must leave aside other, non-geopolitical approaches, which can and should be taken into account in the final conclusions about the destiny of a state and a nation alongside geopolitics.

One of Russia’s most urgent geopolitical demands is “reassembling the Empire”. No matter how we view “socialism”, the USSR, the Eastern Bloc, the Warsaw Pact countries, etc., no matter how we assess the political and cultural reality of one of the two superpowers, from a geopolitical point of view, the existence of the Eastern Bloc was clearly a positive factor for pos-

sible Eurasian unification, for continental integration and sovereignty of our Greater Space. It was the geopolitical logic that made the Belgian theorist Jean Thiriar speak of the need to create a “Euro-Soviet empire from Vladivostok to Dublin”. Only the Eastern bloc could become the basis for uniting Eurasia into an empire, although the division of Europe and the inconsistency of Soviet policy in Asia were serious obstacles to realising this goal. According to many contemporary geopolitical scholars, it was precisely its strategic vulnerability on the western and eastern frontiers that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US controlled the West and the East so skillfully and consistently that it ultimately prevented continental integration and contributed to the collapse of the Eastern bloc itself. The end of the bipolar world is a strategic blow to Eurasia, a blow to continentalism and the possible sovereignty *of all* Eurasian states.

The imperative of Russia’s geopolitical and strategic sovereignty is not only to restore the lost regions of the ‘near abroad’, not only to renew allied relations with Eastern European countries, but also to include the states of the continental West (primarily the Franco-German bloc, which tends to free itself from the Atlanticist tutelage of pro-American NATO) and the continental East (Iran, India and Japan) in the new Eurasian strategic bloc.

For Russia, the geopolitical “gathering of the Empire” is not only one of the possible ways of development, one of the possible relations between state and space, but a pledge and prerequisite for the existence of an independent state, and indeed *an independent state on an independent continent*.

If Russia does not immediately begin to recreate the Great Space, i.e. to return the temporarily lost Eurasian expanse into its sphere of strategic, political and economic influence, it will plunge itself and all the peoples living on the “World Island” into disaster.

The course of possible events is easy to foresee. If Russia chooses a path other than that of “gathering the Empire”, the continental mission of Heartland will begin to be taken over by new powers or blocs of states. In this case, the vast expanses of Russia will be the main strategic target for those

forces that will declare themselves the new “citadel of Eurasia”. It is absolutely inevitable, as control over the continent is inconceivable without control over the space of “geographical axis of History”. Either China will make a desperate dash northwards into Kazakhstan and Eastern Siberia, or Middle Europe will move into the Western Russian lands of Ukraine, Belorussia and Western Great Russia, or the Islamic bloc will try to integrate Central Asia, the Volga and the Urals, as well as some territories of Southern Russia. This new continental integration is impossible to avoid, as the geopolitical map of the planet is itself opposed to its unipolar, Atlanticist orientation. In geopolitics, the sacred law of “there is no place left empty” is quite valid. Moreover, it’s not “territorial egoism” or “Russophobia” that will push other Eurasian blocs to expansion into Russian lands, but an inexorable logic of space and geopolitical passivity of Russia. In the realm of continental strategy, it is foolish to expect other nations to stop their territorial expansion into Russian lands only out of respect for the “identity of Russian culture”. Only territorial impulses and positional advantages apply in this sphere. Even the mere fact of hesitating to immediately “assemble the Empire” is already a sufficient challenge, enough reason for alternative geopolitical Great Spaces to move into Russian territory. This will naturally provoke a reaction from the Russians and lead to a terrible and unpromising intra-Eurasian conflict; unpromising because it will not have even a theoretically positive solution, since to create a non-Russian Eurasia one must completely destroy the Russian people, which is not only difficult, but virtually impossible, as history shows. On the other hand, such a conflict would lay down a front line between the neighbouring states of continental and anti-Atlantic orientation, and this would only strengthen the position of a third force, i.e. the United States and its colleagues in the Mondialist projects. Lack of action is also a kind of action, and procrastination in “gathering the Empire” (not to mention the possible abandonment of Russia’s geopolitical expansion) will inevitably be followed by great Eurasian blood. Events in the Balkans provide a frightening example of what can happen in Russia on an incomparably grander scale.

The reunification of the Eurasian territories under the patronage of Rus-

sia as the “Axis of History” today faces certain difficulties, but these are insignificant in the face of the disasters that will inevitably ensue if this “reunification of the Empire” does not begin immediately.

Chapter 4

Warm and cold seas

The process of 'reassembling the Empire' must initially focus on the long-range goal of Russian access to the warm seas. It was through the containment of Russian expansion to the south, south-west and north-west that Atlanticist England was able to maintain its control over all the "coastal spaces" surrounding Eurasia. Russia was geopolitically a "complete" power in the East and North, where its political borders coincided with the natural geographical boundaries of the Eurasian continent. But the paradox was that these coasts were adjacent to *cold* seas, which was an insurmountable barrier to the development of navigation to the extent that it would allow it to seriously compete on the seas with the fleets of the Western Isles (England, and later America). On the other hand, Russia's eastern and northern lands have never been sufficiently developed due to natural and cultural peculiarities, and all projects to integrate Russian Asia from those proposed by Dr. Badmaev to the last Emperor to the Brezhnev BAM have by some strange regularity collapsed under the influence of spontaneous or controlled historical cataclysms.

In any case, access to the cold seas of the North and the East had to be complemented by access to the warm seas of the South and the West, and only then would Russia be geopolitically "complete". The numerous Russo-Turkish wars were fought for this, the fruits of which, however, were reaped not by the Turks or Russians, but by the British, who drained the last two traditional empires of the three (Austria-Hungary being the third). The

last push towards Russia's vital south was the unsuccessful expansion of the USSR into Afghanistan. Geopolitical logic makes it clear that Russia is bound to return there again, though it would be far better to come as a loyal ally, protector and friend than as a brutal punisher. Only when Russia's southern and western borders become a coastline will it be possible to speak of the final completion of its continental building. It is not necessarily a question of conquest, expansion or annexation. A strong anti-Atlantic, parity-based strategic alliance with the continental European and Asian powers would be sufficient to achieve this goal. Access to the warm seas could be obtained not only through a bloody war, but also through a reasonable peace beneficial to the geopolitical interests of all continental powers, since the project of Eurasian strategic integration would enable *all* those powers to become truly sovereign and independent in the face of an alternative Atlantic Island, united, in turn, by the Monroe Strategic Doctrine. The Straits and the warm seas were inaccessible to Russia at a time when there was no such obvious Atlantic factor as the US threatening the interests of all Europe and all Asia, and the various mainland powers were challenging each other for primacy against England and leadership in territorial strategic unification. The implementation of the Monroe Doctrine in America highlighted the geopolitical significance of Russia, and an alliance with Russia became a self-evident imperative for all realist geopoliticians on the mainland, whatever political form it might take, depending on the circumstances. The threat of monialism and Atlanticist globalism theoretically opens up Russia's access to the warm seas through the self-evident alliance of Heartland and Rimland against the overseas invaders.

PART IV RUSSIA'S GEOPOLITICAL FUTURE

Chapter 1

The need for a radical alternative

There are two principal projects concerning the Russian future in our society today. In one way or another they affect all aspects of national life - economics, geopolitics, international relations, ethnic interests, industrial structure, economic structure, military construction, etc.

The first project belongs to radical liberals, “reformers”, who take Western society, the modern “commercial order”, as an example and subscribe fully to the “end of history” projects developed in Francis Fukuyama’s famous article of the same name. This project denies such values as people, nation, history, geopolitical interests, social justice, religious factor, etc. Everything in it is built on the principle of maximum economic efficiency, on the primacy of individualism, consumption and “free market”. Liberals want to build a new society in place of Russia, a society that has never existed historically, where the rules and cultural coordinates by which the modern West and especially the United States live are established. This camp can easily formulate an answer to any questions about this or that aspect of Russian reality on the basis of models already existing in the West, using Western liberal terminology and legal norms, as well as relying on the developed theoretical structures of liberal capitalism in general. This position was almost dominant ideologically in our society some time ago, and even today it is the most prominent, as it coincides in general with the general course and fundamental logic of liberal reforms.

The second project for the Russian future belongs to the so-called “national-patriotic opposition”, which is a diverse and diverse political reality united by a rejection of liberal reforms and a rejection of the liberal logic advocated by the reformers. This opposition is neither merely national nor merely patriotic, it is “pink and white”, that is, it is dominated by representatives of the communist-statists (who have largely moved away from the rigid Marxist-Leninist dogma) and supporters of the Orthodox monarchist, tsarist type of statehood. The views of the two components of the “united opposition” differ considerably, but there are similarities not only in the definition of a “common enemy”, but also in certain mental and ideological clichés shared by both. Moreover, the patriotic “opposition” is overwhelmingly composed of figures from the pre-Perestroika system, who bring elements of a purely Soviet mentality even to “white”, “Tsarist projects”, to which they most often had no historical, family or political connection before perestroika, feeling perfectly at home in the Brezhnev reality. In any case, the opposition project can be called “Soviet-Tsarist” because it is based on certain ideological, geopolitical, political-social, and administrative archetypes that objectively bring the Soviet and pre-Soviet periods closer together (at least within the 20th century). Patriot ideology is far more contradictory and confusing than the logical and complete constructions of liberals, and thus it often manifests itself not in the form of a finished concept or doctrine, but in a fragmented, emotional, inconsistent and disjointed way. Yet this grotesque conglomeration of jumbled Soviet-Tsarist mental fragments has some integrity, which, however, is sometimes not easy to structure rationally.

Both liberal and Soviet-Tsarist projects are essentially *dead-end projects* for the Russian people and Russian history. The liberal project in general involves the gradual erasure of the national characteristics of the Russians in a cosmopolitan era of “the end of history” and the “planetary market”, while the Soviet-Tsarist project seeks to revive the nation and state in those very historical forms and structures, which, in fact, led the Russians gradually to collapse.

On the other side of both the liberalism of the “reformists” and the Soviet-Tsarism of the “united opposition”, there is an urgent need for a “third way”, a particular ideological project which would be not a compromise or “centrism” between the two, but a radical, innovative, futuristic plan, breaking with the hopelessly dualistic logic of “either liberal or opposition”, The need for a “third way” is urgent, an ideological project which would not be a compromise or a “centrism” between the two, but a radical, innovative, futuristic plan, breaking with the hopelessly dualistic logic of “either liberals or opposition” where the current Russian public consciousness is mangled in a maze with no way out.

The Gordian knot must be cut and the true alternative, opposing both, must be asserted. A great nation, its interests and its destiny are at stake.

Chapter 2

What is the “Russian national interest”?

2.1 The Russians have no State today

In the present political situation it is impossible, strictly speaking, to argue about “Russia’s strategic prospects”. It is all the more impossible to propose any projects regarding Russia’s foreign and domestic policy, since the main question of *what is Russia* today? remains not only unresolved, but also not seriously posed.

The rapid changes in the entire political, geopolitical, ideological and social order that took place in the former USSR completely overturned all existing legal and political criteria and norms. The collapse of the unified socialist system and later the Soviet state created a field of complete uncertainty in the former Soviet territories, in which there are no longer any clear guidelines, no strict legal framework and no concrete social perspectives. Those geopolitical structures that were formed “automatically”, by inertia after the collapse of the USSR, are random, transient and extremely unstable. This applies not only to the republics that separated from Moscow, but primarily to Russia itself.

In order to plan for “state interests”, it is necessary to have a clear idea of which state we are talking about. In other words, this makes sense when there is a clearly identified political subject. In the present situation *there is no* such subject in the case of the Russians.

The existence of Russia, understood as the Russian Federation (RF), clearly does not meet any serious criteria in defining the status of a “state”. The scattered assessments of the status of the Russian Federation in international politics are a clear indication of this very state of affairs. What is the RF? A successor and assignee of the USSR? A regional power? A mono-ethnic state? An interethnic federation? Gendarme of Eurasia? A pawn in American projects? Territories destined for further fragmentation? Depending on specific conditions, the Russian Federation appears in one of these roles, despite the absolute inconsistency of such definitions. In one moment it is a state with a claim to a special role in world politics, in another it is a secondary regional power, and in yet another it is a field for separatist experiments. If one and the same territorial-political entity appears in all these roles at the same time, it is obvious that we are talking about some conditional category, some variable, rather than the complete and stable political phenomenon that can be called a state in the full sense of the word.

The Russian Federation is not Russia, a fully-fledged Russian state. It is a transitional entity in a broad and dynamic global geopolitical process and nothing more. Of course, the Russian Federation can become a Russian state in the long term, but it is not at all obvious that this will happen, and it is also not obvious whether it should be aspired to.

In any case, it is impossible to talk about “strategic interests” of such an unstable and temporary phenomenon as the Russian Federation in the long term, and it is even more absurd to try to formulate a “strategic doctrine of the Russian Federation” based on the current state of affairs. The Russian Federation’s “strategic interests” can only become clearer once the political, social, economic and ideological subjects of these interests have emerged, taken shape and defined. Until that happens, any projects in this direction will turn out to be a momentary fiction.

The Russian Federation has no national history, its borders are contingent, its cultural references are hazy, its political regime is shaky and vague, its ethnic map is patchy, and its economic structure is fragmentary and partly

decomposed. The conglomerate is merely the result of the disintegration of a more global geopolitical entity, a fragment torn from the whole picture. Even to create something stable on this piece of the Empire would require a real revolution, similar to the revolution of the Young Turks, who created a modern secular Turkey from a fragment of the Ottoman Empire (although here again the question arises of whether it is worth striving for?).

If the Russian Federation is not a Russian state, neither is the CIS. Despite the fact that practically all the territories of the CIS countries (with a few exceptions) were part of the Russian Empire and therefore were once part of the Russian State, the CIS countries currently have a sufficient degree of autonomy and are de jure considered to be independent political entities. It can be argued (and with even greater reason) that in relation to these countries these entities do not possess any serious signs of genuine statehood, lack the attributes of actual sovereignty and are more of a “territorial process” rather than stable and defined geopolitical units. Even apart from the increasing nationalism of the CIS countries, which is often anti-Russian oriented, no harmonious picture can be formed out of the unnatural, unstable and contradictory fragments themselves. The Belgian geopolitical scientist Jean Thiriar made one accurate comparison in this regard. *“The USSR was like a bar of chocolate, with the boundaries of the slices-republics marked out. Once the slices have been broken off, it is no longer enough to put them together to rebuild the whole bar. From now on, this can only be achieved by re-melting the entire bar and stamping it again”*.

“Strategic interests of the Russian Federation” is the same empty figure of speech as “strategic interests of the CIS countries”. It has very little to do with the “strategic interests of the Russians”.

2.2 The concept of “post-imperial legitimacy”

Despite the non-existence of the Russian state in the full sense, certain legal principles are valid throughout the post-Soviet space, on which both the Western reaction to certain actions of the Russian Federation and the

momentary logic of the Russian leadership's steps are based. It is these principles, at first sight, that keep the Russian Federation and, more broadly, the CIS from total chaos. This is the doctrine of "post-imperial legitimacy. In order to understand the essence of today's geopolitical processes in Eurasia, it is necessary to briefly outline the main theses of this concept.

"Post-imperial legitimacy" is a set of legal norms closely linked to the immediate antecedent phase of the political development of a region, i.e. the "legacy of empire". An empire (at least a "secular" liberal or socialist one) is most often guided in the territorial organisation of its colonies by purely administrative and economic characteristics, without regard for ethnic, religious or national factors. Administrative boundaries within the empire are quite arbitrary, as they are knowingly conventional barriers created only for the convenience of centralised control of the metropolis. The Empire, during its existence, forces the other powers to recognise its internal administrative system as legitimate. But when an empire collapses, there are always "zones of legal uncertainty", as the structure which legally regulated the status of its constituent parts ceases to exist.

In the process of "post-colonial" transformations, an international legal concept was formulated which formed the basis for the classification of the legality and illegality of post-imperial territorial-political entities. This is the concept of "post-imperial legitimacy". Its essence is that, despite the absence of the Empire as a whole, its purely administrative components receive full legal status, regardless of whether or not the entity in question meets the criterion of a full-fledged state. This approach is based on the secular liberal idea of the arbitrariness of any state formation as a historical accident. According to this logic, ethnic, religious, cultural and social components are insignificant and unimportant, as the population is understood here as a simple aggregate of economic and statistical units. This is the inertia of the "imperial", "colonial" approach, which is used to regard "colonies" and "provinces" as something secondary and unimportant, "additional" within the overall context.

As a rule, "post-imperial entities" never (or almost never) become full-

fledged states and continue to exist as economic and political appendages of the former (or new) metropolis. Almost always, their ruling elite is a direct heir (often a protégé) to the colonial administration, the economy is entirely dependent on external factors, and the political and social structure adjusts to the model of the former centre. The maintenance of such "post-imperial legitimacy" often results in the same autochthonous ethnos inhabiting the territories of different post-imperial states, and several ethnic and religious groups living within the same state. In fact, the relative balance of interests is maintained in such cases only by appeal to an external factor, most often the explicit or implicit power of the former metropolis (or whatever developed state may succeed it). Significantly, during the final stages of Africa's 'liberation', the Pan-African Congress decided to apply the principle of post-imperial legitimacy to all the newly created states, although many large African peoples such as the Bantu, Zulu, etc., found themselves living in two or three states at once. This was done under the pretext of avoiding ethnic, tribal and religious wars. In reality, it was about the desire of the post-imperial leaders to keep their artificial elites in power without allowing new representatives of an organic national hierarchy to emerge in the process of national rise. Given Africa's strategic and socio-economic backwardness and lack of a fresh and vital state tradition, this approach worked quite successfully.

The principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" also applies today to countries that emerged from the ruins of the USSR. In the former "union republics", the heirs of the "colonial administration" are in power almost everywhere, sections of a single administrative structure that was formed entirely in the imperial Soviet context. This elite is alienated from the national and cultural traditions of its peoples and is oriented by inertia towards maintaining economic and political dependence on the metropolis. The only exception is Armenia, where the logic of "post-imperial legitimacy" has been broken (in the case of Nagorny Karabakh) and where, accordingly, purely national political forces carry more weight than in all the other CIS countries. Moreover, Armenia is the only mono-ethnic republic in the CIS.

At first glance, one might get the impression that the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" plays into the hands of Russia and Moscow, as it creates prerequisites for maintaining Russian influence in the "near abroad" and simplifies political and economic relations with geographical neighbours. But in reality the situation is more complicated. As in the case of "decolonization" of the Third World, the collapse of the Empire weakens the geopolitical power of the metropolis, and some colonies and dominions pass under the implicit control of another, stronger power that uses the system of "post-imperial legitimacy" for its own purposes. A striking example of this is the United States, which effectively seized most of the former British, Spanish, Portuguese, French and Dutch colonies under its influence during the process of "decolonisation". Thus, the post-Soviet "colonial administration" in the CIS countries can be (and is) replaced by a different "colonial administration" which uses the already existing artificial structures for its own purposes.

On the other hand, "post-imperial legitimacy" puts the RF itself on a par with other CIS countries, as long as it completely ignores the national-cultural, religious and ethnic interests *of the Russian people*, who fall under the abstract norms of "post-imperial", purely administrative law and are scattered across alien pseudo-state and quasi-national formations. The remains of the imperial administration within the Russian Federation (the party-bureaucratic apparatus) turn out to be just as alien to the Russian national context as in other republics, because the Empire system itself was built on other, purely administrative and economic principles, rather than national and cultural ones. The Russians, having "liberated" themselves from the republics, did not gain freedom and autonomy, but lost a large part of their national community, remained dependent on the remnants of the former nomenclature, and in addition was exposed to the new danger of falling under the influence of external political forces of more powerful powers. This latter danger was not so close during the period of the Empire, but as a simple "regional power", the Russian Federation is exposed to it to the full.

All these considerations call into question the usefulness of the principle of "post-imperial legitimacy" in the current context, as it largely contradicts Russian national interests.

But what criteria should be used to determine what constitutes the "Russian national interest"? Who should be taken as the main *subject* in relation to whom one could determine what is beneficial and what is disadvantageous? In what categories should *Russia* be conceptualised today?

2.3 Russian people at the centre of the geopolitical concept

The collapse of the Soviet Empire and the fragility and state failure of the new political formations on its territory (including the Russian Federation) make it necessary to look for a more concrete category for understanding "Russian national interests". The only organic, natural, historically rooted reality in this matter can only be *the Russian people*.

The Russian people is a historical community that has all the attributes of a full-fledged and stable political entity. The Russian people are united ethnically, culturally, psychologically and religiously. But this is not the only reason for putting it in the centre of the geopolitical concept as a subject of political and social strategy. The Russian people, unlike many other nations, was formed as a bearer of a *particular civilization* that had all the distinctive features of an original and full-fledged planetary-historical phenomenon. The Russian people is a civilizational constant, which served as a pivot in the creation of not one, but *many* states: from the mosaic of Eastern Slavic principalities to Moscow Rus', Peter the Great Empire and the Soviet bloc. And this constant defined the continuity and connection between entities so different politically, socially, territorially and structurally. The Russian people did not simply provide the ethnic basis for all these state formations; they expressed in them a particular *civilizational idea* unlike any other. It was not the state that formed the Russian nation. On the

contrary, the Russian nation, the Russian people experimented in history with different types of state systems, expressing in different ways (depending on the circumstances) the specifics of its unique mission.

The Russian people undoubtedly belong to the number of messianic peoples. And like any messianic people, it has a universal, all-human significance that competes not just with other national ideas, but with types of other forms of civilisational universalism. K. Leontiev and the Russian Eurasians developed this idea quite fully.

Regardless of turmoil, periods of transition and political cataclysms Russian people have always maintained their messianic identity, and therefore has always remained a *political* subject of history. After the next state upheaval the same ancient and powerful Russian force created new political constructions, clothed their spiritual outburst in new geopolitical forms. And as soon as the state constructions developed to a critical line, beyond which loomed the final loss of the connection of political form with the national content, crises and disasters occurred, followed by a new geopolitical and social construction, clothed civilizational mission of the Russian people in new images and political structures.

And in the current transition period, it is the Russian people that should be taken as the main political subject, from which the scale of Russia's geopolitical and strategic, as well as socio-economic interests, should be derived. The Russian people is *Russia* today, but not as a clearly delineated state, but as a geopolitical potentiality, real and concrete on the one hand, but which has not yet defined its new state structure, neither its ideology, nor its territorial limits, nor its socio-political structure.

Nevertheless, the "potential Russia" today has far more fixed characteristics than the ephemeral RF or CIS. These characteristics are directly related to the civilizational mission in the realisation of which the Russian people's *raison d'être* consists.

Firstly, the Russian people (= Russia) are undoubtedly responsible for con-

trolling the north-eastern regions of Eurasia. This Russian "Drang nach Osten und Norden" constitutes the natural geopolitical process of Russian history in recent centuries, which has not stopped under any political cataclysm. Mackinder called Russia "the geopolitical axis of history", and this is quite true, since the Russian people have indeed traditionally gravitated towards the civilizational development of all those inland Eurasian spaces, which are located in the heart of the continental mass. Hence, one can conclude that the strategic interests of Russians are inseparable from the expanses of Northeast Eurasia. This is the fundamental principle in determining the real prospects of the geopolitics of Russia (= the Russian people).

Secondly, the Russian people (= Russia) are endowed with a particular type of religiosity and culture, which differ sharply from the Catholic-Protestant West and from the post-Christian civilisation that has developed there. Russia's cultural and geopolitical antithesis should be taken to be "the West" as a whole and not just one of its constituent countries. Modern Western civilisation is universalist oriented: there is a particular cultural unity in all its compartments, based on a specific solution to the main philosophical and attitudinal problems. Russian universalism, the foundation of Russian civilisation, is radically different from the West in all major respects. In a sense, they are two competing, mutually exclusive models, opposite poles. Consequently, the strategic interests of the Russian people should be oriented *in an antipastern direction* (which stems from the imperative to preserve Russian civilizational identity), and civilizational expansion is also possible in the future.

Thirdly, the Russian people (= Russia) never set out to create a mono-ethnic, racially homogeneous state. The mission of the Russians was universal, and that is why the Russian people systematically went in history to create an empire, the borders of which were constantly expanding, covering more and more conglomerate of peoples, cultures, religions, territories, regions. It is absurd to consider the systematic and pronounced "expansionism" of the Russians a historical accident. This "expansionism" is an integral part of the historical existence of the Russian people and is closely associated

with the quality of its civilizational mission. This mission carries a certain "common denominator", which allows the Russians to integrate the most diverse cultural realities into their Empire. However, the "common denominator" has its own characteristics and is applicable only to those peoples who have a certain historical specificity and cultural content, while other peoples (in particular, some nations of the West) remain deeply alien to Russian universalism (which historically manifested in the instability and even inconsistency of Russian political influence in Europe).

Fourthly, the Russian people (= Russia) in its being proceeds from an even more global, "soteriological" perspective, which in the limit has a general planetary meaning. It is not a question of an infinite expansion of the Russian "living space", but the establishment of a special "Russian" type of worldview, which is accentuated eschatologically and claims to be *the last* word in earthly history. This is the supreme supremacy of the nation as a "God-bearing people".

Consequently, theoretically, there is no people, culture or territory on the planet whose fate and path would be indifferent to the Russian consciousness. This manifests itself in the unshakable belief of Russians in the final triumph of Truth, Spirit and Justice, not only within the Russian state, but everywhere. To deprive the Russians of this eschatological faith is tantamount to their spiritual scoping. Russians care about everything and everyone, and therefore, in the final analysis, the interests of the Russian people are not limited to the Russian ethnos, the Russian Empire or even the whole of Eurasia. This "transcendent" aspect of the Russian nation needs to be taken into account when developing a future geopolitical strategy.

Obviously, in the current circumstances and under the generally accepted Western, secular, quantitative-liberal norms of the legal approach, there is no objective possibility not only to legally secure the status of the "Russian people" as an independent political subject, but even to introduce into legal and diplomatic usage such a term as "people". Modern international law (which copies in the main features of Roman law) recognises only *the state* and *the individual* as full-fledged political subjects.

And so there is a code of "states' rights" and "human rights", while the very notion of "people's rights" is absent. This is not surprising, since a secular and quantitative approach cannot take into account such cultural spiritual categories as ethnicity, people, etc. A similar quantitative approach characterized the Soviet system and the "democratic" world. And since the Russian people in the present period resides in a territory where either "post-imperial" or liberal-democratic principles of legitimacy are in force, any automatic recognition of the political status of "people" is out of the question. Consequently, the logic of clarifying and defending "Russian national interests" requires a serious change in the existing legal practice and, moreover, a radical revision of this practice in the national vein.

Such a transformation would not be possible if we were talking about a single people, underdeveloped and technologically unequipped. In the case of the Russians, fortunately this is not the case. Today we still have the possibility of political transformation which is quite independent from the rest of the world, because Russia's possession of strategic weaponry allows it to withstand pressure from the West to a certain extent. And here everything depends only on the political will and determination of those individuals who will assume responsibility for the fate of Russia and the Russian people.

In any case, the first step towards identifying the "national interests of the Russian people" is to recognise them *as an independent political entity* with the right to decide for itself what is beneficial and what is not, and to take geopolitical, socio-economic and strategic steps in accordance with this.

Chapter 3

Russia is unthinkable without Empire

3.1 The Russians' lack of a "nation-state"

Russia has never been analogous to the "nation-states" that characterised modern Europe and whose model was projected onto Asia and the Third World as a whole in the colonial and post-colonial era.

The "nation-state" is based on administrative unity and bureaucratic centralism, which form a political community created by the state and closely linked to the state. There is no doubt that the model of the "nation-state" first emerged in absolutist France and was later consolidated in the Jacobin revolutionary model. The "nation-state" initially had an emphatically secular nature and was first and foremost a political unity. In such a conception, the term "nation" was understood as a "totality of citizens" rather than "people" or "nations" in the organic, "holistic" sense. This type of state was based on the ethnic, confessional and estates-based leveling of the population, on the establishment of similar legal and procedural norms throughout society, without regard to regional, religious or racial features. Nominally, the nation-state can be monarchical, democratic or socialist. The essential element in it is not the specificity of the political structure, but the understanding of the state as an administrative-centralist instance, placed above all social-ethnic and cultural-religious distinctions. It should be stressed that "nation" in this case has a purely and exclusively political meaning, sharply different from the one that nationalists put into this concept.

The "nation-state" historically emerged in Europe at a time of the final disintegration of imperial unity as a result of the destruction of the last vestiges of the imperial system, which survived in the form of feudal regional structures. The "nation-state" is inherently dominated by profane, bourgeois values which reduce qualitative social differences to a simplified quantitative administrative structure. The "nation-state" is usually governed not by a "divine idea" (like a theocracy or Holy Empire), not by a "heroic aristocratic personality" (like a feudal system), but by a "dictatorship of law" ("nomocracy"), which gives enormous power to jurists and legal bureaucracies. In fact, the "nation-state" is the most manageable and most quantitatively ordered political reality, since all non-quantitative, "irrational" factors are minimised in it.

In Russian history, the "nation-state" never emerged. When this model began to take root in Europe from the 18th century onwards, Russia desperately resisted it by all means. The tsarist regime tried to preserve the imperial structure as intact as possible, although certain concessions to the European model were constantly made. Despite the pro-European reforms of Peter the Great, the Russian Empire maintained its theocratic elements and aristocratic principle, while the transfer of the clergy and nobility to the category of state bureaucrats never really took place (unlike in Western Europe). The national element resisted this transformation of the empire into a "nation-state", which prompted regular waves of spontaneous or deliberate reactions from both the people and the elite. Even under one and the same sovereign, reformist and reactionary attitudes in Russia frequently shifted, and from liberal reforms often turned to mystical restorationist projects (most vividly illustrated by the reign of Alexander I, founder of the Holy Alliance).

It was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that Russia came close to realising a "nation-state" modelled on Europe. However, this time too, the process was thwarted by a revolutionary outburst that incorporated (albeit unconsciously) a profound national protest against a type of state structure in which there would be no place for the manifestation of a spiritual

people's mission. Behind the modernist rhetoric of Bolshevism, the Russians vaguely recognised their own eschatological ideals of the triumph of the Idea, Justice and Truth. The Soviet state was perceived by the people as building a "New Empire", a "kingdom of Light", a "abode of the spirit", rather than as creating the most rational system of administration and management of quantitative units. The tragedy and fanaticism of the Bolshevik cataclysms was precisely due to the "idealism" of the task, and not at all to the inability to organise human resources in a more "humane" and less costly way.

The USSR did not become a "nation-state"; it was a continuation of purely imperial national traditions, clothed in extravagant external forms and contrasted with the later tsarist model, which was slipping towards an ordinary bourgeois society, towards a "dictatorship of law". The Soviet Empire, like any political construction, had three stages: the "revolutionary stage" of building a unique system (Lenin's youth), the stable stage of strengthening and expanding the power (Stalin's adulthood), and the stage of disintegration and decrepitude (Brezhnev's old age). And it was the late Brezhnev period that produced the political-administrative structure most reminiscent of the bureaucratic centralism of a typical "nation-state". The life cycle of this Soviet formation came to an end during perestroika. At the same time, another stage in the national history of the Russian people came to an end.

It is important to note that there is a pattern in Russian history: when it comes to transforming Russia into a "nation-state", disasters ensue, and at a new turn the nation finds another (sometimes rather extravagant) way to evade the seemingly inevitable transformation. Russians strive to avoid such a turn of events at all costs, since their political will is incompatible with the narrow norms of rational and average quantitative existence within a bureaucratically efficient mechanism. Russians are prepared to make unimaginable sacrifices and hardships so that the national idea, the great Russian dream, can be realised and developed.

And the boundaries of this dream the nation sees, at the very least, in the Empire.

3.2 The Russian people of the Empire

Not a mono-ethnic state, not a nation-state, Russia was almost initially a potential imperial state. From the unification of Slavic and Ugro-Finnic tribes under Rurik to the gigantic scale of the USSR and the territories under its influence, the Russian people were steadily on the path of political and spatial integration, empire-building and civilizational expansion. It should be emphasized that Russian expansion had a civilizational sense, and was not a utilitarian pursuit of colonies or a banal struggle for "living space". It was neither the lack of this "living space" nor economic necessity that drove the Russian people to increasingly expand their borders to the East, South, North and West. Lack of land has never been the true cause of Russian empire-building. The Russians were expanding as bearers of a special mission, the geopolitical projection of which consisted of a deep awareness of the need to unite the giant territories of the Eurasian continent.

The political integrity of the Eurasian space has a completely *independent* meaning for Russian history. One could say that Russians feel responsible for this space, for its state, for its connection, for its integrity and independence. Mackinder rightly regarded Russia as the main land power of our time, which inherits the geopolitical mission of Rome, the Empire of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, etc. It is the "geographical axis of history", which simply cannot fail to fulfil its geopolitical destiny regardless of external and transitory factors.

The Russian people are so connected with geopolitical reality that space itself, its experience, its awareness, its spiritual perception have shaped the psychology of the people, becoming one of the most important definitions of its identity, of its essence.

Real terrestrial space is not a purely quantitative category. Climate, landscape, terrain geology, waterways and mountain ranges are actively involved in the formation of ethnic and, more broadly, civilizational types. From the geopolitical point of view, civilization and its specificity in general are strictly determined by geography and necessarily subject to special qualitative laws.

The Russians are a landlocked, continental, northern Eurasian nation, and the cultural specificity of the nation is such that its "soul" is maximally predisposed to "openness", to the implementation of an "integrating" function, to the subtle and profound process of developing a special continental, Eurasian community.

The cultural factor is a natural complement to Russia's purely geopolitical predestination. The geopolitical mission is realised at the cultural level, and vice versa, culture comprehends, shapes and activates the geopolitical impulse. Space and culture are the two most important components of the Russian people as a nation of empire-builders in the first place. Not blood, not race, not administrative control or even religion made a part of the Eastern Slavs into a special, incomparable community of the Russian people. It was the boundless Eurasian expanse and the utmost cultural, spiritual openness that made it so. Under the sign of "space and culture", ethnic, political, ethical and religious aspects were redefined. Russians formed, developed and matured as a nation in the Empire, in the heroics of its construction, in the exploits of its defense, in the campaigns for its expansion. The rejection of the empire-building function means the end of the existence of the Russian people as a historical reality, as a civilizational phenomenon. Such rejection is national suicide.

Unlike Rome (the first Rome), Moscow and Russia have in their imperial impulse a deep teleological, eschatological meaning. Hegel developed the interesting concept that the Absolute Idea in the eschatological situation should manifest itself in its final, "realised" form in the form of the Prussian state. On a planetary scale, however, Prussia, and even Germany, taken alone, are geopolitically insufficient for this concept to be taken seriously. Russia, the Third Rome, on the religious, cultural, spatial and strategic scale, corresponds perfectly well to such a teleological view of the essence of history, and clearly aspires to fulfill exactly this mission. Hegel's Absolute Idea in the case of Russia is the spiritual root of Russian empire-building, gravitating towards the civilizational development of the continent-Eurasia. It is absurd to apply such serious Hegelian criteria to a "nation-state" which

knowingly assumes other "nation-states" with their own goals, myths and interests. To grant such a relative structure the quality of absolute significance is quite absurd. But in the case of a giant empire, based on specific, largely paradoxical, and in some ways not entirely clear principles, it is quite different, and it is no accident that the ancient empires were called "Holy Empires": the quality of "holiness" was conveyed to them by the execution of a special spiritual mission, which prefigured an "Empire of the End", a continental kingdom of the Absolute Idea.

The Russian people were moving step by step towards this very goal. At each stage of the expansion of their state, the Russians moved to the next stage of messianic universalism, first rallying the eastern Slavs, then incorporating the Turkic stream of steppes and Siberia, then moving to the south, into deserts and mountains, and finally forming a giant political block, controlling literally half the world in the Soviet period. If we realize that the Russian people in its essence is this empire-building process, a volitional geopolitical vector of creation of the "state of the Absolute Idea", then it becomes quite obvious that the existence of the Russian people directly depends on *the continuation of* this process, on its development, on its intensification. By cutting or suppressing this vector, we will hit the Russians in the heart, we will deprive them of their national identity, we will turn them into a historical rudiment, we will disrupt the global teleological, eschatological planetary process.

3.3 The "regional power" trap

The Russian people, with their civilizational and geopolitical mission, have traditionally been (and still are) a serious obstacle to the ubiquitous spread on the planet of the purely liberal model of the Western model. Both Tsarist and Soviet regimes, obeying an inexorable national logic, have prevented Western cultural and political expansion to the East, and particularly to the depths of the Eurasian continent. And the seriousness of the geopolitical

confrontation has always been reflected in the fact that Russia has federated, in and around itself, different countries and peoples into a powerful strategic imperial bloc. As a continental empire, Russia participated in world politics and defended its national and civilizational interests.

At present, after the collapse of the USSR, the West is seeking to impose another geopolitical function on Russia, to turn Russia into a political structure, which would be unable to participate directly in world politics and have a broad civilizational mission. The report by Paul Wolfowitz to the U.S. Congress in 1992 stated unequivocally that "the primary strategic objective of the United States is to prevent the creation on the territory of the former Soviet Union of a major and independent strategic entity, capable of conducting a policy independent of the United States. It was based on this urgent need of the West that Russia was offered the role of a *"regional power"*.

A "regional power" is a modern geopolitical category that describes a large and fairly developed state whose political interests are, however, limited to areas immediately adjacent to or within its territory. Regional powers are, for example, India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, China, etc. The specifics of a regional power are that it carries more political weight than an ordinary rank-and-file state, but less weight than a superpower or an empire. In other words, a regional power has no direct influence on planetary civilization and global geopolitical processes, being subordinate in the main strategic lines to the balance of power of more powerful Empires. At the same time, a regional power has a certain freedom in relation to its immediate (weaker) neighbours and can exert political and economic pressure on them (naturally, only when it does not contradict the interests of superpowers).

The status of "regional power" offered (imposed) on Russia today by the West is tantamount to suicide for the Russian nation. It is about artificially and under strong external influence reversing the vector of Russian national history, in the opposite direction, breaking the coherent process of the geopolitical formation of Russians as an Empire. Russia as a regional power would represent a repudiation of that deep impulse of the nation,

which lies at the heart of its highest and deepest identity. The loss of imperial scale for Russians means the end and failure of their participation in civilization, the defeat of their spiritual and cultural system of values, the fall of their universalist and messianic aspirations, the devaluation and debunking of the entire national ideology that animated many generations of the Russian people and gave strength and energy for exploits, creation, struggle and overcoming adversity.

If one considers the specifics of Russians' national imperial self-identification, it is clear that Russia's assumption of the status of "regional power" cannot be the last line of defence. The blow to the Russian national identity would be so severe that it would not be limited to the Russian Federation or a similar territorial space. Having lost their mission, Russians will not be able to find the strength to adequately assert their new, "diminished" identity in a "regional state," as asserting this identity is impossible in the state of affect that logically occurs when a nation loses its imperial scale. Consequently, the processes of disintegration are likely to continue in the "regional power" and the growing wave of regional and religious separatism will be impossible for the disadvantaged Russians to oppose.

Even in order to fix the "regional status" of post-imperial Russia, a powerful wave of nationalism would have to be awakened, a nationalism that is entirely new, artificial, based on energies and ideas that have nothing in common with the traditional and only authentic and justified Russian imperial tendency. It can be compared to the small, "secular" nationalism of the Young Turks, who created the modern Turkey, a "regional power" on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire through a "national revolution". But the nationalism of the Young Turks, had nothing in common with the geopolitical and religious nationalism of the Ottoman Empire, and in fact, today's Turkey is both spiritually, ethnically and culturally an entirely different reality from the Turkish Empire of the beginning of the century.

The same, if not worse, threatens Russia, and it is more likely that attempts to establish itself as a "regional power" that has abandoned its civilizational mission and universalist values will bring to life politicians of the "Mladoros"

type (similar to the Young Turks), who will very probably profess a particular sectarian ideology that has nothing to do with the main line of the Russian national idea. Such Russian “non-imperial” nationalism, secular and artificial, will geopolitically only play into the hands of the West, as it will consolidate Russia’s “regional” status, lead to illusory and short-lived internal stabilisation and simultaneously lay the basis for future intra-Russian ethnic and religious conflicts. But while Turkey has two or three major ethnic communities capable of actively opposing Young Turk centralism, the Russian Federation has hundreds of peoples who got along fine under the imperial model, but who don’t fit into the framework of “Little Russian nationalism” in any way. The conclusion is obvious: Russia will gradually become embroiled in an endless chain of internal conflicts and wars, and will eventually disintegrate.

This will be the natural result of the Russians losing their imperial mission, as this process cannot be limited to a relative shrinkage of territories and must necessarily reach its logical limit to the complete destruction of the Russian nation as a historical, geopolitical and civilisational entity.

3.4 Critique of Soviet statehood

The last form of imperial organisation of the Russian people was the USSR and the geopolitical area that depended on it (the Warsaw Pact countries). During the Soviet period, the Russian sphere of influence expanded geographically to previously unthinkable limits. Land development and military campaigns have included vast territories in the geopolitical zone of the Russians.

In a spatial sense, such expansion would seem to represent the highest form of Russian statehood. And it is impossible to deny the fact that it was the Russian people who were the axial construction of the Soviet Empire, embodying their specific universalism (at least in part) in the Soviet ideological and socio-political model.

Today, at first glance, it would seem that the prospect of genuine Russian national development in the current context would have to coincide with the restoration of the USSR and the re-establishment of the Soviet model and Soviet statehood. This is partly true and logical, and in this case the neo-communist movement, which advocates the restoration of the USSR, is closer to understanding the geopolitical interests of the Russian people and represents the essence of their strategic and civilizational aspirations more clearly than some neo-nationalist circles, which lean towards the “Young Turks” (similar to the “Young Turk”) model of “small”, “diminished”, “ethnic” nationalism. Certainly, the geopolitical restorationism of the neo-communists is justified and their nationalism is more organic and “nationalist” than the romantic and irresponsible in form (and subversive in results) narrow nationalist projects of the Slavophile, Orthodox-monarchist or racist wing of the patriots. If the choice lay between recreating the USSR and building a mono-ethnic or even mono-cultural Great Russian state, it would be more logical and correct in the interests of the Russian people to choose the USSR project.

However, the reasons for the collapse of the USSR and the collapse of the Soviet Empire need to be analysed objectively, which in no way can be reduced to identifying external (hostile) and internal (subversive) influence, i.e. to “conspiracy theory”. The external pressure of the liberal-democratic West on the USSR was indeed enormous, while the activities of “subversive elements” inside the country were extremely effective and coordinated. But both of these factors became decisive only in a situation where the existence of the Soviet Empire entered a stage of internal crisis, which had deep and natural causes rooted in the very specifics of the Soviet system and the Soviet system. Without an understanding of these internal causes of the collapse and their analysis, any attempt to restore the USSR (much less create a New Empire) would prove futile and unpromising. Moreover, any purely inertial conservatism in this matter can only make matters worse.

Let us identify several factors that led the Soviet Union to geopolitical and socio-economic collapse.

Firstly, on an ideological level, during the entire existence of the socialist regime, purely national, traditional and spiritual elements were never integrated into the overall complex of communist ideology. Being largely national-communist *de facto*, it was never transformed into one *de jure*, which hindered the organic development of Russian-Soviet society, created double standards and ideological contradictions, and undermined clarity and awareness in the implementation of geopolitical and socio-political projects. Atheism, materialism, progressivism, “enlightenment ethics”, etc. were deeply alien to Russian Bolshevism and the Russian people in general. In practice, these positions borrowed from Marxism (which, incidentally, were also rather arbitrary elements in Marxism itself, a tribute to old-fashioned positivist humanism in the style of Feuerbach) were understood by Russian communists in the spirit of a folk-mystical, sometimes unorthodox eschatological aspiration, rather than as the rationalist fruits of Western European culture. However, the ideology of National Bolshevism, which might have found more adequate, more Russian terms for the new socio-political order, was never formulated. Consequently, sooner or later, the limitations and inadequacy of such an ideologically contradictory construct were bound to take a negative toll. This was particularly evident in the late Soviet period, when meaningless dogmatism and communist demagoguery finally crushed all ideological life in society. This “stiffening” of the ruling ideology and the persistent refusal to introduce any organic, national and natural components into it, culminated in the collapse of the entire Soviet system. Responsibility for this lies not only with the “agents of influence” and “anti-Sovietists”, but first and foremost with the central Soviet ideologists of both the “progressive” and “conservative” wings. The Soviet Empire was both ideologically and factually destroyed *by the Communists*. To recreate it in the same form and with the same ideology now is not only impossible but also pointless, since even hypothetically it would reproduce the same preconditions that have already led once to the destruction of the state.

Second, on a geopolitical and strategic level, the USSR was uncompetitive in the long term to resist the Atlanticist Western bloc. In terms of strategy,

land borders are much more vulnerable than maritime borders, at all levels (number of border troops, cost of military equipment, use and deployment of strategic weapons, etc.) After World War II, the USSR was at odds with the Western capitalist bloc that had clustered around the US. The US had a gigantic island base (the American continent), totally controlled and surrounded on all sides by oceans and seas, which were easy to defend. Plus, the US controlled almost all the coastal zones in the South and West of Eurasia, posing a gigantic threat to the USSR while remaining virtually out of reach for potential destabilizing actions by the Soviet Union. The division of Europe into Eastern (Soviet) and Western (American) ones only complicated the geopolitical position of the USSR in the West, increasing its land borders and placing it close to a strategic potential enemy, in a situation of passive hostility of the European peoples themselves, who found themselves in a hostage position in a geopolitical duel whose meaning was not clear to them. The same was true in the southern direction in Asia and the Far East, where the USSR had direct neighbours either controlled by the West (Pakistan, Afghanistan, pre-Communist Iran) or rather hostile powers with a non-Soviet-socialist orientation (China). In this situation, the USSR could only acquire relative stability in two cases: either by rapidly advancing towards the oceans in the West (towards the Atlantic) and in the South (towards the Indian Ocean), or by creating neutral political blocs in Europe and Asia, which are not controlled by any of the superpowers. This concept (neutral Germany) was tried by Stalin and, after his death, by Beria. The USSR (together with the Warsaw Pact) was geopolitically too big and too small at the same time. Maintaining the status quo benefited only the US and Atlantism, as the military, industrial and strategic capabilities of the USSR were becoming increasingly exhausted, while the power of the US, a protected island, was growing. Sooner or later the Eastern bloc was bound to collapse. Consequently, the re-establishment of the USSR and the Warsaw bloc was not only almost impossible, but also unnecessary, because even in the case of (virtually improbable) success, it would only lead to the revival of a geopolitical model that was known to be doomed.

Thirdly, the administrative structure of the USSR was based on a secular,

purely functional and quantitative understanding of the internal state division. Economic and bureaucratic centralism did not take into account the regional, much less ethnic and religious specificities of the internal territories. The principle of levelling and the strictly economic structuring of society resulted in the creation of such rigid systems which suppressed, and at best “conserved”, forms of the natural national life of various peoples, including (and to a greater extent) the Russian nation itself. The territorial principle worked even when nominally it was a question of national republics, autonomies or districts. At the same time, the process of regional-ethnic leveling was becoming more and more pronounced as the entire Soviet political system “aged” and by its final stage was leaning more and more towards a Soviet “nation-state” rather than an empire. Nationalism, which had largely contributed to the creation of the USSR in the early stages, became a purely negative factor at the end, as excessive centralisation and unification began to engender natural protests and resentment. The atrophy of imperialism, the ossification of bureaucratic centralism and the pursuit of maximum rationalisation and purely economic productivity gradually transformed the USSR into a political monster that lost life and was perceived as an imposed totalitarianism of the centre. Certain communist theses of a literalist understanding of “internationalism” are largely responsible for this. Consequently, this aspect of the Soviet model, which does not deal with specific ethnic groups, cultures or religions, but rather with abstract “population” and “territory”, should not be revived in any way. On the contrary, the consequences of this quantitative approach, the repercussions of which are so tragically felt today in Chechnya, Crimea, Kazakhstan, the Karabakh conflict, Abkhazia, Transdnistria, etc., should be eliminated as soon as possible.

Fourthly, the economic system in the USSR was based on such a “long” socialist cycle that gradually the return of society to the individual ceased to be felt at all. The extreme socialisation and detailed control of the state over all economic processes down to the smallest detail, as well as the delegation of redistribution to a centralised, purely apex institution, created a climate of social alienation, apathy and disinterest in society. Socialism

and its benefits were invisible, overshadowed by the gigantic construction of the bureaucratic state machine. The individual and the concrete collective were lost before the abstraction of “society,” and the cycle of socialist distribution lost its grip on reality, morphing into the inexplicable, alienated and seemingly arbitrary logic of a soulless machine. Not socialism itself is responsible for this state of affairs, but that version of it which historically developed in the USSR, especially at its later stages, although the origins of this degeneration should be looked for in the doctrine, in the theory itself. Totalitarian gossocialism deprived the economy of flexibility, people of enthusiasm and a sense of complicity in the creative process, and helped to inculcate a parasitic attitude towards society, which has been absolutised today in a mafia-liberalist mindset. The communists were also responsible for this post-Soviet excess, as they proved incapable of reforming socialism in relation to the national element and of maintaining a decent life in it.

These four main aspects of the former Soviet model are the main factors in the collapse of the Soviet statehood, and it is they who are responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Empire. It is only natural that in the hypothetical re-establishment of the USSR, radical conclusions should be drawn in this respect and those causes, which had already once historically condemned the great nation to state disaster, should be fundamentally destroyed.

However, if the restoration of the USSR were to take place under the banners of an ideology which rejected materialism, atheism, totalitarianism, state socialism, Soviet geopolitical space, administrative structure, internationalism, centralism, etc., is it even legitimate to speak of “the USSR” or “the Soviet State”, of “communism”, “restoration”, etc.? Would it not be more correct to call it the creation of a “New Empire”?

3.5 Criticism of Tsarist statehood

Today it is increasingly common to hear calls for a return to the tsarist, monarchical model. This is quite logical, as the discrediting of Sovietism

forces Russians to turn to the forms of statehood that existed before the communist period of Russian history. This model has some positive and some negative aspects. Regardless of the incredible difficulty of restoring the pre-communist state system, this project is being discussed more and more seriously.

Given the historical logic of the geopolitical development of the Russian nation, it makes sense to talk about the later periods of the Romanov dynasty, when Russia reached the limits of its maximum territorial imperial scope.

The most positive in this project is the ideological basis of tsarist Russia, which (albeit nominally) declared allegiance to the national spirit (*Narodnost*), religious truth (Orthodoxy) and the traditional sacral political order (Autocracy). However, as Russian Eurasians rightly pointed out, the Uvarov formula (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality) was, in the last periods of tsarist Russia, more of an idealistic slogan than the real content of political life and social structure. Russian Orthodoxy, shaken by the secular reforms of Peter, in this period was quite far from the ideal of “Holy Russia”, being in fact subordinated to state control and having lost much of its sacral authority and the harmony of Orthodox symphony. Having lost its spiritual independence, the Russian Church was compelled to compromise with secular power, embodied in the tsar’s subordinate Synod, and thus was limited in the freedom of genuine confession of unearthly Truths.

The autocracy, for its part, increasingly lost its sacral significance, becoming involved in purely political tasks and at times forgetting its supreme mission and religious purpose. Although the desacralization of imperial power had never reached the level of an empty parody of European monarchies, especially those of France and Great Britain, until the last Emperor abdicated, the European influence in this area was still very great.

Finally, the “*Narodnost*” of the famous slogan was rather purely declarative, while the people themselves were deeply alienated from political life, as manifested, for example, in their indifference to the February and later October revolutions, which radically destroyed the monarchist model.

A direct appeal in our circumstances to the restoration of this triad is likely to lead to a restoration of that thin and largely demagogic compromise which in practice was behind these three principles in the late Romanov era (in which they were, incidentally, formulated). Moreover, given the absence of unambiguous pretenders to the Russian throne, the unstable and uncertain state of the current Orthodox Church, and the abstract meaning of the term “nationality” (which is often understood as merely superficial, folkloric style or altogether faked by imagining intellectuals), it is easy to anticipate that a return to the Uvarov ideology would be an even greater travesty than the pre-revolutionary Tsarist regime.

The Tsarist model also had a serious geopolitical flaw, which led the Russian Empire to its downfall just as the USSR did seventy years later.

A return to tsarist and, hence, generally “Slavophile” geopolitics would pose a dire threat. The fact is that during the last half-century of the Romanov dynasty, the foreign policy of the ruling house was determined not by the Eurasian traditions of Alexander I and the prospects of a continental Holy Alliance (based on an alliance between Russia and the powers of Central Europe), but by pro-English and pro-French projects, for the sake of which Russia was drawn into suicidal conflicts on the side of its natural geopolitical opponents and against its natural geopolitical allies. The support of the Serbian demands, the irresponsible myth of the “Bosphorus and Dardanelles”, the involvement of French Freemasons in European anti-German intrigues all forced Russia to play a political role that was not only uncharacteristic of it, but directly destructive to it. By trying to establish itself on a Slavophile basis in Eastern Europe and by constantly being drawn into conflict with the Central European powers (Russia’s natural allies), the tsarist regime systematically undermined the foundations of the Russian state, leading Russia straight to geopolitical suicide. The Turkish wars and the war with Japan belonged to the same category. Paradoxically, it seems that Russia sought to best serve the Atlanticist interests of progressive France and colonial-capitalist England instead of fulfilling its natural Eurasian mission and seeking an alliance with all similar (both politically and spiritually) con-

servative and imperial regimes. Slavophile geopolitical utopia cost Russia its Tsar, Church and Empire, and only the arrival of the Eurasian-oriented Bolsheviks saved the country and people from total degradation and transformation into a “regional power”.

Attempting to follow such a late-Romanesque, “Slavophile” line in our circumstances cannot but lead to a similar result. And even the very appeal to pre-revolutionary Russia carries with it potentially suicidal political motives, far more dangerous for the Russian people than Soviet restoration projects.

There is another factor that is extremely dangerous in the case of monarchist tendencies. We are talking about that capitalist form of economy which was characteristic of Russia at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Although it was a variation of national capitalism constrained by a state, social and cultural framework, rather than a “wild” free market, the effect of the economic alienation inherent in any capitalism was extremely strong. The Russian bourgeoisie firmly took the place of the state and military aristocracy and the clerical class, crowding out the bureaucracy and civil servants. This type of Russian bourgeois (quite different from representatives of the traditional, pre-capitalist, feudal merchant class) actually opposed the cultural, social and ethical norms that were the essence of the Russian national value system. Having absorbed the lessons of English economic liberalism, having tasted financial and stock market speculation, deftly exploiting the economic inefficiency of a Russian aristocracy still bound by a code of honor, the Russian bourgeois came to the forefront of Russian political life, fitting in perfectly with the overall picture of a lubonic monarchical pseudo-patriarchy that had lost all its vital, sacred content. It was Russian capitalists (very often of a nationalist, “Black Hundreds” orientation) who became the first agents of English and French influence in Russia, natural agents of the Atlanticist trade model that developed and took shape in Anglo-Saxon and French societies.

The Late Romanov state system was a combination of a desacralised monarchical façade, suicidal Slavophile geopolitics and Atlanticist-oriented market capitalism. In all cases, the national rhetoric was only a screen and a fig-

ure of speech, behind which were political-social tendencies not just distant from the true interests of the Russian people, but directly opposed to those interests.

Another element of this model is rather dubious is the principle of the provincial administrative division of the Russian Empire. Although in practice this did not interfere with the free development of the constituent peoples of the Russian Empire, and normally Russians only helped ethnic groups to form and develop their specific cultures, the legal non-recognition of cultural-ethnic and religious autonomies and some strict state-leveling centralism were not the best methods of engaging nations in unanimous and free continental empire-building. Elements of the 'nation-state' manifested themselves in the last decades of the Romanov dynasty in much the same way as in the last decades of the USSR, and the effect was very similar: alienation of ethnic groups from Moscow (St Petersburg) and the Russians, separatist sentiments, a surge of 'small nationalism', and so on. The response was the degeneration of the great Russian messianic will into banal national chauvinism.

In monarchic Russia it was the cultural and religious side that was positive, the nominal loyalty to sacral traditions, the memory of the ideal of Holy Russia, the Holy Kingdom, of Moscow the Third Rome. The Orthodox Church as a stronghold of dogmatic Truth, the symphony of Autocracy, the awareness of the historical mission of the God-bearing Russian people are the spiritual symbols of the true Russian Empire, which have archetypal, enduring value, which, however, should be cleared of formalism, demagoguery and Pharisaic overlay. But the unnatural geopolitics, the malleability of capitalization, the underestimation of the ethnic and religious factor in small intra-imperial peoples, the anti-German, anti-Japanese and anti-Ottoman orientation of the late Romanov Empire all have to be recognized as a political dead end, having nothing to do with the genuine interests of the Russian people, which was proved by the historical collapse of this model.

3.6 Towards a new Eurasian Empire

On the basis of the preceding considerations, certain conclusions can be drawn about the prospect of the coming Empire as the only form of dignified and natural existence for the Russian people and the only opportunity to bring its historical and civilisational mission to completion.

1. *The coming Empire must not be a “regional power” or a “nation state”.* This is obvious. But it should be particularly emphasized that such an Empire could never become a continuation, a development of a regional power or a nation-state, because such an intermediate stage would cause irreparable damage to the underlying national imperial trend and involve the Russian people in a maze of insoluble geopolitical and social contradictions, and this, in turn, would make systematic and consistent, logical empire-building impossible.

2. *The new empire must be built as an empire from the outset and its project must already be based on full-fledged and developed imperial principles.* This process cannot be regarded as a distant prospect, hoping for favourable conditions in the future. There will never be such conditions for the creation of a great Russian empire if the people and the political forces striving to speak on their behalf do not already consciously and clearly affirm their fundamental state and geopolitical orientation. An empire is not just a very big state. It is something quite different. It is a strategic and geopolitical bloc, surpassing the parameters of an ordinary state, it is a Superstate. Practically never has an ordinary state developed into an empire. Empires were built immediately as an expression of a particular civilizational will, as a superpurpose, as a giant world-building impulse. That is why today we must say with certainty: not the Russian State, but the Russian Empire. Not the path of socio-political evolution, but the path of geopolitical Revolution.

3. *The geopolitical and ideological contours of the New Russian Empire must be defined on the basis of overcoming those moments which led to the collapse of historically preceding imperial forms.* Consequently, the New Empire must:

not be materialistic, not atheistic, not econo-centrist;

have either maritime borders or friendly blocs, on adjacent continental territories;

have a flexible and differentiated ethno-religious internal political-administrative structure, i.e. take into account local, ethnic, religious, cultural, ethical, etc. characteristics of the regions, giving these elements a legal status;

to make state involvement in economic management flexible and affecting only strategic areas, to sharply reduce the social cycle, to achieve organic participation of the people in distribution;

(These first four points are derived from an analysis of the causes of the collapse of the Soviet Empire.)

to fill the religious-monarchical formula with true sacred content, lost under the influence of the secular West on the Romanov dynasty, to bring about an Orthodox "conservative revolution" to return to the roots of a genuine Christian outlook;

to transform the term "peoplehood" from a Uvarov formula into a central aspect of the socio-political order, to make the People the main, fundamental political and legal category, to contrast the organic concept of the People with the quantitative norms of liberal and socialist jurisprudence, to develop a theory of the "rights of the People";

Instead of Slavophile geopolitics, turn to Eurasian projects rejecting Russia's anti-German policy in the West and anti-Japanese policy in the East, to do away with the Atlanticist line disguised as "Russian nationalism";

To prevent the processes of privatisation and capitalisation as well as stock exchange games and financial speculation in the Empire, to focus on corporate, collective and state control of the people

over economic reality, to discard the dubious chimera of "national capitalism";

Instead of the provincial principle, move towards the creation of ethno-religious regions with a maximum degree of cultural, linguistic, economic and legal autonomy, strictly limiting them in one in political, strategic, geopolitical and ideological sovereignty.

(These five points stem from a critique of the Tsarist model.)

The builders of the New Empire must actively oppose the "Mladorussian" tendencies in Russian nationalism, which seek to consolidate Russia's status as a "nation-state", as well as all the nostalgic political forces that contain in their geopolitical projects an appeal to those elements which had already led the Empire to disaster.

The existence of the Russian people as an organic historical community is inconceivable without empire-building, continental creation. The Russians will remain a people only within the framework of the New Empire.

This Empire, according to geopolitical logic, this time should strategically and spatially surpass the previous version (USSR). Consequently, the New Empire should be Eurasian, great-continental and, in the long term, world-wide.

The battle for Russian world domination was not over.

Chapter 4

Redivision of the world

4.1 Land and Sea. A common enemy

The new Empire, which is to be created by the Russian people, has its own internal geopolitical logic, inscribed in the natural structure of the geographical space of the planet.

The basic geopolitical law, formulated most clearly by Mackinder, states that in history the constant and basic geopolitical process is the struggle of land, continental powers (with a natural form of ideocratic political system) against island, maritime states (commercial, market, economic system). This is the eternal opposition of Rome to Carthage, Sparta to Athens, England to Germany, etc. This confrontation of two geopolitical constants began to acquire global character from the beginning of the XX century. The United States became the maritime, trading pole and Russia became the land pole, pulling all other countries into its orbit. After the Second World War the two superpowers finally distributed the civilisation roles. The US strategically absorbed the West and the coastal territories of Eurasia, while the USSR united the giant continental mass of Eurasian space around itself. In terms of geopolitics as a science, the Cold War expressed the ancient archetypal opposition of Sea and Land, plutocracy and ideocracy, merchant civilisation and hero civilisation (the dualism of "heroes and merchants", to quote Werner Sombart, author of the book with the same name).

The collapse of the Eastern bloc and then the USSR upset the relative geopolitical balance in favour of Atlanticism, i.e. the Western bloc and market civilisation in general. However, geopolitical trends are an objective factor, and it is not possible to abolish them in a voluntaristic, "subjective" way. Land tendencies, continental impulses cannot be unilaterally abolished, and hence the creation of a new land-based, eastern, continental empire is a potential geopolitical inevitability.

The Atlantic, maritime, commercial pole of civilization today, of course, is extremely strong and powerful, but objective factors make the continental reaction of the East almost inevitable. A land-based empire is potentially always in existence and is only looking for convenient circumstances to materialise in the political reality.

The New Empire must be built on a clear understanding of this geopolitical inevitability. In this empire the Russians will naturally have the key function, as *they* control those lands that are axial in the Eurasian continental mass. The new empire cannot be anything other than Russian, because territorially, culturally, civilizationaly, socio-economically and strategically, Russians are naturally and organically aligned with this planetary mission and are on their way to fulfilling it throughout their national and state history. Mackinder called the Russian lands the 'geographical axis of history', i.e. the space around which the coastal civilisation of Eurasia (often identified with 'civilisation' in general) was created under the influence of the dialectical opposition of maritime (external) and terrestrial (internal) cultural and political impulses. Some other nation or some other country will be able to act as the pole of the Eurasian continental empire only by seizing control of the totality of the Russian lands, and this requires fulfilling the almost incredible condition of destroying the Russian people, of wiping the Russian nation off the face of the earth. Since this seems unlikely, the Russians need to recognise, realise and assume once again the difficult role of the centre of the Eurasian Empire.

The geopolitical construction of this empire should be based on the fundamental principle *of the "common enemy"*. The rejection of Atlanticism, the

rejection of US strategic control and the rejection of the supremacy of economic, market-liberal values, is the common civilizational basis, the common impulse that will open the way to a lasting political and strategic alliance and create the axial backbone of the coming Empire. The vast majority of the Eurasian states and peoples have a continental, “land-based” specificity of national history, state traditions and economic ethics. The vast majority of these states and peoples perceive American political and strategic influence as an unbearable burden, alienating the nations from their historical destiny. Despite all internal civilizational, religious and socio-economic differences among the Eurasian powers, they have a strong and unshakable “common denominator” - a dislike for the totality of Atlanticist control, a desire to free themselves from the overseas tutelage of the Trade System, which is intensively imposed by the USA, a stronghold of “maritime” civilization.

The differences in the regional interests of the Eurasian states and in their religious, ethnic, racial and cultural orientations are not insignificant factors that cannot be ignored. However, we can only talk about them seriously and fully when the stifling economic and strategic influence of the “common enemy”, which imposes a model that is alien to almost everyone - Christians, socialists, Muslims, national capitalists, Buddhists, communists and Hindus alike - disappears. As long as US dominance continues, all intra-Eurasian conflicts and contradictions are *artificial*, since such a clarification of relations makes sense only in the absence of a more global factor that, in practice, organizes and controls these conflicts in order to maintain fragmentation and fragmentation in Eurasia. In this sense, all “regional powers” in Eurasia logically serve the interests of the Atlanticists, because, being unable to offer them large-scale resistance (which is only possible in an imperial strategic context), they are entirely dependent on a single Superpower and direct their energy to their neighbours only with the sanction of the overseas rulers.

“The common enemy”, Atlantism, is to be the binding component of the new geopolitical construct. The effectiveness of this factor is beyond question,

and all arguments against this consideration either naively ignore the objective seriousness and totality of Atlanticist dominance, or deliberately divert geopolitical attention from the only responsible and realistic perspective in favour of secondary regional issues with no solution at all without regard to the global balance of power.

Eurasia is predestined to be geographically and strategically united. This is a strictly scientific geopolitical fact. Russia must inevitably be at the centre of such unification. The driving force of unification must inevitably be the Russian people. This mission is in perfect harmony with the civilizational mission of the Russians, and their universalist ideal, and the logic of the historical formation of the nation and state. The new Eurasian Empire is inscribed in the geographical and political predetermination of world history and world geopolitics. It makes no sense to argue with this fact. The interests of the Russian people are inseparable from the construction of such a continental structure.

Eurasian geopolitics of the New Empire is not just a geographical abstraction or an expression of a hypothetical will for limitless expansion. Its principles and basic directions take into account geopolitical constants, the current political situation, real international trends, the strategic balance of power and economic and resource patterns. Therefore, the Eurasian imperial project has several dimensions simultaneously - cultural, strategic, historical, economic, political, etc. It is important to stress from the outset that in any “axial” geopolitical alliance, the creation of an Empire involves a completely different degree of integration, depending on the level. In one case there may be cultural or ethnic convergence, in another religious, and in a third economic. These issues have a particular solution in each case. The only universal integrating reality in the future Eurasian Empire will be the categorical imperative of *strategic association*, i.e. such a geopolitical alliance, which will allow to effectively oppose Atlantic influences, American geopolitical pressure and political and economic dictate in all strategic directions.

The strategic unification of the continent in question should ensure control over Eurasia’s maritime borders on all sides of the world, continental eco-

nomic, industrial and resource autarchy, and centralised management of the Eurasian armed forces. All other aspects of intra-Eurasian integration will be decided on the basis of flexible, differentiated principles on a case-by-case basis. This fundamental consideration must be kept in mind at all times in order to avoid unfounded doubts and objections that may arise if, instead of a *strategic association*, someone mistakenly believes that it is a political, ethnic, cultural, religious or economic association. By the way, such a substitution will have to be carried out quite deliberately by representatives of “small nationalism” of all nations, reproaching Eurasians and continental empire-builders for wanting to dissolve their ethnicities, religions, cultures, etc. into a new “internationalist utopia”. The Eurasian project in no way leads to the levelling of nations; on the contrary, it proceeds from the need to preserve and develop the identity of peoples and cultures, only it is not about the irresponsible romantic dreams of “small nationalists” (which in practice lead only to chauvinism and suicidal ethnic conflicts), but about a serious and objective understanding of the current situation, where this goal can only be achieved by radically undermining the global influence of the Atlanticist West with its market, liberal ideology, prete

All that remains to be done now is to ascertain the specifics of this continental project, given the negative factors that have frustrated the implementation of this grand civilisation plan in previous periods.

4.2 The Western Axis: Moscow Berlin. European Empire and Eurasia

In the West, the New Empire has a strong geopolitical foothold, which is Central Europe.

Central Europe is a natural geopolitical entity, united strategically, culturally and partly politically. Ethnically, this space includes the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, as well as Germany, Prussia and parts of the Polish and western Ukrainian territories. Germany has traditionally

been the consolidating force of Central Europe, bringing this geopolitical conglomerate under its control.

For natural geographical and historical reasons, Central Europe has a pronounced 'land-based', continental character, contrasting with the 'maritime', 'Atlantic' spaces of Western Europe. In principle, the political influence of Central Europe could extend southwards into Italy and Spain, for which there have been many historical precedents. The geopolitical capital of Central Europe is most logically Berlin as the symbol of Germany, which in turn is the symbol and centre of the whole entity. Only Germany and the German people have all the necessary qualities for effective integration of this geopolitical region - historical will, a well-developed economy, a privileged geographical location, ethnic homogeneity, and awareness of its civilizational mission. A land and ideocratic Germany has traditionally opposed a merchant and maritime England, and the specificity of this geopolitical and cultural confrontation has markedly affected European history, especially after the Germans finally succeeded in establishing their own state.

England is geopolitically the least European state, whose strategic interests are traditionally opposed to the Central European powers and, more broadly, continental tendencies in Europe. However, in parallel with the increasing role of the US and its seizure of almost complete control of the English colonies, England's strategic role has diminished considerably, and today in Europe the country acts more as an extraterritorial floating base for the US than as an independent force. In any case, within Europe, England is the most hostile to continental interests, the antipode of Central Europe, and hence the New Eurasian Empire has in it a political, ideological and economic adversary. It will hardly be possible to voluntarily reverse the civilizational path of this particular country, which once created a giant merchant-colonial empire of a purely "maritime" type and so contributed to the emergence of the entire modern Western civilization, based on trade, quantity, capitalism, speculation and stock trading. This is totally unrealistic, and therefore in the Eurasian project England will inevitably become the scapegoat, as European continental integration processes will have to

proceed not just without regard to British interests, but even in direct opposition to those interests. In this context, European and more broadly Eurasian support for Irish, Scottish and Welsh nationalism, to the extent of encouraging separatist tendencies and political destabilization of the UK, will have to play a significant role.

Another contradictory geopolitical entity is France. In many ways, French history has been Atlanticist, opposing continental and Central European tendencies. France was the main historical opponent of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and supported the fractured state of the German principalities, with a tendency towards “progressivism” and “centralism” of an antitraditional and unnatural type. Generally speaking, in terms of undermining the European continental tradition, France has always been in the vanguard, and in many cases French politics has been identified with the most aggressive Atlanticism. At least, this was the case until the USA assumed the planetary function of the main pole of Atlantism.

In France there is also an alternative geopolitical tendency, which goes back to the continental line of Napoleon (whom Goethe perceived as the leader of the land integration of Europe) and is strongly embodied in the European policy of de Gaulle, who sought an alliance with Germany and the creation of a European confederation independent of the USA. This same line in part inspired Mitterrand’s Franco-German projects. In any case, it is hypothetical to imagine a turn of events in which France would recognise the supremacy of the Central European factor and voluntarily become involved in a geopolitical European bloc with an anti-American and continental orientation. France’s territory is a necessary component of the Eurasian bloc in the West, as the control of the Atlantic coast, and therefore the security of the New Empire on its western frontiers, depends directly on it. The Franco-German alliance is in any case the main link in Eurasian geopolitics in the continental West, provided that the interests of Central Europe, namely its autarchy and geopolitical independence, are prioritised here. Such a project is known as the “European Empire”. The integration of Europe under the aegis of Germany as the basis of such a European Empire fits perfectly into

the Eurasian project and is the most desirable process for a more global continental integration.

All trends towards European unification around Germany (Central Europe) will only make sense if one fundamental condition for the creation of a solid geopolitical and strategic axis, *Moscow Berlin*, is met. By itself, Central Europe does not have sufficient political and military potential to gain genuine independence from US Atlanticist control. Moreover, in the current circumstances, it is difficult to expect a genuine geopolitical and national awakening in Europe without the revolutionary impact of the Russian factor. The European Empire without Moscow and, more broadly, without Eurasia, is not only incapable of fully organizing its strategic space under the deficit of military power, political initiative and natural resources, but also in a civilizational sense it has no clear ideals and reference points, since the influence of the Trade System and market liberal values has deeply paralyzed the foundations of the national worldview of European peoples and undermined their historical organic systems of values. The European Empire would become a full-fledged geopolitical and civilisational reality only under the influence of new ideological, political and spiritual energy from the depths of the continent, i.e. from Russia. Moreover, only Russia and the Russians can ensure Europe's strategic and political independence and resource autarchy. The European Empire should therefore form precisely around Berlin, which is on a direct and vital axis with Moscow.

The Eurasian impulse should emanate exclusively from Moscow, transferring the civilizational mission (with appropriate adaptation to European specificity) of the Russians to Berlin, which in turn will proceed with European integration according to the principles and projects inspired by the underlying geopolitical continental impulse. The key to the adequacy of the European Empire lies in the clear predominance of Russophile tendencies in Germany itself, as understood by the best German minds from Müller van den Broek to Ernst Nikisch, Karl Haushofer and Jordis von Lohausen. And as an extension of such geopolitical Russophilia, the rest of Europe (and France in particular) should follow a Germanophile orientation. Only under

such conditions, the Western vector of the Eurasian Empire will be adequate and strong, strategically secured and ideologically consistent. But it should be admitted that no other unification of Europe is possible without deep contradictions and internal rifts. For example, the current unification of Europe under American, NATO control will very soon make its geopolitical and economic contradictions felt, and therefore it will inevitably be either derailed or suspended, or will spontaneously acquire the unexpected, anti-American (and potentially Eurasian) dimension that Jean Thiriard foresaw.

It is important to stress at the outset that the unification of Europe around Germany must take into account the major political failures of previous attempts, most notably the failure of the Hitler and Third Reich epic. The geopolitical unification of Europe around Central Europe (Germany) should by no means imply *ethnic* domination of the Germans or the creation of a centralised Jacobean structure in the form of a giant German State. According to Thiriard, “*Hitler’s main mistake was that he wanted to make Europe German, whereas he should have been aiming to make it European*”. This thesis remains absolutely relevant today, and in general can apply to all neo-imperial processes, including those in Russia. The European empire, organised around Germany, should be specifically *European*, free from the ethnic and linguistic domination of any one nation. To be the geopolitical heart of Europe, Germany has to acquire a supernational, civilizational, proper imperial character, abandoning the contradictory and impractical attempt to create a racially homogenous “nation state”. The European peoples should be equal partners in the construction of a Western Eurasian bridgehead and adapt the common imperial impulse to their own national and cultural specificities. The European Empire should not suppress the European nations, not subordinate them to the Germans or Russians, but, on the contrary, liberate them from the oppression of a quantitative, consumerist, market civilization, awaken their deep national energies and bring them back into the fold of history as independent, living and full political subjects, whose freedom will be guaranteed by the strategic power of the entire Eurasia.

The creation of the Berlin-Moscow axis as the Western backbone of the Eurasian Empire implies several serious steps with regard to the countries of Eastern Europe lying *between* Russia and Germany. Traditional Atlanticist policy in this region was based on the Mackinderian thesis of the need for a “cordon sanitaire”, which would serve as a conflict buffer zone preventing the possibility of a Russian-German alliance vital to the entire Atlanticist bloc. To this end, England and France sought to destabilise the eastern European peoples in every way possible, to instil in them the idea of an “independence” and liberation from German and Russian influences. Moreover the Atlanticists’ diplomatic potential was seeking by all means to strengthen the Russophobic sentiment in Germany and the Germanophobic sentiment in Russia in order to draw both these powers into a local conflict over the division of spheres of influence in the intermediate areas of Poland, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, western Ukraine, etc. The current NATO strategists are pursuing the same line, putting forward the idea of creating a “Black Sea-Baltic federation” of states, which would be directly linked to Atlanticism and potentially hostile to both Russia and Germany.

The creation of a Berlin-Moscow axis is first and foremost a disruption of the “cordon sanitaire” in Eastern Europe and an active struggle against the bearers of Russophobia in Germany and Germanophobia in Russia. Instead of pursuing regional interests in the area of mutual influence and unilaterally supporting politically and ethnically close peoples in this region, Russia and Germany should tackle *all* contentious issues together in advance by working out a common plan for redistributing the geography of influence in this region and then rigorously suppressing all local initiatives of East European nations to revise Russian-German plans. The main thing to strive for is the categorical elimination of any semblance of a “cordon sanitaire” and the deliberate dispelling of illusions by intermediate states regarding their potential independence from their geopolitically powerful neighbours. The immediate and clear border between friendly Russia and Central Europe (Germany) should be created, and even in the perspective of creating a single strategic bloc on the Berlin-Moscow axis, this border must retain its

geopolitical significance as a limit of cultural, ethnic and religious homogeneity, to a priori exclude ethnic or confessional expansion in the border spaces. The Russian-Ukrainian, Russian-Baltic, Russian-Romanian, Russian-Polish, etc. relations should not be seen as bilateral from the outset, but as trilateral with Germany. The same applies to relations between Germany and the Eastern European countries (peoples); they should also be triangular, with obligatory Russian participation (and to the exclusion in all cases of extraneous, Atlanticist, American intervention). For example, German-Ukrainian relations must necessarily be German-Russian-Ukrainian; German-Baltic German-Russian-Baltic; German-Polish German-Russian-Polish, etc.

The Moscow-Berlin axis would help to solve a whole range of critical problems that both Russia and Germany face today. In such an alliance, Russia gains direct access to high-tech and powerful investments in industry and gains guaranteed European complicity in the economic rise of the Russian states. There will be no economic dependence on Germany, because Germany will not participate in Russia as a benefactor, but as an equal partner, receiving in return a strategic cover from Moscow which guarantees Germany political freedom from US dominance and resource independence from the Third World's energy reserves controlled by Atlanticism (this is the basis of US energy blackmailing of Europe). Germany today is an economic giant and a political dwarf. Russia is, to the contrary, a political giant and an economic cripple. The Moscow-Berlin axis will cure the ailment of both partners and lay the foundation for the future prosperity of a Great Russia and a Great Germany. In the long run, it will lead to the formation of a solid strategic and economic structure for the creation of an entire Eurasian empire, a European empire in the West and a Russian empire in the East of Eurasia. The prosperity of the individual parts of this continental structure would serve the prosperity of the whole.

As preliminary steps in the formation of the Moscow-Berlin axis it makes sense to thoroughly cleanse the cultural-historical perspective of the mutual relations from the dark sides of the past history of the Russo-German wars, which were the result of the successful subversion of the Atlanticist lobby in

Germany and Russia and not an expression of the political will of our continental peoples. In this perspective, it is advisable to return the Kaliningrad Oblast (East Prussia) to Germany in order to give up the last territorial symbol of the terrible fratricidal war. To ensure that this action is not perceived by the Russians as another step in geopolitical capitulation, it would make sense for Europe to offer Russia other territorial annexations or other forms of strategic extension, especially from among those states that stubbornly seek to enter the “Black Sea-Baltic federation”. East Prussian restitution should be inseparably linked with the territorial and strategic enlargement of Russia, and Germany, apart from keeping the Russian military bases in the Kaliningrad area, should contribute diplomatically and politically to strengthen Russia’s strategic position in the North-West and the West. The Baltic States, Poland, Moldavia and Ukraine as a potential “sanitary cordon” should not undergo a geopolitical transformation *after* the restitution of Prussia, but simultaneously with it, as elements of the same process of finalizing the borders between friendly Russia and Central Europe.

Bismarck’s words “Germany has no enemy in the East” should again become dominant in German political doctrine and the reverse maxim should also be adopted by the Russian rulers “on the Western frontiers, in Central Europe Russia has only friends”. However, for this to become a reality and not just a wishful thinking, geopolitics and its laws have to be the main basis for all significant foreign policy decisions in both Germany and Russia, as only from this point of view the necessity and inevitability of the closest Russian-German alliance can be perceived, understood and recognised in a total and complete manner. Otherwise, the appeal to historical conflicts, misunderstandings and disputes will derail any attempt to build a solid and reliable basis for the vital Moscow-Berlin axis.

4.3 The Moscow-Tokyo axis. The Pan-Asian Project. Towards a Eurasian Trilateral Commission

The new Empire must have a clear strategy regarding its eastern component. The eastern limits of Eurasia are therefore as strategically important to this Empire as the problems of the West.

Based on the underlying principle of “common enemy”, Russia should seek a strategic alliance with those states that are most burdened by the political and economic pressure of the Atlanticist superpower, have a historical tradition of geopolitical projects opposed to Atlanticism, and have sufficient technological and economic power to become the key geopolitical reality of the new bloc.

In this perspective, the need for maximum rapprochement with India, which is our natural geopolitical ally in Asia in terms of both racial, political and strategic parameters, is completely unconditional. After decolonisation, India sought to avoid joining the capitalist bloc by all means and in fact led the movement of ‘non-aligned countries’ seeking opportunities in the narrow ‘no man’s land’ geopolitical space to pursue a ‘Third Way’ policy with undisguised sympathy for the USSR. Today, with Russia’s rigid communist dogma having been abolished, there are no obstacles to the closest rapprochement with India at all.

India is a continent in itself. The sphere of its geopolitical influence is, however, limited to Hindustan and a small area in the Indian Ocean to the south of the peninsula. India is bound to become a strategic ally of the New Empire, its southeastern outpost, though one should bear in mind that Indian civilization is not inclined towards geopolitical dynamics and territorial expansion; moreover, the Hindu tradition does not have a universal religious dimension and therefore this country can play an important role only in a limited part of Asia. At the same time, the country’s relatively weak economic and technological development does not allow it to be fully relied upon, and hence an alliance with it would not solve any of the New Empire’s problems at this stage. India will be able to serve as a strategic

outpost of Eurasia, and at this point its mission is practically exhausted (except for its spiritual culture, familiarity with which could help to clarify the most important metaphysical guidelines of the Empire).

India is an important ally of Eurasia, but not the main one. There are two geopolitical realities in today's world that claim to be the true eastern pole of Eurasia, China and Japan. But there is a deep geopolitical antagonism between those countries that has a long history and fits into the typology of two civilizations. Hence, Russia has to choose one or the other. The problem cannot be posed in such a way: both China and Japan at the same time. A choice is needed here.

On the face of it, China is a landlocked continental mass, its civilisation has a traditional authoritarian (non-trade) character, and the very persistence of communist ideology with liberal reforms in contemporary China would seem to have definitively favoured the choice of China over capitalist, insular Japan. However, history shows that it was China, not Japan, that was geopolitically the most important base of Anglo-Saxon forces on the Eurasian continent, while Japan, by contrast, maintained an alliance with Central European countries of the opposite orientation.

In order to understand this paradox, it is necessary to look carefully at a map and note on it the geography of the last two world wars. Four geopolitical zones can be conventionally identified in the northern hemisphere, corresponding to the main protagonists of world conflicts (countries or blocs of states). The far West, Atlantism, unites the USA, England, France and several other European countries. This zone has a very definite geopolitical orientation, unequivocally identical with the "maritime", "Carthage" line of world history. It is the space of maximum civilisational activity and the source of all anti-traditional, "progressive" transformations.

The second zone is Central Europe, Germany, Austria-Hungary. This space, directly adjacent to the Atlanticist bloc from the East, from a geopolitical point of view, has all the hallmarks of an anti-Atlantic, continental, landward orientation and geographically gravitates towards the East.

The third zone is Russia itself, lying at the centre of the continent's gravity and responsible for the fate of Eurasia. Russia's landlocked and illiberal, "conservative" nature is obvious.

Finally, the fourth zone is the Pacific area, where the central role is played by Japan, which is developing rapidly and dynamically and has a rigid system of traditionalist values and a clear understanding of its geopolitical role. At the same time, Japan is essentially anti-Western and anti-liberal, as its value system is something directly opposed to the ideals of "progressive" Atlanticist humanity.

The Western world (Atlantism), represented by its deepest ideologues (Mackinder, Mahan, etc.) was well aware that the greatest threat to planetary Atlantism would be the consolidation of all three Eurasian zones from the Central European to the Pacific with the participation and central role of Russia against Anglo-Saxon and French "progressivism". The main task of the Atlanticist strategists was therefore to pit the three Eurasian zones against their immediate neighbours and potential allies. Both the Russo-German and Russo-Japanese conflicts were actively provoked by the Atlantists, who acted both within Eurasian governments and externally, using diplomatic and forceful leverage. The opponents of Atlantism, starting with Haushofer, finally came to the conclusion that effective opposition to Atlantism is only possible by rejecting the logic imposed on the three Eurasian zones, i.e. by the categorical rejection of German- and Japanese-phobia by Russians and Russophobia by the Japanese and Germans, whatever historical precedents the proponents of these "phobias" might have recourse to.

At the same time, Japan as a symbol of the whole Pacific space is of paramount importance in these anti-Atlantic projects, because Japan's strategic position, its development dynamics and the specificity of its value system make it an ideal partner in the planetary struggle against the Western civilization. China, for its part, did not play any special role in this geopolitical picture, having been deprived first of political independence (English colonization) and then of geopolitical dynamics.

It was only during the period of active Maoism that a purely soil-based, Eurasian tendency emerged in China itself, when projects of “peasant socialism”, all-Chinese nationalism and pronounced Sovietophilia prevailed. But this state of affairs did not last long, and China returned to its dubious geopolitical function of destabilising Eurasia’s Far Eastern interests and escalating conflicts with Russia under the pretext of disagreement with the development of the Soviet model. There is no doubt that China’s perestroika, which began in the 1980s, was the final turn from the Maoist period to the pro-Atlantic model, which should have definitively sealed China’s break with the USSR and its orientation towards the West. The “Atlanticization” of contemporary China was much more successful than in Russia, since economic liberalism *without* political democratization allowed China to become dependent on Western financial groups without any conflicts, while maintaining a totalitarian system and a semblance of political independence. Liberalism was imposed in China by totalitarian means, which is why the reform has succeeded to the full. To the political power of the party oligarchy was added the economic power of the same oligarchy, which had successfully privatised popular industry and national wealth and fused it with the international cosmopolitan elite of the Trade Construction. China’s economic successes represent a rather ambiguous reality, as they have come at the cost of profound compromise with the West and are not matched by any clear geopolitical concept that could serve as a guarantee of political independence and autonomy. The new liberal China, with its two serious competitors, economically powerful Japan and strategically powerful Russia, is likely to revert to a purely Atlanticist function in the Far East, combining political dictatorship and capitalist development potential, as it has done many times in history. Moreover, from a purely pragmatic point of view, a strategic alliance between Russia and China to create a unified bloc would immediately alienate Japan from the Russians and, consequently, make the key Pacific region, on whose participation in the common Eurasian project depends the ultimate geopolitical success of the land-sea confrontation, hostile again.

In the New Empire, the eastern axis should be the axis of *Moscow and*

Tokyo. This is the categorical imperative of the eastern, Asian component of Eurasianism. It is around this axis that the basic principles of Eurasia's Asian policy should take shape. Japan, as the northernmost point among the islands of the Pacific Ocean, is in an exceptionally advantageous geographical location for strategic, political and economic expansion to the South. The Pacific Ocean area around Japan was the basic idea behind the Pan-Asia Project, which began to be implemented in the 1930s-40s and was only interrupted by the defeat of the Axis countries in the war. This Pan-Asian project needs to be revisited today in order to undermine the expansion of American influence in this region and to deprive the Atlanticists in general of their most important strategic and economic bases. According to some futurological projections, in the future the Pacific area will become one of the most important centres of civilisation as a whole, and therefore the struggle for influence in this region is more than relevant - it is a struggle for the future.

The Pan-Asian project is the centre of the New Empire's eastern orientation. An alliance with Japan is vital. The Moscow-Tokyo axis, contrary to the Moscow-Beijing axis, is a priority and promising one, opening up such horizons for continental empire-building that would finally make Eurasia geopolitically *complete*, while the Atlanticist empire of the West would be weakened to the maximum, and possibly destroyed for good.

The anti-Americanism of the Japanese, who remember the nuclear genocide well and clearly understand the shame of a political occupation that has lasted for decades, is unmistakable. The "common enemy" principle is evident here. In American Serge Friedmann's book, the "coming war with Japan" (the book is called "Coming war with Japan") seems inevitable. Japan's economic war with the United States is already underway. Russia, which is building a Eurasian empire, could have no better ally.

The Moscow-Tokyo axis also solves a number of crucial problems in both countries. First, Russia is allied with an economic giant equipped with highly advanced technology and huge financial potential. But Japan lacks political independence, a military-strategic system and direct access to re-

sources. Everything Japan lacks, Russia has in abundance, and everything the Russians lack, the Japanese have in abundance. By joining forces to build a continental empire, the Japanese and Russians could, in the shortest possible time, create an unprecedentedly powerful geopolitical centre encompassing Siberia, Mongolia, Japan itself and, potentially, the entire Pacific region. In exchange for strategic protection and direct access to Eurasian resources, Japan could quickly and effectively assist the Russians in the technological development and exploration of Siberia, laying the foundation for an independent regional body. Japanese technological and financial assistance would solve many problems in Russia.

In addition, Russia and Japan together could restructure the far eastern part of continental Eurasia. The ever-increasing intensity of Mongolian-Japanese contacts, based on unity of origin, racial affinity and spiritual and religious kinship, is telling in this regard. Mongolia (possibly even Inner Mongolia and Tibet, currently under Chinese occupation), Kalmykia, Tuva and Buryatia form a Eurasian Buddhist enclave that could serve as a strong link between Russia and Japan, providing an intermediate link in the Moscow-Tokyo axis. On the one hand, these regions are closely and inextricably linked to Russia, while on the other hand they are culturally and racially close to Japan. The Buddhist bloc could play a crucial role in creating a solid geopolitical structure in the Far East, which would be the continental link of the Pacific pan-Asian alliance. In the event of an aggravation in relations with China, which will inevitably happen when the Moscow-Tokyo axis is launched, the Buddhist factor will be used as the banner of the national liberation struggle of the peoples of Tibet and Inner Mongolia for expanding the Eurasian continental space proper, to the detriment of pro-Atlantic China.

Generally speaking, China stands a good chance of becoming a geopolitical scapegoat for the Pan-Asian project. This can be accomplished either by provoking intra-Chinese separatism (Tibetans, Mongols, the Muslim population of Xinjiang) or by playing on regional contradictions, as well as by actively supporting the anti-Atlantic, purely continental forces of the potential Buddhist (and Taoist) lobby inside China itself, which in the future

could lead to the establishment of a political regime in China itself that would be loyal to the Eurasian empire. In addition, China should be offered a special vector of regional geopolitics, directed strictly to the South towards Taiwan and Hong Kong. Southern expansion would partly compensate for China's loss of political influence in the North and the East.

China in the eastern regions of the New Empire should be likened in the West not to England, but to France, as the Eurasian Empire will be guided by two criteria in relation to it. In case of active opposition to Eurasian projects China will have to be treated as a geopolitical opponent with all the ensuing consequences, but if it is possible to create a powerful Pro-Japanese and pro-Russian simultaneously political lobby inside the country, then in the future China itself will become a full and equal participant of the continental project.

The Moscow-Tokyo axis, together with the western Moscow-Berlin axis, will create a geopolitical space that is directly opposite to the main model of the Atlanticist ideologues, whose supreme authority has now become the "Trilateral Commission". The "Trilateral Commission", created by American circles of the highest political establishment, envisions as the new configuration of the planet the strategic unification of three geopolitical zones, corresponding exactly to the three geopolitical elements of the four we spoke about above. The three sides of this commission, which seeks to perform the functions of "World Government", correspond to:

- 1) the American zone (USA, extreme West, pure Atlantism),**
- 2) the European zone (continental Europe, Central Europe, but under the auspices of France and England, not Germany)**
- 3) the Pacific zone (united around Japan).**

The "trilateral" thus seeks to construct a geopolitical model in which Eurasia proper (=Russia) would be surrounded on both sides by reliable US geopolitical partners, i.e. three of the four zones embracing the northern regions of the planet would fall under direct US control. At the same time,

there are two service geopolitical spaces (Europe and Japan) between the potential Eurasian adversary of the Atlanticists (Eurasia) and the centre of Atlanticism itself (the US). It is also important to note that China's restructuring in the early 1980s was initiated by the representatives of the Trilateral Commission, who sought to finally bring China back into the mainstream of Atlanticist politics.

The Eurasian project offers something directly opposite to the plans of Trilateral. The New Empire is the anti-Trilateral, its reverse, inverted model. It is a union of three geopolitical zones centered in Russia, oriented against America. By the same logic that the US is trying to keep Europe and Japan under its control geopolitically, understanding all the strategic benefits for American power in this alignment of forces, Russia in the construction of a New Empire should strive to create a strong strategic alliance with Europe and Japan to achieve its own geopolitical stability and power, and guarantee political freedom to all Eurasian peoples. In principle, we can talk about the creation of a *Eurasian* "Three Stone Commission" with Russian, European and Japanese branches, which will involve, however, not politicians of Atlanticist and pro-American persuasion, but intellectual and political leaders of national orientation, who understand the geopolitical logic of the current state of affairs in the world. Naturally, unlike the Atlanticist Trilateral Commission, the Eurasian Trilateral Commission should have a German rather than a Frenchman as its main European representative.

Given the strategic necessity of the Japanese factor in the Eurasian project, it is quite clear that the issue of Kuril restitution is not an obstacle to the Russo-Japanese alliance. In the case of the Kuril Islands, as in the case of Kaliningrad, we are dealing with the territorial symbols of World War II, the alliances and the whole course of which was a complete triumph for the Atlantists, who dealt with all their opponents simultaneously by extremely exhausting the USSR (while imposing on it a geopolitical position which could not but lead to a perestroika collapse) and a direct occupation of Europe and Japan. The Kurils are a reminder of the absurd and unnatural fratricidal massacre of the Russians and Japanese, the early obliteration

of which is a prerequisite for our mutual prosperity. The Kurils must be returned to Japan, but this must be done as part of the overall process of reorganizing the Eurasian Far East. Moreover, the restitution of the Kurils cannot be accomplished while preserving the existing balance of political power in Russia and Japan. It is a matter for Eurasian, empire-building politicians, who can fully answer for the true national interests of their peoples. But the Eurasian elite should already be aware of the geopolitical necessity of restoring the Kuril Islands.

4.4 Axis Moscow Tehran. Central Asian Empire. Pan-Arab project

The policy of the Eurasian Empire in the southern direction should also be oriented towards a firm continental alliance with a force that satisfies both strategically and ideologically, as well as culturally, the common Eurasian trend of anti-Americanism. The “common enemy” principle should also be a decisive factor here.

There are several geopolitical entities in Southern Eurasia which could theoretically act as the southern pole of the New Empire. Since India and China should be attributed to the zone of the East and linked to the prospect of pan-Asian integration, that leaves only the Islamic world, extending from the Philippines and Pakistan to the Maghreb countries, i.e. West Africa. In general, the whole Islamic zone is a naturally friendly geopolitical reality in relation to the Eurasian Empire, because the Islamic tradition, more politicized and modernized than most other Eurasian denominations, is well aware of the spiritual incompatibility of Americanism and religion. The Atlantists themselves view the Islamic world as a potential adversary, and consequently the Eurasian Empire has in it faithful potential allies seeking a common goal of undermining and eventually ending American, Western dominance on the planet. It would be ideal to have an integrated Islamic world as the southern component of the entire Eurasian Empire, stretching

from Central Asia to West Africa, religiously united and politically stable, basing its policies on the principle of loyalty to tradition and spirit. In the long term, therefore, the Islamic Empire in the South (the 'new caliphate') may become the most important element of the New Eurasia, along with the European Empire in the West, the Pacific Empire in the East and the Russian Empire in the Centre.

At the moment, however, the Islamic world is extremely fragmented and there are various ideological and political trends within it, as well as geopolitical projects that oppose each other. The following currents are the most global:

- 1) Iranian fundamentalism (continental-type, anti-American, anti-Atlantean and geopolitically active),**
- 2) A Turkish secular regime (of the Atlanticist type, emphasising the pan-Turkic line),**
- 3) pan-Arabism promoted by Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, partly Egypt and Saudi Arabia (rather diverse and controversial projects in each case),**
- 4) Saudi Wahhabi type fundamentalism (geopolitically in solidarity with Atlanticism),**
- 5) Various versions of "Islamic socialism" (Libya, Iraq, Syria, models close to "left-wing" pan-Arabism).**

It is immediately clear that the purely Atlanticist poles in the Islamic world, be they "secular" (as in the case of Turkey) or Islamic (in the case of Saudi Arabia), cannot serve as the southern pole of Eurasia in the global continental empire project. This leaves "Iranian fundamentalism" and "pan-Arabism" (left-wing).

In terms of geopolitical constants, Iran certainly has priority in this matter, as it satisfies all Eurasian parameters it is a major continental power, closely connected with Central Asia, radically anti-American, traditionalist

and emphasizing at the same time a “social” political vector (protection of “mustazafs”, “the destitute”). Moreover, Iran occupies such a position on the mainland map that the creation of the *Moscow-Tehran* axis solves a huge number of problems for the New Empire. By including Iran as the empire’s southern pole, Russia would instantly achieve the strategic goal it has been pursuing (by the wrong means) for several centuries of *access to warm seas*. This strategic aspect of Russia’s lack of such an exit has been the main trump card of Atlanticist geopolitics since the days of colonial England, which fully controlled Asia and the East, taking advantage of Russia’s lack of direct access to the southern shores of the continent. All Russian attempts to enter the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles were attempts at complicity in the political organisation of Eurasia’s coastal areas, where the British reigned undividedly, easily suppressing any attempts at Russian expansion through control of this coastal zone. However, even if Russia had succeeded in doing so, the Atlanticist control of Gibraltar would always have remained an obstacle to truly large-scale naval operations and prevented Russia from undermining English power. Only Iran, continentally adjacent to Russia and reaching directly into the Indian Ocean, both then and now, could and could be a radical solution to this crucial geopolitical problem. By gaining strategic access, first and foremost, to naval bases on Iranian shores, Eurasia would be safe from the “anaconda ring” strategy, i.e. from implementing the traditional Atlanticist plan to “strangle” the continental expanses of the continent through seizing coastal territories along the whole length of Eurasia, and especially in the South and West.

The creation of the Moscow-Tehran axis cuts the “anaconda” at its most vulnerable point and opens up boundless prospects for Russia to acquire more and more bridgeheads inside and outside Eurasia. This is the most significant point.

On the other hand, there is the problem of former Soviet Central Asia, where three geopolitical trends compete today - ‘pan-Turkism’ (Turkey, Atlantism), ‘Wahhabism’ (Saudi Arabia, Atlantism) and ‘fundamentalism’ (Iran, anti-Atlantism). For obvious reasons, there cannot be “pan-Arabism” among

Turkic-speaking peoples in Central Asia for the most part. The parallel strong pro-Russian orientation should also be taken into account, but it is difficult to imagine how these Islamic regions, with their awakening national consciousness, could rejoin Russia in a bloodless and painless way. Clearly, among the “non-Moscow” tendencies, the New Empire can only rely on a pro-Iranian orientation, which would remove this region from direct or indirect Atlantist control. At the same time, a strong Moscow-Tehran axis would remove all the contradictions between Russophile and Islamist (Iranian type) tendencies, making them *one and the same* geopolitical trend, oriented both towards Moscow and Tehran simultaneously. In parallel, such an axis would automatically mean an end to the civil conflict in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, which are only fueled by the geopolitical uncertainty of these entities, riven by contradictions between the Islamic-Iranian fundamentalist vector and gravitational pull towards Russia. Naturally, this contradiction also exacerbates petty-ethnic tensions, and facilitates the activities of Atlanticist ‘agents of influence’, who directly or indirectly (through Turkey and Saudi Arabia) seek to destabilise intra-Asian spaces in their key centres.

Iran is geopolitically Central Asia, just as Germany is Central Europe. Moscow, as the centre of Eurasia, its pole, should delegate to Tehran the mission of bringing “Iranian peace” (*Pax Persica*) into this space within the framework of the New Empire, organizing a solid Central Asian geopolitical block capable of resisting the Atlanticist influence in the whole region. This means that the pan-Turkic expansion, as well as the financial and political encroachment of the Saudis, will be sharply interrupted. Traditionally hostile to both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Iran would fulfil this function far better than the Russians, who would solve their geopolitical problems in this complex centre only with strategic support from the Iranian side. But here, as in the case of Germany, it should not be a question of creating an Iranian empire, or the Iranization of Central Asia. We should talk about creating a ‘Middle Asian empire’, which, on a federal basis, would integrate the various peoples, cultures and ethnicities into a single southern geopolitical bloc, thus creating a strategically homogeneous, but ethnically and

culturally diverse Islamic entity, inseparably linked to the interests of the entire Eurasian empire.

The Armenian issue occupies an important place in the issue of the Moscow-Tehran axis, as it has traditionally served as a centre of destabilisation in the Transcaucasus. It should be noted that the Armenians are an Aryan people, clearly aware of their Japhetic nature and kinship with Indo-European peoples, especially Asian peoples, i.e. Iranians and Kurds. On the other hand, the Armenians are a Christian people, and their Monophysite tradition fits into the general mood of the Eastern Church (although it is recognized by Orthodoxy as a heretical trend), and they are very much aware of their geopolitical ties with Russia. Armenians occupy lands of extreme strategic importance, as through Armenia and Artsakh lies the route from Turkey to Azerbaijan and on to Central Asia. The Moscow-Tehran-Yerevan axis automatically becomes the most important strategic link, further linking Russia with Iran and cutting off Turkey from intra-continental spaces. In the eventual reorientation of Baku from Ankara to Tehran in the overall Moscow-Tehran project, the Karabakh issue would also be quickly resolved, since all four parties would be vitally interested in the immediate establishment of stability in such an important strategic region. (Otherwise, i.e. if Azerbaijan maintains a pro-Turkish orientation, this “country” is subject to dismemberment between Iran, Russia and Armenia). Almost the same applies to other regions of the Caucasus - Chechnya, Abkhazia, Dagestan, etc. - which will remain zones of conflict and instability only if the geopolitical interests of Atlanticist Turkey and Eurasian Russia clash in them. The inclusion of the Iranian geopolitical line here will instantly strip away the visibility of the clash between “Islam and Orthodoxy” in the Caucasus, which the Turkish and Russian “agents of influence” of Atlantism are trying to give to the conflicts in this area, and restore peace and harmony.

In this project for the reorganisation of Central Asia, it should be noted that Russian ethnic interests will be best protected, since the Central Asian Empire will not be built on the basis of artificial political constructs, fictitious ‘post-imperial legitimacy’, but on national homogeneity, which implies

a peaceful transition of all Central Asian territories (especially Kazakhstan), compactly populated by Russians, to the direct jurisdiction of Moscow. And those territories, the ethnic composition of which is disputed, would receive special rights on the basis of Russian-Iranian projects within one or the other empire. Consequently, through a Eurasian geopolitical project, Russians will be able to achieve what appears to be the goal of “small (ethnic) nationalism”, but which this nationalism itself will never be able to achieve.

It is also important to consider the need to impose Turkey as a scapegoat in this project, as that state’s interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia will not be taken into account at all. Moreover, support for Kurdish separatism in Turkey itself, as well as the autonomist demands of Turkish Armenians, should probably be emphasised in order to wrest the ethnically close peoples of Iran from secular-Atlantean control. To compensate, Turkey should be offered either to develop southwards into the Arab world via Baghdad, Damascus and Riyadh or to provoke pro-Iranian fundamentalists in Turkey itself into a cardinal dimension of its geopolitical course and to join the Central Asian bloc under an anti-Atlantic and Eurasian sign in the long term.

The Moscow-Tehran axis is the basis of the Eurasian geopolitical project. Iranian Islam is the best version of Islam for joining the continental bloc, and it is this version that should be prioritised by Moscow.

The second line of Eurasian alliance with the South is the Pan-Arab project, which covers parts of fore Asia and North Africa. This bloc is also vital for continental geopolitics, as this zone is strategically important in controlling the southwest coast of Europe. This is why the British, and later American, presence in this region is a historical and strategic constant. By controlling the Middle East and North Africa, the Atlanticists have traditionally kept (and continue to keep) continental Europe under political and economic pressure.

However, the integration of the Pan-Arab project with a common Eurasian empire should be entrusted to purely European forces, returning to the projects of Euro-Africa, which represents, from a purely geopolitical point

of view, not two continents but *one*. The European Empire, which has a vital interest in penetrating as deeply as possible into the south of the African continent, should in the long term take full control of Africa as far as the Sahara, supported by the Pan-Arab bloc, and in the future try to strategically penetrate the entire African continent. In the perspective of Euro-Africa the Mediterranean is not a real “sea” but only an inland “lake” which constitutes neither a barrier nor a defence against Atlanticist influence. Outside Arab Africa, a detailed multi-ethnic project should be developed that would help to restructure the black continent along national, ethnic and cultural lines, instead of the contradictory post-colonial conglomerate that is today’s African states. A nuanced pan-African (non-Arab) national project could be a geopolitical complement to the pan-Arab integration plan.

Given that the model of purely Iranian fundamentalism is unlikely to become universally acceptable in the Arab world (largely due to the specificity of the Shiite, Aryan version of Iranian Islam), the pan-Arab project should strive to create an independent anti-Atlantic bloc where the priority poles would be Iraq, Libya and liberated Palestine (under certain conditions also Syria), i.e. those Arab countries which most clearly realize the American danger and most radically reject the market-capitalist model imposed by the West. That is, those Arab countries which are the most aware of the American threat and the most radical in their rejection of the market-capitalist model imposed by the West. In the pan-Arab project, the scapegoat will be, first of all, Saudi Arabia, which is too entrenched in Atlanticist geopolitics to volunteer to join the pan-Arab bloc that is friendly to Eurasia. This is somewhat different for Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, as the ruling pro-Atlantic forces in these states do not express national tendencies, are not fully in control and are only held on American bayonets and American money. If a pan-Arab war of liberation begins at a sufficiently intense level, all these regimes will fall in one hour.

But it must be clearly understood that the most harmonious construction of the pan-Arab space is not so much a matter of Russia as of Europe, Central Europe, Germany, or more precisely, the European Empire. Russia

(more precisely, the USSR) intervened in Arab problems only when it alone constituted a Eurasian state in the face of Americanism. With a strong European base of Eurasian orientation, i.e. after the creation of the Moscow-Berlin axis, this function should be delegated to Berlin and Europe as a whole. Russia's immediate concern in the Islamic world should be Iran, on whose alliance the vital strategic and even narrowly ethnic interests of the Russians depend.

Iran, which controls Central Asia (including Pakistan, Afghanistan and the remnants of Turkey or "Turkey after the pro-Iranian revolution") together with Russia, is the centre of Moscow's priority interests. In doing so, Russia's traditional influence among pan-Arab "left-wing" regimes (primarily Iraq and Libya) should be used to bring Arab countries closer to Iran and to forget about the artificial and Atlanticist-inspired Iran-Iraq conflict as soon as possible.

4.5 An empire of many empires

The New Empire, the construction of which would meet the global, planetary civilizational mission of the Russian people, is a super-project, which has many sublevels. This New Empire, the Eurasian Empire, will have a complex differentiated structure, within which there will be different degrees of interdependence and integration of individual parts. It is clear that the New Empire will be neither a Russian Empire nor a Soviet Empire.

The main integrating point of this New Empire will be the struggle against Atlantism and the fierce opposition to that liberal-market, "maritime, "Carthage" civilisation which the USA and the planetary political, economic and military structures which serve Atlantism embody today. The success of this struggle requires the creation of a giant geopolitical continental bloc, united *strategically*. It is the unity of the strategic continental frontiers that will be the main integrating factor of the New Empire. This Empire will be one and indivisible organism in the *military-strategic*

sense, and this will impose political restrictions on all internal sub-imperial formations. All blocs that will be part of the New Empire will be politically constrained in one categorical prohibition to serve Atlanticist geopolitical interests, to withdraw from the strategic alliance, and to harm continental security. At this level, and *only at this level*, the New Empire will be a coherent geopolitical entity.

At the next, lower level, the New Empire will be a 'confederation of Great Spaces' or secondary Empires. Of these, the four main ones are the European Empire in the West (around Germany and Central Europe), the Pacific Empire in the East (around Japan), the Central Asian Empire in the South (around Iran) and the Russian Empire in the Centre (around Russia). It is quite logical that the central position is the main one in such a project, as it determines the territorial cohesion and homogeneity of all the other components of the gigantic continental bloc. In addition, in addition to the aforementioned blocs, there will be separate independent Great Spaces - India, Pan-Arab world, Pan-African Union, and, possibly, a special region of China, whose status is still difficult to determine even approximately. Each of the secondary empires will be based on a particular racial, cultural, religious, political or geopolitical integrating factor, which may be different in each case. The degree of integration of the Empires themselves will also be a variable, depending on the particular ideological base on which a particular Empire will be established.

Within these secondary empires the confederative principle will also be in force, but applied to smaller ethnic, national and regional units to what, to a greater or lesser degree, may be called a "country" or "state". Naturally, the sovereignty of these "countries" will have significant limitations, firstly, strategic (stemming from the principles of the entire continental New Empire), and secondly, related to the specificity of the Great Spaces in which they will be incorporated. And in this matter the principle of extremely flexible differentiation will be applied, taking into account the historical, spiritual, geographical and racial peculiarities of each region.

The Velikorosses, for example, can be seen as a separate nation or even a

”country“ within the Russian Empire, along with Ukrainians, Belarusians, possibly Serbs, etc., but at the same time they will all be closely linked to Slavic-Orthodox jurisdiction, embodied in a specific state system. At the same time, the Russian Empire will depend on the Eurasian Empire, the New Empire, whose strategic interests will be placed above the national-racial and confessional interests of the Eastern Orthodox Slavs.

The same can be said, for example, of the French, who will remain a people or ”country“ within the European Empire, along with the Germans and Italians, bound to them by a common European imperial tradition, Christian religion and membership of the Indo-European race. But the European Empire itself will in turn be subject to the strategic imperatives of the entire great continental New Empire.

This will also be the case in Central Asia, the Pacific, the Arab world, black Africa, India, etc.

At the global level the construction of a planetary New Empire will have as its main ”scapegoat“ the United States, the undermining of whose power (up to the complete destruction of this geopolitical structure) will be carried out systematically and uncompromisingly by all participants in the New Empire. In this respect, the Eurasian project implies Eurasian expansion into South and Central America in order to take it out of the control of the North (here the Spanish factor could be used as a traditional alternative to the Anglo-Saxon one), as well as provoking all kinds of instability and separatism within the US borders (possibly to rely on political forces of African-American racists). The ancient Roman formula ”Carthage must be destroyed“ will become the absolute slogan of the Eurasian Empire, as it will encapsulate the essence of the entire geopolitical planetary strategy of the continent awakening to its mission.

Specifics in determining the status of this or that people, this or that ”country“, this or that ”Empire of Greater Spaces“ within a common continental block will become relevant only *after the* geopolitical unification, *after the* creation of the necessary axes, and only then the Eurasian peoples and

states will be able to solve their internal problems quite *freely*, without pressure from the Atlanticist forces, which are fundamentally interested only in one thing - not to allow peace, harmony, prosperity, independence, dignity and flourishing of tradition in Eurasia.

Chapter 5

Russia's fate in imperial Eurasia

5.1 Geopolitical magic for national purposes

Russian national interests can be considered at several levels at the global, planetary, geopolitical, civilizational (discussed in the previous sections) and at the narrow national, specific, socio-political and cultural levels (discussed in this section). How do the macro-projects of continental empire-building and the ethnic lineage of the Russian people relate to each other? Something has already been said about this. Here, however, we should consider this problem in more detail.

"Imperialist orientation", "continentalism", "Eurasianism" - all these terms and corresponding projects often scare off Russians who are not familiar with the symbolism of Russian history, who do not grasp the meaning of the nation's historical trends, who are used to using banal everyday clichés when thinking about what the nation is and what its interests are. This generates many misunderstandings among the nationalists themselves and provokes empty discussions and futile polemics. In reality, the specificity of Russian nationalism lies precisely in its *globalism*, which is linked not so much with blood as with space, with the soil and the land. Outside the Empire, Russians would lose their identity and disappear as a nation.

However, the implementation of the Eurasian plan should by no means lead to the ethnic dilution of the Russians as the "axis" ethnos of the empire.

The Velikorosses also need to maintain their ethnic identity, without which the centre of the continent would lose its civilizational and cultural certainty. In other words, within the very framework of the supranational geopolitical empire, there should be special norms (including legal ones) to ensure that Russians maintain their ethnic identity. The specifics of the New Empire should be that with the central role of Russians in geopolitical integration, it should not be accompanied by the "Russification" of non-Russian territories, because such "Russification", on the one hand, would pervert the meaning of the Empire, reducing it to a giant "nation state", and on the other hand, would dissolve the Russian community in another national environment.

With regard to the Russian people within the continental bloc, it should be stressed that their role will not be "isolationist" (contrary to the projects of "small nationalism") or ethno-expansionist (contrary to the "ethnic imperialists" and, in part, the Slavophiles). From these two projects it is necessary to take certain sides, discarding the others. On the strategic level, it will indeed be about "expansionism", but of a geopolitical rather than ethnic nature, which would certainly exclude any form of Russian or Slavic racism. On the purely ethnic level, on the contrary, the "isolationist" option should be implemented to a greater or lesser extent, with political and state isolationism discarded. The Russians will exist as a single *national* community in the space of a *supranational* imperial complex. Ethnic reality will be consolidated within the people, and the super-ethnic mission will be expressed within the Empire. Only with this combination can both the preservation of a healthy national core and the maximum expansion of geopolitical influence be achieved. In other words, the national factor will be defined on the basis of an entirely new combination of ethnic and political, which did not exist in any of the previous stages of Russian national-state history. Ethnic homogeneity existed in Russia only in the early stages of statehood within fairly limited territories. The Tsarist model was based on the principle of a certain "Russification", while the Soviets, expanding the geopolitical limits of Russia, on the contrary, neglected the ethnic quality of the Russian people. In the New Empire, these factors have to come out in a new proportion corresponding to contemporary geopolitical and ethnographic conditions, and

also necessary for the establishment of a stable ethnopolitical balance in the Russian people.

The Russians in the New Empire play two roles simultaneously
:

- 1) as one of the great nations that are political subjects of the Federated Empire of Nations,
- 2) as the initiator of continental integration into this Federal Empire of Nations.

Consequently, the Russians find themselves in a privileged position because, on the ethnic side, being one of several more or less equal ethnic components of the Empire, they become geopolitically at the centre of the entire political process. This dual function allows for a simultaneous increase in extra-ethnic influence and consolidation of intra-ethnic forces during the same empire-building exercise. Empire-building is the only way to preserve, strengthen and unite the Russian ethnos without resorting to interethnic conflicts, wars and revision of political boundaries. *All the* political boundaries of Eurasia, in the process of building the new empire, will gradually be abolished as *political* frontiers, and in their place will arise natural, organic *ethnic* boundaries, not having the strictly delimiting significance which is the case with national borders. These ethnic boundaries will have nothing in common with what is understood by the word "border" in the present situation, since they will be drawn along ethnic-cultural, confessional lines that do not imply political dominance over minorities for the very reason that these ethnic entities will not have full political sovereignty, being limited to the strategic interests of the entire Empire, which in turn is vitally interested in maintaining peace and harmony within its borders. In other words, Russians within such an Empire would not gain their nation-state as the political expression of an ethnic community, but would gain national unity and a giant continental state, in the administration of which they would be given a central role.

The mere nomination of such a project immediately removes the threat of those potential conflicts that are ripe due to the current division of Russians into various newly born "states" within the CIS. The imperial-building vector instantly transfers the problem of the ratio of Russians and Kazakhs in Kazakhstan, or Russians and Ukrainians in Ukraine, or Russians and Tatars in Tatarstan to an entirely different plane than the ethnic one. This relationship ceases to be a political-state problem, which can only be resolved by inflicting certain political-territorial damage on one party or another (for example, the ethnic division of Kazakhstan, separatism within the Russian Federation, military suppression of Chechnya, confessional and national fragmentation of Ukraine, the Crimea problem, etc.), and becomes a question of cohabitation of different ethnicities within the framework of a single political space. And in that case the ethnic consolidation of, say, Russians in Kazakhstan with the Russians within the Russian Federation will not be seen as undermining the political sovereignty of the Kazakh national state in favor of the Russian national state, but will be an organic cultural and ethnic process, which will not infringe, but will not exalt either side, because no Kazakh national state or Russian national state will simply exist. The Soviet model was in some ways similar to this project, but with one important caveat: the concept of "ethnos" was viewed as a rudiment, a historical atavism, lacking the status of an internal political entity. In contrast, within the New Empire, ethnos, without direct state expression, would be recognised as the main political value and the supreme legal subject in all intra-imperial matters.

To summarise this issue, operations with global geopolitical projects which, at first glance, have nothing to do with the achievement of the narrow ethnic goals of Russians, will in fact lead to the best satisfaction of these particular national goals as well. By rejecting the insufficient and too small ("a Russian state within the Russian Federation"), by not trying through conquests and annexations to increase this small in a bloody, fratricidal war, by offering the peoples of Eurasia the construction of a continental block on equal terms, Russians will be able to acquire something large and worthy of them, which would otherwise remain an unattainable dream forever.

By renouncing the ethnic state, we will gain the unity of the people and the Great Empire. In the present circumstances, only in this way, and in no other way, can we not only save the Russian people from political weakness and ethnic degeneration, to awaken them in all their grandiose scope for planetary achievements and finally give them what they really deserve.

5.2 Russian nationalism. Ethnic Demography and Empire

The Russian people, in a narrowly ethnic sense, are in a dire demographic situation. In the distant future, this threatens dire consequences both for the nation itself and for the future Empire, since the replacement of Russians as the main bearer of continental associations by some other nation will inevitably lead to the continental bloc deviating from its natural civilisation mission, generating chaos and conflicts in Eurasia and depriving the geopolitical structure of its most important cultural and political component.

This weak demographic position of the Russians is particularly alarming in comparison with the demographic growth of the Eurasian South, which, by contrast, is booming quantitatively. If these trends persist in the current proportion, it is inevitable that Russians will be forced out of their central position in the Empire, the homogeneity of the nation will be eroded and either the ethnic group will be absorbed into the sea of southern peoples or it will become a relict remnant worthy of existence only in a reservation. To this should be added the lack of compact settlement of large Eurasian spaces controlled by Russians only politically and administratively. This last factor could cause a disturbance of the ethnic balance in the Eurasian Empire and push the demographically booming peoples of the South towards national expansion into Russian territories (especially in Siberia and the Far East).

This problem should be solved immediately, but it should be particularly stressed that its solution should not precede or follow the creation of the Empire. The implementation of geopolitical plans from the outset must be synchronously accompanied by actions aimed at the demographic growth

of Russians and their ethnic regrouping in order to compactly develop the full "living space" of the nation. This goal can only be achieved by *political* methods, which should lead directly to the desired result and predetermine economic measures in this area.

There can only be one political solution - to bring to the fore concepts of *Russian nationalism*. This nationalism, however, should use cultural and ethnic terminology rather than state terminology, with particular emphasis on such categories as "peoplehood" and "Russian Orthodoxy". Moreover, this Russian nationalism should have a thoroughly modern sounding and avoid any attempts at direct restoration of those forms which have historically exhausted themselves. It is nationalism of the populist, ethnic, ethical and religious type, and not "statehood" or "monarchism" that should be a priority in this situation. All Russians should be inculcated with the basic idea that each individual's personal identity is a secondary value, derived from the national identity. Russians should realize that they are Orthodox Christians in the first place, Russians in the second place, and only people in the third place. Hence the hierarchy of priorities in both personal and public life. Above all, the Orthodox self-awareness of the nation as a Church, then the clear understanding of the indivisibility, integrity, totality and unity of the Russian ethnic organism, consisting not only of the living but also of the ancestors and future generations, and only then, lastly, the experience of the particular individual as an independent atomic unit.

In practice, the implementation of such nationalism in politics should mean the total churching of Russians and the transformation of all cultural institutions into an extension of the Single Church, not in organizational and administrative terms, but in spiritual, intellectual and ethical terms. Such churching should deprive culture and science of their profane detachment from the foundations of being, involve them in the process of spiritual domostroika, turn pragmatic and decentralized technical development into the realization of the central providential precept of the Church, into a subordinate instrument of the supermaterial plan. Only in this radical way can Russians really be returned to the bosom of the Church, which lies at the

heart of their historical national existence and which has shaped in basic terms what in the highest sense is called Russian. It is the total restoration of the Orthodox worldview, with all the consequences it entails, that is capable of returning the people to their spiritual origins. Any relative revival of the Church as a narrowly-confessional, religious structure, any restoration limited to cults and external ritualism, will be ineffective. In the framework of Russian nationalism, it is not individuals who should be churchized, but *all* of Russian culture, science and thought taken together. Only in this way will the collective identity of the nation be given a spiritual vertical, which, in turn, will turn the problem of demographic growth into a kind of spiritual task based on Orthodox ethics prohibiting, for example, contraception and abortion.

The next level is ethnic self-consciousness itself, the notion of the people as one body and one soul. And the existence of this unified organism should be understood as something supra-temporal, not limited by either spatial or temporal categories. Russian nationalism should appeal not only to the present of the nation, but also to its past and its future, taken simultaneously as a totality of a single spiritual being. This "being" the great Russian people in its superhistorical totality should be realized by every Russian and recognized in itself. The fact of belonging to the Russian nation should be experienced as chosen, as an incredible luxury of being, as the highest anthropological dignity. The propaganda of this national exclusivity (without the slightest hint of xenophobia or chauvinism) should become the axis of the people's political education. First of all, the demographic upsurge will be ensured ideologically, culturally and ethically. The people should be inculcated with the idea that by giving birth to a Russian child, each family participates in a national mystery, replenishing the spiritual and mental wealth of the entire nation. Children should be understood as a national treasure, as a physical expression of the great nation's inner energy. The Russian child must be understood first as a *Russian*, and then as a child.

Given the dire demographic situation today, national propaganda must be started as soon as possible and any political and ideological methods must

be used. In doing so, nationalist tendencies must be pushed to the limit, provoking a dramatic and rapid awakening of a great and powerful ethnic group.

It should be noted that no economic measures on their own will ever produce a positive demographic result without the appropriate religious-ethical and ideological support. The demographic decline can be stopped to zero and then provoke a reverse process only with the help of an appropriate ideology that would focus on changing *the consciousness* of the people, on transforming their thinking, on introducing hundreds and thousands of symbols into the daily sphere, explicitly or implicitly orienting people towards national interests. Within the Russian ethnos, Russian nationalism must be a single and total ideology, which may have its various versions and levels, but which always remains constant in everything that concerns the placement of the category of "nation" over that of "individuality". Ultimately, a radical slogan must be put forward: "the nation is everything, the individual is nothing".

This political orientation towards nationalism must also be supported by measures of a purely economic nature, as purely material instruments are also necessary for the realisation of the national goal. Support will be given to mothers, families with many children, and social conditions will be provided for the working man to support a large family. But this economic component will have an effect only if the national ideology dominates, which should not just economically support the demographic growth of the Russians, but in general orient the economy in a purely national way, put the material interests of the ethnic group above the individual interests of the individual. In other words, economic support of fertility is a particular case of the general trend in the economy, which as a whole should be derived precisely from national interests and not from individualistic egoistic motivations or utopian abstractions.

At first glance, an appeal to nationalist ideology would seem to be likely to provoke ethnic conflicts, worsen inter-ethnic relations between Russians and neighbouring ethnic groups and generate a host of insoluble contradictions.

This would indeed be the case if Russian nationalism extended its claim to *statehood* in the classical sense of the term. Representatives of other ethnic groups and confessions would hardly want to live in a Russian nationalist Orthodox state. But to live *side by side* with the Russian Orthodox people professing a national ideology, within a united continental Empire, united geopolitically and strategically, but flexible and differentiated in its internal structure, is not a problem for anyone, since there will always be a higher authority in whose face the ethno-religious communities have equal status and which is guided by the impartial principles of imperial harmony and justice. The project of the New Empire, on an ethnic level, lies in the fact that not only the Russian people are to have a clearly defined national-religious ideology, but all the other peoples of the empire are to have it affirmed. Thus, a conglomeration of "positive nationalisms" with a common denominator of the vertical imperial orientation will emerge.

It is important that only in this way will the most radical Russian nationalism be fully realised, as the main obstacles to its development will then be removed, and none of the neighbouring peoples will feel humiliated or suppressed by the Russian nation, as the cultural, ethnic and confessional borders between the peoples of the empire will be of no *political* significance. Russians would live in their national reality, Tatars in theirs, Chechens in theirs, Armenians in theirs, etc., even in the case of ethnic enclaves or national minorities among a different people. A nationalism free from the problem of statehood and borders would only enhance mutual understanding between nations, giving them both the freedom to contact each other and the freedom to isolate themselves ethnically.

For the survival of the Russian people in the current difficult conditions, for the demographic rise of the Russian nation, for the improvement of its dire situation in the ethnic, biological and spiritual sense, it is necessary to turn to the most radical forms of *Russian nationalism*, without which all technical or economic measures will remain powerless. But this nationalism will only be possible in organic unity with the principle of a geopolitical continental empire.

5.3 The Russian question after the coming victory

Apparently, from a theoretical point of view, we should consider the position the Russians will find themselves in after the possible victory of the Eurasian Empire over Atlantism. Of course, this is such a distant prospect that it is almost pointless to seriously consider the problems that would arise in such a case now. However, it should be kept in mind that the collapse of Atlantism can happen almost instantly at any stage of Eurasian empire building, since the geopolitical stability of the West is based solely on the correct and skillful handling of geopolitical categories, rather than on the real industrial, economic or military power. The Atlanticist construct is in fact extremely fragile, and if only one of its strategic axes, for example Central Europe, the Pacific area or the Eurasian continental South, is knocked out, the whole giant edifice of Atlanticism, so powerful and stable at first sight, collapses. The moment the geopolitical strategy of the Trilateral Commission is at least to some extent blocked by an alternative Eurasian project, a serious breakdown of the entire Atlanticist complex can be expected, with further events likely to unfold rapidly and precipitously, as was the case with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and its satellites. Therefore, although victory over Atlantism is an extremely distant prospect, it is worth formulating a few theses regarding the position of the Russians in a hypothetical post-Atlantean world.

First of all, it should be stressed that the geopolitical defeat of the US will pose many problems for the Eurasian Empire itself. At this point, the main factor underlying the project of geopolitical unification of nations and peoples into the New Empire will disappear, the principle of "common enemy" will disappear. The consolidating energy will lose its meaning, and even the very *raison d'être* of the Eurasian Empire will be questioned. In such a situation, the transition from a new bipolar world order of Eurasia vs. the Atlantic to a multipolar model could begin. However, it should be stressed

that the multipolar model will *only* be possible *after* victory over Atlantism, and not before. As long as Atlantism exists as a force claiming to be universal, there can be no multi-polar order. Only within the framework of the New Empire, within the global Eurasian project and in the course of the strategic confrontation with Atlanticism can objective preconditions for the emergence of a more or less balanced multipolarity be formed, and not before that. The germs of multipolarity will be formed only with the implementation of the differentiated imperial model, which will assert the status of a political subject for some organic, cultural and spiritual categories of people, ethnos, religion, nation, contrary to the current dominant system, where it is only about the legal status of states and individuals ("human rights"). The "clash of civilisations" (to quote Huntington) in a multipolar world will only be a reality if these civilizations can establish and assert their right to exist in the context of an anti-Atlantic strategic alliance. At present, there is only one "civilisation", the Atlanticist, Western, liberal-market civilisation, which opposes *all* other historical organic cultural models.

The collapse of Atlantism would put the peoples of the New Empire, and its individual sectors, before a serious problem: whether to continue maintaining geopolitical unity or to consolidate large civilizational blocs within the Empire as an independent geopolitical reality? But in any case, national differences of peoples and confessions will come to the fore.

In that case, the best option would be to preserve the imperial structure as the most harmonious system for resolving all internal contradictions. By analogy with the former doctrine of *Jus Publicum Europeum*, i.e. "Civil European Law", common to all the peoples of Europe, the Eurasian Empire in the post-Atlantic era could be based on a similar, but expanded doctrine of *Jus Publicum Euroasiaticum*. Having lost its military-strategic significance, the imperial continental complex could act as a supreme *legal* authority, which would ease the tensions between the Eurasian nations, whose bond would inevitably weaken after the victory over the "common enemy". Such an exit would be ideal.

But we can also assume the collapse of continental unity and the forma-

tion of several civilizational blocks in the Eurasian space - Russian-Slavic (more broadly Orthodox), European, Far-Eastern, Central Asian, Islamic, etc. The correlation of each of them with the others, and even their boundaries and structures, is, of course, impossible to foresee. However, in such a hypothetical perspective, the project structure of the Russian nation today should already include a model that takes into account in the distant future (and only *after* the end of Atlantism) the independent participation of Russians in world history, which returned to its organic and natural course after a long period of Atlantist anomaly. In this case, the Russian nation should also be ready to create its own statehood, or to form a broader natural ethno-state formation, held together by the unity of tradition, culture, religion and destiny. The question of the Russian state may arise in full force, but this applies exclusively to the post-Eurasian period, which in itself is problematic and hypothetical.

But already at this moment Russians should throw all their energies into the national consolidation, spiritual, cultural and religious revival of the nation, its final establishment and full awakening so that in the future (if necessary) it can defend its *national Truth* not only against enemies, but also against allies in empire-building, who have their own historically predetermined national outlook. Russians should not just maintain their identity in the imperial context, they should affirm it, red-hot it and deepen it to the utmost. And in the long term, after the collapse of Atlantism, Russians should be prepared to defend their own civilisational mission, to defend their universal providential national path.

Be that as it may, the Russians will in any case find themselves in a strategically central position in the Eurasian imperial space, and consequently, in the question of the civilizational priorities of the Empire in the post-Atlantean period (if the Empire still survives) they will find themselves in a privileged position. Consequently, to some extent, this entire Empire will be linked to the Russian Idea, which is indeed eschatological and universal by definition, merged with gigantic spaces and a cosmic sense. Should the continental bloc begin to disintegrate, the Russians, restored to strength

through the nationalist period and the vigorous process of empire-building, would find themselves back in a geopolitically advantageous position, occupying a *central* position among the liberated peoples and states of the continent, making a possible Russian State, the Russian Empire, a stable and stable geopolitical reality based on a solid national ground.

Both of these possibilities should be considered today

Chapter 6

Military aspects of the Empire

6.1 Prioritising nuclear and intercontinental capabilities

In the military-strategic sense, the New Empire can be realistically created only if the nuclear power of the former Soviet Union, as well as all kinds of strategic and space weapons, is preserved in the hands of the Eurasian bloc. This is the main condition not only for the viability of the coming continental formation, but also for its very creation, because the integration of states and "large spaces" around Russia, the statement of the main axes of Eurasia are realized only if Moscow has a *strategic* potential, which will be the main guarantor of the seriousness of the whole project. It is the preservation of the strategic balance between Atlanticism (NATO) and Russia (the military-strategic successor to the USSR and the pole of the new Eurasian bloc) that makes the political plans of the New Empire serious and practically achievable.

At the moment, the strategic potential of the former Soviet Union still retains its proportional comparability with NATO - in the field of nuclear weapons, nuclear submarines, some aerospace programmes and in the issue of strategic aviation. Once this balance has clearly shifted in favor of the Atlanticists, a Eurasian empire will become impossible, and Russia will finally become a mere "regional power" and consequently shrink its terri-

tory and scale of influence drastically. After that, no geopolitical axis or political project will be able to change anything. It is only at this stage, while the Cold War balance of power in the strategic sphere has not yet changed irreversibly, that Russia's geopolitics and policy are indeed decisive and continental in weight. In fact, the possibility of free and independent geopolitical projection is directly dependent on maintaining the strategic comparability of Russian and Atlanticist potentials. Once this proportion is sharply broken, Russia will turn from a *subject of* geopolitics into its *object*. In this case, the Russians will be left to maneuver in the situation imposed from the outside, choosing roles and priorities in an essentially "not their" game.

This state of affairs makes the Eurasian project directly linked to the quality and potential of the Russian (former Soviet) army. And automatically from this it can be concluded that the army in such circumstances should in no way depend on the immediate political situation in Moscow. On the contrary, the very quality of the army (naturally, first of all, in the issue of strategic armaments) is the foundation of all Russian politics, its axis, and, consequently, the structure of the army should predetermine the general contours of this politics and affirm the inherently *political* guidelines. As long as the strategic balance is maintained to some extent, the army will remain the most important factor in Russian politics, because the very political status of the country, its weight, its capabilities and its future in such a situation directly depend on the armed forces.

At the moment, a very dangerous process of reorientation of the entire military doctrine from a continental-Soviet structure to a regional-local one is taking place in the Russian army under pressure from Atlanticism. This means that it is no longer the US and NATO countries that are beginning to be seen as Russia's "potential adversary", but the countries bordering Russia, as well as Russia's internal regions that could turn to separatism. This turn of the new military doctrine is in fact completely opposite to the only reasonable, from the geopolitical point of view, position of the Armed Forces, since the "potential adversaries" in this case are the very countries

that should logically have become natural "allies" of the Russians. In other words, "potential allies" are seen as "potential adversaries" and Russia's main geopolitical "potential adversary" - the Atlantic bloc - is discounted altogether.

The military issue is in direct correlation with geopolitical choices. If Russia thinks of its future as an Empire, as an integrator and pole of the new continental bloc, its armed forces must with necessity prioritise nuclear and strategic weaponry at the expense of more localised forms of weaponry. The main military activities in the imperial plan will be developed in the perspective of the "war of the continents", and consequently, intercontinental missiles (primarily those with nuclear warheads), strategic aviation, aircraft carriers and nuclear submarines, as well as all forms of space military programs developed as an alternative to SOI, acquire a special role. It is these types of weapons that would best contribute to continental integration and make an alliance with Russia attractive and fundamental for the other Eurasian blocs and countries. It is precisely these types of weapons that are directly linked to Russia's ability to play the geopolitical card at the continental level, and hence solve economic problems in a more concrete way through cooperation with the developed regions of Central Europe and Japan. It should not be forgotten that it was the nuclear factor, taught by the US as "the guarantor of Western protection and democracy against Soviet totalitarianism", that was the main driver of the American economy in the postwar period, when economically strong but militarily weak Western countries (and Japan) were forced to subsidise the American economy and industry in return for the strategic tutelage of Pax Americana. In a sense, Russia can already now offer something similar to both Europe and Japan, with the addition that it is in Russia's interest to promote the political maturation of these two "potential Empires" rather than to weaken and tightly control them as is the case with American, Atlantic domination. Even on a purely pragmatic level, overcoming Russia's economic crisis is only possible with an active geopolitical use of the strategic factor and appropriate armaments. To get "more good stuff", it is easier not to reorient the military-industrial complex towards making pots, but to continue and intensify the production of

aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines. With the right political support, a few submarines could bring entire industrialised countries to Russia, purely peacefully, whereas by converting military factories to washing machine production, Russia would do itself irreparable *economic* damage.

Re-profiling the army as a whole in a "regional" fashion means developing all non-strategic, conventional weapons. If such a military reform is carried out intelligently and consistently (which in our circumstances is difficult to believe), the Russians will have an effective mobile army, ready for combat operations in continental conditions and capable of dealing successfully and seamlessly with military conflicts on the scale of Afghanistan, Tajikistan or Chechnya. The inefficiency of the Soviet troops in local conflicts, which could be observed in the Afghan war and in the Perestroika conflicts, was the result of the strategic priority in the construction of the Soviet armed forces, which focused on a global nuclear conflict rather than on local wars of low and medium intensity. This is legitimate. Army restructuring with a priority "regional orientation", i.e. the choice of successful military operations in "wars of low and medium intensity" as the main objective, will inevitably lead to *the destruction of* strategic weapons, because no army today, even in the wealthiest and most economically developed country - for example the USA - is capable of effectively conducting its construction in two directions at once - strategic and regional. (The incompetence of the Americans in local conflicts has already been demonstrated many times - beginning with Vietnam and ending with Yugoslavia and Somalia). Therefore, at first glance, the "positive" transformation of the army, supposedly in keeping with the spirit of the times, in the distant future means the end of the Russians' strategic security, the loss of any serious guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and a complete inability to improve its geopolitical state in any way in the future.

The Russian national interest today is to preserve its strategic potential *at any cost* at the intercontinental level, i.e. to remain a "superpower", albeit in a reduced, reduced version. To ensure this condition, it is possible to sacrifice everything - to make any political, geopolitical, economic and

territorial compromises. If the strategic potential is retained, any concession today will be reconsidered in favour of the Russians tomorrow. As long as things remain the same, all political moves by the Russian leadership in favour of the West remain theoretically reversible.

The fate of the Russians and their grandiose future lies today not in how many Russians are outside the Russian Federation, nor in what our political or economic situation is at the moment, but in whether we will have sufficient weapons to defend our independence *militarily* against Russia's only and natural "potential enemy" - the US and the North Atlantic bloc. All other questions follow from here. This is also the basis for an unambiguous determination of whether a global Eurasian imperial project is *still* possible or not.

6.2 What kind of armed forces does a great Russia need?

The hierarchy of military development in the perspective of a Eurasian Empire is clearly derived from basic geopolitical positions:

1) Priority is given to *space* weapons, which have such a potential scale of territorial impact that traditional forms of ensuring the military security of a state or a bloc of states retreat before them, completely losing effectiveness and significance. The development of the Russian version of SOI is of central importance here. The development of 'atmospheric' weapons and experiments with unorthodox types of weapons involving the impact on the human psyche are also crucial. This costly and science-intensive field of weaponry, while practically unusable in local conflicts, is in fact the most important axis of true state and national security. Without this research and the relevant results, the nation finds itself virtually unprotected in the face of a "potential enemy", and all questions of "independence", "sovereignty" and "geopolitical projects" fall away by themselves.

2) Then there are airborne nuclear weapons - missile capabilities and strategic aviation. This intercontinental sphere of arms, aimed at a potential

conflict with the Atlantic pole, poses a constant threat to those regions that are reliably protected by maritime borders from all other forms of military invasion. It is no coincidence that it was the development of Soviet missile technology that caused such panic in the United States in its time, and it is the successes in this field that enabled the USSR and the Warsaw Pact to survive so long after World War II, despite the extremely unfavourable geopolitical situation of the land borders. Only intercontinental armaments made the USSR in some approximation a "continent", which gave certain grounds for strategic parity with the real continent - the USA.

3) The Navy should be considered as the next level of importance. This type of weapon, like intercontinental missiles and strategic aviation, is designed to carry out global military tasks when confronted by "potential adversary" N1 - the United States. At the same time, in the prospect of creating a continental block, the Russian Navy should become the starting point for a gigantic system of strategic ports both in the South and in the West (which Russia and the USSR were traditionally deprived of). Aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines are of paramount importance in this. The Navy should be structurally oriented to combat operations in maritime conditions and coastal zones, i.e. in the space as far away from the land base as possible. This should be the priority form of combat operations in a potential military conflict, since the main imperative of a successful strategy is, as we know, to conduct combat operations either on the territory of a potential adversary or on neutral territory. At the same time, the geopolitical and strategic specifics of adapting the existing naval model to the conditions of the southern seas and oceans, as well as to the western Atlantic, must be envisaged in advance. The Black Sea Fleet and the Baltic Fleet will sooner or later lose their importance for Russia as an Empire, as they are important strategic points only for a "regional power", the establishment of which is in itself tantamount to strategic suicide for Russia.

Control of the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic is therefore far more important to the continental bloc than secondary ports, easily trapped by straits or the narrow isthmus between the Baltic and the North Sea. The navy as a whole

should rather be guided by Far Eastern and North Sea models, analogues of which Russia should be prepared to replicate, when the time comes, in India. Iran and Western Europe, as these are the true geopolitical boundaries of an imperial (not regional!) Russia.

4) Ground forces are the least important in the imperial perspective and are designed to play the role of "internal troops" rather than a truly important strategic value. In a real intercontinental conflict, the ground forces should serve only a supporting function - this defines their place in the hierarchy of military construction. The only exception in this matter are airborne and special forces, which, because of their mobility and non-coupling to land-based continental bases, can take an active part in serious intercontinental operations. Accordingly, airborne troops should be given priority over other land-based sectors of the army.

This structure of the Russian Armed Forces and the future New Empire in general terms reproduces the purely *Soviet* model of the army in the post-war period. The latter was the result of a natural geopolitical process, which was most clearly realized by the army leadership, which provided an adequate response to the very geopolitical logic of history, while political and ideological clichés did not allow the party leaders of the USSR to act in harmony with the only, self-evident logic of state and strategic development of the Soviet State. The prospect of geopolitical and strategic expansionism was embedded in the very fundamental structure of Russia's geographical position, and it was the army that understood this more fully and clearly than anyone else. Therefore the USSR Armed Forces in a general sense were moving in an absolutely correct direction both in defining the "potential enemy" and in choosing priorities for the development of various kinds of armaments, and in equipping the army with the latest technologies. At the same time, however, the excessive ideological pressure and general dilapidation of late Soviet society also affected the Armed Forces, which seemed instantly oblivious to their own logic and their own interests (coinciding with the national interests of all Russians in the issue of freedom and security of the nation), and private errors diverted attention from the main strategic

issues.

A topical restructuring of the army based on the concept of "Russia

- regional power", effectively overturning the hierarchy that should exist in the New Empire and which existed in general terms in the USSR Armed Forces.

In Russia's "regional" army, priority is given to ground forces, although the airborne troops are also somewhat separated from the rest of the armed forces.

Then there is the navy, with the conversion and reduction being carried out primarily at the expense of aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered submarines, and a scandal between Moscow and Kiev over the Black Sea Fleet, which has virtually no strategic significance, with no outcome whatsoever, as the original terms and objectives are fundamentally flawed.

Even less attention is paid to aviation and missile development, and strategic aviation and intercontinental missiles are destroyed altogether. In parallel, the abandonment of nuclear weapons is being realised.

Programmes for the deployment of space weapons, which are completely unnecessary in regional conflicts, are frozen and phased out because, from a narrow "regional" perspective, they represent only a gigantic and meaningless item of state budget expenditure that has no justification whatsoever.

By comparing the two models of army-building priorities, we see that they represent two opposites.

One army (the first continental option) is designed to defend the continental bloc, Eurasia, Russia in its true geopolitical scope against the "potential adversary", which was and still is the US and the Atlanticist bloc. Such an army is focused on the genuine interests of the Russians and is the guarantor of national independence and freedom. In addition, this army allows to effectively implement a global Eurasian project, which alone can make the geopolitical position of Russia in the world stable and secure, as well as solve

the most important economic problems.

The second army ("regional" type) is needed in Russia, understood only as the Russian Federation and interested only in solving local and internal political problems. Such an army cannot be a genuine guarantor of national security. Its inherent orientation towards potential conflict with neighbouring countries and peoples makes the Russians constantly expect a blow from a "hostile neighbour" ("former brotherly people"). Its structure deprives Russians of the opportunity to enter into adequate geopolitical relations with Central Europe and Japan, as it will clearly be insufficient to protect these geopolitical entities from potential US aggression in the future. Moreover, this structure compels Russians to refer to all three participants of the future geopolitical axes of Eurasia - Berlin, Tehran, Tokyo - as "potential adversaries" and, accordingly, provokes the same attitude of these countries to Russia. And it doesn't matter at all that the army's structural adjustment will be accompanied by pacifist assurances. In geopolitics - which takes precedence over purely political considerations when making the most crucial decisions - the nature of a country's weaponry speaks far more eloquently than the official and unofficial statements of diplomats and political leaders.

Chapter 7

Technology and resources

7.1 Technology deficits

One of the reasons for the USSR's defeat in the Cold War was its serious technological backwardness compared to the countries of the opposite geopolitical camp. The fact is that the Atlanticists' technological leap was ensured by an effective distribution of roles among NATO member states. On the one hand, the US concentrated in itself a purely military, strategic pole, letting the other capitalist countries develop the trade, financial and technological aspect, without caring about direct investment of "new high technologies" in the military-industrial complex. The US often merely used off-the-shelf high technology for its military-industrial complex, while it was created and developed in Europe, Japan and elsewhere. The countries that were under the US "tutelage" paid "technological tribute" for the geopolitical patronage. The USSR, for its part, radically centralised all technological developments almost exclusively within its military-industrial complex, which made research and cutting-edge projects more difficult - it was as if they were initially prepared in a centralised administrative organism and focused on planned objectives, and this sharply narrowed the field of technological innovation. In other words, one and the same centralized structure had two tasks at once -> the enormous pressure to create a planetary military strategic complex and the technological support of this complex together with the development of knowledge-intensive industries in parallel spheres.

The whole field of high technologies, information programs, computer technology, etc. was strictly linked with the military-industrial complex, and this deprived it of the flexibility and independence it needed at times. It can be assumed that in the absence of such geopolitical "vassals" as France, England, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, etc., the USA would have had a much lower technological level than the current one.

The technological backwardness of the USSR was inevitable. Even today, the Russians are fully experiencing the consequences of the USSR's failure in this area, as the dependence of Russian industry and economy on Western patents, know-how, etc. is worsening by the day. Meanwhile, a certain level of technological sophistication is indispensable for any state that aspires to have weight in international politics and an efficient, competitive domestic economic structure. If we talk about the imperial perspective of the Russian nation, then a high level of technology is all the more necessary to ensure all the strategic and geopolitical factors on which all geopolitical and economic expansion rests. So the question is posed: by moving in which direction could the Russians catch up and overcome the technological lag inherited from the USSR, while it is not decreasing at present but rather increasing (brain drain, reduction of state funding of scientific activities, conversion, decay and restructuring in the military-industrial complex, etc.)?

There are three hypothetical possibilities. The first is that Russia renounces all of its geopolitical claims to independence, completely capitulates to Atlanticism, and, as a "reward" for obedience, receives dosed access from *the Americans* to some "high technology", somewhat obsolete and not representing strategic secrets. This way has actually been tried in some Third World countries, which have actually managed to make an economic, financial and industrial leap in this way (the so-called "Asian" or "Pacific tiger"). In the case of Russia, the US will be much more cautious than in the case of Europe or the Third World, since Russia's geopolitical and historical scale is so great that economic prosperity and technological leapfrogging could at some point make it a powerful "potential enemy" of the US again. It is natural to expect that Russian access to "high technology", even under conditions of

total capitulation and total dismantling of strategic aspects of the military-industrial complex, will be sabotaged and sabotaged in every possible way. This path appears to be a dead end.

The second path, typical of the supporters of "small nationalism", is to make a technological leap with the utmost effort of internal resources without the help of outside forces. This would involve an extreme, almost totalitarian, mobilisation of the entire nation and a sharp deterioration in relations with the West. If everything is limited to the volume of the Russian Federation and Russia, understood as a "regional power", then such attempts are doomed to fail, because the same problems as in the USSR case will arise - Russians will have to both protect themselves from the superpower as a "potential enemy" and develop such subtle areas as high-tech research themselves. As the stable and strictly organized USSR could not cope with it, the crisis-stricken, destabilized Russian Federation will certainly not cope with it. Moreover, in this case it will be necessary to introduce elements of "totalitarianism," which will inevitably cause deep internal protest. It means that this route should also be rejected.

The latter option consists of borrowing high technology from developed European and Asian countries (but not from the US) in exchange for a strategic alliance and access to Russian resources. There is a good chance of success here, with such a path keeping the Russians somewhat independent from the US while avoiding national overstretch, dictatorship and austerity. Although such a process would immediately provoke U.S. ire, threats to Russia and, most importantly, to its "wrong vassals," some countries may go for it if Russia's strategic strength is still comparable to that of the United States and if Russian ideology is not overtly imperialistic (or communist). In addition, high technology in this case would be exchanged for the most important component for Germany, Japan and other developed countries - resources, access to which is tightly controlled by the United States all over the world. Russian resources, Central Asia, Siberia, etc. are vital for these very countries, as the US as a whole is rather independent in this matter. Mineral resources, raw materials, energy sources plus a powerful strategic

military patronage - this combination may well persuade some developed countries to cooperate closely in the field of high technology and put the highest achievements in this field at the disposal of the Russians (along with installation and organization of production). In the long term, a national direction in these matters would gradually emerge, but in any case, an initial impetus is needed.

This third way fits fully into the overall Eurasian project, being its concretization on a more practical level. In fact, it means that the creation of a geopolitical Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis is not just a political and geographical plan, but also the best solution to the problem of the Russians' technological backwardness.

7.2 Russian resources

Russia is a natural supplier of resources to other countries. This state of affairs has a rather long history and has largely been a determining factor in Russia's geopolitical status. Let us take a closer look at the geopolitical significance of resource exports and the role of resource provision in general.

There are some inequalities in the global distribution of resources on the planet - two zones out of the four developed sectors in the North have access to resources and are able to ensure resource autarchy if necessary (the US and Russia), while two are severely resource deficient (Europe and Japan). Thus, to a large extent, the control of the two resource-poor zones is determined by the relationship with the other two. There is a further peculiarity that the US seeks to control the resources of colonial or semi-colonial territories and use them to influence developed countries. The USA tries to conserve its own resources for itself and spends them very sparingly, although, if necessary, the USA will not have a big problem to create a resource autarchy for itself *without* a colonial strategy in this area. Russia, on the other hand, has traditionally manipulated the export of its own resources. This difference in the position of the two powers has, on both sides, both pluses and minuses. The U.S. always has an untouchable strategic reserve,

but at the same time, colonial resource bases always theoretically have a chance to get out of hand. Russia, for its part, can be assured of a resource supply because the resources are on its territory, but at the same time, by exporting them, it is always spending its own strategic reserves.

This objective state of affairs in the prospect of creating a continental bloc can be used to the benefit of the Russians in the following ways. At the initial stage, Russia can offer its resources to potential partners in the East and West as a compensation for the aggravation of relations with the United States, which will inevitably occur in the first stages of the Eurasian project. This will also be possible because a direct *land* link can be established with Europe and Japan, independent of the maritime and coastal control that is the main trump card in the geopolitical strategy of Atlanticism. Naturally, such exports would not be one-way aid, as this process would have to be embedded in an overall geopolitical plan involving the active financial and technological involvement of Europe and Japan in the strategic development of Russia itself, and in addition, a significant expansion of its political and defence frontiers to the East and West.

In the long term, however, the US should be oriented towards displacement from Africa, the Middle East and the Pacific, with a corresponding redistribution of resource-rich territories in favour of its Eurasian partners and Russia itself. This plan is a direct opposite of the "anaconda plan" by the Atlanticists, which provides for tight control of the US exactly over the South-Eurasian, African and Pacific spaces in order to prevent the organization of autarkic economic zones for its geopolitical rivals. When it is possible to drive the "anaconda" of Atlanticism back to the American continent, the whole "poor south" of Eurasia will become a natural complement to the more developed Eurasian north. Arabian oil, African minerals and the resources of the Pacific will be able to flow directly to the countries of the Eurasian bloc, *bypassing* the US. Russia could then not only begin to accumulate resources for itself, but also gain new areas to the south. Eurasian Europe will move south to become Euro-Africa, and Japan will establish in the Pacific Ocean the "new order" that it planned to implement in the 1930s.

Russia itself, using the technological experience which it either already has or will acquire during the period of supplying resources to its technologically advanced partners in the bloc (during the first stage of continental construction), will be able to take an active part in developing new fields in Central and Eastern Asia and will gradually freeze those fields which are vital for ensuring its own strategic future.

In terms of resources, the plan to create an "anti-Trilateral" (Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo bloc) in the near and distant future seems highly realistic, since the transition period for the Western and Eastern Axis (for Berlin and Tokyo), which will experience the most severe pressure from the US, will be mitigated by the resource capabilities of Russia, which is capable of creating all conditions necessary for the complete political and strategic revival of Europe and Japan during the transition period with its exports of minerals. After that those "bigger spaces" can themselves strengthen their economic and political expansion in a north-south direction. What is particularly important is that Russia in this transition period will be able to acquire effective technological equipment for mining operations and, by following the easiest path, test the methodology and technical models supplied by the European West and the Japanese Far East. And this factor will, in the long run, greatly enhance the strategic autarchy of the Russians, regardless of how events turn out in the future.

Naturally, at the moment the Russian resources problem is handled in any way but the way that would be beneficial to Russia. The Russians are now selling resources at dumping prices, for fictitious money and foreign goods, either directly to the US or through them (US monopoly companies or TNCs implicitly controlled by Atlantists) to Western European countries. As an alternative, the "nationalists" put forward the generally impracticable demand to stop exporting resources altogether and to leave their development and consumption entirely to Russia. The latter project would require such a strain on all national forces that it could only be realised under a political dictatorship, which is almost unbelievable in the present situation. The situation here is the same as in the case of high technology. Only a "third

way“ - neither resource exports in favour of the USA, nor the total rejection of any exports - can be a realistic way out in the present situation.

Once again, the political need for a continental Eurasian bloc as soon as possible comes to a head.

Chapter 8

Economic aspects of the New Empire

8.1 The economics of the 'third way'

Industrial restructuring in Russia is overdue. There is much truth in what "reformers" say about the inevitability of economic transformation in Russia. The Soviet system, while efficient and competitive to a certain extent, gradually became so inflexible and stagnant that it simply had to collapse, and unfortunately many effective and positive aspects of socialism as such were buried under its rubble.

The logic of Russia's economic transformation, which began during perestroika, was based on a dualistic approach to the economy. On the one hand, there was the existing model of rigid centralist state socialism, "total dirigisme", where the state intervened in the slightest nuances of production and distribution, suppressing any private initiative and excluding all market elements. Such structural rigidity not only made the entire economic system cumbersome and unwieldy (hence the gradual loss in competition with capitalism), but also perverted the basic principle of socialism, which implies the effective participation of society in the economic process. In Marx's economic-philosophical manuscripts there is a warning about this degeneration of the socialist system, which can be characterised as "alienation under socialism".

Criticism of such a centralised economy, however, very quickly moved to the opposite extreme, i.e. to absolute apologetics for the liberal-capitalist system with its "market laws", "invisible hand", "free trade", etc. The liberal reformers decided to move from ultra-centralisation (even if only in theory) to ultra-liberalism. If Soviet socialism in its later stages weakened state autarchy in its competition with the opposing geopolitical bloc, the market reforms entailed the real destruction of this autarchy, which cannot be qualified otherwise than as "betrayal of national interests". Reforms were necessary, but the dualistic logic - either Soviet socialism or capitalist liberalism - put the question on the wrong plane from the start, as the dispute became purely theoretical and considerations of Russian geopolitical autarchy were relegated to the background. The proposed liberal transformations in the style of Chicago Boys programmes and von Hayek's theories have dealt the economy a crushing blow. But the restorationist economic programmes which the "conservative" opposition insisted on to a greater or lesser extent were not much better. In both cases it was a polemic between two utopian abstract models, in which the question of the "national interests of the Russians" was somewhere in the background or even in third place.

This was quite logical, since Soviet economists, by virtue of the specifics of their education, were used to dealing only with *two* economic models - dogmatic Soviet socialism (which they defended for the time being) and liberal capitalism (which they criticised for the time being). Both of these models, as they were studied and developed, never correlated with such a criterion as "geopolitical interests of the country", as this topic (albeit in a different form) was a priority of the army and ideological structures (especially the GRU and the KGB). By shifting the main focus to *the economy*, the leaders of perestroika took the issue of "national and state security and power" out of the brackets. As soon as this happened, the country was trapped in a wrongly formulated problem, any solution in the given terms was a dead end.

Strictly speaking, the people did not have to choose between liberal capitalism and Soviet socialism, but between liberal capitalism, Soviet socialism

and a specific economic doctrine combining elements of the market and elements of planning, subject to the central imperative of national prosperity and state security ("third way"). This "third way" in the economy is by no means a compromise or a syncretic combination of disparate elements of the two other economic models, but a complete and independent doctrine with a long history and many examples of implementation in practice. However, this "third way" has hardly been mentioned in the public debate at all. The result of the stubborn refusal to seriously consider this option is evident: a ruined and weakened country, a collapsed economy, Russia's increasing parasitic dependence on the Navy and the International Bank, the breakdown of economic and industrial ties, etc. There is no socialism or market at the moment, and it is unlikely that anything can be corrected by staying within the logic which has become dominant in dealing with the most important economic issues.

"Third way" economics is not identical to either the Swedish or Swiss model, contrary to what some politicians who are beginning to realise the impasse of the current situation think. Neither Sweden nor Switzerland are full-fledged geopolitical entities and do not have serious strategic sovereignty, and consequently the huge part of the state, industrial and military sectors needed to ensure real autarchy is absent in these states altogether. Some compromise between a socially oriented social structure and a market economy has indeed been achieved in these countries, but it is a purely artificial model that has been able to emerge precisely by the complete depoliticisation of these countries and a deliberate refusal to play an active role in the geopolitical distribution of power in Europe. Russia will never be able to become a "second Sweden" or "second Switzerland" in terms of its scale, because its geopolitical position obliges it to play an active role; neutrality is simply not possible in this case. It is therefore pointless to refer to such examples.

The second illusion, characteristic of those intuitively seeking "third way" models for Russia, is China and its reforms. However, in this case, too, there is a "deception of vision" due to the lack of objective information about the essence and progress of Chinese reforms. China's economic trans-

formation only superficially resembles the "third way" model. In fact, it is about the transformation of a broadly Soviet-like society into a purely liberal order, but *without* a democratic transformation in politics, i.e. with the totalitarian control of the ruling elite over the political situation. The point is that the political totalitarianism of the communist nomenklatura is seamlessly transformed into the economic, monopolistic totalitarianism of the same nomenklatura, which, from the outset, seeks to cut off any possibility of economic competition from below. One model of "alienation society" seamlessly transitions into another model of "alienation society", and political exploitation imperceptibly turns into economic exploitation of the *same* social group.

It is indicative that this type of reforms was developed by the Trilateral Commission, whose representatives had already agreed with the Chinese nomenclature since the early 1980s to include China in the future in the monetary zone of influence and grant it the status of a "regional power". The Atlanticists' move was largely due to the Cold War strategy against the USSR, but also to support Japan's traditional competitor in the Far East and limit the latter's economic expansion.

The true "third way" in economics found its classical embodiment in the works of Friedrich List, who formulated the principles of "economic autarchy of large spaces". This theory is based on the fact of the uneven economic development of capitalist societies and the logical consequence of the economic colonisation of richer countries by poorer ones; the "rich" benefit from "free trade" under such conditions, while the "poor" benefit the opposite. Hence, Liszt concluded that protectionism, dirigisme and customs restrictions, i.e. restrictions on the principle of "free trade" on an inter-national level, must be resorted to at certain stages in the economic development of society in order to achieve a level of national and state independence and strategic power), In other words, it was clear to Liszt that the economy must be subordinated to national interests, and that any appeal to the "autonomous logic of the market" was only a cover for economic (and later, political, political, and social) exploitation. Such an approach immediately sets clear

boundaries as to where the 'market' principle should operate and where the 'socialist' principle should operate. Interestingly, Rathenau, author of the German "economic miracle", Witte, Lenin and even Keynes all formulated their economic principles on the basis of Friedrich List's doctrine, although the language used was closer to either the purely capitalist or communist vocabulary.

The economic hierarchy constructed by List can be reduced to a simple formula: Those aspects of economic life which are on a scale comparable to the interests of the individual should be governed by market principles and based on "private property". We are talking about housing, small-scale production, small holdings of land, etc. As this or that economic activity grows in importance, the form of production should take on the features of collective ownership, because in this case "private ownership" and the individual factor may, in fact, come into conflict with collective interests; here the "cooperative" or "corporate" criterion should apply. Finally, the economic areas directly linked to the state and its strategic status should be controlled, subsidised and administered by state authorities, since there are interests at a higher level than 'private property' or 'collective benefit'. Thus, in such an economic order it is not the elites, the market or the collective that determine the economic, industrial and financial shape of society - it is formed on the basis of specific interests of a particular state in specific historical conditions, and accordingly, there can be no dogma in this model in principle - as the geopolitical status of the state changes and due to historical and national conditions the proportions between the volumes of these three levels of the economic hierarchy can change significantly. For example, in times of peace and prosperity, the private sector, together with the collective sector, may increase and the state sector may decrease. Conversely, in difficult periods of national history - when the independence of the whole nation is at stake - the public sector's powers increase at the expense of some collective economic units, and these in turn crowd out private enterprise.

It is very interesting that it was Friedrich List's model that was used by

historically developed capitalist countries in times of crisis. Thus, even the USA, the radical defenders of the principle of "free trade", periodically resorted to protectionist measures and state subsidies in the industrial sector when periods of "economic depression" occurred. This was the period of the New Deal, when the Americans almost literally reprinted the principles of Liszt, albeit in a softened version by Keynes, author of the theory of "economic insulation", which is basically nothing but a new name for the "economic autarky of large spaces" theory. Incidentally, Liszt himself lived in the USA for a long time and observed the process of capitalist construction in its early phases. Based on these observations, he formulated the basic principles of his theory as applied to Germany. But, of course, the most grandiose results were achieved in National Socialist Germany, when his ideas were implemented totally and without any liberal or Marxist amendments.

The doctrine of "third way" economics has another important aspect - the correlation between financial and production factors. Obviously, early capitalism and Soviet-type socialism placed the main emphasis on the development of production, giving the financial system a secondary, subordinate role. Developed capitalism, by contrast, gravitates towards the dominance of financial capital over production, which in turn becomes a secondary consideration. The dominance of 'labour' sooner or later leads to political violence, the dominance of 'capital' to economic violence. In the first case, labour is autonomised and detached from concrete values; in the second, money is autonomised, also losing its connection with value and becoming a credit/interest fiction. "The third way" insists on a brutal link between labour and value (e.g. gold reserves and, more generally, resources), relegating the sphere of consumption and the circulation of goods to a subordinate, secondary, purely instrumental role. This conflation of labour and value is dictated here by the same considerations of "national power" and state sovereignty as the whole structure of this economic doctrine. One can simplify this idea with the formula 'neither luxury nor poverty', 'contentment with a reasonable minimum'. This means a more flexible and free approach to work than under Soviet socialism, but more limited opportunities for per-

sonal enrichment than under capitalism. This model allows the nation to be independent in strategic areas from other states and economic systems, but at the same time strips the labour process of its coercive nature and ties it to a material equivalent.

It is this version of "third way" economics that is the only alternative in today's Russia, resisting both the rampant liberalism and the restorationist projects of neo-communists unwilling to seriously correct outdated and proven ineffective dogmas. Were it not for the instant associations with Hitler's regime, one might call this project "national-type socialism". The mere fact that List's theory (developed, however, by such famous economists as Sismondi, Schumpeter, Dumont, etc.) is put forward in the context of the current economic situation in Russia would be a great achievement, as it can provide answers to the most urgent questions and put an end to the dead-end dualism of "reformers and anti-reformers" at once. Moreover, the positive aspects of both the liberal reforms and the structures still preserved from socialism could be perfectly harnessed to this economic project. But all this will have a positive effect only in the context of a *conscious* and theoretically elaborated doctrinal corpus and not as pragmatic moves made ad hoc. The economics of the "third way" must have an unambiguous political expression comparable to that of a "liberal party" or a "communist party". All inertial centrism, pragmatism and compromise will be doomed to failure. Friedrich List and his ideas must become symbols like Adam Smith and Karl Marx. "The Third J Way" needs carriers of this ideological dogma who are comparable in preparation, conviction and awareness to liberals and communists. The principles of Third Way economics are as rigorous and unambiguous as those of the other two ideologies. From them all the necessary secondary consequences and applications can be naturally and organically derived.

The economic tendency of the "third way", the principle of "autarky of large spaces" presupposes the maximum volume of the nation-state formation where this model is applied. List insisted on the impossibility of realising these theories in states with insufficient demographic, resource, industrial

and demographic volume, since autarchy would then be a mere fiction. On this basis he once put forward the imperative of "Zollverein", "customs integration", which was intended to unite Germany, Prussia and Austria into a single industrial-financial bloc, since only in such a space could one speak of effective competition with the developed colonial powers of the time - England and France.

At the present stage, the benchmark of a sovereign state is the United States and that political-economic space which is part of the Monroe Doctrine, i.e. the continental totality of North and South America, controlled by the United States. Obviously, only its continental counterpart in Eurasia can fully compete with such a transatlantic "big space" today. Consequently, the economy of the "third way" already in its theory assumes geopolitical integration, in which the subject is not a "nation-state", but a modern analogue of the Empire. Otherwise there will be either an overstretching of the nation's forces (the reason for the collapse of the USSR), or a falling into dependence on a more powerful and independent neighbour (Europe, Japan, etc.). Such a consideration shows that despite the logic and self-sufficiency of this theory, the success of its implementation directly depends on a more general geopolitical project, i.e. the beginning of the creation of a New Empire. Only on such a scale and to such an extent will the "third way" in the economy yield maximum results. In addition, the promotion of such an economic model would be the best theoretical denominator for all potential members of the continental block, since even liberal authors (for example, Michel Albert in his book "Capitalism vs. Capitalism") emphasize the fundamental difference between the "Rhenish-Nippon" model (which has many features of a "third way" economy) and the Anglo-Saxon model. If Russia were to choose this path, the Eurasian chain would be closed in the most natural way. In this case, it will be possible to put forward a new version of Zollverein, corresponding to the current geopolitical conditions - a project of "Eurasian customs integration", which only today can seriously compete with the Atlanticist bloc and lead the peoples of Eurasia to prosperity.

8.2 Economic regionalism

The Soviet economy was based on the principle of centralism. The highest authority for all important, less important and totally unimportant decisions was in Moscow, from where the regulations and directives came. This centralism made the economy sluggish, prevented the development of regional initiatives and inhibited the natural growth of regional economic potential. Furthermore, the Soviet economy was developing a standard pattern of industrial and financial arrangements, with little regard for the regional, ethnic or cultural specificities of the different regions or districts. This rigid system was one of the reasons for the backwardness and economic collapse of Sovietism. ”,

The Liberals, who replaced the Communists, despite their theoretical projects, essentially retained the old state of affairs, only that henceforth centralism was market rather than planned. But as before, major economic decisions were made centrally, and the main economic routes went through Moscow, where the liberal government tightly controlled the overall course of reform in the regions. One form of abstract reproduction of a set pattern everywhere has been replaced by another form, but the principle of centralism in the economic structure has remained the same. Incidentally, much of the failure of market reforms is due to this inertial centralism, with Moscow government officials seeking to tightly control the economic development of the regions.

A sober analysis of this state of affairs and a comparison of the Russian“ situation with the most developed economic systems (primarily those of the Rhenish-Nippon type) leads to the conclusion that a radical departure from this economic approach is needed and that J should turn to an economic model built on a purely regional, regional, local basis. The economic interconnection of all regions of the USSR was an artificially created construct. This interconnection, which was based more on the planning and revolutionary methods than on the principles of maximum efficiency, often hindered the autonomous development of the regional economy. A plan

made absolute has also played its part. With the breakdown of this general network and the coming to power of the liberals, many industrial sectors were left to themselves and doomed to degradation and extinction, and the whole emphasis was placed on the priority development of resource sectors, whose products could be immediately sold abroad. And Western goods, obtained by the monopolistic pseudo-market structures of the liberals in Moscow, were again distributed centrally to the regions. Thus the regional economy suffered even more and its dependence on the centre paradoxically increased with the departure of the communists.

The implementation of plans for a "third way economy" should be based on entirely different methods. Centralism here should be primarily *strategic and political*, but by no means *economic*, as the Empire can achieve maximum economic effect only when all its components have economic autonomy and develop in the freest and most natural way possible. Just as in the context of the continental project as a whole, each part of it should strive to be as independent and self-sufficient as possible at its level, so within Russia, one should create an extremely flexible regional economy built not on the interests of the centre or planned requirements, but on the maximum organic development of those economic potencies that best suit the region in question. Of course, the strategic aspects of the economy - resources, strategic raw materials, the military-industrial complex - should be centrally guided, but in other industries, as well as in matters of financing, the regions should be given the maximum degree of freedom.

Based on the cultural, ethnic, religious, geographical, climatic, etc. conditions of a particular region, not only the economic or industrial orientation, but also the *economic order* itself should be extremely differentiated. Even to the extent that areas with *different* economic orders, ranging from maximum-market to almost communist, may emerge within the empire. Those nations which reject the banking system (Muslims) have to construct their own financial models, which exclude interest-bearing financing of industry, while in other regions banks may develop and flourish. The most important thing in this project is to reach a point where each region or

province is self-sufficient in meeting the most urgent needs of its inhabitants - housing, food, clothing and health being the most important. We must first achieve regional autonomy in providing the necessities of life and only then build projects for the improvement of living standards, technology, technical and industrial development. Every region must have a resilient and flexible system of self-sufficiency so that at any time and under any circumstances and in any crisis, it can guarantee a decent minimum for the whole population, independent of interregional relations or the economic situation in the centre.

The strategic global dimension of the economy must be considered in total isolation from the regional structures working for the self-sufficiency of the population. The state of this population should by no means depend on the priority development of one or another strategic sector in a given region. In other words, the principle "the necessary minimum of life is always available regardless of anything" should be observed, and the region's concentration on one or another strategic global industry can only take place while controlling the preservation of independent economic structures, which are in no way in contact with this industry. In this case, reprofiling this or that type of production, abandonment of obsolete or inefficient industries, territorial relocation of enterprises or reorientation to import that is profitable in all respects will have no impact on the overall standard of living of the region, which will be initially and fundamentally guaranteed.

Only strategic production and planning will remain the responsibility of the centre, and will be realised not as an economic axis but as an overlay of some kind of global superstructure on an already existing autonomous regional economic network, without the two areas having any influence whatsoever on one another. Housing, social security or food supply can in no way be dependent on the economic efficiency of an industrial or strategic enterprise located in a given area (as is the case at present). The economic self-sufficiency of the individual regions, down to the smallest ones, must be such that all the most urgent economic problems can be solved independently of the participation of the population in strategic production. This

principle should be the dominant one in strategic planning, which will inevitably exist at state level, even in the context of the broadest economic freedom.

Regionalism should also be projected onto the financial system, taking, for example, the experience of regional and state banks in Germany, where small financial structures, often limited to one or a few villages, demonstrate a miracle of efficiency in farm development, because of the ease with which loans can be controlled (making fiscal management unnecessary) and the volume of loans, interest and repayment periods are determined by specific organic community conditions and represent not a quantitative, abstract, mechanical element but a vital, ethical one. On the whole, a regional financial system can take the most original form, adapting itself to the logic of the ethno-cultural and geographic landscape. The most important thing is to avoid centralisation of capital, to disperse it as far as possible to autonomous regional financial structures, to make it serve the economy and not vice versa, to make the economy dependent on it.

It is even possible to introduce two parallel and non-overlapping financial systems, two "currencies": one for the strategic imperial sphere and the other for regional needs. In the first case there will be strict state planning based on specific principles of financing and production, in the other there will be a regional market and a regional financial fund. Public capital and regional capital. Private property must be an atomic component of precisely regional, regional capital, while *public capital must in principle have no common measure with private property*. Only then will a strict distinction be drawn between state, public and private, and hence the stability, flexibility of the internal structure and autarchy of the Empire will be maximised.

The economy as a whole must be guided by a basic principle - the ultimate in strategic centralism plus the ultimate in regional pluralism and "liberalism".

Chapter 9 Conclusion

The attempt to outline the continental project, to highlight the most global and pivotal points of Eurasian geopolitics for Russia and the Russian people, certainly needs a very thorough development, which will require tremendous work to clarify, argue, illustrate various points and aspects of this topic. For us, however, it was extremely important to present the most approximate version of the only model of the geopolitical future of the Russian people, which on the other side of the known dead ends could bring it to the planetary and civilizational level, corresponding to its mission, its national, spiritual and religious claims. Much in this project may seem new, unusual, unfamiliar, even shocking. But the need to touch on all crucial aspects of the nation's future has forced us to disregard explanations, rebuttals of possible criticism, to avoid long quotations, enumerations of names and columns of figures. All this will be done as necessary. For now, the most important thing is to point out the general contours of the *"third way"*, the only way that can lead our great nation and our great state out of the abyss of chaos and fall to the shining heights of Russian Heaven.

PART 5 RUSSIA'S INTERNAL GEOPOLITICS

Chapter 1

Subject and method

1.1 Russia's domestic geopolitics depends on its planetary function

A geopolitical analysis of Russia's domestic geopolitical problems cannot be carried out without taking into account the more general, global picture of Russia's place in the geopolitical ensemble. It is only by keeping Russia's planetary role and significance in mind at all times that its internal geopolitical structure can be effectively and coherently parsed and described. Unlike the European school of "internal geopolitics" (Yves Lacoste, etc.), which tends to isolate local and regional problems from consideration of the disposition of forces on a planetary scale, in Russia's case one cannot abstract from its global significance, and hence all of its private, internal problems are adequately formulated (let alone addressed) only within a more general, integral geopolitical framework.

Russia is not just one of the mainland countries. It is a category belonging to the basic principles of all geopolitics. Russia is the "geographical axis of history", the Land. Russia is Eurasia. This meaning does not depend on blocs, ideology, political orientation, regime specificity: continentality is its historical, geographical and geopolitical destiny. In the case of Russia, there can be no question of choosing between "Atlanticism" and "Eurasianism". It is a Eurasian power and cannot help being one. The refusal of Russia to fulfill its role in the ensemble of the planet is possible only in the case of

its complete *geographical* destruction, because if the Russian state refuses to fulfill this mission while preserving the Eurasian continental mass, sooner or later a new political entity will emerge within the same boundaries, which will take over the function of "geographical axis of history". As long as Russia exists, it remains the axis of the Eurasian vector on a planetary scale.

This nature predetermines the angle of consideration of its internal geopolitical problems. These problems stand only in the following vein: *how and on what natural (or artificial) prerequisites to maintain the maximum geopolitical volume of Russia, to increase it if possible, distributing all internal geopolitical factors so as to best ensure the possibility of a planetary geopolitical expansion?*

This formulation of the problem already puts the conditions of analysis in themselves to be emphasised and prioritised:

- 1) The potential for centripetal tendencies of regions;
- 2) The possibilities of extending the spatial influence of the centre to the periphery and beyond.

This implies a clear delineation of the two basic criteria of the concepts of geopolitical centre and geopolitical periphery. The relations between them constitute the essence of the study of Russia's internal geopolitics.

1.2 Domestic geopolitics and military doctrine

The military-industrial complex plays an enormous role in the geopolitical organization of Russian spaces, since in many (especially sparsely populated) territories it is to military towns and bases that civilian settlements are attached. It is also associated with the location of the most important centres of industry, also associated with the needs of the so-called "defense industry. Russia's entire geopolitical configuration depends on the model of military doctrine.

This military doctrine, in turn, has two components. The political orientation of the leadership (which may change depending on domestic and foreign political factors) and the geopolitical constants that set the framework within which political variations are possible. This second component (Russia's geopolitical position) unequivocally affirms the continental importance of the Russian Armed Forces and the orientation that Russia's main "potential adversary" is the Atlanticist bloc. This automatically entails a continental orientation of the entire military doctrine, the unconditional priority of strategic weapons, and a focus on a global conflict on a planetary scale. In this case, it is completely irrelevant what the political design of the regime will be. The geopolitical confrontation will not necessarily be duplicated by an ideological confrontation. It depends on the specific situation and can influence the verbalization of the political course, mitigating or, on the contrary, accentuating the geopolitical confrontation that persists under any circumstances. Without claiming a final formula of military doctrine, geopolitics sets its limits, violation of which immediately entails a total socio-political crisis and territorial disintegration of the state.

Even in the case of a full ideological understanding of Atlanticism, Russia's military doctrine should still define the United States and the Western camp as potential number one enemy, and base the entire structure of the armed forces only on this principle. This, in turn, will affect the overall structure of Russia's domestic geopolitics in a broader sense.

Russia's military doctrine should be absolutely Eurasian. Only in this case, and from this perspective, can Russia's internal geopolitics be analyzed responsibly and priority vectors of development be outlined. Without this, any analysis will only predict a catastrophic degradation of the Russian regions, a territorial disintegration, a chain reaction of destruction and geopolitical self-liquidation. Theoretically, such a turn of events cannot be ruled out, and the modern "military doctrine" of the Russian Federation, which does not mention the US and NATO bloc among "potential adversaries", but includes them among potential geopolitical allies of Russia in the Eurasian bloc, gives many reasons for this. However, from a more general historical

and geographical perspective, this condition should be seen as a 'temporary anomaly' that will soon be eliminated under any political regime as the excesses of a difficult transition period. It is possible to describe a scenario of "geopolitics of catastrophes", which would highlight the phases of disintegration of the "geographical axis of history". But such a position should be of more interest to the Atlantic camp, and so it is only natural that such models are studied by the geopoliticians of the thalassocratic powers. Russian geopolitics, which cannot but be Eurasian, should, accordingly, be guided by a positive perspective, analyzing the current and future situation, based on the normal historical and geopolitical laws of continental and civilizational dualism development. And in this case, one should make the assumption (even if it is not yet the case at the moment) that Russia's "military doctrine" corresponds to a general continental logic and is based on strict geopolitical constants.

This should be borne in mind in the remainder of the presentation.

1.3 Centre and periphery

The historical centre of the heartland is not a constant geographical value. The present-day capital of Russia, Moscow, inherits simultaneously the line of Slavic capitals (Kiev, Vladimir) and the line of Chingiz's steppe stakes. As a geopolitical synthesis of the Forest and the Steppe, Russia has two historical and geopolitical traditions at once, the totality of which underlies the peculiarity of the Russian way.

The Petersburg period was also fraught with territorial expansion, although St Petersburg's Baltic location embodies the state's European orientation, "geopolitical Westernism". In the St Petersburg period, the territorial expansion of the Russians was less organic and more artificial than before. The nature of the synthesis was less obvious, although many Eurasian peoples of Asia and Siberia accepted the authority of the "white tsar" on the basis of ancient continental traditions.

Moscow is geographically best suited to Russia's Eurasian mission. It is equidistant from all the main geographical zones that make up the peculiarity of the Russian landscape. The distances to the polar north, the Eastern European west, the steppe and subtropical south and the taiga east are approximately equal. It should therefore be considered the "normal" (from a geopolitical point of view) Eurasian capital, the continental centre. In this respect, the current state of affairs largely coincides with geopolitical constants. Moscow is the natural capital of the heartland.

A cursory cartographic analysis of Russia, however, immediately reveals a certain asymmetry in this position. The fact is that beyond the Urals (which is, however, no natural intra-Russian border due to the low altitude of the mountains and the homogeneity of the climate on both sides of the ridge) a rather homogeneous taiga zone extends thousands of kilometres into Siberia, thus making Moscow the centre of only "European Russia". This purely quantitative view is counterbalanced, however, by other geopolitical considerations.

Firstly, Siberia does not represent the climatic and topographic structural diversity that characterises pre-Ural Russia. From this point of view, all this gigantic space is only a disproportionate extension of the eastern landscape, the scale of which far exceeds the zonal picture of Russia proper. Thus, in a landscape sense, the gigantic spatial volume is reduced to a limited climatic quality.

Secondly, there is exactly the same disparity at the demographic level. Beyond the Ural Mountains, the same number of people live as in each of the distinctive landscape zones of European Russia.

Thirdly, the development of this region in terms of communications, cities, communications, etc. is also incommensurate with its spatial volume.

In the current situation, therefore, Siberia's geopolitical role cannot be seen in proportion to its space. It is a special, 'reserve space' that represents the last 'undeveloped' part of the Eurasian continent.

Thus, given the special quality of Siberia, Moscow is indeed identified with the geopolitical centre of the “geographical axis of history”. Note: it is the undeveloped nature of Siberia (especially Eastern Siberia) that led Mackinder in his later works to include “Lenaland”, i.e. the space lying to the east of the Lena River, in a special geopolitical entity, not belonging, strictly speaking, to heartland.

But already Spengler had noted the point that Siberia represented a geographical space whose role might gradually become clearer and prove decisive in the historical process. He foresaw that it was from Siberia that a special and unique culture could develop, which would put an end to the “decline of the West” and its “Faustian” civilisation. The same idea was supported by the Russian “Asians”, an extreme offshoot of the Eurasians, who believed that the East (Asia) was more important than not only the West, but also Eurasia itself (in particular, V. Ivanov and some “Tychoceanists”, Pazifiker, Kurt von Beckman of the Haushof school, etc., believed this). Thus, in the distant future, which assumes a change in the demographic and informational development of Siberia and its equation with the rest of the Russian (or European) regions, one can assume that the geographical position of Moscow will lose its centrality, and the geopolitical centre of Eurasia will shift to the east.

But at the moment it should only be considered as a futurological perspective. (More on this in the chapter on the Russian East).

Rays can be drawn from the centre (Moscow) to the various regions of Russia’s peripheral lands. These rays are not segments, as their length is not fixed. Centrifugal and centripetal forces affect the regions with variable magnitude, depending on many historical factors. Moreover, the physical distances from the geopolitical centre (Moscow) do not always correspond to “geopolitical distances”. These distances depend not only on the quantitative but also on the qualitative side of the links, on the independence of regional entities, their form, and their cultural and ethnic specificity.

It is possible to reduce all these rays converging towards the centre to four

main categories or “inner axes”:

1) Moscow-East

2) Moscow-West

3) Moscow-North

4) Moscow-South

On the other hand, the corresponding peripheral spaces represent “zones” or “strips”, each of which has specific characteristics and a particular structure. These strips can be called, respectively, “Russian East,” “Russian West,” “Russian North” and “Russian South. The definition of “Russian” in this case has not an ethnic meaning, but a geopolitical one, emphasizing the connection of the region with the central “continental axis” of Moscow.

The main focus of Russia’s “internal geopolitics” will be to clarify the geopolitical structure of these four “peripheral zones” and the quality and nature of the “rays” linking them to the centre. The structure of the zones will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. The nature of the rays, in the most general terms, can be considered now.

1.4 Internal axes (‘geopolitical rays’)

Four geopolitical rays link Moscow to the periphery of “Russian space”. These rays are of varying quality.

They can be divided into two pairs of rays Moscow West and Moscow South, on the one hand, and rays Moscow East and Moscow North, on the other.

The first two rays are, geopolitically speaking, “unfinished“, “open“. They are rooted in a complex geopolitical system of considerable territorial volume, which separates the continental mass of Russia from the ideal shoreline boundary. Russia’s southern and western borders, from a geopolitical point

of view, are broad belts separating the central part from the coastline. In this respect, these two beams represent the most vulnerable directions for Russia, and the whole geopolitical dynamic along these axes is extremely tense, complex, with many levels and dimensions.

The Moscow West and Moscow South axes combine both internal and external political aspects, as here the regions of Russia-Eurasia proper flow seamlessly into zones under the control of other states, and some of these states belong to the opposite planetary bloc, the Thalassocratic camp.

The second two rays: the Moscow North and Moscow East axes differ sharply from the first pair. Here the Russian border coincides with the coastline, there are no "clutch states", and therefore the political dynamics in these directions are exhausted by domestic political themes. In the North and East Russia has complete geopolitical borders. And the main task in this case is to maintain the status quo.

Moreover, the North and East, precisely because of their oceanic borders, are reserve and well-protected rear areas on the "geographical axis of history", where additional spatial platforms for geopolitical and strategic restructuring can always be created at critical moments.

The difference between the axes "West" and "South" and the axes "North" and "East" is not the result of historical coincidence. The geographical landscape itself, and later the ethnic and cultural map of the respective regions, represents a matrix that was filled with specific state content as political history unfolded. On the western and southern fringes of Russia and on the adjacent territories of neighbouring countries, developed blossoms of cultures, states and ethnic groups, with their own political and spiritual traditions, statehood, etc. This is a zone, one side of which is part of the rimland. The objective and artificial prerequisites for "separatism" are actively developed here, which, in turn, is identified with the Thalassocratic strategy on a planetary scale.

By contrast, Russia's North and East are extremely landscape homogeneous,

and not densely populated by peoples who do not have developed political and state traditions or have long lost the historical initiative of empire-building (for example, the Altai Turks, the Buryats, etc.). Here Moscow has free access to the seas, but the quality of the seas is the same. They are poorly navigable, cold, covered by ice for a considerable part of the year, detached from the central part due to poor communications, and their ports are underdeveloped. Certain strategic advantages are offset by corresponding disadvantages.

The two pairs of rays give full geopolitical symmetry. The length of Russia's northern and eastern shores is paired with demographic rarefaction and communication underdevelopment. The western and southern borders are landlocked, densely populated, landscape-diverse, and represent voluminous swaths of considerable area.

The geopolitical relationship between the centre and the periphery in Russia is thus divided into two kinds of purely internal axes with oceanic linear borders (North, East) and semi-internal axes with land borders of "strip" ("zonal") quality (West, South). The "South and West" dynamic implies entry into the sphere of international relations, diplomacy, etc. The "North and East" dynamic is limited to domestic political issues. However, a purely geopolitical approach makes this picture somewhat relative. Where there is an "independent" state at the moment, the geopolitician sees a "future province", and vice versa, the coastal part of one state's territory may at some point become the coastal bridgehead of an alternative geopolitical power (i.e. a new "sovereign" state).

Rays coming from the centre to the periphery, "continental expansionary impulses", are constantly confronted with opposing power pressures. The Atlantic bloc seeks to limit Moscow's centrifugal energy by exploiting the "separatist" tendencies of peripheral nations or neighbouring states, while basing itself on those coastal zones that are already under the assured control of thalassocracy. In the South and in the West, this opposition is quite discernible in concrete political reality. In the North and East the opposition is less obvious and visible. Nevertheless, it exists in the form of a strategic

Atlanticist military presence in the oceanic coastal zone (especially nuclear submarines), and in certain critical periods it may take the form of direct political interference in internal Russian affairs and support (or provocation) of separatist sentiments among ethnic and cultural minorities.

Chapter 2

The road to the north

2.1 Analysis model

The geopolitical ray Moscow North is in great approximation broken up into a spectrum of rays diverging from a single centre along the entire length of the Arctic Ocean coastline. We thus obtain a complicated model in which three problems arise:

- 1) the ratio of sectors of the North to each other;**
- 2) their relation to the centre (Moscow);**
- 3) Relation to other areas of Russian space (South, East, West)**

Geopolitical analysis is fragmented into several sectors and issues at once. In doing so, the main challenge is to ensure that, while taking into account regional specificities and details where possible, the overall complex of "internal Russian geopolitics" and the even broader planetary context are not lost sight of.

The Centre's geopolitical imperative for the North is to strengthen its strategic control over these areas as much as possible. Given the sparseness of the territories beyond the Arctic Circle and the lack of developed political and state traditions of the ethnic groups living there, the cultural and political aspects here recede into the background. Military control of the

coast (military, air and naval bases), information links, energy supply and food and housing provision become the most important aspects.

2.2 The geopolitical nature of the Russian Arctic

The climatic character of the northern territories implies a point settlement, not a "strip settlement". Hence, the role of centres becomes more important and becomes, to some extent, equivalent to what in other areas is defined as "territory". This identity of "centre" and "territory" in the North is maximal, since the intermediate spaces are not just uninhabitable, but deadly tundra, cold, lack of settlements, roads, etc.

Thus, geopolitically, the North is a system of points located in the Arctic zone, a constellation of discrete settlements scattered over a rather homogeneous (climatically and topographically) space. The vast majority of the northern lands are tundra, i.e. a northern desert with sparse vegetation (lichens). This is a permafrost zone.

The character of the northern space is in some respects similar to that of the "water element". In it, boundaries between territories have little or no serious significance, as control over one land or another provides no particular advantage. Given the sparseness of settlement, the question of "nomadic competition" among reindeer herding peoples is also automatically removed.

The population of the North represents the diversity of the oldest Eurasian ethnic groups that have inhabited these territories for millennia without any particular cultural, migratory or ethnic dynamics. Interestingly enough, it is in the north of Russia's western borderland that the division along ethnic lines also takes place: Northern Europe - Scandinavia, Germany, Denmark up to England, Ireland and Iceland are inhabited by "developed" peoples of Indo-European origin (young ethnic groups); while from Finland and Karelia up to Chukotka the Russian North is populated by ethnic groups which are much older and archaic than those of the European North (Ugric, archaic

Turks and Paleo-Asians - Chukchi, Eskimos, etc.)..). Moreover, as one moves eastward along the Arctic Ocean coast, the archaic nature of the ethnic groups increases. Younger Indo-Europeans (or Turks), moving dynamically in the most inhabited parts of Eurasia, were "shifting" autochthons to the north in waves.

From west to east: after the Karelians and Finns (still quite actively involved in modern history, though in a secondary role), the more archaic Nenets and Komi, then the Khanty and Mansi, the Dolgans, the Evenks, and then the Chukchi and Eskimos. A huge sector of Eastern Siberia is occupied by Yakutia (Sakha), but the Yakuts proper (one of the branches of the Turks) live much further south than the Arctic Circle, and the north itself is almost uninhabited.

From the Ugrians to the Eskimos, the space of the Russian North shows us historical time slices of civilisation.

The concept of the "Russian North" is a trapezoid, repeating the outlines of Eurasia as a whole. It narrows to the west and widens to the east. On the Russian-Finnish border this territory covers about 10 degrees along the meridian, and Chukotka and Kamchatka already cover 20 degrees. But this spatial expansion has little effect on the geopolitical character of the territory; both in terms of demographics, degree of development, quality of communications and frequency of settlement, this geographically expanding trapezoid to the east gives a mirror image, as the "narrow" western flank of the northern sector is more developed and populated than the opposite eastern flank.

If Siberia is the geopolitical "reserve" of Russia, then the North, and especially the Siberian North, is the "reserve" of Siberia itself, being the most remote region of Eurasia from civilization. It is an icy unexplored land, formally described in maps, but representing no historical marker, with no global cultural dimension (at least within the foreseeable historical limits of the past available for study). This situation contrasts strangely with the role that "north" plays in the mythologies of many peoples. There,

it is given the quality of a "great ancestral home", a "promised land" and an "ancient paradise". At the present moment in history, it is rather the opposite - cold, unfriendly, hostile to people, an alienated space with rare inclusions of artificial pockets of civilisation.

2.3 North + North

Administratively, most of the northern lands are autonomous districts of the Russian Federation, except Karelia, Komi and Yakutia, which have a more independent political status (republics). Politically, the regions are located as follows (from west to east): Karelia, north of Murmansk Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Komi Republic and the Nenets Autonomous Area, Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Area, Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets Autonomous Area), northern sectors of Yakutia, Chukotka Autonomous Area, Magadan Krai, Koryak Autonomous Area and Kamchatka.

The similarity of the geopolitical quality of all these territories is reason enough for them to form some kind of territorial and strategic bloc based on certain integration structures. All these areas face typologically similar problems; their development follows similar trajectories. This natural similarity, so prominent even in the most cursory geopolitical analysis, shows the need for a certain consolidation. This consolidation, a kind of "Arctic Land pact," can have several levels, from spiritual and cultural to practical and economic.

The general directions of such a block can be outlined from the outset.

Its cultural basis could be a purely Eurasian theory of rethinking traditional civilization as a positive model of social structure that has preserved the memory of cosmic proportions. This means that the archaism of the peoples of the North (underdevelopment, backwardness, primitiveness, etc.), is not a minus, but a spiritual plus. Ancient ethnic groups are not only not subject to "re-education" and inclusion in "modern civilization", but, on the contrary,

they need to ensure that the conditions of their existence correspond to their traditions as much as possible. Moreover, the concern for these traditions should partly be transferred to the state, which seeks to ensure its strategic control over these lands.

In parallel, the "mythological" aspect of the North as the most ancient homeland of mankind should be taken into account, and the project of the "spiritual revival of the North" would then acquire a worthy historical scale. At the same time the emphasis should be placed on the seasonal specifics of the Arctic year - the polar day and the polar night, which were considered by Hindus and ancient Persians to be "the twenty-four hours of the gods". Existence in the Arctic conditions (common to the entire Eurasian North) returns the human being to the conditions of a special cosmic rhythm. Hence the spiritual and therapeutic value of the Arctic zones.

At the material level and especially in relation to the living conditions of migrants from the South, i.e. the majority of Russians, it is necessary to unite the efforts of all Northern centres in developing optimal models of cities and settlements with regard to climatic specifics. In this aspect, it is necessary to use the latest technologies of unconventional energy sources (solar energy, wind farms, etc.), construction know-how for permafrost, communication and transport systems, development of interregional aviation, etc. The initial project must be that of general Arctic development, working out a single and most effective formula that would allow for the modernisation of settlements in the shortest possible time, to make their existence more dynamic and interconnected.

Given the importance of this problem, it would be logical to leave the solution to the Arctic regions themselves, ensuring state support for the whole project from the centre. It is up to the northerners themselves to work out the 'Arctic formula'.

Since the North is Russia's geopolitical "reserve of reserves", its regions should be prepared for possible active migration from the South. This applies to the other side of the problem of a new settlement in the North.

Sooner or later, taking into account demographic processes, it will become necessary, and it is better to start creating structural preconditions for it already now.

The military aspect is particularly noteworthy. The North is a huge strategic military zone of Russia, an important security belt. Many missile bases and strategic air bases are concentrated here; Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are the largest naval bases in Russia. This situation is not an arbitrary consequence of the ideological confrontation between the two camps during the Cold War. The strategic importance of the North in the military sense remains for Russia in any case, since it is a matter of respecting the interests of Eurasia, the heartland. The meaning of Russia's military presence in the North stems from the continental nature of the Russian military structure and the natural awareness of itself as a continental camp, opposing the "forces of the sea". The main purpose of these military installations is to protect the coastal zone from possible maritime and airborne incursions, and to provide a nuclear strike against the American continent via the North Pole should the need arise. It is the shortest distance from Russia to US territory. For the same reason, this territory is a priority area for missile defence development.

At present the North accounts for a huge percentage of Russia's total industrial output. This does not take into account its central importance in the military-industrial complex. Many natural resources such as salt, nickel, etc. are mined predominantly in the circumpolar areas. But there is a huge gap between such industrial development in the North and the lagging behind in other areas of development. The geopolitical logic requires an active equalization of the situation. And it would be most convenient to do it in the framework of the "Arctic Pact". In this case, it would be necessary to designate the capital (or several capitals) of the North, where the intellectual and technological potential would be concentrated, and where the main economic, financial and engineering levers would be concentrated. This would give the North considerable independence from the centre, freedom from control in detail, reserves for flexible regional development and

rapid industrial and economic response.

On all these levels the need to integrate the North is clear. This is important spiritually, ethnically, culturally, militarily, strategically, industrially, socially and financially. The result of such a multi-level integration (so far only a potential one) would be the creation of an entirely new geopolitical reality, in which a significant increase in autonomy and regional autonomy would not weaken the strategic connection to the centre. The development of the North would be the way to the future, a springboard for an entirely new (geopolitically based) understanding of space in the long term.

The Northern Earth would be transformed from a barren desert back into a polar paradise, reinforcing the continent's planetary weight and creating a model of society for a "Eurasian future" based on a combination of tradition and development, loyalty to roots and technological modernisation.

2.4 North + Centre

The first approach to the geopolitical analysis of the North (North + North) is based on the separation of the "polar trapezoid" into a single coherent region, which can be considered as an independent spatial figure. Such a vision of the North makes it possible to elaborate the most flexible model of its development, since the most stable geopolitical construction is the one that consists of self-sufficient autarky-autonomous (in a limited sense) elements. But even such relative autarchy requires a certain territorial scale. The "trapezium" of the Russian North meets all the necessary conditions to fold into an independent intra-Russian "big space". Moreover, such integrative autonomy can largely compensate for the inevitable strategic centralism for the state.

The second geopolitical approach is to analyse the systemic functioning of the Centre-North axis. This axis was, and in many respects still is, the only and main one in the administrative organization of the Northern territories.

The individual regions and centres of the North were directly subordinated to Moscow, which controlled all the main vectors of development of these territories. Such unambiguous centralism did not allow for the most effective development of the internal geopolitical potencies of the North, knowingly made the specialization of the regions lopsided and focused on the scale of the whole country. This allowed the regime of strict centralism to be maintained, but significantly hampered the uncovering of internal opportunities.

Geopolitical logic suggests that the question of the relation between Centre and Periphery (and in our particular case, Moscow North) should be deliberately divided into two components:

- 1) Strict centralism in macro policy and strategic subordination;
- 2) maximum domestic liberation through maximum cultural and economic autonomy.

In other terms: strategic centralism + cultural-economic regionalism.

In order to work out the most effective model for this geopolitical distribution of roles, the question again arises of a 'capital of the North' that could act as an intermediate point between the centre and all the regions. All military connections from bases, military units, ports, etc. would converge to this point. In addition, there could be a "government of the North", a flexible instance of political coordination of all parts of the "polar trapezoid", reporting directly to Moscow, but acting on behalf of the entire North. This could be a "parliament of the peoples of the North" and the relevant executive structures. Most importantly, the military leadership should be harmoniously matched with regional representatives because the centralist character of strategic control is matched with a regional expression of the will of the Northern states. The tandem of a military representative of Moscow with a civilian representative of the "peoples of the North" in such a geopolitical capital could be an ideal prototype of the most effective and operative, flexible, yet firmly connected with the centre organization of the whole Eurasian space. At the same time, interethnic and cultural friction

between the peoples of the North in such an integration process would be minimal for historical and geographical reasons of fragmented and mosaic settlement and small number of ethnic groups.

It is in the North that this model of space reorganization based on purely geopolitical prerequisites should be tested. In this case, all the conditions for such a project are in place: all regions of the North belong to Russia, territorial and demographic dislocation, the urgent need for restructuring of industrial and economic systems, some of which fell out of the general system of national "labor distribution", demographic crisis, critical situation with the peoples of the North, decay of energy supply systems and communications, the necessary reform of the military, etc.

Moscow's relationship with the North is directly related to the overall integration of the northern regions into a single block for another reason as well. Russia has a latitudinal geographical structure, it stretches along a parallel. The major trends in its development have had a latitudinal dynamic. The Russian state was built on the integration of spaces along the latitudes. For this reason, the main communications and communication systems within Russia were formed in accordance with this model. The latitudinal process was particularly evident in the development of Siberia and the "breakthrough to the Ocean". Therefore, the sustainability of Russia's internal structure directly depends on the completeness and dynamics of latitudinal integration. If we take Russia as a whole, its continental strategic completeness requires development along the North-South axis. This applies primarily to expansion beyond its borders, since any geopolitical organization of space along the vertical axis gives a maximum degree of strategic autarchy. But within Russia itself, such complete autarky is totally inadvisable. Here, on the contrary, one should insist on maximum strategic centralism, on the interconnection of regional spaces with the Center. Therefore, one can formulate a geopolitical law: *inside Russia, the priority is the West-East integration axis; outside Russia, the North-South axis. (In a more nuanced way this law is formulated as follows: the spaces tightly ethnically and politically controlled by Russia and Russians require lat-*

itudinal integration, whereas the inner Russian lands compactly populated by other ethnic groups with a historically fixed tradition of political separatism, on the contrary, require integration along the meridian lines.) Dynamics along the meridian makes a political entity independent from its neighbours on the left and right. This is necessary for the country as a whole but unnecessary for individual sectors of the country. In contrast, the dynamics along the parallel rigidly links the centre with the periphery; this is useful for the internal political organisation of the state, but leads to conflicts and imbalances at the interstate level.

Based on this pattern, we should insist on latitudinal integration of the Northern regions, taking into account their belonging to a single climatic and terrain zone, rather than purely geographical (and even in some cases ethnic) proximity to other (southern, eastern or western) regions. The broad unification of the North will contribute to its cultural and economic development, but will prevent the creation of prerequisites for potential political and strategic sovereignty. Only such a structure will solve the problems of the Periphery Centre in as positive a way as possible, from a geopolitical point of view.

2.5 The Finnish question

The only international problem related to the Russian North is that of Karelia (and Finland). The Karelian ethnos is close to the Finnish ethnos and is linked to it by cultural and historical unity. Proceeding from the logic of latitudinal integration, the Karelian question seems, at first sight, to be an anomaly. Two approaches are possible here.

The first is to absolutize the Karelian-Finnish border geopolitically and suggest that the Karelian Republic should integrate along the North-South axis with the native Russian regions around Lake Onega and Ladoga. Such a development vector is unnatural and should be resorted to only in the worst case, as an artificial break in ethnic unity along the administrative line of

a purely political border will never give geopolitical stability to the region. The matter is aggravated by the fact that the Karelian-Finnish border is an easily traversed forest and swampy terrain and has a huge length; it is extremely difficult, cumbersome and expensive to securely protect such a border.

The second approach is to create a Karelian-Finnish geopolitical zone, culturally and partly economically unified, but representing a strategic pillar of the Eurasian centre. In European languages, there is the term "Finlandisation", which emerged during the Cold War. It refers to a nominally neutral state, with a capitalist economy but strategically inclined towards the USSR, i.e. the heartland. Finland as a state is a highly unstable and far from autarkic entity, naturally and historically a part of the geopolitical space of Russia. This has manifested itself at various points in its history. The centre could have opted for extensive autonomy for the Karelian-Finnish union, the only conditions being strategic control of the Gulf of Bothnia and the deployment of the Eurasian border troops on the Finnish-Swedish and Finnish-Norwegian border. The length of the border would be halved, given that the Finnish-Swedish and Finnish-Norwegian borders are much less homogeneous and easy to traverse than the Finnish-Finnish one. In addition, Russia would be able to control the Baltic from the North.

The second approach is preferable in all respects, and it is the tactic that should be used by the Continental Centre in all ethnically and culturally mixed zones on the borders of the state. A fractured ethnic unity automatically means an unstable border zone, an unstable border. The Atlanticist adversary will sooner or later try to take advantage of this fact to pursue ethnic integration for its own purposes, i.e. to strengthen its control over the rimland and weaken the heartland. The continental powers should therefore actively and offensively use similar tactics and not be afraid to cede cultural and even economic sovereignty to the frontier peoples in exchange for strategic presence and political allegiance.

When stable borders cannot be achieved through direct military or political expansion, an intermediate flexible option should be applied, which in

the anti-Eurasian sense is constantly and successfully used by Thalassocracy.

2.6 North and Non-North

The specifics of the geography of the Arctic coast of Russian Eurasia reduces the problem of correlation of the regions of the North with other regions to a more simplified formula North-South, as latitudinal problems (namely, with the West) arise only in the case of Karelia. The only exception is the problem of Yakutia, which stands apart here, as Yakutia has a tradition of political separatism, although extremely artificial, but still historically fixed. This aspect is reflected in Makinda's later classification of Eurasia, where he singled out "Lenaland," the "land of the Lena River," and Yakutia (Sakha) constitutes the axis of this region, stretching from the Laptev Sea to the Amur Region and the Altai Region to the south. But the case of Yakutia has to be considered specifically.

We will start with the western part of the 'northern trapezoid'. The Kola Peninsula, Murmansk and the Republic of Karelia stand out here. Together with Finland, all this constitutes a single geographical and geopolitical sector which could best be integrated into an autonomous and complete system in which the strategic priority and quality of the military decision-making centre would be the Murmansk region and Murmansk itself, while the Karelian-Finnish area would be granted broad cultural and economic sovereignty. In that case, the Murmansk Oblast could be enlarged to include the northern regions of Finland, Finnish Lapland. The balance between Murmansk (the strategic projection of Moscow) and the Karelian-Finnish space would be a concrete expression of the Eurasian arrangement of the continent, an example of the "new Finlandization" in the post-Cold War context.

Further southward movement of this block will be discussed in the chapter on the Russian West. It should be noted that in any case the fundamental strategic axis in this case will be that of Murmansk Moscow.

Next: the Arkhangelsk region. Here, we should make an exception to the general rule and stress the importance of integration not only along the latitude North-North, but also along the meridian. The point is that the Arkhangelsk Territory is located strictly above the Central European part of Russia, and, consequently, the very idea of the possible sovereignty of this vertical sector from the White Sea to the Black Sea in relation to Russia as a whole is excluded because this region is Russia proper. Therefore, Arkhangelsk and the Arkhangelsk region are in the strategic position that best fits the principle of strategic integration of the North in the interests of the centre. The Moscow-Arkhangelsk axis is the only one in the whole range of internal "geopolitical rays" that represents more than just a military-strategic construction. Here it is necessary to achieve maximum and diverse integration with the South, as far as Moscow, to try to create a smooth transition from the (relatively) densely populated areas of the Vologda region to the point settlements of the Pomorye. The migration of the Russian population to the North, its active development and transformation should begin with Arkhangelsk. This largest port is in the most advantageous position in comparison with all other settlements of the North, so it is logical to choose Arkhangelsk as the "capital of the Arctic pact". The development of the Moscow-Arkhangelsk axis should be comprehensive and a priority. The quality and dynamics of this only (of the entire North) meridian integration will determine the soundness and effectiveness of the entire "Arctic Pact".

To the east, the Northern Zone includes two administrative entities, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug and the Komi Republic. There is no contradiction in integrating these areas into one another, especially given the small population density of the Nenets Autonomous District. Its proximity to Arkhangelsk makes it an active and high-priority area for development as part of a common project. Of particular importance is the development of Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land. These Arctic lands are of enormous strategic importance in the context of intercontinental confrontation. They are the closest Russian territories to the Pole, and therefore to the United States, and are used as strategic military bases. As in the case of Karelia and Murmansk, the northernmost areas are predominantly controlled by the

military, while to the south the civil administration is more developed. The region as a whole is centred around Vorkuta, where the main communications and transport routes converge.

Vorkuta is a major industrial and strategic centre, which is also located close to the Yamal-Nenets Okrug, where there is no similarly sized centre. Consequently, Vorkuta could also control a gigantic area of the Kara Sea coast all the way to the mouth of the Yenisei and the Ob estuary basin. In this area, Yamal-Nenets Okrug is geographically close to Khanty-Mansiysk Okrug, and both are part of the same geopolitical sector.

It should be particularly emphasized that the southern boundary of the "Northern Trapezium" in the case of the Komi Republic has a very important geopolitical significance. In this case, the integration processes of this North Ural region with the rest of the Urals (and the northern Volga region) are not only inexpedient, but outright harmful, because to the southwest (beyond the Komi-Permyak District) is Tatarstan, where separatist tendencies have a long history. Being placed in the middle of the Russian lands, Tatarstan is not particularly dangerous, but in all similar cases the "separatist logic" forces to seek an exit to the seas or foreign territories, and any vertical integration processes in this case may sooner or later prove extremely dangerous. The opposite path should be taken here (rather than in the case of the Arkhangelsk Region) and an attempt should be made to detach the entire North Ural region and its neighbouring sectors to the east and west from the Volga and Urals as much as possible. In this case, the "northern trapezoid" should be strictly separated from the entire continental space to the south.

Even further east lie the lands of the Yenisey Basin, which fall administratively into the Taimyr and Evenk autonomous districts and the northern part of Krasnoyarsk Territory, the former Turukhan Territory. Norilsk stands out in this area, which can be defined as the centre for this entire gigantic region. In this case a meridian dynamic along the North-South axis is not excluded, because Southern Siberia from Omsk to Baikal is densely populated by Russians, and integration in this direction cannot pose any

particular danger. The whole block lies in the intermediate area, where the zone of more or less evenly settled territory ends and Mackinder's "Lenaland" proper, "no man's land", begins. This zone and all the more eastern territories are a giant continental wilderness, a lifeless tundra in the north and impenetrable taiga in the south. This is "potential space". From the south it is partly developed by both Russians and ancient Turkic-Mongolian peoples with a relatively developed political culture. But in the North itself it is "no man's land". This situation cannot be changed quickly and in one shot, and, consequently, this gigantic region with its centre in Norilsk will for some time continue to represent an "inner frontier" of continental Russia in the North-East and a strategic outpost of the Centre in the North. This logically leads to the necessity of special development of Norilsk, which has an extremely important geopolitical significance. It has the function of controlling Taimyr (and Severnaya Zemlya Island) in the north and the Yenisei basin in the south, and it is also the starting point for the Centre's less extensive, i.e. more pinpoint, narrowly focused control over the "far north-east" of Eurasia, over Lenaland.

Mackinder's Lenaland includes Yakutia, Chukotka, Kamchatka, Magadan Region, Khabarovsk Region, Amur Region and Primorsky Region, Sakhalin Island and the Kurils. The entire space is divided into two geopolitical areas - a fragment of the "northern trapezoid" on the one hand and South Yakutia, Primorye Territory and the southern half of Khabarovsk Territory on the other. The two spaces are qualitatively quite different. The southern part, especially the coastline of the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, is relatively densely populated, has ancient political traditions and is home to fairly active Eurasian ethnic groups. In terms of technical development and, at the same time, in climatic terms, this southern sector is an extension of southern Siberia.

The complete opposite is the northern part of Lenaland. It is the most undeveloped and 'wild' part of Eurasia, a gigantic inland layer, with rudimentary infrastructure and virtually no population. The only major centre of the entire region is Magadan, but it is a port, very loosely connected to the vast

inland expanses of Kolyma, Northern Yakutia. Anadyr in Chukotka is not a centre in the true sense of the word, nor is it connected to the continent. This sector is a separate continent, brilliantly protected by sea borders, with numerous minerals, but totally undeveloped and undeveloped in its potential state. This part of Siberia has been relegated to the margins of history, and it is to which Spengler's futurological prophecy of a "coming Siberian civilisation" applies to a greater extent. It is a unique sector of the Old World that has not yet had its say in the history of civilisations and has not yet manifested its geopolitical function in any way.

Such underdevelopment of this region is explained on the basis of the so-called "Potamian theory of civilisation", according to which the cultural development of a region is much faster when the courses of its major rivers do not run parallel to each other but overlap. Siberia (especially Eastern Siberia) is a classic confirmation of this principle, as all major rivers flow in the same direction without crossing each other. However, the lag in development is not a purely negative characteristic. Historical lag helps to accumulate (based on a rational understanding of the history of other territories and nations) the most important historical experience. This, under certain circumstances, can be the key to an unprecedented rise.

The northern half of lenaland, from a purely geographical point of view, involves consideration as a single geopolitical complex. And here a very important question arises. Around what centre could this future geopolitical entity take shape? What orientation will it adhere to? The very fact of Mackinder's doubt as to whether or not to include lenaland in the "geographic axis of history" indicates the possibility of alternative solutions to the situation. This is enough for a continental strategy to pay special attention to this sector.

Clearly, the maximum objective is to incorporate this area into an "Arctic Pact" under the control of the centre (Moscow) and to correlate it with other, secondary centres in the Northern Belt. But two obstacles arise here:

- 1) The lack of a major strategic point at the centre of the region around

which integration systems could be built;

2) The axial position of Yakutia (the Sakha Republic) in the region, which is particularly complicated by the presence of Yakuts, albeit nominal, but historically fixed "separatism".

In this case, the relationship between the northern half of the "Arctic trapezoid" and the south for the first time becomes truly dramatic, since Yakutia has a strategic location that provides all the prerequisites for becoming an independent region, independent of Moscow. This is ensured by its long coastline, the meridian structure of its territories and its technical detachment from other Siberian regions. Under a certain set of circumstances, it is Yakutia that could become the main base of the Atlanticist strategy, from which the Thalassocracy will rebuild the Pacific coast of Eurasia and try to turn it into a classic rimland, controlled by "maritime power". The increased attention of the Atlanticists to the Pacific area and the highly indicative designation of Lenaland by Mackinder as a special category, and then the inclusion of this territory into the rimland zone in the maps of the Atlanticists of Spickman and Kirk all this shows that at the first opportunity, the anti-continental forces will try to remove this entire region, poorly connected to the centre, from the Eurasian control.

The following measures should be taken in this regard:

- 1) Severely limit Yakutia's legal political sovereignty.
- 2) To divide Yakutia into two or more regions, most importantly administratively separating the Laptev Sea and East Siberian Sea coastal regions from the Lena River continental basin. It is also important to maximise the zone separating Yakutia's borders from the Pacific coast and to strengthen strategic control over these coastal zones.
- 3) Establish special tight control over the whole of this territory by a representative of Moscow.
- 4) To organise the industrial and financial integration of Yakutia into the

nonYakutian regions, making the region as dependent as possible on the Centre or its projections in the North and South of Siberia.

The above-mentioned steps imply such a reorganization of this territory, which would create here an entirely new geopolitical structure with a new centre and new radial links. In other words, without waiting for the reorganisation of Lenaland according to the Atlanticist scenario, as long as this area remains part of Russia, one should immediately proceed to the construction of a continental Lenaland according to the Eurasian model.

The problem of the North-South correlation has a special solution for this sector: not only should contacts on this axis be limited, but the entire northern space should be reorganized by detaching its polar and coastal zones from the continental spaces of Yakutia. This is not only a preventive geopolitical move, it is a geopolitical attack, a positional war for Lenaland, for the future Siberia, for its continental, Eurasian destiny. For the time being, this issue may be of domestic political importance. It should not be allowed to become internationally important and to become foreign policy.

2.7 Summary

The northern belt of the Eurasian continent, which includes Russia, represents a crucial geopolitical reality whose importance will steadily increase as planetary dynamics develop. At the same time, the region is particularly important for Russia to assert its global geopolitical status as the "geographical axis of history".

Only when Atlanticism, Thalassocracy is identified as its main geopolitical adversary does the whole system of the North acquire real strategic content. If the recognition of geopolitical dualism at the level of military doctrine or international policy is abandoned, the whole topic instantly loses its meaning. In this case, not only the rapid degradation of the Russian North is inevitable, but in the long run its fragmentation and even alienation of cer-

tain regions from Russia.

The general rhythm of geopolitical processes at present is such that the issue of geopolitical reorganisation of the North in accordance with the above-mentioned geopolitical constants is a highly topical, urgent matter. Even in order to maintain the status quo, the geopolitical reorganisation of all these spaces needs to begin immediately.

Russia's fate is directly linked to the geopolitical fate of the North. This law is the basis of its coming geopolitics.

The North is the future, it is destiny.

Chapter 3

Calling the East

3.1 "Inner East" (scope of the concept)

In examining the geopolitical problems of the Russian East, we will apply the same method as in the case of the North, dividing the question into three components:

- 1) Centre - East
- 2) Linking sectors in the East to each other
- 3) The links of these sectors with other regions and geopolitical zones of Russia.

But first it is necessary to define what is to be understood by the "Russian East". The difference between the Orient as a purely geographical notion and the Orient of culture, civilization and history should be emphasized at once. Thus, the cultural East is usually understood to include all the territories of North Africa, the Middle East, West Asia, Central Asia up to Pakistan and further to the Philippines (the Islamic world) and India, whereas to China and Indochina, as well as to the countries of the Pacific region, the term "Far East" is usually applied. From Russia's perspective, geographically it all constitutes a South stretching from the distant Maghreb West to the Pacific Far East.

On the other hand, within Russia itself, the "East" is an entirely different geographical and geopolitical reality - a territory extending from the Volga region (Tatarstan) through the Urals, Siberia, all the way to the Pacific Ocean. This geopolitical category may be referred to as the "Russian East" or the "inner East". When studying Russia's internal geopolitics, one should take this second concept, the "inner East", the geographical territories lying to the East of the Centre (Moscow), as the "East".

In that case, the Caucasus and Central Asia would fall into the "South" category and would be dealt with in the relevant chapter.

Given that we consider Russia's internal geopolitics as an "open system" that does not coincide with the administrative boundaries of the Russian Federation, based on the method of "geopolitical rays", the allocation of geopolitical zones often falls on the territory of neighbouring states, in the case where there is geopolitical, ethnic and geographic-landscape unity. For this reason, the "inner east" of Russia should include both the Southern Urals and Northern Kazakhstan, from Aktobe to Semipalatinsk, approximately at latitude 50. In addition, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Manchuria are geopolitically part of the South sector in relation to Russia. Consequently, all of southern Siberia, Altai, Tuva, Buryatia, Primorye and Primorye (plus the southern half of Khabarovsk Krai) are part of the 'inner east' band, together with the central Siberian regions to the south of the 'northern trapezoid'.

Thus, the "Inner East" should be considered a rectangle extending from Kazan and the Urals to the Pacific Ocean.

3.2 The "Russian Siberian" belt (structure)

Climatically, the Russian East differs sharply from the North. It is a zone with a moderate continental climate. In the Volga region and the Urals, as well as in Siberia and Primorye, there is a predominantly forested zone. From

northern Kazakhstan to Baikal there is a tapering wedge of steppes. Altai and the Amur region are massifs of low mountains. Most areas are fairly densely populated and provide favourable terrain for living and farming.

The ethnic composition of Russia's inner east is as follows: the vast majority are Russians, scattered in the national republics and compact in most of the Siberian lands. Several ethnic zones can be distinguished, coinciding in general terms with the respective autonomies and republics.

In the Volga region lies Tatarstan, a rather monolithic ethno-national entity, which preserves traditions of political independence and certain rivalry with Russia. It is the most vulnerable (in terms of preserving the integrity of Russia) region, since the national consciousness of the Tatars is very developed. The most important factor making the problem of "Tatar separatism" a minor one is the geographical location of Tatarstan in the middle of a continental space without any sea borders or neighbourhood with a non-Russian state. As long as this geopolitical situation persists, it poses no particular danger to Russia. But in any case, the Tatar historical tradition demands increased attention to this region and a central policy towards Kazan, which would make Tatarstan's geopolitical system connected to the purely Russian regions (perhaps, not territorially contiguous). In contrast, integration processes with Bashkiria, Udmurtia, Mordovia and Mari-El should be discouraged. Moreover, it makes sense to emphasize the territorial division of Tatarstan along cultural and ethnic lines, because the Tatars are a composite ethnos, both in terms of racial and cultural-religious factors. It also makes sense to encourage Russian migration to the republic.

The Tatars are Turks and Muslims, and this makes them a geopolitical part of the Turkic-Islamic world. In this respect, the Centre faces a problem that is the dominant feature of all geopolitics of the South (which will be discussed in the relevant chapter). A complete breakaway from this reality is impossible, either through assimilation or active geographical isolation. Therefore the "Tatar question" is included as a separate article in the broader problem of Russia and Islam. The common denominator in resolving all similar situations is the search for a geopolitical balance between the interests of

the "geographical axis of history" and the Islamic world. In this respect, anti-Atlanticism is the common denominator in all cases without exception, allowing for a long-term planetary alliance. In the case of Tatarstan, the natural continental character of the Tatar nation, whose historical destiny is inextricably linked to Eurasia, should be particularly emphasized, and when the geopolitics of Eurasia is identified with the geopolitics of Russia in the present circumstances, a conscious and voluntary alliance is a deeper imperative than ethno-confessional differences.

More broadly, the Eurasian power Russia is based on a combination of Slavic and Turkic elements, which gave rise to the Great Russian ethnos itself, which became the axis of the "continental state", identified with the heartland. That is why the two ethnic groups of Slavs and Turks (+ Ugric and Mongols) remain the pillars of Eurasian geopolitics in the future. Their future in the development of political and ethnic integration, and therefore the accentuation of ethnocultural differences, and especially the desire to give these differences a political form, is contrary to the logic of the historical destiny of both Russians and Tatars. This theme should become the axis of relations between Moscow and Kazan, and it is possible that this will require the creation of a special "geopolitical lobby" expressing Eurasian interests politically (or metapolitically) as well.

Almost the same considerations apply to Bashkiria, south of Tatarstan. It is also home to a Turkic ethnos practising Islam. The only difference is that the Bashkirs do not have such a pronounced separatist tradition and such a developed national consciousness as the Tatars, who were the most active and "advanced" ethnos in the whole Volga region. For this reason Tatar-Bashkir relations cannot contribute to the geopolitical stability in this sector of the "inner east" of Russia, and the Center should do its best to integrate Bashkiria into the Russian-populated regions of the Southern Urals, and to detach it from its orientation towards Kazan. At the same time, it makes sense to accentuate the specificity of Bashkir culture, its uniqueness and its difference from other Turkic-Islamic forms. Strengthening the geopolitical ties between Tatarstan and Bashkiria is extremely dan-

gerous for Russia, because Bashkiria's southern administrative border lies near Northern Kazakhstan, which could theoretically become a bridgehead for Turkic-Islamic separatism, should the geopolitical situation develop in the worst case. In this case the worst thing is to be torn apart by a Turkic (pro-Turkic, i.e. pro-Atlantic) wedge right in the middle of the continental space. In this sense, Tatarstan's southward orientation, attempts of integration with Bashkiria, and even Bashkiria's rapprochement with the Orenburg region, are extremely negative tendencies, which should be prevented by the continental policy of the Center at any cost. Bashkiria should strengthen its latitudinal ties with Kuibyshev and Chelyabinsk, while its meridional contacts with Kazan and Orenburg should, on the contrary, be weakened.

Further on, from the Southern Urals (Chelyabinsk) to Krasnoyarsk stretches a strip of land actively inhabited and developed by the Russians. From west to east, a geopolitical axis clearly emerges, which historically corresponded to the path of Russian conquest of Siberia: Chelyabinsk Omsk Novosibirsk Tomsk Kemerovo Krasnoyarsk Irkutsk. The entire belt is a developed industrial zone, and a city such as Novosibirsk is also a major intellectual centre. Ethnically, however, it is almost a purely Russian zone. A similar situation is repeated on the eastern side of Lake Baikal, where along the Baikal-Amur Mainline from Chita to Khabarovsk and further south to Vladivostok, there is a sort of continuation of the same strip that begins in the southern Urals. The only deviation is Buryatia, territorially bordering Baikal from the north and breaking the continuity of the otherwise homogeneous belt of "Russian Siberia".

Strictly to the south of this purely Russian belt runs a parallel zone with a significant admixture of Turkic (east of Mongolian) population. It begins in Northern Kazakhstan, extends from Aktyubinsk in Kazakhstan to Semipalatinsk and Ust-Kamenogorsk, and continues in the Russian territory in the Altai (cradle of the Turkic ethnos), Khakassia, Tuva and Buryatia. At the same time from the Altai to Transbaikalia (Chita) the Turkic-Mongolian belt extends landscape-wise and to a great extent ethnically seamlessly into Mongolia, where no invisible geographic border actually exists. From the

geopolitical point of view, the whole of this lower belt is part of the strategic space of "Russian Siberia", and therefore should be seen as an extension of the "Russian East" to the south. The only exception is the fragment of Chinese territory (Chinese Manchuria), located from the eastern border with Mongolia to the Ussuri River. Logically, it would have to be strategically controlled by Russia, because otherwise it would inevitably become an occasion for positional collisions between the "geopolitical axis of history" and the territories that are geopolitically part of the rimland, and China undoubtedly belongs to the rimland category (no geopolitician has ever had a shadow of a doubt about this).

The same geopolitical principle holds true for the named strip of "Russian Siberia": this entire territorial sector should be actively integrated into a single geopolitical field, with latitudinal integration along the long axis Chelyabinsk Khabarovsk being a priority here (the meridian short axis Khabarovsk Vladivostok is an extension of this line in a special geopolitical sector). All this space of gigantic length constitutes Russia's main strategic advantage as a truly Eurasian power. Thanks to this southern Siberian corridor, Russia has the opportunity to firmly link the regions of the Center to the Pacific coast, thus providing a potential highway to the full development of Siberia and the ultimate access for Moscow to the Pacific Ocean. This lane is a lever to control all of Eurasia, including Europe, because the organization of a high-tech continental link from the Far East to the Far West allows for such a restructuring of planetary reality that thalassocratic control of the oceans from the outside will lose its key importance. The resources of Siberia will eventually link up with the high-tech of continental Europe and advanced Japan, and when this can materialise, the planetary dominance of Thalassocracy will come to an end.

The latitudinal integration of Siberia (the Chelyabinsk-Khabarovsk axis) is the most important strategic advantage that only Russia has. The entire geopolitical history of the future may begin with the development of this area, in which case Spengler's prophecies will come true.

In a narrower, "internal" sense, the development of the integration of "Rus-

sian Siberia“ provides an opportunity for expanding geopolitical control along the meridian as well. The southern ”Turkic-Mongolian“ belt will link up with the more northern purely Russian territories, with the broadest possible ethno-cultural autonomy accompanied by economic integration and strategic dominance of the Russian axis Chelyabinsk-Vladi Vostok. And this process must include such administratively heterogeneous entities as Kazakhstan, the autonomous districts and republics within the Russian Federation, Mongolia, and possibly some parts of Chinese Manchuria.

At the same time, a similar meridian vector is assumed in the northern direction, where the situation differs only in the fact that the autochthonous non-Russian population is much more rarefied, politically less developed and has no fresh historical experience of political sovereignty. In the Khanty-Mansi and Evenk districts, as well as in Khabarovsk Krai, the limit of the northern expansion of the ’Russian Siberia’ belt is set by a parallel process of internal integration of the ’northern trapeze’. This integration, unlike the complex geopolitical function of ”Russian Siberia“ (Chelyabinsk-Khabarovsk axis), which has three vectors of development (latitudinal, northern and southern) and faces in some cases established and rather independent political forms (states), has a simple purely latitudinal nature. Therefore, both geopolitical processes will develop at different rhythms, and consequently, the specific resulting boundary between the development of ”Russian Siberia“ to the north and the overall integration of the ”northern trapezoid“ will depend on unpredictable factors.

All these geopolitical vectors of development are not inherently new and unexpected, as they turn out to be merely a continuation of the large-scale historical processes of Russia’s movement to the east and the formation of a Eurasian power. The Russian route to the Pacific Ocean is not accidental, and the territories of Russian exploration of Siberia also follow a clear geographical logic. This path corresponds to the relief borderline of the Forest and the Steppe, on the geopolitical synthesis of which the Russian State itself was founded. On the edge of the northern taiga forests bordering the steppe (or forest-steppe) the Russian explorers of Siberia moved, settling on

the lands most suitable for habitation and agriculture. From Chelyabinsk to Baikal this landscape sector is a tapering wedge. And from Baikal to the Pacific coast it is a continuous zone of northern forests, gradually and imperceptibly passing into tropical forests. At the same time, the percentage of highlands and mountain ranges increases.

This zone from Baikal to the mouth of the Amur River brings us back to the "Lenaland" problem, which was already raised when we dealt with the Yakut sector of the "northern trapeze".

3.3 The positional battle for Lenaland

As in the case of Yakutia (in the analysis of the geopolitics of the Russian North), when approaching Eastern Siberia, extending east of the Yenisei, we are faced with a number of geopolitical problems. Looking ahead, we note that for the third time we will also encounter difficulties when we get to the analysis of the easternmost sector of the "Eurasian South".

Already from a purely geographical point of view, beyond Baikal a major change in topography begins, compared to all the more westerly sectors of Eurasia. There, between the continental forests in the north and the tropical (mountainous) forests in the south, steppe zones necessarily ran through, creating a natural symmetry, with a central area, a first (steppe) peripheral circle and tropical forest and mountain border landforms. This picture is maintained from Moldavia to the Altai, to the north the steppe layer simply disappears. In the case of Eastern Siberia, we are dealing with an entirely new geopolitical and landscape region, which requires different positional solutions. Parallel to the unexpected landscape "challenge" (a smooth transition of continental forests to tropical ones on the background of mountains, hills and hills), an extremely unfortunate ethno-political picture is revealed: there are several internal and external national entities in the region, whose geopolitical loyalty to Russia is not so evident. Against the background of the extremely weak Russian settlement of the entire Lenaland

area, the geopolitical picture becomes extremely disturbing.

Firstly, the territory of Buryatia. It breaks the continuity of the Russian-Siberian belt proper, extending far north from Lake Baikal. The Buryats are Lamaists, and in critical moments of Russian history they tried to establish on their territory an independent theocratic state oriented towards Mongolia and Tibet. This in itself is not a cause for concern, but there is a new problem: the territorial proximity of Yakutia's southern borders to the northern borders of Buryatia. The Yakuts belong to the Turkic group, are strongly Christianized, but they often preserve the ancient shamanistic traditions. However, some groups also practise Lamaism. With Yakutia's access to the sea and Buryatia's border with Mongolia, all this poses the danger of a potential geopolitical bloc, which would have more prerequisites for relative geopolitical independence than Tatarstan or some North Caucasian peoples, whose separatism is evident. If we add to this the proximity of the Pacific coast, extremely sparsely populated by the Russians, the danger is doubled by the possible control of the Thalassocracy over the coastal zones (or sectors of zones, potential corridors from Lenaland to the Pacific Ocean). Finally, the matter is further aggravated by the fact that the south of Yakutia is separated from China's northeastern border by a rather thin strip of the Amur region, which gives grounds for opening a direct geopolitical corridor from the southern Chinese shores of the Indian Ocean to the Laptev Sea in the North.

All these potential geopolitical configurations are extremely worrying. There is no doubt that such a picture cannot but seem extremely tempting to Atlanticist strategists, as the land-rich, resource-rich and strategically unique Lenaland finds itself in a very vulnerable position, geopolitically speaking, and any weakening of Russian control over this region could immediately cause an irreversible tear of the giant piece of the Eurasian continent from the very geographical axis of history. To prevent these events, it is not enough to simply reinforce the military contingent located in the Far East or in the Amur region. Large-scale geopolitical steps are required, for we are talking about nothing less than a potential positional war. This is something

that should be paid special attention to:

1) It is important to strengthen the strategic presence of representatives of the Centre in southern Yakutia. This is achieved through directed migration and systematic "colonisation" of land by people from more western regions.

2) The same should be done with the lands lying to the north of Lake Baikal. The dangerous boundaries would then be pushed back.

3) At the same time, the north of Irkutsk oblast and the whole of Amur oblast should be intensively developed, with a plan for the purposeful "colonisation" of these territories.

These three measures should be backed up by an increased military presence in the area and an intensified strategic, economic and technological expansion to the west and east. All this is intended to smooth out the dangerous narrowing of the "Russian belt".

4) Positional pressure on north-eastern China should be intensified, taking preventive pressure on the area, which would initially forestall any geopolitical creep by China towards northern expansion.

5) The demographic and strategic sector located between the cities of Blagoveshchensk-Komsomolsk-on-Amur-Khabarovsk must be strengthened as much as possible to provide a massive shield against potential Thalassocratic (from the sea) or Chinese (from the land) geopolitical aggression here.

6) It is important to reinforce these measures with a maximum activation of Russian-Mongolian relations, because Mongolia, barren and otherwise unattractive for the region's geopolitics, is a key and most important territory. A massive Russian military pres-

ence along the entire Mongolian-Chinese border, and especially on its eastern part, would minimise the geopolitical risk of Lenaland's alienation.

Recall that the geopolitics of the North envisaged concentrating special efforts in the same sector only from the north, from the coast of the Arctic Ocean. Combining both geopolitical strategies and implementing them in parallel will allow Russia to lay a positioning basis for the distant future, when the importance of these lands will be so obvious that the planetary importance of Eurasia as a whole will depend on their control.

The geopolitical battle for Lenaland should begin now, although widespread attention will be drawn to the region later. But if the right geopolitical and strategic model is not laid down from the outset, resolving the conflict once it starts will be much more difficult, if not impossible.

In geopolitics, major battles are won long before they become overt forms of political or international conflict.

3.4 The capital of Siberia

The project to integrate Siberia raises the question of the geographical centre of this process, i.e. the point which could become Moscow's authorized representative beyond the Urals and act as a pull point for all other regions. The most suitable for this role is Novosibirsk, which is not just the largest city in Siberia, but also the most important intellectual centre on a national scale.

From Novosibirsk, the western axis goes to Yekaterinburg, the capital of the Urals, and the eastern axis to Irkutsk, then to Khabarovsk and Vladivostok. Novosibirsk, therefore, has the most important function of linking the entire "Russian belt of Siberia", in which it is the main link. The axis of Moscow Novosibirsk becomes the most important force line of "internal geopolitics" of Russia, the main "beam" through which the reciprocal pro-

cess of exchange of centrifugal energy flows from the centre and centripetal from the periphery.

The Ural region, centred in Ekaterinburg, should be linked directly to Moscow, rather than becoming an intermediate link between central Russia and Siberia. The geopolitical position of Novosibirsk is so important that this city and its adjoining regions should have a special status and special powers, as it is from here that the secondary geopolitical rays should diverge throughout Siberia to the north, south, east and west.

An exception to such secondary centralisation only makes sense for Primorsky Krai and the southern sectors of Khabarovsk Krai. This is a very special zone, tightly linked to the Lenaland issue and the positional struggle for control over it. Khabarovsk and Vladivostok should be given a special status in this respect and should be linked directly to Moscow (as should Yekaterinburg).

To interact with the "northern trapezoid" it is convenient to organise additional strategic axes Novosibirsk-Norilsk and Khabarovsk-Magadan. In this way, the East will be strategically connected to the North.

The East, like the North, is the geopolitical springboard of the future. Here lies the fate of Eurasia. At the same time, the favourable climate of "Russian Siberia" makes it more prone to start the grand project of creating a new continental model from here. New cities should be built here, new highways should be built, new lands and fields should be developed and new military bases should be established. At the same time, it is important from the very beginning to put into the project a harmonious combination of the two principles of relief, landscape, ethno-cultural factor, finally, ecology, on the one hand, and technical and strategic criteria, on the other. Archaic traditions should be combined with the latest technological developments. The sites of the oldest human settlements in these lands must be taken into account and the choice for the development of industries and military bases must be correlated with them.

This logic leads to the open prospect of the emergence of a new centre in Siberia, not yet manifested or conceived. And as the entire Russian East develops, as the Pacific Ocean actualizes as the "ocean of the future", it is possible that the question of transferring the capital of all Eurasia to these lands to the unprecedented and not yet existing glittering capital of the New Millennium will not be excluded.

The time will come when Moscow will lose its "middle" importance, will become insufficient in the geopolitical sense, too "Western". In this case, the question of a new capital in Siberia will gain not just national, but continental and global significance.

However, it should not be lost sight of for a moment that such a prospect is only possible by winning a positional struggle for Lenaland, without which a geopolitical renaissance of Eurasia is unthinkable.

Chapter 4

THE NEW GEOPOLITICAL GOVERNMENT OF THE SOUTH

4.1 The "New Geopolitical Order" of the South

The geopolitics of the southern regions (as well as the western regions) is related to the planetary mission of Russia-Eurasia to an even greater extent than the problems of the North and the East. Even when considering the North and the East, which belong geopolitically to the internal Russian territories, the foreign policy factor constantly emerged, while when dealing with the problems of the South (as well as the West) it makes no sense to speak only about "internal geopolitics" of Russia, since all internal Russian realities are so connected with foreign policy ones that their separation is simply impossible without completely violating the rigor of the overall geopolitical picture.

With regard to the South, the "geographical axis of history" has only one imperative - geopolitical expansion all the way to the shores of the Indian Ocean. This means the centrality and uniqueness of the meridian development, the unambiguous dominance of the North-South axis. From the geopolitical point of view, all the space separating the Russian territory from the southern shoreline of Eurasia is a strip, whose area must be reduced to zero. The very fact of the existence of a rimland, which is not a line but a strip, is an expression of a thalassocratic influence, the opposite of

the basic impulse of continental integration. If the Eurasian rimland in the north and east of Russia is reduced to zero volume, and the continent here is geopolitically complete (the only thing left is to maintain the positional status quo, preventing in advance the possibility of the line turning into a strip under the thalassocratic impulse), the rimland in the south (and west) is an open problem. In the east and north Russia's rimland is an actual line but a potential band, while in the south and west it is an actual band but a potential line. In the first case, the main imperative is defence and defence, preservation, conservation of the status quo and preventive geopolitical moves. In the second case, on the contrary, it is an actively offensive geopolitics, an expansionary, summarily "offensive" strategy.

In the South of the whole of Eurasia, Russia should establish a "new geopolitical order" based on the principle of continental integration. Therefore, all the established political formations of the South - Islamic countries, India, China, Indochina - should be seen knowingly as a theatre of continental positional manoeuvres, whose ultimate task is to strategically rigidly connect all these intermediate regions with the Eurasian centre with Moscow.

Hence the concept of "open rays" running from the centre to the periphery, which do not stop at Russia's own borders, but should be drawn as far as the southern shore of the ocean. The segments of the "rays" that fall within the Russian territories are topical, those countries which are strategically solidary with Russia are semi-actual, and those states which follow their own geopolitical path or (in the worst case) enter the zone of direct Atlanticist control are potential. The general logic of Eurasian geopolitics in this direction is to make the whole extent of the rays actual or semi-actual.

On this basis, the entire coastline of the Eurasian continent from Anatolia to Korea should be seen as a potential "Russian South".

4.2 Boundary zones and mountains

The imperative of geopolitical expansion to the south also predetermines the structure of the composition of those areas that are part of Russia's administrative borders or allied states with Russia (CIS). Therefore, an analysis of the periphery of actual and semi-actual geopolitical rays should not for a moment detract from the original trend dictated by the laws of geopolitics.

"The Russian South", in a more limited sense, is the following zones:

- 1) The north of the Balkan Peninsula from Serbia to Bulgaria;**
- 2) Moldova and southern and eastern Ukraine;**
- 3) Rostov region and Krasnodar region (Novorossiysk port);**
- 4) The Caucasus;**
- 5) The eastern and northern coasts of the Caspian Sea (the territory of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan);**
- 6) Central Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan;**
- 7) Mongolia.**

Continental strategic control has been established over these zones. But they should all be seen as bases for further geopolitical expansion to the south, not as "perpetual" borders of Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, the presence of coastal strips that are not under the control of the Russian Federation is a constant threat to reduce even those territories that at the moment are connected to the centre of Eurasia quite firmly. The disintegration of the USSR and the emergence of independent political entities on the basis of former Soviet republics provides an impressive example of how the abandonment of outward expansion to the southern shores of the continent (Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan) inevitably entails the retreat of Moscow's secure borders far to the north, deep into the conti-

nent. However, the weakening of the continental presence will never create a vacuum or strengthen the sovereignty of the "liberated" territories, since their provincial status knowingly excludes their geopolitical autarchy. The telluric influence of Moscow is automatically replaced by the thalassocratic influence of Atlantism (in one form or another).

Consequently, the structure of the entire inner belt of the "Russian South" must initially be seen as a potential offensive bridgehead.

However, this is complicated by the fact that almost all border areas are in mountainous (often high mountainous) areas.

To the north of the Balkan Peninsula are the Balkan Mountains, to the east the Caucasus, then the Kopetdag and Hindu Kush ranges, then the Pamirs, the Tien Shan and the Altai. The mountain relief of the southern border of Russia-Eurasia, which to a great extent had predetermined the whole history of the East, is now one of the most important geopolitical trump cards of Atlantism. The ancient Indo-Europeans divided the entire Eurasian East into two components - northern Turan (everything above the Eurasian mountain range) and southern Iran (lying below this range). In fact, this division strictly corresponds to the modern geopolitical terms heartland (Turan) and rimland (Iran). Several millennia later, Russia's southern front poses the same geopolitical problem, which was characteristic of the dialectic of the "steppe nomads versus sedentary farmers of Persia" relationship.

But in this case the situation changed radically in the sense that the sedentary Slavic northern Forest was added to the steppe Turan, balancing and fixing the dynamics of the Turanian nomads. The sedentary Indo-Europeans (Slavs) enclosed the steppe from the north with cultural forms which largely repeated the archetypes of the Iranian south. Russia as Eurasia, as a synthesis of the Forest and Steppe, is qualitatively superior to Turan, and consequently the problem of Iran (more broadly non-Russian Central Asia) acquires a different civilizational and geopolitical meaning. This is especially evident since the Islamic Revolution in Iran, which radically broke with the Atlanticist Thalassocratic policy of the Shah's regime.

All these geopolitical aspects suggest the need for a radically new approach to the problem of the "Eurasian mountains", which should lose their function as a strategic frontier and become not a barrier to continental integration, but a bridge to it.

The need to change the function of the mountains in the south of Russia (and its strategic range) is the pillar of future Eurasian geopolitics. Without such a preliminary operation Eurasia will never achieve real world domination, moreover, it will never even come close to a genuine equal dialogue with Thalassocracy.

4.3 The Balkans

Since the majority of Russia's southern lands and its strategic range fall in lands racially, culturally and religiously distinct from the civilisation of the Russians (except for the Balkans and Ukraine), the geopolitical axes should be strictly meridional. Hence the conclusion: all vertical (longitudinal) integration processes should be promoted and all horizontal (latitudinal) integration processes should be discouraged, i.e. in an area ethnically and politically distinct from the Russian spaces proper, the principle directly opposite to the principle that dominates in conditions of ethno-cultural homogeneity should be applied.

Let us outline the main forms of the geopolitical structure of the "Russian South" (in the broad sense), looking one by one at all the local geopolitical systems from west to east.

Balkan Peninsula. There are four special zones here:

- (a) Bosnian-Croatian (the most western and Atlantic-oriented, pure rimland);**
- b) Serbian (located to the east and clearly Eurasian-oriented);**

c) Bulgarian (even more eastern, having elements of a "Levantine version of the rimland" most clearly represented by Turkey and the continental Eurasian synthesis);

d) Greek (Orthodox, but part of the Atlantean bloc).

"The new geopolitical order (continental and Eurasian) in this area (as elsewhere) is based on encouraging all integration processes on the North-South axis. This means that ties between Belgrade Athens and Sofia Athens should be promoted as much as possible. Since the entire Balkans region is a mosaic and highly complex configuration, the project of a pan-Slavic southern federation consisting of Serbia, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbian Bosnia, which would in theory be an ideal solution, is hardly feasible in the near future. Moreover, it presupposes a dangerous process of latitudinal integration, which in such ethnically complex regions is always problematic. Remember, for example, the bitter Balkan wars at the beginning of the century between the Orthodox states of Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece and the ever-present problem of Macedonia being a bone of contention within the potentially continental and Eurasian Orthodox powers. Therefore, the example of the medieval Serbian Nemanjic 'empire' can be taken as a positive geopolitical paradigm. Moreover, all significant successes of Greece in global geopolitical projects (in particular the conquests of Alexander the Great) were fed by energies coming from the northern Balkan dynasty of Macedonian, and previously the Doric type of Indo-European Sparta. Within the small model of the entire Balkan Peninsula, the Serbs (and partly the Bulgarians) represent the Eurasian impulse, acting as carriers of the idea of heartland. To the south Greece is geopolitically stretched between this northern continental impulse and a stable historical identification with the rimland. Therefore, all unifying integration projects of Greece with the north of the Balkans could strengthen the intra-continental impulses in Greece, which could be based on confessional affinity with Orthodox Russia.

If in the distant future it is possible to imagine a common Balkan Federation, Eurasian-oriented, the geopolitical program could be formulated as the creation of an irregular rhombus of Sofia Moscow Belgrade Athens (and

Sofia again), in which two rays of Russian-Serbian and Russian-Bulgarian origin, and converging in Athens, would emanate from the centre. At the same time, the question of Macedonia could be resolved by granting it a special status in order to remove the stumbling block between all three Orthodox Balkan and potentially Eurasian (to varying degrees) states. Hence Moscow's pressing interest in the Macedonian problem logically follows.

If we look at the whole picture from the opposite perspective, from the position of the Atlantists, it immediately becomes obvious that for Thalassocracy it is important to give all geopolitical processes the exact opposite character.

Firstly, it is important for "naval power" to support the pro-Atlantic forces in the northern Balkans (Croats and Muslims), and in addition, to detach Serbia and Bulgaria from their geopolitical alliance with Greece. Macedonia is the most convenient way to do this, which could disrupt all continental projects in the region. And if Turkey is involved in the Bulgarian problem, i.e. if it promotes improvement of the Turkish-Bulgarian relations at the expense of the Bulgarian-Russian ones, the whole Eurasian continental policy will be defeated here. Eurasian geopoliticians should take this into account.

4.4 The problem of a sovereign Ukraine

Then there is the Ukrainian issue. Ukrainian sovereignty is such a negative phenomenon for Russian geopolitics that, in principle, it could easily provoke an armed conflict. Without the Black Sea coastline from Ismail to Kerch, Russia gets such a long coastal strip, effectively controlled by who knows who, that its very existence as a normal and independent state is called into question. The Black Sea is no substitute for access to the "warm seas" and its geopolitical importance is sharply reduced by stable Atlanticist control of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but it at least provides an opportunity to secure the central regions against potential expansion of Turkish

influence, being an extremely convenient, reliable and inexpensive border. The emergence of a new geopolitical actor in these lands (which, moreover, aspires to join the Atlantic alliance) is therefore an absolute anomaly, which could only result in totally irresponsible, from a geopolitical point of view, steps.

Ukraine as an independent state with some kind of territorial ambitions poses a huge threat to the whole of Eurasia, and without solving the Ukrainian problem at all it makes no sense to talk about continental geopolitics. This does not mean that Ukraine's cultural, linguistic or economic autonomy should be limited and that it should become a purely administrative sector of the Russian centralised state (as, to some extent, was the case in the Tsarist Empire or the USSR). But strategically Ukraine should be strictly a projection of Moscow to the south and west (although possible models for restructuring will be discussed in more detail in the chapter on the West).

The absolute imperative of Russian geopolitics on the Black Sea coast is Moscow's total and unfettered control over its entire length from the Ukrainian to the Abkhaz territories. We can break up this entire zone along ethnic and cultural lines as much as we like, granting ethnic and confessional autonomy to the Crimean Little Russians, Tatars, Cossacks, Abkhazians, Georgians, etc., but all this only under Moscow's absolute control over the military and political situation. These sectors must be radically detached from Thalassocratic influence both coming from the West and from Turkey (or even Greece). The Northern Black Sea coast should be exclusively Eurasian and centrally subordinated to Moscow.

4.5 Between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea

The Caucasus itself consists of two geopolitical levels: The North Caucasus and the territory of the three Caucasian republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The entire area of Russian lands from Taganrog to Astrakhan,

i.e. all Russian lands located between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, is closely adjacent to this sector, which also includes the area of Kalmykia as a wedge.

The whole region is an extremely important strategic hub, as the peoples inhabiting it have enormous social dynamics, ancient geopolitical traditions, and it directly borders on Atlanticist Turkey, which, for its part, strategically controls the border zone that, in terms of topography, belongs to the unified space of the Caucasus mountain massif.

This is one of the most vulnerable points of the Russian geopolitical space, and it is no coincidence that these territories have traditionally been the scene of fierce hostilities between Russia-heartland and rimland countries Turkey and Iran. Control over the Caucasus opens, as a first approximation, access to the “warm seas”, and every (even the smallest) movement of the border to the south (or to the north) means a substantial gain (or loss) for the entire continental power, tellurocracy.

The three horizontal layers of the entire region Russian lands, the North Caucasus within Russia and the Caucasus proper also have their potential extension even further south. This additional, purely potential belt beyond not only Russia but also the CIS consists of Southern Azerbaijan (located in Iran) and the northern parts of Turkey, which are heavily populated by Kurds and Armenians. This entire region is as much an ethno-cultural problem for Turkey and Iran as the Caucasian ethnicities that are (or were) part of Russia. Consequently, there are all the objective prerequisites for the expansion of continental influence deep into the Caucasian area.

Thus, there are four levels or layers between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, suggesting a differentiated approach from the centre.

The first layer, the Russian proper, should be linked as much as possible along latitudinal lines, creating a rigid structure of Rostov-on-Don, Volgograd and Astrakhan. This is the most important link in the Russian space as a whole, because to the north it rests with Central Russia, and

even further north with Arkhangelsk, the most important northern port and potential capital of the “northern trapeze”. Because of its relatively close proximity to Central Europe and because of its demographically dense population and technical development, the Rostov-on-Don Volgograd-Astrakhan triangle is the most important outpost of Russia in the South. It is a kind of substitute for the Eurasian Center itself, a secondary centre connected by continuous territory to the deep spaces. That is why this region should become the geopolitical core of the whole Caucasian strategy of Eurasia, and for this purpose it should be strengthened technologically, strategically and intellectually. It is desirable to create here a special cohesive Russian zone, integrated administratively and politically.

At the same time, some problems arise with the northern regions of Kalmykia, which, however, are rather sparsely populated. It makes sense to include these northern steppe regions in the common integration belt, geopolitically “stretching” them directly between Rostov-on-Don and Astrakhan to close a triangle with the apex in Volgograd from below. Thus, geographically and geopolitically the borders of ancient Khazaria, which controlled this entire region in the early first millennium, will be reproduced. We can conventionally call this geopolitical formation the “Khazar triangle”.

In the transition from the purely Russian zone of the “Khazar triangle”, which should follow the latitudinal (horizontal) logic, although closely related to the north and to the Centre (Moscow) itself, the vector of integration radically changes its character. The entire North Caucasus and everything south of it should obey an exclusively meridian orientation. Strategic centres of the “Khazar triangle” should develop independent geopolitical chains, unfolding strictly to the south. From Rostov through Krasnodar to Maikop, Sukhumi and Batumi. From Stavropol to Kislovodsk, Nalchik, Ordzhonikidze, Tskhinvali and Tbilisi. From Astrakhan to Makhachkala.

Any latitudinal demarcation of the ethnic regions of the Transcaucasus should be supported, while longitudinal integration should be strengthened. Thus, it is important to detach the active separatist Chechnya from Dagestan (and Ingushetia) by any means, closing the access to the Caspian Sea.

If Chechnya is left only to Georgia, which lies to the south, it will be geopolitically controlled from all sides, and ruled by Orthodox Georgia. Dagestan and Ingushetia should also be tied to Georgia, which could lead to the creation of an autonomous North Caucasus zone, developed economically, but strategically entirely under Russian control and Eurasian-oriented. A general redistribution of the North Caucasus could also solve the Ossetian problem, since the new ethnic entities (united Ossetia, for example) would lose their significance as national state formations and would acquire a purely ethnic and cultural, linguistic and religious meaning. Following the same meridian logic, it is important to link Abkhazia directly to Russia.

All these steps are aimed at one geopolitical goal of strengthening the Eurasian telluric complex and preparing its planetary triumph in a duel with Atlantism. So we can call the whole plan, "a new geopolitical order in the Caucasus". It implies the rejection of the traditional approach to the existing political formations as "states-nations", i.e. strictly fixed administrative formations with permanent borders and a complete power structure. The "new geopolitical order in the Caucasus" implies a complete redistribution of the current political realities and a transition from the model of state-state or nation-nation relations to a purely geopolitical system of the periphery, with the structure of the periphery to be determined not by political but by ethno-cultural differentiation.

This could be achieved through a plan to create a "Caucasian Federation", which would include both the three CIS Caucasus republics and the autonomous entities within Russia. The centre would concede cultural and economic autarchy to the entire region, but it would provide the strongest strategic centralism. This would lead to an extremely flexible system that would be based not on violence, occupation or unification of the Caucasian diversity, but on an awareness of the unity and commonality of continental destiny.

Armenia plays a special geopolitical role as Russia's traditional and reliable ally in the Caucasus. Armenia serves as a crucial strategic base for preventing Turkish expansion north and east into the Central Asian Tur-

kie world. Conversely, in offensive geopolitical terms, it is important as an ethno-cultural community that continues uninterrupted to the south, into Turkey, where a large part of ancient Armenia and its main holy place, Mount Ararat, are located. Racial and linguistic affinities also link Armenians to the Kurds, another crucial ethnic factor that can be used to provoke geopolitical upheavals within Turkey. In doing so, it is crucial to create a land corridor that crosses the entire Caucasus and reliably links Armenia to the "Khazar Triangle".

Armenia is also important in another sense. Based on its historical and ethnic proximity to Iran, it is Armenia that could serve as one of the most important links for the spread of the Eurasian impulse from the Centre to the Iranian rimland. This means creating an axis of Moscow Yerevan Tehran.

Azerbaijan should also be linked to Iran (and by no means to Turkey), emphasising Shiism, ethnic proximity to Iranian South Azerbaijan and historical ties. Thus, the most important strategic ray Moscow Teheran through Yerevan would be duplicated by the ray Moscow Baku Teheran, forming a rhombus largely symmetrical to the Balkan rhombus. There are many geopolitical parallels between the Balkans and the Caucasus. Most importantly, it is the place where the most important geopolitical law is proved. *Latitudinal processes provoke terrible conflicts while longitudinal links lead to stability and endurance.* This is particularly evident in the Yugoslav war and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorny Karabakh. The Karabakh problem itself is similar in some respects to that of Macedonia. And therefore for the stabilization of the whole region Moscow should establish the most direct connections with Karabakh to make this territory a point of balance of the whole Caucasian geopolitical system. To this end, the Karabakh negotiations should optimally have four parties: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and Iran, excluding all the Atlanticist actors whose political presence in the region is not advisable for geopolitical reasons.

4.6 The New Geopolitical Order in Central Asia

Central Asia is considered to be a vast stretch of Eurasian land stretching from the northern Kazakh steppes to the coast of the Arabian Sea. From the former Soviet Central Asian republics, this zone extends south through the Kopetdag range and the Pamirs to lowland Iran and southeast into Afghanistan. Central Asia is the geopolitical space that is more likely to lead the heartland to its cherished goal of the Indian Ocean than any other. If Moscow were to win a positional war with the Thalassocracy in this area, there would automatically be many parallel issues of integration into India's continental bloc, strategic support for Iraq against Turkey, a direct corridor to the Middle East, etc. All this makes this area central to the geopolitical restructuring of the Eurasian South.

Central Asia is divided not only politically and geopolitically, but also racially by a mountain range. The former Soviet zone of Central Asia (with the exception of Tajikistan) is populated by Sunni Turks, the successors of Turan, many of whom continue to be predominantly nomadic and cattle breeders. "Non-Soviet Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan (and even ethno-culturally related Pakistan) are populated by sedentary IndoEuropeans. Thus, geopolitical unity has a distinct racial boundary.

The whole area is divided into three parts:

1) Central Kazakhstan (south of the 50th parallel, as north of it are the lands included in the "Russian East");

2) Desert Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and mountainous Kyrgyzstan

(These are purely Turanian lands);

3) Iran Afghanistan Pakistan India (this is Iran in the extended sense of 'Aryan', 'land of the Aryans').

The new Eurasian order in Central Asia is based on linking all these lands

from north to south on a rigid geopolitical and strategic axis. In doing so, as always in such cases, it is important to structure the space exclusively in the meridian direction, facilitating the longitudinal convergence of the individual regions.

Starting from the north, it is a question of linking all of Kazakhstan with the Russians of the Southern Urals and Western Siberia. This connection should serve as a supporting structure for the entire Central Asian area. In a consistent and well-thought-out integration of Kazakhstan into a common continental bloc with Russia lies the basis of the entire continental policy. The most important point in this case is the initial task to rigidly interrupt any influence of Turkey on this region, to prevent any projects of “Turanian” integration coming from the Atlanticist Turkey and proposing a purely latitudinal geopolitical development of the former “Soviet” Central Asia, opposed to the Indo-European North (Russia) and the Indo-European South (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India). The Turanian integration is a direct antithesis of the geopolitical Eurasianism and consists in splitting the telluristic forces into three components - western (European Russia), eastern (Russian South Siberia and Far East) and southern (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan). Such ‘turanism’ is intended to split the racial and geopolitical alliance of the Forest and the Steppe, which gave rise to the Russian state and the Great Russian ethnos, while with regard to Iran and Afghanistan it tears apart the religious unity of the Islamic world. With that in mind Russia should declare a harsh positional geopolitical war on Turkey and the bearers of “Panturanism”, in which the main ally of Russia would be the Islamic Aryan Iran. Central Asia should be “stretched” vertically between the two global Indo-European realities between Russians and Persians. In doing so, every effort should be made to highlight the local autonomist cultural trends in the whole Turkic space, to support the regionalist forces in the autonomous regions, and to aggravate the friction between clans, tribes, “ulus”, etc. Everywhere in this area, territories, districts, industrial complexes, economic cycles, and strategic objects should be sought to be enclosed in territories outside the Turkic area or in a strictly meridian direction. Thus, for example, Karakalpakstan in the west of Uzbekistan territorially should

be integrated not in the eastern direction (Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent), but in the northern (Kazakhstan) and southern (Turkmenistan). The border areas between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan should be restructured on the same principle; Samarkand and the Fergana Valley are historically and ethnically as much connected with the Tajik territories as with the Uzbek ones. The same is true for southern Kyrgyzstan.

The geopolitical pivot of the entire Central Asian geopolitical strategy of the tellurocracy must be Tajikistan. This area combines the most important aspects of the whole Russian 'Drang nach Süden', the 'spurt to the South'. Tajiks are Muslims of Indo-European origin, ethnically close to Iranians and Afghans. That is, they represent a fragment of the "Iranian" world in this region. At the same time, Tajikistan was part of Russia and the USSR, i.e. it was integrated into the continental, Eurasian geopolitical system proper. Therefore, the fate of this small highland country, ancient Sogdiana, symbolises the success (or failure) of the establishment of a new Eurasian order in Central Asia.

The actual border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan should not be perceived as a strict line. This is not a historical given, but a geopolitical assignment, as it would be in the interest of the country to abolish any strict limitations here altogether, moving the strategic boundary far to the south and reshaping the entire intermediate area on the basis of ethno-cultural, tribal and regional boundaries. Afghanistan has no tradition of complete centralised statehood. It is populated by a variety of nomadic and sedentary tribes (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, etc.), bound more by religion (Islam) than by statehood and politics. Therefore, Russia's geopolitical return to Afghanistan is inevitable and predetermined by geography itself. The only thing is that it is necessary to rely not so much on military power as on a wellthought-out geopolitical strategy, on the preparation of a conscious and voluntary strategic alliance on both sides, caused by the need for common opposition to Talasocracy, the "forces of the West" and "Atlantism", which automatically brings the Russians and Muslims closer together. In this process Tajikistan plays the role of the main base, and its territory becomes

a geopolitical laboratory, where two differently directed impulses converge - the Islamic impulse from the Indo-European Eurasian south and the Russian geopolitical impulse coming from the heartland, from the north. Here in Tajikistan, in Dushanbe or elsewhere, a joint Russian-Islamic strategy for the reorganization of a more northern "Turan" should be worked out. This land is called upon to work out an epochal solution for the creation of a New Eurasia, which would finally and irrevocably enshrine the thesis of an accomplished synthesis between the Steppe and the Northern Forest on the one hand, and between the same Steppe (Turan) and Iran, on the other.

Thus, it is logical to draw another ray from the Eurasian centre: Moscow Dushanbe Kabul Tehran, along which an unprecedented geopolitical reality should emerge.

Part of Tajikistan, Gorno-Badakhshan is located very close to Pakistan and India, which converge almost to one point together with China (Xinjiang). Although these areas are hardly passable, as they are located very high in the Pamir Mountains, Gorno-Badakhshan itself has a deep geopolitical meaning. It is populated by Ismailis, an Islamic heretical sect which is an expression of the most extreme Shi'ism, i.e. the most Indo-European (from a spiritual point of view) version of Islam. Badakhshan Ismailis are settled near the regions of Pakistan, and that state (although officially Sunni) is ethnically Hindu, converted to Islam. And this indicates that they are certainly closer to Indo-European trends within that religion, if not overtly 'Shiite', then 'Crypto-Shiite'. Not so far away is Indian Kashmir, also populated by Hindu Muslims and Shivaite. Uyghur Muslims also inhabit the Xinjiang region in China. Badakhshan's religious specificity and strategic location therefore provides it with an opportunity to become actively involved in major geopolitical issues that converge in this area - the Pakistan-India wars, potential Uyghur Islamic separatism in China, national liberation struggles in Tibet, the Sikh movement in the slightly southern Punjab and so on. All strands of this critical knot of Asia converge in Tajikistan, and more specifically in Badakhshan. Hence, an additional and independent axis, Moscow Khorog (the capital of Badakhshan), suggests itself. Moreover, since the link between

Badakhshan and the rest of Tajikistan is not very strong (ethno-religious and clan conflicts), Moscow should separate this region into a separate geopolitical reality, similar to Macedonia or Karabakh, since the strategic significance of Khorog is central to a giant region that exceeds not only the scale of Tajikistan but also that of Central Asia.

This whole complex area should be restructured under the most active influence of the “geographical axis of history” of Russia on the basis of the telluric model, i.e. contrary to the plans that Thalassocratic Atlanticist elements have for it. It is well known that it was England that supported the separatist movement of Indian Muslims that led to the secession of Pakistan. The Indo-Pakistani conflicts are also beneficial to the Atlanticists as it allows them to strengthen their political and economic influence in both regions, taking advantage of the geopolitical contradictions and making the entire region dependent on the military and strategic presence of the Americans and the British. Both Pakistan, India and China are now steadily entering the Thalassocratic-controlled rimland. The geopolitical role of Tajikistan and Badakhshan is to radically change this state of affairs and organize a Eurasian system of continental integration throughout this space. In the ideological sphere it is extremely important to take into account the slightest ethno-religious and cultural-linguistic nuances, and in the military-strategic sphere it is necessary to strive for rigid and non-alternative centralism.

In political terms, the anti-Americanism of fundamentalist Iran and the strict “neutrality” of India provide good grounds for the success of the Eurasian strategy. The rest depends on the geopolitical will of Moscow and, more broadly, of Russia-Eurasia.

4.7 The Fall of China

China is Russia’s most dangerous geopolitical neighbour to the South. In some ways, its role is similar to that of Turkey. But while Turkey is an outspoken NATO member and its strategic Atlanticism is obvious, with

China, the situation is more complicated.

China's geopolitics were initially ambivalent. On the one hand, it belonged to the rimland, the "coastal zone" of the Pacific Ocean (on the eastern side), but on the other hand, it never became a thalassocracy and on the contrary, it always oriented itself towards continental archetypes. That is why there is a stable political tradition to call China a "Middle Empire", and this term characterizes just continental tellurian formations. At the same time, China is separated from the Indian Ocean by the Indochina Peninsula, which is home to a constellation of states with an overtly thalassocratic orientation.

As the West conquered (colonised) the East, China gradually turned into a semi-colony with a marionetically pro-English government of the last generations of Qing dynasty emperors. From the beginning of the nineteenth century up to 1949 (the victory of the CCP over the Kuomintang), China's geopolitics followed purely Atlanticist tendencies (with China acting not as an independent thalassocracy, but as the Eurasian coastal base of the West). The victory of the Communist Party changed the situation, and China briefly (1949-1958) reoriented itself towards a Eurasian pro-Russian policy. However, due to historical traditions the Eurasian line was soon abandoned, and China opted for "autarky". It remained to wait for the moment when the Eurasian orientation would weaken to such an extent that the potential Atlanticism and geopolitical identity of China as a rimland would become evident. This happened in the mid-1970s, when China began active negotiations with representatives of the mondialist "Trilateral Commission". This meant a new entry of China into the structure of Atlanticist geopolitics.

While there is no denying that China could, under certain circumstances, rejoin the path of the Eurasian Alliance, this should not be counted on. From a purely pragmatic point of view, China is much better off with contacts with the West than with Russia, which cannot contribute to the technological development of this country, and such 'friendship' would only tie up China's freedom of geopolitical manipulation in the Far East, Mongolia and South Siberia. In addition, China's demographic growth poses the problem of "free

territories” for this country, and the lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia (almost unpopulated) appear to be highly attractive in this perspective.

China is dangerous to Russia for two reasons, as the geopolitical base of Atlantism and in its own right, as a country of increased demographic density in search of ‘no man’s land’. In both cases, it has a positional threat, the location of which is highly dangerous China occupies land to the south of Lenaland.

Furthermore, China has a closed racial-cultural character and has never participated in Eurasian continental building during historically foreseeable periods.

All these considerations, regardless of the political specifics, make China a potential geopolitical adversary for Russia in the South and the East. This should be acknowledged as a geopolitical axiom. Russia’s geopolitical task in relation to the easternmost sector of its “inner” southern belt is therefore to expand its zone of influence to the south as much as possible, creating as wide a “border zone” as possible. Eventually, Eurasia should extend its influence as far as Indochina, but achieving this through a win-win alliance is virtually impossible. And this is the fundamental difference between China and Islamic Asia (with the exception of Turkey) and India. If the Eurasian alliance with the other southern sectors of Eurasia should be based on the consideration of mutual interests, i.e. be the result of a conscious and voluntary alliance based on the awareness of the common geopolitical mission, the case of China is about the position-based geopolitical pressure, about provoking territorial disintegration, fragmentation, political and administrative redistribution of the state. The same approach applies to Turkey. China and Turkey are potential geopolitical adversaries. Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Korea, Vietnam and Japan are potential geopolitical allies. This suggests the use of two different geopolitical strategies. In the case of adversaries, harm should be sought; in the case of allies, common geopolitical goals should be identified.

It is now easy to derive the priorities of Russia’s “internal geopolitics” from

Badakhshan to Vladivostok.

The main model here is the severance of the North Thai territories from the more southern lands. Geopolitical analysis immediately provides a strong rationale for this. Northwest China falls within Xinjiang, the oldest country with a long history of political autonomy. Historically there have been numerous successive states here. Moreover, these lands are now inhabited by Uighurs, a Turkic ethnic group practising Islam. The Chinese maintain control in these areas through direct coercive pressure, direct colonization, oppressing the local population and suppressing all attempts to assert religious and ethnic autonomy. The ideas of annexing Xinjiang to Russia had already existed with the Russian emperors as part of the project to develop Siberia. This line should be revisited. South of Xinjiang stretches Kun Lun and Tibet, where we again encounter a similar situation. Tibet is a separate country with a special population, a specific religion and an ancient political and ethnic tradition. Beijing's power here is just as artificial and based on direct violence as in Xinjiang. Russia is geopolitically directly interested in actively supporting separatism in these areas and launching an anti-Chinese national liberation struggle in the entire area. In the long run, all these territories would fit harmoniously into a Eurasian continental federation, as they are not bound to Atlanticism either by geography or history. Xinjiang and Tibet should join the tellurocracy belt. This would be the most positive geopolitical solution and would create a reliable protection for Russia even if China does not give up its anti-Eurasian geopolitical projects. Without Xinjiang and Tibet, China's potential geopolitical breakthrough into Kazakhstan and Western Siberia becomes impossible. In this case, not only the complete liberation of these territories from Chinese control, but even the first stages of destabilisation in these regions would already be a strategic gain for Russia.

To the east is the Mongolian sector of Russia's strategic ally. The Mongolian steppes and deserts perfectly protect South Siberia from China. The Mongolian steppes and deserts perfectly protect South Siberia from China. At the same time, Mongolia's ties with Xinjiang and Tibet should be intensified

in order to create prerequisites for a new configuration of the entire region with an orientation to the gradual displacement of China and its geopolitical influence. The Mongol-Tibetan federation, which could also include Buryatia, Tuva, Khakassia and the Altai Republic, could be put forward for that purpose. The unity of the Lamaist tradition of these peoples is an important tool for Moscow's anti-Chinese geopolitical strategy.

The last area of the southern belt is Manchuria, in the north-east of China. Here, too, we encounter a weak (for China) geopolitical link. This territory was also home to ancient states with a tradition of political independence. Already in the twentieth century, Japan again recreated the Manchurian state, with its capital in Harbin, which was the continental bridgehead for Japan's invasion of China. For Russia, the existence of a special political state in Manchuria outside Chinese control is highly desirable. As Japan itself is among the potential geopolitical allies of Eurasia, it could join forces on this issue.

Tibet, Xinjiang Mongolia and Manchuria together form the security belt of Russia. The main objective in this region is to bring these lands under Russian control, using the potential geopolitical allies of Russia, India and Japan, as well as the local population suffering from Beijing's diktat. For China itself, this belt is a strategic springboard for a potential "push to the North", to Kazakhstan and Siberia. These lands, closely adjoining Lenaland from the south, around which the positional geopolitical confrontation of the leading world powers will inevitably unfold. Russia must tear away this bridgehead from China, push China to the south and offer it, as geopolitical compensation, development along the North-South axis in the southern direction of Indochina (except Vietnam), the Philippines, Indonesia and Australia.

4.8 From the Balkans to Manchuria

Eurasia must pressurise the South from the Balkan Peninsula to north-eastern China. This entire belt is a strategically important security zone for Russia. The peoples inhabiting different sectors of this space are ethnically, religiously and culturally diverse. But all without exception have elements that bring them closer to the geopolitical formula. For some it is Orthodoxy, for others the historical belonging to a single state, for others ethnic and racial affinity, for others a common enemy, for others a pragmatic calculation. Such diversity in the South requires a highly flexible geopolitics and highly sophisticated reasoning to justify the need for ties, alliances, etc. No single criterion has priority here; one cannot rely solely on one factor - ethnicity, religion, race, history, profit, etc. Each individual case should be handled differently. The highest criterion remains geopolitics and its laws, which should subordinate all other considerations and not become just an instrument of foreign (or domestic) policy based on some separate and independent principles. Only in this case can Eurasia achieve stability and Russia reliably ensure its continental security and the fulfilment of its telluric mission.

Chapter 5

Threat of the West

5.1 Two Wests

The problem of the organisation of space in the West of Eurasia is the topic that forms the basis of all geopolitics as a science. Western Europe is the rimland of Eurasia, and the rimland is the most complete, unambiguous and historically identifiable. Regarding Russia itself as a heartland, the West as a whole represents the main planetary adversary that sector of “coastal civilisation” which has fully assumed the function of a complete thalassocracy and has identified its historical destiny with the sea. England was in the vanguard of this process, but all the other European countries that adopted the baton of industrialisation, technical development and the value norms of the “merchant system” also joined this thalassocratic ensemble sooner or later.

In the course of the historical formation of the definitive geographical picture of the West, primacy from the island of England passed to the continent of America, especially to the United States. Thus, the ultimate embodiment of Thalassocracy in its strategic, ideological, economic and cultural aspects was the United States and the NATO bloc it controlled.

This final geopolitical fixation of planetary forces places the pole of Atlantism and thalassocracy beyond the Atlantic, on the American continent. Europe itself (even Western Europe, including England itself) from the cen-

tre of thalassocracy becomes a “buffer zone”, a “coastal belt”, a “strategic appendage” of the USA. This shift of the thalassocratic axis across the ocean changes the geopolitical configuration somewhat. While a century ago Europe (England and France) was Russia’s main adversary, after World War II the region lost its independent strategic importance, becoming a strategic colony of the United States. This transformation is strictly in line with the “view from the sea” that characterises the typically colonial attitude towards the mainland of any Thalassocracy. Whereas previously the “coastal” nature of Europe was a potential characteristic activated by the special geopolitical entity of the “island of England”, this now corresponds exactly to the actual distribution of power. The USA, a geopolitical reality that emerged from Europe as its almost artificial projection, has become a completely independent pole, the West in the absolute sense of the word, transforming Europe from a metropolis into a colony. All this is in perfect harmony with the classical logic of Thalassocratic geopolitics.

Thus, at present, the geopolitical problem of the planetary West, in its broadest sense, breaks down for Russia into two components the West as America and the West as Europe. In geopolitical terms, the two realities have different meanings. The West as America is Russia’s total geopolitical adversary, the pole of the direct opposite trend to Eurasia, the headquarters and centre of Atlanticism. Positional geopolitical warfare with America has constituted the essence of all Eurasian geopolitics since the mid-twentieth century, when the role of the United States became obvious. In this regard, the position is clear: it is necessary to counteract US Atlanticist geopolitics at all levels and in all regions of the world, trying to weaken, demoralise, deceive and, ultimately, defeat the enemy as much as possible. It is especially important to bring geopolitical turmoil into the US domestic reality by encouraging all kinds of separatism, various ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident movements of extremist, racist and sectarian groups that destabilize internal political processes in the USA. At the same time, it makes sense to support isolationist tendencies in US politics, the theses of those (often right-wing Republican) circles that believe that the US should confine itself to its domestic problems. This state of affairs is

highly advantageous to Russia, even if “isolationism” is carried out within the original Monroe Doctrine wording, i.e. if the US limits its influence to two Americas. This does not mean that Eurasia should give up on destabilising the Latin American world by seeking to remove certain regions from US control. All levels of geopolitical pressure on the US must be engaged simultaneously, just as the anti-Eurasian policy of Atlanticism simultaneously “sponsors” the processes of collapse of the strategic bloc (Warsaw Pact), state unity (USSR) and further ethno-territorial fragmentation, carrying out its progressive decay up to complete destruction in the guise of regionalising Russia. Heartland is forced to pay Sea Power with the same coin. This symmetry is logical and justified. All of this is central to Russia’s “foreign geopolitics” vis-à-vis the US, so a more detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.

The second reality, also referred to as “the West”, has a different meaning. It is Europe, the geopolitical meaning of which has changed dramatically in recent decades. Having traditionally been a metropolis for other parts of the planet, Europe has for the first time found itself in a colony situation strategically, culturally, economically, politically, etc. American colonialism is different from the more explicit and rigid forms of the past, but its meaning remains the same. Europe at the moment has no geopolitics of its own and no geographical will of its own; its functions are limited to serving as a back-up base for the US in Eurasia and as the site of the most likely conflict with Eurasia. Such a position automatically leads to the anti-American line becoming a common geopolitical alternative for the European states, uniting them in a single project that never existed before. The unification of Europe in Maastricht is the first signal of the emergence of Europe as a whole and an independent organism, claiming to regain its historical significance and geopolitical sovereignty. Europe wants to be neither Russian nor American. Since the end of the Cold War, this will has manifested itself in full scope.

Now the question arises: what, in general terms, is Eurasia’s attitude towards its western peninsula?

From a purely geopolitical point of view, Eurasia has a clear interest in

taking Europe out of the hands of Atlanticism, the US. This is a priority. In the West, Russia should have maritime borders, this is a strategic imperative for the geopolitical development of Eurasia. It was the absence of such borders and the presence instead of them of a land line crossing Europe in the middle, artificially and forcibly, that ultimately led to the geopolitical loss of the USSR. Hence, the task is not to repeat the mistakes and correct the situation. Eurasia will be free of Sea Power only when its strategic borders in the North, East, South and West will be the oceans in the same way as in the case of America. Only then will the duel of civilisations be on a level playing field.

Russia therefore has two options, either a military occupation of Europe or a reorganisation of the European space that would make this geopolitical sector a reliable strategic ally of Moscow, preserving its sovereignty, autonomy and autarchy. The first option is so unrealistic that it should not be seriously discussed. The second option is difficult, but feasible, as Europe's half-century as an American colony has left a serious mark on European consciousness.

A friendly Europe as a strategic ally of Russia can only emerge if it is united. Otherwise, the Atlantic adversary will find many ways to bring fragmentation and division into the European bloc, provoking a conflict similar to the two world wars. Therefore, Moscow should promote European unification as much as possible, especially by supporting the Central European states, above all Germany. The German-French alliance, the Paris-Berlin axis (de Gaulle's project), is the spinal column around which the body of the New Europe is most logically built. There is a strong anti-Atlantic political tradition in Germany and France (both on the right and on the political left). Potential and latent for the time being, it will at some point make itself known in full voice. Moscow should be guided by this line now, without waiting for the final developments.

Moscow's task is to wrest Europe from US (NATO) control, promote its unification and strengthen integration ties with Central Europe under the sign of the main foreign policy axis Moscow Berlin. Eurasia needs an allied,

friendly Europe. Militarily, it will not pose a serious threat on its own (without the US) for a long time to come, while economic cooperation with a neutral Europe could solve most technological problems for Russia and Asia in exchange for resources and a strategic military partnership.

Russia's domestic political situation in its western regions should also be analysed on the basis of this foreign-geopolitical task.

5.2 Break down the 'sanitation cordon'

The basic formula for analysing the geopolitics of the "Russian West" is the principle: "Europe European, Russia Russian". Here, in general, we should proceed in the same way as in the case of the Islamic world, new borders are inevitable, some regions should be divided anew, but in all cases the main task remains to create friendly neutral formations in the West, with maximum ethno-cultural, economic and social freedom, but with a strategic dependence on Moscow. The maximum objective is to "Finnishise" the whole of Europe, but the first step should be to reorganise the areas immediately adjacent to Russia.

This immediately raises a complex problem: the "cordon sanitaire". Atlanticist geopoliticians are well aware of the strategic dangers of an alliance between Russia and Europe (especially Germany) and have traditionally sought to prevent this. The most effective method of Thalassocracy is a "sanitary cordon", i.e. a band of several border states hostile to both eastern and western neighbours, and directly linked to the Atlanticist pole. Traditionally, this "cordon sanitaire" has been Poland and the Eastern European countries to the south - Czechoslovakia, Romania, etc. The idea of such a "cordon" was developed by the geopolitical scientist Mackinder and was very successfully implemented at the beginning of the century and before the Second World War. In both cases, the goal was achieved in the end, with a conflict between the two continentalist powers, Russia and Germany, resulting in strategic victories for the Atlanteans. America owes its place

at the helm of the West to the two world wars, which emaciated Europe and, in particular, weakened Germany and Russia (the main rivals of the Atlanticists).

Obviously, such a “cordon sanitaire” will still emerge, made up of small, embittered, historically irresponsible peoples and states, with manic claims and servile dependence on the thalassocratic West.

It is about the emergence of a geopolitical band between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, composed of states that cannot enter Europe as a full-fledged component, but which are intensively pushing away from Moscow and Eurasia. The contenders for membership of the new “cordon sanitaire” are the Baltic nations (Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians), Poland (including West Prussia), Belarus (this idea is lobbied for by the Catholic anti-Eurasian minority), Ukraine (especially the Western Uniate-catholic), Hungary, Romania (also under the influence of Unites), Czech and Slovakia. It can be seen that almost everywhere we are dealing with the Catholic sector of Eastern Europe, which traditionally belonged to the zone of Western influence. In this case, we are dealing with the same countries that have acted more than once in geopolitical history as levers for the destruction of the continental formations of the Russian Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, more recently, the USSR.

The task of Eurasia is to ensure that this cordon does not exist. This is in the interests of both Europe and Russia. These entities themselves, if considered as states, are insolvent, ethnically and confessional, strategically and economically underdeveloped, and devoid of resources. In other words, these fictitious states only make sense as strategic zones artificially supported by Atlanticism. Everywhere there are factors that tie them to Eurasia (either Orthodoxy, or awareness of Slavic kinship, or the presence of a Russian population, or historical proximity, or several components at once, etc.), but there are also opposing factors that bring them closer to the West (Catholicism, uniatism, ethnic otherness, political traditions of sovereignty, etc.). As long as these entities constitute a whole, they cannot prefer either of the two orientations, and that is why they become a “cordon sanitaire” in

the full sense of the word. Integration with the East is hindered by some elements, integration with the West by others. Hence the constant internal and external instability provoked by these countries, which plays into the hands of Thalassocratia and is a constant obstacle to Eurasian geopolitics and the continental bloc.

The only way to remove the *cordon sanitaire* is through a complete redistribution of state formations on the basis of purely geopolitical factors. This does not necessarily have to automatically mean the annexation of territories to other states. It may be a question of replacing states with federations or several states, whose geopolitical orientation, however, would be unambiguous. Small entities, ethnically, culturally and confessionally united, would find it easier to integrate into larger geopolitical blocs, and with the strong alliance between Russia and Europe, the new borders would not constitute a real threshold, a rupture. Moreover, only the absence of a “*cordon sanitaire*” can make these pan-Eurasian relations normal, turning the space from “Dublin to Vladivostok” into a zone of Eurasian cooperation, collaboration and strategic partnership.

5.3 Baltic Federation

Let us take a closer look at the entire western belt adjacent to Russia. The whole space is divided into several sectors. The northernmost is the Scandinavian belt, stretching from Norway to Finland. As far as Finland is concerned, we will look at the general geopolitical project in the chapter about the North. Here we are talking about a Karelian-Finnish ethno-territorial entity with maximum cultural autonomy, but with strategic integration into the Eurasian bloc. Norway and Sweden, as well as the Baltic republics, belong to a different geopolitical context, broader than the Karelian-Finnish issue.

Here we encounter the more general topic of Baltic and Scandinavian geopolitics. The most convenient thing would be to follow the Swedish geopolitician

Rudolf Chellen (who invented the term “geopolitics”) and consider the whole Baltic region as a northern extension of Central Europe, structured around Germany. Chellen argued that there could be no Nordic geopolitics other than a strategic alliance with Germany, based on ethnic, cultural and geographical commonalities. But the linking element in the whole construction should be Prussia the German state with the dominance of the Protestant denomination common to the Scandinavians. The Protestant-Scandinavian bloc should be the northern extension of Prussia, of Berlin. Therefore all this space, starting to realise itself as one whole, cannot do without the geopolitical re-establishment of Prussian unity. At the moment Prussia did not exist, its lands were divided between Germany, Poland and Russia. Hence, the most important prerequisite for the creation of a “neutral” politically and Moscow-friendly Baltic Federation is missing. Hence the practical impossibility to organise the region according to Eurasian principles.

On a purely theoretical level, the problem is solved in two steps:

1) A new ethno-confessional space is being recreated within historical Prussia. The initiators are Moscow and Berlin. This implies the loyalty of the named axis figure to Russia, which will give life to this entity by ceding part of the Prussian lands acquired during the Second World War (the Kaliningrad region).

2) Around Prussia, the process of strategically merging the Baltic states into a single bloc begins. The bloc includes Norway, Sweden, Germany, Estonia, Finland-Karelia, Denmark and possibly the Netherlands. A special status is delegated to Poland, Lithuania and Latvia. The prerequisite is that all countries withdraw from NATO and create a demilitarised zone in the Baltic. In the future, strategic control is transferred to Moscow and the forces of “neutral” Europe, i.e. the Eurasian defence complex.

The only weak elements in this system are Poland and Lithuania, where the dominant denomination is Catholicism. These lands have been the main lever of Thalassocratic geopolitics against Eurasia and the possibility of a

continental bloc. Moreover, there is a precedent in history for a significant political independence of the principality of Poland-Lithuania, and some historians (notably Spengler) have even spoken of the existence of a special “Baltic civilisation”, geographically coinciding, in general terms, with the historical boundaries of Poland and Lithuania. Only certain historical conditions prevented this civilisation from developing definitively and made it “abortive” (Spengler’s term). Admittedly, this problem has no positive solution at all, as it is formulated as follows: either the Polish-Lithuanian space will exist as an independent geopolitical reality (and then it will become an insurmountable obstacle to a pro-Eurasian Baltic unity with an axis in Prussia), or its fragments will be integrated into other geopolitical blocks, and it itself will be dismembered and nipped in the bud. Any integration on a Catholic basis in this region will create tensions with regard to the East (Moscow), the North (the Protestant world of Scandinavia) and the West (Germany). Hence, in Poland and Lithuania the main geopolitical partner of Eurasia should be the forces insisting on non-Catholic orientation of the policy of these countries, the supporters of secular “social democracy”, “neopagans”, “ethnocentrists”, Protestant, Orthodox religious circles and ethnic minorities. Moreover, ethnic tensions in Polish-Lithuanian relations are an extremely valuable element which should be exploited and, if possible, exacerbated.

If the re-establishment of Prussia would solve, for the most part, problems with Poland, which in such a situation would only have a way south (as the Baltic region would be under German-Russian control), the situation with Lithuania is even more complicated, as it is the northernmost fragment of the Catholic world, has a long coastline on the Baltic and separates Russian space from the northern extremity of Central Europe, belonging to neither world. Obviously, the Atlanticist geopoliticians will not fail to take advantage of that and try to make Lithuania the cause of discord and the main obstacle to the reorganization of Europe. The negative consequences of Lithuania’s geopolitical location for the Eurasian project can be limited only partly by strengthening the strategic unity of the whole area and trying to close it from the north-west through the Swedish-Danish link.

5.4 Catholic Slavs enter Central Europe

Descending further south, we reach the Slavic-Catholic or Uniate region, which extends from Poland through Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, Volhynia, Galicia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic to Croatia and Slovenia in the west of the Balkan Peninsula. Geopolitically adjacent to this space are Hungary, Austria and Bavaria, populated respectively by Catholic Hungarians and Germans. The Uniate Church also exists in Orthodox Romania. This predominantly Slavic area, despite its ethnic and racial kinship with Russia, has never identified itself with the East Slavic statehood, and even less with the Eurasian empire of Moscow. Ethnic kinship in this case is not a sufficient basis for geopolitical integration. The ambiguity of this factor has historically given rise to conflicts and wars between Russia and Germany (more broadly Europe) and has impeded the organic and consistent organisation of the geopolitical ensemble of Central Europe.

Culturally Slavic Catholic peoples were formed in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and ethnic friction with it, leading to the collapse, only arose when Vienna itself lost sight of its supranational imperial geopolitical mission and became more and more identified with ethnic “Germanism”. The only exceptions were Bohemia, Moravia and Bosnia, where Slavs were initially aware of their spiritual difference from Germanic-Catholic origins, as expressed in the Hussite wars, Reformation ferment and outbursts of sectarianism (in the case of the Bosnian Serb Bogomils). Geopolitically, all these peoples belong to Central Europe and should be structured around a Central European centre, which is naturally Germany. Direct influence on these areas can never be a priority for Moscow, as ethnic proximity only emphasises cultural-historical and spiritual-confessional differences.

On the basis of these considerations, Russia should give up direct control over the countries of Eastern Europe, leaving them to German control. In doing so, Moscow should not just passively wait for this to happen

on its own, but should actively facilitate organic processes in this sphere in order to become, together with Berlin, the initiator and realiser of the whole process, thus acquiring a geopolitical share in the solution of all delicate problems. In doing so, the dominance over some regions of western Ukraine, Galicia and Transcarpathia, compactly populated by Uniates and Catholics, will have to be relinquished. The same applies to some regions of Belarus. By renouncing direct political domination over certain territories, Moscow should in return receive the right of strategic presence on the westernmost borders of the entire Central European region. This is the point of the whole reorganization of Eastern Europe. Moscow should commit itself to granting the entire Catholic-Slavic area the possibility of integration into Central Europe under Berlin, i.e. to close this zone according to the principle of North-South. The only important thing is to exclude Lithuania from this ensemble (for the reasons we have already mentioned, so that the whole Central European structure is patronized strictly by two parties (Russia and Germany), with the complete exclusion of the West talassocratic, because otherwise the whole belt will acquire the opposite meaning, turning into a “sanitary cordon” (although it is created just to prevent such a “cordon” from emerging).

5.5 Unification of Belarus and Greater Russia

The map, which takes into account the confessional structure of Eastern Europe, clearly shows how, as one moves southwards, the Orthodox population shifts further west, crowding out the Catholic population. Some Serbian land reaches the Adriatic coast, and there is also a certain percentage of Orthodox Christians among the Albanians (the founder of independent Albania was the Orthodox priest Fan Noli).

These territories, which include Belarus, central Ukraine, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria, have a dual geopolitical nature geographically they belong to the southern sector of Central Europe, but culturally and confes-

sional to Russia-Eurasia. The spiritual identity of these peoples has been shaped by opposition to Islam in the south and Catholicism in the west, and their national idea is inseparably linked to Orthodoxy. In such a situation, Moscow can neither fully delegate geopolitical control of the region to Germany, nor can it claim direct political influence over these countries. All the more so because Russian-Moldovan and Russian-Romanian relations (not to mention Ukraine) are not all that smooth. Russia has the closest historical contacts with Serbia, but it is impossible to build on them the tactics of integration of the entire region, as Serbia has also traditionally rather strained relations with its Orthodox neighbours. Besides, the general picture of Russia's geopolitical strategy in the Balkans has been highlighted in the chapter on the South. Here, however, we should look more specifically at the territories occupied by Belarus, Ukraine and Romania (with Moldova).

With regard to Belarus, the geopolitical picture is quite clear. With the exception of a small number of Polonised Belarusians (Catholics and Uniats, as well as Poles), the vast majority of the population clearly belongs to the Russian space and should be regarded as a subject of the central Eurasian ethnos, i.e. as "Russians" in cultural, religious, ethnic and geopolitical terms. Linguistic specificities and some ethnic and cultural peculiarities do not change the overall picture. Therefore, Moscow should integrate with Belarus in the closest possible way, keeping in mind that promoting the cultural and linguistic identity of the Belarusians is an important positive aspect in the whole system of Eurasian integration. This principle should be observed as strictly with respect to the ethnicities belonging to the single state as it is with respect to the frontier peoples or neighbours. The only painful step in Belarus, which should be taken to prevent centrifugal and subversive tendencies, is the separation into a special administrative category of some regions compactly populated by Catholics and Uniats, up to the point of granting them substantial autonomy sufficient for joining the Central European space. The desire to keep all of Belarus under Moscow's direct and strict control at all costs will result in a smouldering embers of a potential geopolitical conflict in Belarus and its western neighbours, which in this

case (unlike, for example, in Lithuania) can be resolved in the interests of all parties concerned.

Belarus should be seen as part of Russia, and therefore integration with it should be along the West-East axis, which is a priority in all cases of internal organisation of ethnically homogeneous space. Russia's true western border should run much further west, so in a complete geopolitical picture, the Belarusian lands belong to the central region rather than the western periphery.

5.6 Geopolitical Decomposition of Ukraine

The issue of Ukraine is more complex, although the model of its geopolitical composition is very similar. Here, however, the geopolitical scale of Ukraine, which is a gigantic territorial entity exceeding many major European powers, plays an important role. Separatism and political sovereignty tendencies are incomparably more active in Ukraine. Ukraine as a state has no geopolitical sense. It has no special cultural heritage, no geographical uniqueness, and no ethnic exclusiveness. The historical meaning of Ukraine is reflected in its very name "Ukraine", i.e. "outskirts", "border territories". In the era of Kievan Rus, the territories of present-day Ukraine were the centre of statehood of the Eastern Slavs, for whom at that time Vladimir (later Moscow) was the eastern outskirts ("Ukrainian") and Novgorod the northern. But as Russia transformed from a Slavic state into a Eurasian empire, the geopolitical functions of the major centres changed radically. Moscow became the capital of the empire, while Kyiv became a secondary centre where Eurasian and Central European influences converged. A synthesis of cultures was out of the question. Rather, the more archaic, strictly Russian Orthodox strata were exposed to the dynamic more 'modernist' influences of Western Europe, especially through Poland to the west and Austria-Hungary to the south-west. There is no doubt that Ukrainian culture and language are distinctive and unique, but they lack any universal significance. The

Cossack settlements, which formed the Ukrainian ethnos, were noted for their independence, special ethical, economic and social ways. But all these elements are insufficient for geopolitical independence and the potamic map of Ukraine, where the main rivers (Dniester, Dnieper, etc) flow parallel to each other, explains the slow development of Ukrainian statehood.

For this reason, the independent existence of Ukraine (especially within its current borders) can only make sense as a “cordon sanitaire”, as opposing elements in geopolitical orientation will not allow the country to fully join either the eastern or western bloc, i.e. Russia-Eurasia or Central Europe. All this dooms Ukraine to a puppet existence and geopolitical service to the Thalassocratic strategy in Europe. In this sense, Ukraine’s role is similar to that of the Baltic republics. On this basis, at one time there was a serious discussion about the creation of a “Black Sea-Baltic federation”, i.e. a typical “cordon sanitaire” of a subversive geopolitical entity, serving to provoke instability in Eastern Europe and to prepare the ground for a series of armed conflicts. The existence of Ukraine in its current borders and with the current status of a “sovereign state” is tantamount to a monstrous blow to Russia’s geopolitical security, tantamount to an invasion of its territory.

The continued existence of a unitary Ukraine is unacceptable. This territory should be divided into several belts, corresponding to a range of geopolitical and ethno-cultural realities.

1) Eastern Ukraine (everything east of the Dnieper from Chernihiv to the Sea of Azov) is a densely populated territory dominated by the Great Russian ethnos and the Orthodox population of Little Russia. All this territory is undoubtedly close to Russia and is connected to it culturally, historically, ethnically and religiously. This beautifully developed, technologically advanced region may well be an independent geopolitical region, with wide autonomy, but in an unconditional and strongest alliance with Moscow. Meridian integration is preferable here, linking the Kharkov region with the more northern (Belgorod, Kursk and Bryansk regions) proper Russian territories and spreading the construction to the south.

2) Crimea is a special geopolitical entity traditionally characterised by ethnic mosaicism. The Ukrainians, Velikorosses and Crimean Tatars are settled in Crimea in a very complex configuration and represent three rather hostile geopolitical impulses. The Velikorosses are strongly pro-Moscow oriented (more aggressively than in the rest of Ukraine, even in eastern Ukraine). The Malorossians, on the other hand, are extremely nationalistic. The Crimean Tatars in general are more oriented towards Turkey and are quite hostile towards Russia. The geopolitical orientation of the Crimean Tatars is out of the question at all, as Turkey is in every respect a direct geopolitical opponent of Russia. But the presence of Tatars in Crimea cannot be disregarded either. The direct annexation of Crimea to Russia would cause an extremely negative reaction of the Little Russian population and create problems for the integration of this peninsula into the Russian system through Ukrainian territories, which is not realistic at all. Leaving Crimea to “sovereign Ukraine” is also impossible, as it poses a direct threat to Russia’s geopolitical security and generates ethnic tensions in Crimea itself. Taking all these considerations into account, one can conclude that Crimea should be given a special status and maximum autonomy under direct strategic control of Moscow, but taking into account Ukrainian socio-economic interests and ethno-cultural demands of Crimean Tatars.

3) The central part of Ukraine from Chernihiv to Odessa, which includes Kiev, is another complete region, ethnically dominated by the Malorossian ethnos and language, but dominated by Orthodoxy. This Orthodox Malorossia is an independent geopolitical reality, culturally related to Eastern Ukraine and definitely part of the Eurasian geopolitical system.

4) Western Ukraine is heterogeneous. In the north it is Volhynia, a separate region, to the south Lviv region (Galicia), even further south Transcarpathia (the westernmost bulge), and finally the eastern part of Bessarabia. All these regions are rather independent regions. Volhynia is dominated by Uniates and Catholics, this region culturally belongs to the Catholic geopolitical sector of Central Europe. The picture is almost the same in Galicia and Transcarpathia, although these more southerly lands represent a separate

geopolitical reality. Volhynia is historically linked to Poland and Galicia and Transcarpathia to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Bessarabian lands of Ukraine are inhabited by a mixed population, with Little Russians and Great Russians interspersed with Romanians and Moldovans. The region is almost entirely Orthodox and forms an Orthodox belt, extending obliquely from Velikorossia to the Balkans to Serbia. The whole sector from Bessarabia to Odessa should be attributed to the central Ukrainian geopolitical space, so it is more logical to include it in the meridional left bank belt of the Dnieper, whose western border extends from Rivne to Ivano-Frankovsk along the North-South axis and further along the Dniester to Odessa in the south.

Thus Western Ukraine, in the narrow sense of the term, consists of the three regions of Volhynia and Galicia and Transcarpathia. While territorially close, they differ in topography (Zakarpattia is mountainous, as is Slovakia), ethnic composition and political traditions. These regions, which today actively influence the general political atmosphere in Ukraine, actively pursuing an anti-Moscow, pro-Western geopolitical line, should be granted a considerable degree of autonomy (up to and including political) in order to detach these “subversive” territories from the Orthodox and generally pro-Russian all-Ukrainian space, both central and eastern. The strategic border of Russia on these parallels cannot depend on the location of the Ukrainian-Polish, Ukrainian-Hungarian or Ukrainian-Slovak border. This strategic frontier must extend much further west, at least to the western extremity of Central Europe, and at best across the Atlantic. It is from this perspective that the whole geopolitical restructuring of this region is undertaken, because as the initiator of the geopolitical transformations in Eastern Europe, and as the main partner of Germany, Russia should insist, first of all, on the condition that this entire area be taken out of Atlanticist control and that a Eurasian continental defense complex be created in this place, consisting of a military-strategic cooperation between Russia and Europe as a whole.

Volhynia, Galicia and Transcarpathia could form a common “Western Ukrainian federation”, the degree of integration within which could be

set arbitrarily depending on specific circumstances. The most important thing here is to draw a cultural and confessional boundary between Central Ukraine (Kyiv land proper) and Western Ukraine to avoid a disharmonious Central European Catholic or Uniate influence on the Orthodox territories.

The Ukrainian factor is the most vulnerable place in Russia's western belt. Whereas elsewhere the danger of destroying the geopolitical consistency of the heartland is potential, and the positional struggle for a Eurasian geopolitical system has only preventive aims, the existence of a "sovereign Ukraine" is on a geopolitical level a declaration of geopolitical war on Russia (and this is not so much a matter of Ukraine itself, as of Atlantism and Sea Power). It is not that Ukraine itself deliberately chooses the role of Atlanticist "cordon sanitaire", although in some cases this cannot but be a conscious step, but that it in practice begins to fulfill this role, as long as it is not actively involved in integration processes with Moscow or (at least) does not disintegrate into separate geopolitical components.

The Ukrainian problem is the main and most serious problem facing Moscow. If the problems of the North and the "polar trapezoid" are related to the distant future of Russia and Eurasia, if the development of Siberia and the battle for Lenaland are relevant to the near future, if, finally, the positional strategy for the reorganisation of the Asian South is relevant to Russia, but preventive in nature, the geopolitics of the West and the centre of this geopolitics "Ukrainian question" requires Moscow to respond immediately, because it is about a strategic strike already in progress, to which "the geographical axis of history" simply has no right not to respond.

Given that a simple integration of Moscow with Kiev is impossible and will not produce a sustainable geopolitical system, even if it happens against all objective obstacles, Moscow should actively engage in the reorganisation of the Ukrainian space according to the only logical and natural geopolitical model.

5.7 Romania and Moldova integration under which sign?

Romania and Moldova represent two parts of a single geopolitical region inhabited by a single orthodox ethnos of descendants of the Dacians, who speak a Latin group language and have largely absorbed the cultural, linguistic and racial elements of the Slavic environment. From the geopolitical point of view, the integration of Romania and Moldova is inevitable, but Moscow should seek to carry out this integration for its own purposes, in order to include this space in its area of direct strategic control. The culture of Romania is in general a typical Orthodox model, directly linking these lands with Eurasia. The only obstacle to the perfect integration of these lands into Russia is the linguistic factor and the geopolitical proximity to the Catholic regions. In addition, there is a significant percentage of Hungarian Catholics and Romanian Uniates in Banat in the west of Romania.

Through Romania, Moldova and Central Ukraine runs a continuous band of Orthodox peoples, linking the lands of Russia with Serbia, Eurasia's outpost in the Balkans. It is in the interests of Eurasia to turn this entire area into one strategic and cultural region, in effect one country. This requires Moscow to be the initiator of the Moldovan-Romanian integration, the sign of which should initially be defined as Orthodox and Eurasian. At the same time, it is important that the Romanian Orthodox enclave from the east and west should be closed by the proper Slavic Orthodox peoples Ukrainians and Serbs, thus ensuring the continuity of territorial integration, based not so much on ethnic but rather on confessional and cultural affinity. At the same time, such an "Orthodox bloc" from the Dniester to Montenegro, with a united Romania at its centre, should be formed in cooperation with Berlin, which is given the westernmost part of Central Europe from Prussia through the Czech Republic and Slovakia to Hungary and Austria, and on to Croatia, i.e. the Adriatic. If one adds the eastern protrusion of Poland and East Prussia, which goes to Germany to the north, a natural extension of Russia to the west in the Balkan region would be logical and acceptable, without upsetting the geopolitical balance of Central Europe, which geopolitically belongs to Germany's sphere of

influence.

5.8 Prerequisite: soil, not blood

All these actions are derived from the overall picture of European geopolitics, in which the regions of Central Europe (under German auspices) and Western Europe in the narrow sense are clearly distinguished. Russia has no direct points of contact with Western Europe, so the pursuit of a Eurasian strategy in this region (of which France is a key element) depends on building a pan-European construct along the Berlin-Paris axis. But the Eurasian factor in Western Europe cannot be a direct line for Moscow. Moscow only acts here through Berlin, and Eurasian continentalist and anti-Atlanticist tendencies are described here by the single term “Germanophilia”. For the French, no more distinct “Eurasianism” can be demanded than “Germanophilia”, since Western Europe comprehends the problems of the “heartland” through German continentalism. Russia is in this case a “geopolitical abstraction”.

However, this does not mean that Russia should be indifferent to Western European problems. It is in its interest to bring the whole of Europe out from under Atlanticist influence, which means that Moscow should actively promote the alignment of Western Europe with Central Europe, i.e. with Germany.

Germany itself should, however, put forward a fundamental requirement from the outset: all integration processes in Central Europe, where Berlin’s geopolitical dominance is overt, as well as all transformations in Western Europe that aim to orient European powers towards Germany, must exclude the principle of ethnic German dominance in the cultural, political, confessional or ideological field. Europe must be European and Central Europe must be Middle European, i.e. all linguistic, ethnic and spiritual identities of the peoples of Europe must flourish and be promoted by Berlin, whose priority must be exclusively geopolitical and social, and under no circumstances racial. For many Central European ethnicities, Moscow is also

responsible by virtue of its racial kinship with them (Slavicism). Moreover, it is precisely the ethnocentrism and national, racial arrogance of the Germans that has repeatedly led to bloody conflicts in Europe. Throughout the geopolitical reorganisation of Europe, Russia should act as a guarantor of Berlin's strict separation of geopolitics and race, of "soil and blood", to a certain extent to exclude tragedies like Hitler's adventure. Any signs of German nationalism in the geopolitical reorganisation of Europe must be mercilessly suppressed by Berlin itself; all processes must be based on the strictest respect for "peoples' rights", the full autonomy of cultures, faiths and languages.

Moscow should make the same demands of itself and its allies. Ethnicity should be encouraged and actively supported by the geopolitical centre only in a positive aspect, as an affirmative reality, as national self-identification. Of course, one should not expect the complete disappearance of interethnic tensions and the manifestation of the negative aspects of national self-assertion, but it is at this point that the principle of geopolitical centralism should come into active play as the supraethnic arbiter, solving internal problems on the basis of the vital political and strategic interests of the Eurasian whole.

This principle is universal for all regions in which the New Eurasian Order is to be established, both internally for Russia and externally. But in the case of the West, Europe, this is particularly important, since the ethnic problems in these spaces are at the root of all the worst conflicts that rocked the twentieth century.

PART 6 EURASIAN ANALYSIS

Chapter 1

GEOPOLITICS OF GOVERNMENT

1.1 East and West of the Christian Eecumenes

The most significant point in defining the geopolitical specificity of Orthodoxy is that it is the Church *of the East*. In the borders of the Christian world, before the discovery of America, which geographically coincided with the north-west of the Eurasian continent, the Middle East and North Africa, one can clearly see the demarcation line between the Orthodox space and the Catholic space. This division is certainly not a historical coincidence. The Orthodox world is spiritually and qualitatively related to the East, while Catholicism is a strictly Western phenomenon. And as long as this is the case, the very theological formulations underlying the final division of the churches in 1054 must also have elements of a geopolitical character.

The controversy about the 'filioque', i.e. the emanation of the Holy Spirit from the Father alone or from the Father and the Son(1), in theological terms anticipates the further development of two types of Christian and post-Christian civilisations, the rationalist-individualist Western one and the mystical-collectivist Eastern one. The adoption by the West of the amendment to the Nicene Creed concerning the 'filioque' finally consolidated the orientation towards a rationalist theology of so-called 'subordinatism', i.e. the introduction of hierarchically subordinated relationships into divine reality, which belittled the mysterious and supersensible nature of the Trinity.

Parallel to the question of the “filioque” an important point of contention was the idea of the primacy of the See and the supreme theological authority of the Pope. This was also one of the consequences of Catholic “subordinationism” which insisted on a strict, straightforward hierarchy even in those matters which were under the sign of the providential work of the Holy Spirit for the salvation of the world. This position was completely at odds with the idea of the linguistic autonomy of the local Churches and, in general, with Orthodoxy’s traditional ultimate freedom in the realm of spiritual realisation.

Finally, the last and most important aspect of the division of the churches into Eastern and Western was Rome’s rejection of the holy Fathers’ teaching on the Empire, which is not simply a secular administrative apparatus, roughly subordinate to ecclesiastical authority, as the Popes wanted to present it, but a mysterious soteriological organism actively engaged in the eschatological drama as an “obstacle to the coming of the Antichrist”, a “catechon”, a “holding”, as stated in the Second Epistle of the Apostle Paul to the Thessalonians.

The supremacy of divine action (the primacy of apophatic mystical theology), the spiritual and linguistic freedom of the local churches (going back to the apostles’ glossolalia on Pentecost) and the doctrine of the sacral role of the Empire and emperors (the theory of Orthodox symphony) are the main points defining the specificity of Orthodoxy in contrast to Catholicism which actually denies these aspects of Christianity.

All these differences were noticeable long before the final rupture, but a certain balance could be maintained until 1054. Since then the geopolitical dualism of the Christian eikumene has been completely defined, and both Orthodox and Catholic worlds have gone their own separate ways.

Up to 1453 (the date of the capture of Constantinople by the Turks) the Orthodox Church was geopolitically identified with the fate of the Byzantine Empire. The world of Catholicism encompassed Western Europe. Until then, Rome and Constantinople were two Christian “big spaces” (in geopo-

litical terminology) with their own geopolitical, political, economic and cultural interests, as well as with a clearly fixed and unambiguous theological specificity, reflecting and predetermining the difference between the churches with all intellectual dogmatic unambiguity and logical interconnection. The West was based on the rationalist theology of Thomas Aquinas, the East continued the line of mystical theology, apophaticism and monastic wisdom, most vividly embodied in the texts of the great Athonite Hesychast St Gregory Palamas.

Palamas versus Thomas Aquinas is a theological formula reflecting the essence of the geopolitical dualism of the Christian East and the Christian West. The mystical contemplation of the light of Favour, the symphony of powers and the liturgical glossolalia of the local churches (Orthodoxy) versus rationalist theology, papal diktat in the secular affairs of European kings and the dominance of Latin as the only sacred liturgical language (Catholicism). There is a geopolitical confrontation between two worlds with different cultural orientations, psychological dominance and different, specific political structures.

This is the most general outline of the basics of Orthodox geopolitics. Obviously, in such a situation the main task of Byzantium and the Orthodox Church was to preserve its structure, to protect the limits of its political and spiritual influence, to defend its independence. And Orthodoxy in this situation had two main geopolitical opponents:

- 1) *The non-Christian world*, whose pressure was manifested both in barbarian incursions into the empire's outskirts and in the massive pressure of the Islamised Turks;
- 2) *The Christian world of the West*, seen not just as a land of "Latin heresy" but as a world of apostasy, of apostasy, as a land of people who had known truth and salvation but had abandoned them and betrayed them.

In such an original and complete picture of the geopolitical place of Orthodoxy it is very easy to discern all the geopolitical problems that

would worry the Eastern Church and the Orthodox states for centuries after the dissolution of Byzantium. The Byzantine emperors were at a certain point confronted with the double threat of “*the Turkish turban or the Latin mitre*”. Given the particular theological attitude towards the West and Rome, it is easy to understand those Orthodox who made the choice in favour of the “Turkish turban” in those cases where a third was not available. Incidentally, many Orthodox took the fall of Constantinople as God’s punishment for a geopolitical move by Byzantium, which tried to get closer to Rome by accepting the “filioque” in the so-called “Florentine Union” (although this recognition was denounced upon the return of the ambassadors to Constantinople).

1.2 Post-Byzantine Orthodoxy

After the fall of Constantinople the whole geopolitical picture changed dramatically. Although the Patriarch of Constantinople remained the head of the Orthodox Church, the entire structure was disrupted. Recall that one of the cornerstones of Orthodoxy was the doctrine of the soteriological function of the Empire, and since the Orthodox Empire (and, accordingly, the Orthodox Emperor, the Vasilevos) no longer existed, the Church was forced to enter a new, special and rather paradoxical, period of its existence. From this moment the whole Orthodox world is divided into two parts, with profound differences not only geopolitically but also theologically.

The first sector of the post-Byzantine Orthodox world is represented by those Churches which found themselves in the zone of political control of non-Orthodox states, especially in the Ottoman Empire. These Churches were administratively part of the so-called Orthodox Millet, which included Orthodox Greeks, Serbs, Romanians, Albanians, Bulgarians and Arabs, until the collapse of the empire. The Patriarch of Constantinople was considered the supreme figure amongst the Orthodox, although there was also the Patriarch of Alexandria (archpastor of the Orthodox Greeks and Arabs

living in Egypt) and the Patriarch of Antioch (head of the Orthodox Arabs in the territory of modern Syria, Iraq and Lebanon). The small Patriarchate of Jerusalem had a special status, as did the autocephalous Churches of Cyprus and Mount Sinai. The Patriarchate of Constantinople was considered superior throughout the Orthodox world, although there was not a direct hierarchy as in Catholicism and the autocephalous churches had a considerable degree of autonomy (2). The Patriarchate of Constantinople is located in the Fanar quarter, and from this word comes the collective name of the Greek clergy subordinate to this Patriarchate “Phanariots”. It should be noted that since 1453 this sector of the Orthodox world has been in an ambiguous position both geopolitically and theologically, since the absence of an Orthodox state directly affects the eschatological vision of Orthodox political history and means that the Church remains in the world as an “apostasy sea”, where the mystical arrival of the “son of perdition” is no longer inhibited. The inevitable rejection of the Orthodox symphony of powers transforms the Greek Orthodox Church (and other churches connected to it by political destiny) into something other than what it originally was. This means that its theological and geopolitical orientations are changing. Its sacred nature is also changing.

The clear understanding of the relationship between theology and politics in a fully-fledged Orthodox doctrine led Russia to embark on the path it has followed since the fifteenth century, which is intimately linked to the theory of “Moscow the Third Rome”. Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church are the second sector of post-Byzantine Eastern Christianity, which has a very different geopolitical and even spiritual nature.

The establishment of the Patriarchate in Russia and the proclamation of Moscow as the “Third Rome” has a direct bearing on the mystical destiny of Orthodoxy as such. After the fall of Constantinople, Russia remains *the only* geopolitical “big space” where both Orthodox politics and the Orthodox Church existed. Russia becomes the successor of Byzantium both theologically and geopolitically. Only here all three basic parameters that made Orthodoxy what it was, unlike both the Latin West and the polit-

ical domination of non-Christian regimes, were preserved. Consequently, along with its mystical status as the “barrier to the coming of the son of perdition”, Moscow inherited the full extent of Constantinople’s geopolitical issues. Just like Byzantium, Russia faced two hostile geopolitical realities with the same “Latin mitre” and the same “Turkish turban”. But in this case, the full weight of historical responsibility fell on the Russian tsars, the Russian Church and the Russian people. The fact that this responsibility was transferred to Moscow after the fall of Constantinople, gave the whole situation a special eschatological drama, reflected not only in the psychology of Russians in the past five centuries, but also in the specific geopolitical orientation of the Russian state and the Russian Church. Parallel to this was the formation of the concept of the Russian people as a “people-bo-ghonos”.

At the same time, however, a new problem arose: relations with the Orthodox world outside Russia and the status of the Patriarch of Constantinople in relation to the Patriarch of Moscow. The fact is that the non-Russian Orthodox were faced with a dilemma: either to recognize Russia as the “ark of salvation”, the new “Holy Land”, the “catechumen” and, accordingly, to submit to Moscow’s spiritual authority, or, conversely, to deny the possibility of the existence of an “Orthodox Tsardom” as such, and to treat Moscow as an illegitimate usurpation of the Byzantine eschatological function. According to this choice, Moscow had to build its relations with the rest of the churches. It can be said that, in fact, from this moment on, the Orthodox world was divided into two parts, geopolitically and *theologically* different. It is known that in Constantinople’s sphere of influence the anti-Moscow line won, which means that the clergy of the Phanariots adapted the Orthodox doctrine to those conditions where political projection was out of the question. In other words, Greek Orthodoxy changed its nature from an integral spiritual-political doctrine to an exclusively religious doctrine of individual salvation. Henceforth the rivalry between Constantinople and Moscow was essentially a confrontation between two versions of full-fledged Orthodoxy, in the case of Moscow, and a reduced version, in the case of Constantinople.

Moreover, the changes in the quality of Greek Orthodoxy brought it, in a

sense, closer to the line of Rome, as one of the three main points of dogmatic controversy (the question of the “catechumens”) fell away by itself. The spiritual rapprochement of the Fanariots with the Vatican was accompanied by their political rapprochement with the Turkish administration, in which many Orthodox Greeks traditionally held high positions. This bifurcated existence, coupled with the rivalry with the Russian Church for influence over the Orthodox world, in fact, deprived Greek Orthodoxy of an independent geopolitical mission, making it only one of the minor geopolitical factors in the more general non-Orthodox context of the political intrigues of the Ottoman authorities and the papal legates.

In any case, since the fifteenth century the term “geopolitics of Orthodoxy” has become almost identical to the term “geopolitics of Russia”.

At the same time, it would be wrong to regard the entire non-Russian Orthodox world as being controlled by fanatic politics. In various parts there were also opposing sentiments which recognised the theological and eschatological primacy of Orthodox Russia. This was particularly true of the Serbs, Albanians, Romanians and Bulgarians, with whom Russophile and fanatical geopolitical tendencies have traditionally competed. This manifested itself with all its force in the nineteenth century, when the Orthodox peoples who were part of the Ottoman Empire made desperate attempts to regain their national and political independence.

1.3 The Petersburg period

But between the fall of Constantinople and the beginning of the struggle for the independence of the Orthodox peoples of the Balkans an event took place which is of great significance for Orthodoxy in the widest sense. We are talking about the Russian Schism and the reforms of Peter the Great immediately following it. At this point in Russia there was a qualitative change in the status of Orthodoxy, and the dogmatic foundations of the Eastern Church, which had remained unshaken for about 200 years, have

now been shaken. The fact is that the transfer of the capital from Moscow to Saint Petersburg and the abolishment of the Patriarchate, together with the establishment of the Synod, meant that Russia ceased to be a dogmatically legitimate Orthodox Empire in the theological and eschatological sense. In fact, the transition was made from a proper Orthodox geopolitical model to some semblance of a Protestant state. Henceforth, Russian Orthodoxy has also become an ambiguous reality, which only overlaps on a geopolitical level with the Russian State. But although the dogmatic background has been frankly shaken, the overall logic of Russian geopolitics continued the original line, albeit at a different level, as secular and purely political interests began to clearly dominate over the religious and eschatological issues. In parallel, in the West itself, the traditional Catholic model also gave way to the consolidation of purely national-political entities, nation-states, so that there too theological concerns were erased and overshadowed in the face of more practical, mercantile and narrowly political interests. However, the geopolitical layout, predetermined dogmatically in the schism of the churches, remained summarily the same, apart from the emergence of Protestant countries.

Protestantism is geopolitically divided into strictly two sectors - Prussian Lutheranism and Anglo-Swiss-Hollandic Calvinism. Despite the outward similarity and synchronicity of both outbursts of protest against Rome, Lutheranism and Calvinism have an almost polar opposite significance. The Lutheran camp, concentrated in the Prussian state, was based both dogmatically and mystically on a critique of the Vatican in terms of the radicalisation of New Testament assumptions, and in general terms this reproduced traditional Orthodox claims to Catholicism. Lutheran Prussia was also geographically located between Orthodox Russia and Catholic Western Europe. In contrast, Calvinism, which became the state religion in England (and later to a great extent influenced the political order in the USA), was based on an emphatically Old Testament approach and criticised Rome from this perspective. It is no coincidence that geographically Calvinism and the resulting sects gravitated towards the far West both in Europe and across the Atlantic.

The post-Petrine Russia of the Romanovs was closer to the Prussian model, i.e. moving away from Orthodox dogma proper, it stopped halfway towards Catholicism, which, moreover, gradually gave way to the nation states. The main geopolitical tension was between Russia on the one hand, and the Austrian Empire and the British Empire on the other. On the religious level, this was the opposition between Orthodoxy to Catholicism (Austria) and Calvinism (England). Absolutist and then revolutionary France played a particular role in all this, seeking to spread republican ideas and the Enlightenment. It is important to note that while Russia shared some geopolitical interests with Austria (in particular, opposition to Turkey), England's strategy was almost entirely opposite to that of Russia, to the extent of English support for the Ottoman Empire.

In any case, even post-Petrine Russia inherited the main features of Byzantine geopolitics, although the dogmatic completeness of the concept of "Third Rome" was broken. Henceforth, one could only speak of an inertial continuation of what had once been the full and theologically grounded path of the "God-bearing people" in history. In parallel to this transformation, material and narrowly political interests began to play an ever greater role in foreign policy, and religious factors themselves were often used as a pretext for one political move or another, oriented exclusively towards the good of the state in its secular aspect.

1.4 National liberation of the Orthodox peoples

In the nineteenth century, many Orthodox nations - Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, Romanians, etc. - began to actively liberate themselves from the political control of the Turks. The religious factor played a significant role in this, becoming one of the main motives for the national liberation struggle.

The emergence of new orthodox states and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire was a consequence of several geopolitical and ideological factors:

1) The degradation of the political power of the Turks allowed the national feeling of the Greeks and other Balkan peoples to develop, which in turn was facilitated by the spread of Enlightenment ideas; France, the cradle of “modernist trends”, played an important role in this.

2) Russia as Turkey’s geopolitical adversary actively used the situation to undermine its enemy from within; Russian agents in Greece and the Balkans focused their efforts on supporting Orthodox demands, which was also accompanied by external geopolitical pressure from Russia.

3) A kind of religious renaissance of the Orthodox peoples began, and the idea of the struggle for political and national independence was accompanied by messianic premonitions of an eschatological nature.

During this period, the political and ideological concepts of Great Greece (or Great Idea, Megale idea), Great Bulgaria, Great Serbia (the “inscription”), Great Romania, etc. were formed.

1.5 Megale Idea

The supporters of Greater Greece sought the complete recapture of the Greek territories from the Turks and the recreation of a ‘New Byzantium’, the restoration of royal authority and the return of the Patriarch of Constantinople to his preeminent role in the whole Orthodox world. As a result of fierce struggles and national rebellion, the Greeks were able to regain a small independent state around Peloponnesus and Moraea in 1830, which after the Balkan Wars in 1913 effectively doubled its territory. The implementation of the “Great Idea” clashed with the geopolitical interests of other Orthodox peoples, as the Greeks demanded the annexation of Macedonia, Thrace and other territories, which were also claimed by the Bulgarians and Serbs. The plan culminated in the liberation of Constantinople (Istanbul) from the Turks. But the whole project ended in disaster after the defeat of Greece in Atatürk’s war with Turkey, who defeated the Greeks and forced the Greek

population of Anatolia to resettle en masse on Greek lands.

It is very important to note that the national liberation struggle of the Greeks was in no way welcomed or inspired by the fanatic clergy and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, who were politically in solidarity with the Ottoman Empire rather than with Russian geopolitics or the Balkan peoples aspiring for freedom. Moreover, the collapse of the Turkish Empire was a disaster for the spiritual supremacy of the Phanariots in the Orthodox world outside Russia. Hence Greek nationalism and the “Great Idea”, while distinctly Orthodox in character, were initially promoted by some special secret Masonic-type organisations, in which Russian agents of influence, and at the same time supporters of the French Enlightenment, played a crucial role. In other words, the Orthodox idea in Greece during the critical period of its liberation from Turkish domination was the property of a parallel religious structure connected with the Greek diaspora in Russia and other Mediterranean regions. It is also curious that the Greek aristocracy, genetically and politically linked to the Phanariots, was more orientated towards Austria and Germany after independence, whereas the Greek bourgeoisie, among whom the “Great Idea” matured, was an ardent supporter of union with Russia. In this again a certain solidarity of official Greek post-Byzantine Orthodoxy with the Vatican line is clearly discernible.

1.6 The Outline

The idea of a Greater Serbia, based on the historical precedent of the huge Balkan state created in the fourteenth century by the Serbian Nemanjic dynasty, was revived again during the Serbian liberation struggle. The Serbian rebels first liberated a small territory, Šumadija, from Ottoman rule, and after that they started the struggle for the establishment of an independent Slavic state in the Balkans, with the domination of Serbs and the Orthodox dynasty. As of 1815, the Serbs had achieved a degree of independence, which, however, brought with it two different geopolitical

orientations, embodied in the two Serbian dynasties of the Obrenović and Karadjordjević dynasties. The Obrenoviés, although Orthodox, were oriented towards the neighbouring Austria, not least because of the activity of some political-intellectual circles from Vojvodina, the territory closest to Austria. The Karadjordjevic family, on the other hand, gravitated exclusively towards Russia. In 1903, not without the complicity of the Russian secret services, the Obrenovic dynasty was overthrown, and Serbia turned to a pro-Russian line. By 1920, under the Karadjordjevic dynasty, Yugoslavia was created, a huge Balkan state that united many Balkan peoples under Serbian rule, including Catholic Croats and Slovenes, Orthodox Macedonians, Bosnian Muslims and Albanians. In addition, in the north of Yugoslavia Catholic Hungarians came under Serbian control. However, this geopolitical construction proved to be unstable, as the non-Orthodox peoples of Yugoslavia (not without the help of Austrian and Turkish agents of influence) began to oppose the ethnic domination of the Serbs and the religious primacy of Orthodoxy. This confrontation reached particular intensity during the Second World War, when pro-German Croatia and Bosnia actually carried out the genocide of Orthodox Serbs.

1.7 The Great Romania

The project of a Greater Romania also emerged in the Orthodox environment, and it was not only a question of complete liberation from Turkish control (although both Moldavia and Wallachia were never officially part of the Ottoman Empire), but also of countering the policies of the fanatics who sought to bring the Romanian clergy under their influence. In this current, anti-Turkish and anti-Fanariot sentiments were supported by Russia, facilitated by its belonging to the Russian territories of Bessarabia, inhabited by Romanians. At the same time, from the eighteenth century onwards, Uniat tendencies became more active in Romania. Uniatism is the idea of the subordination of the Orthodox Church to the Vatican, while preserving the Orthodox rite, but, in fact, in this approach, geopolitically

only the Vatican wins, while Orthodoxy clearly loses. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Uniatism was seen by the Orthodox as a tactical move of Catholicism, seeking to expand its missionary, political and spiritual influence in the East at the expense of the Orthodox peoples. In Romania itself, Uniatism, widespread especially in Transylvania, was initially accompanied by cultural tendencies of Latinization, glorification of the Romanesque essence of Romania, the Latin roots of the language, etc. Uniatism in Rumania was supported by the Catholic Austria, while Orthodoxy was supported, naturally, by Russia. It is indicative that the Greek Orthodox Phanariots pursued, in fact, a pro-Turkish policy in Romania, contrary to both Austro-Catholic and Russian-Orthodox geopolitical interests. The idea of a Greater Romania had unequivocally orthodox overtones, and under that banner, Romanians fought for national independence. However, it is important that the Romanian nationalism has an openly anti-Greek character, and in the confessional sphere, the uniatism, coupled with the orientation towards the Latin culture, gravitated towards Rome and Western Europe, while the Romanian Orthodoxy followed the pro-Moscow line. Interestingly, after the Sovietization of Romania in 1948, the formally atheistic communist regime took the unequivocal position of Romanian Orthodoxy, subordinating the Uniate confessions to it, and subjecting the Catholic minorities to certain repressions.

1.8 Great Bulgaria

The start of the Bulgarian Orthodox and national revival movement can be dated back to 1870, when, under Russian pressure and support, a Bulgarian exarchate was established with the aim of uniting the Orthodox believers living in the Balkans into a geopolitical bloc, politically hostile to the Ottoman Empire and spiritually opposed to the Constantinople Patriarchate and the domination of the fanatics.

Parallel to the attainment of geopolitical independence, Bulgaria developed

a nationalist project of “Bulgaria of the Three Seas”, which involved the annexation of Macedonia, Thrace and Constantinople. Traditionally Russophile, Bulgarian Orthodoxy at certain moments of its history deviated from this line in pursuit of narrow national aims, and like the Uniates of Romania, the Obrenovitch dynasty in Serbia, the Greek aristocracy and some other East European powers, sided with Central Europe, allied itself with Austria-Hungary against Russia.

Interestingly, as the new Orthodox states in the Balkans emerged, their geopolitical orientation constantly oscillated between Russia and Austria, i.e. between Russian Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. And the formal reason for this sustained dualism was certain disputed territories, primarily Macedonia. There was constant friction between Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia over Macedonia, and Russia’s support for one side or the other in this conflict automatically threw the other into the arms of Austria.

1.9 Orthodox Albania

The traditional boundary between the Byzantine and Catholic worlds ran along the settlement of the Albanians. In this nation there are four denominations Albanians-Sunnites (the Turkic Albanians), Albanians-Bektashis (members of a Sufi organisation, having, as in some exceptional cases, a clannish rather than merely initiatory character), Albanians-Catholics and Albanians-Orthodox. Despite the fact that Orthodox Albanians were a minority, it was this group that was at the centre of the national liberation struggle, and the independent state of Albania emerged thanks to the Orthodox bishop Fan Noli, who became the first Albanian ruler in 1918. Fan Noli was a staunch supporter of Russia, and Russian Orthodoxy actively supported him in all his endeavours. The Orthodox Albanians united the whole nation under their control regardless of denomination, but their main opponents and rivals were not even so much Catholics as the Greek Orthodox clergy, traditionally entrenched in Albania! Once again, using Albania

as an example, we are confronted with a geopolitical dualism in the post-Byzantine Orthodox world, where the geopolitical interests of the Greek and Russian Churches are opposed.

Fan Noli retained his pro-Russian orientation even after the October revolution, for which he was overthrown by Ahmed Zog, the future king of Albania. During the occupation of Albania by fascist Italy Albanian Orthodox Christians were persecuted by pro-Catholic authorities, but after 'sovietisation' the Orthodox Church again received state support, this time from the communist authorities. It was only in 1967, during the "cultural revolution" and the Maoist deviation, that Soviet Albania declared itself "the first exclusively atheistic state in the world" and began direct persecution of believers of all confessions.

1.10 Geopolitical lobbies in Orthodox countries

A general overview of the geopolitical trends of the Balkan orthodox countries reveals a crucial pattern: in each such state there are at least two geopolitical lobbies, the character of which is associated with some religious peculiarities.

Firstly, there is a pro-Russian lobby which is geopolitically oriented towards the Russian Orthodox Church, which in turn inherits (albeit with reservations) the "Moscow Third Rome" line. This lobby is oriented against Rome and any rapprochement with it (and thus against Austria, Hungary and Catholic Germany, i.e. against the Catholic sector of Central Europe), but at the same time, it stands on anti-Turkish and anti-"fanatic" positions, opposing the Constantinople Patriarchate to one degree or another. In some cases (such as Greece itself) this lobby includes not only Orthodox circles but also some secret societies of the Masonic type.

Secondly, in these same countries there is also an opposing lobby, which, whether Orthodox or not, is sympathetic to a rapprochement with Rome,

an orientation towards Middle Europe, Austria, in the extreme towards Uniateism or even Catholicism.

Thirdly, traces of Turkish influence, which was maintained in the region by England, remain everywhere, which means that Anglo-Saxon geopolitics in this case has a southern orientation and relies on fanaticism and in modern Orthodoxy in the Balkan countries, traditionally associated with the Ottoman administration.

The break-up of Yugoslavia gives us an example of the geopolitical layout of the Balkans. The Russophile line is embodied in the position of Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. Croatia and Slovenia are oriented towards Middle Europe, while the Anglo-Saxons (the US and England) actively support the Bosnian Muslims, the successors of the Turks. At the same time, the question of Macedonia, about which disputes again arise between Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. The Albanian problem is also resurfacing, particularly in Kosovo. The Transnistrian tragedy and the anti-Russian sentiments in present-day Romania and Moldavia again force us to pay special attention to the Uniate and pro-Catholic lobby, which alone can be the bearer of anti-Moscow sentiments and Latin tendencies in these areas.

1.11 The Russian Orthodox Church and the Soviets

The relationship between Orthodoxy and the Soviet regime is an extremely difficult question. On the one hand, there is the view that the Soviet period, in spite of everything, inherited from pre-revolutionary Russia a geopolitical line which strictly coincides in the most important aspects with the geopolitics of the Russian Church. It can be conventionally defined as "Sergianism" after Patriarch Sergius of Moscow, who formulated the famous thesis that has become the starting point of internal Church disputes that have not subsided even in our days: *"Your successes are our successes"* (in reference to the atheist, anti-Christian regime of Stalin). This "Sergian" formula is far from being as paradoxical and monstrous as orthodox conservatives want

to present it. The fact is that the Bolshevik Revolution brought about such changes in the life of the Church in Russia that are striking in their symbolism. Synchronously, the Patriarchate was restored, the capital was moved to Moscow (a symbolic return to the idea of "Moscow the Third Rome"), the miraculous discovery of the icon of the Sovereign in Kolomenskoye, the Moscow residence of the Russian tsars, marked a return to the mystical, soteriological and eschatological function of royal authority, restored in its supernatural dimension after two hundred years of the St Petersburg period. Along with this, the Bolsheviks inherited the whole of Russian geopolitics, strengthening the state and expanding its borders. Parallel to this was the spiritual renewal of the Church, which through persecution and suffering restored the forgotten fierceness of religious feeling, the practice of confession and the exploits of martyrdom for Christ.

The second view sees Soviet Russia as the complete antithesis of Orthodox Russia and considers "Sergianism" to be conformism with the anti-Christ and apostasy. This approach excludes the possibility of viewing the Soviet period as a continuation of Orthodox geopolitics. The bearer of such ideology in its most distinct form is the Russian Orthodox Church Outside the Border and the sectarian True Orthodox Church, whose positions derive from the eschatological identification of Bolshevism with the coming of the Antichrist. Curiously, this approach denies Orthodoxy a political dimension and typologically coincides with the position of the "fanatics" who deny the need for the Orthodox Church to relate to politics, which is the basis of a full Orthodox doctrine. At the same time, this approach is combined with sympathy for the 'white' movement, which was geopolitically based on support for the Entente, Western European and especially Anglo-Saxon countries. It is no coincidence that the centre of the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad is in the USA. Geopolitically, such "Orthodox" anti-Sovietism and "anti-Sergianism" coincide with the traditional Western Atlanticist line against Russia (Soviet, Tsarist, patriarchal, modernist, democratic, etc.) regardless of its ideological system.

1.12 Summary

After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the geopolitics of Orthodoxy is deprived of the unambiguous theological and eschatological function which it had in the era of the "millennial kingdom" from the fifth to the fifteenth centuries. The two hundred years of "Moscow of the Third Rome" adjoin this "holy" period, which for Orthodox consciousness is identical with the period of full-fledged Tradition. After the schism and the reforms of Peter the Great a more ambiguous period begins, throughout which Russia nevertheless follows, in the most general terms, the former geopolitical line, while losing doctrinal rigour. The whole post-Byzantine period is characterized by a dualism within Orthodoxy itself, where Russian Orthodoxy, directly linked to the geopolitics of the Russian state, is opposed to the Greek-Fanatician line of the Constantinople Patriarchate, which embodies a type of Orthodoxy strictly separated from political implementation and performing instrumental functions within the overall structure of the Ottoman system.

Russia itself adopts the Byzantine tradition of confrontation with the "Latin mitre and Turkish turban" and is forced to defend the interests of Orthodoxy alone at the geopolitical and state level. This line forces Russia to engage in Balkan politics, where it faces a range of geopolitically hostile tendencies, including a persistent "fanatical" anti-Russian influence.

Finally, in the Soviet period geopolitics, paradoxically, continues the overall planetary strategy of Russian Statehood, expanding Russia's sphere of influence at the expense of countries and peoples traditionally hostile to Orthodoxy. Of course, here we cannot speak of the dogmatic continuity of the Soviets with the Russian Orthodox Church, but it should not be forgotten that the dogmatic obviousness was already hopelessly lost under Peter, and shaken during the period of schism. And if we take the point of view of "Sergianism", we can consider the geopolitical successes of the Soviet superpower, which conquered half of the world, traditionally hostile to Russian Orthodox Christians and our state, as the successes of the Russian Church and Orthodox geopolitics. This last thesis is undoubtedly very con-

troversial, but equally controversial is, strictly speaking, the identification of Romanov's post-Petrine Russia as a truly Orthodox state. Although in both cases there is a clear geopolitical continuity.

In our time, when there is neither Tsarist nor Soviet Russia, but a dying and mutilated, stolen and sold to the West, our eternal enemy, we are able to comprehend the entire geopolitical history of Orthodoxy impartially and objectively and identify its constants, which should be inscribed on the tablets of the new state, the power that wishes to be called "Russian".

Chapter 2

STATE AND TERRITORY

2.1 The three most important geopolitical categories

Most of the controversy over the new geopolitical picture of the world revolves around three fundamental categories:

- 1) *The "Etat-Nation"*, i.e. the traditional historically centralist state (such as France, Italy, Germany, Spain, etc.);
- 2) *Region*, i.e. an administrative, ethnic or cultural space that is part of one or more nation states (Etat-Nation), but which has a significant degree of cultural and economic autonomy (e.g. Brittany in France, Flanders in Belgium, Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country in Spain, etc.);
- 3) *The Greater Space*, a "commonwealth" or "community" that brings together several nation-states ("Etat-Nation") into a single economic or political bloc.

Many "Europeanists", both on the left and on the right, believe that the category of the "nation-state" (Etat-Nation) (The Etat-Nation, i.e. the traditional centralist state, has become obsolete and that the focus should be on the other two modalities, regionalism and even autonomism, on the one hand, and the continental unification of the regions into a single block, on the other. It is telling that the points of view of the polar political spectrums converge here: The "New Left" sees Etat-Nation as too "right-wing", too

“totalitarian” and “repressive”, too “conservative”, an entity which should be abandoned in the name of progress, while the “New Right”, in contrast, sees this same state-nation (Etat-Nation) as too “modernist”, too anti-traditional in European history, when the truly traditional European Empire was destroyed by a nihilistic and secular French absolutism. Furthermore, the New Right sees in regionalism a return to ethnic traditions and to the principle of ethno-cultural differentiation, which is the axis of all “New Right” thought.

On the other hand, there is a rather broad category of politicians who, on the contrary, uphold the values of the Etat-Nation (Etat-Nation). Again, a commitment to state-centrism can unite both the “right” and the “left”. As a rule, however, it is not the “new”, but the “old” right and left that stand on this position. Characteristically, in France, the opponents of European unification were three political forces: Le Pen’s Front National (extreme right), the Marché Communistes (extreme left) and Jean-Pierre Chevènement’s centrist socialists with national sympathies. It follows that the most distant ideological and political sympathies can be combined within the same geopolitical project.

Nevertheless, each political force has its own understanding of the three fundamental versions of the geopolitical order of modern society. It would be interesting to construct a diagram of how all three projects are evaluated in the perspective of their own ideologies by different forces. For the sake of clarity, we will talk about extreme positions, which naturally become more nuanced and nuanced as they get closer to the political centre.

2.2 Right-wing and left-wing regionalism

The general set of left-wing ideologies is oriented towards a weakening of the influence of the state, administrative and political structures on public life. This implies the principle of decentralisation, a gradual evolution from one centre of power to several and, in the long term, to a large number of them. This theory was developed in his time by the famous anarchist Prudhon. The

left seeks the weakening and gradual abolition of totalitarian and authoritarian forms of government, which means that their geopolitical orientation is directed against the preservation of the traditional state, with its borders, bureaucratic apparatus, repressive bodies, etc. All this stems from the main ideological orientation of the Left towards “humanism”, towards the value of the atomic individual rather than any super-individual structures that restrict his freedoms. On this ideological basis, modern European regionalism has developed as a fairly stable tendency towards socio-economic decentralisation and away from the traditional Western principle of the Nation-State of the last centuries.

This liberal tendency of the left rejects the very notion of “state” and the very notion of “nation” as a historical relic. These principles are countered by the “humanist” idea of “human rights”, which has long ceased to be an abstract philanthropic slogan and has become a rather aggressive ideological complex, openly directed against traditional forms of collective existence of people as members of a nation, people, state, race, etc. Hence the left’s logical emphasis on regionalism, since the administrative autonomy of the territorial parts of the state, from their point of view, brings the value benchmark closer to the individual and removes the halo of unconditional authority and control functions from broad social categories.

Obviously, this tendency of the left is at odds with the nation-state ideologists, i.e. “statists” and “nationalists”, for whom it is the historical and political unity of the people, embodied in the Etat-Nation, that appears as the highest value. The opposition of statist-nationalists to liberal-regionalists is a constant in the heated debates on the main geopolitical projects in almost all countries where political processes are actively and dynamically developing.

But there is also a “right-wing regionalism” which is closely linked to the problem of tradition and ethnicity. Such regionalism proceeds from the assumption that the modern centralist state is only an instrument of cultural and ideological leveling of its members, that it has long lost its sacral functions and has turned into a repressive apparatus oriented against the

remnants of genuine cultural, ethical and ethnic traditions. “Right regionalists” see in decentralisation an opportunity to revive the partly ceremonial, cultic form of peoples’ life, traditional crafts, to restore such forms of government as were characteristic of traditional civilisation before the advent of a purely modern world. In fact, such “right-wing regionalism” corresponds exactly to the notion of “post-genocide”. In principle, the right also implicitly refers to a certain “natural” differentialism inherent in the inhabitants of the provinces, who react much more sharply and distastefully to foreigners than do the inhabitants of the big cities.

Thus a second line of political confrontation is taking shape: the “right-wing regionalists”, often also appealing to ethnic and racial purity, and the “left-wing statistes”, who believe that the best way to introduce “progressive”, “liberal” values into society is state centralism, which protects society from the possible restoration of the “progress-overcome” remnants.

2.3 The New Great Space: Mondialism or Empire?

With regard to super-state integration, there is also a rather contradictory political arrangement. On the one hand, there is the “mondialist project”, which involves the complete abolition of traditional states and the creation of a planetary civilisation field, governed from a single centre, which can be conventionally called a “world government”. In principle, such a project is the logical conclusion of liberal tendencies that seek to destroy all traditional social structures and artificially create a single “universal” space consisting not of peoples but of “individuals”, not of states but of technocratic associations and industrial labourers. It was in this light that the early-century Mondialists saw the “United States of Europe” of which both liberal capitalists (Monet, Coudenhough-Calegre, etc.) and communists (Trotsky, etc.) dreamed. Later, the same ideas inspired both the constructors of Maatstricht and the ideologues of the “New World Order”.

However, in parallel with this monist perspective, there is an alternative

option advocated by non-conformist political forces. We are talking about the theorists of the New Empire, who believe that modern nation-states are the result of the tragic collapse of traditional empires, which can only fully correspond to a truly sacred organization of society, based on qualitative differentiation, on spiritual hierarchy, on a corporate and religious basis. Such an understanding of the “New Great Space” does not stem from a purely quantitative approach to integration (as the mondialists do), but from a kind of spiritual and supernational principle which would be transcendent to the existing historical formations and could unite them in a supreme sacral synthesis. Depending on the circumstances, the “imperial project” takes as its basis either the religious factor (Catholic proponents of the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), or the racial factor (ideologists of the European Empire, united by the unity of origin of Indo-European peoples, in particular the French “New Right”), or the geopolitical (theories of Belgian Jean Tyriard), or the cultural factor (projects of Russian Eurasians).

Hence, here too, there are two opposing political poles that see similar geopolitical realities, but from the opposite perspective.

	LEFT (democrats)	RIGHT (conservatives)
small area	Regionalism, separatism	Ethnism, traditionalism, post-evangelicalism
middle space	enlightened centralist state	nation-state, “etatism”, nationalism
big space	Mondialism	Empire

Thus, we have distinguished two radically different, opposing approaches in each of the geopolitical projects, which together predetermine all the basic possibilities of ideological struggle around fundamental issues. This scheme makes it possible to classify the various political alliances between rather distant forces.

2.4 Russia's geopolitics

The general problematics of the geopolitical structure of the modern world is of direct relevance to Russia, where we encounter the same basic geopolitical projects. The three categories of regionalism, nation-state and the Great Space have direct analogues in our geopolitical reality.

Regionalism corresponds to separatist tendencies within the Russian Federation, both in the case of national republics and districts and in the case of claims for full autonomy by purely territorial entities (the Siberian, Ural and other republics).

The centralist-state model is advocated by supporters of the geopolitical project "Russia within the Russian Federation".

Those who advocate the restoration of the USSR, the reconstitution of the Russian Empire within the USSR or the creation of a Eurasian Empire belong to the category of New Greater Space ideologues.

As in the overall scheme, proponents of a project do not necessarily hold the same political beliefs. Moreover, each project may have two polar signs, which are conventionally defined as "right-wing" and "left-wing".

Let us try to outline the positions of the "right" and "left" in Russian political life as they relate to the three geopolitical options.

The separatist tendencies on the extreme "left" flank are being exploited by those forces which were also behind the collapse of the USSR. Considering the Soviet state a bastion of "reactionary" and "totalitarianism", Russian liberals had long been putting forward ideas of "Russia within the borders of the 14th century" and so on, which implied the fragmentation of Russian territories into separate fragments along both ethnic and purely geographical lines. For such "leftists", the unity of the Russian nation and the might of the Russian state not only do not represent any historical value, but, on the contrary, are seen as an obstacle to universal "progress". This regionalist project is defended by some extreme liberals who openly wish for the

disintegration of the Russian Federation.

This ultra-liberal option is consonant with some of the ideas of a certain part of the opposing, extreme nationalist camp, which believes that Russians need to create a compact mono-ethnic state based on the principles of racial purity and ethnic isolationism. This is the idea of a “Russian Republic”. Among the non-Russian ethnic groups inhabiting Russian territory there are similar projects for the creation of independent mono-ethnic states.

The post-Gorbachev Russian leadership, convinced that centralist methods are the most profitable way to carry out reforms, by subjecting all Russian regions to the rigid line of Moscow, embodied a “leftist” version of the nation-state programme within the Russian Federation. State centralism, according to these forces, is the best and fastest way to transform Russia’s socio-political reality in such a way as to bring it to “universal”, “progressive” and, in fact, “Western” and “Atlanticist” standards. The “leftist” centralists legitimately see regionalism as a danger to the realisation of their goals, since decentralisation and autonomisation of regions can contribute to the creation of regimes which would reject the logic of liberal reforms and propose other, alternative (conditionally “right-wing”) socio-political projects. Imperial expansion is also unacceptable to these forces, as the restoration of the USSR could entail corresponding ideological consequences.

There is a movement of “right-wing state-makers” which is actively gaining strength. These are patriots who have accepted the collapse of the USSR and believe that the creation of a powerful centralised Russian state out of the Russian Federation will serve the cause of uniting the nation and organising a powerful independent autarchic space. “Right-wing statesmen reject both separatism and imperialism, believing that the fragmentation of the Russian Federation means the loss of the territories belonging to the Russians and that imperial expansion would introduce many foreign elements and threaten the national dominance of the Russians.

There are also two poles among the theorists of recreating the Empire. The “left-wing” Russian mondialists, mainly oriented towards Gorbachev and his

lobby, consider it necessary to create a "common democratic space" as soon as possible, both within the CIS and more broadly within the Eurasian space.

"The right-wing understanding of the New Great Space is embodied in the political programmes of an opposition irreconcilable with the regime. Most representatives of this opposition, both nationalist-communists and traditionalist-imperialists, believe that Russia within the Russian Federation is not only a territorially insufficient geopolitical entity but also a fundamentally false solution to the question of protecting Russia's strategic interests as a great power. "Right-wing" Eurasianism proceeds from a purely imperial understanding of Russia's historical mission, which should either be an autonomous autonomous "continent" or deviate from its historical and geopolitical destiny.

Thus, we can summarise all the options for geopolitical projects regarding the future of Russian statehood into a single scheme, taking into account the ideological orientation of one or another force.

	Russian conservatives, patriots	Russian liberals, reformers
Russian regionalism	"The Russian Republic"	"ethnic republics", separatism within the Russian Federation
Russian centralism	patriots within the Russian Federation	"liberal reforms under an authoritarian centre"
Eurasian Big Space	"Eurasian Empire", "restoration of the USSR"	"left-wing Mondialism", "one democratic space"

Chapter 3

THE GEOPOLITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEAR ABROAD

3.1 The laws of Big Space

The fundamental law of geopolitics is *the Big Space principle*, identified by Mackinder and Haushofer and elaborated by Carl Schmitt. According to this principle, the national sovereignty of a state depends not only on its military power, technological development and economic base, but also on the size and geographical location of its lands and territories. The classics of geopolitics have written hundreds of volumes, proving that the problem of sovereignty depends directly on the geopolitical independence, self-sufficiency, autonomy of a region. Those peoples and states who truly aspire to sovereignty must first solve the problem of territorial self-sufficiency. In our era, only very large states located in regions strategically protected from possible attacks (military, political or economic) by other state entities can have such self-sufficiency.

At a time of confrontation between capitalism and socialism, the need for blocs, for Greater Spaces, was obvious. No one doubted that a country could be “non-aligned” only at the cost of its removal from planetary geopolitics through marginalisation and displacement to the periphery. Moreover, all the “non-aligned” were still opting for one or the other camp, albeit less radically than the direct supporters of socialism or capitalism.

The destruction of a single superpower certainly seriously alters the geopolitical space of the earth. However, this does not make the principle of the Great Spaces any less valid. On the contrary, today the geopolitical project of “mondialism” is becoming more and more widespread, which boils down to the transformation of the entire surface of the earth into one Big Space, governed from the American centre.

3.2 Pax Americana and the Geopolitics of Mondialism

The project of a pro-American, “Atlanticist” Great Space, the creation of a planetary Pax Americana or the establishment of a “new world order” with a single “world government” are, in fact, geopolitical synonyms. Such a plan is being developed and implemented in the international policy of the West, especially the U.S. Obviously, the Mondialist concept of the Great Space completely excludes any form of genuine state and political sovereignty of any nations and states. Moreover, the bipolar world gave incomparably more degrees of freedom (sovereignty) to the states included in the sphere of influence of one of the two Big Spaces than is planned in the monodialist project, if only because the planetary confrontation forced not only suppressing the satellite states, but also bribing them. The single planetary Great Space of the monetarist futurologists would mean the complete disappearance of even the faintest shadow of any sovereignty, since the suppression by force (military or economic) of the fragmented and atomised “small spaces” would be the only means of control (the need for bribery and deception would disappear by itself in the absence of a possible geopolitical rival).

The current situation poses an urgent alternative to every state and every nation (and especially to the states and nations that used to be part of the geopolitical bloc opposed to the Atlantic West), *either to integrate into a single Greater Space under the leadership of the Atlanticists, or to organize a new Greater Space capable of confronting the last superpower.* The question of genuine geopolitical sovereignty has a direct bearing on

this alternative, but there can be no complete sovereignty for an individual nation or state in either case. In adopting the monodialist model, any sovereignty is a priori excluded, since the “world government” becomes the only power centre without any alternative, and only the planetary pseudo-empire of the “new world order” is sovereign in this case. All its parts become colonies. In the organisation of the new Greater Space we are dealing with relative sovereignty within a large geopolitical entity, since this possible Greater Space will be relatively free in defining ideological and worldview dominance. This means that the peoples and states that will be part of this bloc will be able to count on at least ethno-cultural sovereignty and direct participation in the creation and development of a new macro-ideology, whereas the mondialist version of the “New World Order” is already ideologically complete and worked out and is offered to all the peoples of the earth as a colonial analogue of the liberal-market American model.

3.3 Russia’s paradox

The peculiarity of the current geopolitical situation is that the initiative to destroy the Eurasian Great Space, which existed until recently in the form of the socialist camp, came from the very centre of this camp, from the capital of Eurasia, Moscow. It was the USSR, represented by Gorbachev, which initiated the inclusion of the Eurasian bloc in the Mondialist project. At the geopolitical level, the ideas of “perestroika”, “new thinking”, etc. meant a complete acceptance of the model of a single Greater Space and a conscious transition from a bipolar to a unipolar world. First, the socialist camp was destroyed and the Eastern bloc was truncated. Then the geopolitical self-liquidation was continued and the regions that are commonly referred to today as the ‘near abroad countries’ were cast aside from Russia.

In any case, Russia, as the heartland of the Eurasian Island, in the current geopolitical situation, could stand up to the Atlanticist geopolitics better

than any other region and be the centre of an alternative Greater Space. But the fact of its geopolitical self-liquidation forced it for a time (hopefully for a short time) to withdraw from central roles in the geopolitical confrontation. Therefore, other possibilities for the creation of an alternative Big Space should be parsed, so that the states and peoples, abandoning the Mondialist project, could take some independent steps, without waiting for the geopolitical awakening of Russia. (Incidentally, these steps could only accelerate such an awakening).

3.4 Russia remains the “Axis of History

The geopolitical choice of an anti-mondialist alternative outside a temporarily paralyzed Russia should still take into account the key strategic and geographical function of exactly Russian lands and Russian people, which means that the opposition to modern mondialists, controlling to some extent Russian political space, should not turn into general Russophobia. Moreover, the fundamental geopolitical interests of Russians both culturally, religiously, economically and strategically coincide with the prospect of an alternative anti-mondialist and anti-Atlantist Greater Space. For this reason, the national tendencies of the political opposition inside Russia will necessarily be in solidarity with all anti-mondialist projects of geopolitical integration outside Russia.

3.5 Mitteleuropa and the European Empire

One possible alternative to the new Greater Space is Europe, which certain political and ideological circles oppose to the West to the Anglo-Saxon world, and above all to the United States. Such an anti-Western Europe is not a pure utopia, since such a project has been repeatedly implemented in history, although each time with certain errors or distortions. In the twentieth century, for example, the Axis countries represented the backbone

of such a Europe, although Anglophilia and Francophobia of certain circles in the German leadership, among other circumstances, prevented the full realization of this project. After the Second World War, a similar attempt was made by De Gaulle, and France owes this policy to the fact that it is not formally a member of NATO today. In any case, the idea of an anti-Western, traditional, imperial Europe is becoming more and more relevant today, when the presence of American troops on the European continent is no longer justified by the presence of a “Soviet threat” and is becoming an open American occupation. Europe is a serious adversary of America in terms of its technical and economic development, and if pressure from below on the natural geopolitical interests of Europeans increases, the mondialist and pro-American upper classes of European states may retreat and Europe will start an independent geopolitical life. Tendencies towards political emancipation and the search for an ideological alternative are increasing in Europe every day, while the chances of creating an independent European Volkspasstvo are growing in parallel.

3.6 Germany the heart of Europe

A European Greater Space is to be built around the most continental of European powers, around Germany, or more precisely, around Mitteleuropa, i.e. Central Europe. Germany’s geopolitical interests have traditionally been opposed to the Atlanticist tendencies of the West. This was true in both the continental and colonial aspects of geopolitics. Germany has always been opposed to Anglo-Saxon colonial conquests and sought to create a purely land-based, continental, autarkic civilisation based on traditional, hierarchical and soil-based values. Mitteleuropa, represented by the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire, was the last European trace of the Great Roman Empire, to which European civilisation in its state-social aspect traces its roots. As a matter of fact, the Roman Empire was the great space that united Western and Middle Europe into one geopolitical organism. Even today, the idea of a European empire is directly linked to Germany

and the countries within the German sphere of influence.

One important geopolitical conclusion can immediately be drawn from these theses. *For all the Western “near abroad” countries (both the Baltic Republics and Ukraine and Moldova) an anti-mondialist geopolitical alliance is possible only by joining the Central European bloc (unless, of course, the situation in Russia itself changes) with an orientation towards Germany.* In that case, the western regions of the USSR would have a chance to become the eastern border regions of the European Great Spaces and would have some semblance of sovereignty (although much less than in Russia or in a possible new Eurasian Bloc centered in an anti-mondialist Russia).

The European Empire could guarantee these regions a certain cultural, linguistic and economic autonomy and save them from a levelling mondialist system that destroys in a liberal-market, plutocratic structure even hints of difference, autonomy and the preservation of national identity. However, no political and state independence would be out of the question here. Moreover, a European empire with a German centre will always be in danger of an outbreak of German nationalism, even though this would risk its collapse, just as Hitler’s “pan-Germanism” was fraught with defeat.

3.7 “Join Europe”

This perspective is closest to Western Ukraine and Estonia, as only these regions indeed belong historically and religiously to Western culture and consider their geopolitical interests identical with those of Central Europe. As for the other “near-abroad countries”, Belarus and Eastern and Central Ukraine belong politically and culturally to the zone of Russia-Eurasia, and if there is a cultural difference, it may be reduced to private details, not implying the change of geopolitical block from Eastern to Central (Central Europe), and may be settled in the framework of ethno-cultural (but not state!) autonomy. Lithuania, on the other hand, always played a special role in the geopolitics of Eastern Europe, playing double function in relation

to Russia, acting as a carrier of Western culture, and on the contrary, in relation to the Central Europe, together with Poland, appearing as an eastern power defending the Baltic-Western-Slavic independence against the Germanic pressure. From the geopolitical point of view, in the last centuries Lithuania was becoming sometimes German, sometimes Russian, and the only thing that it is not (and cannot be) for a long time now, is Lithuanian, because it does not have enough geopolitical preconditions to meet the sovereignty conditions imposed by modern times.

Partly the same can be said about Latvia, although unlike Lithuania it has never played any independent role in the geopolitical history, being a periphery of outside influences in the Baltic Sea.

As for Moldavia, this territorial entity also never had its own statehood, and any independent political and statehood tradition of the Romanians, like the Moldovans, is completely absent. However, historically, Romania (including some Moldovan lands) was a part of the geopolitical bloc of both Russia-Eurasia, and Middle Europe (in the person of Austria-Hungary), so Romania had a certain precedent of an alliance with Middle Europe. Although the Orthodoxy of the vast majority of the Moldovans and Romanians brings them closer to the East and Russia.

3.8 Frontiers of “freedom” and lost benefits

The prospect of the western countries of the “near abroad” becoming part of the European Empire and joining Central Europe is possible and historically justified, although in almost all cases (excluding Estonia as a colonial land of the Teutonic Order, populated by the descendants of the silent and submissive autochthonous Ugro-Finnic workers, and Western Ukraine) the Eastern bloc of Russia-Eurasia is, from a purely geopolitical point of view, many times preferable, as culturally these regions are more linked to the East than to Central Europe. Thus, an alliance of Western “near abroad countries” with Central Europe could serve as an intermediate option for an

antiMondialist geopolitical orientation in the event that Russia continues to abandon its integration mission.

It should be noted that, of course, these countries will not receive any political sovereignty if they become part of a hypothetical “European empire”, since the Great Space, while providing geopolitical, economic and military protection, requires its subjects, in turn, to give up their political and national independence and their right to conduct their own ideological or diplomatic policies which run counter to the interests of the empire. However this may affect the representatives of “small nationalism”, in our situation only super-states, continental empires, taken as a whole, can be sovereign.

3.9 “Sanitary cordon”

The geopolitical problem of the Western “near abroad countries” has another aspect - *the Atlanticist factor*, which acts directly and imposes political moves that are beneficial to mondialism and Americanism on these countries. There are several levels to this issue. Let us begin in order.

The US has the prospect of real world domination only if there is no other Big Space on the planet. Hence the conclusion that American geopolitics has as its main objective the destruction of a potential geopolitical strong bloc and the creation of obstacles to its formation. There is a precedent for this policy in history in the form of England, which has always sought to create a “cordon sanitaire” or “sanitary cordon” on the continent. “A cordon sanitaire is an area of states and peoples that lies between two major geopolitical entities, whose alliance or reciprocal entry into the wider space could dangerously compete with the power concerned (formerly England, today the US). The “cordon sanitaire” countries are usually simultaneously the cause of conflicts between the two continental powers, their geopolitical independence is de facto impossible, and they are therefore forced to seek economic, political and military support from outside. The essence of the policy of a

third major geopolitical power in this situation is to turn the "cordon sanitaire" into a zone of tension between two close Greater Spaces, provoking an escalation of conflict through diplomatic influence on the governments of the "intermediate" countries. The most radical version of a cordon sanitaire is one in which the "intermediate" country seeks total independence from both continental neighbours, which in practice means becoming a colony of a third "faraway" power.

The most famous example of a "cordon sanitaire" at the beginning of the century was the countries located between Russia and Germany and controlled by England. They broke up the Great Space of Central Europe and the Great Space of Russia-Eurasia by serving as direct agents and satraps of the countries of the European West. The same move has been repeated many times in other more localised situations. Nowadays, the United States is forced by direct geopolitical necessity to make the "cordon sanitaire" the main instrument of its foreign policy. The report of US security advisor Paul Wolfowitz to the US government (March 1992) expressly referred to the "need to prevent the emergence on the European and Asian continents of a strategic force capable of confronting the United States", and in this sense pointed out that the cordon sanitaire countries (in particular, the Baltic states) are "essential strategic territories, whose attack from the Russian side should entail an armed response from NATO countries. This is a perfect example of the geopolitical logic of a third power in a zone of mutual interest between Germany and Russia.

3.10 Turning from a province to a colony

The cordon sanitaire policy can be expressed in terms of "independence from others and dependence on others". It should be clearly understood, however, that there can be no true independence or sovereignty here, although a short-sighted "petty nationalism" might temporarily identify such "colonial dependence on a third power" with the success of a "national liberation struggle" at the level of the average man. It should also be recalled that in

the case of small states in our beautifully governed world there can be not only no victory but also no full-fledged, unanimous struggle.

The “near-abroad” countries, which have fallen out of Moscow’s control due to various geopolitical circumstances, among which their internal struggle for independence has played little if any role at all, stand a good chance of becoming the “sanitary cordon” of US monialist policy on the continent, and thus losing the trust of their neighbours and bringing upon themselves the curse of “double treachery”. Moreover, in this case, they would be transformed *from provinces into colonies* . What will happen to their national culture in this case is frightening to imagine, since monialism will offer in its place a universal colonial surrogate, a cultural “coca-colonisation”. The “cordon sanitaire” will have puppet overseers as its rulers. The political independence of these countries would be completely denied, and the security of their populations would be constantly threatened by continental neighbours who would not fail to retaliate.

Thus, for the countries of the “near abroad” the prospect of becoming a “cordon sanitaire” means the loss of any geopolitical independence, because for the opportunity of the “sanitary wasp” to tease the “continental elephant”, the wasp will pay full political, cultural and economic slavery to the overseas masters of “new world order” (and in addition, quite logical reaction of the elephant in the very near future).

The prospect of a “cordon sanitaire” against the Western “near abroad” countries is obvious. Its formula is “neither Germany nor Russia” (i.e. “neither Central Europe nor Eurasia”). Since Germany as an independent geopolitical force is today a pure potency, it is fair to assume that the notion of “independence” (“sovereignty”) of the western “near abroad” countries is to be seen as a transition to the service of mondialism and Americanism. At least, that is the current geopolitical picture. In other words, Western “near-abroad” countries that are truly aspiring to “independence” (rather than “doomed to independence” by Moscow’s treacherous policies) are likely to consciously choose the role of a “cordon sanitaire” in the service of the United States. This is particularly the case in those “countries” which have

traditionally had a rather hostile relationship with Germany.

The “cordon sanitaire” countries of the “near abroad” are entering into an alliance with the West (with Western Europe), bypassing Middle Europe, and this is the clearest sign of their Atlanticist, mondialist orientation.

In principle, the same is true for the eastern “near abroad” countries. However, in order to adequately understand their geopolitical prospects, it is necessary to elaborate on the geopolitical forces of the East.

3.11 Asia faces a choice

In the East, there are the following potential geopolitical forces that could claim to be Big Spaces: China, Iran, Turkey and the Arab world. Let us briefly analyse the specifics of each of these Greater Spaces in relation to the eastern “near abroad” countries.

It must be said that the geopolitics of China is a special topic, which cannot be covered in a few lines. As the ‘near abroad’ of the East is a region of spreading Islam, the prospect of a common Greater Space with China recedes into the background before the possibilities of Islamic geopolitical coalitions. At least, that is the case at the moment, which does not exclude a sharp activation of the Chinese factor as an integrating factor in the near future.

Within the Islamic world proper, three geopolitical factors with global perspectives are relevant for the Eastern “near abroad” countries, and each of these factors has its own pronounced ideological features. These are continental-Islamic, revolutionary Iran; secular, Atlanticist, profane-nationalist Turkey; and the Arab “Saudi” theocratic version of Islam. Of course, there are other geopolitical possibilities in the Arab world (Iraq, Syria, Libya), but none of them can currently claim to be an integrating Greater Space in relation to Central Asia. Generally speaking, an orientation towards Saudi Arabia can be conventionally and geopolitically equated

with an orientation towards “Arab (non-socialist) Islam”.

The eastern countries of the ‘near abroad’ have the prospect of three possible geopolitical integrations within the Asian bloc.

3.12 Continental perspectives of the “Islamic Revolution

Iran is a unique country today, which performs the role of Central Europe to the West in Asia. Characteristically, the Iranians themselves sharply distinguish themselves from both the West and the East, understanding by “the West” the “profane mondialist civilisation of Europe”, and by “the East” “India, China and... Russia”.

Iranian Islam is a dynamic and powerful force, which has a vivid anti-mondialist orientation and claims to a global World Islamic Revolution. In geopolitical terms, Iran is a purely continental power, which has all the chances, strategically, economically and ideologically, of becoming the nucleus of a major Eurasian bloc.

The orientation of the Central Asian republics towards Iran (especially Azerbaijan, with its oil and giant nuclear-armed Kazakhstan) could well create the preconditions for genuine continental sovereignty. A pro-Iranian coalition would be the Central Asian analogue of Central Europe (compare: Central Asia Central Europe), since both historical precedents, ideological principles and the cultural and religious homogeneity of these continental regions provide sufficient grounds for the strength and effectiveness of such an alliance.

It is important to note that the pro-Iranian Greater Space potentially includes Afghanistan and Pakistan, which in turn opens up a band of territorial contiguity with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Iran, on the other hand, has direct borders with Turkmenistan.

3.13 The “pan-Turkism” trap

The orientation towards Turkey, often accompanied by “pan-Turkism” (as the Central Asian peoples of the “near abroad” are predominantly “Turkic”), is of a completely different nature.

Turkey as a state emerged in place of the Ottoman Empire, not as an extension of it, but as a parody of it. Instead of a polycentric imperial multinational Islamic structure, Kemal Atatürk created an eastern version of the French *Etat-Nation*, the State-Nation, with a secular, atheistic, profane and nationalist system. Turkey was the first state in the East to make a sharp break with its spiritual, religious and geopolitical tradition. In fact, Turkey, as a NATO member today, is the eastern outpost of Atlanticism and Mondialism, a “cordon sanitaire” between the Asian East and the Arab world. The geopolitical model offered by Turkey is integration into the Western world and an atheist, mondialist civilization. But since Turkey itself, which aspires to enter “Europe”, so far remains only a “politico-ideological” colony of the USA, rather than an actual member of the European Grand Spaces (which could theoretically imply Turkey’s participation in the Middle European bloc), For the countries of the “near abroad”, alignment with Turkey means integration into a “cordon sanitaire”, as a “colonial bridge” between the eastern Eurasian continental mass (with Iran, China and India) and the explosive Arab world, which is in constant danger of overthrowing its monialist puppet leadership.

Turkey’s path is one of service to an Atlanticist superpower and the adoption of a mondialist model of a planetary Big Space under the control of a “world government”. It may be argued that the map of “pan-Turkism” played by Turkey has an outwardly traditionalist character. This is partly true, and projects of “Greater Turkey from Yakutia to Sarajevo” are indeed being actively developed by Turkish propaganda. It should be noted, however, that only a radical change in the political, ideological and economic course of today’s Turkey could make these projects serious, and this implies nothing less than a Revolution and a 180 degree turn of

geopolitical interests. Without ruling out such a possibility, it is unlikely that such a course of events will take place in the near future. But at the same time, such a prospect, promoted in the present, may lead to a very concrete geopolitical result to the turn of the eastern “near abroad” countries away from Iran, to the choice of a secular, atheistic model of society, to the gradual integration into the pro-Atlantist “sanitary cordon”. “Panturkism” is as ambiguous as “pan-Slavism” or “pan-Germanism”, i.e. as all ideologies which place the national identity above the geopolitical, spatial and religious interests of peoples and states.

3.14 Petro-dollars and Mondialism

Saudi Arabia, a stronghold of purely Arab Islam and Islamic theocracy, at the ideological level is a special “Wahhabi” model of authoritarian, moralistic and “purist” Muslimism, typologically very close to Protestant forms of Christianity. Eastern Asian contemplation, asceticism and religious passivity have been replaced here by ritualism and the domination of an almost secular ethic. According to the Islamic fundamentalist Heydar Jemal, “Saudi Arabia in its current state is the direct opposite of the world of ‘continental Islam’. Geopolitically, the interests of Wahhabi Saudi Arabia are quite in line with a certain version of the mondialist project, as the country’s economic and military well-being is based on the support of the United States, which protects the dynastic interests of Saudi kings militarily and economically. An example of military support is the war against Iraq. The economic “support” is as follows. Saudi Arabia’s entire economy lies in oil. All Arab oil traditionally enters the world market through Anglo-American hands. Developing and exploiting Eurasian fields could theoretically compete with the Saudis, enrich the Eurasian states and make Europe and Japan independent of the US. Thus, the US, which controls Europe’s economy through its control of Arab oil, and the Saudi kings, who base their economy on American petrodollars, have the same interests.

The Saudi Wahhabi theocracy has repeatedly acted as an obstacle to the creation of an Arab Greater Space proper, as it contradicts both the interests of the dynasty and those of the Atlanteans. The Saudis have even more reason to fear a Eurasian continental Islamic Greater Space. Revolutionary Iran is generally considered to be the Saudis' number one ideological enemy. Thus, Saudi Arabia's geopolitical interests in the eastern countries of the "near abroad" are directly opposed to the emergence of an Asian Islamic Greater Space. This means that the path to Arab-Islamic integration under the "Wahhabi" banner for the Asian republics will in fact also be an inclusion in the Mondialist project, but not in the secular-nationalist version of "pan-Turkism", but in the moral-theocratic version. In a sense, this path is also nothing less than inclusion in the "cordon sanitaire". Only in this case, the "temptation" is not nationalism, but the religious factor (and money).

Summing up all these considerations, it can be said that the eastern countries of the "near abroad" have only one positive way of creating a new Greater Space is the way of the "Islamic Revolution" with an orientation to Tehran. In this way, national conflicts can be resolved and the restoration of religious tradition and religious order can be accomplished. At the geopolitical level, this would mean the creation of a powerful continental bloc that would be quite capable of opposing the mondialist projects in these regions. Moreover, even the first steps made in this direction will cause a chain reaction in the Arab world, which threatens the mondialists with the loss of control in the entire Islamic Ummah. In addition, such a geopolitical alliance will inevitably awaken the anti-mondialist forces of Central Europe (Iran's natural and main ally in the West) and Russia-Eurasia.

3.15 At least two poles or ... death

In the current geopolitical situation, the question is extremely acute: either a planetary "new world order" led by the US, where all states and peoples would be impersonal and obedient "cogs" of a mondialist technocratic,

atheist-trade "Disney Land" cosmopolitan model or the immediate creation of geopolitical opposition to Atlanticism and mondialism and organisation of potentially anti-mondialist, traditional and soil-dependent peoples and states into an alternative bloc (or several blocks). The situation today is so critical that it is almost irrelevant how and under what sign an alternative Greater Space may emerge. If it emerges, and if it truly opposes monodualism, that alone would be enough to expand, diversify and multiply the geopolitical alternatives in order to increase the internal degrees of freedom within the framework of the anti-mondialist opposition. It should always be remembered that for the US *"the main task is to prevent the emergence of a geopolitical alternative"* (any alternative). It is therefore perfectly fair for all anti-mondialist forces to put forward the exact opposite thesis: *"the main task is to create a geopolitical alternative"* (whatever that may be).

The situation today is so serious that there is no choice between "good" and "better" in it. If Russia can regain its geopolitical independence and get rid of its Atlanticist leadership fine. The countries of the "near abroad" will then have a wonderful opportunity to re-enter Russian Eurasia, this time devoid of the ideological negativity of ambiguous Marxism. Moreover, the voluntary and conscious return of the current "Near Abroad" would guarantee the coming cultural, religious, linguistic, economic and even, perhaps, political (but not state) autonomy. This would be the simplest and best option. Moreover, the exposure of the true colonial aims of the mondialists in this disastrous transitional period would certainly be a prerequisite for an even greater number of allies and satellites of Russia-Eurasia (both in the East and in the West).

If this does not happen, the detonator of the antimondialist geopolitical project could be another Great Space, either Central Europe under the flag of Germany, or a united Central Asia under the sign of the "Islamic Revolution". In principle, there remains the prospect of an anti-mondialist uprising in the Arab world and Latin America, although militarily these potential Great Spaces are insufficiently equipped to compete with the Superpower.

For the countries of the "near abroad", the problem of the Greater Space is

central and vital. The entire future of the nation, religion, culture, freedom, prosperity and security depends today on the choice of geopolitical orientation there. The issue is as acute as it can be. Today, all responsible people should understand that the adoption of the Mondialist model means nothing less than the complete and final destruction of the identity, the identity, the historical face of their states and nations, the end of their national history.

Chapter 4

PROSPECTS FOR A CIVIL WAR

4.1 National Interest and the Mondialist Lobby

The problem of a possible civil war in Russia is becoming more and more acute and there is a need today to study this dire issue from an analytical perspective, on the other side of both alarmist emotions and pacifist exhortations. The worst thing (if a civil conflict does erupt in Russia) is to be completely unprepared for it, confused by a complex and contradictory balance of power that can mislead even the most astute and ideologically consistent patriots.

In this issue, as in all other crucial aspects of the political existence of the nation and the state, we should begin by recalling the fundamental points which define the general contours of the current state of the geopolitical situation. The main imperative of the existence of the state and the nation is the principle of sovereignty, independence and political freedom. And it is the demands of national sovereignty that are synonymous with national interests. Russia and the Russian people in the context of the political history of the world have their unique place, their mission, their role, and the free and full performance of the national state destiny is the main sense of the very existence of the people as an organic community.

But we live in a special era when the domestic national policy of the state is inextricably linked to the foreign policy context, and perhaps never before in

history has the external pressure on nation-states been so strong and insistent. Moreover, almost the most important doctrine of the modern Western political establishment is the theory of monialism, i.e. such an organization of people's life around the world, in which there should be no nation-state formations, no sovereignty and no national interests. At the head of the monetaryist world community is supposed to be a cosmopolitan elite ruling not societies, but a mathematical sum of atomic individuals. Consequently, the monetaryist vector is initially oriented *against* any national-state formations, and its main task is to abolish *the old* traditional world, divided into peoples and countries, and to arrange a "new world order" that denies all forms of historical and organic socio-social formations.

Of course, the monialist factor is not only directed against Russia (other nations and states are also obstacles to it), but it is Russia as a powerful geopolitical entity that until recently was the main bastion preventing the gradual spread of monialist control from the West to the whole world. Of course, the Soviet system in certain aspects also had monialist features, and one of the Western monialists' projects was the gradual, "evolutionary" inclusion of the USSR in the planetary system of the "New World Order". This famous theory of convergence was most likely the main guide for those forces that began perestroika. But the soft variant of "mondialization" of Russia, for one reason or another, did not "work", and then the mondialist policy towards Russia took the form of aggressive pressure and outright subversion. The brutal and ultra-rapid collapse of the USSR deprived the proponents of "convergence" of levers of control, and the monialist policy shifted to openly aggressive, Russophobic forms.

The Mondialist vector is a crucial point for understanding Russia's current situation. Whereas previously the external influence on our country was exerted by other nation-states seeking to weaken the power of the Russian state or to bring it to their side in various international conflicts; whereas previously Russia's potential adversaries (explicit and implicit) were geopolitical forces generally comparable in structure to Russia itself, the main external factor at present is a particular form of pressure that has no clear nation-

state or geopolitical outlines and is predicted to be the most important. Of course, the traditional foreign policy factors also continue to operate (the Mondialist project has not yet been fully implemented), but their significance and weight pale in comparison with the totality of the Mondialist pressures, receding into the background. Russia's relations with Germany, Japan or China, for example, are today not a matter of two parties, but at least three: Russia, another state and the global monialist lobby, acting both directly and through their "agents of influence" in political formations, who clarify bilateral issues between them. At the same time, it is the "third force", monialism, that most often turns out to be the determining one, as its means of influence and structures of influence are incomparably more sophisticated and effective than the corresponding mechanisms of "archaic" nation-state formations.

Thus, in Russia, both in domestic and foreign policy, it is possible to identify two fundamental elements behind this or that decision, behind the organisation of this or that process, behind the determination of this or that orientation of Russian political and socio-economic life: these are the monialist "agents of influence" and the groups guided by the national-state interests. Based on all of the above, it is obvious that both poles are opposed to each other in the most important respects: some seek to minimize Russia's sovereignty and autonomy (up to its complete abolition in the monetary cosmopolitan context of the "new world order"), others, by contrast, are focused on the establishment, strengthening and expansion of national-state sovereignty, on the maximum removal of the nation from the global monetaryist structure, hostile, by definition, to the existence of any full-fledged autocrat. Of course, in real politics these two poles almost never meet in pure form, most power structures are mixed systems, where both tendencies coexist, but, nevertheless, it is these two poles that determine the main power trends, which are in constant and harsh opposition, veiled by compromises, naivety, short-termism or corruption of "uninitiated" statisticians from politics.

So we have identified two poles in the current political picture of Russia.

They correspond to two different perspectives on the possibility of a civil war in Russia. And it is these two forces that will ultimately be the main actors in the potential conflict, the main adversaries, the main parties, although their confrontation may be masked by a more private and confusing distribution of roles. The example of the first Russian civil war shows that in this case, national and anti-national forces acted not under their own banners, but under a complex and contradictory system of social, political and ideological orientations, concealing the true geopolitical motives and trends. In order not to repeat the mistakes of the past, it is necessary to analyse objectively the terrifying prospect of a new civil war, on the other side of political or ideological sympathies.

4.2 Options for the balance of power

Let us highlight the main themes of the Russian Civil War, identify the actors and the immediate motivations for it and outline its presumptive variants.

1) The first (and most unlikely) version of a civil war could develop along the lines of a confrontation: *nation-state forces* versus *the mondialist lobby*.

Indeed, such a division of roles would be very logical, given the complete incompatibility of the main orientations of both. The monialists seek to weaken Russia's sovereignty, undermine its economic and political autonomy, make it dependent on the cosmopolitan monialist establishment and deprive it of the ability to freely pursue its national mission in every possible way. Nationalists and statesmen, on the contrary, want to strengthen autarchy, to achieve maximum political independence and economic and social self-sufficiency. Naturally, it is impossible to combine these two tendencies peacefully, as they contradict each other in everything in general and in particular.

However, this version of civil war ("cosmopolitans against nationalists") can-

not become a nationwide and global one at all, since the monialist ideology is fundamentally incapable of instilling fanaticism in the masses and raising any significant part of the population to defend its ideals. Under peaceful conditions of course inertia, indifference and a general passivity may be auxiliary factors for the Mondialists, but in the case of bloody conflict, shooting and killing, an appeal to deeper layers of the human psyche, fanaticism and sacrifice are needed. Nationalists, on the other hand, could easily count on the support of an overwhelming majority of the people in an open and widespread armed confrontation with the monialists, if the conflict of course assumed a national character rather than being localized in specific centres tightly controlled by the monialists.

In other words, a civil war according to the “nationalists-mondialists” scenario would not be a real and total civil war in any case, because the monialists in their pure form do not and will not have a solid ideologically cohesive and politically active base, capable of organizing the masses to oppose the nationalists. If such a conflict were to break out, its outcome would be swift and unambiguous: the nation-state forces would quickly deal with the anti-national lobby, which had been designated as such and came face to face with the people who had risen up for the patriotic idea. In principle, such a civil war would be almost bloodless and very brief, and after the destruction of the Mondialists, the internal source of conflict would be eliminated and the political and social life of the state would develop strictly within the boundaries of national interests, as is the case in traditional states and nations.

But the Mondialist lobby is hardly unaware of its true position and the suicidal nature of such a scenario, which means it will try to avoid such a turn of events at all costs. That is why this option is almost unbelievable.

2) The second version of civil war is defined by the formula: *The Russian Federation against one (or more) of the former Soviet republics*. Such a situation could easily arise because of the extreme instability of the new state formations on the territory of the former USSR. These states, the vast majority of which have no more or less stable state and national traditions,

created within completely arbitrary borders that coincide neither with the ethnic, socio-economic nor religious territories of organic societies, will inevitably be plunged into deep internal and external crisis. *As a matter of principle they will not be able to acquire any genuine sovereignty, because their strategic capabilities do not allow them to assert their independence without resorting to external assistance.* The collapse of their political, social and economic systems is inevitable, and naturally, this cannot but affect their attitude both to the Russian (or pro-Russian) population and to Russia itself.

In this case, it is likely to be Russia that will be challenged by them, to which Russia will be forced to respond with varying degrees of aggression. This process is likely to have a chain effect, as an explosion of inter-ethnic or territorial contradictions affecting Russia and Russians will inevitably resonate in other former Soviet republics.

Obviously, the national interests of the Russians and the orientation of the mondialist lobby within Russia (and within the new republics) will not then confront each other directly and openly. The main opponent in such a war for the Russians would be their immediate neighbours. However, the mondialist lobby will not necessarily play to Russia's defeat in this case. Such a conflict, called "low intensity warfare" (or even "medium(!) intensity" by the American strategists) may well suit the interests of the Mondialist lobby, if it destabilizes the strategic and geopolitical situation in Russia and, more broadly, in Eurasia by becoming local, protracted and ambiguous. Russian national interests will not necessarily be served in such a case either, even if the civil war is fought under patriotic and nationalist slogans. As in the case of Afghanistan, an armed conflict between Russia and its neighbouring regions will only lead to a weakening of Russian influence in these states and undermine the appeal of the integration impulse of its neighbours to unite with Russia in a single geopolitical Eurasian bloc. At the same time, the similarity of the cultural and social type between the populations of the Russian Federation and the former Soviet republics would make this conflict fratricidal and truly civil. In the case of the Slavic republics (primarily

Ukraine) it will also be an intra-national tragedy.

This civil war option is thus contradictory and ambiguous. Russian national interests, the imperative of sovereignty, will not necessarily be strengthened in such a development and the mondialist, Russophobe lobby, for its part, may even benefit from it, creating a belt of “low-intensity war” around the Russian Federation, discrediting the Russians internationally and undermining the already shaky socio-economic stability of the state. Of course, this does not mean that Russia should not act as a defender of Russians and pro-Russian oriented peoples in the near abroad. But in doing all this, it should be particularly concerned about expanding its geopolitical and strategic influence. Even if the Russians succeed in reclaiming part of the native Russian lands from their neighbours, the price could be the emergence of new hostile states which would be pushed back into the camp of Russia’s main adversaries, i.e. the mondialists, in which case the new imperial integration that Russia needs would be postponed indefinitely.

3) The third scenario is similar to the first in structure, only here the civil war can start within the *Russian Federation* itself *between representatives of Russian and non-Russian ethnic groups* (3). The scenario may be similar to the previous one: the Russian population is aggressed by non-Russians in a national district or internal republic; ethnic solidarity encourages other Russians to take part in the conflict; other national non-Russian regions are drawn into armed confrontation on ethnic grounds; the civil war takes on the character of a “low-intensity war”. In this case, it is even more dangerous for Russia, as the result may be a violation of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation or, at the very least, provoking ethnic hostility towards Russians by non-Russians where they can be “suppressed”. At the same time, other state and national entities will inevitably be drawn into the conflict against the Russians, which may make it protracted and long-lasting. Such a conflict would shift the position of Russians from a nation-state to a narrow ethnic one, which would further narrow the geopolitical quality of Russia, which had already lost its imperial quality with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and then the USSR.

This version of civil war in general is contrary to the national interests of the Russians, as it would, in fact, legitimize the further disintegration of the Russian space into ethnic components, which in the future would reduce the geopolitical quality of the once imperial people to a purely ethnic, almost “tribal” level. For hardcore Russophobe mondialism, focused on undermining Russian national state autarchy, this option would be quite attractive, as it implies instilling in Russians a narrowly ethnic self-identification rather than a state identity, which would inevitably narrow the strategic scope of Russia. On the other hand, in this case too there is a certain risk for the mondialists, as the explosion of ethnic self-consciousness could also hit the “agents of influence”. Russian patriots, on the other hand, would not benefit from such a conflict in any way.

4) The fourth option is also intra-Russian, but it is not based on ethnic strife, but *on regional, administrative-territorial contradictions*. Moscow’s centralist policy in political-economic and social matters cannot but cause powerful opposition to the regions, which, in the general process of disintegration, are striving to gain maximum autonomy. Here, as in the case of ethnic tensions, the collapse of the Soviet empire deprives the centralist and integrationist idea of its legitimacy, obviousness and attractiveness. Moreover, the current policy of the centre, adopting the command totalitarian style of the former system, has in fact abandoned the second half of the centre-region relationship, which consisted of assistance and socio-administrative support.

The centre still wants to take and control as before, but now it actually gives nothing in return. Economically, the regions only lose out as their field of opportunity narrows and they are dependent on the centre. But this is compounded by the political peculiarity of the regions, where the anti-national character of the mondialist reforms is much more painfully felt than in the cosmopolitan metropolises of the capitals.

The first steps towards separatism have already been taken by the regions, although these attempts have been foiled by the centre. However, it is very likely that at some point Russians in southern Russia, in Siberia or elsewhere will want to create an “independent state” free from the political and

economic dictatorship of Moscow. This may be based on purely economic expediency. The sale of regional resources or locally produced goods, bypassing Moscow, can in some cases dramatically improve the local situation. On the other hand, a 'regional revolution' can also bring forward political objectives, such as the rejection of the extreme liberal policies of the centre, the preservation of social guarantees and the strengthening of the national aspect in ideology. All this makes the possibility of civil conflict at this level very real. At some point, the regions may seriously insist on their own agenda, which will naturally provoke opposition from the centre, which does not want to lose control over the territories.

This version of the civil war is no less ambiguous and contradictory than the previous two. Indeed, on the one hand, the demands of the regions wishing to break away from Moscow and the reform centre have some features of patriotism and nationalism and are in the interests of the people; the mondialist forces of the centre, by opposing the regions, will be defending not national but anti-national interests, since liberal control over the entirety of Russian territories is beneficial, first and foremost, to the constructors of the "new world order". But on the other hand, regional separatism will lead to the disintegration of the Russian state territories, weaken the nationwide power, and prepare fault lines within the unified Russian nation. The Mondialists may deliberately go to the provocation of such a conflict in the event that their control over Russia weakens, in which case the territorial disintegration of the country would be the last step in the weakening of the nation-state autarchy.

The national forces should act on this issue based on exactly the opposite logic. As long as the power of the centre is strong, it should be in solidarity with the regional demands, supporting their aspirations for autonomy from the centre. But the need for the strategic and political integration of all regions, based on the prospect of reconstituting the empire, should be emphasised from the outset. As the mondialist lobby in the centre weakens, patriots should gently change their orientation, insisting that civil conflict is unacceptable and calling for unification of the regions.

In any case, a civil war on a regional basis can in no way be in the national interest, nor can the two previous scenarios.

The following point should be emphasised. A fifth variant of civil war, in which the forces would be distributed not along ideological, national and territorial lines but along socio-economic ones, for example “the new rich” against “the new poor”, is inevitably called for. In principle, such an option is not excluded and all the prerequisites for it may emerge in the future. But in the present state of society, a purely economic factor is obviously not dominant. Despite the terrible economic cataclysms, the rampant impoverishment of the working class and the grotesque enrichment of the “new Russians”, Russian society does not yet formulate its demands in economic terms. The geopolitical, national and ideological aspects are incomparably more effective and urgent. It is precisely these aspects that are capable of bringing the masses to the squares and forcing them to take up arms. The economic crisis is the perfect backdrop for a civil conflict, it can serve as a trigger for cataclysms in certain cases, but the main lines of force will be other non-economic theses. Appeals to nation, ethnicity, patriotism, freedom today can relativize the purely material side of life, making it secondary. But even if the material side were to prevail, it could not, because of the discrediting of Marxist and socialist doctrines, express its demands in the form of a coherent and incendiary political ideology. It is more likely that the economic factor will be a concomitant rather than a defining category in the potential conflicts.

4.3 Results of the analysis

A civil war in Russia is unfortunately possible. The fundamental contradictions between the national-state interests and the plans of the mondialists are unlikely to be resolved peacefully and amicably. In order to talk seriously about a “consensus” or “truce” between these forces, either the bearers of the national-state tendencies must be completely destroyed (which is only

possible with the destruction of the Russian state and the Russian nation itself), or the representatives of the monialist lobby must be put to death.

It is for this reason that the unleashing of a civil war in Russia or the creation on its territory of a belt of “low-intensity wars” could at any moment become the main project of the Mondialist lobby. There is no doubt that the representatives of this lobby will try their best to remain in the shadows themselves, acting under some other banner (both separatist and centralist).

The three options of a civil war of the Russian Federation against the near abroad, the Russian population against the foreigners, the regions against the centre are fundamentally unacceptable to all those who are really concerned about the national-state interests of Russia and the Russian people. All three of these options are fraught with further splitting of Russia’s geopolitical and strategic space, even if certain territories come under Russian control. Hence, a civil war under these three scenarios should be prevented by the patriots by any means. Not to mention that from a moral point of view, it is *not beneficial* for them. And as soon as it is so, it is logical to assume that the Mondialists will have a hand in provoking such conflicts (if they start to flare up).

For the Mondialist lobby, something like a civil war in Russia could also be beneficial for several other reasons. Initiating a military conflict with direct Russian involvement would allow liberals from the centre to

- 1) *Introduce a political dictatorship* under the pretext of “saving the fatherland” and forcibly get rid of political opponents;
- 2) *Blame the war for the economic collapse* and force the economy to function under the direct control of the centre;
- 3) *To divert public attention away from the activities of the “reformers”* which is becoming dangerously obvious today;
- 4) *To knowingly prevent a possible future alliance of Russians with neighbouring national-state Eurasian and European entities* under the sign of

continental solidarity against the Atlanticist domination of the West and the Mondialist projects.

All this suggests that the bearers of the hard-line version of monialism in Russia will sooner or later resort to a “civil war”, especially if the position of the liberal regime becomes more and more precarious. It is important to note, however, that in this case there will have to be a “structural realignment” within the monialist lobby itself, with some of it speaking under patriotic and perhaps even nationalist and chauvinist slogans.

It is difficult to say exactly when the first explosions might occur. It depends on many spontaneous and artificial factors. But even if nothing like that happens for a while, the potential threat of such a turn of events will be more than relevant, as long as the Mondialist lobby not only exists in Russia, but also controls the most important levers of state and political power.

Only the first version of the “civil war” of the Mondialists against the Nationalists could have been brief, almost bloodless and beneficial for the patriots, for Russia. Moreover, a direct clash between the nation and its internal enemies would inevitably have given victory to the national forces. This would not be a “civil war” in the full sense of the word, but a brief outbreak of active confrontation, as a result of which the possibility of a full-fledged civil war, if not completely destroyed, would be postponed indefinitely. But for that to happen it would be necessary to provoke the mondialist lobby to act under its own banner, and patriotic forces would have to rally on behalf of the clearly defined and accurately named Russian national state interests. This is certainly not easy (almost impossible). On the one hand, the mondialists themselves are not so naive as to speak loudly about their hatred for the country in which they operate and their desire to destroy it, and on the other hand, the representatives of the national-state forces are often unable to articulate the basis of their ideological position intelligibly and consistently, but concisely and convincingly at the same time. This is hampered by adherence to outdated Soviet-Communist clichés, heightened emotionality, a weak capacity for analytical thinking, disregard for the underlying principles of geopolitics, etc.

Genuine civil peace cannot be based on compromise if the two sides of that compromise are direct opposites in everything. As long as the Mondialist value system is dominant, then all its flanks are right-wing, left-wing and centrist, for all their differences, do not question the common orientation. Yes, in such a situation “peace” is possible, but at the cost of the destruction of the state and the radical exclusion of the national forces from the dialogue. If the nation-state system of values becomes dominant, then we can talk about finding a compromise between national capitalists, national socialists, national communists, national monarchists or national theocrats, but even in this case, anti-national, mondialist, Russophobic forces will be excluded from the dialogue and put ideologically outlawed.

Our society is fraught with terrible civil conflict. If we still have the ability to influence the course of events, to choose, we must choose the lesser of two evils.

Chapter 5

GEOPOLITICS OF THE SOUTH SLAVES CONFLICT

5.1 Symbolism in Yugoslavia

It is well known that Yugoslavia is the territory in Europe from which the most serious and large-scale European conflicts begin. At least, that was the case in the twentieth century. The Balkans is a knot where the interests of all major European geopolitical blocs converge, and that is why the fate of the Balkan peoples symbolizes the fate of all European nations. Yugoslavia is Europe in miniature. Among its inhabitants one can find exact analogues of the major continental powers.

The Serbs represent Orthodox Russia (= Eurasia) in the Balkans. Croats and Slovenes Central Europe (i.e. Germany, Austria, Italy, etc.). Muslim Albanians and Bosnians the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, hence Turkey and even the Islamic world as a whole. Finally, the Macedonians are a mixed Serbo-Bulgarian ethnos, which is a symbol of the Great Orthodox Yugoslavia (based on the unification of Serbia and Bulgaria), which never managed to be historically formed, despite the Serbo-Bulgarian projects that existed at the beginning of the century.

5.2 The three European powers

In the broadest terms it can be said that the geopolitical map of Europe is divided into three fundamental areas.

The first area is the West. The continental West proper is represented primarily by France and Portugal. In a broader sense, it includes England and the transatlantic non-European United States. Although there may be internal contradictions between the continental West (France), the insular West (England) and the overseas West (America), in relation to the rest of the European geopolitical formations, the West most often acts as a single geopolitical force.

The second areal is Central Europe (Mitteleuropa). It includes the states of the former Holy Roman Empire of the German Nations, the former lands of Austria-Hungary, Germany, Italy, etc. Central Europe is characterised by geopolitical confrontation with both the European West and the East.

Finally, the third areal is Russia, which speaks in Europe not only on its own behalf, but also on behalf of all the Eurasian peoples of the East.

Generally speaking, a fourth Islamic geopolitical area could be distinguished, from the Maghreb countries of North Africa to Pakistan and the Philippines, but this geopolitical bloc is outside Europe, and moreover in the 20th century its geopolitical influence on Europe was not very significant, although it is possible that in the future the Islamic world will again (as it was in the Middle Ages) become an important component of European geopolitics.

The three geopolitical European formations create permanent zones of tension on the continent, which run along the conventional and constantly shifting borders between the European West and Central Europe (Mitteleuropa) on the one hand, and between Central Europe and Russia-Eurasia on the other.

Schematically, it is possible to identify a number of geopolitical alliances or, conversely, confrontations that constitute the constants of European inter-

national politics.

The European West can confront Central Europe as its closest neighbour from the East. This geopolitical trend is most clearly embodied in the confrontation between absolutist France (Etat-Nation) and imperial Austria-Hungary. Later on, this contradiction was expressed in numerous Franco-German conflicts. On the other hand, there is the theoretical possibility of a Franco-German geopolitical alliance, which inspired both Vichy and de Gaulle. It is indicative that the West may at times ally itself with the European East (Russia-Eurasia) in the struggle against Central Europe. In other cases, it is Russia that becomes the main geopolitical opponent of both the European West and Central Europe.

Middle Europe (Germany), too, in relation to its eastern geopolitical neighbour, can be either in a state of confrontation (which is always directly or indirectly beneficial to the European West) or in alliance (which always poses a danger to the West).

Finally, Russia's geopolitical preferences in European politics can be oriented either in an anti-German direction (France, England and even the United States logically become allies in this case) or in an anti-Western direction (then a Russo-German alliance is inevitable).

These, in the crudest approximation, are the main geopolitical factors of European politics. It is absolutely necessary to take them into account when analysing the Balkan problem, as all three of these trends collide with each other in the Yugoslav conflict, creating the potential threat of a new great European war.

5.3 The Croatian truth

Croats (as well as Slovenes) were traditionally part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, an ethnos fully integrated into the Catholic sector of Germanic Central Europe. Their natural geopolitical destiny was linked to this Eu-

ropean bloc. Therefore, the gravitation of Croats to Germany and Austria is by no means a random opportunist arbitrariness, but follows the logic of the historical existence of this nation. The collapse of Austria-Hungary and the creation of Yugoslavia was the result of a long struggle of the European West against Central Europe, which explains the pragmatic support given by the French to the Serbs. (Option: West together with East against Central Europe). Those Croats who welcomed the creation of Yugoslavia went, in a sense, against their geopolitical and religious tradition, and it is no coincidence that most of them, through Masonic institutions, were oriented precisely towards the “French Great East” and its geopolitical projects aimed at the triumph of Western forces in Europe. In the creation of Yugoslavia, as well as in the entire balance of power during the First World War, one can trace the dominance of the Western trend, which successfully used the forces of the East (both Serbia and greater Russia) against the Middle Europe.

The Croats in the creation of Yugoslavia were the first victims of this policy, and it is not surprising that they later welcomed the Germans as liberators (as did the Ukrainian Catholics and Uniats, who had always gravitated towards the zone of Central European influence). However, the support of the West by France for the Serbs (incidentally, this support was also provided primarily through Masonic channels) was very ambiguous, as the Serbs themselves, in turn, became hostages of such a geopolitical entity in the Balkans, whose integrity could only be preserved through forceful control.

With the actual crisis of the eastern bloc (i.e. the entire Russia-Eurasia sphere of influence) during perestroika, the integration forces in Yugoslavia have somewhat weakened and Croats (together with Slovenes) have not been slow to assert their geopolitical foreignness towards Serbian Yugoslavia, understood in two ways both as an artificial creation of the West and as an outpost of the East in Central Europe.

Thus, on a geopolitical level, Croats defend the principle that Central Europe should remain itself, i.e. an independent, autonomous and territorially united European region. However, it should be noted that

the idea of transforming Croatia into a separate ethnically homogeneous dwarf Balkan Etat-Nation of the French type is already knowingly laying a mine under the geopolitical unity of Central European space, able to exist harmoniously only as a flexible but integral structure, rather than as a fragmented conglomerate of egoistic micro-states. In other words, the geopolitical tendency of Croats will be full-fledged only in case of its supernational orientation, which also implies a peaceful solution to the problem of the Serb minority in Croatia. Croatian nationalism, moving from the geopolitical plane to the purely ethnic plane, loses its justification and changes its sign to the opposite.

5.4 Serbian Truth

The geopolitical perspective of the Serbs is unequivocally pro-Russian, Eurasian in nature. Through the religious and ethnic factor Serbia is directly adjacent to Russia, being its geopolitical continuation in the south of Europe. The fate of the Serbs and the fate of the Russians on a geopolitical level is one and the same fate. Therefore, in order for the Serbs to return to the origins of their European mission, they need to turn to the East, to Eurasia, to understand the meaning and objectives of Russian geopolitics. At that, not naive and artificial pan-Slavism, the failure of which was perfectly demonstrated by Russian philosopher Konstantin Leontiev, but namely the project of Great Eurasia with Russian axis, a kind of ecumenical-continental Orthodox neo-Byzantism, should be the guiding star of the truly Serbian geopolitics. Only then will the Serbian tendency return to its own roots and stop playing the role of a puppet in the hands of the Atlanticists, used only to fight against Central Europe and the Germanic world.

In the geopolitical history of Europe, one constant tendency can be traced, which will help to understand *what* is a positive solution for Serbia. The trend is as follows: an alliance of East and Central Europe against the West

is always beneficial to both sides. Equally, an alliance with the continental West (France) against an insular and overseas West (the Anglo-Saxon world) is beneficial to the Middle Europe (Germany). In other words, the priority given to the geopolitical East (even to the relative East, since Middle Europe, for example, is the East in relation to France) is almost always beneficial not only to the East itself, but also to the Western member of this alliance. Conversely, a geopolitical alliance with a Western tendency (France with England and the USA against Germany, France with Germany against Russia, etc.) ties knots of new European conflicts and wars.

Given these considerations, we can say that the geopolitical orientation of the Serbs should look to Bulgarian geopolitics, which has almost always combined Russophilia with Germanophilia, creating a space of political stability and harmony in Southern Europe, which could gradually open Central Europe to the Muslim south, and thus end the dominance of the Atlanticist West in this region. Moreover, Serbia must realise the ambiguity of the support it once received from the West, the price of which is clearly visible in the anti-Serbian sanctions imposed by Western countries. Only geopolitical unity with the other Eastern European Orthodox nations (especially Bulgaria) into a single pro-Russian and simultaneously Central European-friendly bloc will create a zone of stability in the Balkans and remove the infamous term “Balkanisation” from use.

Just as in the case of the Croats, the idea of a purely Serbian nation-state will also not solve any problems if that Serbian state adopts a Germanophobia and Western orientation from the Freemason-created Yugoslavia.

5.5 The Truth of the Yugoslav Muslims

The Yugoslav Muslims of Bosnia and the Albanians represent the Islamic, “Ottoman” geopolitical factor in Europe. It is important to note that Turkey, whose influence is most felt among the Yugoslav Muslims, is clearly a spokesman for extreme Western, Atlanticist tendencies in Europe.

Whereas the West, which sought to use the European East (Russia) against Central Europe, nevertheless failed to finally suppress the independent geopolitical self-expression of this continental region and often faced, on the contrary, the expansion of Russia-Eurasia (either through the Russian-German alliance or directly through the creation of the Warsaw block), secular pseudo-Islamic Turkey became a reliable tool in the hands of Atlantist politicians. And more broadly, the Atlanticist influence on the geopolitics of Islamic countries is extremely strong. Therefore the anti-Serb riots of Yugoslavian Muslims outlines an incomparably more global continental conflict of Northern Eurasia (Russia and its geopolitical area) with the South. It is important to note that such a conflict runs counter to the interests of the South itself, as it becomes in this case the same instrument in the hands of the Atlanticist West as the Eurasian East (represented by the Serbs) was against Central Europe (represented by Austria-Hungary and its representatives, the Croats).

The only logical way out for the Yugoslav Muslims of Bosnia and the Albanians would be to turn to Iran and the continuity of its policy, since only this country is currently pursuing a geopolitics oriented towards independence, autonomy and continental harmony, acting according to its own logic independently of the interests of the Atlanteans in the region. By turning to Iran, Yugoslav Muslims could gain a proper geopolitical perspective, as a radically anti-Western, continental and traditionalist Iran is a potential ally of all Eastern-oriented European blocs from Russia-Eurasia to Central Europe. Moreover, an orientation towards Iran in the European Eastern Great Spaces could dramatically change the situation in the whole Islamic world and drastically weaken American influence there, which would not only benefit the Europeans, but would also free the Islamic peoples from the economic and military dictate of the Anglo-Saxon Atlanticists.

Only with this orientation of the Yugoslav Muslims could their geopolitical presence in Europe become harmonious, logical and conflict-free. It can be said that the problem is divided into three stages. The first stage: the reorientation of Muslims from Turkey to Iran. Second stage: strengthening

the geopolitical alliance of Central Europe with Iran and the Islamic world as a whole. And the third stage: a geopolitical Eurasian alliance between the East and Central Europe. However, these stages can run in parallel, each at its own level. Here, it is particularly important to understand that the problem of a small Balkan nation cannot be solved geopolitically without a most serious and global geopolitical transformation. It should never be forgotten that it is with small in size, but giant in symbolic importance local conflicts that all world wars begin.

5.6 The truth of the Macedonians

The Macedonian problem with contemporary Yugoslavia is rooted precisely in the artificiality of the real “Yugoslavia”, which was a “Southern Slavic state” in name only. The Macedonians, representing an ethnos intermediate between Serbs and Bulgarians and professing Orthodoxy, should have been a natural component of the real Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Bulgaria. But the existence of two Jacobean-type Slavic states in the Balkans instead of one federal, “imperial”, Slavic state with a Eurasian orientation has resulted in the small Macedonian people finding themselves on the border between two political regions with rather different political specificities.

In the present moment, however, it is made even worse by the fact that in today’s Bulgaria there is a growing Jacobin nationalism, which has repeatedly pitted the Orthodox Balkan powers against each other and prevented the conversion to the only true neo-Byzantine geopolitics. The Atlanticist lobby (both Catholic and British) was originally also actively involved in this process and is making itself felt in contemporary Bulgaria as well, albeit in different forms.

In essence, Western tactics remain the same here as they were at the beginning of the century. At that time, having destroyed Austria-Hungary, the West prevented the creation of a major Slavic community by playing the card of “Balkan nationalisms” - Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Romanian,

etc. Today, the same geopolitical forces of the West are again striking a double blow to Central Europe and to Yugoslav unity, provoking Croatian separatism in the West and Macedonian separatism in the East.

In the case of Macedonia, as in all other Balkan conflicts, a way out can only be found through a global integration process of the organisation of European Greater Spaces and not through straightforward separatism and the creation of dwarf pseudo-states. The annexation of Macedonia to Bulgaria would also in no way solve the problem, but would only prepare a new, this time truly interstate, inter-Slavic conflict.

5.7 Priorities for the Yugoslav War

Being deeply symbolic and highly significant, the Yugoslav conflict requires every country, every European political and geopolitical force to define and outline its priorities in this matter. It is not only about the sentimental, confessional, historical, ethnic or political inclinations of certain individuals, peoples and states. It is about the future of Europe, the future of Eurasia.

The supporters of the priority of Central Europe and Germanophilia initially took a pro-Croatian stance. This choice was based on a geopolitical analysis of the reasons for the creation of Yugoslavia, a rejection of French Masonic policy in Central Europe and an understanding of the need to naturally recreate a unified Central European space after the end of the “Yalta era”, during which Europe was artificially divided into two, not three, geopolitical camps. This explains the presence of many European national revolutionaries among Croats.

But the logic of preferring Middle Europe did not take into account one very important consideration. The fact is that in addition to the instrumental role of the geopolitical East in the execution of the West’s plans against Middle Europe, there is and always has been a root, underlying and grounded Eurasian proper geopolitics of this Greater Space, the geopolitics

of Orthodox Russia, focused on its own continental interests, and in the distant future on the new Holy Alliance. When in the process of the brutal internal conflict between Serbs and Croats the Serbian self-consciousness was fully awakened, when the blood of the Serbian people again awakened from the unconscious depths the ancient geopolitical, national and spiritual archetypes, when the idea of Great Serbia, Spiritual Serbia became relevant, the instrumental mission of Yugoslavia ended and the Great Eurasian Idea, the idea of the East took its place.

While the Serbs were fighting Central Europe (in the form of the Croats) Atlanticists from Paris to New York were everywhere applauding Federal Yugoslavia or at least reproaching the Croats for “nationalism” and “pro-fascism”. As soon as the Serbs crossed a line and their struggle became a struggle against the very idea of the West, against Atlantism, Serbia was immediately declared the main obstacle to the building of the “New World Order” and harsh political and economic sanctions followed against it.

To make the final choice, it is necessary to refer back to the above-mentioned geopolitical law, according to which the continental harmony is real only if the East has priority, if Eurasia is chosen as a positive orientation, because even the idea of the Middle Europe, positive in itself, becomes negative and destructive when it is opposed to Russia-Eurasia, as it was clearly revealed in the deep and tragic mistake of Hitler, who started the anti-East, anti-Russian expansion, which eventually turned out to be beneficial. Therefore, in the Yugoslav conflict too, geopolitical priority should be given to the Serbian factor but, naturally, to the extent that the Serbs follow the Eurasian, pro-Russian geopolitical trend, gravitating towards a powerful and flexible South Slavic bloc, aware of the importance of Central Europe and contributing to the establishment of a German-Russian alliance against the West. Serbian Germanophobia combined with Masonic Francophilism, however plausible the pretext may be, can never provide the basis for a positive solution to the Yugoslav problem.

In other words, the greatest preference should be given to Serbian traditionalists, rooted in the Orthodox faith, conscious of their Slavic spiritual heritage

and oriented towards creating a new harmonious pro-Russian geopolitical structure with an explicitly anti-Western and anti-Atlantic orientation.

On the other hand, careful consideration should be given to the demands of Croats and their gravitational pull towards the Central European region. With their anti-Atlantic tendencies, Croats could potentially become a positive intra-European force.

The Bosnian factor in the reorientation of Yugoslav Muslims from Turkey to Iran must also be taken into account in order to “turn poison into cure” and on this basis launch an entirely new European policy in the Islamic world, in direct opposition to US economic and military imperialism in Islamic countries.

Finally, the Macedonians, instead of being an apple of discord among the Southern Orthodox Slavs, should be the germ of Serbian-Bulgarian unification, the first step towards the creation of a true Greater Yugoslavia.

These are the conclusions drawn from an impartial geopolitical analysis of the Yugoslav problem. Of course, in the horror of the fratricidal war it is difficult to maintain common sense, the bloodshed only awakens rage and the desire for revenge in our hearts. But sometimes, perhaps, only a cold, rational analysis that takes into account the historical roots and geopolitical patterns can offer the right way out of the deadlock of a fratricidal war, while emotional solidarity with those or others will only exacerbate the hopelessness of the bloody nightmare. Moreover, such an analysis clearly shows that the true enemy, the instigator of the whole intra-Slavic genocide, remains in the shadows, behind the scenes, preferring to watch from afar as one Slavic nation destroys another, sowing discord, closing off the possibility of union and brotherly peace for years to come, ruining the Great Spaces of the now most powerful but fragmented continent.

The real initiator of the Yugoslav massacre is the *Atlanticist forces of the West*, guided by the principle “in the camp of the enemy one must pit one against another and under no circumstances allow for unity, union and

fraternal unity”. This needs to be understood by all those involved in the complex Yugoslav war for Europe, so that it does not become a war against Europe once and for all.

5.8 Serbia is Russia

The importance of the Yugoslav events also lies in the fact that the example of a small Balkan country is a replay of the scenario of a gigantic continental war that could erupt in Russia. All the geopolitical forces involved in the Balkan conflict have their counterparts in Russia too, only in an incomparably larger spatial volume. Croats and Slovenes, aspiring to enter Central Europe, have their geopolitical synonyms with Ukrainians, although the affinity of the latter with Velikorossia dates back not to several decades, but to several centuries, and there are no confessional tensions, except for the Uniates and the Ukrainian Catholics. Be that as it may, judging by certain trends, some forces in Kiev are beginning to 'gravitate towards the Russian East' and are keen to move closer to the European space economically controlled by Germany. Russians and other nations living in Ukraine could become hostages to the “middle-European” policies of these republics, in which case their fate would be similar to that of the Serbs in Croatia.

This comparison shows, among other things, that in its geopolitical and diplomatic relations with Ukraine and Belarus, Russia should be guided by its fundamental understanding of Central Europe, i.e. primarily Germany. In order to be realistic on this issue, the solution should be based not on pathetic slogans about “unity of blood brothers of the Slavs” (what kind of “unity” this is can be seen on the example of Serbo-Chorpathian massacres), but on a deep analysis of the logic of Russian-German relations, because both Ukraine and even Poland are not independent geopolitical entities, but only border regions of the two Great Spaces of Eurasia-Russia and Central Europe. Nor should we forget that the conflict in this border zone is extremely beneficial for another geopolitical power, the West. It is

no accident that Anglo-Saxon diplomacy has always regarded all the territories from Romania to the Baltics as a “sanitary belt”, protecting the West (and especially the Anglo-Saxon world) from an extremely undesirable Russian-German alliance.

The Serbo-Muslim conflict is analogous to a possible Russo-Islamic confrontation in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and it is important to note that in this case too, the Muslim republics that were part of the USSR are an area of competitive geopolitical influence for Turkey and Iran. As in the case of the Yugoslav Muslims, this comparison shows that the Iranian-oriented republics stand a better chance of coming into geopolitical harmony with the main Russian bloc of the Eurasian continent. In contrast, the geopolitical factor of Turkey, currently playing the role of an agent of Atlanticist policy in the region, is inevitably fraught with drama and conflict.

The example of Yugoslavia shows *what* threatens Russia in the case of a similar course of events, and the fact that these events are indeed unfolding in the same direction is no longer in doubt today. The only difference is the speed, which is greater the smaller the space and the smaller the number of people. To prevent Russia from a giant “Yugoslavia”, a bloodbath monstrous in its scale and consequences, it is necessary to answer the fundamental geopolitical questions in advance, to determine the Russian continental strategy, which must be guided by knowledge of the Russian political tradition and understanding of the main geopolitical tasks of Russia-Eurasia, the “geographical axis of history”. At the same time, inertia, passively following the fatal course of events will not only be destructive for the entire system of continental security, but also fraught with the destruction of all humanity.

Chapter 6 FROM SACRAL GEOGRAPHY TO GEOPOLITICS

6.1 Geopolitics is an “intermediate” science

Geopolitical concepts have long been crucial factors in modern politics. They are based on general principles that make it easy to analyse the situation of

any single country and any single region.

Geopolitics as it exists today is certainly a secular, “profane” and secularised science. But perhaps, among all the other modern sciences, it has preserved in itself the greatest connection with tradition and with traditional sciences. René Guénon said that modern chemistry is the result of the desacralization of the traditional science of alchemy, and modern physics is the result of magic. Similarly, modern geopolitics can be said to be a product of the secularization, desacralization of another traditional science, sacred geography. However, as geopolitics occupies a special place among modern sciences and is often referred to as a ‘pseudoscience’, its profanization is not as perfect and irreversible as that of chemistry or physics. The links with sacred geography can be seen here quite clearly. Therefore, we can say that geopolitics occupies an intermediate position between traditional science (sacred geography) and profane science.

6.2 Land and sea

The two original concepts in geopolitics are *land and sea*. It is these two elements of Earth and Water that are at the heart of man’s qualitative conception of terrestrial space. In the experience of land and sea, land and water, man comes into contact with the fundamental aspects of his existence. Land is stability, density, fixity, space itself. Water is mobility, softness, dynamics, time.

These two elements are the most obvious manifestations of the material nature of the world. They are outside of man: everything dense and liquid. They are also inside him: the body and the blood. (Same on the cellular level.)

The universality of the experience of earth and water gives rise to the traditional concept of the firmament of heaven, as the presence of the Upper Waters (source of rain) in the sky implies also the presence of a symmetrical

and obligatory element of earth, land, the firmament of heaven. Be that as it may, the Earth, the Sea, the Ocean are the main categories of earthly existence, and humanity cannot but see in them some basic attributes of the universe. As two main terms of geopolitics, they retain their significance both for traditional civilizations and for strictly modern states, nations and ideological blocs. At the level of global geopolitical phenomena Land and Sea gave birth to the terms Thalassocracy and Tellurocracy, i.e. “might through the sea” and “might through the land”.

Every state, every empire bases its strength on the preferred development of one of these categories. Empires are either “thalassocratic” or “telluric”. The former implies a metropolis and colonies, the latter a capital and provinces on a “common land”. In the case of a “thalassocracy”, its territories are not united in one land space, which creates a discontinuity factor. The sea is both the strongest and weakest point of “thalassocratic power”. On the contrary, “Tellurocracy” has the quality of territorial continuity.

But geographical and cosmological logic immediately complicates the seemingly simple scheme of this division: the pair “land-sea” when superimposed over its elements yields the ideas of “sea land” and “earth-water”. Sea land is an island, i.e. the basis of a maritime empire, the pole of thalassocracy. Terrestrial water or land water is the rivers, which prefigures the development of the land empire. It is on the river that the cities, hence the capital, the pole of tellurocracy, are situated. This symmetry is both symbolic and economic-economic and geographical at the same time. It is important to note that the status of the Island and the Continent is determined not so much by their physical size, as by the specifics of the typical consciousness of the population. Thus, the geopolitics of the United States is insular, despite the size of North America, and insular Japan geopolitically represents an example of a continental mentality, etc.

Another detail is also important: historically thalassocracy is linked to the West and the Atlantic Ocean, while tellurocracy is linked to the East and the Eurasian continent. (The above example of Japan is thus explained by the stronger “attraction”, the influence of Eurasia).

Thalassocracy and Atlantism had become synonymous long before the colonial expansion of Britain or the Portuguese-Spanish conquests. Even before the wave of maritime migrations began, the peoples of the West and their cultures had begun moving eastwards from centres located in the Atlantic. The Mediterranean was also being developed from Gibraltar to the Middle East, not vice versa. Conversely, excavations in Eastern Siberia and Mongolia show that it was here that the earliest centres of civilisation existed, meaning that it was the central lands of the continent that were the cradle of Eurasian humanity.

6.3 Symbolism of the landscape

In addition to the two global categories of Land and Sea, geopolitics operates with more specific definitions. Among thalassocratic realities, maritime and oceanic formations are distinguished. Thus, the civilization of the seas, such as the Black Sea or the Mediterranean, is very different in its quality from the civilization of the oceans, i.e. the island powers and peoples inhabiting the shores of the open oceans. A more private division is also the river and lake civilisations associated with the continents.

Tellurocracy also has its own specific forms. Thus, one can distinguish between the Steppe civilisation and the Forest civilisation, the Mountain civilisation and the Valley civilisation, and the Desert civilisation and the Ice civilisation. The varieties of landscape in sacral geography are understood as symbolic complexes connected with the specifics of state, religious and ethical ideology of certain peoples. And even when we are dealing with a universalist ecumenical religion, its concrete embodiment in this or that nation, race, state will still be subject to adaptation in accordance with the local sacral-geographical context.

Deserts and steppes are the geopolitical microcosm of nomads. It is in deserts and steppes that tellurocratic tendencies reach their peak, as the factor of “water” is minimized here. It is the empires of the Deserts and

Steppes that should logically be the geopolitical springboard of tellurocracy.

The empire of Genghis Khan can be regarded as an example of an empire of the Steppe, and the Arab Caliphate, which arose under the direct influence of nomads, is a characteristic example of an empire of the Desert.

Mountains and mountain civilisations are most often archaic, fragmented entities. Not only are mountain countries not sources of expansion, but on the contrary, the victims of geopolitical expansion by other telluric forces are drawn to them. No empire has a mountainous region as its centre. Hence the oft-repeated motif of sacred geography: “the mountains are inhabited by demons”. The idea of remnants of ancient races and civilisations preserved in the mountains is reflected in the fact that the sacral centres of tradition are located precisely in the mountains. One might even say that in tellurocracy the mountains are correlated with a kind of spiritual power.

The logical combination of both concepts of mountains as the image of the priestly and the plain as the image of the royal was the symbolism of the hill, i.e. a small or medium elevation. The hill is a symbol of royal power, rising above the secular level of the steppe, but not exceeding the limits of imperial interests (as is the case with mountains). The hill is the seat of a king, a duke, an emperor, but not of a priest. All capitals of major telluric empires are situated on a hill or hills (often seven according to the number of planets; five according to the number of elements, including ether, etc.).

The forest in sacred geography is, in a certain sense, close to the mountains. The very symbolism of the tree is related to that of the mountain (both signify the axis of the world). Therefore the forest in tellurocracy also fulfils a peripheral function - it is also a “place of priests” (druids, sorcerers, hermits) but also a “place of demons”, i.e. the archaic remnants of a vanished past. The forest zone cannot be the centre of a land empire either.

The tundra is the northern counterpart of the steppe and the desert, but its cold climate makes it much less geopolitically significant. This “periphery” reaches its apogee in the ice, which, like the mountains, are zones of

deep archaicism. It is indicative that the Eskimo shamanic tradition presupposes a solitary removal into the ice, where the future shaman opens up the otherworld. Thus, the ice is a priestly zone, a precursor to the other world.

Given these initial and most general characteristics of the geopolitical map, it is possible to define different regions of the planet according to their sacred quality. This method is also applicable to local features of the landscape at the level of a single country or even a single locality. It is also possible to trace similarities in ideologies and traditions amongst the most seemingly different peoples if their indigenous landscape is the same.

6.4 East and West in sacred geography

The sides of light in the context of sacred geography have a special qualitative characteristic. In different traditions and in different periods of these traditions the picture of sacral geography may change in accordance with the cyclic phases of development of this tradition. At the same time the symbolic function of the Parties of Light often varies. Without going into detail, it is possible to formulate the most universal law of sacral geography as applied to the East and the West.

East in sacral geography on the basis of “cosmic symbolism” is traditionally regarded as the “land of the Spirit”, the land of paradise, the land of fullness, abundance, the “home” of the Sacred in its most complete and perfect form. In particular, this idea is reflected in the text of the Bible, which refers to the eastern location of “Eden”. The same understanding is common to other Abrahamic traditions (Islam and Judaism) as well as to many non-Arahamic traditions such as Chinese, Hindu and Iranian. “The East is the abode of the gods”, says the sacred formula of the ancient Egyptians, and the word “East” (Egyptian for “inter”) itself meant “God” at the same time. In terms of natural symbolism, the East is the place where the sun rises, the Light of the World, a material symbol of Deity and Spirit.

The West has exactly the opposite symbolic meaning. It is “the land of death”, “the world of the dead”, “the green country” (as the ancient Egyptians called it). The West is “the realm of exile”, “the well of alienation”, as Islamic mystics put it. The West is the “anti-East”, the country of “sunset”, decadence, degradation, transition from the manifested to the unrevealed, from life to death, from fullness to poverty, etc. The West is the place where the sun sets, where it “goes down”.

According to this logic of natural cosmic symbolism ancient traditions organized their “sacred space”, founded their cult centres, burials, temples and buildings, and comprehended natural and “civilizational” features of geographical, cultural and state territories of the planet. Thus, the very structure of migrations, wars, campaigns, demographic waves, empire building, etc. was determined by the initial, paradigmatic logic of sacral geography. The closer to the East, the closer to the East, the closer to the Sacred, to the Tradition, to the spiritual abundance. The closer to the West, the greater the decline, degradation and deadening of the Spirit.

Of course, this logic was not absolute, but at the same time, it was not secondary and relative as many “profane” scholars of ancient religions and traditions mistakenly believe today. In fact, sacral logic and adherence to cosmic symbolism were far more conscious, meaningful and effective among ancient peoples than is commonly believed today. And even in our anti-sacral world, at the level of the “unconscious”, the archetypes of sacred geography are almost always preserved in their integrity and are awakened at the most important and critical moments of social cataclysms.

So, sacred geography asserts unequivocally the law of “qualitative space”, in which the East represents the symbolic “ontological plus” and the West the “ontological minus”.

According to Chinese tradition, the East is the Yang, male, light, solar principle, and the West is the Yin, female, dark, lunar principle.

6.5 East and West in contemporary geopolitics

Now let us see how this sacral-geographical logic is reflected in geopolitics, which, as a purely modern science, captures only the factual state of affairs, leaving the sacred principles themselves out of the picture.

Geopolitics in its original formulation by Ratzel, Chellen and Mackinder (and later by Haushofer and the Russian Eurasians) started from the features of different types of civilizations and states depending on their geographical location. Geopoliticians have recorded the fact of the fundamental difference between “island” and “continental” powers, between “Western”, “progressive” civilisation and “Eastern”, “despotic” and “archaic” cultural forms. Since the question of Spirit in its metaphysical and sacred sense is never raised in modern science, geopoliticians leave it aside, preferring to assess the situation in other, more modern terms than the notions of “sacred” and “profane”, “traditional” and “anti-traditional”, etc.

Geopoliticians have recorded a fundamental difference in the state, cultural and industrial development of the regions of the East and the regions of the West in recent centuries. The picture that emerges is as follows. The West is the centre of “material” and “technological” development. At the cultural and ideological level, it is dominated by “liberal-democratic” trends, an individualistic and humanistic worldview. At the economic level, priority is given to trade and technological modernisation. It was in the West that theories of “progress”, “evolution” and “progressive development of history” first appeared, completely alien to the traditional world of the East (and to those periods of Western history when there was also a full-fledged sacral tradition there, as was the case in the Middle Ages in particular). Social coercion in the West took on a purely economic character, and the Law of Idea and Power was replaced by the Law of Money. Gradually, the specificity of the “ideology of the West” was moulded into a universal formula of “human rights ideology”, which became the dominant principle of the westernmost region of the planet North America, and first of all, the USA. On an industrial level, this ideology was matched by the idea of “developed

countries” and, on an economic level, by the concept of “free market”, “economic liberalism”. The totality of these characteristics, with the addition of purely military, strategic unification of different sectors of Western civilization, is defined today by the notion of “Atlanticism”. In the past century, geopoliticians used to speak about “Anglo-Saxon type of civilization” or “capitalist, bourgeois democracy”. In this “Atlanticist” type, the formula of the “geopolitical West” found its purest embodiment.

The geopolitical East is the direct opposite of the geopolitical West. Instead of economic modernisation, it is dominated by traditional, archaic forms of corporate, workshop-type production (“developing countries”). Instead of economic coercion, the state uses mostly “moral” or simply physical coercion (the Law of Idea and the Law of Force). Instead of “democracy” and “human rights”, the East tends towards totalitarianism, socialism and authoritarianism, i.e. They are united only in the fact that in the centre of their systems is not an “individual”, a “man” with his “rights” and his strictly “individual values”, but something non-individual, non-human, be it a “society”, “nation”, “people”, “idea”, “worldview”, “religion”, “cult of the leader”, etc. The East contrasted Western liberal democracy with various types of illiberal, non-individual societies from authoritarian monarchies to theocracy or socialism. From a purely typological, geopolitical point of view, the political specificity of this or that regime was secondary in comparison with the qualitative division into the “Western” (= “individualist-trade”) order and the “Eastern” (= “non-individualist-power”) order. Typical forms of this anti-Western civilisation were the USSR, communist China, Japan before 1945 or Khomeini’s Iran.

It is interesting to note that Rudolf Chellen, the author who first coined the term “geopolitics”, illustrated the difference between East and West this way. *“The typical American adage, Chellen wrote, is “go ahead”, which literally means “forward”. This reflects the inner and natural geopolitical optimism and “progressivism” of American civilisation, which is the ultimate form of the Western model. The Russians, on the other hand, tend to repeat the word “nothing” (in Russian in Chellen A.D.’s text). This manifests*

the “pessimism”, “contemplation”, “fatalism” and “adherence to tradition” characteristic of the East.

If we return now to the paradigm of sacred geography, we see a direct contradiction between the priorities of contemporary geopolitics (concepts such as “progress”, “liberalism”, “human rights”, “trade order”, etc., have become positive terms for most people today) and the priorities of sacral geography, which evaluates types of civilization from a completely opposite perspective (such concepts as “spirit”, “contemplation”, “submission to a superhuman force or a superhuman idea”, “ideocracy”, etc. in sacral civilization were purely positive and still remain so for peoples of the East at the level of their “collective unconscious”). Thus, modern geopolitics (with the exception of Russian Eurasians, German followers of Haushofer, Islamic fundamentalists, etc.) assesses the picture of the world in a directly opposite way to the traditional sacred geography. But at the same time, both sciences agree in describing the fundamental regularities of the geographical picture of civilisation.

6.6 Sacred North and Sacred South

In addition to sacral-geographical determinism on the East-West axis, the problem of another, vertical, axis of orientation of the North-South axis is extremely important. As in all other cases, the principles of sacral geography, the symbolism of the cardinal points and their corresponding continents have a direct analogue in the geopolitical picture of the world, which is either formed naturally in the course of historical process, or is consciously and artificially constructed as a result of purposeful actions of leaders of certain geopolitical formations. From the point of view of “integral traditionalism”, the difference between “artificial” and “natural” is rather relative, as Tradition has never known anything similar to Cartesian or Kantian dualism which strictly separates “subjective” and “objective” (“phenomenal” and “noumenal”). Therefore, the sacral determinism of the North or the South is

not only a physical, natural, landscape-climatic factor (i.e. something “objective”) or only an “idea”, a “concept” generated by the minds of certain individuals (i.e. something “subjective”), but something third, surpassing both objective and subjective poles. We can say that the sacred North, the archetype of the North, is bifurcated in history into the northern natural landscape, on the one hand, and the idea of the North, “Nordism”, on the other hand.

The most ancient and original stratum of Tradition unequivocally asserts the primacy of the North over the South. The symbolism of the North is related to the Source, the original Nordic paradise, from which all human civilization originates. Ancient Iranian and Zoroastrian texts speak of the northern country Aryan Vaeja and its capital Vara, from which the ancient Aryans were expelled by glaciation, the spirit of evil and the enemy of light Ormuzd. The ancient Vedas also speak of the North Country as the ancestral home of the Hindus, the Sveta-dvipa, the White Earth which lies in the far north.

The ancient Greeks spoke of Hyperborea, a northern island with Thule as its capital. This land was considered the home of the light-bearing god Apollo. And in many other traditions traces of the ancient, often forgotten and now fragmented, Nordic symbolism can be found. The basic idea traditionally associated with the North is that of the Centre, the Fixed Pole, the point of Eternity around which not only space, but time and the cycle revolve. The North is the land where the sun does not set even at night, the space of eternal light. Every sacral tradition venerates the centre, the Middle, the point where the opposites meet, a symbolic place that is not subject to the laws of cosmic entropy. This Centre, symbolized by the Swastika (emphasizing the immobility and constancy of the Centre and mobility and variability of the periphery), in each tradition called differently, but it is always directly or indirectly related to the symbolism of the North. Therefore it can be said that all sacred traditions are projections of a Single Northern Primordial Tradition adapted to particular historical conditions. The North is the side of Light chosen by the primordial Logos to manifest itself in History, and

every subsequent manifestation only restored the primordial polar-Paradise symbolism.

Sacral geography correlates the North with spirit, light, purity, completeness, unity, eternity.

The South symbolises something just the opposite - materiality, darkness, mixing, deprivation, multiplicity, immersion in the flow of time and becoming. Even from the natural point of view, in the polar regions there is one long semiannual Day and one long semiannual Night. This is the Day and Night of gods and heroes and angels. Even the degenerate traditions remembered this sacral, spiritual, supernatural side of the North, considering the northern regions as the abode of “spirits” and “otherworldly forces”. In the South, Day and Night of the gods split into many human days, the original symbolism of Hyperborea is lost and memory of it becomes a factor of “culture”, “tradition”. South in general is often associated with culture, i.e. with the sphere of human activity, where the Invisible and Pure Spiritual acquires its material, coarsened, visible outlines. The South is the realm of matter, life, biology and instincts. The South decomposes the Northern purity of Tradition, but preserves its traces in a materialised form.

The North-South pairing in sacred geography is not reducible to the abstract opposition of Good and Evil. Rather, it is the opposition between the Spiritual Idea and its coarsened, material embodiment. Normally, when the primacy of the North is recognized by the South, there is a harmonious relationship between these two sides of the world; the North “spiritualizes” the South, the Nordic messengers give Tradition to the Southerners, laying the foundations of sacred civilizations. If the South refuses to recognize the primacy of the North, a sacred confrontation begins, a “war of the continents”, and, from the point of view of tradition, it is the South that is responsible for this conflict by its violation of sacred norms. In the Ramayana, for example, the southern island of Lanka is considered the abode of the demons who kidnapped Rama’s wife Sita and declared war on the continental North with Ayodhya as its capital.

It is important to note that the North-South axis in sacred geography is more important than the East-West axis. But being more important, it correlates with the most ancient stages of cyclic history. The Great War of the North and the South, Hyperborea and Gondwana (the ancient paleocontinent of the South) belongs to the “pre-Potopian” times. It becomes more hidden and veiled in the last phases of the cycle. The ancient paleocontinents of the North and South disappear. The baton of confrontation passes to the East and West.

The change of the vertical axis North-South to the horizontal East-West, characteristic of the last stages of the cycle, nevertheless, preserves the logical and symbolic connection between these two sacral-geographical pairs. The North-South pair (i.e. Spirit-Matter, Eternity-Time) is projected onto the East-West pair (i.e. Tradition and Profanism, Source and Sunset). East is horizontal projection of the North downwards. West is horizontal projection of the South upwards. From this transfer of sacred meanings one can easily obtain the structure of continental vision peculiar to Tradition.

6.7 People of the North

The sacral North defines a particular human type, which may or may not have its biological, racial embodiment. The essence of “Nordism” lies in man’s ability to elevate every object of the physical, material world to its archetype, to its Idea. This quality is not a mere development of rationality. On the contrary, the Cartesian and Kantian “pure reasoning” is precisely incapable of naturally crossing the thin line between “phenomenon” and “noumen”, but it is this ability that lies at the heart of “Nordic” thinking. A person of the North is not simply white, “Aryan” or Indo-European in blood, language and culture. The Man of the North is a specific type of being, endowed with a direct intuition of the Sacred. For him the cosmos is a fabric of symbols, each pointing to a hidden Spiritual Primordial Principle. The man of the North is a ‘sunny man’, Sonnenmensch, not absorbing energy

like black matter, but releasing it, pouring out of his soul streams of creation, light, power and wisdom.

The purely Nordic civilisation disappeared along with the ancient Hyperborea, but it was its messengers who laid the foundations of all existing traditions. It was this Nordic “race” of Teachers who originated the religions and cultures of peoples of all continents and colours. Traces of the Hyperborean cult can be found among the North American Indians, the ancient Slavs, the founders of Chinese civilization, the Pacific natives, the blond Germanic people, the black shamans of West Africa, the red-skinned Aztecs and the cheekbones of the Mongols. There is no people on the planet who do not have the myth of the “sun-man”, Sonnenmensch. True spiritual, super-rational Intelligence, the divine Logos, the ability to see *through* the world to its secret Soul are the defining qualities of the North. Where there is Sacred Purity and Wisdom, there the North is invisibly present, no matter where in time or space we find ourselves.

6.8 People of the South

The man of the South, the Gondwanic type, is the direct opposite of the “Nordic” type. The man of the South lives in an environment of consequence, of secondary manifestations; he is in a cosmos which he *reveres* but does not *understand*. He worships the external but not the internal. He carefully preserves the traces of spirituality, its embodiment in the material environment, but is incapable of passing from the symbolised to the symbolised. Man of the South lives passions and impulses, he puts the spiritual above the spiritual (which simply does not know) and honors Life as the highest instance. Man of the South is characterized by the cult of the Great Mother, a matter that generates a variety of forms. Civilization of the South is a civilization of the Moon, receiving its light from the Sun (North), keeping and transmitting it for some time, but periodically losing contact with it (new moon). Man of the South Mondmensch.

When the people of the South are in harmony with the people of the North, i.e. recognize their authority and their typological (rather than racial) superiority, civilizational harmony prevails. When they claim supremacy over their archetypal relationship to reality, a distorted cultural type emerges, which can be defined collectively as *idolatry*, *fetishism* or *paganism* (in the negative, pejorative sense of the term).

As with the palaeocontinents, pure northern and southern types only existed in ancient times. People of the North and people of the South opposed each other in the primordial epochs. Later, entire peoples of the North penetrated into southern lands, sometimes founding pronounced “Nordic” civilizations - ancient Iran, India. On the other hand, southerners sometimes penetrated far into the North, carrying their cultural type Finns, Eskimos, Chukchi, etc. Gradually, the original clarity of the sacral-geographical panorama was obscured. But in spite of everything, the typological dualism of “people of the North” and “people of the South” was preserved at all times and in all eras, but not so much as an *external* conflict of two different civilizations, but as an *internal* conflict within one and the same civilization. The type of the North and the type of the South, beginning at some point in sacred history, confront each other everywhere, irrespective of the specific location of the planet.

6.9 North and South in East and West

The type of people of the North could project to the South, to the East and to the West. In the South, the Light of the North gave rise to great *metaphysical civilizations*, such as those of India, Iran or China, which in the situation of the “conservative” South retained the Revelation entrusted to them for a long time. Here, however, the simplicity and clarity of Northern symbolism was transformed into a complex and varied intricacy of sacred doctrines, rituals and rituals. However, the further to the South, the weaker the traces of the North. The inhabitants of the Pacific islands and southern Africa

retain “Nordic” motifs in mythology and rituals in an extremely fragmentary, rudimentary and even distorted form.

In the East, the North manifests itself as *classical traditional society* based on the unambiguous supremacy of the super-individual over the individual, where the ‘human’ and the ‘rational’ are erased in the face of the superhuman and super-rational Principle. While the South gives civilisation a character of “stability”, the East defines its sacredness and authenticity, of which the Light of the North is the main guarantor.

In the West, the North manifested itself in *heroic societies*, where the tendency to fractionalization, individualization and rationalization, characteristic of the West as such, overcame itself, and the individual, becoming a Hero, went beyond the narrow limits of the “human-sleuth-human” personality. The North in the West is personified by the symbolic figure of Hercules, who, on the one hand, liberates Prometheus (a purely Western, God-fighting, “humanistic” tendency) and, on the other, helps Zeus and the gods to defeat the giants who rebel against them (i.e. serves to benefit sacred norms and the spiritual Order).

The South, on the other hand, projects the opposite effect on all three orientations. In the North it produces an effect of “*archaism*” and *cultural stagnation*. Even northern, “Nordic” traditions themselves, under the influence of southern, “Paleo-Asian“, “Finnish“ or “Eskimo“ elements, acquire the character of “idolatry“ and “fetishism“. (This is particularly characteristic of the Germanic-Scandinavian civilisation of the “age of the Skalds“.)

In the East, the forces of the South manifest themselves in *despotic societies*, where the normal and just Eastern indifference to the individual turns into a denial of the great Superhuman Subject. All forms of totalitarianism in the East are both typologically and racially related to the South.

Finally, in the West, the South manifests itself in *extremely crude, materialistic forms of individualism*, when atomic individuals reach the limits of anti-heroic degeneration, worshipping only the “golden calf“ of comfort

and egoistic hedonism. Obviously, it is this combination of two sacral-geopolitical tendencies that yields the most negative type of civilisation, as it overlaps two orientations, already negative in themselves - the South vertically and the West horizontally.

6.10 From continents to metacontinents

If in the perspective of sacred geography the symbolic North unambiguously corresponds to positive aspects, and the South to negative ones, then in the strictly modern geopolitical picture of the world the situation is much more complicated, and in some cases, even vice versa. Modern geopolitics understands the term "North" and "South" as completely different categories than sacred geography.

Firstly, the paleocontinent of the North, Hyperborea, has not existed on a physical level for many thousands of years, remaining a spiritual reality to which the spiritual gaze of the initiated seekers of the original Tradition is directed.

Secondly, the ancient Nordic race, a race of 'white teachers' who came from the Pole in the primordial era, is by no means the same as what is commonly called today the 'white race', based only on physical characteristics, skin colour, etc. The North of Tradition and its original population, the "Nordic autochthons", have long since ceased to represent a concrete historical-geographical reality. Apparently, even the last remnants of this primordial culture disappeared from physical reality several millennia ago.

Thus, the North in Tradition is a metahistorical and meta-geographical reality. The same can be said about the "Hyperborean race". It is a "race" not in a biological, but in a purely spiritual, metaphysical sense. (The subject of "metaphysical races" was developed in detail in the writings of Julius Evola.)

The Continent of the South, and the South of Tradition in general, has

also long since ceased to exist in its purest form, as has its most ancient population. In a sense, the "South" has, from some point in time, become practically the entire planet, as the influence on the world of the original polar initiatory centre and its messengers has narrowed. The modern races of the South are the product of numerous mixtures with the races of the North, and skin colour has long since ceased to be the main distinguishing marker of belonging to a particular "metaphysical race".

In other words, the contemporary geopolitical picture of the world has very little in common with the principled vision of the world in its superhistorical, supra-temporal cross-section. The continents and their populations in our era are extremely distant from the archetypes that corresponded to them in primordial times. Therefore, between real continents and real races (as realities of contemporary geopolitics), on the one hand, and metacontinents and metaraces (as realities of traditional sacred geography), on the other hand, today there is not just a difference, but almost an inverse correspondence.

6.11 The illusion of the 'rich north'

Modern geopolitics uses the term "North" most often with the definition of the "rich" "rich North" as well as the "developed North". This is understood as the totality of the western civilisation which is focused on the development of the material and economic side of life. The "Rich North" is rich not because it is more intelligent, more intellectual or more spiritual than the "South", but because it builds its social system on the principle of maximising the material gains to be made from the social and natural potential, from the exploitation of human and natural resources. The "affluent North" is racially linked to those peoples who are white, a characteristic which underlies various versions of overt or covert "Western racism" (particularly Anglo-Saxon racism). The successes of the "rich North" in the material sphere were elevated to a political and even "racial" principle pre-

cisely in those countries which were in the vanguard of industrial, technical and economic development i.e. England, Holland and later Germany and the USA. In this case, material and quantitative well-being was equated with a qualitative criterion, and the most ridiculous prejudices about "barbarism", "primitiveness", "underdevelopment" and "subhumanity" of southern peoples (i.e. not belonging to the "rich North") developed on this basis. Such "economic racism" was particularly evident in the Anglo-Saxon colonial conquests, and later embellished versions of it were incorporated in the crudest and most controversial aspects of National Socialist ideology. And often Nazi ideologues simply mixed vague speculations about pure "spiritual Nordism" and a "spiritual Aryan race" with vulgar, mercantile, biologically-trade racism of the English kind. (By the way, exactly this replacement of the categories of sacral geography by the categories of material-technical development was the most negative side of National Socialism, which led it in the end to the political, theoretical and even military collapse). Even after the defeat of the Third Reich, however, this type of racism of the "rich North" did not disappear from politics. However, it was primarily carried by the United States and its Atlanticist collaborators in Western Europe. Of course, the latest mondialist doctrines of the "Rich North" do not emphasise the question of biological and racial purity, but nevertheless in practice the "Rich North" still displays the purely "racist" arrogance characteristic of both the colonialist English and the German national-socialist orthodoxies of the Rosenberg line in relation to underdeveloped and developing countries of the Third World.

In fact, "rich North" geopolitically means those countries where the forces directly opposed to Tradition, the forces of quantity, materialism, atheism, spiritual degradation and spiritual degeneration, have prevailed. "Rich North" means something radically different from "spiritual Nordism", from the "hyperborean spirit". The essence of the North in sacred geography is the primacy of spirit over matter, the final and total victory of Light, Justice and Purity over the darkness of animal life, the arbitrariness of individual predilections and the filth of low egoism. The "Rich North" of the Mondialist geopolitics, on the contrary, means purely material prosperity, hedonism,

consumer society, an unproblematic and artificial pseudo-paradise of those whom Nietzsche called "the last people". The material progress of technological civilization has been accompanied by a monstrous spiritual regression of truly sacred culture, and therefore, from the point of view of Tradition, the "wealth" of the modern "developed" North cannot serve as a criterion of true superiority over the material "poverty" and technical backwardness of the modern "primitive South".

Moreover, the "poverty" of the South at the material level is very often inversely related to the preservation of truly sacral forms of civilization in the southern regions, which means that behind this "poverty" sometimes hides spiritual wealth. At least two sacral civilizations continue to exist in the South, despite the attempts of the "rich (and aggressive) North" to impose its own standards and ways of development. These are Hindu India and the Islamic world. There are different points of view regarding the Far Eastern tradition, as some see even under the cloak of 'Marxist' and 'Maoist' rhetoric some traditional principles that have always been defining for Chinese sacred civilisation. In any case, even those southern regions inhabited by peoples who retain adherence to very ancient and half-forgotten sacred traditions still appear "spiritual", "wholesome" and "normal" in comparison with the atheistic and extremely materialistic "rich North", while the "rich North" itself, from a spiritualist perspective, is completely "abnormal" and "pathological".

6.12 The Third World paradox

The "Poor South" in the Mondialist projects is effectively synonymous with the "Third World". The "Third World" was named during the Cold War, and the very notion implied that the first two "worlds" - the developed capitalist one and the less developed Soviet one - were more important and relevant for global geopolitics than all the other regions. In principle, the expression "Third World" has a pejorative meaning, since by the very logic

of the "rich North" utilitarian approach, such a definition actually equates Third World countries with "no man's land" bases of natural and human resources, which should only be subjugated, exploited and used for their own purposes. In doing so, the "rich North" skillfully played on the traditional political, ideological and religious features of the "poor South", trying to place at the service of its purely materialistic and economic interests those forces and structures which were spiritually far above the spiritual level of the "North" itself. It has almost always succeeded, as the cyclical moment of our civilization's development itself favors perverse, abnormal and unnatural tendencies (according to Tradition, we are now in the very last period of the "dark age", the Kali-yuga). Hinduism, Confucianism, Islam, autochthonous traditions of "non-white" peoples became for material conquerors of the "rich North" only obstacles for realization of their purposes, but simultaneously they often used separate aspects of Tradition for achievement of mercantile purposes playing on contradictions, religious features or national problems. This utilitarian use of aspects of Tradition for purely anti-traditional purposes was even more evil than the outright denial of the whole of Tradition, for the supreme perversion is to make the great serve the insignificant.

In fact, the "poor South" is "poor" at the material level precisely because of its essentially spiritual orientation, which gives the material aspects of existence always a secondary and unimportant place. The geopolitical South in our era has maintained, in general terms, a purely traditionalist attitude towards objects of the outside world, an attitude that is calm, detached and ultimately indifferent in direct contrast to the material obsession of the "rich North", contrary to its materialistic and hedonistic paranoia. Ordinarily, people of the "poor South", abiding in Tradition, still live a fuller, deeper and even *more luxurious* life, since active participation in sacral Tradition endows *all* aspects of their personal life with a meaning, an intensity, a richness that representatives of the "rich North" have long been deprived of, tormented by neurosis, material fear, inner emptiness, a completely aimless existence representing only a dull kaleidoscope of bright, but meaningless pictures.

It could be said that the relationship between the North and the South in the original times is polar opposite to the relationship between them in our era, since it is the South that today still retains ties with Tradition, while the North has finally lost them. Still, this statement does not quite cover the fullness of the real picture, since true Tradition cannot allow itself to be treated so disparagingly as the aggressively atheistic "rich North" is treating the "Third World". The fact is that Tradition is preserved in the South only *inertially*, fragmentarily, partially. It occupies a passive position and resists only defensively. Therefore, at the end of time the spiritual North is not fully transferred to the South, only spiritual impulses that came once from the sacral North are accumulated and preserved in the South. No active traditional initiative can emanate from the South in principle. Conversely, the mondialist "rich North" has managed to strengthen its corrupting influence on the planet so much due to the very specifics of the Northern regions that are predisposed to activism. The North has been and remains a place of power by preference, which is why geopolitical initiatives emanating from the North are truly effective.

The "poor South" today has all the spiritual advantages over the "rich North", but it cannot serve as a serious alternative to the profane aggression of the "rich North", cannot offer a radical geopolitical project capable of upsetting the pathological picture of contemporary planetary space.

6.13 The role of the Second World

In the bipolar geopolitical picture of "rich North" "poor South", there has always been an additional component that is independent and very important. This is the "second world". The "second world" is usually understood as a socialist camp integrated into the Soviet system. This "second world" was neither a truly "rich North", since certain spiritual motifs underlay the nominally materialist ideology of Soviet socialism, nor a truly "Third World", since in general a focus on material development, "progress" and

other purely profane principles underlay the Soviet system. Geopolitically, the Eurasian USSR was also located both in the territories of "poor Asia" and in the lands of fairly "civilised" Europe. Under socialism, the planetary belt of the "rich North" was unlocked in the east of Eurasia, complicating the clarity of the geopolitical relationship on the North-South axis.

The end of the "Second World" as a special civilisation implies two alternatives for the Eurasian spaces of the former USSR: either to integrate into the "rich North" (represented by the West and the USA) or to slip into the "poor South", i.e. to turn into the "Third World". A compromise option is also possible, with some regions moving to the "North" and others to the "South". As usual in the past centuries, the initiative to redivide the geopolitical spaces in this process belongs to the "rich North", which, cynically using the paradoxes of the "Second World" concept, draws new geopolitical borders and redistributes the zones of influence. National, economic and religious factors serve only as tools in their cynical and deeply materialistically motivated activities. Not surprisingly, in addition to the false "humanist" rhetoric, almost blatantly "racist" arguments are increasingly being used to instil in Russians a "white" arrogance complex towards Asian and Caucasian southerners. There is also a correlation between this and the reverse process - the final rejection of the southern territories of the former "Second World" to the "poor South" - and the play on fundamentalist tendencies, on people's yearning for Tradition and the revival of religion.

The "second world", breaking up, is breaking down along the line of "traditionalism" (southern, inertial, conservative type) "anti-traditionalism" (actively northern, modernist and materialist type). Such dualism, which is only emerging today but will soon become the dominant phenomenon of Eurasian geopolitics, is predetermined by the expansion of the monodialist understanding of the world in terms of "rich North" "poor South". The attempt to save the former Soviet Great Space, the attempt to simply preserve the "Second World" as something independent and balancing on the border between the North and the South (in a strictly modern sense), cannot succeed unless the very fundamental concept of contemporary geopolitics,

understood and understood in its real form, is questioned beyond all deceptive claims of a humanitarian and economic nature.

The "second world" is disappearing. It has no place in the contemporary geopolitical picture. At the same time, the pressure of the "rich North" on the "poor South", left alone to face the aggressive materiality of a technocratic civilisation with no intermediate instance of the hitherto "Second World", is increasing. Any fate other than a total split according to the rules dictated by the "rich North" is possible for the "Second World" only through a radical rejection of the planetary logic of the dichotomous North-South axis taken in a mondialist way.

6.14 Northern Renaissance Project

"The rich mondialist North" is globalising its dominance over the planet through the splitting and destruction of the "Second World". This is what modern geopolitics calls the "New World Order". The active forces of anti-tradition are securing their victory over the passive resistance of the Southern regions, preserving and protecting Tradition in its residual forms at the cost of economic backwardness. The internal geopolitical energies of the "Second World" face the choice either to integrate into the system of the "civilized northern belt" and permanently sever ties with sacred history (the project of left-wing mondialism), or to turn into an occupied territory with the permission of partial restoration of some aspects of tradition (the project of right-wing mondialism). This is the direction in which events are unfolding today and will be unfolding in the near future.

As an alternative project, a different path of geopolitical transformation can be theorised, based on the rejection of the mondialist North-South logic and a return to the spirit of genuine sacred geography as possible at the end of the Dark Age. This is the project of the "Great Return" or, in other terminology, the "Great Continent War".

In the broadest terms, the essence of this project is as follows.

1) The *"rich North"* is not contrasted with the *"poor South"*, but with the *"poor North"*. The "poor North" is the ideal, sacred ideal of a return to the Nordic origins of civilisation. "Poor" such a North is because it is based on total asceticism, on radical devotion to the highest values of Tradition, on total sacrifice of the material for the sake of the spiritual. "Poor North" geographically exists only in the territories of Russia, which, being essentially the "Second World", socially and politically resisted the final acceptance of the Mondialist civilization in its most "progressive" forms until the last moment. Russia's Eurasian northern lands were the only planetary territories not fully exploited by the "rich North", inhabited by traditional peoples and constituting terra incognita of the modern world. The way of the "Poor North" for Russia means the refusal both to integrate into the mondialist belt and to archaize its own traditions and reduce them to the folklore level of an ethno-religious reservation. The "poor North" must be spiritual, intellectual, active and aggressive. In other regions of the "rich North", potential opposition to the "poor North" is also possible, which may manifest itself in radical sabotage by the intellectual Western elite of the fundamental course of the "mercantile civilisation", rebellion against the world of finance for the ancient and eternal values of Spirit, justice, self-sacrifice. The "poor North" begins a geopolitical and ideological battle with the "rich North", rejecting its projects, blowing up its plans from inside and outside, undermining its impeccable efficiency, disrupting its socio-political machinations.

2) The *"poor South"*, unable to resist the *"rich North"* on its own, enters into a radical alliance with the *"poor (Eurasian) North"* and begins a liberation struggle against the *"northern" dictatorship*. It is particularly important to strike a blow against the representatives of the ideology of the "rich South", i.e. those forces which, working for the "rich North", advocate "development", "progress" and "modernisation" of traditional countries, which in practice will only mean more and more departure from the remains of sacred Tradition.

3) The *"poor North"* of the *Eurasian East*, together with the *"poor South"*

stretching around the circumference of the entire planet, concentrate their forces against the “rich North” of the Atlanticist West. In doing so, the vulgar versions of Anglo-Saxon racism, the chanting of “white technical civilisation” and the accompanying Mondialist propaganda are ideologically put to rest forever. (Alain de Benoist expressed this idea in the title of his famous book “L’Europe, Tiersmonde même combat” (The Third World and Europe: we are united in the struggle); of course, it is a “spiritual Europe”, a “Europe of peoples and traditions” and not a “Maathrichtian Europe of merchants”. The intellectuality, activism and spirituality of the authentic sacral North returns the traditions of the South to the Nordic Source and raises “Southerners” in planetary rebellion against the only geopolitical enemy. The passive resistance of the “southerners” thus gains a foothold in the planetary messianism of the “northerners” who radically reject the vicious and anti-sacral branch of those white peoples who have embarked on the path of technological progress and material development. A planetary supra-racial and supra-national Geopolitical Revolution erupts, based on the fundamental solidarity of the “Third World” with that part of the “Second World” which rejects the project of the “rich North”.

PART 7

TEXTS FROM THE CLASSICS OF GEOPOLITICS

Halford George Mackinder

THE GEOGRAPHICAL AXIS OF HISTORY⁽¹⁾

When, in the distant future, some historian wants to examine the times we are now experiencing and present them in a summarised formula, as we do today for the dynasties of ancient Egypt, it is very possible that he will call the last four hundred years the “Age of Columbus” and say that it ended soon after 1900. It has now become commonplace to speak of geographical exploration as almost complete. It is also believed that geography should be reduced solely to a thorough survey and philosophical synthesis. Over a period of four hundred years, objects on the geographical map of the world have acquired fairly faithful and precise outlines, and even in the areas of both poles the Nansen and Scott expeditions greatly reduced the possibility of new and improbable discoveries. That said, the beginning of the twentieth century qualifies as the end of a great historical era, and this is not only true of its achievements, however great they may have been. The missionary, the conqueror, the farmer, the miner and, finally, the engineer followed in the footsteps of explorers, which is why it is safe to say that the world in its most remote limits had already been discovered before we could speak of its actual political development. In Europe, North and South America, Africa and Australasia, there is hardly a place where one can drive pegs into the ground and claim ownership of the land. Such a thing would only be possible in a war between civilised and semi-civilised powers. Even in Asia, we are probably becoming spectators of the last acts of a play begun by the cavalrymen of Ermak, the Cossacks and the sailors of Vasco de Gama. By way of comparison, we can contrast the age of Columbus with the preceding centuries by giving as its characteristic feature the expansion of Europe which met with little or no resistance, whereas medieval Christianity was confined to a small region and was threatened by external barbarian attack.

From today onwards, in the post-Columbian era, we will have to deal with a closed political system, and it is possible that this system will be global in scope. Each explosion of social forces, instead of dissipating into the surrounding uncharted space and chaos of barbarism, will echo loudly from the other side of the globe, so that in the end all weak elements in the political and economic organism of the earth will be destroyed. There is a big difference between when a projectile hits a hole and when it falls into an enclosed space between the rigid structures of a huge building or ship. Perhaps at least a partial understanding of this fact will finally divert the attention of statesmen from territorial expansion and force them to concentrate on the struggle for concerted creation.

That is why it seems to me that in the present decade we are for the first time in a position where we can try to establish, with a certain degree of certainty, the connection between the broadest geographical and historical generalisations. For the first time we can find some real proportions in the relation of events taking place on the world stage, and figure out a formula which in one way or another will express certain aspects of the geographical conditionality of world history. If we are lucky, this formula will also have a practical value, with its help we can calculate the perspective of some competing forces of the current international political life. The famous phrase that empire extends westwards is only an empirical attempt of this kind. So today I would like to describe those characteristic physical features of the world which I think are very closely linked to human activity, as well as to present some major phases of history organically linked to them, even when they were not yet known to geography. I do not aim at all to discuss the influence of this or that factor or to engage in regional geography, but rather to show human history as part of the life of a world organism. I admit that I can only reach one aspect of the truth here, and I have no desire to indulge in excessive materialism. It is man, not nature, who takes the initiative, but it is nature that exerts a greater degree of control. My interest lies in the study of the universal natural factor, rather than in the study of the causes of universal history. It is quite clear that here we can only hope for a first approximation to the truth, and therefore I will accept

with humility all the remarks of my critics.

The late Professor Freeman said that the only history to be taken into account was that of the Mediterranean and European races. In some respects this is certainly true, for it was among these races that the ideas that led to the rise of the descendants of the Greeks and Romans to dominate the world were born. In another and no less important respect, however, such a limitation greatly constrains thought. Ideas which form a nation as opposed to a mere crowd of human beings are usually adopted under the pressure of a common misfortune, or under the common necessity of resisting an external force. The idea of England was hammered into the states of Heptarchy by the Danish and Norman conquerors; the idea of France was imposed by the Huns on the disputing Franks, Goths and Romans at the Battle of Chalon and later, during the Hundred Years War with England; the idea of Christianity was born of persecution in the Roman Empire and was brought to its logical conclusion during the Crusades. The idea of the United States was only embraced with the local patriotism of the colonists during the long War of Independence; the idea of the German Empire was accepted, albeit reluctantly, in South Germany after its struggle against France in alliance with North Germany. What I can describe as a literary conception of history perhaps unwittingly omits from view the original movements, whose pressures played the role of a prompting impulse in the atmosphere in which the great ideas were cultivated. Some disgusting persona performs some important social function in uniting their enemies, so that it is through the pressure of external barbarians that Europe has managed to create its civilisation. This is why I ask you to look at Europe and European history as a phenomenon subordinate to Asia and its history, for European civilisation is very much the result of centuries of struggle against Asian invasions.

The most important contrast visible on the political map of modern Europe is the one represented by the vast expanse of Russia, which occupies half this continent, on the one hand, and the group of smaller territories occupied by Western European countries on the other. From a physical point of view, of course, there is also a similar contrast here between the unploughed

lowlands of the east and the riches of the mountains and valleys, islands and peninsulas which together make up the rest of this area of the globe. At the first glance you may be shown that in these familiar facts before us there is such an obvious connection between the natural environment and political organisation that it is hardly worth mentioning, especially if we mention that on the Russian plain the cold winter is opposed by the hot summer, and the conditions of human existence thus introduce an additional uniformity into life. And yet, the few historical maps contained in the Oxford Atlas, for example, will show us that the rough overlap of the European part of Russia with the East European Plain is no accident, and this has not happened in the last hundred years, but in earlier times there had been a very different tendency in political unification here as well. Two groups of states used to divide the country into northern and southern political systems. The fact is that orographic maps do not express that particular physical peculiarity which until very recently had controlled human movement and settlement on Russian territory. When the blanket of snow gradually retreats northwards from these broad plains, it is replaced by rains, which are particularly heavy in May and June on the Black Sea coast, but in the Baltic and White Sea region they pour more frequently in July and August. In the south there is a long dry summer. The consequence of this climate regime is that the northern and north-western regions are covered in forests, occasionally interspersed with lakes and marshes, while the south and south-east are vast grassy steppes, where trees can only be seen along riverbanks. The line separating these two regions runs diagonally to the northeast, starting at the northern tip of the Carpathians and ending near the southern Urals rather than in its northern part. Outside Russia the border of these vast forests runs westwards, running almost in the middle of the European Isthmus, whose width (i.e. the distance between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea) is 800 miles. Beyond it, in the rest of the European territory, forests occupy the German valleys in the north, while in the south the steppes form the great Transylvanian bastion near the Carpathians and extend as far as the Danube, where the Romanian fields now ripple, and as far as the Iron Gate. A separate steppe region, known locally as "Pushta" and now actively cultivated, occupied the Hungarian plain; it is bordered by a chain of wooded

Carpathian and Alpine mountains. In western Russia, with the exception of the far north, the clearing of forests, the drainage of marshes and the uplifting of undeveloped land have relatively recently shaped the landscape, smoothing out much of the difference that used to be so noticeable.

Russia and Poland emerged on the forest glades. At the same time, an uninterrupted succession of nomadic Turanians - Huns, Avars, Bulgars, Magyars, Khazars, Pechenegs, Kumans, Mongols and Kalmyks - had been coming here across the steppes from distant and unknown parts of Asia, from the V and until the XVI centuries. During the reign of Attila, the Huns established themselves in the middle of the Pashta, in the remotest "Danube" islands of the steppe, and from there they struck north, west and south at the sedentary populations of Europe. Much of modern history can be written as a commentary on the changes that directly or indirectly resulted from those raids. It may well have been when the Angles and Saxons were forced to cross the sea and establish England in the British Isles. For the first time the Franks, Goths, and inhabitants of the Roman provinces were forced to stand shoulder to shoulder on the battlefield at Chalon, with the common aim of fighting the Asiatics; thus they inadvertently formed modern France. By the destruction of Aquileia and Padua Venice was founded; and even the papacy owed its great prestige to the successful mediation of Pope Leo at the meeting with Attila at Milan. Such was the result produced by a mob of ruthless and culturally ignorant horsemen who flooded the ungoverned plains it was a blow freely struck by an Asian hammer on an unoccupied space. The Huns were followed by the Avars. It was in the struggle against them that Austria was founded, and the campaigns of Charlemagne resulted in the fortification of Vienna. Then came the Magyars, and through their incessant raids from the steppe camps located in the territory of Hungary, further increased the importance of the Austrian outpost, thus shifting the focus from Germany to the east, to the border of that kingdom. The Bulgarians became the ruling caste in the lands south of the Danube, leaving their name on the world map, although their language had dissolved into that of their Slavic subjects. Probably the longest and most effective in the Russian steppes was the settlement of the Khazars, who were contemporaries of the

great Saracen movement: Arab geographers knew the Caspian Sea or the Khazar Sea. Eventually, however, new hordes arrived from Mongolia and for two hundred years the Russian lands in the forests to the north of the territories in question paid tribute to the Mongol Khans or 'Steppes', and thus Russia's development was delayed and distorted just at a time when the rest of Europe was rapidly pacing itself.

It should also be noted that the rivers running from these forests to the Black and Caspian Seas run across the entire steppe route of the nomads, and that from time to time there were occasional movements along the course of these rivers to meet the movements of these riders. Thus, the missionaries of the Greek Church went up the Dnieper as far as Kiev, just as the Varangians from the North had gone down the same river on their way to Constantinople not long before that. But even earlier the Germanic tribe Goths appeared for a short time on the banks of the Dniester, passing through Europe from the shores of the Baltic Sea in the same southeastern direction. But all these are passing episodes, which, however, do not negate the broader generalizations. For ten centuries, several waves of nomadic horsemen marched from Asia through the wide passageway between the Urals and the Caspian Sea, crossed the open spaces of Southern Russia, and, taking up their permanent residence in Hungary, reached the heart of Europe, thus bringing a moment of inevitable confrontation into the history of their neighboring peoples: such was the case with the Russians, the Germans, the French, the Italians, and the Byzantine Greeks. The fact that they stimulated a healthy and powerful reaction instead of a destructive opposition under widespread despotism was made possible by the fact that the mobility of their power was due to the steppe itself and inevitably disappeared when mountains and forests appeared around them.

A similar mobility of power was characteristic of Viking sailors. From Scandinavia to the southern and northern coasts of Europe, they infiltrated deep into Europe, taking advantage of river routes to do so. The extent of their activities was limited, however, as, in fairness, their power extended only to areas immediately adjacent to the water. Thus, the sedentary population

of Europe was caught between the nomadic Asians from the east and the sea robbers pressing in from three sides. By their very nature, neither side could overpower the other, so both had a stimulating effect. It should be noted that the formative influence of the Scandinavians was second only to that of the nomads, for it was thanks to them that England and France began the long road to their own unification, while united Italy fell under their blows. Once upon a time Rome was able to mobilise its population using the roads for this purpose, but now the Roman roads had fallen into disrepair and were not changed until the eighteenth century.

It seems that even the invasion of the Huns was by no means the first in this “Asiatic” series. The Scythians in the accounts of Homer and Herodotus, who fed on the milk of mares, most likely lived the same way of life, and belonged, probably, to the same race as the later inhabitants of the steppe. The Celtic elements in the names of the Don, Donets, Dnieper, Dniester and Danube Rivers could have been the names of people with similar habits, though not of the same race, but it does not seem that the Celts came from the northern forests, like the Goths and Vikings in later times. Nevertheless, the huge wedge of population which anthropologists call the Brachycephals, pushed westwards from Brachycephalic Asia through Central Europe all the way to France, probably embedded between the northern, western and southern groups of the Dolichycephalic population and may well have come from Asia.

Meanwhile, the influence of Asia on Europe is unnoticed until we start talking about the Mongol invasion of the fifteenth century, although before we analyse the facts concerning all this, it is advisable to change our ‘European’ point of view so that we can present the Old World in its entirety. As the amount of precipitation depends on the sea, the middle of the greatest massifs of the earth is rather dry in climatic terms. That is why we should not be surprised that two thirds of the world’s population is concentrated in relatively small areas, located on the edges of the great continents in Europe near the Atlantic Ocean, near the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean in India and China. A wide strip of land stretches across North Africa, almost

unpopulated as far as Arabia, due to the virtual absence of rain. Central and southern Africa were for most of their history as separated from Europe and Asia as America and Australia were. In fact, the southern boundary of Europe was, and is, the Sahara rather than the Mediterranean Sea, for it is this desert that separates white people from black people. The vast lands of Euro-Asia, thus enclosed between the ocean and the desert, amount to 21,000,000 square miles, that is half the total land on the globe, if we exclude the deserts of the Sahara and Arabia from the count. There are many remote desert areas scattered throughout Asia, from Syria and Persia north-eastwards towards Manchuria, but among these there are no deserts that can be compared with the Sahara. Euro-Asia, on the other hand, is characterised by a very remarkable distribution of river flows. For much of the north and centre, these rivers were practically useless for the purposes of human communication with the outside world. The Volga, Ox, and Yaxart flow into saline lakes; the Ob, Yenisei, and Lena into the cold northern ocean. There are six great rivers in the world. In the same areas there are many, though smaller, but also significant rivers, such as the Tarim and Helmund, which again do not flow into the Ocean. Thus the centre of Euro-Asia, mottled with patches of desert, is on the whole a steppe terrain, representing vast, though often sparse, pastures, where there are not so few river-fed oases, but it must be emphasised again that its entire territory is still not pierced by waterways flowing from the ocean. In other words, in this large area we have all the conditions to support a sparse, but altogether very significant population of nomads moving on horses and camels. In the north, their kingdom is bounded by a wide strip of sub-Arctic forests and swamps, where the climate is too harsh, except at the western and eastern extremities, for the development of agricultural settlements. In the east the forests run south to the Pacific coast along the Amur to Manchuria. It is the same in the West; in prehistoric Europe forests occupied the main area. Bounded thus to the north-east, north and north-west, the steppes run uninterrupted for 4,000 miles from the Hungarian Pashta to the Lesser Gobi in Manchuria, and, except at the westernmost extremity, they are not crossed by rivers flowing into the ocean accessible to them, so that we may disregard the recent efforts to develop trade at the mouth of the Ob and Yenisei. In Europe,

Western Siberia and West Turkestan the steppe lies close to sea level, in places even below it. Further east, in Mongolia, they stretch as a plateau; but the transition from one level to the other, over the bare, flat and low areas of the arid central lands does not present significant difficulties.

The hordes that eventually descended upon Europe in the mid-fourteenth century were gathering their forces 3,000 miles away, on the steppes of Upper Mongolia. The devastation wrought on Poland, Silesia, Moravia, Hungary, Croatia and Serbia within a few years was nevertheless only the most remote and simultaneously fleeting outcome of the great eastern nomadic movement associated with the name of Genghis Khan. While the Golden Horde occupied the Kipchak steppe from the Aral Sea through the passage between the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea to the foothills of the Carpathians, another horde descended southwest between the Caspian Sea and the Hindu Kush to Persia, Mesopotamia and even Syria, establishing the Ilkhan Empire. Later, the Third Horde struck Northern China, taking possession of China. India and Mangi, or Southern China, were temporarily sheltered by the magnificent barrier of the Tibetan mountains, the effectiveness of which could hardly be compared, except of course for the Sahara and the polar ice. But in later times, in the days of Marco Polo in the case of Mangi, in the days of Tamerlane in the case of India, this obstacle was bypassed. It happened that in this well-known and well-described case, all inhabited regions of the Old World sooner or later felt the expansive power of a mobile power that originated in the steppe expanse. Russia, Persia, India or China either paid tribute or accepted Mongol dynasties. Even the incipient state of the Turks in Asia Minor endured this yoke for more than half a century.

Like Europe, records of earlier invasions survived in other Euro-Asian frontier lands. China was repeatedly subdued by invaders from the north and India by invaders from the north-west. At least one invasion of Persia played a special role in the history of all Western civilisation. Three hundred or four hundred years before the arrival of the Mongols, the Seljuk Turks, who emerged from the region of Asia Minor, spread out over a vast expanse of what may be conventionally called the region located between the five seas of

the Caspian, Black, Mediterranean, Red and Persian gulf. They established themselves in Kerman, Hadaman, Asia Minor, overthrew the Saracen rule in Baghdad and Damascus. It became necessary to punish them for their treatment of the pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem, which is why the Christian world undertook a whole series of military campaigns, known collectively as crusades. Although the Europeans failed to achieve their objectives, these events so galvanised and united Europe that we may well regard them as the beginning of modern history - another example of Europe's advance, stimulated by the need to respond to the pressure exerted on it from the heart of Asia.

The notion of Euro-Asia, which we thus obtain, implies a vast land, girded with ice in the north, strewn everywhere with rivers, and covering 21,000,000 square miles, i.e. more than three times the size of North America, whose central and northern regions contain 9,000,000 square miles, and more than twice the size of Europe. But it has no satisfactory waterways leading to the ocean, though on the other hand, with the exception of the sub-Arctic forests, it is generally suitable for the movement of all kinds of nomads. To the west, south and east of this zone are the frontier regions which form a wide crescent and are accessible to navigation. According to the physical arrangement the number of these regions is four, and it is not insignificant that in principle they coincide, respectively, with the spreading areas of the four great religions of Buddhism, Brahmanism, Islam and Christianity. The first two lie in the monsoon zone, one facing the Pacific Ocean, the other the Indian Ocean. The fourth, Europe, is irrigated by rain coming from the West, from the Atlantic. These three regions, totalling less than seven million square miles, are inhabited by over a billion people, in other words, two-thirds of the world's population. The third sphere, coinciding with the Five Seas Zone, or as it is more commonly called, the region of the Middle East, suffers even more from a lack of moisture due to its proximity to Africa and, with the exception of oases, is accordingly sparsely populated. To some extent, it combines features of both the frontier zone and the central region of Euro-Asia. This zone is devoid of forests and its surface is riddled with deserts, so it is quite suitable for nomadic activities. The features

of a frontier region can be traced here insofar as the sea bays and rivers flowing into the ocean make it accessible to the maritime powers, allowing them, at the same time, to exercise their own dominance on the sea. That is why empires belonging to the “frontier” category periodically emerged here, based on the agricultural population of the great oases of Egypt and Babylon. Moreover, they were connected by waterways with the civilized world of the Mediterranean and India. But, as might be expected, these empires fell within the range of a series of hitherto unseen migrations, some of which were carried out by Scythians, Turks and Mongols coming from Central Asia, while others were the result of efforts by Mediterranean peoples to seize land routes leading from the western to the eastern ocean. This was the weakest link for these early civilizations, as the Isthmus of Suez, which divided the maritime powers into Western and Eastern, and the arid deserts of Persia, stretching from Central Asia to the Persian Gulf, provided a constant opportunity for nomadic associations to reach the ocean shore that separated India and China on one side and the Mediterranean world on the other. Whenever the oases of Egypt, Syria and Babylon fell into disrepair, the inhabitants of the steppes were able to use the flat plains of Iran as outposts from where they could strike out directly to India via Punjab, via Syria to Egypt, and via the defeated Bosphorus and Dardanelles bridges to Hungary. On the main route to inland Europe stood Vienna, resisting the raids of nomads, both those who came by the direct route from the Russian steppes and those who penetrated by the winding routes south of the Black and Caspian Seas.

So we have illustrated the obvious difference between Saracen and Turkish control in the Middle East. The Saracens were a branch of the Semitic race, people who inhabited the Nile and Euphrates valleys and small oases in southern Asia. Taking advantage of the two opportunities the land afforded them, horses and camels on the one hand, and ships on the other, they created a great empire. At various times in history, their fleets controlled the Mediterranean as far as Spain, as well as the Indian Ocean as far as the Malay Islands. From this central, strategic position between the western and eastern oceans, they tried to conquer all the border areas of the Old World,

in some ways repeating Alexander the Great and pre-empting Napoleon. They were even able to threaten the steppe. But the Saracen civilisation was destroyed by the Turks, who were completely separated from Arabia, Europe, India and China by the pagan Turanians who lived in the heart of Asia.

Movement on the surface of the ocean was a natural rival to the movement on camels and horses observed within the continent. It was on the exploitation of oceanic rivers that the Potamian stage of civilisation was based: the Chinese on the Yangtze, the Indian on the Ganges, the Babylonian on the Euphrates and the Egyptian on the Nile. On the basis of the development of the Mediterranean Sea was founded what is called the “maritime” stage of civilisation, the civilisation of the Greeks and Romans. The Saracens and Vikings were able to rule the coasts of the oceans precisely because of their ability to sail.

The most important result of finding a route to India around the Cape of Good Hope was that it should link the western and eastern cabotage of Euro-Asia, even if by such a roundabout route, and thus neutralise to some extent the strategic advantage of the central position occupied by the steppe people by pressing on them from the rear. The revolution initiated by the great mariners of Columbus’ generation had given the Christian world an extraordinarily wide mobility, without, however, reaching the coveted level. A unified and extended ocean surrounding divided and insular lands is certainly the geographical condition which provided the highest degree of concentration of command at sea and in all theory of modern naval strategy and policy, as Captain Mahan and Mr Spencer Wilkinson have written extensively on. The political outcome of all this was a change in the relationship between Europe and Asia. It must not be forgotten that in the Middle Ages Europe was sandwiched between impassable sands in the south, an uncharted ocean in the west, ice or boundless forests in the north and north-east, and was threatened on the east and south-east by the extraordinary mobility of nomads. And now she had risen above the world, reaching out to thirty-eight seas and other territories and spreading her influence

around the Eurasian continental powers that had hitherto threatened her very existence. New Europe was being created on the vacant lands opened up amongst the waters, and what Britain and Scandinavia had previously been to Europeans, now became America and Australia, and to some extent even trans-Saharan Africa, now adjacent to Euro-Asia. Britain, Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia and Japan constitute a ring of sorts, consisting of island bases for trade and naval power, beyond the reach of the land powers of Euro-Asia.

Nevertheless, the latter continue to exist, and well-known events have once again highlighted their importance. While the “maritime” peoples of Western Europe were covering the surface of the ocean with their ships, going to distant lands and in one way or another imposing tribute on the inhabitants of the Asian ocean coast, Russia organised the Cossacks and, coming out of its northern forests, took control of the steppe, pitting its own nomads against the nomadic Tatars. The Tudor era, having seen the expansion of Western Europe on the seas, also saw the Russian state advance from Moscow towards Siberia. The rider’s rush east across Asia was as politically fraught as the crossing of the Cape of Good Hope, though the two events had long been at odds with each other.

Perhaps the most striking coincidence in history was that both the maritime and land expansion of Europe continued, in a sense, the ancient confrontation between the Greeks and the Romans. A few failures in this area had far more far-reaching consequences than Rome’s failed attempt to Romanise the Greeks. The Teutons were civilised and adopted Christianity from the Romans, the Slavs from the Greeks. It was the Romano-Teutons who later sailed the seas; and it was the Greek-Slavs who rode across the steppes conquering the Turanian peoples. So the modern land power differs from the maritime power even in the source of its ideals, not in its material conditions and mobility(2).

Following the Cossacks, Russia appeared on the scene, quietly parting with the loneliness it had experienced in the forests of the North. Another change of extraordinary intrinsic importance that occurred in Europe in the last cen-

ture was the migration of Russian peasants southwards, so that if previously the agricultural settlements ended at the border with the forests, now the population centre of all European Russia lies south of this border, in the middle of wheat fields, replacing the steppes there and westwards. This is how the extraordinarily important city of Odessa emerged, developing at a purely American pace.

A generation ago it seemed that the steamship and the Suez Canal had increased the mobility of maritime powers compared to land powers. The railways played mainly an appendage role to ocean trade. But now transcontinental railways are changing the fortunes of the land powers, and nowhere do they operate with greater efficiency than in the closed central regions of Euro-Asia, in the wide expanses of which no suitable log or stone can be found to build them. The railways are performing unprecedented wonders in the steppe because they have directly replaced the horse and camel, so that a necessary stage of road development has been skipped here.

In the trade situation it should not be forgotten that the oceanic method, although relatively cheap, usually runs the goods through four stages factory-manufacturer, yard-sender, yard-receiver and retail warehouse, while the continental railway leads directly from the factory-manufacturer to the importer's warehouse. Thus intermediate ocean trade leads, all other things being equal, to the formation of a zone of penetration around the continents whose internal boundary is roughly marked by a line along which the price of four operations, ocean freight and rail freight from a neighbouring coast equals the price of two operations and freight on the continental railway.

The Russian railways run for 6,000 miles from Verballyen in the west to Vladivostok in the east. The Russian army in Manchuria is a remarkable example of mobile land power, just as Britain is a maritime power in South Africa. The Trans-Siberian railway is of course still a single line of communication, but it would not be another century before Asia was covered by a network of railways. The Russian Empire and Mongolia are so vast, and their potential in terms of population, grain, cotton, fuel and metals is so high, that they will undoubtedly develop their own vast economic world,

albeit somewhat remote, beyond the reach of oceanic trade.

Running such a quick glance over the major trends of history, do we not see with all clarity the constancy in terms of geography? Is not this vast region of Euro-Asia, inaccessible to ships but accessible in ancient times to nomads, now to be covered by a network of railways, a pivotal region in world politics? The conditions here were and still are promising (albeit limited by a certain factor) for the development of military and industrial powers. Russia replaces the Mongol Empire. Its pressure on Finland, Scandinavia, Poland, Turkey, Persia, India and China has replaced the steppe raids coming from one centre. In this world it holds the central strategic position, which in Europe belongs to Germany. It can strike and receive blows from all directions at the same time, except from the north. It is only a matter of time before the final development of its mobility, connected with the railways. And no social revolution will change its attitude towards the great geographical limits of its existence. Soberly aware of the limits of their power, Russia's rulers have parted with Alaska, for it is, in fact, the rule of Russian politics not to own any overseas territories, just as it is for Britain to rule the oceanic expanse.

Outside this axial region there is a large inner crescent made up of Germany, Austria, Turkey, India and China, and an outer Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada and Japan. In the present state of balance the axial state, Russia, is not equal to the peripheral states, and here France may emerge as an opponent. The United States has just become the eastern power. They do not influence the balance of power in Europe directly but through Russia, and there is no doubt that they will build the Panama Canal to make the resources of the Mississippi and the Atlantic available for pumping into the Pacific. From this point of view, the line of real separation between east and west should be sought precisely in the Atlantic(3).

The upsetting of the balance of power in favour of the Axis state, through its expansion into the Euro-Asian frontier territories, makes it possible to use the vast continental resources to build a fleet. A world empire will soon appear before our eyes thanks to this. It could happen if Germany wanted

to join Russia as an ally. This is why the threat of such an alliance should push France into the arms of the maritime powers and then France, Italy, Egypt, India and Korea will form such a strong alliance in which the navy will support the army, eventually forcing the Axis allies to deploy their land forces, keeping them from concentrating all their power on the seas. To make a more modest comparison, it is reminiscent of what Wellington did while fighting from Torres Verdas base. And could not India eventually play the same role in the British Empire system? And is this not the idea behind Mr. Amery's conception of a battle front for Britain stretching from the Cape of Good Hope through India all the way to Japan?

This system could be decisively influenced by the development of the enormous capabilities of South America. On the one hand, they will be able to strengthen the position of the United States, and on the other, if of course Germany can effectively challenge the Monroe Doctrine, they are in a position to disengage Berlin from what I have described as an Axis policy. The regional combinations of powers are irrelevant here. I argue that, geographically speaking, they are making something of a circular rotation around an axis state, which is always great in one way or another, but with limited mobility compared to the surrounding frontier and island powers.

I was talking about all this as a geographer. The real balance of political power at any given moment is of course the result of geographical conditions (as well as economic and strategic) on the one hand, and the relative numbers, courage, equipment and organisation of the competing nations on the other. If we calculate accurately the numbers of all these things, we can predict in advance the outcome of the rivalry without resorting to force of arms. Geographical indices are more useful and more constant than human ones in calculations. That is why we hope to find a formula that is as applicable to the past as it is to present day politics. Social movements at all times had more or less the same physical traits, for I doubt whether the gradually increasing aridity of the climate, if it is still to be proven, changed the environment in Asia and Africa in historical times. The westward movement of the empire seems to me to have been more of a short-lived rotation of the

frontier powers around the south-western and western corners of the axial region. The problems associated with the Near, Middle and Far East depend on an unstable balance between internal and external powers in parts of the frontier crescent where local states are hardly taken into account.

In conclusion, replacing Russia's control with some new kind of intracontinental control would not reduce the significance of this axis position. If, for example, the Chinese, with the help of Japan, defeated the Russian Empire and conquered its territory, they would create a yellow peril for world freedom by adding oceanic expanses to the resources of the great continent, thus gaining an advantage not yet gained by the Russian master of that axis region.

**Peter Savitsky GEOGRAPHICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL BASIS
OF EURASIANITY (4)**

Russia has far more reason than China to be called the "Middle Kingdom" ("Zhong-go", in Chinese). And the further time goes by the more those grounds will be flaunted. For Russia, Europe is no more than the peninsula of the Old Continent, lying to the west of its borders. On this continent, Russia itself occupies the main space, its torso. The total area of the European countries combined is close to 5 million square kilometres. The area of Russia, at least within the borders of the modern USSR, greatly exceeds 20 million sq. km. (Especially if we include the area of the Mongolian and Tuvan People's Republics of the former "Outer Mongolia" and "Rianhoei Region", which are actually parts of the Soviet Union at the moment).

With few exceptions, Russian people of the late 19th and early 20th centuries forgot about the Trans-Ural spaces (one of those who *remembered* them was the brilliant Russian chemist D.I. Mendeleev). Nowadays times are different. The entire Urals-Kuznetsk Combine, with its blast furnaces, coal mines, and new cities of a hundred thousand inhabitants each, is being built *beyond the Urals*. The Turksib is also being built there. Nowhere is the expansion of Russian culture more widespread and spontaneous than elsewhere in the Trans-Urals in the so-called "Central Asian republics" (Turkmenistan, Tajik-

istan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan). The whole torso of the Russian lands “from the arrows of Negorely to Suchan station” comes alive. Eurasians have their share of credit for this turn of events. But at the same time the nature of the Russian world as *the central world* of the Old Continent is revealed quite clearly. There were moments when there seemed to be a void between its western periphery, Europe, which included the Russian Daural region (the “European Russia” of the old geographers), and Asia (China, India, Iran). The Eurasian setting of Russian modernity fills this void with the beating of living life. Already since the late nineteenth century the direct route from Europe to China and Japan has been through Russia (the Great Siberian Railway). Geography indicates with absolute certainty that the roads from Europe (at least to the north) to Persia, India and Indochina should run no differently. These possibilities have not yet been realised to date. The Trans-Persian Railway, cutting through Persia in a north-western to south-eastern direction and linked to the railway network of both British India and Europe (via the Transcaucasus, Crimea and Ukraine), was close to being realised on the eve of the World War. At present, due to political circumstances, it has been relegated to the realm of unfounded projects. There is no connection between the railways of Russian Turkestan (“Central Asian republics”) and India. There is no orientation of the Russian railway network towards European-Indian transit traffic. But sooner or later such traffic will become a fact whether in the form of railways, motorways or air links. For these latter, the shortest distances given by Russia are particularly important. The more the air traffic with its characteristic propensity *to fly straight* the clearer will be the role of Russia-Eurasia as a “middle world”. The establishment of transpolar lines could further strengthen this role. In the far north Russia is America’s neighbour to a great extent. With the opening of routes across the pole or rather over the pole it will become the connecting link *between Asia and North America*.

The following articles discuss the Eurasian aspirations to provide a spiritual synthesis of Eastern and Western origins. Here it is important to point out the correspondences to this aspiration *in the field of geopolitics*. Russia Eurasia is the centre of the Old World. Take away this centre and all its

other parts, this whole system of continental margins (Europe, West Asia, Iran, India, Indochina, China, Japan) turns into a kind of 'scattered temple'. This world, lying to the east of the borders of Europe and to the north of 'classical' Asia, is the link that binds them all together. This is obvious in today's world and will become even more evident in the future. The binding and unifying role of the "middle world" has been evident in history as well. For several millennia, the political predominance in the Eurasian world belonged to *the nomads*. Occupying the entire space from the borders of Europe to the borders of China, simultaneously touching Asia Minor, Iran and India, the nomads served as mediators between the disparate worlds of sedentary cultures in their original state. And, say, interactions between Iran and China have never been as close in history as they were during the era of Mongol rule (twelfth to fourteenth centuries). And thirteen or fourteen centuries before that exclusively and only in the nomadic Eurasian world the rays of Hellenic and Chinese cultures intersected, as the newest excavations in Mongolia have shown. By a force of irreducible facts, the Russian world is called upon to play a unifying role within the borders of the Old World. Only to the extent that Russia - Eurasia - fulfills this vocation, can the entire range of diverse cultures of the Old Continent be transformed into an organic whole, and the East-West confrontation is eradicated. This fact has not yet been sufficiently realised in our time, but the relations expressed in it lie in the nature of things. The objectives of unification are first and foremost *those of cultural creativity*. In Russian culture in the centre of the Old World a new and independent historical force has risen to a unifying and conciliatory role. It can solve its task only in interaction with the cultures of all the surrounding peoples. In this respect the cultures of the East are as important to it as the cultures of the West. In such a turn *simultaneously and equally* to the East and West is a peculiarity of Russian culture and geopolitics. For Russia, these are its two equal fronts, the Western and the Southeastern. The field of vision, covering to an equal and full extent the entire Old World can and must be Russian, predominantly as a field of vision.

Let us return, however, to phenomena of a purely geographical nature. Com-

pared to the Russian “torso”, Europe and Asia equally represent the outskirts of the Old World. Europe, from the Russian-Eurasian point of view, is all that lies *to the west* of the Russian border, while Asia is all that lies *to the south and southeast* of it. Russia itself is neither Asia, nor Europe - this is the main geopolitical thesis of the Eurasians. Therefore, there is no “European” and “Asian” Russia, but there are its parts that lie to the west and to the east of the Urals, as there are its parts that lie to the west and to the east of the Yenisei, etc. Eurasianists continue: Russia is neither Asia nor Europe, but is a special geographical world. How does this world differ from Europe and Asia? The western, southern and south-eastern fringes of the old continent are distinguished by the considerable ruggedness of their coasts and the variety of landforms. The same cannot be said of its main “torso”, which is said to comprise Russia-Eurasia.

It consists primarily of three plains (the White Sea-Caucasus, West Siberian and Turkestan) and then of areas lying to the east of them (including the low mountainous countries east of the Yenisei River). The zonal composition of the western and southern margins of the continent is marked by “mosaic-fractional” and not very simple outlines. Natural forest areas are alternated here in a bizarre sequence, on the one hand with steppe and desert areas, on the other - with tundra areas (on high mountains). This “mosaic” is opposed by a relatively simple, “flag-like” arrangement of zones in the middle plains of the Old World. By this latter designation we indicate the fact that when mapped it resembles the outlines of a flag divided into horizontal stripes. Desert, steppe, forest and tundra alternate here from south to north. Each of these zones forms a continuous latitudinal band. General latitudinal division of the Russian world is emphasized also by latitudinal extent of mountain ranges, which border these plains from the south: Crimean ridge, Caucasian ridge, Kopetdag, Parapamiz, Hindukush, the main ranges of Tian Shan, ridges on the northern edge of Tibet, In-Shan, in the area of the Great wall of China. The last of the ranges we have named, in the same line as the previous ones, flank to the south the elevated plain occupied by the Gobi desert. It communicates with the Turkestan plain through the Dzungarian Gate.

There is a peculiar east-west symmetry in the zonal structure of the mainland of the Old World, which is reflected in the fact that the situation of phenomena on its eastern edge is similar to the same situation on the western edge and differs from the nature of the phenomena in the middle part of the mainland. Both eastern and western fringes of the continent (both Far East and Europe) in latitudes between 35 and 60 degrees North latitude are naturally forested areas. Here boreal forests directly contact and gradually transform into forests of southern floras. Nothing similar is observed in the middle world. Forests of southern flora can be found only in its mountainous fringes (Crimea, the Caucasus, Turkestan). And they are nowhere in contact with forests of northern flora or boreal forests, being separated from them by a continuous steppe-land belt. Thus, the middle world of the Old World can be defined as a region of steppe and desert belt, extending in a continuous line from the Carpathians to Khingan, taken together with its mountainous frame (in the south) and the areas lying to the north of it (forest and tundra zones). This world is what Eurasians call Eurasia in the exact sense of the word (*Eurasia sensu stricto*). It must be distinguished from the old “Eurasia” of A. von Humboldt, covering the entire Old Continent (*Eurasia sensu latiore*).

The western boundary of Eurasia runs along the Black Sea-Baltic headland, i.e. the area where the continent narrows (between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea). A number of representative botanical-geographical borders, such as the eastern border of yew, beech and ivy, run along this headland in the general north-west-south-east direction. Each of them starts at the shores of the Baltic Sea, then reaches the shores of the Black Sea. To the west of these borders, i.e. where the aforementioned species still grow, the forest zone extends from north to south. To the east of them begins the division into the forest zone in the north and the steppe zone in the south. This boundary can be considered the western boundary of Eurasia, i.e. its boundary with Asia in the Far East passes in the longitudes of the continuous steppe zone as it approaches the Pacific Ocean, i.e. in the longitudes of Khingan.

The Eurasian world is a world of a “periodic and at the same time symmetri-

cal system of zones". The boundaries of the main Eurasian zones are timed with considerable precision to the extent of certain climatic boundaries. For example, the southern boundary of the tundra corresponds to a line connecting points with an average annual relative humidity of about 79.5% in 1 hour of the day. (Relative humidity at *1pm* is particularly important for vegetation and soil life). The southern boundary of the forest zone runs along a line connecting points with the same relative humidity of 67.5%. The southern border of the steppe (at its junction with the desert) corresponds to the same relative humidity of 55.5% at one hour of the day. In the desert it is everywhere below this value. What attracts attention here is the coincidence of the intervals between the forest and steppe zones. Such coincidence and the same rhythmic distribution of intervals can be established by other features as well (see our book "Geographical features of Russia", part 1, Prague 1927). This gives grounds to speak about the "periodical system of Russia-Eurasia zones". It is also a symmetric system, but not in the sense of east-west symmetries, which we discussed in the previous section, but in the sense of north-south symmetries. Here the deforestation of the north (tundra) is corresponded to the deforestation of the south (steppe). Calcium content and humus percentage in soils from middle parts of black earth zone decreases symmetrically to the north and south. Symmetric distribution of phenomena is also observed in terms of soil colouring. It reaches maximal intensity in same middle parts of horizontal zone. Both to the north and south it weakens (passing through brown shades to whitish). Across the sands and stony substrata from the border between the forest and steppe zone symmetrically diverges: steppe islands to the north and "island" forests to the south. Russian science defines these phenomena as "extra-zonal". Steppe areas in the forest zone can be characterized as "south-bearing" phenomenon, while island forests in the steppe are "north-bearing" phenomena. South-bearing formations of the forest zone correspond to north-bearing formations of the steppe.

Nowhere else in the Old World are the gradual transitions within the zonal system, its "periodicity" and at the same time "symmetry" so pronounced as in the plains of Russia-Eurasia.

The Russian world has an *extremely transparent* geographical structure. In this structure, the Ural does not at all play the defining and dividing role that geographical “wampum” has attributed (and continues to attribute) to it. Due to its orographic and geological peculiarities the Urals not only do not separate, but, on the contrary, tightly tie together ‘Pre-Ural and Trans-Ural Russia’, proving once again that geographically they both constitute a single undivided Eurasian continent. The tundra, as a horizontal zone, lies both to the west and east of the Urals. The forest extends on one side and on the other. The situation is no different with respect to the steppe and desert (the latter fringes both to the east and west the southern continuation of the Ural Mountains of the Mugodzhar). At the border of the Ural Mountains we do not observe essential changes in geographic situation. Far more significant is the geographical limit of the “inter-seas”, i.e. the spaces between the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea on the one hand, the Baltic Sea and the coastline of northern Norway on the other.

Russia-Eurasia’s peculiar, extremely clear and at the same time simple geographical structure is associated with a number of crucial geopolitical circumstances.

The nature of the Eurasian world is minimally conducive to all kinds of “separatism”, whether political, cultural or economic. The “mosaic-fractional” structure of Europe and Asia is conducive to the emergence of small, self-contained worlds. Here there are conditions for the existence of small states, specific for every city or province cultures, economic areas with great economic diversity. In Eurasia the situation is quite different. The broadly cut sphere of “flagging” zones does not contribute to anything of the kind. Endless plains accustom to width of horizon, to breadth of geopolitical combinations. Within steppes, moving on land, within forests on water of numerous rivers and lakes, people were constantly migrating, constantly changing their place of habitation. Ethnic and cultural elements were in intensive interaction, interbreeding and intermingling. In Europe and Asia it was at times possible to live by the interests of one’s own bell tower. In Eurasia, if it is possible, it is for an extremely short period, in a historical sense. In the

north of Eurasia there are hundreds of thousands square kilometres of forests, among which not a single hectare of arable land. How can the inhabitants of these areas live without contact with the more southerly regions? In the south the steppes are spread over an equally large area, which is suitable for livestock farming and to some extent for agriculture, but on the space of many thousands of square kilometers there is not a single tree. How can the population of these areas survive without economic interaction with the north? The nature of Eurasia is much more prompting of people to unite politically, culturally and economically than we observe in Europe and Asia. Not without reason within the Eurasian steppes and deserts there was such a “unified” in many respects way of life of nomads throughout the whole area of its existence: from Hungary to Manchuria, and throughout the whole history from the Scythians to the modern Mongols. It is not without reason that such great *political* unification attempts as those of the Scythians, Huns, Mongols (XIII-XIV centuries), etc., were born in the expanses of Eurasia. These attempts encompassed not only the steppe and the desert, but also the forest zone lying to the north of them and the more southern area of Eurasia’s “mountainous fringe”. Not without reason the spirit of a peculiar “brotherhood of peoples” is sweeping over Eurasia, with its roots in the centuries-old contacts and cultural fusion of peoples of different races, from Germanic (Crimean Goths) and Slavic to Tungus-Manchurian, through the links of Finnish, Turkish, Mongolian peoples. This “brotherhood of peoples” is expressed in the fact that here there is no opposition between “superior” and “inferior” races, that mutual attraction here is stronger than repulsion, that *the “will to common cause”* is easily awakened here. The history of Eurasia, from its first chapters to its last, is unbroken proof of this. These traditions have been adopted by Russia in its main historical affair. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, they were at times obscured by an intentional ‘Westernising’, which required the Russians to consider themselves ‘Europeans’ (which they were not in fact) and to treat the other Eurasian peoples as ‘Asians’ and an ‘inferior race’. Such an interpretation led Russia to nothing but disasters (e.g. the Russian Far Eastern adventure of the early 20th century). It is to be hoped that by now this conception has been overcome to the end in Russian consciousness and that the aftershocks of

Russian "Europeanism", still lurking in emigration, have been stripped of all historical significance. Only by overcoming deliberate "Westernism" can the path be opened to a true brotherhood of Eurasian peoples: Slavic, Finnish, Turkish, Mongolian and others.

Eurasia has played a unifying role in the Old World before. The modern Russia, embracing this tradition, should definitively and irrevocably abandon the former methods of unification, belonging to an obsolete and overcome era of methods of violence and war. In the modern period it is a question of ways of cultural creativity, of inspiration, illumination and cooperation. This is what the Eurasians are talking about. Despite all the modern means of communication, the peoples of Europe and Asia are still, for the most part, sitting each in their own cell, living in the interests of the bell tower. Eurasian "place-development", by its basic properties, is accustomed to a common cause. The purpose of Eurasian peoples is to lead by their example other peoples of the world to these paths. And then the links of the ethnographical kinship with some non-Eurasian nations, the Indo-European links of the Russians, the West Asian and Iranian links of the Eurasian Turks, the links that exist between the Eurasian Mongols and the East Asian nations can be useful to the universal cause. They can all benefit in the construction of a new, organic culture, albeit of an Old, but still (we believe) young, but fraught with a great future of the World.

Jean TIREAR

SUPERHUMAN COMMUNISM

(Letter to a German reader) (5)

Modern history will further operate with the notion of a continental rather than a territorial state. Already in 1962-1963 in my book *Europe: An Empire of 400 million people* I described in some detail the way Europe was created "from Dublin to Bucharest". Witnessing the so-called Crusade of 1941-1945, I already stressed in 1963 that such a Europe must avoid conflict with the East at all costs and, what is more, not even antagonise it.

The acceleration of the course of history makes me say today that it is no longer a question of a peaceful coexistence between Western Europe and the USSR, but of creating a united Europe from Vladivostok to Dublin. It has to be understood that Russia is among the European countries and that it is the only European power independent of the global American empire.

Our historical thinking must be distracted from the type of ideology of the current USSR. Marxist Communism is not something horrible, but something stupid. This ideology must disappear under the pressure of facts. It will disappear because one day, which seems to be just around the corner, the Soviet leadership will be convinced that the endemic weakness of the USSR economy is precisely due to Marxist dogma. If the Soviet leadership wants to stay in power, and that depends on the Soviet Union surviving, it will have to make a turn towards "historical thinking" and get rid of the dogmatism that weakens it.

The Lübeck-Sofia line continues to be a historical absurdity. It is ineluctably reminiscent of the division of Germany in the mid-17th century between Protestant and Catholic states, which, from the time of Richelieu and Mazarini, allowed France to postpone the creation of the Second Reich by 250 years.

Just as the Treaty of Westphalia once enabled France to intervene in Germany, so the Yalta Treaty enabled the United States to intervene in Europe. Some Germans today are willing to obey the Americans unconditionally. This is despicable. For 30 years now, Bonn has been emptying the State Department's night pot. Apart from that, there are two other trends in today's Germany: a craving for neutrality on the one hand and nationalism on the other.

Consider first the question of German nationalism. Germany was not defeated in 1945. In a dramatic situation her courage took on a Shakespearian character. Its military prowess is undeniable. In June 1940, the French ruling class fled Paris without a backward glance. In April 1945, the German leadership was dying fighting in the streets of Berlin. In 1945 Germany

was not defeated, but crushed. Completely. It was only for 12 years that Germany existed as a single formed state, while England, France and Spain had been such for centuries. But if Germany was crushed in 1945, it was the country that wanted to be crushed. Hitler wanted to create a Germanic Europe. The idea of a "European" Europe was beyond his comprehension. An exceptional man in many respects, he was utterly short-sighted on the subject. As a provincial from Central Europe, he was incapable of appreciating the enormous importance of the Mediterranean Sea for geostrategy. Furthermore, he could not rise to the idea that other nations might also have outstanding qualities. His contempt for the Russian man, the Slav, was the reason for his underestimation of the bravery of the Russian soldier. Goebbels propaganda portrayed Russians as a dubious mix of Tatars, Mongols and Kalmyks. The propaganda department's photographic services and the front's "RK" cameramen tried to outdo each other in this field.

Today I am subscribing to the *Revue militaire sovietique* (Soviet Military Review). Contrary to Goebbels' propaganda publications, Soviet soldiers are portrayed here "with pretty faces, just like our boys": tall, with blond, short-cropped hair and a "cheerful look". Dr Goebbels did not tell us that they were descendants of Vikings. Those Vikings who could freely join the "SS" troops. They were fully consistent with the racial traits according to which candidates for these selected units of the Third Reich were selected.

The taboos, too, change with the changing political order and historical era. Today, the combined Tel Aviv-Washington propaganda department portrays the Soviet army as an army that does nothing but rape, burn and kill exclusively children, women and old people in Afghanistan.

As a young man I had keenly experienced the failed Franco-German rapprochement between 1940 and 1942. Receiving Admiral Darlan at Berchtesgaden on 14 May 1941, Hitler was still under the impression of Hess' escape to England (11 May 1941). Hitler was not magnanimous, he was not capable of allowing the Franco-German conflict to end without a victor and without France being destroyed. The same France that still owned the African, especially Mediterranean colonies and an absolutely intact navy. In alliance

with France, Hitler could, by passing through Syria, invade Iraq, thus defeating England in the Mediterranean. The British fleet would then have been forced to withdraw from the Mediterranean. "Anything was possible" as early as the day after the Mers-el-Kebir massacre on 3 July 1940, when the English fleet massacred the unarmed sailors of Admiral Jansoul. In the week that followed, Hitler could easily have involved France in his war against England. But that would have required magnanimity and a European mindset. Hitler was not a great European. He was only a great German.

I have lived and suffered through it all. I took an active part in the events, but not on the side of Germany, but on the side of National Socialism. Many of us were disappointed at the time, and some of us also felt fooled. Still, we fought on the side of the Reich to the end. Many of my comrades paid for this with their lives: some were killed on the Eastern Front, others were shot immediately after the war ended in May 1945. Thanks to influential lawyers, I was able to get away with three years in ordinary prison, which was hardly a gift. From this story I have come to the conclusion that a nationalism which subjugates, exploits and humiliates the defeated does incalculable harm. Hitler was incapable of rising to a unifying nationalism.

German and French nationalisms have done much mischief and harm. Today, therefore, the slightest expression of German nationalism must be ruthlessly suppressed in the name of European interests.

Germany has nothing to complain about being defeated in 1945.

She was going for it herself, humiliating the Poles and Russians and despising the French.

Hitler's Germany made the mistake of choosing Mussolini's Italy as an ally. This alliance cost her a series of stupidities and mistakes. Mussolini prevented the slightest rapprochement between France and Germany. This is why Germany, and in particular a number of prominent Nazi Anglophiles, also erred in their choice of an enemy. Rudolf Hess failed, too literally, to

apply the concepts of General Haushofer, whose aide-de-camp he was during the First World War (1914-1918). In 1940, Germany's ruthless enemy was not mainland France but the maritime power, England. It is England that has been Europe's original and foremost enemy for five centuries.

In 1945, the Third Reich collapsed completely. But Germany was not the only one who lost the war. We all lost it. First the Dutch were expelled from their colonies. Then France and England and finally Belgium. After the shameful loss of Algeria in 1962, France finally ceased to exist as an independent power. We all lost the war together. As early as the end of 1941, the British began to drive the French out of the Middle East (Syria). In retaliation, the French helped the Zionists to drive the English out of Palestine. Even before 1945, the British and the French sought to strip Italy of its African colonies. Finally, in 1960 the Belgians, on Washington's orders, abandoned the Congo, the richest country in Africa. Our nationalist strife has brought the whole of Europe, or at least a multinational Europe, to ruin. Now it is time to create a mono-national, united continental Europe, a great Europe "from Vladivostok to Dublin".

Combining Haushofer's clear geopolitical concepts with the power of the Soviet army, one should try, by going east-west, to accomplish what Hitler failed to do by going west-east. It is necessary to rid communism of its ineffectiveness due to Marxist and Leninist dogmas. Communism of the Soviet type must be purged of Marxism, improved, mutated.

There needs to be a synthesis of non-Marxist communism with non-racist national socialism. I am against ineffective communism, but for effective communism. This is the essence of national-communitarianism. This synthesis should reflect Alexander the Great and Caesar's ingenious understanding of empire: empire is an integrating, flexible nationalism. The defeated becomes a partner, a supporter and finally a compatriot. I am talking about an "imperial communism", a kind of New Rome or "Great Prussia", an empire which will be an expression of the idea of the state with a better functional structure, an empire which not every state will have the right to join.

This does not exclude the danger of a classical Russian nationalism, which was a way of suppressing and exploiting other peoples. If the USSR tried to impose a Russian-type Europe on us, it would fail even faster than Hitler's Germany. On the contrary, if the USSR tried to apply the principles of a "Soviet" nationalism of the imperial type, a nationalism of integrating nationalism, it would have a much better chance of success. The concepts of "Great Russia" and "Soviet Empire" reflect two opposing concepts, namely those of suppressive and integrating nationalism. Suppressive nationalism generates, strengthens and aggravates the nationalism of neighbouring states. It breeds its own opponents, its antagonists. Such nationalism is doomed to failure if its genocide fails because of the inherent contradiction.

For the vast majority of people, changing the concept of "territorial" (overwhelming) nationalism to that of "continental" imperial nationalism is a difficult, if not impossible, mental operation.

Suppressive nationalism resembles the evolutionary choices made by arthropods. It works according to a rigidly set programme. It has set its own limits. By contrast, integrating nationalism, which reflects an "imperial concept", is reminiscent of vertebrates. Theoretically, its territorial expansion could be limitless. Whether at the upper level of the concept or at the lower level of ideology, the choice of arthropods, as the opposite of vertebrate choice, can be found analogous in a number of fields: from religion to the formation of nations, including the development of political theories. For example, the Jewish religion, based on a racial approach, shares the fate of arthropods. Demographically, it has had only a very limited spread. In contrast, the Christian and Islamic religions, restricted neither by linguistic nor by racial criteria, have had the widest spread.

The racially and linguistically limited expansion of Hitler's Germany also went the way of the arthropods. It ended with the fatal indigestion of the inability to digest 200 million Slavs. The Derouled of yesterday and the Debre of today, as well as those sighing for a helmet with a bump or a swastika, should also be counted in the class of arthropods. They are all clenched in the shell of their rigid ideologies. As for European nationalism, it serves

as an analogy for the evolution of vertebrates. It is a kind of open system. It is characterised by flexibility, integrative capacity. To understand it requires a level of thinking that is completely inaccessible to most "ordinary nationalists".

Here we come to the perennial attempt to neutralise, "Finlandise" Germany.

Life is merciless to the weak. The same can be said of history. Today's Europe, torn apart by narrow-minded nationalists (French, German, English, etc.) is a potential "battlefield". In this it is similar to the Germany of the mid-17th century. As one once spoke of "marionette Germans" pulled by Richelieu and Mazarini, so today one can speak of "Europeans being manipulated by Washington".

All those who slavishly put up with American domination in Europe (especially in West Germany, where it is quite blatant) and are prepared to "Finnishise" West Germany can be called masochists of history. In 1840, when Germany's best representatives were struggling to unify the Second Reich, such masochists were extolling the virtues of the Peace of Westphalia (the bicentennial treaty plan). A certain Christoph Gack, for example, glorified the historic nothingness of Germany. This type of man, willing to buy peace at the price of historical castration, is not new.

Today we must seek rapprochement with the Soviet Union. We must negotiate first for rapprochement, then for unification and finally for a merger with it. We are talking about absolutely frank negotiations. We do not need peace between the cat and the mouse.

West Germany must be given the right to equality and dignity within Western Europe. To do this, the Jewish-American theses of "guilty people" and the original sin of the Germans must be discarded. This is biblical nonsense. The image of an inhuman Germany is carefully cultivated through all media in France, England, Belgium, Holland and Italy. This propaganda aims to divide Western Europe, to prevent its unification by picking at old wounds.

The West German armed forces, the Bundeswehr, are today reduced to the

position of colonial infantry (like the Senegalese in the 1914-1918 war) of the USA.

Today's Germany must have the courage to exorcise its evil spirits and tell itself that National Socialism finally belongs to the past. In any case Hitler committed no more crimes than those who stained their hands with blood by bombing Hamburg or aimlessly destroying Dresden in 1945, not to mention the 1500 women, children and elderly people innocently murdered recently in Lebanon. Everyone has to answer for their misdeeds, but eventually there comes a time when those misdeeds should be the subject of study, not by politicians, but by historians. That time has come for Germany. Almost all the survivors of the 1939-1945 war are already dead. The new generation of Germans must not shoulder Hitler's legacy. On the one hand Germany should not shrug off responsibility for war crimes completely but today it has the right to demand compliance with the principle of the statute of limitations also for itself. Germany must no longer abandon its role as a stepchild of the Common Market or NATO. A stepdaughter whose adoptive parents are "awful".

Western Europe should strive for armed neutrality and avoid unarmed neutrality. Only masochists, naïve people and ospreys would advocate such neutrality. Europe should expel the 400,000 American soldiers stationed there. The risk of war lies in the American military presence in Europe. The Pentagon, subordinate to the State Department, which patronises the state of Israel, could play "atomic poker" in Europe in response to Soviet actions in the Mediterranean or some other part of the world.

If nuclear weapons were in the hands of Europeans (including, of course, the West Germans), the Soviet Union would be at incomparably greater risk of nuclear conflict than if they were in the hands of Americans stationed in Europe. Europe is a perennial battleground, a testing ground. There is much to ponder here. We have known the horrors of war, both in Russia in 1941-1943 and at home in 1943-1945. Here we know what war is and only dare to fight it as a last resort. Washington, the capital of a country which has not had an enemy gunboat off its shores for nearly two centuries, does

not know what war is.

Europe must base its policy on an alliance with the East, an alliance driven by geopolitical considerations. Europe, extending from west to east, cannot stop at the Lübeck-Sofia line. At the same time, the great Soviets, going from east to west, cannot stop at this artificially established boundary line. Our distant future can be read on a geographical map. The border running along the Lübeck-Sofia line is a line of defence, extremely vulnerable in case of manoeuvre warfare. The existence of such a border is very dangerous, geostrategically speaking. It is very difficult to defend. This explains the importance that the USSR attaches to classical armaments. "Flank" Lübeck-Sofia is the only weak point of the Soviet defence on the far approaches. On all other sides the USSR is well defended due to its climate (in the north) and vast distances (in the south). In classical military science terms, an American army based in West Germany could be compared to a single Soviet army standing in Canada between Montreal and Winnipeg. In this purely hypothetical case, the bulk of the American ground forces would be located between Minneapolis and Boston.

The "natural" shores of the USSR (as opposed to the borders) are the Canary Islands, the Azores, Ireland and Iceland. The same applies to Western Europe.

A "cultured" or "economically advanced" nation is inconceivable without relying on a "politically strong" nation. From 1648 to 1870, Germany was an example of a "cultured" nation, famous for its porcelain and musicians. At the same time it was a battleground for anyone. Without an army there is no nation, and today there is no army without nuclear weapons. Having lost their colonies, countries like England and France are now only PERSONS of great powers. Nations of less than 200-300 million inhabitants no longer have any international weight. History offers us two options to choose from:

1) The Soviet Union conquers Western Europe or has to do so as a preventive war;

2) War is avoided and Western Europe, freed from Washington's political mercenaries, goes for a political alliance with the East.

Cooperation, partnership, alliance and, finally, unification. Germany, which today has one foot in the West and the other in the East, is best placed to play the role of mediator.

There is a leftist nationalist movement in Germany, which emerged in West Berlin in between a happening and a drug party. Father Brandt has already dishonoured his country and his race. Nowadays we can admire the romantic fantasies of his offspring Peter. The transformation of the Bundeswehr into a "National People's Army" on the pattern of the Yugoslav army is pure fun. Even in the case of reunification (I admit this hypothesis) Germany would become a dwarf power like Mitterrand's France or Thatcher's England, boasting of their "independence" from the USA, the USSR and China. The miserable young people, reaching for Peter Brandt, want to return to the days of the romantic Germany before 1848, the Germany before Fichte. In 1982 it is no longer just a question of Germany being a "battlefield", but of the whole of Europe being a "battlefield".

The religious war between "Marxist Communism" and "Democratism" blinds most of these people and this blindness prevents them from recognising the geopolitical reality. If Europe is not to become a "battlefield", the direction of a possible Soviet offensive must be shifted to Gibraltar, Dublin and Casablanca. Agreement must be sought with the Soviet Union and the foundations for effective cooperation must already be laid. The site of the protracted war should be the part of Africa between 20 degrees north latitude and 20 degrees south latitude. Even if these areas are partly devastated, this would not have too great an impact on the future of humanity.

To avoid the destruction of Europe, we must consciously go for close cooperation with the USSR, cooperation rather than the trickery offered by Hitler to the French in 1940-1942. Western Europe and the USSR must create a kind of "community of destinies" dictated by geography, a marriage of

convenience, a forced marriage.

The USSR and Western Europe must develop together as soon as possible some kind of counterbalance to the Monroe Doctrine. Our Monroe Doctrine should be the motto "...not one soldier, not one American soldier on the Mediterranean Sea". European problems should be solved by Europeans themselves. The Russians are as European as the Germans, French, English and other European nations.

We must force the Americans out of Europe not just for geopolitical reasons. Their presence in Europe can be compared to the Carthaginian conquest of Sicily under the flank of the Roman Republic. By staying in Europe and increasing the risk of war, the Americans will not be able to deal with the crisis of their society, which is only just beginning. We risk being infected by them. This crisis of society is caused by the disintegration of three spheres:

- 1) the technical and economic system,**
- 2) Policies based on persuasion, demagoguery, in short, "democratism",**
- 3) a deranged culture.**

The techno-economic order is a reflection of the materialist world, the world of science, rationalism, foresight. The second sphere, the political sphere, does not lend itself to any logical analysis, to any rationalist approach. Here the argumentation of persuasion prevails (the first sphere is dominated by logical-experimental argumentation). As for culture, it should nowadays rather be relegated to the realm of psychiatry. At least in the United States. Only a totalitarian system can bring these three spheres into balance.

The notion of rationality is long overdue in politics. In my next work, *Euro-Soviet Empire*, I will devote an entire chapter to the question of whether politics, metapolitics, should be based on power or pleasure.

North America has made its final choice in favour of hedonism, and its entire policy is directed towards "the means of pleasure". Such a choice would lead humanity down a blind alley. It remains to get the communists to wise up

and explain to them what a metapolitics directed towards the "means of action" or, in other words, towards the means of force, would consist in.

Already Hobbes showed that freedom rests on force. In our age of the scientific and technological revolution, we can add to this that power serves knowledge (space research, basic research in physics) and knowledge gives power.

If we want to create homo novus, we will have to choose between strength and pleasure. Marx's dream was to give everyone according to need. Today this dream can easily be realised. Achieving abundance is a problem of planning and will. It would take no more than a quarter of a century to solve. This abundance would lead either to a hedonistic society, doomed to decline (USA) or to the transformation of the common man into homo novus.

Huxley and Orwell noted only the possible negative side of A Wonderful New World. The positive side remained unknown to them.

Remember also Koestler's prophecy: *"The thesis of the victors, the antithesis of the vanquished, the synthesis of the victors and the vanquished become cohesive citizens of a giant new Eurasian homeland"*.

I would change it: *"The thesis is racist national-socialism, the antithesis is Marxist communism, the synthesis is Great European national-bolshevism, in other words, elite imperial communism, rejecting Marx as an ideologist and Hitler as a limited myopic nationalist..."*

National Socialism was a great school of efficiency, the very efficiency that Marxist Communism lacks.

Ordinary communism needs to make a baby to have an extraordinary offspring, a kind of "gifted monster", a "superhuman communism".

As early as 1941, Koestler knew who was to become his father.

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Carl Schmitt

PLANETARY EAST-WEST TENSION AND LAND-SEA CONFRONTATION(6)

The East-West confrontation, which is quite evident today, involves contradictions of various kinds: economic interests, qualitative differences between the ruling elites and incompatibility of underlying intellectual attitudes. All these contradictions are growing, mutually reinforcing each other. However, the connection of economic, sociological and spiritual tensions has been manifested in all the great wars of human history. The peculiarity of modern antagonism is that these tensions have become global and encompass the entire planet. Therefore, today it is absolutely necessary to adequately address the historical and geopolitical background on which this tense confrontation is based.

We are talking about the contrast between East and West. It is clear that this is not just a geographical difference. In the course of our study we will examine in detail which type of opposition we are talking about here and show that there are two different types of tense opposition: historical-dialectical and static-polar.

The East and West are not polar opposites. The Earth has a North Pole and a South Pole, but neither an East Pole nor a West Pole. In the conditions of our planet, the geographical opposition of West and East is not something fixed and static; it is only a dynamic relationship associated with the diurnal “waning of light”. Geographically speaking, America is the West in relation to Europe; in relation to America the West is China and Russia; and in relation to China and Russia the West is Europe. In a purely geographical sense, there are no clear poles and hence, based on geography alone, it is completely impossible to understand and think about the real planetary animosity between East and West and its underlying structure.

1.

It is possible to go down the road of investigating the historical, cultural and

moral specificity of the present East and the present West, and in this way to isolate a number of antitheses which are, no doubt, very important. Here I would like to use a term introduced by the geographer John Gottman in his brilliant work “La politique des Etats et leur géographie”(7): the notion of regional iconography (iconography of space) *iconographie régionalale*. Different world visions and representations, resulting from different religions, different traditions, different historical pasts, different social models, form autonomous spaces. In this sense, not only paintings and works of plastic art, but all visible forms of public and private life belong to the iconography of a certain space. The essential importance of art in this regard has recently been pointed out by Luis Díaz del Corral, in his book *The Abduction of Europe*, which can be called an encyclopaedia of European iconography. Carlos Oliero explored the differences between the perceptions of form in different cultural regions, and especially in the structure of power and polity. In addition to the various forms of social life, the concept of “*iconography of space*” can also include all the other typical forms of human existence, systems of characteristic implications, allusions, the symbolic language of feelings and thoughts, as they are characteristic of certain territories with a particular and unique culture.

This also includes images of the past, myths, sagas and legends, just as all symbols and taboos are topographically localised in one particular space and only by virtue of this acquire historical validity. Gottmann speaks in this regard of the “*circulation of iconography*”, i.e. the dynamic influence of territorial cultures on one another over time. Thus Pareto’s famous theory of the “circulation of elites” is replaced by the no less important theory of the circulation of iconographies.

The use of the word (and concept) “iconography” seems to me in this case to be quite appropriate and fruitful, above all because this term most accurately reveals the essence of the East-West confrontation. The relationship to the image and the icon reveals the essential qualities of the East and the West in their most profound dimension:

The East has traditionally acted as an opponent of visual images, paint-

ings and icons, while the West, by contrast, has acted as a stronghold of veneration for iconography and, more generally, painting.

When it comes to iconoclasm or the ban on the representation of God, the educated European recalls events from Byzantine history, the struggle around the iconoclastic heresy of the time of King Leo (717-741) and the recognition of iconography by Charlemagne. The prohibition on depicting God in the Old Testament and in Islam also comes to mind. Some have gone so far as to find here an inherent contradiction between verbal and visual expression, which they in turn draw to an even more general contradiction between hearing and sight, acoustics and the visual, with word and hearing unequivocally identified with the East and image and sight with the West.

The use of the term “iconography”, in the above-mentioned overarching sense, should protect us from such simplifications. In fact, there is no geographical place where the visual dimension of reality is absent, and image, representation, icon and iconography are everywhere. This is why the opposite tendency, which denies the value of the visual image, i.e. iconoclasm in the broadest sense, is only possible. And the problem of iconoclasm is not at all limited to Byzantium or Islam. The West also knows numerous and very aggressive forms of the iconoclastic spirit. Wycliphites and Hussites, Baptist and Puritan sectarians, religious modernists and crude rationalists - all these iconoclastic currents emerged and developed in the West. This conflict, the main dispute in world history, reached global proportions during the epoch of great geographical discoveries and the colonization of the New World. Outwardly it manifested itself in the struggle between the two confessional forms of Roman Catholicism and Northern Protestantism, the Jesuit and Calvinist line. Let us try to consider the iconographic aspect of this conflict, which will lead us to a deeper understanding of its meaning.

The point of the Reconquest was to reclaim space on the Iberian peninsula for the free veneration of the image of the Blessed Virgin Mary. I once wrote that the Spanish sailors and conquistadors of the New World saw the symbol of their historical achievements in the setting up of the image of the Immaculate Virgin everywhere. Some readers have misunderstood me. One

Catholic author even wrote on the subject: “*Schmitt speaks of Christian accessories of the Conquista, which can only lead readers astray*. For me the icon of the Virgin Mary is not ”all kinds of Christian accessories“. Moreover, the veneration of the icon of the Virgin has for me a great importance, which becomes more understandable, if we take into account the arguments mentioned above about the relation of the visual image, the icon with the essence of the Western tradition. I venture to argue that all the religious wars of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe, including the Thirty Years’ War in Germany, were really wars for and against the medieval Catholic veneration of the icon of the Virgin Mary. In this context, should the iconoclasm of the English Puritans be considered a purely Eastern phenomenon and the icon-worship of the Bavarian, Spanish and Polish Catholics a sign of their Western spiritual nature? In the Byzantine controversy surrounding the iconoclastic heresy, the Christian dogma of the Trinity was involved on a theological level. The spiritual problem was the complexity of the iconographic juxtaposition of Unity and Trinity in the Godhead. Still, it would be wrong to strictly identify the dogma of the Trinity exclusively with the West and abstract monotheism with the East. Certainly, at certain points in history this overlap was almost complete. The Frankish monks added to the Christian Creed of the West the formula that the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the Son, and the outrage of the Greek patriarchs over the Filioque led to the great schism between the Western and Eastern Churches (8). (8) From this one could say that Filioque was the attack of the West against the East, but this is refuted, on the one hand by the special teaching of the Syrian Church Fathers on the Trinity and the Virgin, and on the other hand by the Western Arian view, which denied the divine nature of Christ altogether. Thus the impressive iconographic distinction between East and West on the issue of the Trinity becomes not so unconditional and absolute.

Traditional iconography is not static, it is being invaded by new factors. The industrial invasion of technology, for example. Modern psychoanalysis can also very well be seen as a manifestation of the iconoclastic tendency. The Spanish psychoanalyst Juan José López Ybor has undertaken a very

interesting study of this sphere, based on our iconographic approach to the problem. In addition, almost all contemporary painting, both abstract and retained the remnants of objectivity, carries with it the destruction of the traditional understanding of the image, the visual image, and the icon. All three phenomena are connected between technique, psychoanalysis and contemporary painting. If we undertake a study of this relationship, comparing it to the present confrontation between East and West, we can come to sensational and startling conclusions. The only obstacle on this road is the impossibility to identify the East strictly with iconoclasm and the West with iconoclasm. To fully grasp the structure of the world's West-East dualism we must, however, proceed from other criteria.

2.

The history of the planetary confrontation between East and West in its entirety is reducible to the fundamental duality of the elements: Earth and Water, Land and Sea.

What we today call the East is a single mass of solid land: Russia, China, India a huge chunk of land, the "*Middle Earth*"⁽⁹⁾ as the great English geographer Sir Halford Mackinder called it. What we call today the West is one of the world's Oceans, the hemisphere in which the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans are located. The confrontation of the maritime and continental worlds is the global truth which underlies the explanation of the civilizational dualism which is constantly generating planetary tension and driving the entire process of history.

At the culmination of world history, the clashes of warring powers culminate in wars between the elements of the Sea and the elements of the Land. This was already noticed by the chroniclers of the wars between Sparta and Athens, Rome and Carthage. Up to a certain time, however, it was confined to the Mediterranean Sea. Humans had not yet known vast expanses, great oceans or planetary conflicts. At the outset, we have to make a conceptual distinction between the element of the Sea and the element of the Ocean.

Of course, partial parallels exist, and many refer in this sense to the famous passage from the first PhiliphypHEME of Demosthenes (38.41). I myself do not quite share Plato's quip, who said of the Greeks that "*they sit on the shore of the Mediterranean Sea like frogs*".

Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between the maritime civilisation, which is inland, and the ocean civilisation. The tensions between East and West, and the planetary framing of the conflict that characterise our period of history, are unparalleled in the past. The confrontation between Land and Sea (as Ocean) reaches its final world-historical volume only when mankind develops the whole planet.

The planetary nature of the battle between Land and Sea was first revealed during the wars of England against revolutionary France and Napoleon. It is true that back then the division into Land and Sea, East and West was not as clear as it is today. Napoleon was ultimately defeated, not by England, but by continental Russia, Austria and Prussia. "The Nomos" of the Earth⁽¹⁰⁾ still consisted then in a balance between the forces of Land and Sea; the Sea alone could not achieve a decisive victory with its own forces. In 1812, when the clash reached its climax, the United States declared war not on Napoleon but on England. There was then a rapprochement between America and Russia, with both of these young nations seeking to distance themselves from both Napoleon and England. The contradiction between the Earth and the Sea, between East and West, had not yet crystallised into a pure confrontation of the elements, which only happened at the time of the conclusion of the North Atlantic alliance in 1949.

But already in Napoleon's time, the pattern of political conflict, predetermined by the difference in civilisational elements, a conflict where one had to choose between the land and the sea, became quite clear. In July 1812, when Napoleon was approaching Moscow, Goethe composed a eulogy, supposedly to Queen Maria Louise, but in fact to her husband the French Emperor:

"Where thousands of people are confused, one man (Napoleon) decides everything."

The German poet continues, referring to the global aspect of the confrontation between Land and Sea:

"Where the twilight of centuries gathers,

He (Napoleon) scatters them with the light of his spiritual gaze.

Everything insignificant has disappeared,

Only Land and Sea matter here.

("Worueber trueb Jahrhunderte gesonnen

Er uebersieht's im hellsten Geisteslicht.

Das Kleinliche ist alles weggeronnen,

Nur Meer und Erde haben hier Gewicht.")

Goethe was on Napoleon's side. For him it was the side of the Land, the Earth. But Napoleon was also identified with the West. The West was still the Land and not the Sea. The German poet sincerely hoped that the West would remain the embodiment of land, continental power, and that Napoleon, as a new Alexander, would reconquer coastal territories from the forces of the Sea, and then *"the Land would come into its own."*

Thus Goethe, a typical representative of the West, in the summer of 1812 made a choice *in favour of* the Land, the Earth *against* the Sea. Of course, in accordance with his worldview, he understood the confrontation between Land and Sea as a static, polar tension and not as a dialectical unrepeatable historical moment. In this case, the distinction between static polarity and historical dialectics, which we discussed at the very beginning of the article, is crucial.

3.

Goethe thought in terms of static polarity. But the polar tension is quite different from the historical-dialectical tension. The static polar tension presupposes synchronism, a permanence in which the interaction of the opposing poles constitutes a fixed structure that remains essentially the same under all external changes arising from specific historical situations. This is a kind of eternal return.

In contrast, the concrete-historical approach explores the chain of logical and historical relationships between the concreteness of a given question and the given answer. The question and the answer provide a dialectic of the historically concrete and determine the structure of historical situations and epochs. Such a dialectic need not be identified with the Hegelian logic of concepts or with the fatalistic natural ordering of events.

We are interested here, however, in the study of the structure of the concrete planetary dualism that exists in our world (rather than in a general theory of the historical process). Historical thinking is the thinking of one-time, disposable historical situations and, consequently, disposable truths. All historical parallels only serve to best recognise this singularity, otherwise they become mere dead functional elements of an abstract system that simply does not exist in real life. It is absurd and unrealistic to make assumptions such as what would have happened if events had taken a different turn from what they did in real history. For example, what if the Saracens had won the Battle of Poitiers? What if Napoleon hadn't lost the Battle of Waterloo? What if the winter of 41/42 had not been so cold? Such ridiculous assumptions, which can be found even in famous historians, are absurd even because they completely lose sight of the uniqueness and uniqueness of any historical event. The structure of polar tensions is always relevant, eternal, like an eternal return.

The historical truth, on the other hand, is true only once. It cannot be true more than once, because it is in its singularity that its historicity lies. The singularity of historical truth is one of the secrets of ontology, as Walter Warnach puts it. The dialectical structure of question and answer which we are talking about here, trying to explain the essence of history, in no way

weakens or eliminates the quality of the one-time historical event. On the contrary, it only reinforces it, as we are talking about a uniquely specific answer to an equally uniquely specific question.

If the confrontation between Land and Sea, as expressed in contemporary planetary dualism, were exclusively static polar, i.e. incorporated into the chain of natural equilibrium and eternal return, it would only be a fragment of a purely natural process. The elements in nature divide and reunite, mingle and stratify. They replace each other and pass into each other in a perpetual cycle of metamorphoses, which reveals more and more images and forms of the essence of the always identical polar tension. If the matter were confined to such a natural static dualism, the actual opposition between East and West would be only a special form of expression of the eternal circulation of elites, a problem of iconographies. Eternal return and eternal transformation know no specific truth, no unique situation, no historical moment. A static-polar confrontation excludes historical uniqueness. But this is not the case in concrete history. At certain epochs, capable and powerful peoples and groups emerge, seize and divide the land in the process of friendly treaties or wars, take over their territories, graze cattle, etc. Out of this forms the Nomos of the Earth. It is confined to its unique *here and now*, and the tension between the elements we are discussing, between the Land and the Sea, only generates the natural, objective context in which this Nomos takes shape.

If we take the Earth and the Sea (and the creatures that inhabit them) as purely natural elements, it is obvious that they cannot in themselves produce an adversarial confrontation that would have a purely historical eventuality. The inhabitants of the Sea and the inhabitants of the Land cannot be absolute enemies by nature. Terrestrial animals may devour marine animals, but in this case it is absurd to speak of any enmity. The fish themselves devour each other, especially the large small ones. And the inhabitants of the land do not treat each other much better. Therefore, one cannot argue that there is a natural animosity between the land and the sea. Rather, in a purely natural state, the two elements exist totally irrelevant and indifferent

to one another, to such an extent that it is utterly ridiculous to speak of such a specific and intense relationship as enmity here. Every living being is in its own element, in its own environment. The bear is not inherently at war with the whale, and the whale does not declare war on the bear. Even marine and terrestrial predators firmly know their boundaries and limits of their habitat. A bear does not encroach on the domain of a lion or a tiger; even the bravest animals know their place and seek to avoid unpleasant encounters. Those who cite as an example of natural enmity relations between cats and dogs, prove once again that such natural enmity differs dramatically from the human one. When a dog barks at a cat and a cat hisses at a dog, their conflict has an entirely different meaning than a human feud. The most important difference is that humans, in contrast to animals, are able to deny the very human quality of their opponents, while animals are not. The being of a dog spiritually and morally does not call into question the being of a cat and vice versa.

However, it is indicative that it is animal fables that particularly illustrate specifically human political situations and attitudes. Generally speaking, from a philosophical point of view, the problem of animal fables is interesting in itself. By transferring a purely human political situation to the animal world, we demythologize it, clarify it and take away the ideological and rhetorical veils. Precisely because relations among animals have a completely different meaning than relations among people, this allegorical device, whereby people appear as animals and animals as people, makes it possible to discover what was hitherto hidden through a conscious departure from straightforward and one-dimensional analysis. The transformation into the beast alienates man from the human, but through this alienation, humanity only becomes more distinct and prominent. This is the basis of the political meaning of the animal fables (which we shall not dwell on here).

In transferring the land-sea duality to humanity, it would seem that we should be talking about maritime conflicts between Sea people and land conflicts between Land people. In fact, this is quite different, starting from the moment the historical planetary tension reaches a certain critical level.

Unlike animals, humans, and *only* humans, are capable of waging war between the peoples of the Land and the peoples of the Sea. When enmity reaches its highest point, hostilities take over all possible areas and warfare on both sides unfolds on both the Land and the Sea. Each side is forced to pursue the enemy deep into the hostile elements. When a third, air element is mastered, the conflict is also transferred to it, and the war becomes an air war. But the original subjects of the conflict do not lose their quality, so it seems to me quite reasonable to talk about the confrontation between the element of the Earth and the element of the Sea. When the planetary-historical confrontation is approaching its peak, both sides strain all their material, soul and spiritual powers to the limit. Then the battle spreads out to all the space adjacent to the warring parties. And the spontaneous natural difference between the Land and the Sea in this case turns into a real war between these elements.

The hostility between human beings has a particular tension that is many times greater than the tension characteristic of hostility in the realm of nature. In man, all aspects of nature are transcended, acquire a transcendental (or transcendental, as you like) dimension. This additional dimension can also be called "spiritual" and to recall Rimbaud, who said: "*Le combat spirituel est aussi brutal que la bataille des hommes*"(11). Be that as it may, enmity between people can reach an incredible degree. This highest degree of enmity is clearly manifested in civil wars when the enemy is so criminalised, morally, legally and ideologically, that it is effectively put outside all human laws. In this, a purely human, inherently supernatural element, transcendent in relation to its natural dimension, is evident; this element generates an incredible tension and transforms the natural polarity into a concrete historical dialectic.

The word "*dialectics*" expresses here that special quality (peculiar only to humanity) which is radically different from all natural forms of polarity. The word 'dialectics' points to the *question-answer* structure, which alone can adequately describe a historical situation or historical event. The historical situation can only be understood as a challenge to man and his response to

this challenge. Every historical action is a human answer to the question posed by history. Every human word is an answer. Each answer finds meaning through the question it is meant to answer; for someone who does not know the question, the word remains meaningless. And the meaning of the question, in turn, lies in the specific situation in which it is posed.

This is reminiscent of R.J. Collingwood's Question-Answer Logic, and indeed it is what we have in mind. Collingwood, with the help of thinking in terms of "question-answer", sought to define the specific meaning of history. He did this with resplendent precision, for for him this definition represented the crowning achievement of a philosophical journey to overcome his own extra-historical natural-scientific positivism. Collingwood's conception was splendid, but the English scientist was too deeply affected by the nineteenth-century English definition of science to be able to overcome the psychology-individualist interpretation of the question-answer problem. Only this factor can explain his painful, complex bouts of Germanophobia which riddled his last work, *The New Leviathan*¹². But the great merit of his "question-answer logic" remains unquestionable. But it must be emphasised that the question here is not posed by an individual or a group of people, and certainly not by an arbitrary historian investigating the past, but by History itself, which consists in its qualitative aspect of questions and answers. The question is in itself a historical event, from which grows through the concrete human answer the next event. Exactly to the extent that people accept the challenge and question of history and try to respond to it with their attitude and their actions, to the extent that they demonstrate their capacity for risky participation in history and, therefore, are subject to its judgment. In short: they move from a state of nature to a state of history.

Arnold Toynbee developed the "question-answer logic" to the cultural-historical concept of the "challenge-response-structure" (13) (challenge-response-structure). Toynbee developed the concept of "question" to that of "challenge" and the concept of "response" to that of "response". This was a crucial step in clarifying the essential characteristic of the historical, for here the tension understood dialectically, rather than the statistically polar,

natural tension pieced together by non-historical individual psychological natural science schools of thought, is clearly discernible. Toynbee identifies, on the basis of his method, over twenty cultures or higher civilizations, each based on a specific historical response, the response of people to the question posed and challenged by history. For example, in the case of Egypt, the challenge was the natural specificity of the Nile Valley, the attachment to the river and the constant threat of enemy invasions. The development and organisation of the Nile Valley, the protection against external barbarian influences and the Egyptian civilisation based on it with its cults of gods, dynasties, pyramids and sacred art were all a concrete response to the challenge.

The methodology of cognition gained enormously from this approach, as it was now possible to study the dialectical structure of every historical situation. But Toynbee himself could not avoid a characteristic fallacy that significantly damaged his concept. When he begins to describe the mechanism of interaction between the twenty civilizations or cultures he identified, his analysis loses the most essential aspect of history, the structure of history itself, the unique singularity of each specific situation and its resolution. There are no universal laws of world history. This abstract attempt to subject living history to dry laws or statistical probability within a narrowly functional system is fundamentally wrong.

In reality, we are dealing only with one-off concrete situations. And the concrete situation of our epoch proper is defined by the fact that in it the confrontation between East and West has acquired the character of planetary dualism, planetary enmity. When we try to clarify the nature of the dialectical tension generated by this dualism, we do not seek to derive a universal law or a statistical probability, let alone construct any system. When we use the word 'dialectic', 'dialectical', we run the risk of being misunderstood and relegated to a narrowly Hegelian school. This is not quite the case. Hegel's historical dialectic, in fact, makes it possible to comprehend the singularity and uniqueness of the historical event, as can be seen if only from Hegel's phrase that the incarnation of the Son of God is the central event of

all human history. This shows that for Hegel history was not just a chain of objective regularities, but also had a subjective dimension of active participation. But in Hegel's universal systematisation, historical uniqueness is often lost, and the concrete historical event dissolves into a one-dimensional thought process. This remark is enough to clarify our understanding of the term 'dialectics' and to prevent the automatic enlistment into Hegelianism which is very characteristic of the 'technical', automatic way of thinking of our contemporaries.

Apart from the misunderstanding of the essence of historical dialectics which is characteristic of Hegelianism in general, one should also be wary of the mania for formulating regularities and discovering laws typical of the nineteenth century. Almost all Western sociologists and historians except Alexis de Tocqueville were subject to this disease. The need to deduce from each specific historical situation a universal law of development covered the scientific discoveries of even the most visionary thinkers of the last century with an almost impenetrable veil of vague generalizations.

The elevation of concrete-historical fact to some universal law was the price with which the nineteenth century compensated for its scientific-natural positivism. Scientists simply could not conceive of any truth outside of a universal, precisely calculable and measurable functional regularity. Thus Auguste Comte, the historian of modernity, endowed with genius intuition, correctly identified the essence of his epoch, presenting it as the result of a development consisting of three stages: from theology through metaphysics to positivism. This was a perfectly correct observation, precisely defining the one-time, accomplished step in three moments that Western thought took from the thirteenth to the nineteenth century. But the positivist Auguste Comte himself was able to believe in the truth of the principle formulated by him only after he declared that the law of three stages applies to all mankind and to all its history. Karl Marx, for his part, made a very precise diagnosis of the state of affairs that characterized the second stage of the industrial revolution in mid-nineteenth century Central and Eastern Europe; but the trouble is that he elevated his considerations into a universal universal histor-

ical doctrine and proclaimed the simplistic thesis of “class struggle”, when in fact it was only a specific moment of the techno-industrial revolution, linked to the invention of railways, telegraph and the steam engine. Already in the twentieth century, Oswald Spengler considerably limited the significance of his discovery regarding the profound historical parallels between the present era and the era of the Roman Civil War and the period of the Caesars by the fact that he compiled a universal theory of cultural circles on this basis and consequently killed the purely historical nerve of his entire work.

4.

Industrialisation and technological development are the destiny of our land today. Let us therefore try to identify the one-time historical question, the great challenge and the concrete answer posed by the industrial-technical revolution of the last century. In doing so we discard all superficial conclusions that involve us in risky systems of causality. We have extracted a purely dialectical tension, distinct from the polar-static tension, from the general concept of tension. But this concept of dialectical tension must not be understood as a banal product of Hegelianism, natural science views or normativist constructions. Toynbee’s formula of “challenge-response” should also only be used as a tool, for we need first of all to grasp correctly the purely unidirectional actual truth of the present planetary dualism of East and West.

Here, Arnold Toynbee’s 1953 text with the evocative title: “The World and the West”(14). This work provoked fierce criticism and polemics, which we prefer to keep silent, as we are only interested here in the confrontation between the Earth and the Land. Toynbee speaks of our era, singling out the West as a separate category, opposed to the rest of the world.

The West appears to him as the aggressor, which for four and a half centuries has pursued the expansion of its industrial and technological power

to the East in four main directions: Russia, the Islamic world, India and East Asia. For Toynbee it seems very important that this aggression was carried out through a technique that had been liberated from the norms of the Christian tradition (*entfesselte Technik*). For Toynbee, the fact that the East of today began to make extensive use of technology means the beginning of its active self-defence in the face of the West. It is true that in the seventeenth century the Jesuits attempted to preach the Christian religion to the Hindus and Chinese, not as a religion of the West, but as a religion universal, applying equally to all men. Toynbee believes that this attempt failed miserably because of dogmatic differences between the various Catholic missions and the centralised Jesuit preaching network. The meaning of the October Communist Revolution, according to Toynbee, is that the East began to arm itself with European technology, liberated from Christian religion. This technology Toynbee *calls* “a piece of European culture that had broken away from it by the end of the sixteenth century. Note this crucial, absolutely accurate formulation.

Let us now clarify in the light of “question-answer logic” what was the challenge and the response that historically manifested itself in our era through the industrial-technological leap.

From what does the Industrial Revolution come? The answer to what question is it? What are its origins and its homeland, its beginning and its motivation? It comes from the island of England and dates back to the 18th century. Let us repeat the well-known dates 1735 (first coke oven), 1740 (first cast steel), 1768 (first steam engine), 1769 (first modern factory in Nottingham), 1770 (first spinning machine), 1786 (first mechanical loom), 1825 (first steam engine). The Great Industrial Revolution comes from the island of England, which became the main industrial nation in the world in the 19th century. This historical phenomenon, which we must constantly keep in mind, was already noticed by the first German sociologist Lorenz von Stein in 1842.

He wrote on the subject
:

“Surprisingly and totally unexpectedly, at the same time as ideas of freedom and equality are spreading in France, the first machines appear in England. With them an entirely new era opens up for the whole world in matters of welfare, production, consumption and commerce. Machines became a truly revolutionary force in the material world, and from this subordinate material world they began to spread their power downwards into all spheres of the spiritual world.”

”Surprisingly and quite unexpectedly“ and it is ”in England“! In these words one can hear the eager wonder of a young German, who begins to realise the historical situation of his people and in the Paris of Louis Philippe realises that the political revolution, spreading from 1789 across the European continent, is only a pale ideological epiphenomenon compared to the industrial revolution spreading from England, which is a truly revolutionary force. Thus was born the remarkable phrase we have just quoted from the chapter with the significant title *”The Proletariat“*. In the same text, for the first time, a scientific reflection on the fundamental difference between labour power and property is introduced into European discourse.

So, the Industrial Revolution comes from eighteenth-century England. What was the historical situation on this island at that time? England was an island that separated from the European continent from the 16th century onwards and took its first steps towards a purely maritime existence. This, from a historical point of view, is what is most essential for us. Everything else is just a superstructure, a superstructure. Whichever external event we choose as the final step towards a purely maritime existence, the capture of Jamaica by Cromwell in 1655, the final expulsion of the Stuarts in 1688 or the European peace at Utrecht in 1713, the main one is this: a European people, from a certain point onwards, stopped regarding the island on which they lived as part of the somewhat remote European Land and realized it as a base for purely maritime existence and for maritime domination over the world ocean. From the sixteenth century onwards, England entered the Age of Discovery and began to reconquer the colonies from Portugal, Spain, France and Holland. She defeated all her European rivals, not by sheer

force or moral superiority, but solely by taking a decisive and irrevocable step away from the hard land to the open sea, a situation in which the control of the maritime space was assured by the conquest of the land colonies.

It was a one-off, unique, historical response to an equally one-off, unique historical challenge, the great challenge of the age of European exploration. For the first time in the known history of humanity, a challenge did not refer only to specific rivers, coasts or inland seas; for the first time it was of a planetary, global nature. Most European nations recognised this challenge in continental, land-based terms. The Spanish created their gigantic overseas empire; yet it remained essentially land-based and built on vast inland masses. The Russians broke away from Moscow and conquered the giant country of Siberia. The Portuguese, despite their amazing achievements in navigation, also failed to transition to a purely maritime existence. Even the heroic epic of the Portuguese Age of Discovery, the *Lusiads* of Camões, speak of the Indian Ocean in much the same way that Virgil's Aeneas speaks of the Mediterranean. The Dutch were the first to embark on global maritime adventures and remained in the vanguard for a long time. But the base was too weak, the entrenchment in the politics of the land powers too deep, and after the peace of Utrecht in 1713 Holland was finally tied to the mainland. The French entered into a bicentennial war with England and eventually lost it. England was not particularly bothered by the continent and finally and successfully transitioned to a purely maritime existence. This created the immediate preconditions for the Industrial Revolution.

The once-European island rejected the traditional, land-based view of the world and began to consistently view the world from the perspective of the Sea. The land, as a natural living space for man, became something else, a shore stretching deep into the continental expanse, a backland. In the 15th century, at the time of the Maid of Orleans, English knights, like knights of other countries, earned their spoils in a fair fight. Up to XVI century Englishmen were sheep breeders, who sold wool to Flanders, where it was used for weaving. And this nation became a nation of 'frothing at the seas' and founded not just a maritime but an oceanic, global empire. The island

ceased to be a detached fragment of land and became a ship lying at anchor near the continent. The old, land-based Nomos of the Earth was replaced by a new Nomos, incorporating into its structure the developed spaces of the open Sea, but at the same time severing the open Sea from the continental mass and contrasting the space of the Sea with that of the Land, to create an equilibrium by means of the control of the Land by the Sea.

What fell away from European culture in the sixteenth century was, contrary to Toynbee, not a "*technical splinter*" but something quite different. The European island broke away from the European continent, and the new, island-designated world of the Sea rose up against the traditional world of the continental Land. This world of the Sea gave rise to a counterbalance to the world of the Land, and peace (Frieden, peace) on earth became like a scale in its hands. It was the expression of a concrete answer to the challenge of the opening of the Ocean World. And on this island of England, which had accepted the challenge and taken a decisive step towards a maritime existence, the first machines suddenly appeared.

5.

The Ship is the basis of people's maritime existence, just as *Home* is the basis of their land-based existence. The Ship and the Home are not antitheses in the sense of a static polar tension; they represent different responses to different challenges of history. Both the Ship and the Home are created by technical means, but their main difference is that the Ship is a totally artificial, technical means of transport, based on the total domination of nature by man. The sea is a different kind of environment from the land. It is more alienated and hostile. According to the biblical account, it was through the separation of the Earth from the Sea that man obtained his habitat. The Sea remained associated with danger and evil. Here we refer readers to the commentary on the first chapter of the Book of Genesis in the third volume of Karl Barth's *Church Dogmatics*. We emphasize only that

in order to overcome the ancient religious horror of the Sea, mankind had to make a significant effort. The technical effort undertaken to overcome it is essentially different from any other technical effort. A man daring to embark on a sea voyage, the word "pirate" originally meant one who was capable of taking such a risk, must have, in the words of the poet, "a triple armour on his chest" (*aes triplex circa pectus*). Man's overcoming of the inertial resistance of nature, which is the essence of cultural or civilising activity, differs sharply in the case of shipbuilding and mastering the Sea and in the case of breeding cattle and building dwellings on the Land.

The centre and grain of terrestrial existence, with all its concrete norms of dwelling, ownership, marriage, inheritance, etc. are all Home. All these concrete norms are derived from the specificity of terrestrial existence and especially from agriculture. The fundamental legal institution, property *Dominium* gets its name from the House, *Domus*. This is obvious and known to all jurists. Many lawyers, however, do not know that the German word *Bauer* (*paganus*, peasant) does not come directly from the word "Ackerbau" (tilling), but from the word "Bau", "Gebäude", "aedificium", i.e. "building", "construction", "house". It originally meant the person who owned the house. So, at the centre of land-based existence stands the House. At the centre of maritime existence sails a Ship. Home is peace, Ship is movement. So the Ship has a different environment and a different horizon. People living on a Ship are in a completely different relationship both with each other and with the environment. Their relationship to nature and animals is completely different from that of the people of the Land. Dryland man tames animals, elephants, camels, horses, dogs, cats, donkeys, goats and "anything that belongs to him" and makes animals out of them. Fish cannot be tamed, they can only be caught and eaten. They cannot become pets because the very idea of home is foreign to the sea.

In order to realise the bottomless difference between land-based and maritime existence, we have given a cultural-historical example. We are now trying to find an answer to the question of why the industrial revolution, with its inherent liberation of the technical impulse (*entfesselte Technik*),

originated in a maritime existence. The land existence, whose centre is the House, has a very different attitude towards technology than the sea existence, whose centre is the Ship. The absolutisation of technical progress, the identification of any progress solely with technical progress, in short, what is understood by the expression "liberated technical impulse", "liberated technology" all this could only originate, germinate and develop on the basis of maritime existence, in the climate of maritime existence. By taking up the challenge of the opening of the world ocean and bringing the transition to a purely maritime existence to its logical conclusion, the island of England provided the historical answer to the question posed by the age of great geographical discoveries. It was also the prerequisite for the Industrial Revolution and the beginning of an era that we are all experiencing today.

Specifically, we are talking about the Industrial Revolution, which is our common destiny today. This revolution could never have taken place anywhere else, except in eighteenth-century England. The industrial revolution is precisely the emancipation of technical progress, and this emancipation becomes understandable only from the specifics of maritime existence, in which it is, to a certain extent, reasonable and necessary. Technical discoveries have been made at all times and in all countries. The technical prowess of the English is not greater than that of other nations. It is only a question of how to use a technical discovery and within what limits; in other words, into what system of norms to place that discovery. In maritime existence, technical discoveries are made more easily and freely, as they do not necessarily have to fit into the fixed structure of norms inherent to land-based existence. The Chinese invented gunpowder; they were no sillier than the Europeans, who also invented it. But in the purely land-based, enclosed existence of China at the time, this entailed its use exclusively for games and fireworks. In Europe, the same thing led to the discoveries of Alfred Nobel and his followers. The English, who made all their famous discoveries in the 18th century that led to the Industrial Revolution, the coke ovens, steelmaking, the steam engine, the loom, etc., were no more brilliant than other nations and other eras who lived by the land laws and made similar discoveries independently of the English. Technical discoveries are not reve-

lations of a mysterious higher spirit. They are largely dictated by time. But whether they are forgotten or developed depends on the human context in which they were made. I will put it more precisely: the technical discoveries that underpin the industrial revolution are only there to actually lead to the industrial revolution, where a decisive step towards maritime existence has been taken.

The transition to a purely maritime existence already carries in itself, and in its direct consequences, the liberation of technology as an independent and self-sufficient force. Any development of technology in the preceding periods of terrestrial existence never led to the emergence of such a principle as *Absolute Technique*. It must be stressed, however, that coastal and inland-sea related forms of cultures do not yet mean a transition to a purely maritime existence. It is only when the Ocean is mastered that the Ship becomes the real antithesis of the Home. The unconditional belief in progress (understood as technical progress) is a sure sign that the transition to a maritime existence has been made. In the historically, socially and morally infinite space of maritime existence, a chain reaction of boundless succession of discoveries arises by itself. It is not a question of a distinction between nomadic and sedentary peoples, but of a contradiction between the Land and the Sea as two opposing elements of human existence. It is therefore wrong to speak of "sea nomads" in the same line as nomads on horseback, camels, etc. It is inappropriate to transfer land conditions to the elements of the Sea. The living space of humanity in its supernatural, historical sense is radically different in all parameters, external and internal, depending on whether it is a land-based or a sea-based existence. Whichever way we look at this difference, from Sea to Land or from Land to Sea, it manifests itself in a completely differently structured force field of civilization and culture; it should be noted that culture per se is more Land-related and civilization is more Sea-related(15), the marine worldview is techno-morphic, while the land-based one is socio-morphic.

The two most important phenomena of the nineteenth century can be illuminated in a new light through a theory of the specificity of maritime existence.

These are the classical political economy of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries and Marxism. With the development of the industrial revolution, the unveiling immensity provoked more and more steps towards unbridled technical progress. The so-called classical political economy was a conceptual superstructure developed on the basis of the first stage of the industrial revolution. Marxism, in turn, based its teaching already on this superstructure of classical political economy. It developed it and elaborated a conceptual superstructure for the second stage of the industrial revolution. As such, Marxism was adopted by the elite of Russian professional revolutionaries, who managed to make a revolution in the Russian Empire in 1917 and transferred the dual superstructure to the conditions of their agrarian country. In all this it was not about the practical implementation of pure doctrine and the logical implementation of the objective laws of historical development. It was about the fact that an industrially backward agrarian country felt the need to arm itself with modern industrial technology, because otherwise it was ensured the role of prey for other more advanced industrialized major powers. Thus, Marxism, from an ideological superstructure of the second stage of the industrial revolution, became a practical tool for overcoming the industrial-technical insecurity of a vast country and for dislodging an old elite that was clearly not up to the task of history.

But the consistent taking the principles of classical political economy to their logical conclusion was only one aspect of Marxist teaching. The roots of Marxism remained Hegelian. In one place in Hegel's *Fundamentals of the Philosophy of Law*, paragraph 243 contains the meaning of the whole problem. It is a famous place. This paragraph describes the dialectics of bourgeois society, which develops freely according to its own laws, and emphasises that '*this society inevitably bears the progressive growth of population and industry*'. Hegel argues that such a society "for all its wealth will never be rich enough, i.e. based only on its internal capacities will never be able to prevent the growth of poverty and the increase in the number of the poor". Hegel, however, openly refers to the then England as an example. In paragraph 246 he continues

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"According to this dialectic, a particular bourgeois society is compelled to go beyond its borders in order to seek among other peoples, who lag behind either in industrial means or technical skills, consumers of its products, and consequently the means for its own existence." (16)

Such are the famous paragraphs 243,246 of Hegel's "Fundamentals of the Philosophy of Right", which received their definitive development in Marxism. But as far as I know, no one has paid attention to the deeper meaning of paragraph 247, immediately following the one just quoted. It affirms the fundamental opposition between Land and Sea, and the unfolding of this 247 paragraph could be no less significant and important than the unfolding of paragraphs 243 246 in Marxism. It argues for a link between industrial development and maritime existence. This 247 paragraph contains the following decisive sentence

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"Just as for matrimony the first condition is the solid earth, the Land, so for industry the most animating element is the Sea."

Here I interrupt my account and allow attentive readers to see the beginning of the unfolding of paragraph 247 of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, just as the unfolding of paragraphs 243 246 created Marxism.

Our analysis raises a new question and with it a new danger. One is tempted to pose the following problem: what is the current challenge of history? And immediately there is a dangerous temptation to answer this question in the old way that was adequate and correct in the preceding era. People tend to cling to what once proved to be true and effective. They categorically refuse to understand that on humanity's part a new answer to a new question can only be an assumption, and most often, as in the case of Columbus' voyage, a blind assumption. One has an irresistible need to treat the last chronologically historical experience as something eternal. When we Germans invaded France in 1914 it seemed to us that events would henceforth unfold as in 1870-71 until our decisive victory. When the besieged French stormed out of Paris in 1870-71, they were sure that the scenario of the

victorious Revolution of 1792 would repeat itself. When Secretary of State Stimson announced his famous Stimson Doctrine in 1932, he thought that the whole situation resembled, on an enlarged scale, 1861 and the beginning of the War of Independence.

A sense of history should steer us away from such mistakes. Paradoxically, it is precisely in those countries that have advanced furthest along the road of liberated technology that the view is widespread that technological means will henceforth begin to break through into new, endless expanses of space. Five hundred years of the age of great geographical and technical discoveries will seem like an insignificant period of time compared to this breakthrough into space. Humans are planning attacks on the stratosphere and flights to the moon. Our planet itself, the Earth, is gradually being transformed into a spaceship, floating in outer space.

This view seems to me to be a repetition of an old response, a development of the response that was once given to the challenge of the opening of the world Ocean. People see the challenge of today as a massive repetition of the discovery of America. Psychologically, so to speak, it is understandable. Back then, new continents and oceans of the earth were being discovered. Today I do not see any space opening, I do not hear any cosmic challenge. Let's not talk about flying saucers. A liberated technology can dig into space as long and as fiercely as it pleases, it will not create a new historical challenge and still less an answer to such a challenge. Emancipated technology, of course, generates a monstrous power impulse and the will to overcome it. But this impulse is not the same as the challenge. It is true that modern technology always creates artificial needs, but this only means that it is able, at best, to respond in a highly artificial way to an equally artificial question posed to it.

It is this ultra-modern development of the old answer that is, from the point of view of history, unhistorical and anachronistic. However, it is only natural that the victor of a past era should overlook the new challenge of history. And how can the victor understand that his victory is a one-time truth? Who can teach him that? I have come to the conclusion that it is already

good if we refuse to give the old answer to the new question. Already a lot, if we comprehend the new world not according to the scheme of the "new world" that existed yesterday. Personally, I see the new challenge on the wrong side of the stratosphere. I notice that the liberated technology limits people rather than opens up new spaces for them. Modern technology is necessary and useful. But it is far from being a response to the challenge. It merely serves new needs, which are partly its own creation. For the rest it is itself called into question today and, therefore, cannot be the answer. Everyone says that modern technology has made our earth ridiculously small. The new spaces from which the new challenge will emerge must therefore be *on* our earth, not outside it in outer space. Whoever succeeds in taming the unfettered technology first is more likely to respond to the current challenge than someone who tries to use it to land on the Moon or Mars. Taming unfettered technology is a feat for the new Hercules. From this area I hear a new challenge, the challenge of the Present.

(translated from German by A.D.)

INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION

APOCALYPSE OF THE ELEMENTS

(From Geopolitics to Philosophy of History Reflections on Carl Schmitt's Theory of Elements)

1.1 There are only two civilisational elements

The connection of civilisational structure with the dominance of one or another element of Land and Sea is the axis of Carl Schmitt's concept and its strongest and most impressive aspect. It is important to emphasize that it is not just an abstract application of the sacral theory of the four elements to the cultural-historical analysis, but the separation of the fundamental historical (not only natural) dualism of the two elements of Land and Sea, Earth and Water, and this dualism becomes a truly historical factor only when it is recognized and intellectually experienced by human society. To clarify what we mean, let us point out the absence of a reference to the fire element and its philosophical, cultural and civilizational analysis in Schmitt (discussed below). As for the air element associated with the age of aeronautics, Schmitt argues that it has not produced its own "nomos", its own civilisational type, being a technical continuation of the historical trajectory approved by the Sea civilisation. Aerocracy and the even more topical Etherocracy, i.e. the aeronautical and cosmic stages of technological development, did not provoke such global changes in the course of human history as the discovery and challenge of the Ocean World had brought with it.

Schmitt's ingenious intuition told him quite correctly that the cosmos was neither a real challenge nor a historical answer, and that space exploration under "etherocracy" merely demonstrates the agony of a subjugating, but not liberating, technocratic civilisation. At first sight, it seems that such an approach to the historical dialectic of the elements in Schmitt, given his implicitly antithalassocratic sympathies, should form the basis of a strictly conservative doctrine with an emphatically ecological background. It is tempting to understand the concluding words of his article on "The Planetary Tension between East and West" in this way

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"The new spaces where the new challenge will come from should be on our

earth, not outside it in outer space.“

This is what Schmitt's followers most often do, given his conservative views on politics as well. But, in our view, this would be too easy. If the new challenge is nothing but a return to a land orientation after the revolutionary era of the dominance of “liberated technology” and ocean civilization, even for fear of technological or ecological catastrophe, then the spiritual tension of historical dialectics loses its dramatic dimension, becomes almost a natural cyclism, is identified with that static-polar tension, on overcoming which, according to Schmitt himself, all inherently human spiritual history is based. The civilizational land-sea dualism must be resolved in some other way.

Schmitt is inclined to consider the transition to aerocracy and further to etherocracy as only a natural development of the strategy of the Sea and not signs of new revolutionary epochs. Thus, we can say that the element of Water in its universalist expansion, which is carried out just at the expense of Dryland and the spaces traditionally subordinated to it, puts at its service two other elements air and ether (vacuum), which, from the physical point of view, are nothing but the increasingly rarefied states of matter. In other words, the water element of the sea manifests itself through the subordinate elements of air and ether, continuing its civilizational tendency towards “liquefaction”; at the same time, let us recall that it was this tendency that gave rise to the historical dialectic of “maritime existence” and the related liberation of technology and phases of the industrial revolution.

How then can one explain the successes in aeronautics and space of such a landed superpower as the USSR, the last planetary expression of the geopolitical Behemoth, the forces of the continental masses and the landed Nomos? Just as Schmitt himself brilliantly explained the historical function of Marxism in Russia: it was the conceptual arming of an alternative elite with the doctrine of the second industrial revolution, which was able to willfully and consciously transform an archaic land country into a giant industrial and technical bastion, capable of successfully resisting the multi-dimensional pressure of oceanic civilization for 70 years. The use of aerocracy and ethe-

rocracy by the Eastern Bloc was a continuation of the Marxist strategy of the industrial revolution to resist the bourgeois civilisation of the West.

So, one member of More's historical dualism has incorporated the other elements in the process of its planetary affirmation. Whereas at the time Schmitt wrote *Planetary Tension* 1959 this process was in its infancy, by the 1980s it had become transparent and obvious to all. The sea has mastered Air and Space.

Here we come to a crucial point in recent history that is a touchstone for the vast majority of ideologies and socio-political doctrines that were considered quite acceptable until very recently.

We are referring to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and perestroika

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1.2 Specificity of the Universal Flood

This event is key to testing the adequacy of Carl Schmitt's views. Reasoning in his terms, the event can be described as follows.

The end of the Eastern bloc, which embodied in our age the planetary tendency of the Land opposing the Sea, meant the end of that historical stage in which it was possible to make effective use of the conceptual structure summarising the second stage of the industrial revolution to compete globally with the civilisation of the Sea, with the West and a world which identified its destiny with the unlimited development of unfettered technology. In other words, it was the end of the adequacy of Marxism. The forces of the land had lost the defensive conceptuality that had been effective until the conditions of the response that Marx had given to the challenge of European history of his day had changed definitively and irrevocably.

One explanation for the collapse of the Soviet bloc is its lagging behind in the field of technological competition, the main point of this lag being its inability to respond adequately to the US SOI programme. In other words, More won the technological duel with Sushi in the field of high-tech

etherocracy associated with strategic inventions in the space domain.

What does this mean, in terms of the dialectic of history?

Firstly, the Sea which gave birth to the impulse of technical breakthroughs and subsequently to technical civilisation, has nevertheless defeated the Land, although the latter borrowed timely and effectively the latest (for its time) conceptual technology from the Sea itself. This process strictly coincided with the end of the second phase of the industrial revolution. On a theoretical level, this began to become clear from the early 1970s onwards, in parallel with the rapid degeneration of communism and socialism in Europe. In practice, the point was put in perestroika. The third phase of the industrial revolution needed at least a new Marx and a new Marxism. This could have been European fascism, but this attempt proved abortive both theoretically and physically, Germany was defeated by a more civilisationally consistent land power (the USSR), supported in this case by the Sea (as had happened many times before in history from Napoleon to World Wars I and II). There was no New Marx, apparently could not and should not have been.

Second: The collapse of the Eastern bloc means the real globalisation of the Sea, which is moving from the role of judge and controller to that of autocrat (autocrat). This is monialism, the civilizational integration of the planet under the aegis of the West. In religious language there is only one name for this event, the World Flood, the end of the Earth's nomos and the universal domination of the nomos of the Sea. Recall also the apocalyptic beast emerging precisely from the Sea(1). It entails the final transition from the era of confrontation between the two elements to the era of subjugation of one element to the other, hostile to it. It can be said to be the beginning of a "universal world". Leviathan defeats Behemoth, Whale defeats Bear. The triumph of Moby Dick over the Russian Bear.

Third: the Sea is now subordinated to the other elements of the conquered Land (the vanquished enemy, Hostis), Air and Aether (natural allies in solidarity with the water dialectic, Amicus) serve as the Sea's ideovariants, the

underlying elements of the planetary Ship, the World Island (in Spickman's terms, not Mackinder's). This is the era of One World, post-industrial society, the age of global informatisation and automation. In the language of Marx's most avant-garde intuitions, this is called the "real dominance of capital" (2). A time of disappearing ideologies, a time of postmodernism and "the end of history".

The challenge of the opening of the Ocean, accepted by the Anglo-Saxons, who responded, embodied in the techno-industrial surge, moulded itself into modern Western civilisation, subjugated the whole world and found its final form in the global autocracy of America, the same continent with which Columbus had discovered the "modern world". This challenge culminated historically in the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, in perestroika and in the collapse of the USSR. The liberated technology (*entfesselte Technik*) overcame all external obstacles. The power of the Sea is now absolute. It is embodied in the hegemony of the technocratic West, the strategic primacy of the United States, the dominance of fluctuating capital, and the total blurring of traditional value structures. Ownership, inheritance, marriage, dwelling have all lost the significance that they had in the age of terrestrial existence, in the age of the Earth's *nomos*.

1.3 An overlooked element

Although Schmitt speaks of the singularity of truly historical events, preferring to avoid any form of determinism and systematisation, still, as a Christian, he could hardly deny that history has an End and therefore some teleology. His rejection of the teleology of Hegel or Marx does not mean rejection of teleology altogether. As a completely honest thinker (and in this sense he is similar to Heidegger) he does not want to limit either in himself or in others the free intuition of truth, believing that this is what constitutes the highest human dignity and intellectual freedom, projecting ultimately into Politics (*das Politische*) and into Decision (*die Entscheidung*). In all Schmitt's discourse there is an implicit eschatology which is normal for a Christian: he emphasises the uniqueness of the New Age in its globalism and

in its attitude to 'liberated technology' and maritime existence, apocalyptic overtones are easily discernible.

Schmitt obviously recognised the parallelism between the biblical account of the creation of the Land as a result of the withdrawal of the Water and the present situation, which represents something of the reverse of maritime existence to land existence, i.e. the symbolic overwhelming of the Earth by the Water. Importantly, however, the thalassocratic trend, permanent in history, is only now entering its oceanic phase, acquiring its fullest possible scale. The radiation of the oceanic thalassocracy into the stratosphere and cosmos only illustrates the ultimate victory.

But there is a logical retrospective question: why exactly Earth, Dryland nomos became a matrix of human existence in millennia of Tradition? And further, why such a stable land structure of traditional nomos (not overturned by either Potamian (river) or limitedly Thalassocratic or nomadic retreats) has finally fallen victim to the chaotic elements of the Ocean?

The Book of Genesis, affirming the existence of Waters before Dryland, hints at a certain primacy of Chaos over order, and the Indo-European mythology in many stories confirms it. In a sense we can assume (as it is in the Hermetic tradition) that the Earth is the condensed Water, and in terms of geography Dryland is the bottom of the Ocean, freed from the Water. But this territory wrested from Chaos, Nomos, Dryland, Continent, Mackinder's Heartland, the Mithgard of the ancient Germans, the fortress of Order, the historical Polis is not the cause of traditional nomos, but the result of some transcendental influence, a trace of the Supernatural fixed in Nature, an imprint of what might be called the origin of History. The Russian word for solid earth, *das feste Land*, *die Erde*, will enable us to approach this mysterious power. This is the word *Susha*. It etymologically refers to a quality of dryness, which is absent in other languages. This quality, in turn, evokes associations with warmth, heat and *Fire*, that last forgotten element, the fifth element, which is familiar in ancient classifications, but for some reason absent from Schmitt's civilisational and historical analysis.

And here we are reminded of Heraclitus, who, contrary to Thales of Miletus and other Thalasso philosophers, established the revolutionary theory of the origin of the universe from Fire. Fire is certainly a transcendent element in relation to the elements of the terrestrial environment. If Earth, Water and Air are internal in relation to our planet and its inhabitants, and even cosmic vacuum surrounding stratosphere can be considered as internal in relation to environment quintessence (ether), then Fire, Heat, Light come to us *from outside*, from shining sacrificial star, the Great Sun. The ordinary elements are the elements of men. Fire is the element of Gods, the substance of spiritual Heaven. And the polarity of Fire in relation to all the other elements does not fit into that static, purely natural scheme which Schmitt rightly singled out when speaking of the natural tension between the Land and the Sea, and which he quite correctly distinguished from the tension inherent in the dialectic of human history. In fact, the tension provoked by Fire is the essence of dialectics, and while we can agree with Thales about the origin of Nature, only Heraclitus is right about the origin of History. The gift of the titan Prometheus to mankind, the divine Fire reduced to the earth, is the main mysterious subject of historical dialectics, the alchemists' agent invisible, the philosophical child of the same Heraclitus who unfolds through centuries and cycles the content of his solar spirit, the heavenly gnosis.

The Transcendental Fire disperses the primordial Waters so that Dryland can emerge. The Transcendental Fire is worshipped as the main Principle by the people of the Earth they place it in the centre of their Home (sacred hearth), in the centre of their Temple (sacred altar), in the centre of their body (heart veneration), in the centre of their world (sun, giving orientation to space and measurement of time). The terrestrial nomos of the earth is a consequence of the subtile influence of Fire. By a land order humanity has responded to the challenge of the Transcendent, and thus has entered History, risen above nature and become itself. Home is the answer to the Sun. Land and its civilization is the product of intellectually meaningful Fire.

As long as the link between Fire and Earth was realised, the oceanic challenge did not exist. Thalassocracy was counterbalanced by Tellurocracy, and Roman Vesta triumphantly crushed Carthage, born of foam, whenever it encroached on the universalisation of its cultural and civilising message. As the sacred fire died out in people's homes, in people's hearts, in their temples, the apocalyptic roar of Leviathan rang out. And the Land, which had lost its meaning, its centre, its power, was henceforth doomed to lose an eschatological duel to the Sea.

The restructuring and slaughter of the Hippo became inevitable already at the moment when Tradition became conservative, when the answer given to the challenge of transcendent Fire finally overshadowed the question, when the *nomos* of Earth ceased to check its norms with the *nomos* of Heaven. Ultimately, all human history is nothing but an interlude between the First Flash of the Magic Star and the Universal Flood.

1.4 Icon and Dryland

Schmitt's remarks on iconography and his generalisation about the relationship of the Image to the West are very interesting. This relates directly to the element of Fire, as the visual ability is an element of the light dimension of reality, which in turn is an aspect of Fire (along with heat). If we accept the genetic link between the Land and the Sun, which we have uncovered, the connection of the Icon, a sacral visual image, with the Earth's *nomos* will also become clear. Naturally, spatial immobility, fixity and orderliness of the environment gravitate towards its expression in an image, a symbol, a hieroglyph, a picture. Fire, as if wrests a fragment from fluid reality, transforming it into an Image, an Icon, into something permanent. It is as if the sacrament of the origin of the primordial Land from the mass of watery chaos is being repeated in this. The *nomos* of the earth, through the Icon, constantly reminds us of its origin. In this sense, the worship of icons and the use of painting in general is indeed a clear sign of traditional, earthly, continental existence.

This consideration helps to build on the observations that Schmitt made about Spain's historical mission. The Catholic Spain, which had put the face of the Blessed Virgin on all the conquered lands, had the incredibly important mission of neutralising the Ocean (and evoking it) by means of Fire. In some ways this planetary operation was analogous to the historical function of Marxism in Russia: in both cases the challenge of the Sea was accepted in order to neutralise as far as possible its deleterious effects on the Earth's nomos and try to turn the poison into a cure. Spain's loss of the sea battle with the English pirates had terrible planetary consequences: on a trans-Atlantic island the Anglo-Saxons sowed the seeds of the apocalyptic civilisation that was destined to embody Leviathan in all his eschatological, final might. A Continent-ship emerged from the foam, surpassing its European prototype in every respect. It was in the nature of this monster to extinguish the holy fire, smash the Image, and establish its "new world order" on the planet. Naturally, the dominant worldview of the newborn monster was the ideas of extreme Protestant sects, Baptists, Puritans, Mormons, etc., characterized by the utmost degree of iconoclasm, ecclesiastical modernism and light-naissance. A doomed Latin American gerilla based on a mixture of Marxism (sic!) and Catholic liberation theology (sic!!) is all that remains today of the ambitious planetary demarche of the Spanish Conquistadors to disrupt the Universal Flood.

But there is one theoretical difficulty, not fully understood by Schmitt. The point is that he mentions the habit of identifying the visual image and iconoclasm with the West and its negation and iconoclasm with the East. Schmitt himself gives several examples which refute the unequivocal rightness of such an identification. Let us look into this in more detail. All the more so because it touches closely on the most important issue for us - the historical meaning of Russia and its mission.

1.5 Absolute Amicus et Hostis portraits in time and space

Here we are dealing with a problem whose metaphysical meaning was dealt with in our other book (Mysteries of Eurasia, chapter "The Subconscious

of Eurasia”). We are talking about the typical identification of European thinkers of their Tradition with the West. Often it is not just the West, but the North-West. And what is more, sometimes even three geographical concepts are merged - West, North-West and North. The South, the South-East and the East are opposed to it, most often also merging into one civilizational picture, represented by the Semitic cultural landscape of the Middle East, most familiar to Europe historically. This view is sometimes derived from the Roman and sometimes Christian heritage.

But it is really about the optical illusion to which Europeans owe geography. Only the most profound minds, and above all René Guénon, were able to detach themselves from this confusion and look at things from a different, more adequate position. Thus, René Guénon quite rightly pointed out that, in terms of real (and sacred) geography, the continent-Eurasia is a vast mass of land, where Europe is only a western cape, a peninsula, pointing into the Atlantic. The Indo-European peoples, on the other hand, live all over the continent from Hindustan through Iran and Russia to Europe itself. Aryan India holds the memory of the most ancient myths and intellectual beliefs of the white race, while Orthodox Christianity spreads far beyond the Urals to the Pacific Ocean, occupying spaces greater in size than Europe. However, historical narrowness and inoculated clichés do not allow Europeans at all to treat Orthodox culture in Russia as a completely authentic Christian tradition, and one entrusted to a white Indo-European people. It is very revealing in our context that it is in Orthodox Russia that the Greek name ‘icon’ has been retained for the sacred image, and furthermore, it is the Orthodox Russian icon that today fully supports the authentic Christian tradition, which has virtually died out in the West.

René Guénon, reviewing the book “The Origin of Mankind” by the German professor Hermann Wirth (3), pointed out that the concepts of North Atlantic (north-west), Hyperborean (north) and Atlantic (west) should be distinguished.

In fact, the veneration of Fire and the terrestrial nomos of the Earth, diligently studied by Schmitt, is a distinctive quality of the Indo-European

White peoples as a whole, who descended into Eurasia from the North, settling all over its space from West to East and from East to West. Where Indo-Europeans are, there is the Icon, sacred painting, worship of Fire and Light, solar myths, traditional hierarchy and the memory of Hyperborea. Sacred images abound in India. In Iran, even after Islamisation and Islam strictly forbids the depiction of people and animals, miniature painting and painting itself flourished. In the Russian Orthodox Church not only icons were revered, but also iconographers, and Orthodox Hesychasm, the doctrine of the Uncovered Light, was a central lifeline of the Russian Church. The icon is an indispensable attribute of the Indo-Europeans and must be identified specifically with the North, with Hyperborea, the most ancient ancestral home of the normal and traditional land nomos of the Earth.

The aversion to the image, iconoclasm, is also peculiar not so much to the East as to the South. It is a quite normal geographical symmetry, given the Hyperborean origins of Indo-Europeans. If the race of the North worships fire and the image, the race of the South, opposing it, must worship the antithesis of Fire (e.g. Water) and the antithesis of the icon (e.g. sound). Curiously, Guénon himself relates this cultural dualism to sedentarism and nomadism: he juxtaposes sedentarism with the biblical figure of Cain, the visual image and time, whereas nomadism with Abel, verbalism and space (4). This fits perfectly with the duality of elements parsed by Schmitt. The maritime existence (although strictly separated from nomadism) represents such an extreme development of nomadism that it takes on a new quality at the moment when the journey from land-based nomadism through navigation on the continental seas to resolute entry into the open ocean ends.

One more detail is extremely curious: Henon argues that the Semitic tradition is not an Eastern tradition, but an Atlantic, Western and nomadic one at the same time. Hence, according to him, the positive attitude towards the herdsman Abel in the biblical narrative. Moreover, Henon points to the fact that for the construction of Solomon's temple the great architect was invited from among foreigners, and proves that it was a representative of the Indo-European tradition, as it was characterized by the cultivation of

sacred architecture, i.e. the construction of that House which, according to Schmitt, is the basis of the Earth nomos, while the Semite nomads had a different socio-sacral structure.

Finally, in relation to the East, Henon argued that this side of the world is more connected with Tradition, with the permanence of sacral archetypes, with loyalty to origins than any other. In his book “East and West” he elaborated the arguments in support of this thesis. We can say that Henon unambiguously links the East with the North, considering it to be the historical successor of the original Nordic Tradition. Incidentally, regarding the identity of the concept of the Light of the North and the Light of the East, brilliant passages can be found in Henri Corben, the best contemporary expert on the Iranian tradition and translator of the great Sohrevardi.

So, to summarise our remarks. The North is identified with the Indo-European tradition, sedentariness, veneration of Fire and the Image. Besides, the North is also sacralized with the East. It is these two orientations that should be taken as primordial in the question of the history of the development of the Earth nomos and its central power lines. The defence of iconoclasm in history is thus by no means a Western, but a Northern or Eastern tendency. This line is characteristic of the whole of Eurasia from India to Ireland. It coincides with the historical trajectory of the Light of the North, Nordlicht, and with the peoples and cultures acting as bearers of that Light. These are Doric Sparta, imperial Rome, Zoroastrian Iran, Vedic India, Byzantium, Orthodox Russia, Catholic Ireland and Spain. This is the camp of the nomos of the Earth.

At the opposite pole of history, accordingly, are the South together with the West(!), the nomadic Semites, the Iconoclasts, the germs of Thalassocracy, the commercial civilisation and the “technological breakthrough”. Genon would call this camp the “precursors of an anti-traditional civilisation” and the “builders of the Great Parody”. It is also worth recalling the idea outlined by Guénon in *The Kingdom of Quantity* concerning the eschatological dissolution of the Egg of the World, “dissolution”, which coincides exactly and chronologically and typologically with the triumph of the Sea, as de-

constructed by Schmitt. Henon, like Schmitt, connects this dissolution with technical progress, liberal ideology and Western New Age civilisation. The Anglo-Saxon world as a whole was deeply distasteful and wary of him.

Finally, the role of the Semitic factor is Western and nomadic, according to Guénon; Southern, if we evaluate the spread of the Semites from a Eurasian perspective; associated with trade and free exchange, typical of all thalassocracies (Carthage versus Rome); at the origin of capitalism (criticized by both Marx and Sombart); iconoclastic and hostile to all Indo-Europeanism in religious matters (Judaism and Islam); in solidarity with the Protestant movement in its Calvinist version (the spread of Calvinism in Holland, England and later in America); finally, particularly active in the destruction of Europe's traditional nomos of the Earth (as Schmitt himself repeatedly wrote) puts the last point in the chain of correspondences.

North + East, Icon, Indo-European, Fire, Home, Sedentariness, Tradition and Land. These are the forces of the Earth nomos. Supporters of culture and order, who responded to the challenge of transcendent Fire with a fan of Aryan traditions up to Christianity.

South + West, iconoclasm, Semitic peoples, Water, Ship, nomadism, modernism and the Sea. These are the forces of Earth negation, the carriers of dissolution, the apocalyptic energies of rational chaos, the nomos of the Sea. They have answered the challenge of the Oceanus by taking its side against the Earth, and against the ancient, almost forgotten fiery Promethean question which preceded the nomos of the Earth and the whole of human History.

1.6 Nomos of Fire

The end of the Eastern Bloc means a complete victory for the nomos of the Sea. All attempts to resist its logic and its structure through its own technical means have proved unsuccessful. The battle of the ships was lost by Spain; the economic-industrial, strategic and doctrinal resistance to Nomos of the Sea by National Socialist Germany (1933 1945), inspired in part by

the Eurasian project of Haushofer, was crushed by the strength and cunning of the West, which used the USSR for this purpose; the technological rivalry, taking into account the lessons of Marxism, which lasted the longest, was lost in the 1960s and 1980s by the Warsaw Pact countries in parallel with the end of the second phase of the industrial revolution and the transition to a post-industrial society. The cycle of human history, having traversed the static polarities of nature, came to an end, as one American with a Japanese surname informed us.

We can state the absolute loss of Dryland, Behemoth, Eurasia, the nomos of the Earth. Of course, the nomos of the Earth itself was only a trace of humanity's solution to the open problem of Genesis posed to it, but not its essence. An external form of the Answer, but not the fiery element that gave birth to the Hyperborean Answer. The Earth can no longer answer the challenge of the nomos of the Sea, which has become global and singular. It is flooded by the Waters, its Order dissolved through the cracks in the World Egg. The end of the Industrial Revolution has debunked the illusion that it is possible to compete with liberated technology (*entfesselte Technik*) on its own level. The ethereal stage of absolute thalassocracy, a view cast on the earth from outer space, renders all the beings teeming on it fundamentally the same, their value strictly pragmatic and equal to their utility. Life is calculated in the financial equivalent of the really dominant Capital. Genetic engineering is breeding chickens and human clones, just as the steam engine or loom was invented yesterday. Technology has invaded humanity, reaching its centre. In 1959 Schmitt might still have had a spark of hope that something might suddenly change. By the end of the century, there is no such hope.

The triumph of Water apocalyptically absorbed all the elements and all historical forms, which it was able not just to destroy, but to transmute in its civilizational geopolitical parody alchemy. Gold (money), the universal solvent, and the technical ingenuity of the Forces of the Sea have turned humanity into a controlled biomass. But there remains something that is immune to this global process.

Fire.

It is he who, cleansed of his natural, cultural and socio-political strata acquired during the journey through history, is now in a privileged position compared to the compromised state in which he was in, remaining only the nomos of the Earth, the order of the Land. It is only now that the structure of its original challenge becomes clear, as only now manifests in its full historical scope what it was challenged *to*. What is in question is neither more nor less than Man. To what extent was he historical? To what extent is he natural? To what extent has he succumbed to the elements that constitute his natural fabric (right down to species-wide rationality)? To what extent was he able to remain faithful to a non-obvious transcendent dimension? How much Fire was in him in the end? Or is he all just Water?

GLOSSARY

(basic concepts and terms of geopolitics)

Anaconda's strategy is a geopolitical line of Atlanticism aimed at alienating as much coastal territory as possible from Eurasia in order to contain its geopolitical expansion.

Atlanticism (related to the terms *Water, Sea, Thalassocracy, Sea Power*) is a complex geopolitical concept; it combines: historically a Western sector of human civilisation, strategically an alliance of Western countries dominated by liberal-democratic ideology, strategically NATO member states, socially oriented towards “*commercial order*” and “market values” (US model). Opposite to *Eurasianism*.

Aerocracy is Greek for “power through the air”. The power component of a strategy based on the development of airspace and its use for *geopolitical expansion*. The development of aviation, unlike the development of seafaring, did not create its own nomos, becoming only a development of the thalassocratic principle.

The hippopotamus is the Hebrew word for “beast” (from the Bible).

“The beast, ”the beast of the land“ (in the Bible). Schmitt’s term. Same as *continent, continentalism, Eurasianism*.

Berlin is the natural strategic capital of Central Europe.

A bipolar world (bipolarism or bipolarity) is a natural geopolitical construct, reflecting on a planetary scale the basic geopolitical dualism *of thalassocracy* versus *tellurocracy*.

A bloc is an amalgamation of several states that significantly changes their strategic and geopolitical quality, bringing them to a higher level of planetary activity. According to the law of “*spatial progression*“, the formation of blocs is an inevitable process.

The rich North is the same as Atlantism, the West and the liberal-democratic world.

The Great Space (Grossraum) is Schmitt’s term. The consolidation of several powers into a single strategic entity. The emergence of Grand Spaces is due to the theory of “*spatial progression*“.

Outer crescent (or *island crescent*) Mackinder’s term for the set of territories within the *Thalassocratic* influence zone. Parts of continents and islands gravitating towards ‘*maritime existence*’. Also an area which is entirely under the control of strategic *Atlanticism*.

Inland sea (mare internum lat.) is a term referring to a body of water enclosed within a land-based telluric volume, and therefore not a strategic or cultural boundary.

Inland Ocean is a term meaning the same as ‘*inland sea*’, only on a planetary scale. Also *Middle Ocean*.

The inner crescent (or *continental crescent* or *rimland*) is a McIndar’s term for the coastal areas of Eurasia located between *the ‘outer crescent’* and the ‘*axial range*’.

The internal axis is the quality of the geopolitical connection between the centre and the periphery within a single strategic (or political) space. See also geopolitical ray and geopolitical segment.

Water (or Sea) is a special term for "thalassocracy". Especially developed by Schmitt (das Meer) and by Mahan (Sea, Sea Power).

The East is the same as the Second World.

Enemy (hostis lat.) Schmitt's term. A purely political concept denoting a set of external state, social, ethnic or religious entities that stand in opposition to the positions of strategic capital. Has no moral force and can be dynamically transferred to different entities. Movable category. See friend.

Second World The name of the socialist camp during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, means Eurasia.

The geographical axis of history (or *axial areal* or *heartland*) is Mackinder's term for the intra-continental Eurasian territories around which the spatial dynamics of historical development take place. Coincides with the territory of Russia.

Geopolitics is the science whose main points are outlined in this book.

Geopolitical dualism is a basic principle of geopolitics, asserting the opposition between Thalassocracy and Tellurocracy as the engine of the historical process.

The geopolitical ray is the vector of the power (economic, strategic, cultural, economic, administrative, etc.) impact of the geopolitical pole on the peripheral regions. The real political picture of the world in a static state operates with geopolitical segments. In geopolitics it is customary to speak of the rays as an open dynamic process of constantly continuing momentum.

Geopolitical segment The totality of the relations of a strategic capital (or geopolitical pole) with the peripheral regions, considered at a specific historical moment without regard to the general dynamics of political processes.

See also geopolitical ray.

Geostrategy Military Aspects of Geopolitical Analysis.

Geoconomics is an offshoot of Atlanticist geopolitics. It considers space in a utilitarian-economical sense. One of the priority disciplines of "thalassocratic" analysis.

State-Nation a secular state with a pronounced centralism. A political entity in which state forms lead to the birth of an ethnicity and its culture. Distinguished from ethnic formation (community, nation) and from empire.

There are two types of borders in geopolitics: the line border and the strip border. The line-boundary is a maritime boundary. The border-border-band is a land border. The task of a geopolitical bloc, claiming to act on a planetary scale, is to make the line-boundaries maximal for itself and minimal for its rival, and vice versa.

Chellen's term **demopolitics**. The influence of demographics on the structure of the state. Not widely disseminated.

Discontinuous belt Cohen's term. Discontinuous coastal zones with an indeterminate, variable orientation, which can turn both towards the telluric continent and towards the thalassocratic sea.

Friend (amicus lat.) Schmitt's term. A purely political concept denoting a set of external state, social, ethnic or religious entities in positions of coincidence with those of strategic capital. It has no moral force and can be dynamically transferred to different entities. A moveable category. See enemy.

Eurasianism is a complex geopolitical concept; it combines: a historically Eastern sector of human civilisation, a strategically relevant or potential bloc of states and nations that refuse to recognise the imperative of liberal-democratic ideology, a strategically relevant or potential alliance of Eastern, '**telluric**' countries into a military alliance, a social orientation towards '**ideocracy**', a social state, a non-capitalist economic system.

Eurasia is the same as *continent, heartland, land, earth, tellurocracy*. In a more limited sense it means geopolitical Russia.

One World - see *monialism*.

Life space Haushofer's term.

A minimum territorial scope for the people to achieve their historical and political aspirations.

The West is synonymous with *Thalassocracy, Atlantism*.

Land (or **Dryland**) is a special term in geopolitics to denote "tellurocracy". The theory of "Earth", das Land, is developed in particular detail by Carl Schmitt.

Ideocracy Gr. "power of ideas, ideals". A term of the Russian Eurasians (N. Trubetskoy, P. Savitsky). It is opposed to the "power of matter", the "market system", the "*commercial order*". Under ideocracy, the hierarchy in society and the stimulation of labour are based on non-economic principles.

An empire is a super-state entity that unites several peoples and countries under the umbrella of a universal idea of a religious, ethical or ideological nature.

Integration in geopolitics refers to various forms of unification of several spatial sectors. Integration can take place either through military expansion or through peaceful means. There are several ways of geopolitical integration - economic, cultural, linguistic, strategic, political, religious, etc. All of them can lead to the same end result of increasing the strategic and spatial volume of the bloc.

Colony Territory controlled by a force separated by water space. Considered as a temporary and external base, alienated from the general geopolitical space of the metropolis. Opposed to the *provinces*.

End of History Fukuyama's term. The Mondialist thesis of a total victory

of Thalassocracy and the liberal-democratic model across the planet. See *Mondialism, One World*.

Continent Eurasia, Terrestrial, Telluric Principle.

Continentalism is synonymous with *Eurasianism* in a narrowly strategic sense. The concept is close to that of *Land, Land*. The continentalist school of geopolitics is unique in Russia, prevalent in Germany, present in France and impossible for Anglo-Saxon countries. The opposite of *Atlantism*.

Chellen's term *Kratopolitics*. A consideration of the state in terms of its power potential. It is not widely used.

Leviathan is Hebrew. "sea monster" (in the Bible). Schmitt's term. Same as *Atlantism, Sea*, etc.

Liberalism is a worldview that combines left-wing (minimalist humanism, individualism, ethnic and cultural egalitarianism) components in politics and right-wing (market, privatisation, private property, capitalism) components in economics. The ruling ideology of the Atlanticist camp. The political expression of liberalism is *liberal democracy*.

Meridian expansion (expansion on the North-South axis) expansion of the sphere of influence (military, strategic, cultural or economic) along the meridian, also *longitudinal expansion*); a basic condition for the territorial and strategic stability of a state.

Meridian integration (North-South integration) linking individual spatial sectors into a unified whole along the meridian (also longitudinal *integration*). Positive in the case of assertive control over northern and central areas. Negative if there are geopolitical entities in the north or in the centre, whose loyalty to *the strategic capital* is doubtful or weak.

Place-development is Savitsky's term. The same as qualitative space or just *space* (in the geopolitical sense).

Minimalist geopolitics is an applied discipline that borrows some terms and methodology from genuine geopolitics, but leaves out the basic geopolitical dualism.

World Island is Mackinder's term. Mackinder referred to **Eurasia** and the geographical axis of history. In Speakman, the notion radically changed its meaning and began to denote a set of **thalassocratic** zones (zones of **the outer crescent**). Due to this variation, it is better not to use the term broadly to avoid ambiguity.

A multipolar world at the present stage is a purely theoretical concept, involving the coexistence of several **Greater Spaces**. Possible only after overcoming **the unipolar world**.

The idea of the world as a whole is not a political one, but a political one. A particular ideology that proposes the fusion of all states and peoples into a single planetary entity with the establishment of a World Government and the destruction of racial, religious, ethnic, national and cultural boundaries. There is a "right-wing" monialism and a "left-wing" one. The right represents the globalisation **of Atlantism**. The left considers it necessary to include the **Eurasian** sector (on one basis or another) in the One State.

Sea is the same as **Thalassocracy, Water**.

Moscow is the natural strategic capital **of Eurasia**. The basis of the axes of all **continental integration**. See **Eurasia**

Neo-Atlanticism is a modern version of Atlantism which rejects monialism (even right-wing) as a premature and unfeasible project in the present circumstances. Believes there will be **a clash of civilisations** instead of **One World**.

The new order is a project of major geopolitical reorganisation.

The New World Order is the same as monialism and World Government projects.

Nomos is Carl Schmitt's term. A basic principle of organisation of any space (geographical, social, political, economic, cultural, etc.). Synonymous with "order", "law", "order". Nomos of the Land = **Tellurocracy**. Nomos of Water (or Sea) = Thalassocracy.

Society is the result of the disintegration of communal formations. Unlike the community, it is fundamentally divisible into atomic members (individuals).

Community is the natural form of existence of people bound together by organic ties. It is opposed to **society**, where instead of organic ties, the norms of a formalised contract between individuals prevail. Society is governed by Tradition.

Fire is the element symbolising pure spirit. The transcendent principle.

A unipolar world is the geopolitical model that emerged after the defeat of the USSR in the Cold War. The only dominant pole is Atlanticism and the US.

An axis is a geopolitical alliance of two or more **geopolitical capitals**.

Partisan is Schmitt's term, the symbolic figure of the defender of the *"nomos"* in a situation of triumph of an opposing geopolitical force.

Passionarity is Gumilev's term. The internal energy of an ethnos, the driving force behind cultural, political and geopolitical creation.

Peripheral spaces and lands with no independent geopolitical orientation, distant from the **strategic capital** on whose behalf major geopolitical decisions are made.

Political geography was Ratzel's term for what after Chellen became known as "geopolitics" proper.

Possibilism from the French possible, "possible". A term coined by Vidal de la Blanche. It is intended to nuance the geographical determinism partly

inherent in geopolitics. The theory of post-Sybilism argues that *space* does not predetermine history, but only predisposes to one or another course of history.

Applied geopolitics Lacoste's term. The use of geopolitical tools as applied to regional-level micro-problems without regard to underlying principles. Also ***minimal geopolitics***.

A province is a peripheral territory that is part of a major geopolitical entity and is seen as an integral part of an organic whole. The opposite of ***a colony***.

Space is a basic concept of geopolitics. It is not a quantitative, but a qualitative category. The structure of space predetermines the structure of history (especially political history) - this is the basic thesis of geopolitics as a science.

The law of spatial progression is formulated by Jean Tyriard. It reads "from city-states through territory-states to continent-states". The geographical dynamics of political history lead inexorably to an increase in the scale of minimal social formations. See also "***living space***".

The spatial meaning of Ratzel's term. A system of historical predetermination laid down in qualitative space. See ***space***.

Regionalism focuses on the autonomy ***of peripheral spaces***. Has several forms economic, cultural, political and strategic.

Sacred geography is the sum total of the ancients' conceptions of qualitative space. Modern geopolitics is guided by a typologically similar understanding of ***space***, only it expresses it in a rational natural-scientific form.

A cordon sanitaire is an artificial geopolitical formation that serves to destabilise two large neighbouring states that could form a serious bloc, which in turn would be dangerous for a third party. A classic move in the Atlanticist strategy in their opposition to continental integration of Eurasia.

North in sacred geography (and in Doeblér) is a symbol of spirit and ideal order. In contemporary geopolitics, it is synonymous with the notion of **the rich north**, which is the exact opposite of Atlanticism and liberalism.

Sociopolitics is Chellen's term. The study of the social aspects of the state.

The Midland Ocean is Speakman's term. The Atlantic Ocean, if North America and Europe are considered as one geopolitical space.

Central Europe, the space intermediate between Russia and the Atlantic coast of Europe. It is traditionally seen as an area of predominantly German influence.

The Clash of Civilisations Hunting Tone term. The theory of permanence and irreducibility of geopolitical conflicts at the civilisational level.

The strategic capital (the geopolitical pole or source of the geopolitical ray) is the centre of geopolitical **integration** and an active actor in the larger geopolitical process. The links between strategic capitals form geopolitical **axes**.

Land see. **Land**

Tellurocracy is Greek for "power by means of land" or "land power". Characterisation of powers with a clear land-based geopolitical orientation. See Eurasia, Heartland, ideocracy.

Thalassocracy - Greek for "power by means of the sea" or "maritime power". Characterisation of states and nations dominated by seafaring.

Tokyo is the natural strategic capital of the Pacific.

Trade system A type of society in which the hierarchy and incentives of labour are derived from economic principles. A market-based, liberal-democratic system. The opposite of **ideocracy**.

The Third World is a generic name for underdeveloped countries belonging

predominantly to regions of the geopolitical South.

Turan the north-eastern regions of the Eurasian continent, the steppe expanses of Eurasia.

The broad integration (integration by parallels) is the most vulnerable and difficult point of linking geopolitical spaces under the control of the centre. It should be implemented by peaceful and diplomatic means as much as possible. It is based on the gradual incorporation of heterogeneous regions into the central part through a spatial hierarchy of sectors most loyal to the centre.

A broad-based expansion (parallel expansion) is an aggressive geopolitical trend that invariably generates conflict situations, a geopolitical strategy of an offensive nature. It is almost always fraught with military conflicts. it only takes place after the meridian expansion has been completed.

Ecopolitics Chellen's term. Considering the state as an economic force. It is not widely used.

Ephyrocracy is Greek for "power through the nadatmospheric layers". The dominance of space weapons. Development of thalassocratic and aerocratic tendencies.

The South in sacred geography are regions of disorder, mixing and degeneration. In contemporary geopolitics, the Third World, underdeveloped countries where liberal-democratic principles have not taken hold.

Heartland English 'heartland'; see **geographical axis of history** . McIndar's term.

Hinterland German. "back land". Territories extending inland from the coastlines. A term characteristic of **Thalassocratic** analysis of space.

Jus Publicum Europeum Latin. General European Law. The historical body of law that governed inter-state relations in Europe.

Jus Publicum Euroasiaticum Latin, "General Eurasian Law". A draft international law that could regulate relations between Eurasian countries and peoples on the basis of recognition of the priority of continental ***telluric*** values.

Lenaland English "land adjacent to the Lena River basin". McIndier's term. Refers to all northern Eurasian territories lying east of the Yenisei River all the way to the Pacific coast. In his later works Mackinder paid special attention to this area, believing that these lands belonged not ***to tellurocratic***, but ***to thalassocratic*** zones of influence.

Kissinger's ***Linkage*** term. ***An Atlantist*** strategy to link ***the discontinental belt*** of Eurasia into a solid Western-controlled territory.

Mitteleuropa German for ***Middle Europe***.

One World A mondialist concept of One World. See also The End of History.

Pax Americana Latin: "American World". Same as ***Atlantism***.

Pax Euroasiatica Latin: 'The Eurasian World'. Same as ***Eurasianism***.

Pax Persica, Latin for 'Persian Peace'. A project for the geopolitical reorganisation of the Central Asian space under the auspices of Iran in alliance with Russia.

Rimland English 'coastal land'; see ***Inner Crescent***. McIndier's term.

THINK IN TERMS OF SPACE

Part I

PHILOSOPHY OF SPACE

Chapter 1

Space and Being

(to. raising some questions)

”..el quand dans les deux agonisaient les constellations triomphantes du lit arthurien, le Grand Continent tivre aux charognards des inframondes sur les rivages ethiopiens de la recession occidentale de l’etre; deliee la Ceinture d’Orion, eteinte laflananepolaire de la Spiga Sdntulans, les etendards de l’Absolu amour en berne dans les excavations antarctiques en nous de la detresse aux drops de tenebres, de deviance metacosmique sous vents de la supreme deflagration des nonprincipes; le chant des Vieilles Nonnes a peine saississables a l’Est du maidan heliocentric; metis dans les sables aux reflets deplatine, sous les sapins, ecu. bord du petit etang, queue souche pardonne de l’Anden Sang, des Grands Exterieurs issue, recommencera le cheminement accelere par les fruits du reveti d’une caste plus aubliee que le viol de l’Ange Moi-Meme; car il y cut - “rment; a la terrifiante entaule sur le Coeur de Diamant, et un serment encore plus faudroye...”

Jean Parvulesco

1.1 Being and time

For the last centuries we have been living within a historicist paradigm. We think and view existence through time, and even if our consciousness is turned to other axiological or ontological problems, time and its logic dominate everything else, implicitly predetermining the trajectories of our intellectual gaze. We are steadily trapped in a historicist paradigm, and anything that goes beyond it (or tries to go beyond it) is automatically labeled as a non-conformist, subversive tradition of thinking that transcends the boundaries of the accepted. Historicism is not only found in the Hegelian perspective or in other philosophical models which explicitly place the problem of history at the centre of intellectual discourse. Such explicit historicism is only partial. The very *modus operandi* of contemporary thinking implicitly implies historicism, even where abstract or static categories and phenomena are considered. Progressiveness is perceived as the main form of being, and it remains a constant background to our thinking, both professional and everyday. The idea of progress in the field of knowledge, implying

the evolution of epistemology, betrays historicism to the full.

The very notion of "modernity" or "modernity" is a frank admission of our absolutisation of the temporal factor, because otherwise this category would lose its axiological content, would lose the significance of a decisive argument.

We take time as a basic category, with one of its most important characteristics being its homogeneity, its universality. From this comes the notion of the unity of history, which is broken up into secondary segments only by some "optical" (in the Heideggerian sense) errors, a kind of "frictional forces".

Time is thought as a uniform progressive unfolding of being, stably staying only in this process of becoming and losing its concrete density in other modes, turning into a representation (Schopenhauer). It is the category of time as a present homogeneous progressive unfolding that also dictates a correlative representation of space. Only "Minkowski space", i.e. abstract homogeneous space in which all geometrical laws are observed without the slightest error, can be such a space derived from the Historicist paradigm. The homogeneous notion of time forced Descartes to separate "extent" and "mass" in the category of space. Extension without mass is the basis of Minkowski space.

Thus the absolutisation of time gave rise to a particular idea of space, constructed by analogy with time. This is 'modern space'.

Understanding existence through time can produce three unequal versions, which in turn predetermine three philosophical (and in the limit, attitudinal) orientations.

In one case, history is seen as an accumulation of being, as a constant addition of ontology and gnoseology. This can be summarised as 'conservative historicism', of which Hegel's philosophy is a striking example. In this perspective the past is not devalued at all, but is seen as a preliminary phase of the present. The ontology of the past is removed, but not abolished. In order to justify such a position of "conservation of time", it is necessary to

postulate a certain action that would ensure the continuity of the transition from ontology to gnoseology. Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit" and "Greater Logic" illustrate in detail the mechanisms of such a transition.

The second line is futurological. It is an absolutization of the first version, but it assumes real ontology not in the gradual accumulation of being, which is also postulated as some prehistorical form of the existence of reality (in the modus of the Absolute Idea, for example), but in the gravitation of an insufficient (inchoate) historical process of being towards full ontology, carried into the future. Absolute being in this case is not thought of as the sum of the moments, but as the final overcoming of history, to be followed by a "beginning" of ontology. Futurological utopianism may be seen as an invariant of conservative historicism, but in terms of its philosophical and ethical undertones this trend is rather "leftist" and "communist", reproducing the main features of the traditional hiliastical expectation of some religions. For the sake of correctness, it should be noted that the ultimate ontologism of a futurological, communist utopia is not self-evident. It is implicit in communism, rather than explicitly postulated, and there is no unequivocal consensus on this question in the left-wing camp itself. Looking slightly ahead, there is also a persistent "revisionist" tendency among communists towards the problem of time, which tends to converge with the third version of historicism.

This third version of historicism is the most consistent and radical. It places existence within the elusive confines of the present moment. The only real thing is the ephemeral, the instantaneous, the momentary. The past and the future are utterly deontologicalized, all reality is believed to be in the moment of dynamically changing "modernity". The development of a temporal modality is identified with an active activity of overcoming and annihilating the past. The past is seen as permanently blotted out, as negative time, as being passed into non-existence, as a value that has ceased to be. In contrast to conservative historicism, the act of gnoseologising history is taken here as a purely negative procedure, as representation is seen antithetically to being. What belongs to the realm of knowledge or representation, by virtue of this,

does not already exist. There is exclusively that which has not yet become representation, which is pure presuppositional emergent, momentary, direct experience, a heuristic outburst of imprecision.

This radical approach to the historicalist paradigm could not have emerged immediately from the era of the dominance of the temporal approach. It is the result of the development of the historicist paradigm from its "impure", contaminated by other systems of thought, forms to its most refined and absolutised expressions. Historicism as a philosophical approach or meta-approach, as a background implicit attitude, in turn has a history. This history moves from the pole of an ontological understanding of time to the pole of its deontologised understanding. There is a consistency and progression here too: the initial forms of historicism - both conservative and futuristic - remain linked to metaphysics and statics, which characterise other, non-historical modes of thought. The overcoming of metaphysics and independent ontology is taken only as an intention, as a goal, as a reference point. Gradually, this process intensifies, and the problematic of philosophy is shifted from the opposition of historicism and non-historicism to the opposition of ontologically loaded historicism and such historicism in which deontologization is absolute,

This purely philosophical path is directly reflected in the realm of ideologies. The very emergence of the historicist approach, the dominance of the category of time over the thought of being, coincides precisely with the New Age, i.e. with the transition of the West from traditional society to modern society. The concepts of progress and evolution emerge at this very stage and form the basis of those ideological currents, which are later compressed into the basis of a variety of ideologies and worldviews, characteristic of the New Age.

Then differentiation begins within "modern" worldviews, cumulatively pushing the remnants of thinking of previous eras to the periphery. First of all, conservative historicism, recognised by "modernity" as an attempt to retranslate the ontological approach into the new historical conditions, is peeled off. Hegelianism is exposed as a "conservative revolution" in thought

and everything affected by it is questioned. This is reflected later through the ideological collapse of "fascism", the "neo-Hegelianism" of Giovanni Gentile, etc.

At this stage, the futurological and "ephemerist" ideological camps are still in solidarity with one another. It is a kind of alliance of "left-wing forces", a "Popular Front" within philosophy.

The ontology of the past is amicably denied by both proponents of future ontology and opponents of any ontology.

Finally, in the final stage of the scrubbing of the historicist model, conflict is signalled between futuro-ontologists and anti-ontologists. In the block of the Left, the conflict between communists and liberals heats up. Since the liberal denial of ontology and the absolutization of the ephemeral corresponds to a more refined and perfect phase in the development of historicism, it is not surprising that the ideological victory in this dispute belongs to the liberal-democratic worldview and its exponents.

The historicalist paradigm in its most recent and highest stage of development coincides with the planetary triumph of liberalism.

The notion of modernity becomes so total and universal that liberals proclaim the end of history, the complete overcoming of meaningful time, of time "stained" by being, and the beginning of a paradoxical cycle in which the only content of time becomes time itself, empty and ephemeral, consisting of an extra-reasonable bundle of imprecations.

1.2 Aggression of the ephemeral

A curious point: when we try to evade the iron logic of historicism, to circumvent the shocking conclusion about the total deontologicalisation of existence, about its ultimate evaporation within the liberal picture of the world, we necessarily begin to appeal to what has preceded such a situation. In other words, the first thing that catches our eye is other historicalist paradigms that have not yet come to such radical conclusions. We begin

to contrast the dictatorship of the moment with the ontological models of conservative historicism or with communist futurology. The horror of understanding the substantive side of the triumph of liberalism invariably pushes us into the camp of philosophising in "red-brown" tones. This is logical, but dystopian. The triumph of ephemerality in liberal thought, accompanied by the corresponding victory of this worldview on the political plane in key sectors of the contemporary world, is inscribed in the mechanism of the time paradigm with inexorable rigidity. Already the first step towards placing being in time is fraught with the fact that in more advanced stages time will destroy being altogether, however uncertain and distant this future may seem to our philosophising ancestors. Conservative Historicism is doomed to fall first - due to the basic contradiction between ontology and history. This by no means detracts from Hegel's anti-Kantian exploit, but it does not remove the main problem, only postpones it, postponing the fatal conclusion.

The futurological ontology of communism (not fully understood and postulated, but rather foreshadowed and anticipated) also fails to take into account (or not fully account) the fact that the being of the future is a function of a subjective factor, expressed in the revolutionary will of the proletariat. This communist ontology is not a given but a task, and the realisation of this task can be compromised by unforeseen obstacles or, more importantly, by the intervention of another alternative will. This will is capable of derailing the project, of disrupting the unfolding of time from its teleological assignment (i.e. preventing Revolution or provoking its alienation from its own essence). Hence, onto- | logism in this case is not guaranteed only by the specificity of philosophical aspiration, and, moreover, the plan itself is based on a subtle mixing of a purely temporal paradigm (absolutized in the liberals) with unconscious vestiges of "ontologism". This is why the Reds were gradually exposed as 'cryptoconservatives' (see the critiques of Popper, Hayek, Aron, later Bernard-Henri Lévy, André Glucksmann and other representatives of 'minimal humanism').

The futurological ontology of the communists, in fact, turned out to be

National Bolshevism, the last incarnation of the ontological approach in the reality of the absolutization of the historicist paradigm. And the ultimate ideological defeat of Marxism stems from the very logic of understanding being through time. It could not have ended otherwise; but it is unlikely that thinkers of the past were able to foresee this precisely. For us, however, we are talking about the final chord of the accomplished history of thought.

Time, containing only itself, and unfolding in the homogeneous and mass-free space generated by it - this is the outcome of history. The clearest manifestation of this datum is in the realm of the virtual. Here there is time and geometrical quanta of measured sensory-rational imprecisions. The surface of the screen becomes increasingly flat, flat, geometrically flawless. Errors themselves, as an attribute of life, begin to be simulated by virtual geography. The end of history. The end, in fact.

1.3 Wheels with eyes

The victory of liberalism is a philosophical and attitudinal victory. It is a victory of time over being. It is hardly an accident. Rather, it's a logical victory. Ontology initially anticipated this turn of events. The historicalist paradigm has opened Pandora's Box, breaking its secret seal. In traditional society, time was imprisoned in an ontological prison, dominated by the weight of myth and religious asceticism. Time was subordinated to the boundaries of metaphysics, its sphere of influence was strictly limited. Traditional society was a time concentration camp, where time was enclosed in a circular calendar, in a closed ring of a cycle. The event as such did not exist; it was a fragment of mythological fabric, turned on itself. Only the dynasties and forms of the wheels of existence changed. Being shone in myth, and myth interpreted a posteriori time. Hence the typological monotony of the chronicles, which embarrasses modern history revisionists. The chronicles narrated - like nerdy calendars - only the changing seasons. The snowfalls of kingdoms and the ice drifts of foreign raids.

It was all repeated in a slender rhythm, rhymed and sung by the priests. Russian bogatyrs strummed gusle strings between cities, rhyming space and

martial campaigns, religious rituals and the changing seasons. All this was so until the Time came. It is called the New Time because such a Time, such a concept of time, had never existed before.

The antithesis of ephemerality is not some other historicist paradigm, even the most imaginative and attempting to tie the knot with ontology. It is a doomed path. The antithesis of time is space. But not Minkowski space, which is itself generated by the historicist paradigm. The paradigm of space is the paradigm of the inseparable fusion of mass and extension. This space is not empty, not ideal, not geometric. It is physical, natural, preserving distinct traces of the genesis of the universe, what modern physicists call the "de Sitter universe". This is the space of non-integrable processes, irreducible series. It is qualitative space, generating, in turn, the plurality of times, a complex mosaic of calendar circles. It is the "Ofanim", the angelic wheels of the vision of Ezekiel.

If you start not with time, but with space, being is given stability and stillness. It is no longer dependent on time, it is evenly spilled over, but not in a substantive way, but as a fragrance, a subtle vapour. It does not descend into time itself, it is not involved in progression. Being is stored in a pattern of qualitative space, uneven and unequal to itself. It is a magical mass, the substantial flesh of the world.

The fabric of ontology is eternally closed in such a space. Time is captured and spirals in spiralling vortices through cellular funnels and protrusions. Each sector has its own particular calendar, its own tamed, mastered time. Time may break out of the cycle, but only to enter a new cycle, a new orbital rotation around the living mass of non-Decartan space.

Past, future and present in this paradigm are ontologically equivalent. They are equally there. There is only a static tension between them due to the multiplicity of distances. One event is further from the centre of the cycle, the other is closer. One to the left, the other to the right. The sequence is not important, what matters is the disposition on the eternal map. The development is a movement in a circle. It makes sense, but it is neither

cumulative nor costly. Being is neither diminishing nor growing. It can be somewhere more obvious and visible, somewhere more obscure and hidden, and this gives the circle an authentic meaning.

1.4 The sunset home of Time

The space paradigm in its total acceptance can also embrace, explain and codify the time paradigm, quietly bypassing the hypnotic effect of its pretentious universality, for in this case it is not the event but the interpretive methodology itself that is interpreted. The time paradigm is taken from the outside, as a fact along with other series of facts, rather than as an axial vector that establishes the norms and priorities of knowing being (and the basis of the dominant political ideology). The time paradigm is then revealed as the result of a special space, as its generation, as the product of one of the sectors of the real synchronous universe.

What is this sector? It could be loosely called the "western" sector.

Immediately everything falls into place. Each space generates its own time, conditioned by the uniqueness of the pattern of the mass's arrangement along the extent. In one of the "left of centre" sectors, the mass is such that it creates the illusion of unobstructed gliding. This illusion is autonomous and generates the hypothesis of a spaceless, independent chronos detached from the topos. And then, starting from such a homogeneous and changeless chronos, an artificial conception of the structure of topos is formed. The real topos of the West gives birth to an abstract notion of a benign time, which in turn postulates the concept of a fictitious "topos" that does not exist. And this is not an anomaly, but an expression of the peculiarity of the West as a place of spatial depletion, evaporation, decay and rarefaction. The intensity of being dissipates at the "Western" edge of qualitative space. The result of decay is conceptualised and generalised. Further, as time turns, other sectors of space fall under the influence of the West as well. In some compartments of the cycle, the "western" characteristics of the manifold spaces come into resonance. The maximum resonance of the "Western" aspects of ontology is expressed in the undivided dominance of the time paradigm, i.e. the

apparent anomaly is embedded in the more general structure of spatial order.

Time seemed to devour being. In fact this is just an illusion generated by one of the boundary spatial realms of being itself. Deontologisation is not externally caused by the paradigm of time, but this paradigm itself, claiming to deontologise, was revealed through the ebb and flow of the mass of being in one of the special, critical, extreme realms of space itself.

(Turning to the West, Christians spit three times at the moment of baptism, saying "I deny Satan"; Lucifer, according to Orthodox tradition, has fallen from heaven and landed in Europe.)

1.5 The Quantum Conspiracy

The temporal paradigm in its most perfect - "liberal" - form is based on a discontinuous, "quantum", "discrete" approach to reality. Since being is placed in the moment of the present, by analogy, only 'moments', 'fragments', 'portions' are taken into account. This corresponds to the individualistic and rationalistic underpinning of the temporal paradigm, since progressive time can only be grasped through the 'individuation' of its present, through the central position of the ephemeral clot. The continuity of time as its inherent fundamental characteristic is here effectively denied. This is on the grounds that the antecedent and the consequent are deontologised, and hence that with which a given 'moment' could be inextricably, continuously linked, does not exist. This is how atomic quantum time arises, and hence atomic individuals and discrete reasoning forms.

Let us remember where discontinuity comes from: it is nothing but the superposition of two heterogeneous continuities - temporal and spatial. We measure motion and the measure of time only on the basis of the relation between time and space, which are continuous in themselves, but when superimposed give discreteness. This point of intersection is the starting point of discontinuity.

The radical time paradigm is absolutising this intersection and putting it at the centre. In the radical time paradigm this intersection is absolutised, put

forward as the centre. Quanta of ephemeral time glide in the even virtual space of Minkowski. Such a 'shower of moments' constitutes the content of reality as it is understood by the most radical adherents of the modern spirit. Its origins are to be found in rationalist constructs and positivism.

The spatial paradigm ontologises both continuities - both temporal and spatial - and, in contrast, takes their intersection as a predicate, as a derivative and non-self category. The past, the future and the present coexist continuously and are equally ontological, equally there. There is both now and not now. There is both here and not here. The witness-atom, which accepts the imprecations and builds models on their basis, is seen as a secondary, subordinate, transient entity. Everything is and can be outside of it and without it. Or in the presence of a witness of a completely different nature and ontological constitution. - Time and space can overlap at will and in countless combinations.

The spatial paradigm predetermines analogue thinking and a non-individualistic, but personalistic attitude to anthropology. Man and his structures of consciousness become not "individual", i.e. "not subject to division", but quite "divide-al", "masked" - in the etymological sense of the word "persona" (Greek for "mask") or "personality". Atomicity, discreteness, discontinuity, the rational, reasoned method of thinking are equated with a contingent, not provided with an independent ontology factor, a pragmatic product of the "contract".

For proponents of the radical temporal paradigm - the quantum individual is the only autonomous reality (hence 'minimal humanism') and the rest of reality is the product of the contract.

For the carriers of the spatial paradigm it is the other way round: the individual and reason are contingent, reality is ontological in itself (hence "anti-humanism" or "maximal humanism" of the Nietzschean, superhuman type).

Analogue thinking derives from the spatial paradigm and is based not on

binary reasoning logic (is-no), but on the logic of relief. It knows diminution and addition, but both are interconnected, never discontinuous, never passing into quantum "is" and quantum "no". "Is" and "is not" are contingencies. In ontological qualitative space, everything simultaneously is in some sense is and in some sense is not. The superposition of spatial circles gives rise to a complex pattern, generates spatial dynamics, and establishes a variety of times and cycles. But the subject of relief remains contingent. The ontological relief moves by itself, creating constellations of "personas" - "non-existent" as autonomous subjects, but "eternal" in the sense of unity with the thickness of being.

The anthropology of the spatial paradigm is based on treating the human being as a variable, as a mathematical 'x' capable of taking on different species. By 'person' we mean animal, plant and angel. This is an interspecies scene, highlighted by the resonance of ontological perturbations. So there are as many varieties of people as there are spaces. The special time generated by a discrete (but never totally discrete) sector of qualitative space, superimposed over the same paternal space again, yields a pseudo-quantum, a game unit, a man-role, a person-mask. Hence the fundamental anthropological pluralism. Untempered harmony, naonic Old Believer chant.

It is not the individual himself that is continual, but his basic constitutive elements, his ontological background from which he is woven and by which his thinking is predetermined. Man in the ontological sense neither comes from anywhere nor goes anywhere. What precedes and inherits him, and strictly speaking what co-exists him, are extra-individual ontological modifications, waves of ontological terrain.

Man consists of mountains, rivers, rocks, forests, deserts, winds, swamps, light, thoughts and stars. And in their pre-substantial, pre-material, pre-formed state. This is the music of the spheres and the glossolalia of plans.

1.6 Glass waves

The dispute between the proponents of discrete and wave theories expresses

the duality of the original epistemological positions. The temporal paradigm cannot but lead to the triumph of the discrete ontology theorists. But at the same time, the most perceptive among them must admit that this is not the nature of reality, but the nature of the reasoned observer. Hence the role of gauges, and hence the role of the observer, in theories of quantum mechanics. Within the temporal paradigm, everything is reduced to the atomicity of the individual and its epistemological expression - i.e. the reasoner. When reality is placed in the atom, then the only reality becomes a reasoned dual-code reconstruction, i.e. in other words, virtuality.

Modernity's move towards the dominance of digital technology is no accident. It is the last word in the development of the time paradigm, it is the triumphant chord of liberalism.

Why have the Waveists lost the historical argument? Because we have long ago entered the band of Western resonance, towards the vortex of ontological catastrophes associated with the ultimate - but never definitive - exhaustion of reality in spaces of universal damage. Under the sign of the West, everything is measured by its standards, and the one who is more in tune with the critical terrain of the ontological winter is "right". "Right", of course, in a relative sense. To the disembodied time it seems that its movement is true. Space has an opinion of its own on this point.

Wave theory is based on the premise of continuity, the inseparability of the ontological fabric. This follows from the spatial paradigm. The wave nature of reality would imply a multipolar interference of fields. Something opposite to the liberal project of 'one world' and 'world government' based on a universalist logic. The wave project is a superposition of multiple simultaneous worlds, "cultural circles". The sources of large ontological masses are localised and a map of reality is drawn on the basis of this localisation. Physical and spiritual processes are located in the frozen angelic continuum of the "royal palace". Each room has its own time, its own ethnos, its own culture. But the waves here are the frozen shafts of a crystal apocalyptic sea. Piles of quartz melted by the fallen sun.

1.7 Wozu Propheten in durftige Zeit?

Parenthesis: on prophecy. Prophecy is the result of the operative application of a spatial paradigm to an epistemological process. From the perspective of progressive time, all foresight is falsity, arbitrariness or delirium. The school of prophecy was based on the contemplation of the whole ontological landscape together. It is not just a matter of the future, but a picture of all being seen synchronously. The world of prophetic vision belongs to the total picture of reality, so most often the visions of the prophets describe an even geometric figure, the equivalent of a circular or square calendar. In this figure all seasons and cycles coexist, marked simultaneously. Hence the enigmatic nature of the prophecies. It is not about a precise description of future events, but about revealing the eternal paradigm of reality, extending to the past, present and future. Therefore, the statements of a prophet are always deliberately overloaded with meaning and significance. They carry such a gigantic amount of information about the structure of reality that they cannot be adequately interpreted only in a temporal paradigm, as the banal reasoning of ordinary beings requires.

The prophet tries to say: 'I saw all time as space, and space was overloaded with being and over-illuminated with meaning; I was lost and blinded in this radiant infinite expanse; I saw so much and so immediately that the limits of my consciousness collapsed like the walls of Jericho; the city of my individuality fell; choirs and bands of beings without duration sounded through me... So I could not discern detail, I contemplated the Whole, and understood too much to retain the ability to speak any one language. I am suppressed and destroyed, capable only of mumbling and making sounds in which all the languages and dialects of the world, past, present and future, have merged. All, however, have a common axis, but it goes beyond reason. If you want to understand something in my prophecies, I can only advise you to repeat my experience. But no, no, better stay where you are now. I cannot take responsibility for your leap into the realm of space. I will find disciples and diligently prepare them to interpret my cries and lamentations. I will shield them from the monstrous directness of experience, but teach

them the mysteries and visions intimately. From them you will learn what was, is and will be...”.

This is what the schools of prophets are based on. After all, it is also a profession.

But the cycle of prophecy ends when the world enters under the black shadow of the West. Time bites the prophet’s vulnerable foot venomously. And drags it down.

1.8 Where is your brother Cain?

René Guénon gives an interesting interpretation of the story of the children of Adam. He speaks of the original dualism of sedentarisation and nomadism. Sedentarism and nomadism correspond to the two original states of human society. Therefore we find their archetypes at the dawn of sacred history. Abel and Cain.

Cain is sedentary, his occupation is husbandry, his sacrifice is bloodless. His kingdoms are vegetable and mineral.

Abel is nomadic, his occupation is herding, his sacrifice

- bloody. His realm is the animal kingdom.

Both are children of the first man, Adam. But before Adam was expelled from paradise he “cultivated the garden”, i.e. he was also the overseer of the vegetable kingdom. The very symbolism of paradise (it is at the beginning) is vegetal, but the symbolism of the heavenly Jerusalem (it is at the end) is mineral.

Cain inherits from Adam to a greater extent than Abel. Therefore he is called the firstborn. Cain is in charge of both the beginning and the end. Cain is regarded as the creator of the first city. Perhaps the Judaic concepts of the “demonism of cities”, embodied in the eschatological legends of Babylon, go back to this...

Cain - fixation, Abel - mobility. Cain is ancient and coming, Abel is intermediate, present. Cain's bloodless sacrifice is linked to the pre-Arahamic cults, to Melchizedek. Abel

- The prefiguration of Aaron and his priesthood. Blood sacrifice.

In Henon's "Kingdom of Quantity" the theme is developed in a complex way: the "sedentary" (kainites) work with time, the "nomadic" devour space. Cain's murder of Abel, according to Henon, is the progressive sedentarization of civilization, a fixation which reaches its peak with the violent "settling" in the same place of the last nomadic peoples in the 20th century - Jews and Roma. What follows is Abel's revenge: "perverse nomadism" erodes urban civilisation, dissolving fixation through the subversive atomising concepts of "wandering cosmopolitans".

There is some ambiguity here: the "sedentary", logically linked to space, now appears to be responsible for the "affairs of time", while the "nomadic" are the opposite. This requires further reflection. In another paper.

One thing is certain: Cain is space in both his hypostasis: Adamic agricultural and eschatological urban. A misunderstood figure within the framework of Judaic ethics, which exalts everything nomadic and bloody and belittles everything bloodless and sedentary. The Eurasian Alexeev rightly noted on this subject that the entire era of kingdoms associated with the construction of the Temple was seen by Orthodox Judaism in a rather ambiguous, if not negative, light. The Jews gravitated towards theocracy, towards Aaronic service, towards radical Abrahamism. Kings, sedentarism, cities, all were alien, external, suspicious. '

Wagner on Monsalvat: "Here time passes into space". Henon identifies Monsalvat with the axial mountain of ancient traditions, on top of which lies 'earthly paradise'. "The passage of time into space" is, for Genon, at the same time the course of the extreme phase of the eschatological process. Cain completes Abel only today. But at the same time it is the unravelling of the square of the circle - the "stone flower", the "petrified paradise plant".

Somewhere, in the secret plane of being, it is indeed so, but not as a given, but as a task, not as a fact, but as the goal of a grand revolution...

Abel is time, the very spirit of the historicist paradigm. This paradigm was born in Abrahamism, in Judaism, and from there crept into modernity, made modernity. The New Age is the time of Judaism. The time of Abel. Departing from Henon, let us put forward our own version of "Abel's revenge" - this revenge is not in the future, but in the past, in the present. This revenge is the very historicist paradigm.

Liberals are not preachers of sedentarism. They are the bearers of a "new nomadism". It is no coincidence that Jacques Attali identifies the "realm of money" with the "realm of the new nomads".

In Cain, however, lies Monsalvat, the link between the city and the countryside, the working peasantry and the proletariat. The proletariat is the metallurgist, the Tubalka-in, the metal world of the cities, the "blacksmiths and alchemists". The peasantry is the agricultural labour of Cain himself, repeating his father's ancient, pre-Crenechopaden occupation. (Although the Kabbalah teaches that Cain and Abel had other fathers, and that Adam and Eve's firstborn outside adultery was Seth).

Cain is an Oriental, demonised by the priests according to Aaron's rank. So was Seir, Esau, the other blond beast, and again the firstborn, only to Isaac. The constant discrimination of the firstborn in the Jews - right down to Ephraim and Manasseh. This time wants to present itself as the firstborn of space, Cronus tries to pass himself off as the first and only... And he among 'titans is the youngest (and has beheaded his father - Heaven, apparently, having caught him once drunk and naked, like Ham). The Roman Saturn - the equivalent of Cronus - gave its name to the feast of 'saturnalia', when the highest and lowest in the hierarchy swap places, 'the last become first'.

The time that passes into space is not the time that devours space.

"O Cain! You just don't understand, and neither does Cronus' brother, Japeth.

Titan Iapetus...

Delicate Japheth, the blue-eyed, golden-haired son of Noah, loyal to the rainbow, builder of great empires, leader of four universal kingdoms.

You are Cain!

Knight of the Grail, you are Cain! If you have successfully reached the goal, and on the holy mountain - "the hill of salvation" - you have found the flaming cup.

Good-natured red-haired Esau, great hunter, you are Cain! How rejoiced the noble Isaac, whose Deity was honoured by the name of 'Husband the Strong', 'Ish': how he loved your lively natural forest smell, your courage, your simplicity... But..."

Abel gave birth to Occam, Occam gave birth to Descartes, Descartes gave birth to Kant, Kant gave birth to Comte, Comte gave birth to Popper, Popper gave birth to Fukuyama... May the lunar race who think they are the "chosen ones" dry up on Fukuyama.

Genon is wrong, Cain has not yet killed Abel, or rather he has, but not completely. "They went into the ovens by the hundreds, and out by the thousands..." Monsalvat's not very pleasant miracle with the three lads and the heavenly dew has been repeated more recently with the opposite meaning. As long as Abel's vengeance lasts, the curmudgeon of the humble carcasses of the innocent sheep, 'these little ones'. Cain is innocent, he was doing his duty - blood for blood, who once let it go from an innocent creature, will answer in full. It is more humane to sacrifice human beings than beasts. At least man is necessarily guilty of something, but the Beast? And the Beast?

Cain is "ka", the light that raises its hands, the spring rune of space. Cain is East, Abel is West.

1.9 Jehovah's War

If the West has so flouted ontology, dared to rebel against it, if it turned out to be the home of Time, the temporal paradigm and René Descartes, then what about the other sides of the world, the other regions of qualitative space?

The South accentuated mass. North was a rupture and a limit, a sector of being in which both continuities - time and space - questioned what abides on the other side or back of the centre. East is the fortress of the paradigm of space, the ascending antithesis of the subversion that seeks to generalise. The East is the militant truth of ontology. The East therefore has the mission to put an end to the Western resonance of catastrophe.

But the East is obliged to put together a triangle for this, where the role of the North and the role of the South will be understood. Overcoming the Western temptation is not really possible without re-examining the content of all ontological domains.

Why is time out of control in the West? How are South and West connected? North and East?

The resonance of the West is palpable. But what would be the resonance of the North? And the South? And what should be the resonance of the East?

Space can only respond to catastrophe if it manages to grasp its ontological cause. It means the sides of the world have to tell themselves fully about the structure of their being-roles. All orientations will be brought to the East, to the East of things, in order to find speech. And only then will the serpent of the New Age succeed in wringing its slippery neck, in crushing its spectacle-shaped bald skull.

The East needs to be saturated with new knowledge, to exchange with the triangle of the other sides of the World the specificity of highlighting ontological messages. The old time of the East is not suitable. The crisis of the time paradigm provokes the birth of a special chronological modification in the East. This modification is a response to Western resonance, but it activates a distant dialogue between North and South. All taken together,

it should add to the general fabric of being knowledge of its origins, the shadow side, the dark side of the ontological Moon. Or of the Kabbalistic meaning of the name of the sun demon...

How the paradigm of space and the paradigm of time relate today can be described. The problem is highlighted by the crisis of the modern world. In this dynamic catastrophic action the spatial mechanics of the epistemological East and West have opened up. Let us add, in their subnatural state. The hypertrophy of the New Age, as the cry of the West painfully trying to absolutise itself, brought previously obscured ontological structures to the surface. But we do not yet have the tools for the next step. - We do not know what the East's response to this challenge will be. We know what the East is like in suffering, as the historically defeated antithesis of the West. We do not yet know its triumphant ontological march, its golden post-critical self-assertion. It is suspected that such an affirmation is impossible without a fundamental rearrangement of the proportions in the general substratum of being.

The issue of the West - the temporal paradigm - is billed as an anomaly to be overcome and eradicated. What paradigm is then dictated by the South and the North, and how should they be considered by the East in order to "crush the viper"?

North is the source impulse, South is the mass. North articulates ideal models of ontological orientations. Like Motherland and Heaven. The South gives dark ground to the vesting of figures in the masses. In the East, both principles are poured into a unity of spirit-giving flesh or corporeal spirituality. Living space. The West divides North from South, "dense from subtle", *suaviter cum magno ingenio*. The West transforms the North into Minkowski space, while the South subdues, atomises and atomises. It is clear how the East exists alongside and before the West. Dawn before sunset, before sunset is obvious and imaginable. But when the Sunset-West wants to devour everything, going beyond its allotted limits, what is the East to do? Is it capable of pulling the light out of the vortex of the great midnight sun itself?

In such a dire situation, you cannot get away with a scheme. The resonance of the West could end up atomising everything. This will happen if ontology has a supratemporally predetermined end. Some religious theories think so. In this case, the temporal paradigm is the instrument of final annihilation. Whatever it manages to corrode will be turned into anti-being, turned outward. It cannot be ruled out that there is collusion between the West, these religions and anti-being. Almost certainly there is.

If this is not the case after all, it will simply start all over again. The West, swelling, will capture into its virtual void, into the negative cell of the digital couple (“yes” and “no”) only the varieties of being, and in the empty, vacated place, the East and the paradigm of space will discover itself. But it will be about new personas, new wave crossings. There are also such religions, fatalistic, stable, calm, stoically surviving their own annihilation.

But the ultimate attraction is the sectors of thought located at the intersection of these circles. The paradigm of time is terrible. It is evil and the end. The paradigm of space is beautiful. It is truth and permanence. But in both there is no teleology, no question of the final and providential orientation of the steps that predetermine not the structurization of the ontological strata, but the cause of this structurization. In other words, uncertainty - perhaps in the form of a particular discreteness under question - is glimpsed at the inner edge of wave universe, where the Big Answer would seem to be located. And in this case the ontological dysfunctions of the West and the shimmering (not firmly present, not asserted, not witnessed) gap at the point where the centre of the ontological map lies are themselves connected - no, it is not precise - shockingly suspicious of a possible connection.

The vapours (fumes) from this centre are thought to go up to the North and the sludge down to the South. Then North mixes with South and East appears. Then the East gives impetus to a rotational trajectory, following ontologically the orthogonal gesture of the collapse of the pole into North and South. As a result of the circular wandering the lump of life disintegrates. This is the West. But the waste of life, the immanent results of the end do not coincide with the carnal-spiritual predestination of North and South.

So the complete irrevocable ontological process beyond atomic illusions is carried out. The persona-mask, thing or form moves through the degrees of being, speaking of itself in different ways in different stages. Then temporal indivisibility dissolves, but the names remain. In the spatial paradigm all this does not really repeat itself, but there is one and the same thing. In an ontological and semantic way. No matter what the beings who fall under the hypnosis of the flickers of misty varieties, the droplets of damp existence think about it. All this remains unchanged.

The irreversibility of 'Western exile' (Sohravardi), besides pointing to the limitations of ontology - the conclusion of the West itself - or asserting the permanence of space, where there is simply no displacement (the axiom of the East), may have a third meaning.

This is the way of 'Jehovah's War', the cuirass of the East. A schism in the last thicknesses, taken on a shield.

It is impossible to say this because it has not yet become a fact. Moreover, it may not become a fact, as it goes beyond even the spatial paradigm.

Is there something beyond being?

And is it not this hypothetical "something" that has brought upon us the plague of the West, the feverish malaise of Cartesianism, to indirectly point to prospects even more distant, dangerous and profound than the fear-soaked solemn structure of the fixed spatial universe?

Au-dela de la Lumiere primordiale de l'Orient des choses et des etres...

And even more audacious: Jenseits des Nordens, des Eises, des heute (Nietzsche)...

Part II

MOSCOW AS AN IDEA

Chapter 1

Moscow as an idea

1.1 The religious significance of Moscow

Moscow is not just a great city, not just a great capital, not just a symbol of a gigantic Empire. Moscow is a basic concept of theology and geopolitics.

Moscow is called the “Third Rome” not just as a metaphor or a self-indulgence of narrow national pride. It is much, much deeper than that. In Orthodoxy there is a particular doctrine of the “three Romans”. The first was the imperial Rome before Christ - the same Rome on whose territory the Son of God came down to earth. This Rome was a universal reality, which united into a civilizational unity of gigantic spaces, numerous peoples and cultures.

The Second Rome, the New Rome, was Constantinople, the capital of the Roman Empire, which had received the grace of holy baptism. From then on, the Roman Empire acquired a purely ecclesiastical, deeply Christian meaning.

The Orthodox Emperor, the Basil, as head of the Empire, was identified with the enigmatic character from St Paul’s 2nd letter to the Thessalonians - the “keeper”, the “catechumen” - who must prevent the “coming of the son of perdition” at the end of time.

The coming of Christ is the central event of world history. Everything that preceded it was an omen. What followed was the universalisation of the Good News. And the centre of history in the Christian era, in the Orthodox sense, was Rome, New Rome, Constantinople and its head, the Orthodox emperor.

In other words, after Constantine, New Rome (Second Rome) was the true subject of history, the lever of the mysterious house-building of Salvation and Deification of the ecumenism.

The heretical West, led by the Germanic usurper kings and the secularised Catholic clergy, had fallen away from Rome, hence falling away from the

Church. The Vatican was anti-Rome, denied the orthodox significance of the “catechon”-vassal, and inappropriately asserted the totality of papal authority.

After the Schism of the Churches into the Western (Catholic) and Eastern (Orthodox) Churches, the New Rome, Byzantium, remained the only guardian of true Christianity, while the Catholics fell into the abyss of apostasy. From them the “catechumens” were taken away.

But the Second Rome was also doomed to fall. When he was shaken in his faith and tried to resort to military aid from the West against the Turks, even at the cost of refusing to stand firm in the Orthodox truth and accepting the Florentine Union. But this did not save him, perhaps on the contrary, it ruined him completely.

And then there seemed to be no more room for the “catechon”, the “keeper”, the door for the coming of the “son of perdition” was open.

But in the northern kingdom, in the snowy and wild lands inhabited by a strange, thoughtful, contemplative people immersed in the elements of their secret mission, all things remained as if the terrible event - the “removal of the holding” - had not happened. As paradise was spared the decadence of the sinfulness of all other places on earth, Russia turned out to be the only country where the proportions and norms of genuine Christianity were wonderfully preserved.

So the eternal city has moved to the North, to Moscow. Moscow henceforth accepted the baton of the subject of history. Later the Patriarchate was established in Russia, and the “symphony of powers” was fully established. Moscow became synonymous with Orthodoxy in the post-Byzantine era.

The last stronghold of Salvation, the ark of truth, New Israel.

Moscow is the seal of God-bearingness of the Russian people.

This city was the last to enter spiritual history. The third Rome, “there shall be no fourth”.

But the latter will be the first, which means that Moscow is the most God-elected point on earth. And since it is our human earth that the Saviour chose as the place of Incarnation, it means that this place is central in the whole universe.

Moscow is truth, life, the way, the good. Moscow is an absolute.

The shadow of the Antichrist tried to break this last stronghold of the Good News. Two hundred years of St Petersburg, Romanov's Russia - a period of "abomination of desolation". No Patriarch, no full-fledged symphonic monarchy, no Moscow as the capital. It all adds up.

It was only in 1917 that the Bolsheviks, a strange, variously possessed personality, put things in their proper place as a supreme paradox, as a strange soteriological enigma. In this period, despite outright anti-Church persecution, the Russian Patriarchate was restored, the traitorous dynasty was abolished, and most importantly: Moscow was once again the capital, once again the Third Rome.

Meanwhile, in the residence of the tsars of Moscow (!), an icon of the Sovereign has been miraculously discovered. It shows the Queen of Heaven on her throne, as the ruler of Russia, as the autocrat of the Third Rome, the holy city of Moscow, the most beautiful and tragic of which there is, has never been and will never be in the universe.

1.2 Moscow's geopolitical mission

As the centre of the theological Christian doctrine linked to the mystery of the fate of all humanity, to the mystery of salvation, Moscow is also the axis of a more down-to-earth, purely geopolitical reality.

Whereas the Christian vision of history is based on the battle between the faithful to Christ, between the Church of Christ and the world of apostasy, the reality of the Antichrist, the "son of perdition", in geopolitics the main drama unfolds in the confrontation between two camps - Land and Sea, Tellurocracy and Thalassocracy.

The world of the Sea, from Carthage to the modern USA, embodies the pole of the mercantile system, the “market civilisation”. This is the way of the West, the way of technological development, individualism, liberalism. It is dominated by dynamism and mobility, which promotes modernization and progress in the material sphere. The civilisation of the Sea was also called “Atlanticism” in recent centuries, as its main stronghold shifted little by little to the Atlantic Ocean (USA) up to the point of eminence. The modern North Atlantic Alliance is a strategic expression of this civilisation model.

It is opposed by the world of Dryland, the world of Tradition. This is the “heroic civilisation”, the reality of fidelity to ancient foundations. Here progress is made not so much in the material realm as in the realm of the spirit, the moral dominates the physical, honour over profit. The geopolitical history of the land stretches from Ancient Rome through Byzantium to the Eastern bloc that confronted the West during the Cold War. The civilisation of the Land is Eurasia, the continental vastness. At the centre of this Eurasian expanse is Russia, dubbed by the greatest English geopolitician, one of the founding fathers of this discipline, the “middle land”. And again in the centre of Russia is Moscow. As a summary of all land spaces, as a synonym of the civilisation of the Land.

Mackinder wrote: “He who controls Eurasia controls the world. This is the basis of the long-term geopolitical ”anaconda strategy“ that the Anglo-Saxons, the Atlanteans, have been pursuing for centuries within the continental expanse. It is the ongoing ”battle for Moscow“.

Moscow is the capital of the land civilisation. Situated in the heart of the continent, far from ports and seas, it is a continental capital that combines the spatial masses of the Eurasian East and the technological dynamics of the Eurasian West.

From the West, Atlantists have rushed here under different flags and at different times: from the Poles to Napoleon to Hitler. And every time the invaders of the West were pushed back by continental power to the Atlantic

shores.

Moscow is the axis of the Eurasian bloc, the heart of the "heartland".

1.3 The Moscow Tsardom

Different schools of history define the source of Russian statehood in different ways. Most tend to believe that the central period of state history is the Moscow Empire or the so-called "Moscow period", which lasted from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century, i.e. from the liberation from the Tatars to Peter the Great. It was during this period that the main features of the Great Russian people and its state and social institutions were formed. The great Russian scholar Lev Gumilev, who, following the Russian Eurasians, emphasised the radical ethical, ethnic and cultural-social difference between Moscow Rus' and the rest of the Slavic entities, and Kiev Rus', which remained an ordinary provincial Eastern European state without any special Eurasian geopolitical features, showed this process in more detail and in greater volume than other historians.

Russia itself as a unique Eurasian entity, which assumed the geographical and political mission of Genghis Khan and was called upon to unite under its control the continental lands (and cultures) of the East and West, took shape precisely in the Moscow period, when Moscow princes, later tsars, realized their responsibility for the special historical and cultural path entrusted to the Russian people. On the religious level, this manifested itself in the Russians' adoption of a Byzantine ideology, but in practice this lofty idea was superimposed on the model of a rigid centralized administrative and economic system of the Tatar empire. This combination made a provincial state the cradle of a global empire, and a strange, paradoxical people lost in the snow and forests, an ethnos blessed with a universal mission.

The Moscow idea, the concept of the "Third Rome" (the elder Philo-Pheus) embodied the highest aspirations of the national will. The Domoskovsky period was a prelude to the Moscow period.

The Petersburg period, when the Romanovs, beginning with Peter the Great,

formally anathematized the "old order" and the "old faith", turned to the West, renounced their own Eurasian mission and doomed the people to a veiled but no less formidable "Roma-German yoke" (in the words of Prince Nikolai Trubetskoy), still carried the trends laid down in Moscow. Although at a different level, the link with the cradle of national statehood was never severed. While St Petersburg was the embodiment of Russian "Westernization", a capital as close to "Atlanticism" as possible, Moscow remained a symbol of a Eurasian, traditional beginning, embodying the heroic, sacred past, loyalty to its roots and the pure origins of state history.

Everything "modernist" in Russia is linked to St Petersburg. Everything traditional is connected to Moscow.

Russia's three historic capitals symbolise three geopolitical orientations and simultaneously three types of statehood.

Kiev is an ethnic, eastern Slavic line. At the limit, it gravitated towards becoming a cultural and political province of Europe. Being Orthodox, Kievan Rus was part of the Orthodox world, but it was not and could not be a powerful independent Orthodox state with a specific national idea and a specific social structure.

Moscow is a Eurasian capital, a symbol of Russians becoming themselves, gaining the meaning of their historical existence, a special unique style combined with the assumptions of a universal mission in both cultural and political, religious and socio-ethical senses. Moscow is self-sufficiency and completeness, an acquisition of self.

St Petersburg is a secular capital, post-Moscow, associated with the desacralisation of Russian life, with the rejection of the spiritual historical mission, of the unique and universal simultaneously Russian way. This is a line of alienation from its own roots and spiritual and historical traditions. It is obvious that Synodal "Petersburg" Orthodoxy has little in common with true Byzantism, on the principles of which the Russian Church was built in the Moscow period, headed by the Orthodox Tsar and the Orthodox Patriarch.

In St. Petersburg in the eighteenth century it was forbidden at all for people in plain Russian dress to enter...

1.4 Moscow Sovetskaya

The Bolsheviks' relocation of the capital to Moscow is highly significant. Geopolitically, historically and, in a sense, spiritually, it was a gesture towards a return to a Eurasian orientation. It is difficult to say whether the Communist leaders were aware of such an act. But from the point of view of a higher logic, it was perfectly justified. Under the Soviet regime, Russia is once again putting itself in opposition to the West (although now on strictly ideological grounds), once again opening up to Asia, once again taking the path of cultural, social and economic autarchy. One can argue as much as one likes about the "too high a price" one has paid for it. But everything great in history is done, alas, with great blood.

In any case, it was under the Bolsheviks that the Eurasian camp reached its maximum spatial volume, and the USSR remains the most expressive example of a giant continental empire. Various continental territories, Eurasian ethnicities and cultures are integrated into a single bloc. The Soviet period represents an attempt to find a new relevant and contemporary, yet still recognisable messianic ideal of the Third Rome.

Red Moscow becomes the capital of the Third International. The Third Kingdom - Empire of the Holy Spirit, This theory goes back to the Christian mystic Joachim de Flore, and even deeper to the ancient charismatic preacher Montan, who was, incidentally, the first to begin building the New Jerusalem in Thessaly, an earthly prototype of the Heavenly City, long before the Anabaptists and Patriarch Nikon.

Even if in a heretical and extreme form, the Bolsheviks could clearly sense the secret whiff of Eurasian thought, of the Moscow Idea in its universal meaning. The people and the Church were replaced by the "proletariat", "Satan" by capital, "civilisation of the Sea" by international imperialism and colonialism, e

Language changes, terms change, ideologies change... But the essence remains the same. Moscow, the capital of the Land, of the Spirit, of Labour, against the oceanic strategies of matter and commercial technology.

Again Rome versus Carthage, the ideal of hierarchy and service versus the values of profit, enterprise and "rational selfishness".

This time, Moscow - becomes the "Rome of the proletariat". And yet it is Rome. The hope of the oppressed, the dispossessed, the robbed and humiliated of the whole earth... The capital of a new empire - an empire conceived as the dawn of an era of universal happiness and goodness...

The price paid for the ideal is too great. But it does not discredit the ideal itself, but only the ways of realising it. The fact that the miracle did not happen is not the fault of those who sincerely and sacrificially strived for it, but of those who proved too mundane and ordinary for the lofty dream.

1.5 To be or not to be

The history of Moscow is the history of an idea. It lies not only in the past, but also extends into the future.

Today we are undoubtedly experiencing a deep crisis of state and national ideas, unable to find the right proportions to understand the past. Hence the confusion in the present. A sense of disaster associated with the thought of the future. Our society is frantically trying to find a reliable reference point, a coherent, comprehensive, capacious concept of our national path.

There is a certain public sector which - following the American political scientist Fukuyama - believes that "history is over", that nations, states, religions and cultures are destined to fade away into the single world of the planetary market. Such are the extreme Russian liberals who believe that their main task is to put a final stop to national history, to make Russia a "tabula rasa", to turn it into a quantitative, indistinguishable segment of the world community.

But it is clear that such an extremist approach is unlikely to satisfy all of

us. We are unlikely to accept the prospect of historical disappearance, of a voiceless dissolution into a benign world. We are unlikely to give up our religious, geopolitical, social and cultural identity easily, as the technocrats of the "new world order" would like us to do.

Our national alternative has a name, a symbol, a banner. It is Moscow. In all the meaning of this most complex concept, in all the depth and paradoxical nature of this complete and self-sufficient theory.

Hamlet's question "to be or not to be?" in a nationwide historical sense is formulated for us today as "to be or not to be Moscow?", "to be or not to be the Moscow Idea?".

At this point, economic and administrative problems, political interests and philosophical questions, historical theories and contemporary ideologies, economic ties and social crises intertwine like a focal point.

But at all levels, in all slices and on all floors of this complex subject, we must clearly remember the semantic depths behind every specific issue, behind every decision taken, behind every approved or rejected project, every resolution.

Chapter 2

Pole of the Russian Circle:

Moscow's place in the sacral

Russian geography

2.1 The contours of the country in the "psychology of the deep"

Issues of geography are intimately connected with psychological archetypes. Every nation, every civilisation, every culture sees and understands space in a special and unique way. There is always some code that serves as a hallmark of the national myth of territory.

The reconstructions of modern religious historians, sociologists and anthro-

pologists allow us to speak of an entire science - sacred geography - that predetermined our ancestors' perception of the surrounding world in its spatial dimension. The norms of sacred geography formed the basis of epics, hagiographies, legends, myths and fairy tales.

As rational aspects of life developed, sacred geography moved into the sphere of the unconscious, predetermining deep psychic archetypes, rudimentary reactions, the typology of reservations and dreams. Having disappeared from the daytime level, the geography of myth moved into the sphere of unconscious reactions, but it had by no means lost its hypnotic power.

There are peoples who see their homeland, their country, as an island. Others see it as a plain bordered by mountains. Some see it as a space between two or more great rivers. Some see it as an uninterrupted chain of mountains. Some see it as a coastline. And so on. And on the basis of this sacred geography of the native land, an idea of the entire universe is formed.

As ordinary (non-sacred) geography develops, these perceptions recede into the past, but - as research by Gustav Jung's school of "depth psychology" has shown - they retain their influence on the structure of the human soul. And even in a modern society based on exact knowledge and technological rationalism, the ancient perceptions are still very much in evidence.

2.2 Russian psaltery of the Kiev period

The sacral geography of Russia has three main formulas, corresponding to the three stages of development of Russian state thought. The most ancient model of sacral geography, peculiar to Kievan Rus, viewed the Russian space as a circle, a giant plain surrounded on all sides by a ring of mountains. There were legends about how some Russian hero (Ilya Muromets, etc.) accomplished a feat by clearing the Russian Plain of rubble, forests and basur-mans, shifting it all to the outskirts. The cleared space, flanked by dark, hostile forces and landscapes, greatly influenced the national psychology of the Russians, predetermining the main features of the folk character, embodied in folklore, culture, civilisational, social and political clichés. The

Russian Circle is perceived at this basic level as a field, i.e. etymologically as a harmonious emptiness (the word "field" from "hollow", "empty").

Kievan Rus was not strongly centralised. There were several poles in parallel, several capitals - Kiev, Novgorod, Chernigov, Vladimir, etc. The legends and traditions liken the poles of the Russian circle to the spikes of psaltery or another stringed instrument, with the roads strung between them. The whole Rus appears as a psaltery, on which the people's will plays, and upon which the harmonious shiver of national history runs.

The entire territory is cumulatively opposed to the worlds of the periphery, and within there is the same distinction as between the harmonies and strings of the same instrument. Peace and tranquillity is a harmonious melody. Enmity and strife are cacaphony, unstructured sounds.

The sacral geography of the times of Kievan Rus' is characterized by polycentricity and parallelism of power lines, corresponding often to the trajectories of the flow of the great Russian rivers. The main "string" of space is stretched between the North (Novgorod) and the South (Kiev).

Such a sacral-geographical model has developed from the very beginning of the history of Russia as a state, from that period when the predominantly Slavic tribes of the Russian Plain realised their cultural and social unity.

2.3 The wheel of Moscow

Together with the Tatar-Mongol invasion, this picture begins to transform. The unity of the Russian circle was undermined from within (the discord), which enabled the successful conquerors to include Russia in the context of an entirely different territorial construct. In a sense it can be said that the Russian people during the Mongol presence realised the historical inadequacy of the polycentric, parallel structure of Russian space, too malleable to resist a rigid and centralised enemy.

Gradually, influenced by observations of Tatar social institutions, the Russians came to the conclusion that a new configuration of sacral geography

was necessary. The Russian circle must have a rigid centre. From parallel "strings" one must move to the model of the wheel. This constriction of space to the centre, a rigid connection forms the second and most important archetype of the national formula of the territory - the Moscow Kingdom.

A new point rises between the North (Novgorod) and the South (Kiev) - Vladimir, later Moscow. This is an entirely new element - a single axis, an exclusive pole.

The new configuration of Holy Russia is historically juxtaposed with our Russian "Reconquista", with the reconquest of independence and the reverse wave of the Russian movement to the Tatar lands - to the East and South, to the steppes and to Siberia.

The inadequacy of the ancient circle without a centre is made up for. Moscow Russia is a circle with a centre. A new Russia. Great Russia, which has reached the apogee of its civilizational flourishing.

It was during the period of the Moscow Kingdom that the Great Russians finally formed into an independent ethnos, with an entirely different quality and a different national psychology. The Moscow Tsardom was the time when the Great Russians finally emerged as an autonomous ethnic group, with a very distinctive quality and national psychology.

The ethnopsychology of the Russian people acquired its final forms during this period, and strictly speaking "Holy Russia" should be referred to geographically and historically as the Kingdom of Moscow.

The sacral geography of this period is a circle with a centre. The pole of Moscow-Third Rome, from which beams diverge in all directions.

All roads lead to the Third Rome. Together with the new dominant ethnic group - the Velikorosses, the "Russians" themselves - a new picture of the world is emerging.

Russian national psychology is deeply Moscovian, Moscovocentric. This factor is responsible for the cultural type of what we call a "Russian person".

2.4 The "Russian Babylon" of the Romanovs

The crisis of the Moscow model of sacral geography falls during the period of schism and the subsequent reign of Peter the Great.

The balance of Moscow as the absolute pole of Holy Russia, as the axis of Orthodoxy, is broken in favour of the Western component. The wheel of the Russian circle is slipping off its providential axis. The clarity and harmony of the Great Russian blossom comes to an end. Cultural and religious life is being fragmented and decentralised. The rigid orthodox Old Believers of the Moscow Idea are taking the great formula of Holy Russia on the run and into the fire. In Pustozersk they burn not a passionate denouncer of the new orders, but a great symbol of fidelity to the optimal picture of sacred geography.

The Old Believers are developing the concept of "Russia-Babylon", the Russia of Peter and the Western monarchs who have substituted royal authority and church sacraments. They are absolutely right in their diagnosis - there is a change in the sacral-geographical paradigm, the Muscovocentric system of national psychology is collapsing.

From now on, the centre is moving to St Petersburg. But this is not a new pole. Rather, it is a passive pull towards the West, a demonstration that the centre is not inside but outside, beyond the borders of the West. Romanov's Russia perceived itself as a province of the West. The aristocracy adopts the manners of colonial administration. The upper class henceforth treats the Russian people, their national psyche, their legends, their sacral and geographical depths as "savage prejudices". On the negative side, this manifests itself in the blatant contempt and Russophobia of the misguided nobility. But even the "populists" treat the "commoners" like butterfly collectors treat their exhibits. "The people are a child," they say. They should be taught and educated." Naturally, the deep mental layers of national life and the mythology of representations are not taken seriously by anyone.

The Petersburg period did not produce any new sacral-geographical picture.

In the strata of the aristocracy, the centre has shifted to Europe, i.e. Russian space itself has lost its symbolic independence. And on the level of common people, either drawn massively to Old Believers, or simply faithful to the precepts of old times in a more general sense, the old Russian sacral-geographical picture continued to live and was transmitted. Holy Russia - the great Russian circle - with its holy centre in Moscow.

Moscow became a secret capital, a kind of Kitezh, a stronghold of those classes and strata of the Russian people who continued to be faithful to their ancient ideas and passed on the secrets of national tradition from generation to generation, the sacred formula of Russian space.

2.5 Bolshevik Restoration of Sacral Geography

Paradoxically, the return to the Muscovite-centric model comes with the Revolution. It would seem that the Bolsheviks, raised on Western credentials, should have followed the St Petersburg path of the essentially Russo-phobic pseudo-Romanovs even further. In practice, however, the strata of the new elite that had risen from the depths of the people brought with them the dormant forces of Russian national geography. When hopes of an early victory of the Revolution in Europe collapsed, the construction of “socialism in one country” awakened the ancient elements of the Russian soul. Not just the capital was moved to Moscow, but unconscious structuralisation of psychological space was reborn on a new level. As in the days of the Moscow tsars, in the new Bolshevik Russia, the role of the political, spiritual, psychological and social centre was concentrated in one ancient pole. The Third Rome became the capital of the Third International, while the idea of universal salvation through the true Faith, preserved intact only within Holy Russia, was replaced by the mission of building communism worldwide, departing from the unique historical experience of the Russian socialist state.

The apparently even more rationalist and “progressive” communist rule had in fact awakened dormant archetypes. At the level of the collective unconscious, Soviet Russia was far more reminiscent of an ancient Russian circle

centred in Moscow than of an eastern semi-colonial appendage of Europe, as it had been during the Romanov era. Moscow Rus' hatred of Latin heresy, papism, and categorical rejection of the religious, cultural and civilizational apostasy of the West was reflected in the Russian Communists' rejection of the capitalist world, the bourgeois system of values. Again, as in ancient times, the giant wheel with its centre in Moscow was perceived as a bastion of harmony and order, as a chosen ark surrounded by the forces of darkness, chaos and evil.

The myth of the Bolshevik Revolution, the socialist Fatherland and the new communist order overlapped perfectly with the ancient layers of the collective unconscious. Soviet Moscow, Red Moscow in this context was a symbol, the most important, central element of a strong, effective, active myth.

2.6 The anti-Moscow nature of the reforms

We are currently experiencing a major crisis. Once again the deep archetypes of national psychology are being broken. And as always at critical moments in history, from the abysses of the collective unconscious rise images of sacred geography, ancient figures that predetermine the structure of our national and cultural type.

In these circumstances, Moscow cannot be seen only as an administrative centre, as the capital in the prosaic, utilitarian-technical sense. Its role, its significance, its symbolic content go far beyond pragmatics.

Russia once again faces a choice. Which sacral-geographical model to choose? Which historical period to take as a starting point? What orientation to follow? What model to strive for?

At the beginning of the reforms, the choice seemed clear-cut. Moscow-centrism looked like outright evil. Both socialist and nationalist tendencies were branded as "red-brown", as forces of reaction, etc. Westernisation" became the dominant ideology and the whole argument was over the speed at which the country should be incorporated into the liberal-democratic world.

The reformers were divided between outspoken radical Russophobes, who openly admitted their hatred of everything Russian - history, statehood, culture - and who proposed to discard everything for the sake of uncritical copying of universal, averaging Western models, and moderate Westerners, who positively assessed the Romanov period and tolerated the idea of an “enlightened monarchy”. In principle, both varieties of reformers acted within the same paradigm of space, which equally rejected Muscovocentrism.

In other words, at the level of sacred geography and psychology of the depths, we can say that perestroika and the first phase of liberal reforms were blatantly anti-Moscow.

2.7 Moscow today: a negative image on three levels

At present, Moscow’s functions in the collective unconscious are divided into three distinct realities. On the one hand, Moscow is the federal centre. This means that it is the concentration of administrative, political and strategic life for the entire country. This “federal Moscow” is an abstract category, characterised by the fact that it is the base of the all-Russian bureaucratic leadership. Since the overall social and cultural climate in the country is distinctly negative and critical, “federal Moscow” for other Russian regions is often identified with a negative authority, the fiefdom of corrupt egoistic bureaucrats responsible for all the country’s woes and misfortunes.

The negativity of this image of “federal Moscow” is equally shared by those who disapprove of liberal reforms and those who sympathise with them. Opponents of reforms in the provinces see the “federal centre” as an instance that destroys an organised economic system on the ground for the sake of abstract liberal principles while robbing the regions, withholding budgetary resources and restricting the regional economy. In other words, in the eyes of “conservatives”, “federal Moscow” performs the opposite function to that which “patriotic Moscow” should perform. The aversion to such a Moscow represents a certain parallel with the Old Believer idea of turning Moscow into Babylon. The Young Reformers in such a situation fulfil the functions of “papal agents” (the historical Arsenii Grek, Paisii Ligarides and other

activists of the Nikonian reforms), while the President is an apostate tsar who has fallen under the influence of the “servants of the Antichrist”. The main claim to the “federal Moscow” of the “right” is that such a Moscow is not Moscow enough.

The reformers themselves, on the other hand, believe that Moscow is still too Moscow, and that the current administration is still influenced by the old centralist methods. In the provinces, this position is most often expressed in demands for economic autonomy and a desire to establish direct contacts with foreign partners, bypassing the control of the centre.

Admittedly, in both cases, the image of “federal Moscow” is generally negative, and this will largely account for the processes of Russia’s territorial disintegration, which in addition to socio-economic and political reasons must also be based on certain psychological archetypes.

The second level is political Moscow, Moscow as Russia. Here we are talking not about the internal but the external image of the capital. Here, on the whole, the same unattractive picture as in the previous case is repeated. Countries, regimes, groups and currents which traditionally adhered to the Eurasian orientation and considered Moscow as the leader of the coalition of all anti-Western, anti-Atlantist forces, consider Moscow’s modern line as liquidatorial and traitorous, as an abandonment of its planetary large-scale mission. Moscow is not enough Moscow.

On the contrary, the traditional opponents of the Eurasian project, like the Russian liberals, refuse to believe in the “seriousness and irreversibility of the democratic transformations” and are now and again waiting for a catch from a traditional opponent and rival, who has recently moved into the category of allies. Moscow is still too Moscow. And its “hand” is still to be feared.

And finally, a third Moscow. Moscow is regional, Moscow as one of Russia’s regions. This “Moscow regionalism” consists in treating the city as a small country, considering it from the position of a region. “Moscow regional” is

to a certain extent opposed to “Moscow federal”. Yet “Moscow regionalism” cannot serve as a universal model for development of other regions because the status of the capital and the federal centre still plays a huge role here. Therefore, from a purely regional point of view, the Moscow experience is seen as not entirely objective and pure, as a kind of selfish exploitation of the resources and energies of the whole country by one privileged region. Against this background, all the achievements of the Moscow economy in the regional sense change their sign to the exact opposite, and only add to the negative image of a “federal Moscow”.

In other words, there is a major crisis of the Moscow-centric

The situation is aggravated by the fact that no model for the conceptual and symbolic organisation of Russian space is proposed at all today - not even the St Petersburg model, when Russia was seen as a secular empire and an extension of the whole country. The situation is aggravated by the fact that no model for the conceptual and symbolic organisation of Russian space is proposed at all today - not even the St Petersburg model, when Russia was seen as a secular empire, as a continuation of Europe to the East.

2.8 Social relief conflict

The most stable and operational construction, in terms of sacred geography, is full-fledged and complete Muscovocentrism, the idea of Russia as a wheel revolving around a centre. Concentric psychology is deeply rooted in our people. In this, Russia is the exact opposite of the United States, whose mythological geography is inherently fragmented and individualized. There is no qualitative difference between the centre and the periphery. A one-storey America is America as such. The fragmentation of the States, the multi-polarity, the equivalence of each particular place in the USA is the antithesis of the sacral-geographical model of Russia. The space of North America is completely demythologised, devoid of quality. It also has a historical explanation - the USA emerged as an artificial cultural, civilizational and state formation, as an application of the principles of European rationalism and pragmatism to life. The USA has no sacred prehistory; the

autochthonous inhabitants of this land were the first victims of rational colonisers. In the USA, the desacralisation of space is much more complete than in Europe, where the process of decentralisation also unfolded actively, but because of the presence of traditions and mythological prehistory, it did not achieve such radical results in depriving space of qualitative specificity as in the New World.

Russia is much more archaic in this sense than Europe, let alone the United States. If the space of the States is extremely homogeneous, the space of Russia is extremely hierarchical. Whereas in America, there is an equality of states, the Russian circle is always measured by the degree of remoteness from the centre. This is a peculiarity of our cultures, of our history, of our particular and sometimes opposing paths of development.

Russia will always naturally gravitate towards Muscovocentrism, towards a circular, polar structure. If the special task of bringing Russia closer to the European or American ideal of organising space were to be undertaken, it would take enormous effort, and the resulting structure would be extremely unstable. Perhaps the most “rational” way to achieve this goal would be to doom the Russian people to the fate of the North American Indians. But then the reformers must deliberately commit genocide.

2.9 Who will restore the Sacred Circle?

Moscow stands at the heart of our homeland, our history and our culture. It is the heart of Russia, its secret nerve.

Moscow’s mission is on the other side of the “federal Moscow”, the “political Moscow” and the “regional Moscow”. This mission is sacred and planetary, it has spiritual meaning. In terms of sacred geography, Moscow is the centre of the Sacred Circle, the Circle of Salvation.

Who will become the bearer of the idea of Moscow in its entirety?

Who will take the courage to say a radical “YES” to Russian sacred space, to recognise and defend the specificity and secret meaning of national geog-

raphy in its spiritual, historical and concretely pragmatic dimensions?

EURASIA: FOUNDING FATHERS

Chapter 1

Nikolai Trubetskoy: Overcoming the West

1.1 Monument in 'Eurasia Square'

Prince Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoy (1890-1938) can rightly be called "Eurasian number one". It is to him belong the main worldview theses, with which this amazing creative worldview began. Prince Trubetskoy may be called the "Eurasian Marx", while Savitsky clearly resembles the "Eurasian Engels". The first Eurasian text proper is Nikolai Trubetskoy's book *Europe and Humanity*, in which the basic principles of the forthcoming Eurasian ideology are easily discernible.

In a sense, it was Trubetskoy who created Eurasianism and opened the main power lines of this theory, which were subsequently developed by a whole galaxy of major Russian thinkers - from Peter Savitsky, Nikolai Alekseev and Lev Karsavin to Lev Gumilev. Trubetskoy's place in the history of the Eurasian movement is central. When this movement establishes itself as the dominant ideology of the Russian statehood (and this is bound to happen sooner or later), the first person to whom a monument will be erected will be him - Prince Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoy. The main monument on the coming great "Eurasia Square", as the central square of a reborn Russia will surely be called, which will be drenched in luxuriant foliage and flooded with the purest jets of silver fountains.

1.2 The fate of the "Russian Spengler"

To speak of Trubetskoy is the same as to speak of Eurasianism as such. His personal and intellectual destiny is inseparable from this movement. Trubetskoy's biography is extremely simple. A typical representative of a well-known princely family, which gave an entire galaxy of thinkers, philosophers, theologians, he completed his classical education, specializing in linguistics.

He was interested in philology, Slavophilia, Russian history and philosophy. He was distinguished by a strong patriotic feeling.

During the civil war he sided with the white movement and emigrated to Europe. He spent the second half of his life abroad. From 1923 he taught at the Department of Slavic Studies at Vienna University of Philology and History of Slavic Literature. Together with Roman Jakobson, Trubetskoy was one of the core founders of the Prague Linguistic Circle, which in the 1920s and 1930s developed the foundations of structural linguistics - the intellectual movement that would later become known as 'structuralism'.

Prince Nikolai Trubetskoy was the soul of the Eurasian movement, its main theorist, a kind of Russian Spengler. It is from his book *Europe and Mankind* that the history of this movement should be reckoned. Trubetskoy was the most active in developing the main fundamental aspects of Eurasianism. But being a scientist and devoting a considerable part of his time to philological research, he was little and reluctantly interested in aspects of applying the principles of Eurasianism to current politics. The function of political leader in Eurasianism was performed by his close friend and associate Peter Savitsky. Trubetskoy's temperament was more abstract, with a penchant for speculation and abstraction.

The crisis of the political component in Eurasianism, which had become evident since the late 20s, was experienced severely and painfully by its main theorist. The consolidation of the position of Soviet power, the stagnation, archaism and irresponsibility of the émigré milieu, the spiritual and intellectual stagnation that began in both branches of Russian society from the 1930s onwards, after the rapid spiritual upsurge of the early century, all this ideological cooling put the Eurasian ideology, based on a gamut of subtle intuition, paradoxical insights and passionate flights of fancy, in a desperate, deadlocked situation. In recent years, Trubetskoy, seeing the marginalisation of the Eurasianist idea, has devoted increasing amounts of time to pure science: he has stopped participating in the polemics and conflicts within the movement since its split, leaving aside the critique of the émigré opponents of Eurasianism that was based on an unchanging *ressentiment*. In

1937, Prince Trubetskoy was caught by the Gestapo in Vienna and spent three days in custody. The elderly scholar is never able to recover from the blow and soon dies.

His death was unnoticed by almost no one. A terrible catastrophe was looming over the world. Its main ideological prerequisites were the rejection of those principles and axioms, which, in the highest spiritual, intellectual strain, the Russian Eurasians and their European counterparts, the conservative revolutionaries, supporters of National Bolshevism and the Third Way, had managed to formulate.

Eurasians predicted worldview routes and their political results with prophetic clairvoyance. But the fate of prophets at all times, alas!, is the same: stones thrown by the crowd, the bonfire, the Gulag, the Gestapo...

1.3 Humanity versus Europe

The most valuable aspect of Prince Trubetskoy's thought, the foundation of the entire Eurasian worldview, is the assertion of the radical dualism of civilisations and the comprehension of the historical process as a competition between two alternative projects. The first theoretical book of Prince Trubetskoy, *Europe and Mankind*, is devoted to this dualism. In it, the following idea is expressed in stingy and often approximate terms: there is no single path of civilization development; such a claim conceals only the aspiration of one particular aggressive form of civilization, namely the Romano-Germanic one, to universality, uniqueness, hegemony and absolutism. It is the gigantomaniacal, inherently racist, claim of the Romano-Germanic world to be the measure of culture and progress that underlies the need to divide the whole world into Europe, on the one hand, and humanity, on the other. The Romano-Germanic world, as part of a multipolar, multi-cultural historical reality, had the satanic claim to be a conceptual whole, arrogantly relegating the other cultural types to the regions of barbarism of underdevelopment, primitiveness, savagery. And humanity, in Troubetzky's conception, is the unified category of all those peoples, cultures and civilisations that differ significantly from the European model. Trubetskoy argues that this difference

is not just a statement of fact, but a formula for civilizational and historical confrontation, a demarcation line, along which the nerve of modern history runs. According to Trubetskoy, it is not the Romano-Germanic world with its specific culture that is bad, but as one of the plural worlds it would be interesting and meaningful. The only thing unacceptable, unacceptable in it is its aggressive attitude towards all the other cultures, its colonialism, its domination, its propensity for civilizational genocide and the subjugation of all that is different in relation to it.

Thus, humanity, according to Trubetskoy, should realise its unity through the rejection of the totalitarian model of the modern West, uniting the "blossoming complexity" of peoples and cultures into a single camp of anti-Western planetary liberation struggle.

Trubetskoy saw Eurasia as the most generalised form of humanity, a "blossoming ty" (to quote Konstantin Leontiev) - the ideal formula for what as the spiritual message of Genghis Khan's steppe Turanians was passed on to Moscow Rus'. siya-Eurasia in this picture of the world became the bulwark and lever of the planetary struggle of humanity against the universal planetary Romano-Germanic yoke.

It is surprising how much this thesis resonates with the position of the major French traditionalist René Guénon, who in his *Orient et Occident* states exactly the same thing, except for emphasising the special role of Russia in the planetary confrontation with the modern West. It is difficult to say whether Trubetskoy was acquainted with Henon's works. It is only known that Henon is mentioned in the texts of another prominent Eurasianist, an associate of Prince Trubetskoy - Nikolai Nikolaevich Alekseev. However, if Henon is referring only to the need for the remaining traditional societies to oppose the modern West, the Eurasian project, in addition to a well-founded pessimism about the inertial development of events, has a developed futurological revolutionary component, seeking to propose a project of such cultural and social form, which would combine loyalty to tradition and socio-technological modernism.

The main hope of Trubetskoy and all Eurasians was Russia - their beloved homeland. It was here that they shrewdly saw a paradoxical combination of two principles - an archaic rooting in tradition and an aspiration for an avant-garde cultural and technological breakthrough. Russia-Eurasia, in the Eurasian ideology, was conceived as an outpost of humanity in its confrontation with Romano-Germanic Europe, as the front line territory on which the fate of the home front was decided.

From this general approach, specifying various aspects of the original paradigm, the real content of the Eurasian theory emerged. Whatever the details of specific studies, the initial civilizational dualism revealed and postulated by Prince Nikolai Trubetskoy has always remained the common denominator, the unchanging background of all Eurasian discourse, both orthodox, orthodoxy embodied in the line of Savitsky, Alekseev and Suv-chinsky, as well as the heretical Marxist-Fedorovsky line that was followed by the Parisian branch of Eurasianists, the absolute Doubtschists (Efron, Karsavin and others.).

1.4 The Eurasian paradigm of Russia

The general position of Trubetskoy predetermined the specificity of the Eurasianists' views on Russian history. The largest figure of the Eurasian movement, Georgy Vernadsky, son of the great Russian scientist, developed this concept in the most detail. In his numerous works, he deploys a panorama of the Eurasian vision of Russia, but this monumental exposition is essentially just a development of the theses formulated by Prince Trubetskoy. The dominant Eurasian understanding of Russian history is the idea of the essence of the Russian people and Russian state as something fundamentally different from the ways of the Romano-Germanic world. Russia is thought of as an organic part of Humanity in opposition to Europe. Hence the need for a total revision of the Russian school of history, which had earlier departed directly or indirectly from the canons of European scholarship. Of course, Slavophiles, Dostoevsky, Leontiev and Danilevsky did a great deal to get close to an alternative, proper Russian, not Romano-Germanic, assessment of our path. The Eurasianists themselves considered

themselves the continuers of this line. However, they were even more radical and revolutionary than their predecessors in the rejection of the West. They insisted not only on emphasizing our national identity, but also on the alternative civilizational paradigms of Europe and organic, bottom Russia, Russia-Eurasia.

The Eurasians regarded all periods of Russia's rapprochement with the West as an anomaly. The Eurasianists regarded all periods of Russia's rapprochement with the West as an anomaly. Such a radical view overturned all the norms of Russian historiography and historiosophy. If Russian Westerners, despising the homeland, Russia considered backward "non-European" country, the Slavophiles, as if justifying, tried to protect the national identity. The Eurasians, on the other hand, went much further, not stopping at the defensive apologia of identity alone. They argued that the Romano-Germanic world with its culture is a historical pathology, a dead end road of degeneration and decline. To a large extent, Troubetzky's ideas resonate with the concepts of the German conservative revolutionary Oswald Spengler, who gave the West a similar diagnosis and, like Troubetzky, prophesied the coming salvation mission of the eastern regions of the Eurasian continent.

The general picture of the Eurasian view of the history of Russia is set out in Prince Trubetskoy's programme book "The Legacy of Genghis Khan".

For Trubetskoy, the axis of Russia, the central paradigmatic moment in its history when the ideal and the real are superimposed, is the bicentennial period of Moscow Rus', which followed the Tatar-Mongolian control and preceded the St Petersburg period. Kievan Rus, to which the origins of Russian statehood are traditionally traced, in the opinion of Trubetskoy, was not really the cradle of Rus; it was no more than one of several components of the coming Russian Kingdom. Predominantly Slavic, occupying territories between the Baltic and the Black Sea coast, rooted in forested areas and river banks, and having little control over steppe areas, Kievan Rus was only a variant of the Eastern European principality, whose centralisation was greatly exaggerated later, and whose integrating idea did not exist at all. It was a religious province of Byzantium, a political province of Europe.

The Tatar-Mongol conquest easily dealt with this unfinished geopolitical construct, absorbing it as an integral part. But the Mongols were not just barbarians. They performed the great empire-building function, laying the foundation of a gigantic continental state, the basis of a multipolar Eurasian civilization, essentially alternative to the Romano-Germanic model, but quite capable of dynamic development and cultural competition.

Troubetzkoy emphasizes the enormous value of the Turkic-Mongolian impulse, shrewdly pointing to the most important geopolitical fact that the entire expanse of eastern Eurasia is integrated through the unification of the steppe zone, stretching from Manchuria to Transylvania. The Tartars had accomplished what was foreseen in geography, and had thereby become a fact of planetary history.

A truly Russian, Eurasian state, according to Trubetskoy, emerged when the Moscow princes took on the Tatar geopolitical mission. Moscow Byzantism became the dominant state ideology already after the collapse of Byzantium and in organic combination with a state system borrowed entirely from the Mongols. This is Holy Moscow Russia, tsarist and Eurasian, continental, strictly different from, and radically opposed to, the Romano-Germanic world.

Two hundred years of Muscovite Russia is two hundred years of an ideal, archetypal Russia, strictly corresponding to its cultural, historical, political, metaphysical and religious mission. And it was the Velikorosses, spiritually and ethnically mingled with the Eurasian empire-builders of Genghis Khan, who became the core and grain of continental Russia-Eurasia, melted culturally and spiritually into a special integrating, state-forming ethnos.

This is a very important point: the Eurasians emphasised in every way the exclusivity of Velikorosses among the other Slavic tribes. Being Slavs in language and race, Velikorosses were the only Eurasians among them, Turanians in spirit. And therein lies the uniqueness of Moscow.

Having taken the initiative of the original Chinggis Khan impulse, the

Moscow tsars set about recreating the Tatar-Mongol Eurasian state, merging its disintegrating segments into a new empire under the aegis of a white tsar. This time Orthodoxy became the cementing religion and the state doctrine was the Moscow version of Byzantism, the famous concept of the Pskov elder Philotheus, "Moscow the Third Rome". The practical organisation of the state and, most importantly, the vectors of its spatial organisation were derived from the Tatar empire.

The end of "Ideal Russia" coincides with the end of "Holy Russia", with the schism. The innovations of Patriarch Nikon, formally aimed at strengthening the geopolitical power of the Moscow Kingdom, but carried out with criminal cultural and religious negligence and carelessness, lead to ambiguous and largely disastrous results, clearing the way for the secularisation and Europeanisation of Russia.

Schism is the point at which secular Russia breaks with Holy Russia.

With the arrival of Peter the Great begins what in Eurasian theory:: is commonly referred to as the "Romano-Germanic yoke". If the "Tatar yoke" was for the Russians the ferment of the coming empire-building, the Eurasian impulse, the "Roman-German yoke", which lasted from Peter to the Revolution of 1917, carried with it only alienation, caricature, degeneration of the underlying impulse. Instead of asserting its own cultural identity and Eurasian Idea, it was a clumsy imitation of the nobility's European universalist and rationalist patterns of securitised society. Instead of Byzantism - Anglicanism. Instead of "blossoming complexity" (K.Leontiev) - grey bureaucratic bureaucracy. Instead of a living faith - a clerical synod. Instead of the native element - the cynical coddling of official propaganda, veiling the complete cultural alienation of the Europeanised upper classes from the archaic lower classes.

The Romanov period, beginning with Peter the Great, was seen by Eurasianists as an essential negation of the Moscow stage, accompanied by external parody. The development of Eurasia's East continues, but instead of "fraternisation" there is "cultural assimilation" along Romano-German lines;

instead of a rich dialogue of civilisations there is formal russification; instead of a common continental will there is a flat colonial methodology.

Here Eurasianists, like Slavophiles and Narodniks, divided the history of post-Petrine Russia into two levels: noble-aristocratic and popular. The upper echelons followed the path of Westernism and copied European models with a greater or lesser degree of clumsiness. They were like a "colonial administration" of Russian spaces, civilizational overseers of the "wild people".

The grassroots, this very "wild people", on the contrary, remained on the whole faithful to the pre-Petrine way of life, carefully preserving elements of the sacred old days. And it was precisely these bottom tendencies, yet influencing to some extent the upper levels as well, that constituted all the most Eurasian, valuable, national, spiritual, and distinctive features of Petersburg Russia. If Russia never became the eastern continuation of Europe, despite all the "Roman-German yoke", it was only thanks to the popular element, the "Eurasian lower classes", who cautiously and passively, but persistently and unbendingly, opposed Europeanisation in depth.

From the point of view of the elite, the St Petersburg period was disastrous for Russia. But this was partly compensated for by the general 'groundswell' of the Eurasian masses. ,J

This model of Russian history, clearly set out by Trubetskoy, also predetermined the Eurasianists' attitude towards the Revolution.

1.5 Revolution: national or anti-national?

The Eurasianists' analysis of the Bolshevik revolution is the pivot point of this worldview. It was the peculiarity which distinguished the representatives of this movement from all other worldviews.

Two widely held views dominated the White camp: the reactionary-monarchical and the liberal-democratic. Both viewed Bolshevism as a strictly negative phenomenon, albeit for polar reasons.

The reactionary wing, the monarchists argued that "Bolshevism" was an en-

tirely Western phenomenon, the result of a "conspiracy" by European powers with "foreigners" and "Jews" in Russia itself, aimed at destroying the last Christian empire. This group idealized the Romanovs, seriously believed in the Uvarov formula of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality", adhered to the "Black Hundreds myth" about the "Judaic Masonic world government", and blamed the laxity of the pre-revolutionary authorities, the imperfection of the penal system and the treachery of the intelligentsia. In this perspective, the revolution was seen as a contagion introduced from the outside, the development of which was helped by random elements alien to the system. The pre-revolutionary Russia itself was presented to this camp as something absolute in its ideological and social foundations.

The liberal wing of the white emigration saw Bolshevism as an absolute evil for exactly the opposite reasons. They saw in Bolshevism a manifestation of the barbaric Russian mob, unable to establish enlightened "February" democracy and having perverted liberal reforms to "rampaging, savagery and rampaging of the dark elements". The liberals criticised Bolshevism not for its Westernizing elements, but for its lack of them, not for its external forms, but for its popular content.

Both of these positions of the Russian emigration continued the dispute between the two traditional camps into which the ruling elite of the Roman-German type had been divided during the last hundred years of the Tsarist Empire. It was a dispute within the same "colonial administration", equally anti-people and abstracted from the Eurasian identity of Russia. The reactionaries believed that the Eurasian masses should be kept strictly in check, that they were not amenable to "culturalisation", while the liberal Westerners believed that under certain conditions they could still be tamed along the lines of European societies.

The Eurasians, for their part, offered an entirely different interpretation of Bolshevism, arising from exactly the same assumptions. They believed that the historical reflection of the ruling class under Tsarism in general was inadequate, non-national, and consequently it proved faulty, criminal, and ultimately brought the popular element to the point of radical rebellion.

The Eurasians saw the essence of Bolshevism in the rise of the people's spirit, in the expression of a bottom-up Russia driven into the underground since the schism and the time of Peter. They affirmed the deeply national character of the Revolution as a vague, unconscious, blind but desperate and radical desire of Russians to return to the times before the "Romano-Germanic yoke". The transfer of the capital to Moscow was interpreted in the same way. Here they agreed with the liberals about the national nature of Bolshevism, but viewed this factor not negatively but positively, as the most valuable, creative and organic component of Bolshevism.

On the other hand, the Eurasians were traditionalists, Orthodox Christians, patriots oriented towards a national system of cultural values. The Marxist terminology of the Bolsheviks was therefore alien to them. Here, they partly agreed with the extreme right-wing émigré circles, believing that the Westernizing, pro-European element in Bolshevism was its negative side and prevented the Bolshevik movement from developing organically into a fully Russian, Eurasian reality. But at the same time, the Eurasians did not blame the Westernist (negative) component of the Revolution on the mythical "Judeo-Masonic" plot, but on the St Petersburg model of statehood, which was Westernist in all its aspects, and so influenced Russian society in this sense that even the protest against the "Romano-German yoke" could only take shape in terms borrowed from the armoury of European thought - specifically, from Marxism.

Trubetskoy and his followers thus rejected the positions of both reactionaries and liberals, establishing in emigration a very special, unusual, unique outlook current that captured the best minds at a certain time (the 1920s).

The Eurasian understanding of the Revolution was shared by both the left and the right. On the left were the extreme Narodniks, part of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists, who, unlike the Liberal Democrats, regarded the popular, bottom-up element of Bolshevism very positively. On the right, conservative circles following the Slavophiles, Danilevsky and Leontiev, who viewed the Romanov system as a "liberal compromise". Russian national-bolsheviks (Ustryalov, Klyuchnikov, etc.) held almost the same

position on the revolution as Prince Nikolai Trubetskoy.

Of course, the Bolsheviks themselves expressed their understanding of Russian history somewhat differently. They were dominated by narrow Marxist dogmatism, unable to embrace and adequately grasp multi-dimensional cultural and civilisational processes and alien to the history of religion and geopolitics. But it is fair to say that even in Bolshevism (especially in its early stages) there was a tendency to bring Marxism closer to popular heterodox beliefs. In particular, Bonch-Bruyevich, Lenin's closest associate, with the blessing of the leaders of the RSDLP, published a special newspaper for Russian sectarians and extreme Old Believers (*Novaya Zarya*).

Eurasianists, on the other hand, understood Bolshevism in a much broader sense, in the context of multiple factors of Russian history, taking into account the history of religion, sociology, ethnology, linguistics, etc. It is no coincidence that some detractors called Eurasians "Orthodox Bolsheviks". Of course, this was an exaggeration, to which Trubetskoy himself objected, but there was still some truth in it, if we refuse a deliberately negative understanding of the term "Bolshevism".

For reactionary politicians, the internationalism preached by the Bolsheviks was confirmation of the anti-Russian, anti-national essence of the whole movement. The Eurasianists, on the other hand, saw the whole picture quite differently. They caught in the "proletarian internationalism" of the leaders of the Russian revolution not the desire to "destroy the nations", but to recreate a single Eurasian type within the USSR, a mosaic of "all-Eurasian nationalism", of which Trubetskoy wrote. In this case, Bolshevik internationalism, confined to the space of the Soviet state and referring primarily to the Eurasian ethnic groups, was in the eyes of Eurasians only a euphemism, another name for "imperial nationalism", a particular model of a universal continental community of Eastern peoples, for "Humanity", as understood by Trubetskoy in his opposition to "Europe". Since the ideal for the Eurasians was not to blindly copy the European "nationalisms" born out of the common Romano-Germanic matrix, but to appeal to the Eurasian model of Muscovite Russia, the community of which was guaranteed more by

the unity of the cultural and religious type than by the racial and linguistic affinity, they recognized in the practical national policy of the Soviets a familiar and close to them integration principle. For this reason, they also understood the Bolsheviks' call for global decolonisation, for the throwing off of the Romano-Germanic yoke by the peoples of the East and for a planetary national liberation movement. The implementation of such a policy was exactly in line with the vision of the Eurasians themselves of the planetary liberation mission of Russia.

1.6 At the threshold of the Old Faith

In the religious sphere, Eurasian theory inevitably leads to the assertion that authentic Orthodoxy, which inherits the unbroken tradition of Muscovite Russia, is Russian Old Believers, the Old Orthodox Church. Exactly to the extent that the anti-national monarchy of the Romanovs led Russia to the disaster of the XX century, Nikonism - subordinate, obedient, synodal, official "Orthodoxy" - led Russians to atheism and sectarianism, depleting the true Faith, and throwing people into the arms of agnosticism, materialism and heresies. The Westernist essence of the pseudo-monarchical post-Petrine state was accurately reflected in the synodal Nikonian "Orthodoxy". The Europeanised, Westernised upper echelons of the Empire transformed the official Church into a kind of counterpart to the State Department. This could not but affect the very nature of the Russian Church. The true Orthodox spirit has gone to the people, to the grassroots, into schism.

It was to Old Believerism as a genuine authentic Russian Orthodoxy that it was logical for Eurasians to turn. And so it was: N.S.Trubetskoy (together with other Eurasians and in general the best political and religious figures of his epoch, such as Bishop Andrey Ukhtomsky) fully recognized the rightness of Avvakum, the traditional duplicity, the illegality of the "robber cathedral of 1666", the Nikonian righteousness, the unjustified and erroneous conversion to the Little Russian edition of the Holy and liturgical texts from the Moscow edition of the Great Russian Church. But, perhaps, the "baroque", aristocratic origin of the leaders of historical Eurasianism prevented them from unambiguously and fully recognizing not only the historical (this was

just the case), but also the ecclesiological, ecclesiological righteousness of the Old Believers. Old Believers were perceived by the nobility as a "religion of the nobility", and the elitists (and the Eurasians were just that) experienced a "class" predetermined restraint in relation to the "common people's faith".

There was a great deal of interest in Old Believerism among almost all Eurasian authors. The cult of Avvakum, whom Eurasians regarded as the founder of all modern Russian literature and whose Vita was extolled as the first and unique example of Russian national existentialism, is indicative.

1.7 Ideocracy: apagogic totalitarianism

An important role in Eurasian philosophy is played by the concept of the ideocratic state, ideocracy. It is based on the notion of the state and society as a reality called to implement an important spiritual and historical mission. This theory is called "ideocracy", "the power of ideas", "the power of the ideal". This approach stems from the Eurasianists' more general conception of the meaning of human existence, of the supreme purpose of the collective, of the people, of any community. The Eurasianists regarded the human fact as a transitional stage, as a starting point for self-overcoming, and, consequently, the entire anthropological problem was seen as a task rather than a given. In its basic features, such a view was characteristic of all spiritual and religious traditions. In contemporary philosophy and in a completely different context, we encounter a similar perspective in Nietzsche and Marx. In the spirit of the Russian philosophy's common aspiration to speak of the individual but of the general integral community, to transfer anthropological problems onto the collective, the Eurasians, following Trubetskoy, deduced from such an approach the imperative of universal self-defeat. The embodiment of such collective self-overcoming, self-exaltation, transformation and purification for the fulfillment of the higher mission was, in their opinion, ideocracy, elevated to the social state norm. The Italian traditionalist philosopher Julius Evola called this model of socio-political order "apagogic totalitarianism", i.e. a system in which the being of each individual is forcibly involved into the spiral-like movement of general spiritual ascent, ennoblement and sacralization.

Troubetzkoy argues that the problem of ideocracy, its recognition or rejection, is not a matter of private choice. It is a binding imperative of the historical collective, which by the very fact of its existence must fulfil the complex and demanding task given to it by divine Providence. Most importantly, ideocracy demands that social and state institutions be based on idealist principles, that ethics and aesthetics be placed above pragmatism and considerations of technical efficiency, that heroic ideals be affirmed above considerations of comfort, enrichment and security, and that the superiority of the heroic type over the mercantile type (in Werner Sombart's terminology) be legitimized.

Eurasians recognised certain traits of an ideocratic character in such phenomena as European versions of fascism and Soviet Bolshevism. Paradoxically, they saw the totalitarian nature of these regimes as a good rather than an evil. The only thing they questioned (and this radical[^] distinguished them from communists and fascists) was the apagogic nature of these socio-political forms. The sacred, spiritual ideal was replaced in these movements either by vulgar economism or by irresponsible and dead-end racial theory. The true ideocracy for Eurasia, according to Trubetskoy, would have to be a neo-Byzantine, neo-imperial model, enlightened by the saving rays of true Christianity, i.e. Orthodoxy. Only this could provide totalitarian regimes with sacral investiture, the mysterious blessing of the City of Invisible Light. But this Orthodox Eurasian ideocracy did not presuppose, according to Trubetskoy, confessional exclusivism, aggressive missionaryism, or forced Christianization. The Orthodox ideocratic empire was conceived by the Eurasians as an axis and pole of the all-planetary uprising of different cultures, peoples and traditions against the one-dimensional hegemony of the utilitarian bourgeois colonial imperialist West. In the long run, a whole ensemble of ideocratic societies and cultures rooted in the histories of various states and peoples could be proposed. What would be common, however, would be only the basic principle - the rejection of the Western anti-ideocratic formula and the notion of the high ideal task of every human community as a unified whole, seized by a passionate impulse to fulfil its spiritual mission.

Alas, the expected transformation of Bolshevism into an ideocracy of the Eurasian type has not taken place, and the most disturbing predictions of the Eurasians have come true - that Bolshevik ideocracy, incomplete and contradictory in itself, is doomed to degrade and fall into the pragmatic, utilitarian, lifeless bourgeois order that has long been consolidated in the Romano-German West, without reference to the higher spiritual values.

And yet the lofty ideocratic ideals, the Eurasian concepts of "anagogic totalitarianism" remain surprisingly relevant today, giving meaning and purpose to the struggle of those who refuse to see man and humanity as a mechanical conglomerate of egoistic consumption and pleasure machines and believe that each of us and all together has a higher task, a spiritual content, an ideal destination.

1.8 Eurasianism and structuralism

When people talk about the philosophy of structuralism today, they tend to overlook the fact that one of the founders of this method, which has so significantly influenced all modern thought, was Prince Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoy, whose philological ideas became the foundation of "functional linguistics" of the so-called "Prague School", which, along with the Copenhagen and American schools, is one of the three whales of structuralist philosophy. Those who analyse Trubetskoy's philological ideas and his major work "Fundamentals of Phonology" (Prague, 1938) do not link them with the author's Eurasian outlook, which is left out of the scope of the majority of studies on Trubetskoy the linguist. On the other hand, historians of Eurasianism as a worldview pay little attention to Trubetskoy's linguistic studies, considering them a private matter of the thinker, quite detached from his ideological activity. However, this is not true. Philology and philosophy are intimately linked, as the most perceptive contemporary philosopher, Friedrich Nietzsche's *We are Philologists*, has already shown.

As the famous hypothesis of the American structuralists Warf and Saper states, "the language we speak forges our perception of reality". Language is an ideal paradigm of reality, preceding the materiality of things, prede-

termining and organising this materiality. Structural linguistics as a whole is characterised by the desire to get rid of the progressive, evolutionary, logical-rational interpretation of language, of language that is only identical to logical sequences of atomic words. Instead, it is necessary to see language 'holistically', the whole, as an overall functional proto-structure that pre-determines words and messages with its bottom-line outlines from the overall context, rather than vice versa, i.e. not as an amalgamation of ready-made rational elements.

The school of the anthropologist and psychologist Gregory Bateson (1904-1980), working in the same direction, uncovered the so-called "analogue level" of language, consisting of "noises", intonations, reservations, a functional background preceding a rational discourse built according to the laws of Aristotelian logic. Prince Trubetskoy worked in this very direction, which in its outlook is in perfect harmony with the desire to overcome the one-dimensional Romano-Germanic rationalism fundamental to Eurasianism, to go beyond formal logic.

It is indicative that the structuralist method, in its most general terms, boils down to a prioritisation of the spatial paradigm. This is the so-called synchronic method, opposed to the diachronic one. This choice of methodological priority in the field of linguistic (more broadly, epistemological, philosophical) analysis is, in fact, nothing but a projection of the main idea of Eurasianism - the idea of plural, multi-polar, parallel and diverse development of national cultures in a "blossoming complexity". Eurasianists contrasted the pluralistic humanity with the one-dimensional universalism of Europe and based all other theories on this basic civilisational, geopolitical dualism. Within linguistics, this unitary, classically "Romano-Germanic" one-dimensional logic corresponds to the diachronic approach, the concept of word-concept and logical construction as the essential basis of language. In contrast, the synchronic approach allows the particular to be deduced from the general, and this general is simultaneously grasped as a whole and living organism, rather than as a dead mechanical construction, entirely predetermined by the functioning of its parts.

The "functional linguistics" of the Prague Linguistic Circle, of which Prince Trubetskoy was an active participant, thus appears to be a kind of projection of the spatial paradigm that characterizes the essence of the Eurasian worldview into the sphere of the science of language. The synchronic method underlying structuralism is the same course of thought (reproduced at a different level and applied to different realities) as the basic attitude of Eurasian philosophy.

Developing this observation and continuing to trace similar correspondences between different scientific disciplines and worldviews could lead us to a completely new, unexpected interpretation of the main tendencies of contemporary philosophy, where the hidden matrix of a deep dialogue between two background protoideologies, which predetermine at the level of the initial impulse all the further constructions of various scientific and philosophical schools, would emerge through the most complex terminological strata. But if for the Marxists the similar technique was to clarify the class character of the theory of this or that philosopher and scientist (which sometimes led to quite witty and productive epistemological classifications), here we would have a different duality - the endless secret dispute between the epistemology of Europe and the epistemology of Man, between the thinking of Atlanticists and Eurasians. And figures such as Prince Trubetskoy would be the most important points at which the abstract political and ideological worldview and the professional occupation of a particular scientific field come together for us. How many unexpected and revelatory correspondences would be revealed if the history of contemporary structuralism were compared with the basic worldview of Eurasianism...! But this is a separate topic.

1.9 Eurasia as a project

The doctrine of the Eurasians was extremely topical in the 20s and 30s. It was filled with almost prophetic intuitions, insights, epiphanies into the mystery of the fate of Russia and the rest of the world. Eurasianists gave the most capacious and convincing analysis of Russia's state upheavals in the 20th century. They managed to rise above the clichés inherent in their class and caste origins, accepting and guessing the historical positives of Bolshe-

vism, but remaining faithful to the true roots of their national and religious identity. They were not driven by conformism, but by a courageous and brave desire to grasp the truth as it is, beyond the narrow, inexplicable and ultimately irresponsible platitudes with which the other worldview camps were content.

Eurasianism absorbed all the brightest and most viable in Russian political thought in the first half of the twentieth century. But their ideas were not fated to materialise in practice. Their passionate heroic impulse was supported neither by Soviet Russia nor by immigration. Nobody heeded their prophecies, events continued in a fatal turn, drawing closer a global catastrophe, in which not just Russia, not just Eurasia, but all of Mankind was defeated. The alarming one-dimensional shadow of the West, like a stain of corpse, was spreading across the world, striking the "blossoming complexity" of peoples, cultures and civilisations with the malaise of the flat-bourgeois end of history.

The two types of ideocracy that Eurasianists looked closely at collapsed for precisely the reasons they saw and uncovered: they both lacked an apagogic component, and however minor it may seem to political pragmatists, no historical edifice will stand long and strong without it.

Today we are living in an era in which Europe and its most accomplished monstrosity, the US, are celebrating the final stage of their civilisational victory over Mankind. When the last strongholds of ideocracy, albeit partial, have collapsed. When Eurasia - as culture, statehood and ideal - fell under the pressure of the alternative pole of history.

Only today are we able to appreciate the genius of the founders of Eurasianism, and above all of Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetskoy. A late, tragically belated recognition does come to them.

The Eurasianists have created for us a full-fledged, logically perfect, amazingly attractive ideal, a comprehensive, multi-dimensional national worldview, open to comprehensive development, deeply patriotic in its essence,

but containing a knowingly effective antidote to degeneration into vulgar chauvinism. It is a worldview that welcomes modernism, austerity and avant-garde social technologies of the Bolsheviks, but rejects the vicious hypnotisation of economic and material formulas. A worldview that is deeply Christian and Orthodox, but which has overcome two centuries of synodal alienation and formalistic officiousness, and at the same time is open to a constructive and tolerant dialogue with other traditional Eurasian faiths.

The most avant-garde methodologies, which became the basis for a purely modern analysis, were first employed by the Eurasians. They were the first to develop the principles of such sciences as Russian geopolitics (Peter Savitsky), Russian ethnology (later brilliantly developed by their student Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev), Russian structural linguistics (structuralism), Russian sociology (especially the theory of elites) and much more.

We cannot demand from the historical Eurasians that they answer all the questions that confront us, but we must be immensely grateful to them, because they bequeathed to us a treasure trove of strikingly correct intuitions, which we must develop, modernise, and enrich with the latest data and technology learned elsewhere, is our most urgent task.

And geopolitics, and sociology, and structuralism, and depth psychology, and traditionalism, and the history of religion were actively developed in the 20th century by a whole constellation of brilliant authors, but we would not have been able to adequately apply their findings to our own Russian experience if not for the giant theoretical leap made by Eurasians. On the contrary, with their help, everything immediately falls into place, placed in an adequate national and historical context, and begins to play with a new light.

Eurasianism is more relevant than ever today. It is not the past. It is a project. It is the future. It is an imperative. It is our common task.

Chapter 2

Peter Savitsky : Eurasian Triumph

2.1 Understand what the mind cannot understand

The panorama of Russian thought, of Russian culture as a whole, has a major and fundamental quality - paradoxicality. This paradoxicality is associated with the lack of a complete and complete conceptual picture, set out in a spectrum of rational discourses. The boundaries of Russian theories and doctrines are always blurred... The main vectors of thought are jumbled and obscured by a multitude of casual and unnecessary remarks, digressions, details and imprecations. Russian thought - even scientific or political - is always literary.

This leads to the fact that it is practically impossible to strictly define the space of Russian intellectualism on the basis of its own criteria, which are immanent to Russian culture. A strange picture of polemics or historical disputes is emerging, in which questions that are completely impossible in Western culture are often asked (for example, did Russian literature exist before Lomonosov? Is there such a thing as "Russian theology" or is this just an inertial reproduction of late Byzantine clichés?) In other words, all too often it is not the particularities, but the very fact of the existence of a phenomenon that are put into question, and this lends the whole discourse a somewhat sleepwalking character, as if one were trying to wake up from a dream and distinguish between the phantoms of dreams and the unfolding reality, to restore the past as it was, not as its unquenched dreams whisper about it - he tries, but ... cannot, falls back into a half-slumber.

This fact is quite applicable to all Russian culture. It is equally (or maybe even more) applicable to Eurasianism, a special and extremely interesting phenomenon in Russian thought. At the first glance this phenomenon is vague and indefinite, contradictory and paradoxical. But at the same time, it is exceptional in that it does not simply represent one of the varieties of Russian thought, but tries to conceptualize the very specificity of this thought, to give the most general outline of what is the basic and main feature of the "Russian subject", understood in the broadest sense - as a people, a state, a religious type, a geopolitical organism, a specific national personality. Eurasianism does not simply try to think in terms of a semi-

dream like all Russians, but seeks to conceptualise this condition, offering a system that takes into account the whole series of paradoxes that make up the characteristic atmosphere of the national worldview in its general form.

The very formulation of such a task makes Eurasianism a unique and unprecedented phenomenon in Russian history. After all, we are talking about the systematisation of what, as Fet put it, "cannot be understood by the mind".

In Eurasianism, we are confronted with a double degree of uncertainty - uncertainty inherent in Russian thought itself, and an attempt to broadly systematize this uncertainty into a new uncertainty, but one with a logic of its own. If we also take into account the fact that in our situation we are also dealing with an extremely confused ideological situation in which mutually exclusive philosophical and ideological attitudes coexist on an equal footing as products of the spiritual confusion of our obscure era, it becomes extremely difficult to pass judgment on Eurasianism and to assess the success or failure of this undertaking.

But we are aware of the risks involved, so we will try to do it.

2.2 Peter Savitsky - ideologue of Greater Eurasia

Three people can be considered the founding fathers of Eurasianism: Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoy, Pyotr Nikolayevich Savitsky and Nikolai Nikolayevich Alekseyev. At a certain stage, they were joined by such famous people as G.V. Vernadsky, G.V. Florovsky, P.M. Bi-cilli, A.V. Kartashev, N.N. Alekseev, etc. Eurasians of the second order may be called P.P. Suvchinsky, P.S. Arapov, P.N. Malevsky-Malevich, V.N. Ilyin (not to be confused with the extreme right-wing monarchist I.A. Ilyin - a vicious opponent of Eurasianism), N.P. Rklitsky, V.P. Nikitin, A.Y. Bromberg, Prince D. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, M.V. Shakhmatov, I.V. Stepanov, etc.

If the first intellectual impetus to the movement came from N.Trubetskoy's seminal work "Europe and Humanity", then it was Pyotr Savitsky who should be considered the main ideologist of Eurasianism, its leader. Of

course, Eurasianism was a purely collective movement; throughout its history, it united many people around itself - Eurasian rallies and conferences gathered thousands of participants, and the influence of their ideas spread to the broad circles of the Russian emigration and even to significant sectors of specialists and fellow citizens who remained in Soviet Russia and accepted the Soviet regime with considerable reservations. Yet at the heart of the entire movement stood one man, Pyotr Savitsky; it was he who was the soul of Eurasianism, its undisputed leader, its face. Other prominent Eurasianists - N.S. Trubetskoy, G.V. Florovsky, G.V. Vernadsky, L.P. Karsavin - established themselves as authorities in a particular field - Trubetskoy as linguist, Florovsky as theologian, Vernadsky as historian, Karsavin as philosopher, while they joined Eurasianism as recognised authorities in other fields. Savitsky - despite his professional training in geography, jurisprudence, international relations theory, etc. - Savitsky was a Eurasian in the first place, the number one Eurasian, just as Lenin, who was a philosopher and publicist, was first and foremost a Bolshevik and then everything else.

Pyotr Savitsky was born into a noble family in Chernigov. Later in his articles he would emphasise his Little Russian ancestry in his polemics with the Ukrainian Samosti, who reproached the Eurasians for their narrow, velikorussian idea.

Savitsky's education was technical. He graduated from the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute as an economist-geographer. His brilliant knowledge of foreign languages and competence in international relations contributed to his taking up the post of secretary-counsellor at the Russian mission in Norway at an early age.

His political views were initially formed under the influence of the Cadet Party, i.e. he was a moderate nationally oriented liberal. The ideologists of the Cadets, P. Struve and the famous scientist V. I. Vernadsky, were his main teachers. In full accordance with Cadet logic, Savitsky does not accept the October Revolution and takes the side of the Whites. He takes part in the Wrangel government, where he holds an important position - first assistant-secretary to Peter Struve, Minister of Foreign Affairs in that

government.

After the defeat of the Whites, he finds himself in Gallipoli and later in Prague, a traditional haven for white emigration. Here in Prague the history of Eurasianism begins.

Savitsky becomes acquainted with Trubetskoy's writings as well as with himself and proposes that he establish a new ideological movement on the basis of the ideas outlined by Trubetskoy in his book.

This is how the first Eurasian collection, *Exodus to the East: Premonitions and Accomplishments*, appears. *The Approval of the Eurasians*" (Sofia, 1921). It summarises the basic principles of the movement, the novelty and audacity of which shook all the Russian intellectual elite of the time. Almost all the major figures of the time responded to this collection - Struve, Berdyaev, Milyukov, Ilyin, Krasnov, Hippus, etc. Henceforth, it is the attitude towards the Eurasianists and their theses that will be a distinctive feature for the self-determination of the ideological position of the Russian emigration. Those who will treat their program sympathetically and positively will constitute the faction of the Third Way (neither Bolshevism nor Tsarism). Those who reject it will clearly identify with anti-communist conservative or liberal reaction. "The Exodus to the East is the first complete and coherent declaration of the Russian Conservative Revolution, that paradoxical movement which was extremely popular in Europe during this era and gave birth to some famous totalitarian regimes.

Savitsky and Trubetskoy stand at the centre of the collection. And Savitsky articulates the basic principles more sharply, more clearly, more boldly than his colleagues. In a sense, this is the work of Savitsky, his bright, ingenious and not fully understood either then or now contribution to Russian culture and the formation of the Russian worldview.

Eurasianism captured the minds and the initiative developed as a result. In 1922 a second collection, *On the Roads. The Establishment of the Eurasians*". Later, separate issues of "Eurasian Times" began to be published, and in

1926 the program document "Eurasianism. Experience of a Systematic Outline.", most of which was written by Savitsky. In addition, there were sporadic issues of the Eurasian Chronicle.

Savitsky's personality is always clearly visible behind all these initiatives - he writes most of the manifestos, determines the plans and themes of publications, edits materials, organizes symposia and conferences. At the same time, it should be taken into account that all this takes place in dire moral conditions, in exile, in complete isolation from the dearly loved, deified by the Eurasians Russia. And besides, the ambiguity of the Eurasian Third Way, its principled and declared break with both the right (marketers, tsarists, conservatives) and the left (Bolsheviks), automatically creates enemies in both sectors of Russian society, split by the Revolution and the Civil War.

Savitsky is the true leader of Eurasianism, ceding leadership roles in the official Eurasian structures to N. Trubetskoy only for reasons of seniority. In fact, Trubetskoy is a pure intellectual, not prone to political activism. In Vienna, where Trubetskoy lived, no full-fledged Eurasian cell was ever established, whereas in Prague, Belgrade and Sofia Savitsky personally managed to create numerous and perfectly organised structures.

One member of the Eurasian movement described Savitsky's psychological portrait as follows: 'Savitsky is certainly the leader... He is the godfather of Eurasian ideology... He is well and thoroughly educated. In addition, he is a highly gifted man, capable of thinking logically. Dialectically his abilities are magnificently developed. To all his intellectual talents must be added the main core - a rabid ambition, which cannot be understood in a vulgar way. It is not a ministerial portfolio that attracts him. His ideal is Lenin, leader and prophet of the masses...'

In the mid-1920s, the Eurasian movement enters a period of protracted crisis. A rift between the right-wing and left-wing versions of the Third Way is emerging. This is quite logical - it is incredibly difficult to maintain the tension of an innovative, paradoxical synthesis for a long time, especially when trying to give it an ideological and political load. This is the drama

of all Eurasianism and the personal drama of Savitsky, its chief ideologist.

In Paris in 1926, the newspaper *Eurasia* begins to appear, in which the outright pro-Bolshevik orientation of the movement becomes ever clearer. On the other hand, the Prague Circle, uniting the founding fathers (in particular Savitsky himself, Alexeyev, Kartashov, etc.), is increasingly drawn towards conservative positions. This is compounded by the exit from the movement of Florovsky and Bicilli, who are unable to endure the innovation and avant-garde nature of Eurasian ideology, choosing social passivity, renouncing the worldview struggle and delving into archival-historical work, waving goodbye to the challenge posed by history.

Eurasianism splintered and by the mid-1930s it had all but faded away. The left-wing Eurasians effectively become obedient instruments of Moscow, abandoning the original originality of the movement, while the right-wingers concentrate on narrowly-specialised areas - history, geopolitics, economics, etc.

Savitsky himself teaches at the Prague Gymnasium until 1945, when he is arrested by the Soviets. He receives 10 years in a camp for anti-Soviet activities, where he stays until 1956. While in prison he gets acquainted with a young talented historian - Lev Nikolayevich Gumilev, the son of a brilliant Russian poet and an equally brilliant poetess. Gumilev became Savitsky's diligent pupil, and it was he who later became the main theorist and inspirer of the Eurasian approach in Soviet historiography. Later they would meet again, but already in Prague, at a scientific symposium. It is from Savitsky that Gumilev borrows the main points of his own theory of ethnogenesis; it is Savitsky who infects him with his interest in Eurasia, Turan, cultural cycles, etc. Without Savitsky, there would have been no Gumilev. Thus, even the bleak conditions of exile become a way for the unbroken Eurasian intellectual to spread his ideas. And history has shown that this has yielded results - the incomparable success of Gumilev's views, the incredible popularity of his books and theories in our time testify to the fact that, ultimately, the main cause of Savitsky's life had not been wasted - hundreds of Russian historians became involved in Eurasian studies, The

main point of Savitsky's life was not wasted - hundreds of Russian historians, intellectuals, and geographers became involved in Eurasian studies, often without even realizing that through Gumilev and his ideas they were directly accessing the fullness of the Eurasian worldview, fraught with many implicit conclusions, which Gumilev himself for understandable reasons did not draw.

In 1956 Savicki is released and even rehabilitated. He returns to Prague to join his family. In 1961, he publishes in the émigré press under the pseudonym "Vostokov" the texts describing his stay in the camp, for which he is imprisoned again. Only the intervention of the famous philosopher Bertrand Russell allows him to be released.

Savitsky died in 1968, forgotten, unwanted, persecuted, weary and with the full feeling that his life's work had ended in utter failure.

We will allow ourselves to refute this. No, it is he who turned out to be right, it is his cause that has a real chance of a great future, it is his Russia, Russia-Eurasia, that will prove to be the final and triumphant reality, destined to embody all the mystical, spiritual, philosophical and religious quests of the unique and mysterious Russian soul.

2.3 Tertium datur

Eurasianism is a worldview that aims to explain all the absurdities, tragic and passionate impulses of Russian history in an absolutely paradoxical way, by matching a unique and paradoxical element with an equally unique and paradoxical concept. Eurasianists refuse to take the usual positions, to recognize the banal clichés in all the historical-philosophical, philosophical, political, legal and religious issues that they address. They are characterised by a purely dialectical method, reminiscent of the wonderful Hindu formula which is meant to describe the supreme transcendental reality of Deity - "neither this nor the other". This is imprinted already in the self-name of the whole movement - Eurasians, supporters of Russia, understood as Eurasia.

Eurasia is a paradoxical concept. It is neither Europe nor Asia. In such a

perspective, the very problem of an adequate interpretation of Russia, its history, its religiosity, its ethno-social and economic-political reality can only be solved within an innovative, avant-garde approach, rejecting traditionally accepted norms in this field. The Westernizing line within the Russian intelligentsia viewed Russia as a "backward sector of the West", and hence applied purely Western Romantic-German criteria to assess the major milestones of its history. European historians, on the other hand, generally regarded Russia as a dark, Asian, despotic and authoritarian state.

Eurasianists, following the Slavophiles, argued that both views of Russia (as a "backward part of Europe" and as a "developing part of Asia") were insufficient, that Russia represented a separate category, a special "place-development" (in Savitsky's terminology). But unlike the Slavophiles, the Eurasians did not look to the past but to the future, they did not idealise the old days (often understood rather tinkershiply) but sought to put forward a project of a created history, they did not romanticise the peasant community and the official triad (Orthodoxy, monarchy, nationality") but developed theories of rigid ideocratic power, based on an active circulation of elites.

Eurasianists have therefore been called "Slavophile futurists" or "Orthodox Bolsheviks". They were even more accurately described as "conservative revolutionaries".

"Neither this nor the other", *tertium datur*, is the general formula of the Eurasian method. Hence their attitude to most of the most important issues. In politics, it meant "neither for the Whites nor for the Reds" or "neither for Tsarism nor for Bolshevism". In religion it was "neither Petersburg synodal officious orthodoxy nor Marxist atheism". In economics - "neither socialism nor capitalism". In philosophy, "neither abstract idealism nor crude materialism". And so on.

Everywhere and on every issue is that cherished Eurasian *tertium datur*.

A more specific question is the attitude to the Revolution. Here Eurasians apply the same principle. They see revolution as evil. This is natural, given

their common white past and traditional national-patriotic upbringing (as well as their noble origins). This distinguishes them from the Left, the Changeoverists and the Bolsheviks themselves. But at the same time, they see it as an inevitable evil, not at all accidental, stemming from the entire logic of Russian history, and therefore fraught - as the culmination of a disease - with a new recovery, a new transformation, an awakening.

Eurasianists believed that the Bolsheviks were the natural consequence of the entire St Petersburg period, in which Westernist, secular, alienated tendencies dominated, while Orthodox-monarchist and Narodnic slogans only bashfully covered up the arrogance of the bureaucratic bureaucracy and the European-oriented nobility. The Eurasianists especially stigmatized the elements of Western capitalist economy, which had been introduced in Russia since the middle of the 19th century and were deeply alien to national traditions. The October Revolution put an end to the St Petersburg period - in blood and violence, in the ecstasy of rebellion and the frenzy of revolt, but the alienated, secular, Petrine, almost "Protestant" Russia disappeared. After the transition period, Eurasians expected a new national revival, a rebirth of Marxism, a return on a new dialectical level to the high ideals of the Orthodox Empire, under the ancient pre-Petrine slogan - "For Faith and Truth!

The Eurasians spoke of a "new order" and a "new man", whose features were clearly discernible in the Communist revolutionary transformations, but as a distortion, a grotesque, an extravagant parody. Austerity, modernism, new people in power, strengthening of central power, modernisation of all aspects of life - all this was welcomed by the Eurasians from the Bolsheviks. But at the same time, they insisted on the spiritual orientation of society, the dominance of Orthodox religiosity, a rigid hierarchy based on meritocracy, a mystical, not at all economic, understanding of the essence of history.

Out of all this came a unique ideological formation, representing a kind of ultra-radical conservatism on the one hand, and a logical and avant-garde modernism on the other.

In the general logic of their paradoxical thinking, the Eurasians took a fresh look at the ethnic-racial composition of Russia. The key to understanding the specificity of the Russian people was the idea, developed by Trubetskoy, of the synthetic nature of Russians, consisting of two principal components - Aryan Slavs and Turan (Turkic) ethnic groups. From the two opposing poles - Aryan and Turan - something third was born, a new unique synthesis, representing something special, unlike anything else, original and messianically singled out.

Russians are neither Slavs, nor Turks, nor Aryans, nor Asians. They are a special community, endowed with a great mission and a deeply distinctive culture which defies the logic of either European or Asian cultural interpretations.

This racial dialectic was precisely matched by the landscape dualism - the Forest and the Steppe. The sedentary, northern, predominantly Slavic populated Forest was one component of the Russian state. The nomadic, southern, predominantly Turkic Steppe was the second constituent. From these two elements emerged Russia-Eurasia, which ethnically, geographically, culturally and ideologically synthesized the pairs of opposites, bringing them to the highest synthesis, which is not at all local, but absolutely universal significance.

Such an approach, a specifically Eurasian method explained virtually all the incongruities, all the paradoxes and contradictions of the Russian way, rejecting the Eurocentric interpretation of Russian history, but at the same time correcting the Slavophile line to a significant extent.

In matters of philosophy, culture and religion, the Eurasians also had their own particular views. They were, of course, all Orthodox, but at the same time they were clearly not satisfied with the official St. Petersburg creed, the almost bureaucratic moralism of the clergy and the allegorical interpretation of the sacraments that existed in the Church. They were in search of a new (or, conversely, ancient, primordial) religiosity, an "everyday confession", which would extend the religious experience to the totality of the

cosmic environment. That is why the Eurasians place such an important emphasis on the idea of "elements", cosmic "elements". They understood the world, nature, history, and society as facets of a latent divinity, as aspects of a luminous theophany that totally connected the lower with the higher, the immanent with the transcendent, the otherworldly with the otherworldly. The classical dualism of Romanesque theology was unacceptable to them - the idea of "two Hrads" which became the basis of Romano-Germanic religiosity and polity. On the contrary, close and comprehensible to them was the pre-Petrine Russian-Orthodox, and earlier Byzantine, ideal of the "Orthodox kingdom", in which the higher and the lower are merged together in a common social and religious liturgy, the "common work", The "holy people" (*hieros laos*), the aristocratic elite, the monarch-vassal, the sovereign-prince and the contemplative, mystical, Hesychast Orthodoxy - the Athonian, the holy-teaching, the Eastern, the ascetic, the luminous. This particular religiosity, in which, as with the Eurasians again, the same trinitarian logic is clearly discernible-"neither this world nor the other world, but something third"-sharply contrasted with the general mood in the Church, especially in émigré circles, where an extremely closed, gloomy, anti-Soviet, hyperconservative mood was the norm. On the contrary, Eurasianists, departing from their ideal, considerably expanded the theme of religiosity, having a positive attitude not only to Orthodoxy itself, but also to other Eurasian concepts such as Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Lamaism, etc. Because in this case, too, they considered that neither the Nikonians nor the adherents of the ancient piety (or sectarians) had the fullness of truth, and that in this case, once again, one should search for a new synthesis and spiritual overcoming of opposites. The same perspective was applied to Bolshevism, which they saw as a deeply religious, spiritual, popular, mystical and national impulse wrapped in a distorted form of Western-derived materialist-economist teaching. Eventually, a part of the leftist Eurasianists put forward quite a paradoxical formula - "a synthesis between Orthodoxy and Marxist atheism is necessary"! But even such a paradox, rejected, however, by the more moderate (Prague) wing, fit perfectly into the logic of the "Eurasian revision".

All these trinitarian paradoxes are embodied and come alive only in one

unique space of the world - Russia-Eurasia. Russia itself is always something Third, transcending dualistic evaluation. This explains our temperament, our culture, our amazing literature, our passionate religiosity, sometimes combined with an extreme moral decline, our Asianness, our Europeanness, our sensitivity to everything new, our deeply conservative psychology, our monarchism, our democracy, our obedience, our rebelliousness...

Russia is a special world, a continent not grasped in normal categories, a unique land chosen by Divine Providence for some incredible important all-human mission...

The Eurasians came close to intuiting some great mystery, an epiphany into some transcendental realm, the discovery of which is associated with certain peaks in world history. They have looked beyond the veil that hides the mystery of cosmic purpose from men.

2.4 The geopolitics of Eurasianism

Perhaps none of the researchers of Eurasianism have paid attention to the fact that it was the Eurasians who were the first Russian authors to use the term "geopolitics".

Nevertheless, this is a fact. Moreover, it is Eurasianist leader Pyotr Savitsky who should be called the first Russian geopolitician in the full sense of the word. In order to fully appreciate the uniqueness of Savitsky's role, let us take the shortest excursion into the history of this apparently underestimated until very recently science.

The basic principles of geopolitics were formulated by the German geographer Ratzel (he called the new science "political geography"), the Swede Rudolf Chellen, the Englishman Halford Mackinder, the American Mahan, the Frenchman Vidal de la Blanche and the German Carl Haushofer. All these authors, despite profound differences in ideological and political sympathies, agreed on a basic, underlying picture of the world derived from the data of this unique science. It is based on the confrontation of two types of civilisations, predetermined by geographical categories. On the one hand,

we are talking about "thalassocratic", maritime civilisations associated with an island or coastal type of existence, seafaring and a trading system. Examples of this type are Carthage, Athens, Portugal, the British Empire and, in the modern world, the USA. In the first half of the 20th century, the concept of Thalassocracy included the Entente countries (with the exception of Russia), i.e. Western republican-democratic regimes. After 1945, this geopolitical category was identified with the liberal-democratic camp and the NATO countries.

The second pole is the telluric civilisation - a continental, authoritarian, land-based civilisation. Its earliest examples are Rome, Sparta, Byzantium and later Russia. Tellurocratic zone is lands, rather distant from warm seas, convenient for trade coastal zones. These are the interior spaces of continents. This territory is also called Heartland or "heartland". (Incidentally, Mackinder himself, one of the classics of geopolitics and author of the basic concept of geopolitical dualism, was the British representative in the White Army, advising Kolchak and Wrangel. It is possible that Savitsky, who held high rank in Wrangel's government, was personally acquainted with him (although there is no documentary evidence to support this).

Mackinder believes that at present the land adjacent to the centre of the Eurasian continent, i.e. Russia's territory, is the mainland.

Between the 'heartland' and the maritime civilisation are the coastal zones, rimland. There is a strategic struggle between the Continentals and Thalassocrats for control of them.

This is, in general terms, the geopolitical view of the major factors in the state, civilisational, ideological and political course of history. The principle of "geography as destiny" underlies such views.

Anglo-Saxon geopoliticians, applying scientific data to concrete political realities, concluded on this basis that the interests of the continental powers - primarily Russia and Germany - were fundamentally and structurally opposed to their own interests. On this basis, the prospect of a Russian-

German geopolitical and strategic alliance was seen as the greatest danger, as it would strengthen the power of the two continental, telluric powers in an unprecedented way.

German geopoliticians have carefully considered the conclusions of the Anglo-Saxons and have reached similar conclusions, only with the opposite sign. For example, Karl Haushofer, head of the German geopolitical school, advocated a "continental block" along the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis. He saw this as an appropriate response to the Anglo-Saxon challenge.

Usually, historians of geopolitics, when talking about continentalism, end their analysis with the Haushofer school, considering it the direct antipode of the Anglo-Saxon line. But therein lies the surprise. At the same time with Karl Haushofer developed a complete and independent geopolitical doctrine, even more consistent and complete than the German model, because in contrast to the dual position of Germany, here the continental choice was organic, natural and the only possible. We are talking about the theories of Peter Savitsky.

Savitsky is a figure in no way inferior in scale to Haushofer or Mackinder. He represents the voice of that reality which is called heartland. And it is this purely geopolitical category, which takes into account and accepts the entire scope of the unique geopolitical approach, the entire colossal theory of the "historical function of space", stands at the heart of the worldview of Savitsky and his associates. This is Russia-Eurasia. Russia-Heartland, Russia-Middle-earth... It is Savitsky who is the person who most adequately and consistently gave a meaningful and complete answer to the problem posed by geopolitics as a science. If the American Mahan (and later Speakman) expressed the main vector of American geopolitics to become the "main island" of the world as the main way to take full responsibility for the world thalassocracy; if the Englishman Mackinder saw thalassocracy as the strategic destiny of England and the Anglo-Saxon world; if the Frenchman Vidal de la Blanche thought that the geopolitical future of Western Europe (in particular France) lay in close solidarity with England and America if the German Haushofer believed that the future of Germany depended on ef-

fective opposition at the planetary level to the Western Thalassocratic bloc, then on behalf of Russia's geopolitical interests one single person consistently and responsibly acted - Peter Nikolayevich Savitsky, who developed a complete and developed theory of specifically Russian geopolitics, conscious of its continental mission, radically opposed to Thalassocratic tendencies, and accepting its mainland, land-based and therefore universal fate.

The unfortunate fact that this great man has been undeservedly forgotten, that his name is hardly mentioned in the context of geopolitical science, is a profound injustice. he and his ideas geopolitical dualism seems unequal. The Thalassocratic pole and the German continentalism opposing it are considered to be classical positions that gave birth to their own schools and theories, while the Russian pole is seen as wordless, fulfilling its geopolitical mission in an unthinking and unreflective manner. This is an absolute misconception, and the writings of Peter Savitsky are an excellent and expressive confirmation of this view.

Tellurocracy at its most radical and consistent has its own expression, its own school, its own outstanding teachers.

The opposition between East and West, bourgeois mercantilism and liberalism on the one hand, and ideocratic forms on the other, was well understood and comprehended by the Eurasians, who - in their left wing - took the logic of this dualism to its last conclusions and . The Bolshevism, which, from a geopolitical point of view, fulfilled a clearly continentalist function, was recognised as being right.

Mackinder referred to the Russian lands as the "geographical axis of history". Eurasian geopolitics is a conceptualisation of the strategic, cultural and spiritual interests of this axis. In Eurasianism, the axis of history finds its voice, making a piercing and unambiguous statement.

2.5 The Great Continental Utopia

All references to the Eurasians and their history are constantly accompanied by references to the utopian nature of their views, their idealism and

abstraction. It is in this utopianism and romanticism that it is customary to see the cause of their historical collapse. But let us take a closer look at this problem. The Bolsheviks were utopians too, and their views, even in the general context of the chaotic moods of the pre-revolutionary period, seemed to be the height of extravagance and reverie. And yet, this small sect of fanatics was able to overturn the foundations of a gigantic conservative, rather passive country. And after all their experiments, even after more than 70 years of failure, there is hardly anyone who would dare to claim that communist utopianism prevented the Bolsheviks from creating a unique, innovative, avant-garde and tolerably functioning state for a certain and fairly long period of time. This or that utopian project is or is not realized because it is too abstract or too far removed from harsh reality. The reasons are much deeper. Incidentally, along with the Bolsheviks, there were many other powerful and determined and rather fanatical parties in Russia (the Left Socialist Revolutionaries and the Anarchists, for example), but they dissolved into history, leaving almost nothing behind.

Utopianism is certainly inherent in the Eurasian worldview. But it is inherent in any project at all, since the essence of a project is precisely to change the actual state of the real state of affairs, rather than to conceptualise the status quo post factum. Note that the most consistent "anti-utopianism" has led the most radical liberal authors (e.g. von Hayek) to deny and discredit the very notion of "project", recognising it as something "immoral" (since the implementation of a project involves violence over the de facto state of affairs).

So the reference to "utopianism", while valid, does not yet explain anything. Yes, many Eurasian foresights proved to be either inaccurate or too hasty. For example, Eurasians foresaw the rapid collapse of Marxism in Russia, and 'the rebirth of the ruling regime under pressure from internal energies into an ideocratic Third Way state with a dominant conservative-revolutionary ideology. They believed that Orthodoxy and the religious spirit would soon supersede Marxist orthodoxy and that Bolshevism would be replaced by the ideology of Eurasianism and its party expression. When, by the end of

the twenties, it became clear that such a turn of events was unlikely, the Eurasianists came to the most important line for the movement: it was necessary either to admit (like Ustryalov and the National Bolsheviks) that the Eurasian ideal was embodied in the Bolsheviks, or to abandon the basic idea. The Russian emigration's reactionary and radically anti-Soviet wing was right, claiming that "Russia had come to an end", that "the whole people had fallen into Satanism" and "sold out to the devil", and that only "Western intervention and occupation of Russia could change the situation for the better".

This was the most dramatic era for the entire Eurasian movement. Endless nostalgia for the homeland left behind, weariness of the mundane émigré existence, a growing dislike for the indifferent, selfish West and its culture, moral turmoil and internal émigré squabbles - all this gradually destroyed the original avant-garde pathos, exhausted the leaders, instilled scepticism and doubt in the rank-and-file activists.

Georgy Florensky, disillusioned with everything, chose an extreme path, closed himself in theological themes and moved to the USA: he began by advocating the absolute purity of Orthodoxy and ended up as the leader of the ecumenical movement, which, by all accounts, is deeply alien to the Orthodox spirit.

But let us leave Florovsky and other critics of Eurasianism to the right. It is much more important to understand the meaning of the Eurasian conception, based on a particular dialectic, an independent and original geopolitical doctrine, and a unique spiritual synthesis.

Eurasianists formulated in general terms a model of Russian Utopia, combining both a summary of conservative Slavophile and Narodnik aspirations and futuristic and mobilising, avant-garde motifs. This Eurasian Utopia, combined critical realism, rigorous knowledge of the economic-technical and industrial side of reality with an extreme idealistic, spiritual tension. Dostoyevsky's intuitions about the universal mission of the Russian people, the traditional doctrine of Moscow-Third Rome, Holy Russia, the Ark of Salva-

tion and even the communist chiliastic messianism of the Bolsheviks (the Third International) - all these major trends of Russian history, aspects of the unique and unmatched Russian Destiny were translated by Eurasians into a complete worldview, simultaneously consistent and open to all possible forms of clarification and nuance.

Russia is a special continent, the Eurasians argued. This continent is equal in importance not just to a single European or Asian country, but to such a large civilizational and geographical formation as Europe or Asia (taken as a whole). The full and comprehensive assertion of such an identity, inscribed in the geography, culture, ethnic psychology, civilization, and historical path of the Russian People and the Russian State, is for the Eurasians the axis of their Project. But even this rather strong idea is not the limit of the Eurasianists' audacious worldview. In the distant future, Russian Truth is seen as the highest and unique form of spiritual and cultural, religious and historical synthesis, capable of incorporating all the highest, luminous, God-given aspects of Europe and Asia, the East and the West, to merge and confirm them in the eschatological grace of the new Russian Paradise, whose premonitions pervade the entire Russian culture, history, literature, poetry, even politics.

The Eurasianists sometimes applied the name "third maximalism" to themselves. It was meant to be a movement as radical, extreme, utopian and extreme as the right-wing and left-wing "maximalists" (monarchists and Bolsheviks). However, the "third maximalism" was not an absolutisation, taking one of the polar tendencies (radical modernism or radical archaism) to the extreme, at the expense of a complete negation of the other. Eurasian Utopia implied a particular kind of synthesis, a kind of generalisation of both maximalisms in a dizzying, risky and overstretched model. One might consider it a "temptation", as moderate temperaments, bureaucratic and philistine natures tend to do... But all great things require incredible exertion, creativity and creation, not without risk.

The Eurasians were unable to proceed with their project. The émigré milieu was powerless and riven by internal contradictions, while the leaders of the

USSR believed¹ that Marxism was a self-sufficient doctrine, and even if the Revolution involved national-messianic elements who realised Bolshevism in mystical-religious terms, this had to be used for pragmatic purposes. Still, by gradually starting with the principle of "the rights of peoples and nations for self-determination", the Bolsheviks themselves came to true empire-building, and put into practice some essential aspects of the Eurasian plan (albeit in a truncated, distorted form). ! Of course, the Eurasianists proved to be more prescient than the anti-Soviet emigres who were constantly proclaiming the imminent end of the Bolsheviks. Of course, only a Eurasian analysis can understand the rebirth in a patriotic, etatist spirit of Marxism in the USSR. Certainly only Eurasian geopolitics explains the behaviour of Stalin and later Brezhnev* in the international arena. And in this sense, the left-wing Eurasianists and National Bolsheviks were absolutely right and their analysis of the events of the era has lost nothing of its relevance (unlike the "foresights" of the reactionaries and anti-Sovietists, which have been disproved by history).

But still, it is obvious that the USSR never became that Great Eurasian Empire, the Russian Paradise, which the Eurasians dreamed of, a complete and complete transformation did not take place, some lower components were not enough for the eschatological synthesis.

And in this light, the tragic witness to Peter Cai's fate takes on a symbolic significance. His rejection of the left-wing bias of the first section of Eurasia (although he calls himself a "National Bolshevik" in a letter to Struve in 1921) is of great significance. The spiritual vector, the solar Orthodox reference point, even understood as broadly, paradoxically and innovatively as possible, is not just one component of the Eurasian utopia, which can be neglected for pragmatic reasons. Savitsky insists that it is necessary to "distinguish between spirits". That "third maximalism" is still not one version of "red maximalism", but something independent, demanding its own incarnation, its own history, its own party, its own path.

Once again, Savitsky proves to be more prescient than the others. The gap that existed between Soviet ideology, Soviet state practice, on the one hand,

and the Eurasian project, on the other, was ultimately the lever by which the Great State collapsed and the great undertaking collapsed. Deprived of the ideological flexibility of the Eurasians, the paradoxalism of their philosophy of history, their particular mystical integrating religiosity and their clear geopolitical analysis, the Soviet state-ideological construct eventually shattered, unable to withstand the aggressive pressure from outside and unable to satisfy adequately the cultural and spiritual demands from within.

Utopia, as our century, in particular, has shown, is quite realisable. But so far, only intermediate, approximated, distorted versions have been realised, in which the trick, the spoilage, the fatal elements of fakery, incompleteness and imperfection were already inherent.

Eurasian Utopia (like Conservative Revolution projects in a broad sense) is the most perfect, logical, consistent, non-contradictory, vital, passionate, light and sunny, and most importantly - so resonant with the highest levels of our national spirit, our historical path.

The Eurasian project, unlike the Bolshevik project, does not know the sad results of defeat and, even worse, degeneration, transformation into self-parody and internal decay. It has simply been postponed for some time. Apparently, the timing of the birth of the Great Eurasian Empire has not yet approached. But strictly speaking, there is no other project at the moment except this one - apart from it, there is either a complete surrender to the West, or an ostrich policy of toothless, archaic, irresponsible, "archaeological" conservatism.

Although Savitsky (like Ustryalov, Arthur Muller van den Broek, Thiryar and Nikish) was not destined to become the "Lenin of the Eurasian Revolution". Well, then he will be the "Eurasian Marx" or even the "Eurasian Fourier".

The sunny dream of a world of justice and brotherhood, of the State of the Spirit and the new man, of the total victory of the light mind over the darkness of matter will never disappear from humanity or, at least, from

the Russian people. Otherwise, only a swarming mass of selfish dead, the last people of whom Nietzsche prophesied pessimistically, will remain of this humanity. But this will not happen, it does not have to be... >

And if so, then the Eurasian dream, the high ideal of the Last Kingdom, saving, God-bearing Russia-Eurasia will certainly come true. And based on the highest transcendental logic, we can say today with good reason and right, that Eurasianism is just doomed to triumph, to become the main spiritual instrument of the Russian Struggle and the Russian Victory, the victory over the chaotic, fatally dual, inescapably gravitational and entropic fatal logic of "this world", vainly trying today to break its last links with the "other world".

Chapter 3

Nikolai Alekseev : Theory of the Eurasian State

3.1 One of the three best

The name of Nikolai Nikolaevich Alekseev is not always mentioned when listing the leading Eurasian thinkers. This is an unfortunate misunderstanding, contrasting sharply with the scale and depth of this thinker and the importance of his writings and concepts for the entire Eurasian worldview. The names of Karsavin (a rather ordinary thinker) or Suv-chinsky (who is generally more valuable for his financial support of the movement than for his mediocre articles) come first in the list of Eurasians, while Alekseev comes after the comma, and sometimes he is simply forgotten. In fact, he should be included in the top three most interesting, original, profound Eurasian authors along with Nikolai Trubetskoy and Pyotr Savitsky. But while Trubetskoy specialized in the cultural-ethnic and ideological aspects of Eurasianism, while Savitsky led the geopolitics, geography and headed the political-conspiracy line, Alekseev is the pillar of the "theory of Eurasian law". This cultural-political-legal triumvirate (Trubetskoy-Savitsky-Alekseyev) should be seen as the three main lines of Eurasian teaching, constituting together the outline of a unique, complete, highly original worldview, the only consis-

tent and adequate to the very essence of the Russian path through history.

Alekseev laid the foundations for "Eurasian law", the jurisprudence that was to replace Soviet jurisprudence after the inevitable collapse of communist rule, according to Eurasian aspirations, while retaining the full ideocratic, deeply national pathos of Bolshevism, unmistakably recognised by Eurasians as the dominant national trait of the Russian people.

Alekseev was faced with a very specific task. - He had to develop a legal theory which, on the one hand, would stem from the main line of the organic social development of the Russian people and, on the other hand, would be as consistent as possible with modern criteria and requirements. To accomplish this task, all existing and existing legal concepts in Russia, from the works of pre-revolutionary authors to Soviet legal and constitutional documents, had to be thoroughly reviewed. In addition, an adequate position also had to be developed in relation to the legal thinking of the West.

Is it possible to imagine a task more ambitious, immense, clearly exceeding the capabilities of a single individual, however gifted and well prepared? Nevertheless, Alexeev has fulfilled this mission, and thanks to him today we have the foundations of a unique theory, which, in our opinion, sooner or later will become the starting point in the development of an organic, rooted in history, modernised and perfectly appropriate to our national environment of Russian Law.

But even this merit does not exhaust Alekseev's contribution to the Eurasian cause. In parallel with the legal aspect of the question, he also developed interesting philosophical, cultural and historical themes. Strikingly, it is in Alekseev's work that we most often find references to the pleiad of conservative-revolutionary figures of his time. He constantly refers to Oswald Spengler and Schmitt, to the German Organizationalist school of sociology and even to ... René Guénon! As far as we know, this is a unique case of Henon's citation among Russian philosophers of that epoch, and this fact alone shows how true and accurate our identification of the Eurasian movement with the main line of Western traditionalism, theories of the Third

Way and Conservative Revolution is.

Discovering Alekseev, returning and making sense of his legacy is a categorical imperative of our common Eurasian revival.

3.2 The Eurasian context

As a Eurasian, Alekseev remains a radical "orientalist". This means that for him the geographical and geopolitical East represents a positive pole, whereas the Romano-Germanic world, the West, evokes rejection and rejection in its most essential aspects. This singling out of a strict dichotomy between the West and the East is a distinctive feature of Eurasianism in general and goes back to the formula of Prince Nikolai Trubetskoy - "Europe and Humanity", where "Europe" (= "Запад") is opposed to the rest of humanity as an aggressive, claiming uniqueness and fullness of moral and physical power, anomaly. "Humanity" as the inverse of "Europe" is identified with "the East". By the way, it is extremely interesting to point out the existence of René Guénon's book "The East and the West" (quoted by Alekseev), which asserts a similar concept: "The West" is a world of degeneration and decadence, a decadent "modern world", a sharp, catastrophic deviation from the norms and principles of Tradition, while "The East" is a world of Tradition and fidelity to principles, a full reality that has maintained a connection with the original world of the "Golden Age".

The Russian Slavophiles (+Leontiev) and Eurasians, the German organo-citizens (Ferdinand Tenis, etc.) and later the Conservative Revolutionaries (Arthur Müller van den Broek, Ernst Jünger, Oswald Spengler, Martin Heidegger, Karl Schmitt, etc.) The Romanesque traditionalists (René Guénon, Julius Evola) adopted an essentially very similar approach to modernity, an approach that is cultural-spatial and clearly resonant with geopolitics, but at the same time based on a historical paradigm, and radically opposed to the progressivist-evolutionist model that dominates in the West. "Modernity" was identified with the West, Tradition with the East. But at the same time, the usual evaluation marks were reversed. The "modern world" and "progress" were seen as degeneration and decay, while Tradition and the

constancy of the cultural and religious paradigm were taken as the highest good.

Thus, the "modern", the "Western", the "progressive" was seen as negative, to be overcome or even destroyed. The positive thesis was the "Great Return", the "exodus to the East" as to "the Source", to the beginning, to the Principle, to the forgotten, lost heart of things, to Heartland', the "heartland".

However, in this spirit, common to the whole conservative-revolutionary movement on the European continent, Russian Eurasians made an essential amendment, first formulated by Peter Savitsky. He stated in his review of Trubetskoy's seminal book that the dichotomy "Europe and Mankind" drawn there should be specified, since the second concept, "Mankind", is too vague to serve as an operational category of the historical opposition of civilizations and mobilize geopolitical and national organisms for concrete political and metapolitical action. Savitsky, drawing on geopolitics, proposed the next conceptual step - to identify "Humanity" confronting Europe, what Henon called "the East", with Russia, but understood not as a nation-state, but as a continental-cultural potency, as an ideal instance sufficiently clear about its historical mission, on the one hand, and open and at the same time concentrated enough to speak for all of "He-Europe", on the other. When Dostoevsky, that greatest Russian conservative revolutionary, spoke of the "all-humanity of Russians", he had the same idea in mind. "Europe" offers, imposes by force on everyone else its archetype of "humanity", identical to "the modern European and his system of values and priorities". This is "progressive fallen cosmopolitanism". European cosmopolitanism, striving to become universal and the only one, is opposed by the "Russian All-Man", Leontief's "blossoming complexity", a Eurasian ensemble of cultures, religions and ethnicities, uniting around Russia in order to resist Western aggression and assert the right to Tradition and identity.

Peter Savitsky developed these theses in detail, equipping them with both geopolitical studies and analysis of global processes of concrete politics. The same geopolitical Russophilia is to be found in most of the Conservative Rev-

olutionaries in Germany - Müller van den Broek, translator into German of Dostoevsky and author of the landmark book *The Third Reich* (a term later usurped by the Nazis), Ernst Nikit, the geopolitician Karl Haushofer (with his doctrine of the Eurasian Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis). This "Eurasian component" in the movement of the German conservative revolutionaries was called *Ostorientierung*.

True, René Guénon drew a different conclusion and simply converted to Islam, moved to Cairo, and integrated himself politically into the Arab socio-religious environment, leaving the West, which, in his view, was henceforth irrevocably lost. His disciple and friend Julius Evola (incidentally, Spengler's translator into Italian and a friend of Merezhkovsky) tried to resuscitate Indo-European "paganism" and participated in the ideological support of the fascist and national-socialist movements, which generally rejected the conclusions of geopolitics and the Eurasian approach. But these are details. The starting point for all was the same, and the inglorious end of the Axis countries in World War II confirmed the theoretical correctness of Eurasians and their European followers, rather than racists and supporters of a return to "traditional Europe" alone, without help from the East.

In the context of these basic orientations Alekseev acted, fully sharing the radical Eurasian views, which among all directions of the conservative revolution were the most consistent, complete, consistent and convincing. If Russia-Eurasia is to realize its particular civilizational mission and put it into practice, it needs a ready-made doctrine covering all social, ideological, economic and social levels. Nikolai Alekseev set himself the task of creating a theory of a Eurasian state (or a guarantee state, in his terminology). And in this sense, his role is comparable only to that of the brilliant German jurist Carl Schmitt, who faced a similar task, but in a different national context.

Alexeev is a Russian Schmitt, and continuing this analogy, it can be argued that without Nikolai Alekseev's Eurasian philosophy of law one cannot get a complete picture of Eurasianism, just as one cannot speak of the German Conservative Revolution without mentioning one of its central figures, Karl

Schmitt.

3.3 The "compulsory state" versus the "rule of law"

The Eurasianist philosophy was based on the opposition between the organo-cultural, "holistic" approach to society and history and the mechanistic, "atomic", individualistic, "contractual" approach. Organism (holism) sees historical peoples, states and societies as organic entities, as integral natural beings born together of spirit and soil, from an organic combination of subjective and object aspects. Hence a specific approach to all other, more specific issues.

The atomistic approach, by contrast, sees all socio-historical formations - ethnicities, states, classes, etc., - as a consequence of the arbitrary grouping of particular atomic individuals, individuals who fix this grouping in various forms of "contract", "agreement". In other words, only the individual is indivisible, constant in this mechanistic approach (this Latin word means "indivisible" and its exact Greek analogue is the word "atom" - "indivisible"), all other entities are ultimately historical arbitrariness, possess no independent ontology and can therefore change just as arbitrarily, giving way to other forms of contractual groups.

Interestingly, the organicist approach was most prevalent among German scholars, while "individualism" received its priority development in England and France. Russian conservative philosophers (Slavophiles) have always gravitated towards organicism and in this respect have mainly relied on German authors. In a spatial sense, the following pattern can be traced - organicism (holism) is characteristic of the East, individualism - of the West, and this is true both for the European part of Eurasia and for the whole continent (the Far Eastern tradition and Hinduism represent the most radical forms of holistic philosophy and religious doctrine).

Nikolai Alekseev projected this dualism onto legal theory and got a very interesting result. His study of Western legal thought led him to conclude that the very notion of law is inherently linked to a mechanistic individ-

ualist doctrine. “Law” describes the sphere of freedom of the individual in relation to other realities - Other individuals, property, natural and cultural environments, social institutions, etc. In other words, law proceeds from the premise of the “autonomy”, the “sovereignty” of the individual, his self-sufficiency and finality in the face of other layers of being. From this Rousseau derived his extreme theory of “natural rights”. But already long before the Enlightenment, in the feudal West and even partly in the ancient world, Alexeev sees tendencies towards the autonomization of the individual and the confirmation of this autonomization in the social code. Initially, the notion of ‘rights’ refers to selected categories - the Emperor, the patricians, later the seniors, members of the clergy, etc. It is still a long way from Rousseau, who recognised the “natural right” of all members of human society, but the general trend is quite clear. As we move in this direction we come to modern liberal theories of law, most fully set out in the writings of the Austrian liberal jurist Kelsen. By extending the concept of law to every member of society, we arrive at the concept of the rule of law, the now famous “human rights” theory.

Nikolai Alekseev shows that this way of legal thought and the evolution of legal institutions reflects only one of the possible lines of social development, based on atomic individualistic, rationalistic philosophy, which is natural and logical for the West, but completely alien and unacceptable for the East. It is very important to accentuate this point of Alekseev’s thought - the very concept of “right” is associated with a strictly fixed geopolitical, geographical reality. It claims to be universal, but in fact, it reflects a purely local process of development of only one segment of humanity. Alexeev ironically points to the fact that under the “General Theory of Law”, Western lawyers understand “the general theory of Western law”, leaving out all the alternative legal models that are still common among the peoples that make up most of humanity, and in addition, that existed in the West itself in other historical epochs. In other words, a typical deception is again revealed in the legal sphere - the West seeks to impose its local attitudes on all other peoples, identifying its unique geographical and historical experience with the “general theory of development”, with the “mainstream path of social and

moral evolution”, etc. Alexeev’s most interesting conclusion is that when we use the word “right”, we implicitly enter the system of the Western way of thinking, we enter a philosophical context that is alien to the organicist logic.

But what opposes the concept of right in alternative social models? The concept of duty. Alekseev dwells on this in detail. Citing the social history of Russia as an example, he uses very accurately the old term “draught state”, a state built on the principles of the domination of duty.

In its purest form, such a “pulling system” does not know or recognise any rights at all, but asserts only duties everywhere. This stems from the philosophical attitude of traditional society which regards the individual as part of the whole, as a non-self-sufficient and non-sufficient projection on the singular of the universal. Hence, the individual appears only as a part of the whole - the Church, the State, the people, the nation, the community. This is the communal principle, the principle of the precedence of the common in the formation of the whole. Ferdinand Tönnies, to whom Alexeev often refers, has beautifully dissected this dualism in contrasting the principles of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. *Gemeinschaft* means ‘community’, *Gesellschaft* means ‘society’. The Latin equivalents are “*communa*” and “*socium*”. “*Communa*”, “*Gemeinschaft*”, “community” imply that the whole precedes the private, predetermines it, and therefore the private has only duties to the whole. “*Socium*, *Gesellschaft*, ‘society’, on the other hand, sees the common as the product of the particular, the whole as composite, arising through connection (‘*socium*’, ‘*Gesellschaft*’ - literally means ‘connected’, ‘joined’, ‘artificially fastened’). Consequently, such a “composite unity” owes its very existence entirely to its parts, which therefore automatically acquire basic “rights”, “rights” arising from their ontological primacy.

In fact, two possible theories of law emerge. One involves individuals as private and the contractual community as the product of private connections. The relations between them and the individuals among themselves constitute the content of law as it is understood by the West. The ultimate expression of such a construction is the theory of the “rule of law” and “hu-

man rights“ (this latter does not involve the state at all, which in this case can be replaced by some other form of association, leading to the modern theories of ”monodialism“, ”World Government“, etc.)

The second theory of law deals not with individuals (”indivisible“), but with personas, personalities, because the term ”persona“ in Greek meant ”mask“ and was applied to the characteristics of the participants in a tragedy. Russian persona is etymological derivation from Greek, and means function, role and mask, rather than an independent and sovereign, autonomous unit. These person-masks are discrete forms of expressing the one - the community, the people, the state. They perform a ”pulling function“, ”pulling“ the yoke of social being, which is so heavy because we are talking about a transaction with the universal, with the whole, with the one. The social field of every individual in the ”draught state“ is knowingly fraught with the fullness of a weighty ontology. Here everyone serves the whole, fulfilling the role set by the whole and being rewarded with the ontological, permanent prospect of full participation in this whole and the possibility of unlimited drawing from this whole of the forces of being and peace of mind.

The sovereign, the Tsar, the Vasilevos, the one who is the bearer of law in the Western concept long before the Enlightenment and liberalism, is no exception in the ”draughtsmen’s state“. The Eurasian tsar, the tsar of organicist society, is as much a persona, a mask, a draughtsman as anyone else. He is a servant of the common being, and consequently, he is the first to feel the full burden of ontological service. The king is more indebted than all his subjects. He is personally responsible for the smooth functioning of all other personalities. He is not the collector of tribute, but the overseer, the ”bishop“ of the common enterprise of being entrusted to him by something higher than himself, in relation to which he himself is only a mask and a role, a function and a servant.

Alekseev speaks mildly, so as not to finally intimidate the Russian émigré old regime intelligentsia, brought up overwhelmingly on liberal theories, about the concept of ”right-bonding“ as an alternative to the legal approach. However, objectively, we should still only speak of ”duties,“ of the ”obligatory

state," of the "dependent state," which, if it uses the category of law, only in an applied, instrumental, subordinate sense, in order to structure and rationalize those legal questions that are more conveniently viewed from the perspective of rights. However, this technical necessity of referring to "rights" does not yet mean that they are part of a social ontology; hence, it makes sense, strictly speaking, to exclude the very mention of "rights" from the basic definition of "Eurasian jurisprudence" and talk only about "obligations", which is quite symmetrical to Western concepts of the "rule of law".

3.4 "Our monastery is Russia"

In order not to distort our author's position, it should still be made clear that he does not refer to the Eurasian state as "obligatory", but speaks of "rights obligations", of a "guarantee state", of "democracies" and "ideocracies". The term "demotia" was used by Eurasians to distinguish between a mechanistic and an organicist understanding of the democratic principle. "Democracy" is "organic democracy", the principle of "the complicity of the people in their own destiny", as defined by Arthur Müller van den Broek. Such participation, unlike liberal democracy, presupposes the complicity in momentous social and governmental decisions not only of living, adult citizens who belong to a concrete territory and social system, but also of a certain special being - the popular spirit that emerges from the dead, the living and the unborn, from the general natural course of a people as a community through history. "Ideocracy", on the other hand, means the subordination of social life to a particular ideal, a natural "telos" derived from the culture, religion and spirit of a nation and state, which remains constant despite political, ideological, ethnic and even religious cataclysms. Of course, both the principle of "democracies" and the concept of "ideocracy" unequivocally lead to the "obligatory state" as a radical antithesis to the Western law, a kind of Anti-Kelsen. Still, Alekseev is personally keen to emphasise the more benign, positive features of the Eurasian state rather than the rather rigid social ontology that is associated with the "obligatory state" and which was clearly embodied in the Soviet system.

The desire to distance oneself from the radical model of "obligatory state" is manifested in Alekseev's socio-legal comprehension of the traditional for Russian historiosophy opposition between the Iosiflians, supporters of Joseph Volotsky, Bishop of Volokolamsk, and the Volga, followers of the Hesychast Nil Sorsky. Joseph of Volotsk, a revered Russian saint, was one of the first Russian theorists of a "pull state". He regarded all social and even spiritual manifestations of the individual as serving the national-religious Whole, the Orthodox Kingdom, Holy Russia. Later Volotsky's line was continued by Ivan Peresvetov, the main theorist of the oprichnina, and Ivan the Terrible himself, the iconic figure of Moscow Rus', this vivid historical example of the "obligatory state". Quite rightly Alekseev distinguishes the same line in the pathos of the early Old Believers and, in our time, in Bolshevism and Leninism. Alekseev recognises that "josiflianism" is a deeply Eurasian phenomenon, symptomatic and extremely important for the understanding of an alternative socio-legal model to the West. But at the same time Alekseev is inclined to consider such a type not as a central axis, but as one of the possible poles of the Eurasian social organisation, as the Terrible Pole, as a restrictive, prohibitive, suppressive, terrorist regime of absolutised public service. Incidentally, of Alekseev's contemporaries, the Iosiflian model was defended by the National Bolsheviks and the Shmenovkhovs.

However, while recognizing the advantages of Islamic liberalism, Nikolai Alekseev still gravitates towards a different version of the social order, which he traces to the lineage of the Trans-Volga elders, Nilus Sorsky, his disciple Vassian Patrikeyev and Prince Kurbsky. This is the Merciful Pole of the Eurasian model, releasing a special cultural-spiritual space for spiritual, contemplative work on the other side of the social and moral service, aimed at compensating the excesses of socialisation and totalitarianism, at refining and sanctifying the pathos of the "obligatory state". And this line, of course, is also deeply rooted in the Russian national element, which along with the ethics of service and asceticism knows perfectly well the ethics of luminous speculation, of Thabor contemplation, of the luminous transformation of the flesh into spirit. The line of the Trans-Volga elders, its projection into politics, into a kind of secret society, which is hinted at by Alekseev and

which, in his words, is behind the very phenomenon of Eurasianism, gives a theory of a full-fledged messianic state, an ideal Russia-Eurasia, the Third Russia, which is based on the "obligatory state" of the Josephians, but sublimates it to an isikhastic monastic mind contemplation. "Our monastery is Russia", Nikolai Gogol said on a similar occasion.

Moreover, this Merciful Pole is by no means, strictly speaking, a concession to the legal principle. It is simply the notion of the basic individual, which is an inheritance of social unity, that is elevated to a mystical-church, contemplative-monastic level. No rights for the individual arise, but in addition to the gravitational, socio-political, labor duty, a gracious, compensatory, light duty arises, but also a duty, a duty of personal isichastic complicity in the fullness of the non-transcendent light revealed by the sacrifice of Jesus to each member of the Church, the Church as the original unity that constitutes the "new person" or the "good person" of the born-again Christian.

The mysticism of Russian history confirms Alekseev's point. - Nilus Sorsky was canonized and counted as a saint, as was his opponent Joseph Volotsky. But the veneration of Nil Sorsky was rather local, whereas Joseph of Volotsk enjoyed the glory of a national saint, loved and widely venerated by all people. Likewise in the political models of the Eurasian state - the Iosifian, the Terrible, the Moscovite, the Oprichnikov-Bol'shevist line was widespread, as a kind of "exoterism". Whereas the Mercy Line of the Trans-Volga elders was intelligible to the elite - the Optina elders, monasticism, the subtle prophets of Russia (such as Dostoevsky or Blok), our mystics and spiritualists.

3.5 Byzantism

The typology of two alternative social models proposed by Alexeev in his article "The Idea of an 'Earthly City' in Christian Doctrine" is extremely interesting, correlating legal forms with religious and confessional attitudes. Alexeev accurately points to the crucial fact that the Old Testament society was a prototype of modern liberal-democratic regimes, as it did not know

the theory of "organic state", was based solely on theocratic principles and relativized (and in some cases demonized) the importance of royal power in every way. Elements of this "theocratic democracy" Alekseev traces through the entire history of Western jurisprudence up to modern theories of the "rule of law". This is a very important element - the identification of the Jewish tradition with the Western spirit, with the Western form. The same (albeit in a different context) was asserted by René Guénon, who classified Judaism as a spiritual tradition of the West. Later, already in Christian society, the same line led to the Catholic model, to papo-cesarism, etc. The highest and most complete form of such anti-state of the Old Testament type is considered by Alekseev to be the USA, a country of the extreme West, where all social-liberal trends have reached their historical culmination. And it is no accident that the USA is the work of Protestant extremist sects, which have tried to artificially recreate a copy of the ancient Jewish reality in the New World, to which all the Calvinist branches of Protestantism traditionally appeal.

Alekseev quite rightly argues that the East adhered to a different social model which, on the contrary, emphasised the importance of the monarchical principle, "despotism". Instead of a "social contract" supervised by a theocracy, there was a "holistic state" headed by the Father-King, organically resembling a working family or even a single organism. It is possible to compare the theocratic principle with the dominance of the mind, the head. The monarchical principle with the dominance of the heart, the centre of being.

Russia was originally built as a state of the Eastern type, the opposite of the Judaic model. Even earlier, such a radically non-Jewish form had developed in the Byzantine Empire, which was the embodiment of a Christian tradition recognised in an Eastern ("Eurasian") vein. Orthodoxy and its political-social doctrine are Eurasian Christianity. But unlike the non-Christian monarchies of the East, the Orthodox Christian Vassilius is not deified in the full sense of the word. His functions and even the priesthood of his public, holistic ministry are subordinated to the light principles of the Church, not personified as in Catholicism, but mystically, providentially,

eschatologically. Roughly this model is called 'Caesarean papism'. But here the proportions are not simply reversed in relation to the papo-cesarism of Western Christianity. Here the quality of both functions is quite different; the forms of authority are configured differently from the corresponding institutions of the West. Byzantism, in fact, is in some ways consonant with the Ghibelline idea in its most sublime version. The kingdom is understood as a religious ministry, as an aspect of the ecclesiological domestication of the Church, as an eschatological and soteriological function. The emperor does not take religious authority away from the Patriarch (the Pope), but sacralises to the full his secular authority, making it more than a secular, transforming service. The ecclesiastical ruler, on the other hand, is placed even higher in the spiritual sense, but in the secular sense his powers are reduced, freeing up energy for a purely religious, mystical, eucharistic service. Thus the Byzantine model is not simply an eastern despotism (although at its worst it slopes towards it), but an ideal balanced system, with optimal proportions between the "draught principle" of the holistic State, the State as idea, as ontological undivided essence, as principle, as sacral empire, and the spiritual workings of the religious domestication of salvation.

But even if this harmonious, providential balance between the two types of power is lost (and it is precisely this balance that René Guénon considered a hallmark of a truly traditional, perfect society), Byzantism is doomed to descend into an eastern model of despotism, and not at all into the "rule of law" into which the Old Testament or Catholic social forms degenerate.

3.6 The Eurasian State Project

What are the main conclusions from Alekseev's writings? What does he propose to replace the legal systems he criticises?

First, and most importantly, Alekseev unequivocally argues that law in Russia must be built on principles and premises alternative to Western-liberal legal theories. It is not law that is important, but truth, the state of truth. A guaranteeing, "obligatory" State, dealing with individuals but not individuals, with projections of the one and not the atomic founders of an arbitrary

and non-binding collective enterprise. Consequently, national jurisprudence must sharply and firmly reject the copying of Western legal theories and subject them to a detailed and scrupulous historical-geopolitical and critical analysis, adopting only that which does not contradict the principles of the "pull state" and can be used for limited-instrumental purposes.

Secondly, the ideal type of the Eurasian State will be a full-fledged Byzantine model, combining the formidable principle of the Josephian totalitarianism, the apagogic totalitarianism of the nationwide, nation-wide house-building, with the merciful principle of Transylvanian contemplation and Hesychast conversion, elevating the community work to the level of Intelligent Action.

Thirdly, the Eurasian State should consistently pursue the universalization of its type, absorbing other cultures and ethnic groups, enriching them with the light of the saving mission and enriching itself with the uniqueness of the diversity of cultural forms. Ultimately, Eurasia itself should be realized and seen as a Single Whole, as an undivided community, as a plastic proto-reality of historical-geographical (spatial and temporal) destiny. But this Whole manifests itself through "personas", national personalities, entrusted with a pulling mission - to reduce the continental mosaic to a single picture, to decipher landscapes and ethnic ensembles as fragments of a single finished Text, whose reading is entrusted to generations of the eschatological era, the population of the Great Eurasian Empire of the End, whose creation and consolidation is the highest mission and the final choice of the people, the Russian God-bearer people. 1

Nikolai Alekseev has done a great deal along the way. He left the rest to those who would come after him, i.e. us.

Part IV

CRUSADE AGAINST US

Chapter 1

A crusade against us

1.1 Liberalism-totalitarian ideology

What is the dominant ideology of the modern West and its geopolitical vanguard, the United States of America? This is not an idle question at all. It directly affects all of us. Let's be frank: we have lost the global geopolitical conflict. We are defeated. And so we must know exactly and strictly - who is the boss in the new conditions of the planetary balance of power, what the main features of his world outlook are, what he thinks about the world, history, the fate of humanity, about us? This is necessary for everyone - both for those who intend to resign and obediently serve the new masters, and for those who refuse to accept this state of affairs and seek to rebel and win a new geopolitical freedom.

We have been led to believe that there is no ideology at all in the West, that there is a pluralism of positions and beliefs, that everyone is free to believe, think, say and do whatever they want. This is a complete lie, a propaganda move borrowed from the arsenal of the Cold War. In reality, there is a dominant ideology in the West that is no less totalitarian and intolerant than any other ideology, except that its forms and principles are unique, its philosophical premises are different and its historical basis is fundamentally different from the ideologies we are familiar with. That ideology is liberalism. It is based on the dogma of the "autonomous individual" (i.e. on consistent individualism), on "applied rationality", on the belief in technological progress, on the concept of an "open society", on elevating the principle of "market" and "free exchange" not only to an economic, but to an ideological, social and philosophical absolute.

Liberal ideology is "right" in the narrow economic sense and "left" in the sense of humanitarian rhetoric. Moreover, all other combinations of "right" and "left" or simply "right" and "left" are themselves rejected, dismantled, marginalized and relegated to the ranks of officialism. Liberalism is totalitarian in a special way. Instead of direct physical repression of dissidents, it resorts to tactics of soft strangulation, gradual shifting to the margins of society, economic strangulation of dissidents and opponents, etc. But the fact remains that the dominant ideology of the West (liberalism) actively

combats alternative political and ideological projects, but uses more subtle, "softer", more sophisticated methods than other forms of totalitarianism to achieve its goals, but this is only more effective. Liberal totalitarianism is not brutal, not open, but veiled, ghostly, and invisible. However, this does not make it any less brutal.

The West's "dominant ideology" is gradually becoming clearer and clearer in our society. The naivety of early perestroika and dreams of "pluralism" and "democracy" have gradually faded, even among the most ardent reformers. The reality of liberalism and the ideology of liberalism has become apparent and, consequently, greater certainty has been achieved. Supporters of the West must henceforth share all the ideological premises of a particular liberalism (and not some "democracy" by which everyone understood something vague and indefinite), its opponents are united in their rejection of this ideology. This is more or less understandable.

But liberalism has another, more hidden layer. It is about some of the theological and religious assumptions that ultimately led the West to the very ideological model that has taken root in it today and become dominant. This layer is not as universal and unambiguously recognised as the vulgar stamps of "open society" and "human rights", but it is nevertheless the base and secret source of the dominant liberal ideology on the planet, which in itself is only the tip of the iceberg.

This is about Protestant eschatology.

1.2 The USA is the essence of the West

There is no doubt today that the world is ruled by the only remaining full-fledged superpower - the USA. It is not just the most militarily powerful state of the West, it is, in a sense, the result of the Western way of development, its peak, its maximum achievement. The USA was founded and built as an artificially constructed entity, devoid of historical inertia, tradition, etc. by the standards of the most radical prescriptions worked out by the whole course of Western civilisation. It is the pinnacle of this civilisation, the

crown of its formation.

The USA is the sum of the West, its geopolitical, ideological and religious vanguard. It is only in the USA that the principles of liberalism have been implemented in a total and consistent manner, and since some time both the West and liberalism have been quite legitimately identified with the USA.

America is the hegemon of the modern world, a giant geopolitical, strategic and economic empire that controls all the most important processes of our planet. And not just as one of the ordinary states, even if very powerful and developed, but precisely as an ideological model, as a way of development, as a judge and shepherd of humanity, imposing a certain system of ideological, ideological and political values on it. The US empire is an empire of liberalism, an empire of capital, an empire of post-industrial society as the highest stage of development of the bourgeois system.

There is no doubt that the USA is the direct heir to Europe and to European history. But the uniqueness of this entity lies in the fact that the States took from Europe only one, the most refined, purified direction of civilisation - liberal rationalism, "social contract" theory, individualism, dynamic technological industrialism, absolutised concepts of the "mercantile system". Earlier, all these trends had been concentrated in Protestant England. The British Empire was the first (if we do not take Ancient Phoenicia into account) model of building a purely "trading civilization", to which Western history logically led. It is no coincidence that the main theorists of liberalism were the English - Adam Smith, Ricardo, etc., while the philosophers of individualism were Locke, Hobbes, Mandeville. Max Weber and, even more strikingly, Werner Sombart showed convincingly how Western capitalism was born out of Protestant ethics and how the ethno-religious factor was essential for the emergence of certain socio-economic formations.

From England the baton of the "mercantile system" gradually passed to the USA, and since the second half of the 20th century America's leadership in the general context of Western civilisation has become an indisputable historical fact.

The USA is the embodiment of the West, of Western capitalism, its centre and axis, its essence. And now that the US has become the sole master of the entire planet, we can easily recognise the logic of history converging like a focal point to a single point (which, for historical reasons, those thinkers who did not live to see the dramatic unfolding of the geopolitical, social and economic confrontation of the Cold War could not do).

So, all Western history converges on the United States. The West as a geopolitical phenomenon emerged during the split of the Christian Church into Orthodoxy and Catholicism. The Catholic arena became the basis of what is now called "the West", "the West" in the conceptual sense. From that moment on, the people of the Catholic world identified themselves with full humanity, their history with world history, their civilisation with civilisation in general. All other civilisations and traditions were contemptuously equated with "savage, barbaric countries". It is indicative that not only non-Christian nations fell into this "subhuman" category, but the whole orthodox world, which was in reality the zone of real, undistorted and authentic Christianity. By the way, it was precisely because the Orthodox countries - first Byzantium, later Russia - were Christian that they aroused such an aggressive aversion among Catholics. Orthodoxy gave an example of a different kind of Christianity - universal, open, non-sectarian, radically alternative to the whole civilizational order that had developed in the West, which until a certain time claimed to be the only form of Christian statehood. In the opposition of Catholicism to Orthodoxy one should look for the origin of the dialectical development of the history of civilisation and geopolitical processes in the following centuries.

The history of the West is to be traced back to the schism of the churches. Catholicism at that time became the leader of purely "Western" tendencies. But after a certain period of time certain elements of Catholic teaching, inherited, by the way, from the Orthodox unity of the churches, come into contradiction with the main line of development of the West. The turning point came at the Reformation. At this point the most "Western" tendencies become isolated and concentrated in the Protestant type. Protestantism

spreads precisely in those countries and among those peoples who consistently move in the direction set by the schism: alienation from the East, arrogant contempt for the "wild nations", identification of themselves and their technical development with the peak of civilisation, individualistic and rationalistic tendencies, not content even with the Catholic framework (although those in turn were an essential step in the same direction from the perfectly traditional and faithful spirit of the original teaching of Orthodoxy).

The Protestant countries - England in the first place - are taking the path of "maritime civilisation", gravitating towards the absolutisation of the liberal model, towards the universalisation of the "mercantile system". Henceforth, in the West itself, the role of vanguard, the role of the "Far West" begins to be played by the English.

Even later, it was the extreme, most radical Protestant English sects who laid the foundations of American civilisation, designing and realising the United States. They go there - to the far West - as the "promised land" to build there a perfect society, the "ideal West", the "absolute West". The United States of America as a state was created by a consensus of fundamentalist Protestant sects, and the overwhelming majority of the political class of the USA still remains the representatives of Protestant denominations. This, however, is quite logical - the country is ruled by the legitimate ideological heirs of those who created it, who organised it, who led it to prosperity and power.

Americans themselves call it "Manifest Destiny", "Manifest Destiny" (or "Manifest Destiny"). In other words, Americans see their history as an afterthought to the civilisational triumph, to the victory of the worldview model on which American civilisation itself is based - as the quintessence of the entire history of the West.

1.3 Protestantism as an ideology

It may be objected: "Modern Western society - and especially American so-

ciety - has long been atheistic, few people adhere to religion, and moreover, fundamentalism, however Protestant-type, can in no way be equated with the official ideology of the United States, much less the West as a whole. In fact, it should be pointed out that religion does not necessarily have to act as a cult or a set of dogmas. Often in the modern world, it manifests itself subconsciously, as psychological preconditions, as a system of cultural and everyday stamps, as a semi-conscious geopolitical intuition. One can compare religion with ideology - some people (a minority) possess the whole totality of the conceptual apparatus, while others grasp ideology intuitively. And most often religion today influences more through cultural background, through family psychology, through norms of social ethics. In this respect the USA is an absolutely Protestant country, and this "Protestantism" affects not only open adherents of this confession, but also huge strata of people of other religious convictions or atheists. The Protestant spirit is easy to find not only in Puritans, Baptists, Quakers, Mormons, etc., but also in American Krishnaism, and in the Moon sect, and among the American Jesuits, and simply in the irreligious American common man. They are all affected in one way or another by "Protestant ideology", although culturally and dogmatically it is recognised as a relative minority.

Second argument. The political class in the US is not a proportional reflection of society as a whole. Just look at the negligible number of people of colour among politicians and top administrators. By tradition the majoritarian type in American politics is "WASP" - "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant". Consequently, full-fledged Protestant fundamentalism is far more likely here than in other strata.

And finally, even more specifically: the Republican Party of the United States, one of the two with a de facto political monopoly, is guided by a Protestant-fundamentalist worldview openly and consistently, legitimately considering it the axis line of American civilisation, the religious and dogmatic embodiment of Manifest Destiny, the "Manifest Destiny" of the States.

An intermediate layer between the generally recognised secular liberalism

for the masses and the Protestant eschatological fundamentalism of the political elite are the geopolitical centres of analysts serving the authorities, who use a generalising methodology in their elaborations, where the main religious and philosophical tenets of Protestantism, taken without the details and prophetic fanaticism of the preachers, are combined with the most pragmatic aspects of liberal doctrine, cleared of pathetic demagoguery about “human rights” and “democracy”. In other words, the geopolitical thinking, extremely developed by the US political elite, combines in a consistent manner eschatological fundamentalism, the idea of “the USA as a New Israel, called to shepherd the nations at the end of history” and the idea of free trade as a maximum rationalisation of social order based on the priority of “rational egoism” and “atomic individualism”. The Protestant messianism of American geopolitics is thus combined with the proposal of a universal market model and a liberal value system.

1.4 The Evil Empire

Russia has been the main geopolitical and ideological enemy of the West for centuries. This is quite legitimate. On a theological level, it is rooted in the opposition between Catholicism (+Protestantism) and Orthodoxy, the Western Roman Empire - Byzantium. Western and Eastern forms of Christianity are two choices, two paths, two incompatible, mutually exclusive messianic ideals. Orthodoxy is focused on the spiritual transformation of the world in the rays of the light of the Uncovered Light of Tabor, Catholicism is focused on the material reorganization of the earth under the administrative authority of the Vatican (see *The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor* in *The Brothers Karamazov* by F.M. Dostoevsky). The Orthodox regard contemplation above all, the Catholics action. Political doctrine in Orthodoxy insists on a “symphony of powers”, strictly separating the secular (the sovereign, the tsar) and spiritual (the patriarch, the clergy) powers. Catholicism, on the other hand, seeks to extend the power of the Pope to secular life, provoking a backlash of usurpation by secular monarchs eager to subjugate the Vatican. The Orthodox regard Catholics as “apostates” who have betrayed “apostasy”; Catholics regard the Orthodox as a “barbaric spiritualist sect”.

Later, the most Haitian Orthodox features - up to and including the rejection of the service and many of the dogmas - were taken to extremes by the Protestants.

Russia was the direct and only spiritual-political, geopolitical successor to Byzantium after the fall of Constantinople. That is why, by the way, and only for that reason, she was called "Holy". It was made "holy", "God-bearing", "God-chosen" by its providential acceptance of the Byzantine heritage, by its fidelity to the fullness of the Orthodox tradition (including socio-political, and even economic aspects). It is especially important to stress that it is not simply the fact of the spread of Orthodoxy as a denomination which has given this sanctity - there are Orthodox churches in other countries and among other peoples. It is not just the combination of the Orthodox faith with a powerful and free political empire, with the Tsar and the national Russian Patriarch, that provided the dogmatic and theological, eschatological legitimacy of this name. And strictly speaking, Russia ceased to be "holy" when the "symphony of powers" and the Orthodox political order was rejected - first by the second Romanov (the schism), then by his westernising son and liquidator Peter the Great.

In any case, since the sixteenth century, Russia has been the main ideological, civilisational opponent of Europe. Later follows a protracted geopolitical duel with England in the East and, more recently, the Cold War.

The story is not linear, it often makes digressions, goes sideways, highlights details, emphasises paradoxes and anomalies. Still, the axis line is obvious. There is certainly a kind of Manifest Destiny in the broad sense. - It leads the West to the American model, to the American way of life, to a superpower, while the East (at least the Christian East) is embodied in Russia through the ages. As a perfectly symmetrical antithesis to the market eschatology of the Protestant Anglo-Saxons is the socialist belief in the golden age of the Soviet Russians. The "end of the world" according to the liberal scenario and its opposite - the "end of the world" according to the Orthodox-Russian, social, Eurasian, Eastern scenario.

The logic of history constantly, on a variety of levels, obsessively highlights the underlying dualism - the USA and the USSR, West and East, America and Russia. In economics, politics, geopolitics, theology, culture - a clear, frighteningly clear antithesis, as a vividly unfolded fiction of the drama of the world, of the two poles of continental duel, of the great continental war - physical and spiritual.

1.5 Dispensationalism

Are Americans themselves aware of the theological implications of their geopolitical confrontation with Eurasia, with Russia? Certainly, yes, and sometimes much more clearly than the Russians.

There is a particular Protestant eschatological doctrine called “dispensationalism”, from the Latin word “despensatio”, which can be translated as “providence”, “design”. According to this theory, God has one “plan” concerning Anglo-Saxon Christians, another concerning Jews, and a third concerning all other nations. The Anglo-Saxons are considered “descendants of the ten tribes of Israel who did not return to Judah from the Babylonian captivity”. These ten tribes “remembered their origins by adopting Protestantism as their main confession”.

The “providence” of the Protestant Anglo-Saxons, according to the proponents of Dispensationalism, is this. - Before the end of times there must come a troubled age (“great tribulation”, tribulation). At that moment the forces of evil, the “empire of evil” (when Reagan called the Soviet Union an “empire of evil”, he had this eschatological biblical sense in mind) would attack the Protestant Anglo-Saxons (as well as others “born again”), and the “abomination of desolation” would reign for a short time. The main negative character of the “troubled age” is “King Gogh”. This character is identified steadily and constantly in the eschatology of the Dispensationalists with Russia. This was first clearly articulated during the Crimean War, in 1855 by the evangelist John Cumming. He then identified the Russian Tsar Nicholas I with the biblical “Gog, Prince of Magog” - the leader of the invasion of Israel predicted in the Bible (Ezekiel 38-39). This theme reemerged with

particular force in 1917, and during the Cold War era, it became in fact the official position of the “moral majority” of religious America.

A different “providence”, according to the doctrine of the Dispensationalists, exists in God concerning Israel. By “Israel” they mean the literal restoration of the Jewish state before the end of time. Unlike Orthodox and all other normal Christians, Protestant fundamentalists are convinced that the biblical prophecies concerning the participation of the people of Israel in the “end times” must be understood literally, strictly Old Testament, and that they apply to those Jews who continue to practice Judaism today. The Jews must return to Israel at the end of times, restore their state and be subjected to the invasion of the Gog, i.e. the “Russians”, the “Eurasians” (this “dispensationalist prophecy” was strangely! literally fulfilled in 1947).

Next comes the strangest part of “dispensationalism”. In the i ment of the “great tribulation” it is assumed that the Anglo-Saxon Christians will be “taken” (“raptured”) to heaven (rapture) - as if in a “spaceship or saucer” - and there survive the war of Gog (the Russians) with Israel. Then they (the Anglo-Saxons) together with the Protestant “Christ” will come down to earth again, where they will be met by the Israelis who defeated Gog and immediately converted to Protestantism. Then the “millennial kingdom” will begin and America will, together with Israel, dominate undividedly in a steady paradisiacal “open society”, “one world”. -*

This extravagant theory would be the domain of marginal fanatics were it not for some circumstances.

Firstly, a devout dispensationalist who truly believed in the literal fulfilment of the eschatological scenario described above was Cyrus Scofield, famous for being the author of the most popular English-language Bible, the “Scofield Reference Bible” which has sold many millions of copies. This book can be found in every corner of America. Scofield inserted into the biblical text his own historical comments and prophecies of future events, made in the spirit of radical “dispensationalism”, so that the unsophisticated reader is difficult to distinguish the actual biblical text from the author’s dispensa-

tionalist interpretation of Scofield. Thus, the propaganda of Christianity in the Anglo-Saxon world, and especially in the United States, already at the very beginning carries a component of “patriotic” American education (“Manifest Destiny”), Russophobic eschatological indoctrination and accentuated Zionism. In other words, “Dispensationalism” embodies the newest form of that age-old ideology which lies at the heart of West-East dualism.

In some texts by contemporary dispensationalists, “provocations” are linked to the latest technical developments and then images of “nuclear dispensationalism” emerge, i.e. considering “atomic weapons” as a certain apocalyptic element. Again, Russia (or the USSR) appears here as the “forces of evil”, the “nuclear King Gog”.

The populariser of this “atomic dispensationalism” was the evangelist Hal Lindsay, author of the book of interpretations of prophecy “The Former Great Planet”, which sold 18 million copies (it was the second most popular book after the Bible in its day).

His ardent supporter was none other than Ronald Reagan, who regularly invited Liney to lecture Pentagon atomic strategists. Another “nuclear dispensationalist” TV evangelist Jerry Falwell became, under the same Reagan, the closest advisor to the government, participating in its closed-door meetings and consultations of generals where atomic safety issues were discussed. Thus, archaic religious eschatological concepts coexist in such a secular and progressive American society with high technology, geopolitical analysis and brilliantly tuned systems of political management.

By the way, it is dispensationalism that explains the incomprehensible unconditional pro-Israel position of the United States, which, by and large, directly contradicts the geopolitical and economic interests of this country. The solidarity of Protestant fundamentalists with the fate of earthly Israel, restored in 1947 (which was, in Protestant eyes, a direct and impressive confirmation of the interpretation of Scofield and his Bible), is based on deep theological eschatological themes.

It is very important for us that the anti-Russian, anti-Eastern, anti-Eurasian principles of American thinking are just as deep and stable. These are the depths of denial, hatred, ingrained and carefully nurtured hostility for centuries.

It must be said that “dispensationalism” is in its own way stunningly convincing. With its help many events of the present become logical, comprehensible and meaningful. The restoration of Israel, the Cold War, the stages of America’s journey towards sole planetary domination, NATO’s expansion eastwards, etc.

1.6 They will not stop.

Put all the elements together. We get a scary (for Russians) picture. The forces, groups, worldviews and state formations which are collectively called “the West” and which are the post-Cold War rulers of the world for the house of “liberalism” profess a slender eschatological theological doctrine in which events of secular history, technology, technological progress, international relations, social processes, etc. are interpreted in an apocalyptic perspective. The civilisational roots of this Western model go back to antiquity, and, in a sense, archaism has persisted here up to the present day in parallel with technological and social modernisation. And these forces steadily and consistently identify us, the Russians, with the “spirits of hell”, with the demonic “hordes of King Gog from the country of Magog”, with the carriers of “absolute evil”. The biblical reference to the apocalyptic “princes of Rosh, Meshech and Tubal” is interpreted as an explicit reference to Russia - “Rosh” (=“Russia”), “Meshech” (=“Moscow”), Tubal (= “the ancient name of Scythia”). In other words, the Russophobia of the West, and especially of the United States, does not stem from a pharisaical concern for “victims of totalitarianism” or the notorious “human rights”. It is about the consistent and doctrinally justified demonisation of Eastern European civilisation in all its aspects - historical, cultural, theological, geopolitical, ethical, social, economic, etc.

We would like to draw particular attention to the multidimensional overlap

of the distant conceptual levels of “Western ideology”: Advocates of capitalism in the economic sphere, individualist theorists in the philosophical and social sphere, geopoliticians on the level of continental strategy, theologians, operating with eschatological and apocalyptic doctrines of “dispensationalist” persuasion - they all converge to the unambiguous and coincident in all cases identification of Russia with an “evil empire”, with a historical negative, with a negative hero of the world drama.

This is all very, very serious. World wars and the collapse of empires, the disappearance of whole peoples and races, class conflicts and revolutions are just episodes in the great confrontation which must culminate in the final apocalyptic battle, the Endkampf, where we have an essential role to play. In the eyes of the West, it is entirely negative.

They will not stop until they finish us off. All of us, all our children, the elderly and women. With Old Testament brutality and liberal cynicism.

Their intentions are obvious and terrible.

Our calm, yawning, stupidity and laziness look like a crime against this background.

Chapter 2

The Mondialist Conspiracy

2.1 An enchanted mind

We have recently experienced a terrible shock - the sudden, lightning-quick collapse of a gigantic continental State and a unique social system. It would seem that all our intellectual energies should be thrown into understanding, realising, figuring out how it happened? Why? How did it happen? And what actually happened? Without seriously asking these questions, without passionately, intensely, dramatically clarifying the meaning of this event, we cannot move in any direction, we cannot plan, we cannot navigate, we cannot breathe. But strangely: it is the question that everyone is silent on, or self-righteously proposing ready-made, totally untenable, unconvincing

schemes whose insignificance stands in stark contrast to the scale of the disaster.

The nation's mind is like a bewitched one.

Something has to be done about it.

2.2 In terms of geopolitics

We offer here one version of the explanation of the catastrophe that occurred, without claiming that it is the only true or perfect one. Rather, it is an invitation to reflection, to discussion. No more than that.

The USSR was a highly complex phenomenon which can be disassembled, evaluated and described at different levels. We will limit ourselves to the geopolitical level only, in which all other aspects of the analysis are present in a stripped down form. Without this clarification, it will not be obvious what follows.

As a geopolitical construct, the USSR strictly corresponded to the continental mass, the Heartland, Eurasia, the “geopolitical axis of history”. The expansion of the USSR to the south and west corresponded to the vector of territorial integration, potentially and objectively embedded in the geographical specificity of the continent itself. The USSR fully inherited the mission of the land pole of geopolitical dualism and was a complete expression of the “order of the Earth” in opposition to the “order of the Sea”.

In contrast, the West, as the geopolitical antithesis of the USSR, was the embodiment of the “maritime order”, the “World Island”, confronting Eurasia in all its hypostasis.

This objective dualism is the basis of the main demarcation, the power line of recent history, taken in its geopolitical cross-section.

Thus, the key to the geopolitical explanation of the modern stage of world history (20th century) is the assertion of an irremovable, radical, multi-level, complex confrontation between the “land forces” (Russia, later USSR) and

the “sea forces” (England+France, later USA).

This geopolitical dualism, this “great continental war” explains everything else, clearly and impressively. Such an approach immediately gives meaning to all events, which otherwise become a complex chaotic vortex of atomic facts.

But such a geopolitical picture of the world has never been sufficiently articulated and popularised by the general public. This is not coincidental, as the geopolitical competence of the general public would severely limit the freedom of action of certain sectors of political elites, whose plans and methods in certain cases were in clear contradiction with the interests of individual nations and states, with what can be objectively defined “as the geopolitical interests of a power”. Geopolitics has never really been a “secret science”, a “secret knowledge”. But at the same time, the disproportion between the clarity and simplicity of geopolitical methodology, its persuasiveness and the appalling ignorance in this field, which distinguishes not only the general public, but also numerous representatives of analytical and political experts, is striking. The external “demonisation” of geopolitics, its insistence on its classification as “pseudoscience”, but at the same time its active use by the most competent, almost “secret” circles of the global financial and intellectual elite in closed organisations engaged in world planning - such as the American “Council on Foreign Relations”, the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderberg Club, the Club of Rome, etc. - All this cannot but suggest that this is not the spontaneous attitude of an academically fixated community, but a special, well-designed strategy designed to artificially conceal (discredit) a number of methodological models whose knowledge could lead to unpleasant consequences for the ruling class or some of its most closed sectors.

In geopolitical terms, the fall of the USSR means the fall of the “Land Forces”, their total defeat in the face of the “Sea Forces”. Only in this way, and in no other way, should this terrible event be interpreted geopolitically. If the question from the beginning - from the first stages of perestroika - had been posed in this way, such an action could hardly have been carried out

so simply and quietly, so easily and with impunity, as it happened.

If Soviet society had treated the USSR and the Warsaw Pact countries as a purely geopolitical, continental reality, organically formed by the will of objective spatial laws, any ideological changes or political and economic reforms would have taken place in the strict framework of maintaining (and preferably increasing, building up) the entire geopolitical potential of Eurasia, the fullness of spatial control over the land regions. It is possible that ideological and economic reforms in this case would not be less radical, but the strategic power of Moscow would not weaken by one penny. Hence, keeping geopolitics in secret, its marginalization, its artificial silencing was the most important tactical move of those forces, which were focused on the destruction of the citadel of the “land civilization”. The fact that American political elites, on the contrary, methodically check their plans and projects with geopolitics, verify the main points of their strategy using this science, fully recognizing its priority and its adequacy in relation to other methods of analysis, proves this thesis correct.

2.3 The defeat of Sushi *

The geopolitical explanation of the USSR’s demise is thus deliberately put beyond the brackets of conventional interpretations that focus only on ideology or economics. Therefore, the mechanisms of geopolitical liquidation must also be found in a specific conceptual and ideological realm, which preceded the subsequent framing of the initial impulse in a different, more down-to-earth and simplified form. In other words, it is necessary to find out, how were the leaders of the gigantic continental empire, entrusted with the management of the “forces of the land”, able to embark on the path of state and strategic suicide? What models were used by those who led them to take a chain of fatal decisions and steps leading the great state to the abyss of geopolitical non-existence?

The simplest explanation would be to argue that the Soviet leadership had somehow been turned into agents of an alternative geopolitical camp, having gone into the service of the “Forces of the Sea”. But such a prospect seems a

phantasmagoria. How could a group of people, who strategically and geopolitically controlled half of the world, who reached the pinnacle of power in a Eurasian state, and who defended the “forces of the land”, suddenly, overnight, abruptly change their convictions and betray their property to the enemy? Such a turn of events could take place in those geopolitical constructions which occupy an intermediate position between the “land forces” and the “sea forces”, in “coastal zones”, which are usually affected by two vectors - from outside from the “sea” and from inside from the “land”. Here one may assume that the political top may at some point prefer one or the other geopolitical vector, choosing one of the two possibilities over the other. But the USSR, as the state expression of Dryland, Eurasia, had no choice. The land is not a coastal zone. The Land cannot choose one of the two. It is only what it is, and hence it is, in a sense, doomed to its own geopolitical and civilizational path. Eurasia cannot choose “Atlantism” simply because if the Land chooses, the Sea, it ceases to exist as such, it is “flooded”. The USSR could become a World Island (as happened to America) if it extended its power over the whole of Eurasia - including Western Europe, the Far East, India and the Middle East - and then began its expansion into the Atlantic and the Pacific, pushing America out of there. Only then would the Continent become a Ship, an Island. Any other development would have presupposed a purely continental line, on all fronts resisting the Atlanticist attack of the Sea, a strategy of Anaconda, strangling Eurasia through control of its coastal zones.

In other words, the transition from an objectively Eurasian course to pandering to Atlantism in the Soviet leadership could not have taken place consciously and directly, as such a move is so unnatural that even the blackest soul of a traitor is hardly the right place for such a paradoxical suicidal decision, and the collective nature of the Soviet leadership excludes the crucial role of individuals in this matter.

It is clear that the self-liquidation of the USSR is the greatest victory of the “Forces of the Sea” and the triumph of the “Atlanticist agency”. But in order to hypnotise the brains of the late Soviet leaders, this Atlanticist

lobby had to have a particular concept which, relying on a particular body of influence, managed to confuse the leaders of the Eurasian empire and push them towards fatal steps, but which would not be a simple statement of an Atlanticist vision of the situation, by definition directly hostile to the strategic interests of Moscow.

What is this concept? If we figure it out, we'll get closer to unraveling the great drama.

2.4 Is the world community manageable?

One of the curious texts which launched perestroika was an article by Gorbachev's advisor Shakhnazarov under the catchy title "The world community is manageable". It caused a stir among the first wave of the patriotic public, who had just been introduced to the theory in samizdat of a "world Masonic conspiracy" aimed at establishing a "world government" and a single "world state". Shakhnazarov spoke directly about the reality (almost inevitability) of such a prospect. Shakhnazarov's status and the official tone of his publication left no doubt that this was not a private opinion of an analyst, but one of the themes that were actively being worked on and discussed at the top of power. It could not have been otherwise in those rather totalitarian times. Apparently, the conservative, national-patriotic forces in the Central Committee and the KGB, who also read the anti-Masonic samizdat, were outraged by Shakhnazarov's actions, and the subject was closed for a long time. By the way, no serious and programmatic publications on this subject have appeared since then. Since the party conservatives have long since disappeared from the historical scene, it can be assumed that the recommendation to silence the subject came from some other, more influential circles with a vested interest in ensuring that, despite the appearance of "freedom of speech", certain subjects were kept out of the public eye.

Be that as it may, the "world government" theory cannot be reduced solely to anti-Masonic speculation by agitated conspiracy theorists, who are consistently marked by clear signs of paranoia, which drastically reduces the quality of their exposés and undermines the credibility of their information.

This line goes back to religious teachings that at the end of time “mankind will restore its unity, broken since the age of the Babylonian Pillar of Babel”. There are many versions of this unification doctrine. Some of them have a distinctly Christian character - the theme of the “Third Kingdom”, the “age of the Holy Spirit”, as taught by Joachim de Flora. But the closer one gets to modernity, the more secular, more atheist-humanitarian, liberal ideas began to take on a similar character, often, in fact, constituting a specific feature of European “progressive” Freemasonry. As Western civilization became secularized and secularized, utopian theories of the unification of all men in a single state became the banner of humanism, and having left the closed laboratories of Masonic lodges, spread widely in the scientific, cultural and political circles of the European, later Western elite. Ultimately, all who believed in progress had to turn to this very perspective in the future, since the existence of individual peoples, nations and states, with their particular languages, faiths and cults, was seen by evolutionists as intermediate stages in the overall development of humanity - stages which would at some point be overcome and their respective institutions abolished as unnecessary. Multiple versions of “world government” coexisted with each other; in some cases (Martinism, the “Egyptian” branch of Freemasonry, fundamentalist Protestant sects, the Jesuits, the Scottish Rite High Degrees, etc.) this theme continued to have a mystical, “obscurantist” (as they would say before) character; in other cases it was only about a humanistic, social ideal (“Club of Rome”, projects of Count Cudenoff-Kallergi, Jean Monnet, etc.); in third, economic and political benefits of planetary integration for financial and political elites were considered (English “Round Table Society”, the Trilateral Commission, Bilderberg, etc.). All these projects for the unification of mankind, sometimes directly opposite in orientation and objectives, were called “mondialism”, from the French “monde”, i.e. “peace”. It is telling that there was also a communist variety of “monialism”, best known as “world revolution”.

It is important for us to emphasise that the concept of “One State” is by no means an extravagant hypothesis of dubious exotic conspirators, but one of the main topics of attention of various elites - from pragmatists

(economists, sociologists, technocrats) through humanist utopians (scientists, cultural activists, socialists) to realists (politicians, industrial and financial tycoons). The “mystics”, occultists, fundamentalists and “Illuminati” themselves (who, however, are the most frequent targets of conspiracy theorists) are rather “marginal” in this matter, and their influence is extremely low.

2.5 The instrumental myth of “one humanity

The concept of Mondialism, a project of “world government”, is at odds with geopolitics as a science. Although both deal with rather global categories and complex realities - which may give the mistaken impression of similarity of approach - the basic principles are fundamentally different. Geopolitics begins and ends with the assertion of an irremovable fatal dualism, a “great continental war”, a planetary duel between two global types of civilizations - the “land” (Eurasian) and the sea (Atlantist). This dualism generates the dialectic of history both in its subjective (human) and in its object (geographical, landscape) dimensions. Consequently, geopolitics is based on the assertion of radical irreducibility, absolute alternativeness of these civilizational types, each representing a “world in itself”, a complete and self-sufficient model, its own universal type. In such a perspective, “world government” is possible only after the final and irreversible victory of one pole over the other, and “united humanity” in such a case will not be a gathering into a single whole of two halves, but universalization, globalization, totalization of some one type - either Eurasian or Atlanticist. However, since this perspective can only be imagined in an indefinitely distant perspective, geopolitics prefers to talk not about futurological projects, but about the elaboration and implementation of specific geopolitical strategies and tactics to achieve specific goals.

On the contrary, monodialism - at least in theory - asserts the essential ‘humanist’ unity of humanity, all divisions within which appear to be random, arbitrary and qualitatively ‘negative’ phenomena. Consequently, as progressive development proceeds, civilisational inaccuracies will be consciously removed by a “wiser” humanity, which will move first to the technosphere,

reflected in the establishment of the power of "technocrats", "scientists" and "engineers", and later to the "noosphere", a special stage of civilisation that somewhat resembles the concepts of an "information" or "post-industrial" society.

It is clear that Mondialism and geopolitics, as two interpretative models, are in conflict with each other. Mondialism denies the destiny and eschatological meaning of geopolitical dualism (as well as dualism itself), while geopolitics affirms it and, on the contrary, denies the idea of a "common humanity" and, consequently, of a "common progress". If there is "progress", then its trajectory, its nature is radically different in the case of Eurasian civilisation and Atlantean civilisation.

We have come very close to the most important thing of all.

2.6 Mondialism in the service of the Kremlin

If we turn to the history of the Soviet security services, we are confronted with one glaring example of how the two conceptual approaches of interest in this case - monialism and geopolitics - collided with each other. We are talking about a covert Soviet intelligence operation to develop nuclear weapons and obtain crucial classified information from Western scientists, without which the production of the Soviet nuclear bomb was delayed or even impossible. Quite objectively this whole story is described by our legendary intelligence agent Pavel Sudoplatov. In this story the secret logic of the conceptual history is clearly shown. Note, that it is with nuclear weapons that the whole system of the bipolar post-war world was connected, which was the most grandiose and impressive confirmation of the geopolitical explanation of history: the existence of two blocks (corresponding exactly to the geopolitical poles, identified already by the first geopoliticians at the beginning of the century) tied together a knot of geographical, civilizational, economic and ideological points, thus providing a brilliant confirmation of the geopolitical views on the logic of world history and its relationship with geography.

During the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, the capital of "Dryland", was forced by Hitler's suicidal (in the geopolitical sense) German behaviour (war on two fronts) to collaborate with its main geopolitical and ideological opponent - the liberal capitalist West (England and the USA). The only conceptual model that could somehow justify such a contradictory alliance from all points of view (except the factual Realpolitik) was the mondialist model, the idea of uniting "humane", "progressive" humanity against "fascist cannibals" as a "species anomaly". Note that up to a certain point the monialist projects - in particular those of Teilhard de Chardin, one of the godfathers of modern monialism - suggested the inclusion of "fascist" elements in the "world government" as well, but the manic behaviour and pronounced "anti-humanism" (as well as racism) of Hitler forced this to be abandoned even in theory.

Thus, the milieu most sensitive to various versions of monialism became the organism that provided the conceptual framework for Soviet-English and especially Soviet-American cooperation. However, under the conditions of rigid ideological totalitarianism (communist on the one hand, and capitalist on the other), all monialist themes had to remain largely classified, closed, under the direct and vigilant control of the secret services. In the USSR, all details of the Mondialist operation were supervised personally by Lavrenty Beria and even Stalin himself, who was aware of the minutest nuances of the entire project. Mondialist tendencies were directly linked to Soviet intelligence, to the NKVD, and examining the archival files of the time, it is difficult to draw a line: where the sphere of conceptual ideologemes ends and vulgar (scientific, political or military) espionage begins. Yet the line does exist. Most Western scientists, such as Oppenheimer, Fermi, Einstein, Niels Bohr, who agreed to cooperate with USSR in scientific and technical field, always remained only convinced and sincere mondialists, and only some - for example Pontecorvo - were real Soviet agents.

The following episode is indicative. In 1943, Stalin arranged a personal meeting with the Russian scientist Academician Vernadsky, a convinced monodialist and theorist of the "noosphere". (incidentally, Teilhard de Chardin had

borrowed the term from him). During the conversation Vernadsky expressed confidence that Western scientists would easily respond to any monodialist proposals, no matter where they came from. Vernadsky's belief in "one humanity and "universal progress" was so great that Stalin chided him for his "political naivety". Here is the main point to understand the relationship between geopolitics and mondialism. Stalin is guided solely by a geopolitical approach. For him the appeal to the monialist sentiments of scholars (Soviet and Western) is only a tactical pragmatic move. He wants to use Mondialism for strictly Eurasian purposes and entrusts the supervision of the entire operation to Beria personally, the NKVD, the intelligence service, including Pavel Sudoplatov. Sudoplatov would later hint in his memoirs that among Soviet nuclear scientists there was also a barely visible demarcation line for the uninitiated. - Some - such as Kapitsa or Vernadsky - were convinced and sincere mondialists (Sudoplatov speaks of them as carriers of "pre-revolutionary manners"). Incidentally, it should be noted that Vernadsky, who was at one time an ideologist of the Cadets, was also connected to the Masonic circles of pre-revolutionary Russia. Others - such as Kurchatov, the younger generation - were staunch Stalinists and Eurasians, and regarded the mondialist sympathies of their older comrades with incomprehension.

Incidentally, the NKVD used in this period not only the monialism of scientists, but also other, more extravagant forms of it - including the Zionist version of monialism, claiming that at the end of time all mankind would unite in service to the Jewish state restored with the coming of the "Machiach. Stalin and Beria also put this direction to work for purely applied, geopolitical, Eurasian purposes, for which the infamous Mihoels Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was organized, controlled by direct NKVD agents, in particular the largest Soviet intelligence agent, Heifits. Working with the Zionist milieu provided significant assistance on the issue of nuclear weapons, duplicating on another level the line of appeal to the mondialist milieu. Oppenheimer and Einstein were "developed" by the NKVD precisely through Zionist channels.

After the victory over fascism, when again the geopolitical and ideological contradictions between the West and the USSR came to the fore, Stalin began to wind down the complex system of monialist structures. And it is possible that the liquidation of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee as well as the repression of some scientists and members of the creative intelligentsia during this era was a consequence of the dismantling of the mondialist group, which had become unnecessary to Stalin in his Eurasianist orientation at a certain point. Probably an echo of these complex conspiracy events was the latest wave of Stalinist terror, which had a pronounced anti-Zionist orientation.

It is difficult to say to what extent this Mondialist network was entrenched in Soviet society in the scientific environment, in the upper echelons of the NKVD. But the fact remains. In the case of the nuclear bomb and at the dawn of the Cold War, many crucial events in international life, in the confrontation between the West and the East, and in the dramatic collisions and upheavals of political elites (especially the special services) can be explained exclusively by friction between the geopolitical approach and the monialist orientation of weighty and intellectually significant social groups (in scientific, cultural, departmental or political environments).

2.7 Surviving the big purge

In the 1960s, in the so-called "thaw", we are confronted with a new ideological wave, strangely reminiscent of the mondialism of the previous period. The very structure of Khrushchev's thought and discourse constantly betrays the idea of comparing two civilisations - the Soviet (Eurasian) and capitalist (Atlanticist) civilisations - on material parameters, which implicitly implies a qualitative homogeneity. Khrushchev's slogan "to catch up and overtake the West" (i.e. the implicit recognition of mondialism, the unity of civilizations, since any competition can only take place if there is a common, unified criterion) is the strict antithesis of Joseph Stalin's geopolitical, Eurasian maxim - "even the last man of socialism is above the first man of the bourgeois West". Stalin has two worlds with no common denominator; Khrushchev has two versions of the same world, with the best being

determined by a material criterion.

With the thaw a whole spectrum of the Mondialist stratum came to life. It is difficult to ascertain definitively which centres were primary here. But judging from certain signs, it is possible to identify three poles of Khrushchev-era monialism in a society recovering from the last Stalinist purges.

Firstly, the scientific community of nuclear physicists. Here the figure of Academician Sakharov plays a key role. From all indications, Andrei D. Sakharov was closely associated with monialist-oriented scientists from the earliest period of his scientific career, when the nuclear weapons project was worked on by scientists with distinctly monialist views. It is possible that this scientific lobby in the USSR managed to maintain some contacts with similarly oriented European colleagues.

Secondly, it is almost certain that some structures survived in the depths of the NKVD even after the destruction of Beria's apparatus and the purges carried out by the new Khrushchev regime against the previous generations of Chekists. By some indirect evidence it is possible to reconstruct the connection between these Cheka circles who supervised monetary projects in the wartime and post-war years and the 5th Directorate of the Soviet KGB established in the late 1960s and headed by such a strange figure as Filipp Bobkov who later became Deputy Chairman of the Soviet KGB Kryuchkov. Important information about this group could have been provided (if desired) by Pavel Sudoplatov himself. Curiously, Filipp Bobkov is now head of security for the BRIDGE group, whose head, Vladimir Gusinsky, is also chairman of the Russian Jewish Congress.

Thirdly, and most obviously, the Mondialist currents persisted within a certain section of Soviet Jewry that was enthusiastic about Zionist projects. Clearly this milieu was naturally predisposed to such sentiments, especially after many Jews felt disillusioned with the Soviet project, coinciding with the creation of the state of Israel and largely reinforced by anti-Zionist tendencies in the USSR in the late 1940s and early 1950s.

It is safe to say that monialist-oriented groups survived the last wave of Stalinist purges and first became quite clearly active during the thaw.

2.7 Architects of collapse

In 1967, an important event occurred that marked a new era in the history of the Mondialist project. We refer to the creation of the Club of Rome, an international organisation that openly proclaimed the need for a globalist approach to critical issues. At the same time, the closed think-tanks of the Western financial, political and media elite such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Bilderberg Club, the Trilateral Commission and others were actively working on the "theory of convergence" according to which the capitalist and socialist systems were likely to merge into a world economic system with a common leadership. "The Club of Rome, founded by the Italian industrialist Aurelio Peccei and the English (Scottish) scientist Alexander King, was seen as a public organisation designed to bring the projects of secret Mondialist groups to life and to involve prominent scientific and public figures in the implementation of the project.

The Soviet Union took a keen interest in these projects by delegating to the Club of Rome a certain academician, Geremi Mikhailovich Gvishiani, married to the daughter of Kosygin's predecessor, Lyudmila. In fact, from 1972 Gvishiani's persona became the focus of the officially recognized mondialist sector in Soviet scientific circles. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) based in Austria was established by the Club of Rome and a branch was also opened in Moscow under the leadership of the same Gvishiani - the Institute of Systems Research.

Operating with ecological, catastrophic forecasts, raising demographic and commodity issues, the monist ideologists of the Club of Rome gradually led to the conclusion that the geopolitical confrontation between the two planetary blocks was a dangerous development path, that the contradictions between the two systems were not as acute as it seemed, that the differences between Eurasian and Atlantic civilisation patterns were the result of rather random historical factors, reflecting no underlying regularity, etc. To a large

extent, monetary motives also predetermined the detente politics and the pacifist movement of the 70s as a whole.

Of course, the Soviet Brezhnev leadership still adhered to the traditional Eurasian approach, but nevertheless, monialist tendencies in the Soviet system also grew and strengthened steadily, penetrating the highest political, scientific, analytical and ideological environments. Apart from the Institute for Systemic Studies itself, the aura of monialism included the CEMI, the US and Canada Institute, the APN, a significant sector of the Central Committee's higher staff, and especially the 5th Department of the KGB, which was leading ideological projects and, due to its specific nature, was constantly and at different levels dealing with monialist projects and circles.

By the 1980s the Soviet monitionists were already in contact not just with the Club of Rome, a seemingly harmless organisation of geek scientists, utopians and humanitarians concerned with the fate of humanity, but directly with the officials of the Trilateral Commission, which concentrated members of the highest Western elite who, we note, acting in secret and without any democratic powers, had, strictly speaking, no legitimate right to decide the fate of the peoples of the world.

We quote excerpts from a confidential Trilateral Commission document dated 16 October 1980, of which we have a copy.

“Title: Tokyo Chairmanship meeting and future activities of the Trilateral Commission.

1. The Beijing meeting and possible contacts with the Soviet Union.

The following points stand out in the Chairs' meeting in Tokyo on the relative agreements with Beijing: (...)

3. The current asymmetry in our contacts with Beijing and Moscow should be corrected in the coming weeks through renewed contacts with Mr Guishiani. It is the unanimous opinion of the European as well as American and Japanese groups that talks with Moscow should be resumed in one way or

another in order to avoid an anti-Soviet interpretation of our Chinese contacts.”

What are we talking about? About the beginning of Chinese perestroika, about plans to integrate the Chinese economy into the world market and about probing ways of involving the Soviet Union in the same process.

16 October 1980. Brezhnev is still alive, the Warsaw Pact is still alive and the KGB is still functioning. But preparations for perestroika - with all its attendant consequences - are already in full swing. Work in the department of Gvishiani is in full swing. Incidentally, Gvishiani’s own sister is the wife of Yevgeny Primakov, one of Gorbachev’s closest collaborators. But this is a private matter.

So gradually the secret mechanisms of what happened to us are being revealed. And there is one crucial historical parallel that is making all the difference.

2.8 Expansion of the Sea Forces to the East

Let us recall how Stalin and Beria in their time took advantage of monodialist sentiments and relevant groups in the West for their own Eurasian, geopolitical purposes, equipping Eurasia with nuclear weapons thanks to a subtle ideological reconnaissance operation. This is an example of Eurasianism using monodialism for its own purposes. Another example of the same strategy can be seen in the organisation of the Comintern and, more broadly, the Third International, when the propaganda and preparation of the “world revolution” objectively served the interests of the Eurasian bloc.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the same move, the same operation was repeated again, but with the opposite sign. This time, the monodialist project is already being used in the interests of a different, Atlanticist side, and under the guise of “convergence”, a smokescreen of monodialist rhetoric, the Western pole achieves a complete victory over the Eurasian bloc, paralyzes it, destroys the frame of the continental structure. Under the pretext of refusing a bipolar world, of confrontation, of the prospect of nuclear suicide

of humanity, by deception and deft manipulation the West forced its opponent to abandon its geopolitical logic (and its ideological orientation) and disarmed it, but at the decisive moment it harshly refused to reciprocate and did the same to the Soviet Union and the Soviet people as Joseph Stalin did to the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee of Mikhoels, which performed a subversive mission to the West and later proved no longer necessary.

The picture that emerges is that monialism in practice turns out not to be an independent doctrine, not a complete and coherent plan, but a tool of geopolitics, an auxiliary tool - albeit strikingly effective - in the ideological struggle between two civilisational poles.

All the behaviour of the Atlantic community after perestroika, the eastward expansion of NATO, the rigid imposition of the political and economic system of the West on a confused, stunned Russia, the retention of the full range of US strategic power after the unilateral disarmament of Eurasia - are clear, convincing and visual evidence of the rightness of the only and only geopolitical approach, which in practice proves to be the only adequate, correct and dominant, while dreams of a “common humanity” and humanistic utopias serve only as a cover,

2.9 A trial under the laws of war

Now we can answer the question posed at the beginning of the article. The Soviet leadership, which took the unilateral liquidation of the Eurasian bloc, was not (and logically could not be) a direct “agent of Atlantism”. No most effective intelligence agency in the world could have succeeded in such a recruitment operation. The intermediate and fatal link in the realization of the geopolitical catastrophe was the mondialist circles and mondialist institutions in the USSR whose germs were inherited from Stalin’s times (and perhaps their roots go back to pre-revolutionary groups and societies) but whose true flowering under the aegis of the 5th department of the KGB[^] was in the 70s-80s. Direct agents of the West certainly operated in parallel, but without the mondialist environment they could never, under any circumstances, have achieved such astounding and lightning-fast success.

It would not be correct to accuse all supporters and participants of the monodialist project in the USSR of direct treason. This is a more complex issue which needs to be dealt with in detail. But the fact that it was thanks to these groups and personalities, these institutions and apparatuses of referents and advisers that the greatest power collapsed and left the world stage, is undeniable. And it would be only natural for all those who remain loyal to the Eurasian idea, the Russian State and the continental civilization to ask the Mondialists (and their accomplices) severely - regardless of whether their actions were the result of a fatal mistake, an avowed delusion or an evil will.

Chapter 3

Carthage must be destroyed

3.1 The manic refrain of Cato Sr.

Many in the Senate laughed at the manic habit of the Roman Cato the Elder (324-149 BC) of beginning his speeches with the phrase “*Carthago delenda est*” (Carthago must be destroyed). He would conclude his speeches with a similarly paranoid formula, no matter whether they were about the domestic problems of Rome’s arrangement or arguments about sacrifices to the gods: “Therefore I think Carthage must be destroyed” (“*ceterum, censeo Carthaginem esse delendam*”). The senators were deadly tired of this, but history has shown that it was Cato’s voice that spoke history, that he penetrated to the essence of the struggle of civilisations, which was decided in the Punic wars. It was not a struggle for colonies and sea routes, not a clash of commercial interests, not a confrontation of state claims, that was the content of the struggle between Rome and Carthage. It was a formula for the future which determined world history, at least for the next few millennia. Rome and Carthage were the two poles of civilisation, aspiring to universality, to the founding of a world empire and to become the yardstick of universal ethics.

Carthage embodied the mercantile system, the “open society”. It was ruled

by a market economy, individualism, rationalism and absolute scepticism. Ethics was equated with wealth - the rich were considered not just “fortunate” but “holy”. The inferiority of human nature, the propensity for corruption and venality, was not questioned. Everything is sold and everything is bought. Good roads, intelligent free trade, maximum use of sea communications, bribery of savage barbarian peoples, exploitation of colonies - all this was invented by Carthage, implemented, brought to perfection. Maximum profit was extracted. Carthage was a world power which had several times brought Rome to its knees. And behind the glittering façade was the dark cult of Moloch, a dark deity who devoured infants. By the hundreds the Carthaginians threw the small corpses of their newborn children into the fiery jaws of the idol. Innumerable little skeletons have been found in the ruins of this sinister city. A cult of Moloch, a shadowy tribute to the total power of Capital.

Had it not been for Cato, humanity would have lived in a completely different reality for two thousand years.

Rome originally followed a different path. Far from being fairytale-like, pastoral or kind, on the contrary, often cruel and treacherous, ascetic and destructive, but focused on a radically different archetype. Rome believed in human honour and dignity, in heroism and discipline, in self-recovery and the ideal dimension of the human person. Instead of the corrupting element of money, direct light violence, instead of Moloch the baby-eater, arrogant but just heavenly gods, free in war and empire but not in trade. Rome carried the ideal of autocracy and freedom, hierarchy and asceticism, the ideal of the warrior rather than the merchant, the hero rather than the banker, voluntary self-sacrifice rather than shameful infanticide. Rome offered the peoples their own model. No less universal, but essentially opposite, not devoid of flaws and vices, but not comparable to the system of Carthage. It is no coincidence that the Saviour himself descended from heaven on the territory of the Roman Empire. Who knows if the destruction of the Semitic monster in North Africa by the Romans was not a secret preparation of the way for the Good News?

Cato understood this with startling clarity. It was as if he could see the future.

“Carthage must be destroyed. Once and for all. It is never superfluous to be reminded of this. It is the only thing we need to know for sure. We Russians are the heirs of the three Romans. The last of which still stands.

3.2 Rome and Carthage in the twentieth century

The exact same problem is now being addressed. A new Carthage stretches its ominous shadow over the planet. Like the spectre of Rome wiped out by its legions, the Phoenician city rises from hell. The voice of Moloch can be heard clearly: “trade order“, “rationalisation of society“, “good roads“, “open society“, “might of the sea“... The truth is on a different scale. Instead of the Mediterranean, the whole planet.

The modern West is a direct ideological successor to Carthage. Of course, this has not always been the case. For most of the last two millennia, the Roman line still dominated: hierarchy, ethics of spirit and human dignity. But apparently, Carthage managed to infect the West with a latent virus that made itself felt many centuries later.

Since the New Age, during the Enlightenment, the West and its civilisation have been heading towards the dark Carthaginian pole. On this path today they have reached perfection.

In the twentieth century, the struggle of civilisations came to a final dual formula. The USSR embodied the line of Rome, the NATO bloc deliberately and consistently defended the interests of Carthage.

Land power (socialism) versus Sea power (liberalism), Eurasianism versus Atlantism, Labour versus Capital.

In between these two complete formulations of civilisational models there were half-finished, fragmented and incomplete versions (fascism and its analogues). But this did not change the overall picture. History stretched - as it once did in the age of the Punic Wars - between two axes, two orientations,

two mutually exclusive paths.

New Rome, Eurasia versus New Carthage (Atlantism, USA). - This is the only true content of twentieth-century history, freed from multilayered historical theories that are designed only to divert attention from the main point, to confuse and confuse.

We are approaching the boundary of the century, the boundary of the millennium. We are seeing more and more clearly what was essential and what was secondary, what mattered and what was ephemeral, what was connected with the spirit of history and what had very little to do with it...

One line is clear and unambiguous. The first Rome, defeating Carthage, clearing the way for mankind for centuries from the contagion of the "mercantile system".

The second Rome is Constantinople, the Byzantine Empire. The Roman ideal is church-celebrated, the empire sanctified by Christ, transformed by the gracious power of the Holy Spirit into a "deterrent", a "catechumen", a barrier to the coming of the "son of perdition". (from St Paul's second letter to the Thessalonians). Byzantium is also a victory over Carthage, but an internal Carthage. The second Rome lasts a thousand years. Tausendjahrige Reich.

The West is falling away from Orthodoxy. It is still very far from the present abomination of desolation, but the first signs of apostasy are evident. They are clear to the Orthodox visionaries (Patriarch Photios, St. Mark of Ephesus, etc.). The transfer of the mission of Rome to Byzantium is not subject to revision. The true Rome is a floating concept.

But this cycle also comes to an end. Byzantium falls because it compromises with the West. It retreats from its function and God's punishment in the form of wild rabid Turks falls on the cradle of Orthodoxy.

But a new sun is rising in the North of Eurasia. The last Rome. Moscow. Russia takes on the mission of Rome. Both the one that wiped out the hated

city, and the one that illuminated the edges of the earth with the truth of Christ's faith. Russia - the axis of history, a stronghold of the forces of the land. A new Rome of the age of the end times.

With zigzags and retreats, through the paradoxes of history and the tricks of the "world mind", Russia is on its way to the final battle. The paths of the West and Russia are different. Opposite. We go from Rome and to Rome. They betrayed Rome for Carthage and its golden calf.

"Free world", "civilised countries", "open society" - that is what the servants of Moloch are called today. Having broken away from Byzantium, the West marched towards one goal - the reign of Capital, the absolutisation of the "monetary system". The last fling was the "queen of the seas" industrialised England. Later, under the banner of this purely Carthaginian ideal, a new civilisation took shape - the "American Dream", cleansed of history, of the last traces of ancient Rome - not fully surplus to Europe - an artificial laboratory ideal of the Carthaginian world order - the United States of America. They set themselves the audacious task of achieving world domination, of subjecting the planet to a single model - the model of ancient Phoenician maritime power. As revenge, as retribution on Roman spirituality, as revenge from hell on the high Indo-European gods.

In 1991, the Last Rome fell.

Today Carthage celebrates a planetary triumph. Not everything is going smoothly, but there is a victory in sight. Not just one country over another, not just one economic model over a competing one, not just one culture over an alternative culture. It's much more serious than that. It is the victory of Moloch, the infernal deity, the baby-eater.

"And I stood on the sand of the sea and saw a beast coming out of the sea with seven heads and ten horns: on its horns were ten diadems, and on its heads were names blasphemous.

And it was given to him to make war with the saints and to overcome them; and authority was given to him over every tribe and people and tongue and

tribe.

And all who dwell on the earth shall worship him...”

3.3 The Russian army as the last subject of world history

I don't think we are all capable of understanding the deeper meaning of history. After all, Kafka was laughed at too. And his statement has gone down in history as an example of 'obsession'. Different sectors of society perceive the current of being in time to varying degrees. It so happens that those in charge of Russia's fate during the last Soviet phase were, to put it mildly, not up to the level of the mission entrusted to them. Some were too naive, some were corrupted by the Atlantist machine. The fact is that the political elite of the Soviet state not only betrayed a great country and a unique people, but also gave up a unique civilization project without a fight, opened the gates of the third eternal city to the conquerors. This is a crime unparalleled. It is collaboration with Moloch, the golden calf. It is hard to imagine what punishment such an act deserves. But judgment is a matter for another time. We must now realise what can still be saved, how should we act, what strategy should we use?

Perhaps the only force that can grasp the full extent of this catastrophe is the Russian army. It is reasonable to ask why it is the Russian army? After all, according to generally accepted clichés, its representatives are by no means renowned for their high intellectual level. But there is one circumstance that makes the military a privileged caste at this point in world history. It is this.

American military doctrine, both during the Cold War era and at present, is entirely based on one principle. - The Russians (the Soviets) are not just an ideological, but a historical enemy of the United States and the rest of the West. Therefore, it is not about ideology or economic model, it is about geopolitics, geography and history. Admiral Mahan and Nicholas Spijkman make this point very clear. They are the founders of the global strategy of the United States. Their direct heirs are the modern theorists - Kissinger,

Brzezinski, David Rockefeller. American military strategy is based on a comprehensive analysis of the historical authors and derives from a clear understanding of the universal, planetary significance of the American model. If in other sectors of Western society there is some scattering of opinions and often different subjects and themes come to the fore, military strategy does not change from secular fashions. That is the key to the American power: irrespective of political programmes, all leading political parties and powerful economic corporations pursue the same geopolitical strategy, realising - as a common denominator - the unity of the civilisation project. The essence of the USA is its geopolitical strategy. It reveals with incredible clarity what is veiled in other areas. It is a strategy based on the struggle against the land, against Eurasia, against continental models that reject the "trade system". In short, on the struggle against Rome. Everything else is secondary. "The Third Rome must be destroyed", the American strategists keep repeating. And they are right in their own way.

Due to the specific nature of their profession, the first to become aware of US military strategy in Russia are the military. They are the first to read the 1992 report of the US Undersecretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, published in the New York Times on March 8, 1992 and in the International Herald Tribune on March 9, 1992, which listed the main priorities of the US foreign policy, dictated by strategic considerations. It states that all countries should "refuse to oppose American leadership or to question the supremacy of our economic and political order". The Wolfowitz report singles out as a major danger "the danger to European stability stemming from the rise of nationalism in Russia or Russia's attempt to reincorporate newly independent countries like Ukraine, Belorussia and others".

Consequently, it is the Russian military that is the social actor that directly confronts the clear unambiguous expression of the global will of Atlanticist Carthage. Soviet strategy was built on the antithesis of American strategy. Today, Russia's political leadership - let us not now discuss for what reasons - refuses even to acknowledge the real state of affairs, let alone respond adequately. Officials can still invoke "ignorance" as an excuse. But the Russian

military cannot. They observe with their own eyes that the West does not soften its pressure on Russia at all, despite all the ideological concessions of Moscow. Carthage will only calm down when there is nothing left of us. This is clear (or should be clear) to any Russian officer with complete clarity and obviousness. Hence the drama of the army. It has remained the last social actor capable, indeed obliged, to meet the challenge of history. All others have withdrawn, barricaded by ignorance, demagoguery and meaningless economic statistics. All that is left on the city wall is a squad betrayed from within and crushed from without. Unable to leave the post. Rome's last warriors. The Russian army.

On them, the Russian military - unprepared, unqualified to deal with global political issues - history came crashing down. They turned out to be the last descendants to enter the legacy of Catoan, the eternal legacy of the Punic Wars.

History is given to them in the map of the location of enemy NATO units, like a black doom, approaching our borders. It is calculated by the number of warheads, submarines* and military spy satellites they have acquired and destroyed by us. Terrible statistics of planetary defeat. Not just the Soviet system, not just Russia and the Russian people. The defeat of the mission of eternal Rome, the defeat of Dryland.

The demise of the gods.

Goebbels, under the Soviet bombs raining down on Berlin in the last days of the Reich, said: "Do you think it is Germany that is dying? No, it is the spirit that is dying...". With even greater justification we can apply this phrase to ourselves today.

"You think it's the USSR that's dying? No, it's Rome that's dying... It is the dying spirit..."

3.4 The future Russian Catullus

Carthage is extremely strong today. It is on the verge of absolute plane-

tary power. Towards one world government, world domination. But it is suspected that the colossus will collapse for the same reasons that brought it to its heyday and power. Gilbert Chesterton realised this very precisely. How relevant today are his words. -

"Why are practical people convinced that evil always wins? That he who is cruel is clever, and even a fool is better than a clever one, if he is mean enough? Why do they think that honour is sensitivity and sensitivity is weakness? Because they, like all people, are guided by their faith. For them, as for everyone else, the basics are based on their own idea of the nature of things, the nature of the world they live in; they believe that the world is driven by fear and therefore the heart of the world is evil. They believe that death is stronger than life and therefore the dead are stronger than the living. It would surprise you to learn that the people we meet at receptions and at the tea table are secret admirers of Moloch and Baal. But it is these intelligent, practical people who see the world as Carthage saw it. They have that palpable raw simplicity that made Carthage fall. It has fallen because the businessmen are maddeningly indifferent to true genius. They do not believe in the soul and therefore eventually stop believing in reason. They are too practical to be kind, moreover, they are not so stupid as to believe in any kind of spirit and deny what every soldier calls the spirit of the army. It seems to them that money will fight when people can no longer. This is exactly what happened to the Punic businessmen. Their religion was a religion of desperation, even when their business was going great. How could they have realised that the Romans still had hope? Their religion was a religion of power and fear - how could they understand that people despised fear, even when they were forced to submit to power? At the very heart of their worldview lay weariness, tired of war too - how could they understand man they had for so long worshipped blind things - money, violence and gods as cruel as beasts? And now the news fell upon them: ashes everywhere burst into flames, Hannibal defeated, Hannibal overthrown... Carthage has fallen as no one has fallen since the days of Satan "

Again, as 2,000 years ago, scepticism and money on the one hand, a fanatical

spirit of rebellion on the other.

To defeat the enemy, we must stop at nothing. This is war. A great continental war.

One must believe that there is no such thing as a completely lost war. When all seems lost, the most serious and responsible stage of the battle begins. Our enemies have shaky ground under their feet. They seem to have calculated everything, thought everything through, implemented everything. But they will never understand the "spirit of the army". The spirit of the Russian Army, the ineradicable, indestructible voice of Eternal Rome, the Third Rome, the Bright City of Hidden Russia. I have no doubt that sooner or later a future Russian poet, returning home to the hinterland of Eagle, Tambov or Omsk, will say, like the ancient Roman poet Catullus of Syr-Mion, "Carthage is destroyed, the United States of America no longer exists."

Chapter 4

Geopolitics as destiny

4.1 Struggle between Land and Sea

Geopolitics is based on the division of all states and cultures into two types - land and sea. This is the first law of geopolitics. Geopoliticians have observed that maritime civilisations, cultures based on navigation, are more likely to have a market-based economic system and gravitate towards liberal-democratic politics. In contrast, land powers favour non-market (planned or partially planned) economies and limited democracy, or hierarchical societies in general.

The images of this confrontation in antiquity are: mercantile Carthage versus hierarchical Rome, democratic Athens versus militarised, ascetic Sparta.

Later, the primacy of maritime civilisation passed to England (even later to the USA), while powers such as Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia embodied patterns of land power.

Gradually, the geopolitical pairing of Land and Sea took hold in the form of a confrontation between the countries of the West and the East. The West, and especially the outpost of Western civilisation, the USA, pushed the market logic to the very last limits, while Eurasian and Eastern states were looking for other ways of development (the Soviet socialist experiment was quite in line with this search). Beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, the geopolitical map of the world was finally divided into two camps - the Eurasian Eastern bloc with its axis in the USSR and the Atlantic Western bloc with its axis in the USA. Journalists and later politicians called this situation the "Cold War" and the term was widely used. Purely ideological motives (the struggle between socialism and capitalism) were thought to be at the heart of the planetary tensions. However, geopoliticians long before the second half of the XX century, when even the concept of "cold war" did not exist, predicted an inevitable confrontation between the maritime Anglo-Saxon, Atlanticist civilization and the land powers of Eurasia (and they predicted this without regard to ideological differences at all). The opposition between Atlantism and Eurasianism is inevitable on fundamental cultural and civilizational grounds, even if the East and the West recognize the same ideological values. Geopolitics will sooner or later take its toll and sooner or later an inevitable geopolitical conflict will emerge and escalate between the two planetary poles. It is not the ill will of individuals or "militarist" oriented politicians ("hawks") that is responsible for this, but the objective logic of space and the landscape.

Thus, the division of the world in the 20th century into two strategic camps - the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO countries - was not a consequence of ideological, but a purely geopolitical confrontation, stemming from the basic laws of "political geography".

4.2 Why does the Cold War never end?

American presidents and their advisers were clearly aware of the geopolitical underpinnings of the US-Soviet Cold War confrontation. Being familiar with the basics of geopolitics, they were never for a moment mistaken about the fact that even possible ideological shifts in the USSR in a democratic

direction would not cancel out the cultural confrontation. And the clear proof is that the self-dissolution of the Eastern bloc, the Warsaw bloc, was not followed by a similar, symmetrical action on the part of the NATO strategists were well aware that Moscow's rejection of munism and theories of "world revolution" was essentially nothing in opposition to "Atlanticism" and "Eurasianism". That is why the North Atlantic alliance not only survived, but grew in strength and strength. Such unfriendliness on the part of the "Western partners" perplexed the Russian leadership, although the latter can only be explained by a complete disregard for the basics of geopolitics, that "bourgeois science", from which the Soviet specialists and analysts, who by inertia constitute the staff of advisers to the new non-communist leaders of the Russian state, turned away with disdain.

Thus a paradoxical situation gradually developed. The US, based on geopolitical analysis, continued to regard democratic Russia as a potential adversary and enshrined this position in its military doctrine (despite the similarity of its political system). And Russia itself, contrary to geopolitics, and on the contrary, having to be guided by purely ideological logic, only now taken with an opposite sign, refused to consider the United States and NATO countries as "potential adversaries", hastily dropping them as such from its military doctrine. So as not to be unsubstantiated, here are a few quotations.

A 1992 report by the US Undersecretary of Defence for Political Affairs, Paul Wolfowitz, published in the New York Times on 8 March 1992 and in the International Herald Tribune on 9 March 1992, listed the main priorities of US foreign policy, dictated by strategic considerations.

The US needs to "convince potential rivals that they should not expect to play a role in world politics comparable to the US". Moreover, "they must also be persuaded not to aspire to a greater role, even on a regional scale". The US must "take into account the interests of the other highly industrialised nations so as to compel them. not to oppose American leadership or to question the supremacy of our economic and political order". As a major danger, the Wolfowitz report points to "the danger to European sta-

bility stemming from the rise of nationalism in Russia or Russia's attempt to re-incorporate the countries that gained independence: Ukraine, Belorussia and others“.

These statements are based on the geopolitical thesis that there is a need for Atlanticist opposition to even the theoretical possibility of organising an alternative land block. By "potential rivals“, the US unequivocally refers to Russia, Islamic states and some powerful European powers (France, Germany, etc.) - i.e. all those states and cultures that have a Eurasian, continental dimension and a specific cultural and strategic history.

So, the notorious NATO advance to the East, from the Atlanticist geopolitical point of view, is quite logical, and from the point of view of the Atlanticist strategists - completely logical. And the phrases about "the rise of nationalism in Russia“ (not the slightest sign of which is actually observed here) are only intended to obscure the true essence of the Atlantic strategy and embellish the rather aggressive steps with "humanitarian rhetoric“.

4.3 Orthodoxy and nuclear weapons

But geopoliticians don't just operate on cultural factors. It is equally important for them to consider real strategic and economic potential. This is what distinguishes the geopolitical approach from all others, as it takes into account a variety of factors - ideal, material, military, religious, cultural, and economic. And in addition to Russia's geographical location, which makes it objectively the main geopolitical adversary of Atlanticism, we are confronted in reality with the problem of nuclear capability, which Russia still possesses and which is still sufficient to prevent, if necessary, by force, a large-scale military conflict directed against our country. Russian history, Eurasian culture, Orthodox religion and Russian nuclear weapons in geopolitical sense turn out to be complementary force factors, which all together provide Russians with preservation of statehood, freedom and independence. Ideology is secondary. History shows that it often changes, even over the course of several decades, but the basic vectors of the development of the state and the nation are preserved no matter what. Both Europe and Russia

have seen more than one political model, coups and putsches, dictatorships and republics, monarchies and parliaments, revolts and repressions... But at the same time, if we look across history, we see the triumphant and majestic, long and difficult, but invariably beautiful and meaningful path of peoples and states towards their own goal, towards the highest ideals, created over centuries and millions of lives.

Geopolitics is a science that makes you think big, think across centuries, continents and nations. And if it may seem too abstract to some, that impression is misleading. Due to the most attentive and scrupulous accounting of geopolitical regularities, the American analysts and, more broadly, strategists of the western civilization, managed to achieve such impressive successes against the Eurasian rival (i.e., alas, against us). And in this analysis they took into account all factors - economic potential, and Protestant ethics, Western philosophy of individualism and market efficiency, nuclear weapons and the "American dream" of world domination ("manifest destiny").

Russian geopolitics should do exactly the same - take into account all historical, economic and strategic levels and illuminate for the country's leaders the historical and geopolitical landscape in which they have to act and make vital decisions. Any one-sided approach - e.g. purely economic, religious or strategic - can be fatal. Geopolitics is an indispensable science for the authorities of a state.

4.4 Ignoring geopolitical laws is deadly

Even these brief considerations are enough to understand one paradox. - The word "geopolitics" is often used in the media, by analysts and politicians, but no attempt has yet been made to articulate its basic principles clearly and coherently. "There have been attempts to reduce geopolitics to a local, regional scale and to apply it solely to the analysis of private problems. At the same time, the first law of this science - the law of "duality of civilisations", objective opposition between Land and Sea, Eurasianism and Atlanticism, trade system and non-trade system, East and West - is actively

silenced. It is unlikely that ignorance and lack of competence are behind it all. This law is described in all Western geopolitical reference books and it is impossible not to notice it. However, it is this very expressive and impressive law that contradicts the political bias that has characterized some figures in the Russian leadership, who have now, fortunately, left high positions. These people, brought up in the tradition of simplistic ideological rather than geopolitical dualism, felt that a change of ideology by the Russian society automatically makes our yesterday's adversaries allies. And any disagreement with such a position was seen almost as an outcry. An appeal to geopolitics as a science would immediately refute their arguments and show the utter inconsistency of their naïve hopes for "Western help". Of course, such optimism, thank God, is already in the past. At the present stage, the Russian leadership is taking a much more responsible and thoughtful position (which applies both to the line of the Presidential Administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence). But in many ways the geopolitical situation has been missed, and today's authorities are forced to sort out serious geopolitical rubble. And the most important geopolitical problem today is precisely "NATO's enlargement to the East".

What does geopolitics have to offer on this issue?

4.5 Eurasian bloc

The second geopolitical law (after the law of the opposition of maritime and land civilisation) is the law of strategic blocs. It states that the logic of history dictates the need to expand the territories comprising either a single state or a strategic bloc of several states in order to meet the changing historical conditions and to remain competitive. This law is rephrased as "from city-states - through territory-states - to continent-states". Such territorial, military and economic integration is an obvious fact of political history throughout the twentieth century. In the present context, no nation-state can ensure its independence, economic, military and cultural autonomy unless it participates in one of the major strategic blocs. We see this in the processes of integration of the American continent into a single customs union, in the creation of the European Union, etc. At that, it is

quite natural that the Atlanticist civilization can expand only at the expense of neutral or Eurasian territories and vice versa. Not only power or material factors play an important role in the choice of the bloc, but also the proximity of cultures, religions and national traditions.

In such a geopolitical perspective, NATO's "enlargement" is quite natural, as it manifests the desire of one planetary bloc - the Atlanticist bloc - to maximise its zone of continental control at the expense of another bloc (even if still potential) - the Eurasian bloc.

It would be perfectly normal for Russia to put forward a strictly symmetrical geopolitical concept and proceed with the creation of a Eurasian Union, which would include both the former Soviet republics (with the possible exception of the Baltic states) and some Eastern European states (Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia), as well as some Asian countries (Iran, India). This would be a competitive geopolitical project, which does not mean that it would automatically become aggressive, "militaristic", "provocative", etc. This project could be seen as a direct application to Russian (more broadly, Eurasian) geographical and historical realities of the same geopolitical concept consistently adhered to by the United States and other Western powers in solidarity with them.

Part V

KHAZAR QUESTION

Chapter 1

Jews and Eurasia

1.1 Unsatisfactory explanatory schemes

The Jewish question continues to trouble the minds of our contemporaries. Neither artificial silence, nor hasty apologetic rhetoric, nor primitive Judo-phobia can remove the problem. The Jewish people is a unique phenomenon in world history. They are clearly walking a very special, unique religious and ethical path, fulfilling a mysterious and ambiguous mission through the

millennia.

No convincing, fully satisfactory interpretation of this topic exists today. Some historians tend to deny the importance of the Jewish factor in Russian and Soviet history altogether, which is a gross abuse of the truth. One only has to look at the lists of names of the main Bolsheviks and the political elite of the Soviet state and the disproportionate number of Jewish names catches the eye.

The second version concerning the function of the Jews in Russia (USSR) in the twentieth century is characteristic of our national-patriotic circles. There is the notion that the role of the Jews was purely negative, subversive and subversive. This is the famous “Jewish conspiracy” theory, which was especially popular in Black Hundreds and later White Guard circles. Invet-erate conservative Judaizers transfer this same model to the destruction of the USSR, which they also blame on the Jews, referring to the large number of representatives of this nation in the ranks of the reformers. The weakness of this concept is that the same people are accused simultaneously of having created the Soviet state and of having destroyed it, of being the main promoter of socialist, anti-bourgeois concepts, and of being the main apologist for capitalism. Moreover, an unbiased acquaintance with the fate of the Jewish Bolsheviks proves that they believed quite sincerely in the communist ideology, easily sacrificing their lives for it, which would be unthinkable if one were to take seriously the version of a group of “cynical and deceitful saboteurs”.

The third version belongs to Judophile (in the extreme case, Zionist) circles. They insist that the Jews are always and in all cases the right side, victims of unjust persecution by other peoples, the bearers of all positive, moral, cultural and social values. This position acknowledges the leading role of the Jews in all major historical processes in Russia, but knowingly asserts that in the Revolution, throughout Soviet history, and in perestroika, it is the Jews who are the positive pole, embodying eternal truth, goodness, intelligence, humanity.

All these versions suffer from obvious flaws. How are things really?

1.2 New version

It should be noted that the anti-Semitic and Zionist versions of explaining the role of the Jews in modern Russian-Soviet history proceed from a certain implication of the underlying unity of Jewry, the unity of its historical reflection and will. In other words, there is a tendency to view the Jews not just as an ethnic group along with others, but as a kind of organisation, party, order, lobby, etc.

A different version, on the contrary, assumes that there is no Jewish unity and that, as in the case of other peoples, each Jew appears in history separately, from his own self, as an individual who is determined only in a background, secondary, psychological sense by ethnic factors (in which case the term “Jewishness” itself, as it is understood by anti-Semites and Zionists, has no right to exist).

We reject all these approaches because they are almost obviously inadequate, but we suggest a different version. If neither the personalist nor the group-wide approach, i.e. neither the concept of indeterminate multiplicity nor the concept of cohesive unity, is satisfactory for us, it is natural to assume an intermediate model. It makes sense to talk about the internal duality of the Jews, about the presence within this unique ethnos not one will, but two wills, two “organisations”, two “orders”, two centres of historical reflection, two scenarios of the messianic path.

1.3 Easterners and Westerners in the ranks of Jewry

The famous Eurasian author Yakov Bromberg put forward a very similar idea in his article “On Jewish Orientalism”. The idea was that there are two clearly distinguishable antagonistic groups among Russian Jewry, which represent polar psychological and cultural archetypes. One group is of Hasidic-traditionalist orientation. It is characterized by mysticism, religious fanaticism, extreme idealism, sacrifice, deep contempt for the material side of life, for greed and rationalism. But besides the orthodox religious milieu, the

same psychological type gave rise, secularizing, to ardent revolutionaries, Marxists, communists, and Narodniks. And one branch of mystical Jewry was distinguished not merely by abstract Marxism, but by a deep sympathy for the Russian people and a sincere solidarity with them, especially the Russian peasantry and the Russian workers, i.e. with the element not of the official, Tsarist, but of the indigenous, grounded, bottom-line, parallel Russia, the Russia of the old believers and mystics, “enchanted Russian wanderers”.

Bromberg combines this Hasidic-Marxist, mystical-socialist milieu into one group - “Jewish Orientalism”. This is the “Eurasian faction” in Jewry. Another prominent Soviet historian, Mikhail Agursky, comes to a similar conclusion in his landmark work “The Ideology of National-Bolshevism,” where he points to the origins of Russophilia, widespread in Jewish revolutionary circles, which was characteristic of many figures of Soviet national-bolshevism of Jewish origin - in particular the biggest ideologists of this trend, Isaiah Lezhnev and Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz. Many Jews saw in Bolshevism an opportunity to finally merge with a larger people, to leave the ghettos and the Pale of Settlement in order to eschatologically unite Russian messianism with Jewish messianism under the common aegis of the Eurasian revolution and the destruction of the alienating laws of capital and exploitation. Thus, the extreme circles of mystically oriented Eastern European Jews (from the Hasidim to the Sabbatai) constituted a breeding ground for the Bolsheviks, Social Revolutionaries and Marxists, and it is no accident that most of the leaders of the Reds came from Hasidic families and localities, embraced by a mystical eschatological messianic pathos. Despite the outward paradox of this rapprochement, the Hasidic type of Jewish fundamentalist and the ardent builders of atheist Bolshevik society had the closest, typological and psychological connection, since both belonged to the “Eurasian,” “orientalist,” mystical-irrationalist part of Jewry.

The opposite group combined a completely different Jewish type - the type of Jewish rationalist, bourgeois, cool about religion, but, on the contrary, passionately immersed in the element of greed, personal enrichment, accu-

mulation, rationalization of economic activity. This, according to Bromberg, is "Jewish Westernism". Again, as in the case of Jewish orientalism, we see a combination of outwardly polar positions. - On the one hand, the religious circles of the extreme Talmudists ("Rabbanites"), who inherit the orthodox Maimonides line, i.e. the Aristotelian-rationalist line in the Jewish religion, belong to this category. At one time, this Talmudic camp actively fought against the spread in Jewry of Kabbalistic, passionately mystical tendencies, which were contrary in spirit and mythological form to the dry creationist Judaic theology. Later its leaders sharply opposed the pseudo-messiah Sabbatai Tsevi, the messianic leader of Jewish mystical heterodoxy. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a party of so-called "mitnaged" (literally "opponents", in Hebrew) emerged from among them, who fought desperately against Hasidism and the revival of extreme mysticism among Eastern European Jews. This camp was based on religious rationalism, on the Talmudic tradition, cleansed 'at the same time from all mystical-mythological strata. Ironically, to the same category of Jews belonged the activists of the "Haskalah," the "Jewish enlightenment," who proposed the modernization and secularization of the Jews, the denial of religious rituals and traditions in the name of "humanism" and "assimilation" with the "progressive peoples of the West. In Russia, this type of Jew, though extremely opposed to the conservative nominally monarchical-Orthodox regime, stood in a Westernizing, liberal position. The peak of their aspirations was the February Revolution, which fully satisfied the bourgeois, rationalist and democratic aspirations of this group. After the Bolshevik Revolution, "Jewish Westernism" generally supported the "White Cause", since despite its racial affinity with the Bolshevik leaders, it did not recognize itself in the universalist and mystically oriented "Jewish Orientalists".

Just as the Russians were divided in the revolution into "whites" and "reds" - also on the basis of deep archetypal characteristics - Jews split politically along the deep line outlined much earlier, into two intra-Jewish camps - Hasidic-Kabbalistic (Bolshevik) on the one hand, and Talmudic-Rationalistic (pro-Evangelical, bourgeois-capitalistic) on the other.

Thus, Bromberg-Agursky's typology using historical examples confirms the conclusion that we arrived at by purely logical means: Jewry, while representing an ethno-religious unity (which, however, is questionable), is still essentially divided into two camps, into two "orders", two "communities", two types, which in certain critical situations demonstrate not only difference, but also fundamental hostility. Each of these poles has both religious and secular expression, while remaining essentially unified. "Jewish Orientalism", "Jewish Eurasianism" (according to Bromberg) or "Jewish National Bolshevism" (according to Agursky) comprise the religious level - Hasidism, Sabbataism, Kabbalah - and the secular level - Marxism, revolutionary socialism, Narodnism, Bolshevism.

"Jewish Westernism" is also dual; in it the religious plane coincides with Maimonides' rationalist Talmudism (later the Vilna "Gaons", centres of the "mitnaged", anti-Hasidic circles), while the secular version is expressed in a liberal-democratic, "enlightened" humanism.

1.4 Two examples

The fundamental duality we have uncovered instantly explains many factors that remain incomprehensible and paradoxical in other interpretative methodologies. In particular, the enigmatic phenomenon of so-called "Jewish anti-Semitism" provides a logical explanation. Thus, Marx's criticism of Lassalle, in which Marx used extremely Judophobic language, as well as Marx's radically anti-Jewish passages in general, which identified Judaism with capitalism, become perfectly understandable from now on, Because Marx's Jewish characteristics unambiguously belong to the mystic-hasidic, messianic type, which traditionally sees the bourgeoisie and capitalism (in which Jews play an important role - in both the philosophical and the practical sense) as its main adversary. In his article "Towards the Jewish Question," Marx wrote: "What is the secular basis of Jewry? Material needs, self-interest. What is the secular ideal of the Jew? Merchandising. Who is their earthly god? Money... Money is the zealous deity of Israel. The empirical essence of Jewry is haggling.

Another example. At one time, a group of Kabbalist-Zoharites (admirers of the Kabbalistic book "Zohar"), followers of mystic-sabbataist Yaakov Frank converted to Christianity as a group, simultaneously "exposing" the misanthropic rites of Talmudists (Rabbanites), their eternal enemies. Jewish historian G.L. Shtrak in his book "Blood in the Beliefs and Superstitions of Mankind" describes the conflict between the followers of Frank and the Talmudists as follows "In 1759 they (Frankists - A.D.) declared to the Archbishop of Bratislava Lubensky that they thirst for baptism like a deer for a source of water, and offered to prove "that the Talmudists spill more innocent Christian blood than the pagans, thirst for it and consume it." At the same time, they requested that they be assigned living quarters to the east of Lemberg, so that they could live by the work of their hands where "the Talmudic Shinkars breed drunkenness, suck the blood of poor Christians and rob them to the last scrap. (...) Soon after the dispute, at the insistence of the Polish clergy, about a thousand Zoharites were baptised".

In these two examples we see the unity of spiritual confrontation occurring on different levels. The atheist Marx identifies Capital with the figure of "the Jew" and on this basis curses both the Jews and their "empirical deity". The "Frankist" mystics curse the Talmudists on entirely different grounds, reproaching them - in keeping with the level of the whole polemic - for "drinking the blood of Christians". Strikingly, in the Zoharites too, social motives surface: "the Rabbanites are robbing the Christians to the last thread", while the Zoharites themselves are going to "live by the labours of their hands". The spiritual conflict of contemplative mystics, myth-makers, Gnostics, fanatics and spiritualists against religious moralists, supporters of pure ritual, cultic formalists somehow imperceptibly and naturally transitions to the confrontation between socialists and capitalists, Bolsheviks and liberal democrats.

1.5 Jews vs Jews

On the whole, Jewry on the eve of the revolution was united in its opposition to the existing order. This applied to both sectors. The Jews of the East opposed capitalism and religious conservatism, alienation and formalism in

the cultural sphere, longed for revolutionary change and the opening of a magical era of messianic fulfillment. The Western Jews did not accept Tsarism for entirely different reasons, seeing it as a backward, insufficiently capitalist, civilized and humane regime, to be brought up to the level of Western civilization. All Jewry as a whole was in solidarity with the need for the overthrow of the dynasty and the revolution.

By the combined action of all these forces, when the situation was favourable, the February Revolution was realised. Immediately after this, however, irremovable contradictions in the camp of the victors became apparent. After the overthrow of the tsarist regime, the second line of division (this time internal) was clearly revealed and predetermined everything that followed. After the February Revolution, revolutionary and evolutionary forces, left Easterners and left Westerners, Eurasians and Europeanists, came to the fore. Within Jewry itself, a fundamental dualism of types was clearly exposed.

The Bolshevik pole united precisely the representatives of "Jewish Orientalism", the Hasidic-Sabbataist type, the Communist Jews, the Socialist Jews - the same Jews who at the end of the nineteenth century wanted to "live by the work of their hands". This working-class, eschatological, universalist, Russophile Jewry for the most part has solidarized with the national-Bolshevik current of Russian "left-wing imperialists," who see in the October Revolution not the end of the national dream, but its beginning, a new red dawn, the second coming of Soviet Russia, the secret Old Believer Kitezh, lost in the dark bicentennial of the St. Petersburg synodal blasphemy. In short, the Jewish stream in Bolshevism is the logical and triumphant conclusion to the historical journey of a vast (organic to Jewry) sector rooted in the religious disputes of the Middle Ages.

The enemies of this eschatological community of "eastern Jews" were all the capitalists of the world, and especially the Jewish bourgeois, the secular, empirical (according to Marx) embodiment of the ancient Rabbanites. Hence the paradoxical Bolshevik "anti-Semitism", not alien to many Jewish Communists either. Agursky cites in his work a very interesting case in

which the Jew Vladimir Tan-Bogoraz stands up for the Russian Bolshevik who allowed himself a crude anti-Semitic tirade, not only stands up for him, but fully justifies him. How reminiscent this is of the story of the Zogarites!

On the other hand, anti-Semitism could also be directed in the opposite direction, in which case it could well be carried out by Jews or by politicians under their control. Thus, for example, Churchill's anti-Semitic statements are widely known. He, pointing to the Jewish origin of most of the leaders of Bolshevism, spoke of the "Jewish danger to civilization from the East". Yet Lord Churchill himself relied on right-wing Zionist circles in Britain and the United States in his political career, as Douglas Reid convincingly shows. Consequently, just as there is "right-wing" and "left-wing" Jewry, so there is "right-wing" and "left-wing" anti-Semitism.

From February to October there is a watershed between the two halves of world Jewry, and from a certain point in time this confrontation takes a violent form.

1.6 Living by the work of your hands

There is no doubt that the Jews are uniquely capable in certain social, economic and cultural fields. The centuries of dispersion have taught a great deal to a small, but resilient, tenacious people, unwilling to give up their ancient dream, their millennia-old religion, their distant covenant. Viewing everything around them as temporary, distant and transient, the Jews developed a number of amazingly dynamic features that allowed them to instantly navigate in the social cataclysms, in the fast-flowing processes of national and state scale, occurring among the "big nations", which, "always being at home", perceived everything with a certain lag. However, these skills could be used in different ways in different situations. Thus, the Jewish Bolsheviks put all their efforts, all their national talents, all their spiritual strength into the creation of the most powerful Soviet state, an empire of social justice, a Eurasian bastion of land geopolitics. And numerous elements of the Jewish diaspora in Europe, America, Asia, coming from the same religious-spiritual, mystical, "orientalist" in spirit, "Eurasian" environments, were for decades

the structural backbone of the Soviets, faithful agents of Great Eurasian influence, conductors of Bolshevik messianism. It was they who formed the basis of the Comintern and wove a powerful Eurasian network of Moscow agents in all corners of the world. But again, let us stress that it was not just about Jews, but about a special category of Jews, a specific Jewish camp, the "Jew-Eurasians". By the way, at a certain stage, it was they, these "red-brown" Jews-Eurasians, who prepared the creation of the state of Israel, under the leadership (and sanction) of Moscow in a tough battle with the Atlanticist British, the forces of capital and liberal democracy. They also constituted the axis of the Israeli left, and the fruit of their efforts were the famous kibbutzim. It was all the same Zoharite - "live by the work of one's hands".

The apologists of Jewry as such, presenting all Jews as purely innocent victims, cannot explain the fact that in the era of harsh repression, both Leninist and Stalinist purges, Jews were not only victims, but also executioners, and not in an individual, purely personal sense, but precisely in a group, party, factional sense. This circumstance, which does not fit into either anti-Semitic or Judophile frameworks, can in fact be explained by the fact that even during the Soviet rule the internal struggle within Jewry did not cease; that the Bolshevik, "Hasidic", "Zoharite" elements, well aware of the skills and serpentine manners of their own countrymen, their propensity for intrigue, for chameleonism, for conspiracies, were mercilessly fighting with the bourgeois elements of Jewry, with the remnants of the "Western Jews", with the heirs of the "Rabbanite spirit", with the ideological descendants of the "Mithnagogs". Hence the paradox that the Jews themselves were at the centre of the pronounced anti-Semitic purges.

1.7 From fracture to collapse

The critical point in the history of Jewish Eurasianism is 1948. At this point, Stalin and his cronies come to the conclusion that the state of Israel, whose creation was enthusiastically supported by the Soviet leadership at the beginning (as a Hasidic-socialist construct), turned out to be a tool of the bourgeois West, as the capitalist-Mitnaheden line had prevailed in

it. Zionist tendencies began to awaken in Soviet Jewry as well, and this meant that the initiative passed to the remnants of the "Westernist" sector, whose total eradication proved to be only an appearance and whose vitality surpassed even the watchful suspicions of the Jewish-Eurasians.

This moment was fatal - as recent events at the end of our century show - for the entire Soviet state and for socialism worldwide. When anti-Semitic tendencies in the Soviet leadership crossed certain boundaries - particularly egregious was the destruction of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee, composed almost 100 percent of convinced Eurasians and direct agents of Lavrenti Beria (which speaks only in their favor) - only the most persistent Jewish National Bolsheviks managed to remain unshaken in their Russophile, Soviet-imperialist position. On the whole, in the eyes of the Jewish masses, the influence of the Eurasians had been sufficiently undermined and their basic geopolitical and ideological line had been significantly discredited. On the other hand, from the party and military environment Velikorusskie and Malorossiyskie elements who could not understand the messianic pathos of left-wing nationalism, messianic national-Bolshevism, which had been the basis of the spiritual alliance of Jewish and Russian Bolsheviks since the beginning of the century, began to rise to the top of power. This new generation felt themselves to be more statesmen than preachers of the New Truth, inheriting either the army "Romanovian" spirit of the tsarist military caste, not fully uprooted by the Bolsheviks, or a common people, worker-peasant chauvinism with a certain amount of unreflective, instinctive anti-Semitism. These army cadres, who had no knowledge of the revolution and the supreme spiritual and historical tension accompanying it, did not delve into the subtleties of national politics. The Ukrainians were particularly deaf in this matter and, together with Khrushchev, they began to occupy the heights of power in the USSR more and more tightly. Although, immediately after Stalin's death, Beria put a complete stop to the anti-Semitic "doctor business", the most irreparable thing was done.

Next came the fatal turning point. The Russian-Jewish, Eurasian-continental, international-imperial, messianic, revolutionary current, which

had been the backbone of Soviet power, was undermined, broken, disfigured at its core. The state, the government, the economic organisms began to function by inertia. The purges, which were invariably based on hidden ideological, metapolitical, fundamental causes, were over, replaced by clan warfare, the gradual "obour-joisation" of socialism, its descent into philistinism, into philistinism. The revolutionary eschatological pathos had evaporated. The Soviet state continued to remain only by inertia. The base of the world eschatological Eurasian revolution had essentially become an ordinary state. Powerful, gigantic, peculiar, but lacking the intensity of the original universal mission.

At the level of Jewry, this meant the total defeat of the Hasidic-Sabbataist camp and the gradual rise to prominence of the Jewish Rationalists, Kantians, Humanists, Mithnagites and Westerners. The secret alliance of National Bolshevism was dissolved, Jewish Orientalism was being marginalized at an accelerated pace. Its influence, its position, was falling catastrophically.

Gradually, the very type of Bolshevik Jew was relegated to the periphery, and representatives of the Maimonid, Talmudic persuasion emerged at the head of the Jewish community in the USSR. More often than not, a secular, omniched, humanist-liberal version of the Jewish community emerged at the head of the USSR.

This bourgeois, right-wing Zionist flank was henceforth working only for the collapse of the Soviet system, preparing the collapse of socialism, undermining the gigantic geopolitical construct from within.

1.8 Towards a Eurasian future

Jewish orientalism is not a purely modern, exclusively Soviet phenomenon. It is rooted in the depths of national history. Perhaps there is some terrible religious or racial secret behind it. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the victory of the "Mithnaged" lobby, of Jewish Westernism, is not and cannot be an irreversible and total fact. There is no denying that the

position of Jewish orientalism is weaker and more marginal than ever. But this may well be only a temporary phenomenon. The very national identity of a certain part of Jewry is inconceivable without sacrifice, without great compassion, without a painful and idealistic search for the truth, without a deep mystical contemplation, without a galling contempt for the dark slave laws of "this world" - the laws of the market and selfish gain. Jewish orientalism, the feats of humility and sublime foolishness of the first legendary Tzaddiks, sincere compassion for others, regardless of their race and religion, a fanatical belief in justice and the fair organization of society, and finally, a vaguely guessed solidarity with the tragic and beautiful, also chosen, God-bearing people of history - the Russian people, all this is indestructible in a certain part of Jewry, inseparable from its unique fate.

Sandwiched between the (partly justified) anti-Semitism of Russian patriots and the Westernist, rationalist, market-oriented, subversive and anti-statist orientation of the bulk of today's Russian Jewish liberals, Jewish orientalism is having a hard time.

But we should not despair. There have been more trials than that in the life of these people.

Part VI

HOLY SOIL OF THE EAST

Chapter 1

From space to culture (soil factor)

1.1 Land as war

The notion of "land" is closely linked to the notion of "war". The history of wars shows that conflicts over territory are the main and almost the only reason for wars. All other values - money, gold, herds, wealth, women or provisions - acquired as a result of wars are secondary to the main thing - land, territory. This is understandable - whoever owns the land in a sense owns everything on it, and so the seizure of territories automatically allows

the enjoyment of all the wealth that is there - including human lives.

This theme is rooted in the most ancient cults associated with the Earth, Mother Earth, the giver and parent of human wealth. The Earth embodied the original matrix from which everything else emerges. Some mythologies claim that humans themselves once, "in the time of it", grew out of the earth. The biblical account of the creation of the first man from "red clay" (the Hebrew "adam" is derived from "adam", "red clay") fits this logic perfectly. That is why the earth is considered to be the life-giving force of matter. The wealth of riches, the highest value - because all values come from it.

The war between nations and states, between civilisations and confessions is waged precisely for this magical substance - Mother Earth. Whoever succeeds and gains territory is incredibly rich, even if the inhabitants of the conquered lands are themselves poor and the soil is barren. Land, as a sacred category, is valuable in itself, but this is also true in the pragmatic realm. Even the poorest arid zones and infertile steppes or deserts can, under certain conditions, play a key role for the peoples, societies and states that control them.

In matters related to the Earth, the most ancient archaic plots of the human unconscious are strangely intertwined with the latest, ultra-modern geopolitical and geostrategic concepts that point to the crucial importance of geography for the development of civilisations, cultures and ideological blocs. The notion of "Earth", "Land", is a fundamental category of geopolitics as a science.

1.2 Dragon teeth

If war is inherently linked with the land, there must be some qualitative link with the land and the military caste itself. The military, the army, is the protector of its lands and in certain situations the conqueror and conqueror of new territories. An army is a dynamic manifestation of the earth as a qualitative category. And many ancient myths speak of mysterious invincible warriors born from the Earth, sown by "dragon teeth" or some

other magical method. In the warriors, the kshatriyas, the bogatyrs, the Earth manifests its agile, forceful impulse. Graziers, artisans, and other types of people are connected with the static aspects of the Earth. The military embodies the moving, dialectical principle of the Earth.

It is not by chance that the symbolic quality of the warrior caste in Hinduism is "rajas", which means "expansion", "stretching", "expanding", and this is one of the fundamental qualities of space, i.e. of what is "extended", "stretched", "stretched out". It is also indicative that the Russian word 'warrior' is cognate with the Old Indian root 'veti', which means 'to pursue, pursue, strive for', which again refers us to the idea of 'dynamic motion', 'stretching'. The same concept is behind the Indian term kshatriya, derived from the word kshetra - i.e. field, horizontal space, earth.

Such stable correspondences predetermine the spatial nature of military thinking as a special type. - The military's love of maps, strategic manoeuvres, redeployments, and marches are, after all, all expressions of the spatial, earthy nature of the army. The military perceives the world as space, as something that takes place in space, and this specificity lies at the root of the army's classic conservatism - the military seems to ignore time and history, as different epochs coexist for them in a single spatial ensemble. In some situations, this seems somewhat strange and at times incongruous. But at the heart of it all is caste typology.

1.3 Liquid market hordes

Geopolitics divides all varieties of civilisations into two types - terrestrial and maritime. The land-based ones are connected to the Earth, and consequently to the warriors as the main "land" caste. The Sea civilisation, the maritime power is based on a different type. This type is the type of merchant, a person specializing in exchange, deriving personal benefit from that exchange. The merchant is not bound to space and to land, he is the antithesis of the warrior. His area of action is not connected with fixed realities, but with a fluid environment. This environment is detached from its roots, filled with objects that have already lost their connection to the

process of emerging from the ground, from the life-giving matrix of things. Trade is disconnected from the Land, and therefore it reaches its maximum development and perfection among peoples inhabiting coastal zones, coastal territories. "Trade", "port", "shore", "fleet" are almost synonymous concepts. Commercial thinking, unlike military consciousness, is detached from space as a fixed, invisible whole. This indifference to space and its form predetermines the traders' inattention to the factor of borders. In the borders, natural or artificial, a trader sees only negative obstacles, environment, the world's imperfection preventing from optimization of trade transactions. The land is desacralized in principle, equated to a kind of commodity, one of many others, not distinguished at all by its essence. In other words, the attitude of merchant consciousness to land completely ignores its life-giving quality, its form-forming origin, its precedence over the appearance of forms. Such land is "dead", "secondary", subjective, spiritually arid. The trader sees any land as a desert, a purely quantitative space, a flat scenery, against which and through which the merchant caravan moves. The most ideal space, which corresponds exactly to the merchant mentality, is not even the desert, but the Sea. It is perfectly identical and equal throughout, it is homogeneous and open, it is purely decorative and dead in itself, subject to simple and uniform exploitation.

And not coincidentally, one of the definitions of capital is "liquidity", i.e. "fluidity", "liquefaction" of its substance, non-density, non-fixity, detachment from ensembles of strict forms.

The historical consciousness can be said to be closely linked to the 'fluid' mentality of the traders, whereas the warrior's consciousness of the classical Sushi people gravitates towards viewing things *sub speciae eternitatis*, 'from the angle of eternity'.

1.4 Metacivilisations

Based on this duality of types observed by both geopoliticians and sociologists (especially Werner Sombart), curious conclusions can be drawn regarding more general realities. For example, the State, as a category inextricably

linked to the configuration of space, certainly belongs to the military-land structure. Conversely, trade consciousness cannot be truly State, since any State structure necessarily imposes certain limitations on the sphere of exchange which, from a purely market perspective, are always exclusively negative.

The capital and commercial order cannot, by its very nature, be national, state, strictly localised in space. The only thing that can be asserted about its geographical nature is its gravitation* to "maritime spaces".

Of course, in the real world, neither warlike nor mercantile societies are ever found in pure form, but still both tendencies are in radical and irreducible contradiction with each other, and the domination of one over the other determines the essential orientation of each nation and state, more generally of each individual civilisation.

If a society is dominated by the land principle, an implicit cult of land and space, one can almost certainly argue for a military arrangement for such a society. If, on the other hand, the main effort is invested in the development of the navy, such a state is doomed to a strengthening of its merchant position and its further dissolution into a more general geographical context can easily be predicted. Interestingly, many peoples with an emphasized land orientation, but living on islands or in coastal zones, had sacred taboos both on navigation and on certain forms of exchange and trade. In such cases, objective geography was replaced by subjective, cultural geography in active confrontation with the dictates of the natural environment.

It is not space itself that underlies the civilisation type, but the awareness of space, its image, the erection of its Fnecoi "ideal form", which gradually acquires independence and itself begins to dictate space's structure.

This allows us to speak of an "ideal Land" and an "ideal Island", which in caste terms would be identical to a "warrior system" or a "merchant system". "Warrior system" is embodied in the concept of the "sacred State". The "mercantile order", on the other hand, leads to the destruction of the

State (first through its desacralisation) and then to its abolition altogether.

1.5 Militarism - Eurasianism - Socialism

The relationship of military and commercial principles to each other is the caste or socio-economic counterpart of the "great continental war" waged at the level of geopolitics between the land and the sea. And curiously enough, human history is gradually moving towards the purification, the absolutization of these two principles, both geopolitically and typologically. The civilizations of the Sea are gradually merging into a single macro-civilization, the meta-civilization of the Sea, which obliterates borders and states, peoples and races, religions and cultures into a single homogeneous block, the world market. The merchant type extends to all other professions and "castes", social strata and institutions.

A similar process is developing at the other land pole. - Here warriorlike, conservative, statesmanship tendencies gravitate towards integration in a Continental Empire, in a single Metago State, created on the basis of the Warrior typology. It is an ode to the Great Continental Sparta. It is a potential metacivilisation of the Dryland. There is also a philosophical pairing to correspond to this division: holism, wholeness, continuity, continuity as the basic principle of spatiality dominates the military order of the Land; discreteness, discontinuity, discontinuity, atomicity, individuation are linked with the mercantile order of the Sea.

The transposition of the external, purely geopolitical dual issue into the field of social typology and even psychology is of great operational importance. With such a step, we have a reliable and effective tool for understanding how external, global, geopolitical factors influencing the situation from outside are linked to internal political, local events, socio-economic processes and battles at the level of each individual state or nation.

The most important conclusion: the interests of the Land, the geopolitical goals of Eurasia are inseparable from the dominance of the military type, from its unambiguous and radical placement over the merchant class, over

the laws and requirements of the market. The market in the land metacivilization must be strictly subordinated to the army, the Sea to the Earth. The choice of liberal-trade, capitalist, bourgeois-market ideals and principles as the ruling ideology for a land power is tantamount to suicide. Consequently, the army of a land power, apart from the external threat and geopolitical adversary, can clearly and responsibly identify, name and designate the internal enemy. This enemy would be Capital, the ideologies and institutions designed to ensure the establishment and maintenance of the "mercantile system".

Werner Sombart divided all people into two types - "heroes and merchants", "Helden und Haendler". Heroes grow out of the Earth, "Hera", mother of the gods, wife of Zeus, like "Hercules". Heroes and warriors are synonymous. In today's picture of the world, this dualism translates into a fierce and total confrontation of the 'last battle'. The class struggle, in Sorel's interpretation, is a war of Heroes and Traders, of Warriors and Bourgeoisie, since Sorel equated the working class itself with one of the divisions of the army, the "workers' army".

To be a Eurasian, a traditionalist is the same as to be a kshatriya, a military, a warrior. To be a warrior is the same as to be a socialist, a fierce opponent of Capital and the commercial system.

If the Russian military man is not a socialist, he is either ignorant, hypnotised, deceived, or he is a traitor to his State and his people, for Russia - being a stronghold of the land metacivilisation, its axis, is condemned by Capital, the hostile metacivilisation of the Sea, to total destruction.

There is no such thing as national capital; capital is international in its essence. Even more precisely, capital is linked to the West as the geographical pole of the "trading civilisation". Consequently, between the external enemy (Atlantism) and the internal enemy (the bourgeoisie), a strict equation must be placed (and acted upon accordingly).

Chapter 2

Russian Heart of the East

2.1 Preliminary remarks - The beginning and end of positivist science

Sacred geography is very different from ordinary, physical geography. We are used to viewing the earth as a globe, as a globe (Latin for 'globus' is a sphere). The North is the top of the globe and the South is the bottom. The globe can be rotated, and hence the concepts of East and West escape our geographical attention. And when we imagine our Earth rotating in the solar system and in open space, we are distracted from concepts such as the sides of the world altogether. It all seems such a convention! A relic of the 'dark ages', when the world was imagined as standing on three whales and the earth was seen as a disc.

For a long time, the frantic pace of scientific discoveries that opened up new horizons was regarded uncritically and over-enthusiastically, and this, in turn, made us look with disdain and disdain at the worldview of our ancestors. We were inclined to think of our ancestors as dark, savage, primitive and no longer being "apes".

This positivist attitude rather quickly began to collide with contradictions. The development of science came close to the problem of consciousness, the human factor as applied to natural phenomena. And then everything changed - it turned out that mythological archetypes, settings of consciousness formed by culture, history, environment, geography, language have such a strong influence on scientific methodology that they can deform the data of so-called objective material research.

This disillusionment with the omnipotence of the positive sciences went on at all levels - discoveries in depth psychology and psychoanalysis revealed how the supposedly rational man depends on dark forces and impulses lodged in the depths of the subconscious; linguists and psycholinguists discovered, in turn, the direct dependence of thinking on the specifics of language; Positivist philosophers discovered that such a category as "atomic fact" simply does not exist, and that outside interpretation there can be no question

of fact at all; and finally physicists, investigating the paradoxes of quantum mechanics, came to the conclusion that the presence or absence of an "observer" directly affects the course of quantum processes, bringing a subjective element even to such a rigorous discipline as physics.

In the late 1980s, an international scientific conference with the evocative title "The End of Science" was held in the USA, where participants were forced to state that the body of modern scientific knowledge is, in fact, only a modern form of mythology, which means that humanity fatally remains the same as before - its "development" and "progress" are cyclical in nature.

The era of optimistic materialism and positivism is clearly over. This means that a new comprehension of ancient mythological constructs is on the agenda, a rehabilitation of various disciplines and sciences that have been hastily relegated to the category of the overcome and primitive. Hence the growing interest in mythology, the history of religions, alchemy, magic and astrology among the most sober representatives of modern science. The human race, while changing, remains itself, and consequently scepticism about the past and past civilisations is no longer acceptable.

We must now put the globe aside, forget about the piece of matter carried in a lifeless cosmos, and turn to the magical world of sacred geography, to that amazing world in which our ancestors lived, created, loved and killed their enemies, who gradually and persistently shaped our culture, our psychology, our soul. It is time to return to myth. And that means a return to the magical, sacred and amazing land - Bright Russia.

2.2 Polar mountains in the middle of the continent

First of all, we should note a certain regularity in the sacral geography of the ancient world. All ancient cultures that come to mind when we speak of the ancient world were located geographically south of the mountain range that crosses the entire Eurasian continent from West to East. This is a very important point. Certainly, even to the north of this great range there existed peoples and tribes, cultures and civilizations. But these "northern"

territories - from Celtic to Siberia and Mongolia - either preceded the more southern civilizations, or were formed later, as if on the outskirts of the southern world. We will not deal with this problem here, as there are differing opinions on the subject.

More important for us is the following point. The sacral-geographical models of the world order, which became more or less universal in the Ancient World, were all, without exception, developed in the area located to the south of the Eurasian range. And it is on the basis of these southern models of the world that the later geographical conceptions were developed until the formation of the modern "globe geography", which sharply (and probably too hastily) broke off with the ancient heritage.

The band of southern civilisations covers:

- Mediterranean range - from the Maghreb (Tunisia, Morocco) and the Iberian Peninsula to Italy, Greece and Anatolia in the north and Algeria, Lebanon, Egypt, Israel, Schumer in the south;
- Interfluve and Persia (Elam);
- India;
- China;
- Indochina.

In the north, all those cultural circles were bounded by mountains, which played an invariably important role in the concept of sacral geography of the respective civilisations. Each of the civilisations surrounded the northern mountain ranges with a special mysterious habitat.

To the far west of Eurasia to the north of Hercules' column were the Pyrenees, separating modern-day Spain from France. These mountains had great mythological significance and were associated with the exploits of Hercules in his sacred and geographical journeys. The Pyrenees were associated in myth with the Pyrenees, the beloved of Hercules, whom he left behind.

These were also regarded as sacred places by the Druids, and in the Christian world the most important European pilgrim route to Campostella to the tomb of St James ran along them.

These same Pyrenean mountains would assume an important sacred significance in the era of the Albigouan heresy, and ancient legends would be revived in the tales of the Cathars and their spiritual capital, the Pyrenean castle of Monse Por, where the last representatives of the 'pure' died, led by the beautiful lady Esclaramonde de Foix who turned into a dove at the last moment - according to languedoc legends - and flew to the mystical lands of the East.

In Northern Italy there are the sacred Alps. In Northern Greece, Olympus (the abode of the gods), the Balkans and the Carpathians, where there were the oldest and most important sanctuaries of the cult of Apollo.

Above Mesopotamia and Anatolia (the ancient land of the Aryan-Hittites), as well as western Iran, stood the sacred mountains of the Caucasus, with Mount Elbrus, the polar mountain of Aryan mythology.

To the east stretched the Pamirs, the Tien Shan and the Himalayas. And North India and China rested on the peaks of Tibet, considered the abode of the gods in both Hinduism (especially Mount Kailasa, where Shiva and Shakti Parvati reside), Buddhism and the Chinese tradition.

All these remarks clearly show that, according to a certain and rather mysterious logic, all known ancient civilisations operated with a rather similar picture of sacred geography, similar at least in that in the far north of the earth (identified with the far north of a given cultural region) there was a mountain or chain of mountains that was considered the Axis of the World, a sacred pole, a magic source and a supreme sanctuary. The sacred mountain of the Hindus, Meru, has the same meaning.

This relative "north" or sacred north was not only surrounded by veneration and commemorated in elaborate cults and rituals. It was also shrouded in rather disturbing legends and myths, for approaching the shrine meant

simultaneously enhancing all otherworldly energies. And the guardians of the threshold, who guard the approaches to the Centre of the World, to the Pole, naturally and logically seek to ward off the curious and the unworthy.

Hence the disturbing and sinister themes associated with the North in sacred geography. In some cases, the theme of "northern evil" became an independent one, and then this orientation acquired an ominous negative meaning. Thus, in some West Asian cults there was a legend that mountains were the abode of "demons" and that the north was the orientation of evil.

Interestingly, the northern orientation is negative in the Judaic tradition, where the northern country of Rosh, Meshech and Tubal is associated with the arrival of the "Gogs and Magogs", demonic tribes who are to appear on earth at the end of time.

The demonisation of Northern European peoples (barbarians and especially the Celtic Picts) in Greco-Roman civilisation falls into the same category. The inhabitants of ancient Iran contrasted themselves with the northern Turan on the same basis. The Chinese saw the northern nomads - Mongols, Chzhurchens, Manchus, later Turks - as demon-possessors-lovers, etc.

In sacred geography, the North is both sacred and demonic at the same time.

Alas, this expression is not quite correct. The moralistic division of the sacred sphere into white and black appeared rather late. Up to a certain moment, and in the case of some archaic cults up to the present time, the sacred knew no division into "light" and "dark". The netherworld was perceived as something uniform and equally opposed to the common, profane world. The passage from the profane to the sacred always presupposed a conflict with the periphery of the sacred, with its dark side and the negative. Only as the spiritual path reached the centre, the pole of the beyond, did the darkness of the "threshold guardians" disperse and the shining world of the polar Garden, Paradise, was revealed.

In sacred geography, the North Mountain, the axis of the world, was regarded as the point at which the sacrament of transition from the beyond to the

beyond occurs. It was, therefore, both awe-inspiring and terrifying 'at the same time, laden with dark rapture and luminous dread.

So, let's summarise all the considerations.

Traditional civilizations of ancient times developed a rather broadly similar picture, in which the northern lands bordering the Polar Mountain were given a profoundly dual meaning - they were both Hell and Heaven, because contact with the beyond, localized in the North, meant entering an entirely new realm than the ordinary world, frightening, dangerous, but also salvific and spiritual.

Let us note a curious detail. Iranian tradition, characterized by sharp dualism, accentuated the Iran-Turan contradiction (clearly expressed in Firdausi) very strictly, almost in moralistic terms. Here the demonization of the North is comparable to the Jewish tradition (in general, there are many similarities between them). In India, which, on the contrary, is characterized by an accentuated Advaitism, a non-dualism, the sinister side of the North was least revealed, except in the connection with the North and the northern mountain of Shiva the Destroyer, who, however, is not a negative or demonic character in Hinduism, but rather a transcendental hypostasis of the Absolute that destroys the beyond, but opens the beyond. This fits perfectly with the model of sacred geography that we have identified.

2.3 Hyperborea found

Let us now turn to Russia and its place in sacred geography, in the original picture of the world.

The Russian lands lie to the north of that Eurasian mountain range which stood for the Centre of the World in ancient civilisations. This means that, along with central and northern Europe, Russia is a strictly "Hyperborean" territory. René Guénon once pointed out the strangeness of the Greek term "Hyperborea" itself, meaning not just "the northern country", but "the country that lies on the other side of the North". Guénon expressed his bewilderment at this contradiction and suggested the use of the term 'Borea',

'northern country', which he compared with the Indian name of the magical Northern continent 'Varahi'. It follows by itself from our previous considerations that the name 'Hyperborea' was perfectly justified in the case of the Greek picture of sacred geography, since 'Borea' for the Greek world was the Balkans and the Carpathians, the ridge of northern mountains framing the Apennine peninsula from above. Beyond those mountains lay not the "Borean" lands, but precisely the "Hyperborean" lands. In that case, everything falls into place.

Northern Eurasia, most of which is occupied by Russia, is thus Hyperborea in the truest sense, and it is this name that most accurately fits Russia in the context of sacred geography.

If this is so, then the peoples of the East, who have never severed ties with the most ancient levels of culture and tradition (as the arrogant and narrow-minded people of the West did), should have a special attitude towards Russia, which stems precisely from its hyperborean location, from its polar symbolism.

Russia is a country of polar archetypes, the place from which the founding ancestors of ancient southern Eurasian civilisations descended. In principle, something similar could be said about Western Europe, which occupies a similar place in the overall Eurasian continental ensemble in terms of sacral and geographical symbolism. Since the first centuries of Christianity, when the attention of civilization was gradually shifted to the North of the Eurasian mountains, the space of Europe was perceived as the land of a "new sacredness", as the regained Hyperborea, destined to become the centre and stronghold of the "Christian Eikumene", the heart of a new Empire. At the same time it is the Germans, the inhabitants of northern European countries, who become the axis of all Christian dynasties, because of the sacred polar significance that marked Hyperborea in sacred geography. The axis of the world, the polar mountain is the highest form of sacred monarchical power. The king in human society, the state, the Empire is analogous to the "northern mountain".

But by the time of the Schism of the Churches, the significance of the line dividing Eurasia into East and West is revealed with renewed force. The West, together with the Mediterranean area, is gradually settling into a separate sacral geographical system, with its Hyperborea (Germanic lands), its South (North Africa), its East (the Levant) and its "far West" (Ireland, Brittany, later America). Eurocentrism is rooted in this picture of the world and is valid only within these boundaries, where it is justified in terms of the symbolism of sacred geography.

The second part, whose centre was at first Byzantium (the Eastern Roman Empire) and then Russia, has a very different structure. Here it is Northern Eurasia, Moscovia, to the East the Pacific area, China and Indochina, to the South all the lands lying to the South of the Eurasian mountains (from the Caucasus to the Altai and Manchuria) and to the West the entire Catholic world, the Mediterranean and Maghreb.

So, hyperborean function of Russia in a complex of sacral geography most of all transpires in its relation with the Asian peoples and countries. As these cultures under the influence of the general civilization process were forced involuntarily to expand their ideas about the geography of the world, they discovered the mysterious world of Northern Eurasia, the country of the "otherworldly", disturbing and spiritualizing at the same time.

This was how many peoples of Siberia and the Eurasian steppes, later Mongols and Tibetans, perceived the mission of the Russian Empire, which greatly facilitated the Russian development of Siberia, which was not a conquest or colonisation in the full sense, but was based on the oldest sacral-geographical archetypes so alive and clear in the collective mythological memory of Siberian peoples. The White King of Russia was identified with the symbolic figure of the Pole, the Polar Mountain. By the way, the sacral charisma of Genghis Khan, who was also called the "white king", was based on the same symbolic complex (as according to legend he was a descendant of the sons of Alan-Goa from the "white spirit" who entered her yurt through a smoke hole - this plot is similar to "coming from the North", "descending from the Polar Mountain", etc.).

Following the same logic, Buryat lamas regarded the dynasty of Russian tsars as a succession of "tulku", incarnations of deities in the Lamaist pantheon. In particular, the Russian Empress Catherine the Great was considered by Buryats to be an incarnation of "White Tara", a powerful female deity. (Interestingly, "white Tara" plays an important role in Vajrayana, Buddhist tantrism; perhaps the empress' famous temperament was somehow related to her tantric archetype.)

Already in the twentieth century, during the parallel development of the Eurasian project by the Bolsheviks, emigrant Eurasians and the German geopolitical school of Haushofer, Russia's polar function of integrating the Asian powers into a single strategic bloc came to the fore again and was actively developed in closed special centres. Based on the recent and unique research of the young Russian historian Oleg Shishkin, it is almost certain that within the bowels of Soviet intelligence there was a special structure led by Gleb Bokyi and Barchenko and patronized by Central Committee member Moskvina, which worked in earnest to use the sacral and geographical traditions of Asian peoples to create an Asian strategic bloc controlled by Moscow. This made active use of the writings of French occultists and Martinists (most notably Saint-Yves-d'Alveydre) on the preservation of sacral archetypes in oriental traditions.

Curiously enough, it was St-Yves d'Alveydre, married, incidentally, to the Russian occultist Countess Keller, who was instrumental in popularising the theme of Aggartha, the mystical underworld, also identified with Shambhala, the centre of the world.

The symbolism of Aggartha, as revealed by René Guénon in his book "The King of the World", has the same polar symbolism as the axial Mountain. And consequently, the theme of Aggartha is directly related to the theme of Hyperborea and consequently the sacred legitimisation of the geopolitical mission of Russia in the integration of Eurasia.

Although Buddhologist Marco Pallis has proved quite convincingly that the word Aggartha - contrary to the false etymology uncritically accepted by

Henon - is not Sanskrit and the Aggartha theme itself is totally alien to Hindu mythology, it turns out not so simple.

2.4 Aggarta and Eurasia

The speech, by Marco Pallis in a collection of articles in the *Cahiers de Lerne*, dedicated to René Guénon, significantly undermined the prestige of the great French esotericist's book, as it revealed some obvious inaccuracies in the works of someone who claimed undisputed sacred authority and acted as the authorized representative of the "King of Peace" himself in Europe (as his allusion in a footnote in a similarly named book suggests). Curiously, one inaccuracy was also discovered by the author of this text, as Henon, speaking of the authenticity of Ferdinand Ossendowski's information regarding Aggarta and the "King of Peace", refers to the lack of a Russian translation of St. Yves d'Alveydra. In fact such a translation existed and was dated at the beginning of the 10s. Besides, one has to be completely ignorant of the Russian nobility to believe that the lack of a translation from French could be an obstacle to familiarity with a book by an author related by family ties to the Russian aristocracy, where every second person was a spiritualist or occultist and, in addition, often spoke better French than his native language.

But these are details. More interesting is something else.

Jean-Pierre Laurent, contemporary French scholar and researcher of Henon's work, discovered a reference to Agartus in an ancient manuscript published in Leiden in the 17th century, which referred to a special city (or sanctuary) located in Egypt, in the Nile Delta. The exact name is Agartus Oppidum. The author of this text was Lucius Ampelius, a 3rd century Latin writer. He reports that in this mysterious city there is "a statue with ivory hands, on whose forehead is a bright emerald. This statue inspires panic-stricken terror in the beasts." If the word Agartus has no Latin translation, the word oppidum means "hill", which again refers us to the symbolism of the Mountain and the polar mountain.

On the other hand, there are authors who approximate the word "agarta" to the ancient Germanic Asgard, the city of the Aesir, the gods. They tend to refer to Count Gobineau's "Essays on the Inequality of the Human Race", book 6, chapter 1 -

"Asgard, the city of the Aryans or Aryans, was the capital of the Sarmatians-Roxalans (note that, according to L. Gumilev, the very word "Russian", "Russia" came from the name "Roxalans"). Probably, it was a large city, full of palaces and residences of the first conquerors of India and Bactria. Its name, however, was not first uttered in the world. Apart from other instances, there was a Midian city not far from the southern shore of the Caspian Sea called Asa-garta for a long time.

Ptolemy called the inhabitants of this country "Sagarths". A Persian inscription cited by Niebuhr also mentions them. Herodotus reports eight thousand Sagarths in Darius' army".

There is also the view that the "sagards" referred to are "Sarmatians", i.e. the Aryan nomadic tribes that inhabited the Eurasian steppes.

In fact, all these names clearly refer to the same symbolic complex associated with a polar northern land or city or people. The Nile Delta is the far north for Egypt, the location of the "Sagarths" is the far north for the Indo-Iranian and Tibetan peoples, the Asgard of the Scandinavians is the far north for the Germans. Now if we accept this symbolical identification of Aggartha with Hyperborea, it is easy to see that in the sacred geography of the Eurasian continent as a whole (or at least in its most massive eastern part from the Caucasus and Mesopotamia to the Pacific Ocean) the symbolic function of Aggartha is performed by Russia.

René Guénon associates with the complex of Aggartha the figure of "the presbyter John", whom he considers a symbolic image of the "King of Peace", Melchizedek. Interestingly, the aforementioned Count Gobineau says that in the East, where he served on a diplomatic mission, people often speak of the "mission of St John", although it is not at all clear which country it

is referring to. And finally, the same theme of "Presbyter John's kingdom" interests the Russian Eurasianist and great historian Lev Gumilev, who undertakes an entire study of this myth ("In search of an imaginary kingdom") and concludes that it is about the Eurasian Nestorians, Tochars and Uigurs, who in ancient times inhabited Xinjiang and western Tibet (country of Tan).

Be that as it may, the theme of "Aggarta-Polar Mountain-Presbyter John the World-White King" is steadily associated with the Eurasian lands lying north of the mountain range of our continent. And these lands gradually merged into the borders of historical Russia, which united, rallied and organized them into a single political-state imperial ensemble.

By chance?

It's clearly not a coincidence. There are no such coincidences in history. And as soon as we get away from the obsolete and unexplaining positivist clichés, the whole picture of the global role and sacred significance of Russia, its lands and its historical mission is revealed in its entirety.

2.5 Russia's middle mission

What preliminary conclusions can be drawn from our cursory analysis of Russia's sacred geography and its place in the general complex of Eurasian mythological models?

Firstly, the "polar" complex of the Russian lands can explain some psychological features of our nation, which to a certain extent shape our self-consciousness. One often hears a fair comment that the demonic and angelic elements are adjacent in the Russian man without any mediating element. But just as ominous and spiritualized at the same time look in Tradition "guardians of the threshold", guarding the access to the sacred pole, the Axis of the World.

Secondly, Russia traditionally performs a geopolitical mission of hyperborean, unifying nature. And like the West's Eurocentrism, Russians need

to consistently and systematically insist on geopolitical "Muscovocentrism" of Eurasia, i.e. relentlessly move towards the implementation of the "PanAsian" or "Eurasian" project, the strategic integration of the eastern part of the continent, which exactly corresponds to the logic of Russia's territorial development and its mission in the sacred geography.

In doing so, Russia will finally get what it has been striving for for centuries - strategic access to the "warm seas".

Thirdly, the specificity of Russia's symbolic position makes us rethink the meaning of Russian Orthodoxy as a unique "polar" Tradition that has kept intact the foundations of initial Christianity, which at its first stage was fully "polar" but later lost this quality in part (it is no accident that the Church spread almost exclusively from South to North, as if attracted by the invisible magnet of the Arctic).

Fourthly, Russia can (and must) choose its own way of geopolitical and cultural development, rejecting both the orientation towards the West, which contradicts its "polar" function, and the dead-end isolationism. Russia must definitively assert its central, middle place in the continental structure, and this requires an active spiritual dialogue and strategic alliance with the East and South, with Asia, with its ancient religions and dizzying mysteries. A Eurasian openness and willingness to communicate flexibly and actively with the world in which the most ancient sacred archetypes are intact, with India, Japan, Iran, Tibet, Mongolia, and China. But at the same time, the observance and assertion of our own unique Orthodox Tradition, enriched and enlightened by a burning love for the Russian land, Russian history, Russian Tradition, Russian spirit, Russian chosenness.

Part VII

GEOPOLITICAL

PRIORITIES

CONNECTED

RUSSIA

Chapter 1

Eurasia comes first

1.1 Geopolitics with a capital letter

Geopolitical analysis can unfold at three fundamental levels.

Geopolitics” proper should be called only that discipline which examines the historical, strategic, geographical and planetary reality from the point of view of the confrontation of two types of civilizations - the civilization of the Land and the civilization of the Sea. This approach is fundamental, and all other - more particular - forms of applying geopolitical methodology to the consideration of specific problems derive from it.

The historical duel between Land and Sea in our age is finally taking on the character of a confrontation between Atlanticism and Eurasianism. This is the level of not just the “Big Game”, but the Very Big Game. Ultimately, geopolitics is the science of the confrontation of civilisations, and it is to it that it reduces all other trends studied and dissected in specific studies.

The Fundamentals of Geopolitics section is primarily devoted to presenting precisely this initial and most general basis of geopolitical science.

1.2 Average level

The second level represents a kind of a step down to a more concrete plan. Here we move away from the global approach of the confrontation of civilisations and deal with the concept of “superpowers” or “great powers”. Unlike the civilizational approach, which emphasizes the combination of spiritual orientation and geographic territory, the middle level of geopolitics operates with the reality of states or blocs of states in their concrete political configuration. Here, the civilizational impulse is clothed in the form of actually existing countries with their respective political, administrative, economic, strategic, military organisms.

While on the first level it is most appropriate to speak of the Eurasian pole and the Atlanticist pole, here specific states act on behalf of these poles. In our time, the most complete embodiments of these civilisation poles are, respectively, the USA and Russia.

What Emrick Choprad understands as “The Great Game” (see Part 9) is on this level. And in his article he quite rightly proposes to interpret the code of major international events - primarily conflicts - as a manifestation of the traditional struggle of the Anglo-Saxon world (the US) with Russia.

1.3 Regional geopolitics

An even lower level of geopolitical processes begins where we are not dealing with a direct confrontation between US and Russian forces, but with competition between the private interests of individual regional powers. Of course, behind this friction, too, are the “great powers”, who use regional problems for their own planetary agendas. But at the same time, regional states are very often based on principles very similar to those that govern planetary geopolitical processes in their relations. Until the time when only great powers or continental strategic blocs had real sovereignty, regional geopolitics was a full-fledged geopolitics, but gradually it became dependent on a more general context and lost its independence.

However, for the convenience of research, geopolitical methodologies can in some cases also be applied to the level of regional conflicts and tensions, keeping in mind, however, the wider context of the Great Game and the Very Great Game.

1.4 Apparent contradictions

Let us now apply the division of the geopolitical discipline into different levels to the problem of the Moscow-Berlin and Moscow-Beijing axis.

From the point of view of the “Very Big Game” (civilisation approach), the decisive factor for the planetary domination of one or another civilisation model will be the control of the Eurasian coastal zone. The most significant

sectors of this coastal zone are Europe in the West, the Middle East in the South, and Iran, India, China, Japan (more broadly, the Pacific area) to the East.

The Atlantists (formerly England, now the United States) seek to tear the coastal zone away from the inland spaces where the “geographical axis of history”, the Eurasian pole (the original Russian lands) is located. Eurasians seek to break this suffocating siege and make the powers of the “coastal zone” their strategic partners, i.e. to include them in the continental block. Eurasia would then gain access to the “warm seas” and be able to confront Atlanticism on a planetary scale on an equal footing. Moreover, such a continental unification knowingly puts Eurasia in privileged conditions and the collapse of the Atlanticist civilization becomes inevitable.

So, the Very Big Game consists in the organisation of the Berlin (the capital of Europe)-Moscow (the capital of Eurasia)-Tokyo (the capital of the Pacific area) axis with the southern axis of Moscow-Tehran. A sub-axis is the Moscow-Delhi axis. In theory, the Moscow-Ankara, Moscow-Beijing and Moscow-Paris axes could also be included here if there were no entrenched historical contradictions between Ankara and Tehran, Beijing and Tokyo, Berlin and Paris at the third (regional) level.

The creation of a Moscow-Berlin-Tokyo-Tehran axis is the long-term geopolitical imperative of the entire Eurasian strategy, and this imperative does not depend on the specific state of the states concerned. This configuration of continental alliance is the most stable and perfect on principle, and if it succeeds, it will mean a radical and irrevocable victory of the Land over the Sea, the establishment of the Eurasian Order over the world. Such a Eurasian formula does not depend on specific circumstances - Moscow, Berlin, Tokyo, Tehran may at certain periods of time refuse to fulfil the Eurasian mission and seek momentarily beneficial but historically hopeless alliances in the opposite bloc. All this depends on the specifics of the historical circumstances, but it cannot cancel out the main geopolitical trends, which only become fully clear in the long term, emerge as a grandiose plan through the seemingly chaotic flurry of “realpolitik”.

Moscow's alliance with Berlin (wider Europe) and Tokyo (wider Pacific space) is not an arbitrary historical moment; it is a fate. It may elude us for as long as we like, but sooner or later it will come out in full force.

This is the fundamental conclusion of geopolitics in its most orthodox, classical expression, and one can only deny this conclusion with the whole of that science.

1.5 The Great Game at a medium level

When we move to the second - middle - level, instead of a potential plan for a geopolitical map, we are confronted with the realities of specific political-strategic machines in a strictly defined historical period. At present, because the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo pact was broken on the eve of World War II, the Atlantists have managed (at the hands of the Russians) to subjugate Europe and Japan, which found themselves in the position of American vassals after their defeat in 1945.

Therefore, in their present state, neither Japan nor Germany are able to pursue an independent geopolitical line, and have to submit to the will of Washington. In the Very Big Game, they could (and should) take a place in the Eurasian bloc, otherwise there will be no planetary victory for Eurasia. But at the moment they are playing along with the US in the Just Big Game, and cannot do otherwise.

The only country whose geopolitical line coincides in potential and actual sense is Iran, with which Moscow should seek rapprochement at all levels and with all issues.

Overall, Moscow should be guided by a double logic in implementing its specific policies in the Balkans (Serbia - Kosovo), Asia (Afghanistan, Asian CIS countries), the Middle East (Iraq) and the Far East (North Korea, Vietnam, Mongolia): it should separate the actual Germany and Japan from the virtual Germany and Japan. This assumes that Moscow, in its opposition to US geopolitical initiatives directed strictly anti-Russian, can develop a position of understanding regarding those who sooner or later should be-

come strategic partners, despite the fact that on the middle level in the Great Game they find themselves on the other side of the barricades. While Germany's position on Kosovo (as on Croatia and Bosnia in the past) may not be acceptable to Moscow, the Eurasian logic makes it necessary to shift the weight of the hostility exclusively onto the United States. At the lowest, regional level, these relations should be improved as much as possible.

The same should be said of the Moscow-Beijing axis. A certain convergence of geopolitical positions at the middle level between Russia and China has indeed been visible in recent years, but it is a temporary and short-lived alliance. China not only wants, but also can (like any coastal state) fit into the global market, into the Atlanticist geopolitical system. It only insists on certain preferential conditions, blackmailing its Western partners with the prospect of a closer alliance with Moscow and a return to socialism. Moscow, on the other hand, is doomed to remain the pole of Eurasianism by its very geography, and Atlantism in its case is doomed to remain a transient, short-term pause, indicating more internal turmoil than a rigorous solution, since such a solution means nothing less than direct and definitive geopolitical suicide. The Moscow-Beijing axis is fragile, conditional, and historically random. It is in some ways an improvised response to the so unnatural Washington-Tokyo axis, which, after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, can only be considered reliable and durable by short-sighted people.

Emrick Choprad, in his article "The Great Game", describes the reality of the geopolitical middle ground. This state of affairs certainly needs to be taken into account. It also needs to be respected. But one must learn to place the "geopolitical mean" in a more general theoretical context.

1.6 Victory pledge

The Eurasian school can often be accused of sinning with Germanophilia, Japanophilia, Turkophilia and so on. All of this does not correspond to reality. The Eurasian school is guided by the data of geopolitics as a science - with its apparatus, its methodology, its history, its classics, etc. - and on the basis of this data identifies the fate of Eurasia with the fate of

Russia. Everything that leads to the strengthening of Eurasia's civilizational sovereignty, and consequently to the freedom and power of our homeland, to the triumphant fulfilment of its historical mission, becomes positive in this case. Everything that contributes to this is good; everything that hinders it is evil. The Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo-Tehran axis is an objective guarantee of Eurasian victory. Consequently, this is the categorical imperative, not some abstract sympathy for the Germans, Iranians or Japanese. The same can be said of the Japanese, German or Iranian Eurasians - they strive in every possible way, realizing the geopolitical logic, for the closest alliance with Russia, although they may not feel any special sympathy for us as a people. This is not required.

The Great Continental War is unfolding at a level too deep and serious to match human-slash-human emotions or phobias.

Chapter 2

Economy: Zone 4

2.1 Economics is nothing more than language

Today, many are convinced that the economy is destiny, that it is a reality in itself, predetermining everything else and serving as a universal cipher for understanding the most important historical processes. Opponents of such a narrow approach tend, in turn, to downplay the importance of the economy, to ignore its regularities, to dismiss its imperatives. Both positions are unconstructive.

In fact, economics is nothing but language. And in that language, all sorts of ideas and messages can be expressed.

2.2 Defining the geo-economy

Among economic theories which express, in a specific manner, a range of underlying worldviews, there are those which consider economic regularities as something universal and universal (such as liberalism and Marxism). But there are other models that inextricably link economics with other fac-

tors - historical, cultural, ethnic, religious, social, etc. All these theories can be summarised as “third way economics” or “heterodox economics”, as only liberal and Marxist approaches have been considered “orthodox” until recently.

Among “heterodox” models, the most interesting are those that link economics with space, with geography, and ultimately with geopolitics as a universal discipline exploring the impact of space on the history of civilisations. Such theories have been called “geoeconomics”. They associate the economic model with the specificity of the historical space of each particular people and state.

Geoeconomics can be said to be a composite language that combines elements of traditional economic concepts with a purely geopolitical apparatus.

Geoeconomics is based on the following principle: the particular historical location where economic models are applied in practice affects the entire economic system, adjusting it to the unique civilizational environment. Thus, significant adjustments are made to any economic models, making each particular case of economic system existence unique and special. The special cases are then generalised and a coherent and organic typological system emerges.

Note that modern geo-economics goes back to such theorists as the German Friedrich List and the American J.M. Keynes. Each of them formulated in his own way the principle of peculiarity of economic zones. Liszt spoke about “autarchy of large spaces”, Keynes about “economic insularity” (i.e. construction of economic systems according to the “island principle” - “insula” in Latin means “island”).

2.3 The Three Zones and the Tripartite Commission

We omit (due to space limitations) the stages of development of geo-economic thought. At present, the geo-economic picture of the world presents three gigantic economic zones - American, European and Pacific. In accordance with this division, in the mid-1970s, the largest intellectual

foundations and financial transnational corporations of the capitalist world created the Trilateral Commission to regulate the complex relationship between these three worlds. The commission's leadership included representatives from the US, Europe and Japan respectively.

Each of the three geo-economic zones is largely autonomous and limited, autarkic and in competition with the other zones. But they are not homogeneous in a qualitative sense. The American zone is predominant among them. Not so much economically, but strategically and politically - only the USA possesses nuclear weapons and therefore acts as the political-power guarantor of the whole world capitalist system. The other two zones are in a semi-vassal position in relation to the USA and are obliged to subordinate the logic of development of their purely economic processes to the external strategic will of the USA.

This pattern is embodied in the structure of the Trilateral Commission, whose permanent chairman is an American - David Rockefeller (Chase Manhattan Bank), while the main intellectuals are also represented by the US - the famous Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski and the apparatus of their scientific foundations.

In this picture, it is clear that the capitalist world only outwardly appears to be a homogeneous market field, a continuous "open society". In fact, its structure is determined by a geopolitical, civilizational project: the USA, which turned out to be the main victors in World War II, strategically subdued in an economic sense the other two geo-economic zones - the European zone (formed mainly around Germany) and the Asian zone (organised around Japan). In doing so, both these zones had to pay a kind of "nuclear tax" to the USA, paying tribute to the American function of "protecting world capitalism".

2.4 A doomed homeland

After the fall of the socialist camp, the geo-economic picture of the world changed dramatically. In place of the socialist economies that had occupied

a position at the heart of Eurasia, a certain vacuum emerged. The whole three-zone system was designed to compete with the USSR and squeeze it from East and West. When the destructive objective was achieved, a shift in the equilibrium occurred in the overall system.

Western strategists and ideologues of the Trilateral Commission gradually came to the conclusion that the new market-oriented economies emerging in place of the USSR, acting as a single bloc, represented an enormous destabilising factor for the whole system, deprived the US of the rationale for its strategic primacy and justified the desire of the other two geo-economic zones for complete independence from Atlanticist curatorship.

It was decided to actively promote the economic disintegration of the CIS countries, the weakening of economic unity within the Russian Federation itself, and further the political fragmentation of the Eurasian states. This project is voiced in Brzezinski's famous article "Geostrategy for Eurasia". It is about the necessity of dismembering Russia and gradually incorporating its various parts and other CIS countries into the three existing zones, thereby expanding their spheres of influence.

In geo-economic language, this draft verdict on Russia and the CIS is called "fidelity to the concept of the three geo-economic zones". In purely economic language, synonymous with such a project is the formula "deepening liberal reforms".

Russia, the CIS and Eurasia simply have no place in the traditional capitalist world model. This is not the ill will of some mythical "secret organizations", this is a simple and clear logic of the geo-economic structure of our planet at the turn of the second millennium. And this is taught in the highest Western colleges, not behind the dense covers of Masonic ateliers.

2.5 The patriotic idea in economics

The patriotic project may well be formulated in geo-economic language, with the same clarity with which it is formulated in politics. Here the task is unambiguous: a fourth economic zone.

The future of Russia, the future of Eurasia as an independent and autonomous 'island', a 'continent', depends on whether we can now defend the processes of economic integration within the CIS and preserve the integrity of economic ties within Russia itself.

There can be no complete national isolation in our world. And the broader the Eurasian economic zone, the more beneficial it will be in the far and medium term, despite the temporary costs that may arise from the inclusion of some poorer CIS countries in a single customs union. Obviously, patriotic motives in Russian politics immediately run into active opposition from the West. This affects not only the demonisation by the Western media of the patriotic opposition, but also the image of a modern and wavering, generally pro-Western Russian establishment itself, which is also gradually presented in an increasingly negative light in the West.

In such a situation - while we cannot take a direct political and ideological confrontation with the West - the most important area of action is the economy, especially in a geo-economic vein. If the strategists of the Trilateral Commission can still explain to the Western public why they are reacting harshly to changes in Russian policy in the national spirit, it will be much more difficult for them to reasonably justify harsh resistance to purely economic integration processes in Eurasia.

By demanding the immediate creation of a fourth geo-economic zone, by promoting it in every possible way regardless of the political framing of the process - which will only be more effective if purely "economic", even "market" arguments are used for pragmatic purposes - we are actually entering into a national liberation struggle, into an anti-colonial revolution.

Since economics is only a language, a patriotic idea can also be accurately formulated in that language.

2.6 The nuclear factor

If Russia manages to assemble a fourth geo-economic zone - developing the line of "Treaty 5" on a customs union (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyr-

gyzstan, Tajikistan) - the whole picture of the world will change. Keeping our nuclear potential will put the European and Pacific geo-economic zones before a new choice. And since purely ideological motives will be absent in this case, it is not at all obvious that the choice will be made in favor of the United States, which, in relation to the two structure-forming powers of these geo-economic zones (Germany for Europe and Japan for the Pacific area), acts as “winners” and “occupiers”, which once carried out political castration of these powerful powers, forced to invest their historical potential only in the economy from now on. Geo-economically integrated Eurasia can become a source of enormous world transformation and initiate the process of geopolitical liberation of other zones from American curatorship.

What the US fears most is Russia’s proliferation of nuclear weapons. Especially against those states that refuse to blindly submit to the American geopolitical and geo-economic diktat. Consequently, this is exactly what we need to do.

Those who condemn us to death are most afraid that we will stay alive. This is natural. But if we still want to live, let’s take a closer look - what exactly is the ruthless executioner so afraid of?

Chapter 3

Isolation?

3.1 Liberal agony takes us away from the main point

As we speak, a new political configuration is taking shape in the country, the outline of which escapes our attention because of the tense, hysterical battle between agonising liberals, who are rapidly losing power, influence and financial potential, and the measured and unhurried camp of “enlightened patriotism”. The oligarchs and media criminals are frantic, desperate to stay afloat or give a decisive rematch. But despite the repulsive accompaniment of the farewell fit of the “clearly yesterday’s”, irreversible changes are taking place in Russia’s objective state, in its economic infrastructure, in its geopolitical status - changes far more serious in their significance than

the agonising farewell to the “young reformers”.

The real problem facing Russia today has a name. Isolation. Whereas “isolation”, “autarky” and “national self-sufficiency” used to be the political slogans of the radical opposition, opposing the mondialist tendencies of the “reformers” who sought to open Russia completely to the West, today it is not a wishful thinking, but a factual state of affairs. And from now on, any coherent political course of parties and movements, pressure groups or sectoral lobbies must give their own answer as to how to deal with Russia’s isolation, how to construct an economic and political reality in a situation where the main trends of the world economy are being bracketed?

What the liberals have been scaring the less-than-clear-minded public with in recent years has now come to pass, not through the revolutionary coming to power of the national-patriotic opposition, but through a series of actions by liberal politicians themselves.

It is a good time to reflect on the meaning of isolation as it applies to Russia at the turn of the millennium.

3.2 The economic genius of Friedrich List

The term ‘isolation’ is steadily accompanied by a kind of negative conceptual background. Liberals have got it into our heads that “openness” is good and “isolation” is bad. Market economic regimes based on openness and free trade are usually cited as a positive example, contrasted with “totalitarian states” where poverty, if not poverty, is rampant and living standards underestimated. Hence the hasty identification: “openness, mondialisation - prosperity, isolation - poverty”. But it is far from obvious.

The German economist of the last century, Friedrich List, who had an enormous influence on economists and politicians of all kinds (from Keynes to Rathenau, Witte and Lenin), broke the liberal thesis (“openness is good, isolationism is evil”) with a series of arguments so irrefutable that they retain their full significance today. Thus, using the example of England, Liszt showed that the liberal openness of the economic systems of two societies

invariably leads to the fact that only one of the parties - the one with a more developed and entrenched, well-established and long-standing market infrastructure - can take full advantage of it. In other words, Friedrich List revealed the most important point of liberal ideology - it biasedly serves the interests of those countries or strategic blocs that were first on this path. Thus, the apparent disinterest and outwardly proclaimed “universalism” of the liberal-market doctrine are only a cover for rather selfish interests of quite specific countries. And those states which, for whatever reason, developed their economic structure following other paths are doomed in the event of liberalisation to lose their sovereignty and find themselves in a dependent, subordinate position relative to their more “market-advanced” neighbours. On the other hand, Liszt was well aware that a dynamic economy in modern conditions could not take place within a single state with a total blockade of external economic contacts and that the economic challenge of modernity could not be met simply by the abandonment of dialogue. In other words, isolationism is not a solution either; it will inevitably lead, sooner or later, to stagnation and - later - to outright colonisation by dynamic liberal competitors. What is to be done?

Having analysed many parameters of economic and geopolitical models, Friedrich List concluded that the only salvation for a state competing with its liberal neighbours, but which took this economic path at a later historical time, is “autarchy of large spaces”.

The point of the Lisztian theory of “autarky of large spaces” can be summarised as follows. Openness to the economic structure is an essential component of the socio-economic dynamics of society, but at the same time, openness to more market-oriented states inevitably leads to colonisation and loss of sovereignty. Consequently, it is necessary to resort to a selective openness, which exists in relation to states that are as or less developed in the market sense than the state in question, but which becomes an “iron curtain” in the case of more developed states. But in the latter case, too, the relations are not reduced to a complete customs blockade, but to economic cooperation, which is qualified as harmless or even useful by the state

authorities, who monitor the geopolitical interests of the state. Exchanges that contribute to the economic growth of the power are also welcomed in the case of more developed countries; anything that may hinder that growth is outlawed.

But such selective openness will only be effective if the developing countries manage to create a fairly large economic continent united by a single customs border. In other words, the only possible “autarky” can only exist effectively in the “big spaces”. A single nation-state is incapable of autarky for objective reasons.

Friedrich List formulated his theory in the midst of concrete historical events. Before his eyes was a developed liberal England imposing - to its advantage - the rules of the game on a feudal, continental Germany, seemingly hopelessly backward. But List ingeniously foresaw the milestones of the path that changed the whole picture. The German rulers were smart enough to listen to the scientist’s opinion. The solution was a “customs union”, the Zollverein, which brought together the economies of Germany, Austria and Prussia in a single economic bloc. Ethnic and historical proximity served as a favourable factor in this case. “Selective openness” did not just give Germany a new dynamic impetus, but became a kind of economic tradition for the whole of Europe. And it was thanks to the implementation of “autarky of large spaces” - albeit in a new form - that continental Europe (and especially Germany) was able to recover swiftly from the catastrophe of the Second World War. Even though the Anglo-Saxons (primarily the US) managed to impose the market order in the form of the official economic doctrine of the West. However, it was the tacit and cautious use of the Leafian paternalistic model, and not at all the occupation and colonisationist Marshall Plan, that was responsible for the “German miracle”.

3.3 A direct historical parallel

Let us return to our country. The general logic of the reforms is remarkably similar to the situation faced by Friedrich List. Radical liberal reforms in a non-market country (USSR) lead not to economic development

but to its complete destruction, loss of sovereignty and transformation of a great country into a colony and a resource-extracting appendage of the West. The young reformers persistently and aggressively silenced Keynes, branding anyone who differs even a little from the Chicago liberal orthodoxy as “red-brown” and “revanchist”. The result is a total collapse of reforms, destabilising social and political reality in Russia. A gigantic state is collapsing along the way. Industry is paralysed. Financial, abstracted from economic concreteness, mondialist games lead quite naturally to the August “default” at the state level. Even the most partisan and biased politicians are realising that Russia has failed to fit seamlessly into the “world market”. Ruble inflation in relation to the world’s reserve currency (which is de facto the dollar) can no longer be contained by any - even the most sophisticated - financial adventure. The real sector of the Russian economy has come into objective contradiction with global market models. The continuation of the movement towards the market requires the final rejection of the last elements of sovereignty, of the country’s territorial unity, of minimum guarantees of social stability and national security. Abandoning reforms leads inevitably to isolationism, isolationism within a single nation state in an extremely difficult economic situation. Both paths appear to be fatal.

But Germany was in a similar position at the end of the last century, only the role of today’s US was then played by Great Britain. And the way out was found in the “autarchy of large spaces”.

This exit is also the only saviour for Russia today.

3.4 The way of salvation

The implementation of the project of “autarky of large spaces” for contemporary Russia in its most general form boils down to the following main steps:

- The creation, strengthening and expansion of a “Eurasian customs union” and the creation of a “fourth geo-economic zone” (in addition to Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, it could also include

some of the continental non-CIS countries - Serbia, Greece, Iran, India, Iraq, Syria, Libya, etc.);

- establishment of a “selective openness” regime in economic relations with the West, strict geopolitical (rather than lobbying and corruption as is the case today) control over customs, monopolisation of certain strategic areas of industry;
- A differentiated approach to economic ties with developed countries (priority should be given to Europe, China and the Pacific instead of the US and those international institutions that unconditionally obey the US will);
- reorientation towards an international currency other than the dollar, e.g. the European ecu, followed by the prospect of creating its own “Eurasian currency” - the “Eurasian rouble” or even the “Eurasian dollar”;
- the introduction within the country of norms of special “political correctness” of the Eurasian type, automatically excluding from public, socio-political and media life those political and economic forces which deny the “Eurasian project” and the broad consensus formed on its basis and insist (in theory or practice) on choosing a different historical path (which will inevitably lead to disaster, both in the case of further liberal-Mondialist reforms and in the case of narrow national isolationism)
- the transition to a mobilisation regime in the economy;
- A widespread campaign to awaken the creative energies of the masses, who are currently in a state of depression and apathy.

We are at a critical juncture. What is dead should not roar off the screens, but be buried as quickly as possible. The vast expanse of great creation lies before us. If we miss our chance, if we give in to triviality and the momentary, we will have committed an unpardonable historical crime. Today there is a unique opportunity to take a sharp turn from the road, avoiding both the old and the new abyss. - Neither openness nor isolationism. A Third Way. The Eurasian Way

Chapter 4

Ukraine or the Empire?

4.1 Ratification of the “grand treaty” by Moscow

On 25 December 1998, the Russian State Duma adopted a decision “On ratification of the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine”.

It is an important legal document of enormous significance for Russia’s geopolitical future and has generated much public debate.

In order to understand its content, an excursion into the geopolitical picture of the world is necessary.

The main opposing forces are the Atlanticist and Eurasian blocs. At the heart of Atlanticism is the United States, at the heart of Eurasianism is Russia, the “middle ground”.

Between them, a positional war is brewing for the fate of the world.

Russia’s main long-term programme is continental integration, the creation of a continental Eurasian space from Tokyo to the Azores. Moscow’s task is to extend its strategic influence to the East, West and South. The Atlanticists’ (NATO) task, on the other hand, is to enclose Russia-Eurasia in an anaconda ring.

Moscow, along with perestroika, abandoned its mission and surrendered to the enemy unilaterally. This was a real geopolitical crime. There is no intelligible explanation or justification for it. There is no doubt that the liquidators will be condemned by Russian history in the very near future.

Having abandoned its Eurasian mission, Russia has taken the path of creating a regional power. Contrary to the majority sentiment expressed in the March 1991 referendum, an anti-people coalition of liberals took the path of eliminating the Eurasian formation of the imperial type - however it may

be called “USSR” or “Russian Empire”.

The fault of the Atlanticist lobby has led to the emergence of new independent states in Moscow. This included Ukraine. Russia itself has abandoned its imperial-Eurasian continental mission and started to “strengthen its regional significance”. “In fact, the separatist processes have been transferred to the Russian Federation as well.

It was a pivotal and most terrifying moment of abandonment of its geopolitical mission, the monstrous fruits of which we are reaping today.

In the CIS all the states had two choices from now on - either to return to the Eurasian project or to join NATO. In each state, there are both Eurasian (pro-Moscow) tendencies and anti-Moscow, self-styled and in fact pro-American tendencies. The very fact that the geopolitical map of the world is divided into two camps makes the rejection of Moscow an automatic step towards Atlanticism.

The mere existence of a “sovereign Ukraine” is already a step towards Atlantism. But it is not the Ukrainian people who are responsible for this, but subversive elements and foreign groups with no interest in a common Eurasian destiny, as well as geopolitical agents of Western influence who have moved into strategic positions both in Ukraine and in Russia itself.

As soon as Ukraine fell out of the Eurasian space the problems started. The problem of Crimea, the problem of the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine, the problem of customs duties and energy payments, the problem of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Church, etc.

Having become two different states, Russia and Ukraine have become on different sides of the geopolitical barricades. But their functions are different. Russia by definition, even in its reduced form, continues to be the centre of Eurasia, while Ukraine begins to act as a “cordon sanitaire”, becoming a NATO outpost - hence the joint exercises with NATO and the constant threats to enter into a strategic alliance with the West over Russia’s head.

The situation is complicated by the fact that Moscow is still not fully aware and recognises its geopolitical mission. There is no unanimity on the Eurasian course of Russian geopolitics either in society or in the highest echelons of power.

And in such a situation, when Moscow's geopolitics have not yet been defined, the question of ratification of the treaty between Russia and Ukraine arises.

This treaty is ambiguous. On the one hand - and this is positive - it mentions an allied, strategic relationship, but on the other hand it legally records the fact that Russia renounces territorial claims against Ukraine.

If the strategic partnership between Russia and Ukraine does not lead to broader integration processes, if Ukraine does not become part of the Eurasian continental construct but remains a regional state, then this treaty will prove to be an act by which Moscow surrenders its "cordon sanitaire" position to a power which, for objective reasons, is forced (if it becomes an independent state) to become a springboard for NATO, i.e. its main geopolitical foe, sooner or later.

4.2 Kyiv-Moscow: the formula for Russian statehood

Now let us turn to the historical and geopolitical picture, which made possible the very raising of the question of union, unity or conversely the absence of union and unity of the two fraternal Slavic peoples - the Russian and Ukrainian.

The relationship between Kiev and Moscow provides a geopolitical formula for Russian statehood.

When Russia was a mono-national (not to be confused with mono-ethnic) state, Kiev was the capital. It was a typical construction of an East Slavic state within the sphere of spiritual influence of Byzantium. Of course, even then the best Russian people - for example, Metropolitan Hilarion, the first Slavic to occupy the Kiev chair - were already prophesying about the coming

greatness of Russia, that the latter would be the first. Russians were baptised later than other peoples - the last, but they were destined to become the first in the history of Christianity (when Constantinople fell, the mission of saving the world was passed on to our Russian people, to the Kingdom of Moscow, to the Russian Orthodox Church).

Then came the yoke, fragmentation, and from the Tatars, Russia received a new impulse for empire-building.

The Moscow Empire became a radically different geopolitical entity. It was no longer a nation state, but a Eurasian empire with the Orthodox ideology of Byzantism and Horde economic, military and strategic centralism.

The shift of the centre of gravity from Kiev to Moscow was the most important stage. It was a transition from Russia as a nation state to Russia-Imperia, Russia-Eurasia.

Kiev's geopolitical role has changed significantly. Little Russia, the cradle of Russian statehood, became Okra, Ukraine. Moreover, due to a number of circumstances, some of the Little Russia lands, especially the western ones, have fallen under the steady geopolitical influence of Central Europe. In other words, from a certain point onwards, Kiev became a conductor of Westernizing tendencies. Orthodox authors detected it in the XVII century. In "The Book of Faith" Zachariah Kopystensky already foresees how through Ukraine comes to Russia great misfortune - apostasy from the true Orthodox Faith, the Uniate and Catholic heresies.

During the Moscow period, Kiev gradually began to play an anti-Eurasian role in Russian history. From here came the "anti-Moskal tendencies", the beginnings of a "Little Russian ideology", whose religious ferment was uniatism and whose cultural ferment was "Europeanism", combined with a particular anti-Eurasian, anti-velikorussian version of Slavic Small Nationalism.

The unfortunate reforms of Nikon were largely provoked by this Malorussian line, and the theological and cultural uniqueness of the Russian Church and

the Russian rite, the Moscow Idea itself, was sacrificed to the pragmatic task of expanding the borders. The most radical defenders of this Moscow Idea were the Old Believers, following Protopop Avvakum.

The transfer of the capital from Moscow to St Petersburg was a different version of Westernism. It was a rejection of the consistent and conscious Eurasianism inherent in Moscow as the Idea, Moscow as the Eurasian pole.

Kiev is the symbol of a nation state, a regional power, while Moscow is the symbol of an Empire, a Eurasian integration ensemble.

Kiev is the past, Moscow the present and the future.

It is important that the Great Russians themselves were formed as a Eurasian integrating ethnic group, not just as the easternmost branch of the Slavs, but as a unique cultural, religious, ethno-state formation, which absorbed at the ethnic level not only the Slavic element itself, but also the Tatar and Finno-Ugric element. The Great Russian (Moscow) idea is not simply the idea of a single nationality, like, for example, the Ukrainian idea. The Great Russian idea and mission of the Great Russians - i.e. genuine Russians - is to establish a colossal planetary ideal, the great Truth, realised as the Eurasian Empire of the Sun, the Empire of Justice.

The Kiev idea is more limited, more European, less universal, less global. In Moscow's messianic ideal, consistent Ukrainians, Ukrainians not ethnically but ideologically, see only imperial ambitions and colonialism.

On the contrary, they see their Malorussian ideal in a rather averaged form. As a "petty-bourgeois" ideal of "well-being", "prosperity", "frugality", etc.

The idea of the Great Russians, i.e. us, is the Great Idea. The idea of the Little Russians is a small one.

4.3 Velikoross, Maloross - the choice of cultural type

The Russian Eurasians - the most interesting movement in Russian philosophical thought in the twentieth century - were staunch supporters of

Russia's geopolitical priorities

The Great Idea, Muscovocentrism. But ethnically almost all of them were Little Russians - Savitsky, Trubetskoy, Suvchinsky. And when the Samoists attacked their integrationist projects, they spoke of their Little Russian ancestry, which did not prevent them from siding with the Great Russian Eurasian truth.

It is difficult to find pure blood in us Russians - Little Russians, Great Russians, Tatars, Ugrians and other Eurasian ethnicities are mixed up in a truly Russian person. This is not our disease, it is the pledge of our uniqueness, our universalism, our greatness. Dostoyevsky called the Russian man "the All-Human". This only applies to a Velikoross - a Velikoross in spirit. That is why the choice between Moscow and Kiev is not an ethnic choice, but a choice of the Idea, a choice of a geopolitical homeland, a spiritual and religious choice rather than a racial one.

Proponents of an exclusively Russian regional state, who reject the Eurasian project and emphasise narrow ethnic Great Russian nationalism, behave like "Ukrainians". Their national Russia will always be small, "Little Russia". And just as small and modest will sooner or later be their national ideal.

4.4 The Eurasian imperative - unity at all costs

The separation of the two states - Russia and Ukraine - is beneficial only to the Atlantists, the enemies of Slavicism, the enemies of our Ideal. We are being pushed against each other by Atlantist strategists, opponents of Greater Eurasia. The sovietists, no matter how they argue their positions - and sovietists on both sides, the Russian "Little Russians" and the "Little Russians" of Ukraine - objectively play into the hands of overseas enemies, the antichrist of the "new world order".

A strict priority should be established in relations between Moscow and Kiev. Only a common Eurasian continental state, only a unifying universal Moscow idea.

And in Ukraine itself there are many potential or actual supporters of such a project. This includes the 11 million pure Velikorossians, the majority of Orthodox Ukrainians, the objective Soviet Eurasians, who are all people with socialist sympathies. Even the most radical Samosti and Ukrainian nationalists, who have the awareness that the Atlanticist West brings death to all national cultures, all traditional values, even they for the sake of the high ideal of Tradition and understanding the objective laws of geopolitics should become supporters of Eurasian unification, the New Empire, the Empire of Light and Truth, against the colonial "new world order", bringing degeneration, impoverishment, destruction and false light of capital to all the peoples and nations of the earth.

We can only defeat the Atlantean evil if we are united.

Chapter 5

The Caucasus Challenge

5.1 Global context

The Caucasus is a traditional area of confrontation between Russian and Western European geopolitical interests. The wars for control of the Caucasus and Transcaucasus have been fought over the last three hundred years between the Eurasian pole (Moscow) and the Atlanticist pole (Western Europe, especially England). The essence of positional geopolitical warfare was as follows: Russia sought to reach the warm seas, to the South, to India and the Indian Ocean, England sought to oppose this in every way possible. The Caucasian wars, the Crimean War, all the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Iranian wars had this very geopolitical sense. The other side of Russia was always England.

The same pattern of clashing Russian-English interests in the Caucasus was also present at the beginning of the 20th century and in the post-revolutionary years.

Tsarist and later Soviet Russia, realising the central importance of this re-

gion, managed to resolve the geopolitical situation in its favour and achieved victory at the medium-strategic level: consolidating control over the eastern coast of the Black Sea and over most of the Caspian Sea. Although the maximum objective - access to the Ocean - was not achieved. The last strategic operation in this direction, the invasion of Afghanistan, ended in disaster.

In the twentieth century, the factor of oil as the driving force of industrial civilisation became of particular importance. And in this perspective, the traditionally key importance of the Caucasus region became even more central at the expense of the Caspian. In terms of its reserves, the Caspian region is second only to Saudi Arabia.

Since the middle of the 20th century, the centuries-old dualism between Russia and the West (especially England), referred to in geopolitical science as "Eurasianism-Atlantism" dualism, was embodied in the confrontation between the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA. The problem of the Caucasus region and its adjoining territories proved to be a particular case of global confrontation.

This confrontation did not disappear after the collapse of the USSR, but on the contrary, its geopolitical (and not just ideological or political-economic) content became apparent.

All the perestroika and post-perestroika conflicts in the region were the expression of a clash of two global geopolitical forces that were directly or indirectly behind the smaller actors of social, religious, ideological and ethnic strife.

Any consideration of the Caucasus region in the geopolitical frame of reference implies the ultimate reduction of the whole complex picture of the real balance of power to a global geopolitical dualism, to the clash of always and in everything opposite geopolitical interests of Russia and the USA (more broadly, the North Atlantic Union countries).

5.2 Atlantists versus Eurasians in the positional battle for the Caucasus

Based on the geopolitical dualism, it is easy to formulate the ultimate geopolitical goal of both Eurasians and Atlantists in the Caucasus region. The task of Eurasia is to strengthen the centripetal tendencies, to keep this entire space under Moscow's strategic control, to create a stable structure that continues the geopolitical traditions of Tsarist and Soviet Russia, which has always found ways to maintain and strengthen its influence and strategic presence through a flexible control system and multifactorial methodology.

The Atlantists are interested in the exact opposite. The direct geopolitical interests of the US are to take the entire zone out of Moscow's influence, to disrupt the established geopolitical system, to reshape the Caucasian territory so that the West can gain maximum strategic benefit from it.

There are two stages in the American plan: destructive and creative. The first involves destabilising the Caucasus, destroying the balance of power and the drive belts of Moscow's strategic control. This involves the use of a wide variety of factors, some of which are used purely pragmatically and have nothing to do with the forces that will be prioritised in the next stage. This second phase will consist of a stabilisation of the situation, but in a qualitatively new environment in which key positions in the region will be concentrated in the hands of either directly pro-American or indirectly serving anti-American interests.

Moscow, accordingly, should be oriented towards a symmetric model: first of all, it is necessary to maintain a fragile, but delicate balance by counteracting the first phase of the Atlanticist plan. But since in the real situation the processes are going on in a destructive way, apart from a purely protective strategy, Moscow should adjust to the destructive processes that have already begun, not passively, but actively counteracting them, trying to destroy the enemy's operations, to mix up their cards, to introduce a destructive element into the systems and structures they are beginning to create. Moreover, the regions of the Caucasus already alienated from Moscow (the three CIS countries and Chechnya) should become an arena for active geopolitical activity aimed at blocking Atlanticist impulses there, undermining pro-American influence groups and organisations and destabil-

ising the sociopolitical situation, especially when positive links between local political and economic elites and the USA and its strategic partners begin to take shape.

The main threat to Russia's security is the lack of an unambiguous political formulation of the identification of the "geopolitical enemy", which alone can make the national security doctrine complete, consistent and effective. The political leadership of the Russian Federation must unambiguously and document (in one form or another) the obvious geopolitical fact that our main adversary is the USA, Atlantism and its strategic partners, and that all other countries, peoples and groups are viewed exclusively as something in-between, as a field of conflict of interests of two objective civilization and geopolitical poles - Eurasia and the World Island (USA, NATO).

Consequently, the whole Caucasus problem acquires a new dimension in the geopolitical dimension.

5.3 Chechnya

The centre of geopolitical activity in the contemporary Caucasus today is Chechnya. This entity is a symbol and indicator of the whole gamut of geopolitical and strategic transformations in the region, a dynamic centre of change.

The entire course of the contemporary Chechen conflict repeats the historical constants of Caucasian geopolitics. Small, archaic mountain peoples, under the direct patronage of Turkey, are waging a geopolitical campaign against Russia-Eurasia in the interests of Atlanticism (formerly England, today the United States). To make matters worse, there is a paradoxically strong Atlanticist (Russophobe) lobby in modern Russia itself, which openly took the side of Chechnya during the Russo-Chechen war. Having subsided today, it has not disappeared.

Chechnya has become the detonator of the destruction of the "Russian world" in the Caucasus region, repeating the path of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan in the latter stages of the USSR. But as these CIS countries have now

found themselves in the position of independent states, this is already the past. Chechnya, on the other hand, is an example of the coming destructive stages concerning the Russian Federation itself.

The main strategic objective of the Chechen war was to alienate parts of the Russian territories from the centre, creating a restless conflict zone with an amorphous statehood. In doing so, the Atlantists relied on all the forces objectively interested in separatism without much distinction.

In fact, the anti-Russian forces in Chechnya were and are divided into two components: the pro-American lobby, linked to official Ankara and the Saudi Arabian "Wahhabis", and the local nationalists, backed rather by Iran, Sufism and the Turkish fundamentalist opposition. Both forces are in solidarity in their anti-Russian orientation, and were therefore equally supported by the West in the first phase, but gradually - and especially in the future, when it comes to the West's benefit in normalising the situation in the region - the preference will increasingly go to the "Wahhabis". The "Atlanticist", pro-Turkish grouping in Chechnya is oriented towards the Saudis (logically, they should be supervised by a direct CIA resident). The opposite pole - the "autochthons" or "pro-Iranians" - will sooner or later act as a factor preventing the establishment of an "American order" in the region.

The intra-Caucasian lobbies linked to geopolitics extend as a model to other spaces in the Caucasus region, where quite similar forces exist. Only in some sectors the direct influence of Moscow still persists by inertia, while in others only two global factors remain. At the same time, it is possible to ascertain a permanent decrease in the importance of direct Muscovocentrism and an increase in the importance of separatist trends in general, one of which will be supported by Atlantists in the future and the other is doomed to be eradicated after the process of destabilisation and separation of these territories from Russia is over.

5.4 The three CIS Caucasus countries

Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia are an important component of the geopo-

litical picture of the Caucasus, and one can observe some objective regularities in the path that the other peoples of the Caucasus have yet to follow.

Christian. Armenia, which began with a pro-Atlantean policy of "independence from Moscow", reproducing the history of the beginning of the century, when Armenians preferred the "white" Atlanticist Entente to Bolshevik Moscow, quickly realized all the disadvantages of its geopolitical location surrounded by Islamic states with no access to the sea and no high-quality safe communications routes, and adopted an unambiguously pro-Moscow strategic position. At the same time, regional ties with Iran are actively developing, which stems from the overall anti-Atlantic Eurasian concept of the Moscow-Tehran axis.

Orthodox Georgia was more anti-Russian oriented than anything else, but here too the religious-geopolitical reflection is slowly awakening and the awareness of the need for an alliance with Eurasia is making itself felt.

Azerbaijan, which was the most "pro-Soviet" and "pro-Moscow" republic at a time when anti-Moscow passions were simmering in Armenia and Georgia, is the most difficult to deal with; it is now predominantly oriented towards Turkey and directly towards the United States. Wahhabi influence is minimal here, as Azerbaijanis are Shiite, but Atlantism is supported through the political, ethnic and economic mediation of Ankara. Tensions with Iran are also contributed to by the problem of South Azerbaijan, which is on Iranian territory.

5.5 Three trends in Caucasian geopolitics

We can sort out the various political forces in the Caucasus region, including entire nations and peoples, on a geopolitical scale.

There is an inertially pro-Moscow lobby, supported by natives from the regions who have taken up major positions in federal structures and based on old Soviet leaders. In the Islamic milieu, this trend is steadily on the wane, albeit at different rates. But in Christian countries and enclaves, in addition to inertial residual Russophilism, new trends can also be observed,

based on an actual awareness of the complexity of geopolitical life in an alien religious environment. This is most clearly seen in Armenia and Ossetia and more vaguely in Georgia.

The second type is national separatism with its reliance on autochthonism and orientation towards a non-Western, "traditionalist" path of development. This is the most "passionate" part of the regional leaders, oriented against any kind of universalism - Russian or American. As a rule, they are fundamentalist Muslims of Sufi or Filo-Shia orientation, with clear sympathies for Iran and a certain antipathy towards "Arab Islam".

The third type is Caucasian separatism with an orientation towards the West, Saudi Arabia and official Turkey, where moralistic Sunni "Wahhabism" may well coexist with liberal-democratic, overtly Atlanticist themes.

5.6 The need for a new model

Russia's strategy in the Caucasus should take into account the overall geopolitical context. At the moment, one model of influence and control over the region is being actively broken down and there is an urgent need for another model. This new model, in addition to the traditional methodology of encouraging pro-Russian sentiments among regional elites and playing on internal contradictions, should take into account a completely new situation that did not exist before (it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of separatism, of which one is absolutely unacceptable and negative in both the short and long term, while the other, on the contrary, can be used in the long term in a positive way for Moscow).

In other words, our current opponents - the separatist "traditionalists", the "fundamentalists" of pro-Iranian orientation - can be used in the future for Russia's geopolitical benefit.

5.7 Dagestan and Chechnya

Dagestan is the strategic space that will be the next stage in the separation of the Caucasus region from Moscow. The multi-ethnic composition

of Dagestan, the most complex system of ethnic balance in the republic's administrative structures, the extremely unbalanced combination between an underdeveloped industrial and economic complex (Dagestan has the second highest budget dependence on the centre among all the republics and regions of Russia) and a shadowy smuggling "caviar" business - all this made Dagestan a territory highly dependent on Moscow and therefore extremely loyal and conservative. Separatist tendencies were therefore least evident in Dagestan. But the same factors that have served up to a certain point as a guarantee of loyalty may under certain circumstances become factors of destabilisation. Once the critical barrier is breached, the fragile harmony risks turning into a bloody hell.

For modern Chechnya it is Dagestan that is the main strategic target in the implementation of the complete separatist plan for the removal of the Caucasus from Moscow's sphere of influence. All Chechen leaders - "Wahhabists" and "traditionalists" alike - agree on this. Shamil, with whom the heroic history of the struggle of the Caucasians against Moscow is linked, was an Avar (the most numerous ethnic group in Dagestan), and access to the Caspian opens up new strategic horizons for Grozny. Chechnya is therefore a constant vector of influence on Dagestan in one direction - that of its secession from Russia.

There are several ways in which the Chechen leadership is dealing with Dagestan.

1) The first is ethnic. Campaigning by Chechens-Akin from Aukh for secession and annexation to Chechnya. This line is held by a pro-Turkish group that has recently come into conflict with the official Grozny. However, it is obvious that such position is short-sighted as it pits other Dagestani ethnic groups (Avars, Dargins, Kumyks, Laks, Lezgins, etc.) against Chechnya. In this sense we should expect the "Wahhabi lobby" to try to draw Dagestan and its political forces into a more integrated project whose contours are not yet clear, but we should suppose that at the centre of it will be the idea of "united Sunnism" and "purity of Islam" (à la "Taliban"). Parallel to this is the likely influence of Turkey, especially on the Turks (Kumyk), in the same

direction.

2) The second is "fundamentalist". This approach is developed by a pro-Iranian group, appealing to a more general geopolitical project of creating a "Pan-Caucasian Islamic state", anti-Russian and anti-Western at the same time, oriented towards Iran and representing an independent geopolitical entity. Here we are talking about building a complex political system of interaction with Dagestani political forces, especially the Avar "Imam Shamil People's Front" with the aim of uniting "traditional" Sufi, Caucasian Islam as a consolidating element of the new geopolitical construction.

5.8 Oil

The geopolitical importance of the Caspian oil and therefore the pipeline is crucial. The US strategic plans are to create a geopolitical zone linking the Caspian and the Turkish Black Sea coasts, an area that would be beyond the control of either Russia or Iran. This would involve the creation of a "Caucasus state" or several states, either under Turkish or direct American influence.

This means further dragging Azerbaijan into Turkey's zone of influence along ethnic (racial) lines. Georgia should enter the project through its political elite and the pro-Western Shevardnadze clan. The rest of the Caucasian nations are to enter through the spread of "Wahhabi" Islam, tied to Saudi Arabia.

The configuration of a pipeline or series of pipelines would then involve the withdrawal of the Caspian-Black Sea area from Russian influence. This is a major geopolitical challenge for the US, as the world's oil reserves are severely limited, and it is through control of oil and its transportation to developed countries that the US manages to maintain global hegemony.

The USSR did not pay much attention to Caspian oil, preferring to develop fields in northern Eurasia,' therefore in the present situation control over the Caspian and the Caspian-Black Sea area is a strategic objective of the global confrontation between Atlanticism and Eurasianism.

5.9 Moscow-Tehran axis

The overall structure of the geopolitical context of the entire Caucasus region dictates the limits of Moscow's strategy.

The main imperative of this strategy is the need to counter the plans of the US and its satellites in the region, i.e. to counter all projects and trends that could be described as "Atlanticist". This is what should be at the top of the agenda. Atlantism should not only be confronted head-on, but also through ostensible cooperation with it under the guise of joint "peacekeeping" efforts.

Based on this imperative, Moscow's position in the Caucasus should be consolidated. Especially those trends of pro-Moscow orientation that are emerging along new power lines, rather than the inertia that has persisted since the Soviet period, should be taken into account. In this sense, it is necessary to anticipate ahead and calculate the factors that may fulfil a centripetal function after the possible political disengagement of the regions from direct dependence on Moscow. The best example is Armenia, which is returning to a pro-Russian geopolitical orientation (which is, however, a historical constant of Armenian politics) after a certain period of "Russo-phobia" and separatism.

Structural networks should already be in place in anticipation of the transformation to come. If the creation of a "Caucasian state" becomes a reality, which cannot be ruled out, given the desire of the United States (and consequently Turkey) to achieve it at any cost (the oil factor is particularly important here), it makes sense for Moscow to orient in an appropriate way those leaders and representatives of political movements who, in turn, could later serve as subversive elements regarding the pro-American and pro-Turkish course of the new entity. We are talking about a "fundamentalist", "Sufi", "autochthonous" version of Caucasian Islamism (and nationalism) oriented towards Iran and against the United States (the West). For this purpose, it makes sense to use the Armenian diaspora, rooted in the political reality of the Caucasus and perfectly aware of the behavioural patterns and motivations of regional elites (the Armenian security services proved their

effectiveness in the Azerbaijani events that led to the ouster of Elchibey).

Furthermore, it makes sense to bet on those ethnic entities that find themselves in the role of "scapegoats" when the Vainakh (or Avar in Dagestan) influence on the region becomes more prevalent.

North Caucasus, as well as with the increasing importance of Azerbaijan. To this end, it makes sense to support the Lezgin movement and the idea of uniting the Lezgins of Dagestan and Azerbaijan in a single ethnic entity, as well as to skilfully control the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and the contradictions between Chechen-Akkins and Laks and Kumyks in Dagestan.

Since one of the main areas of confrontation is oil, Moscow should conclude a political and strategic pact with Iran whereby both countries would contribute on both sides to destabilising those Caucasian regions where Turkey, "Wahhabism" or the US directly have a strong influence, and on the opposite to stabilising those areas where Iranian and Russian positions are strong. It is these pipeline options - Russian and Iranian - that should be mutually supported, with priority given to laying it through geopolitical entities friendly (in the long term) to Russia and Iran.

Specifically on Dagestan. Since Dagestan is the most likely territory of the Caucasian conflict in the very near future, it seems imperative that the closest cooperation between Russian and Iranian influence networks be organized immediately to lay the groundwork for this inevitable disaster, which must begin with clarifying positions on Chechnya. A clear understanding on the part of the Russian and Iranian leaders that only joint and coordinated efforts in this direction can bring the situation to an outcome beneficial to Moscow and Tehran, will allow both sides to achieve the desired result and turn the nascent catastrophe into the right direction.

Tehran should become Moscow's strategic partner in controlling the f1d escalating Dagestan conflict, with Islamic ethno-traditionalism and Sufism, as well as anti-American Islamic integrationism, as a middle ground.

Chapter 6

Islam versus Islam

6.1 The "Islamic threat" myth

Among the modern political myths fabricated by the architects of the "New World Order" and consumed by the naïve masses, one of the most pernicious is the myth of a single Islamic fundamentalism as a savage obscurantist force threatening civilised humanity and especially the "rich North". The existence of an Islamic or fundamentalist danger justifies the existence of NATO. It is one of the most important arguments in political-strategic relations between the West and Russia. In the face of this perceived evil, the West has given Russia the role of a barrier force. At least, that is what NATO officials and Washington envoys insist on. The reality is quite different. This concept is just a smokescreen, a screen for the West to carry out its real and more sophisticated and subtle strategic operations aimed at pitting potential allies in the rival camp against each other in order to deal with each of them one by one.

The Islamic world is far from homogenous. There are several influential geopolitical nodes, each of which draws on distinct religious, historical, cultural and civilizational trends and pursues an independent strategic line both globally and locally. Apart from fundamentalism, there are many other versions and trends in Islam. But more importantly, there are several not just different, but directly opposite trends behind the very notion of Islamic fundamentalism. Without realizing this, we will not be able to adequately grasp the meaning of the current crisis events in Chechnya, Dagestan and the North Caucasus, or the imminent disasters in other areas with an Islamic population on Russian territory, or what is happening in the Islamic world as a whole.

6.2 The poles of Islam

The most geopolitically active poles in the Islamic world are the following civilisational and political centres.

1) Saudi Arabia plays an important role throughout the Islamic world, where

Wahhabism is not just a widespread ideology, but the official ideology of the ruling regime. Wahhabism is a moralistic, puritanical, extremist form of Arab Sunnism, devoid of any hint of mystical, initiatory elements. It is an Islam devoid of spiritual dimension, an embodiment of moralistic fanaticism and self-sufficient lettering. In a sense, the term Pharisaism is even more applicable to the concept of Wahhabism than it is to the Jewish religion.

In today's reality, however, this Saudi Wahhabi pole, coupled with the totalitarian rule of the oil sheikhs, is the ultimate ally of the Atlanticist West, the most reliable US outpost in the Middle East and, more broadly, in the entire Islamic world.

2) The second pole, which is opposite in every way, is embodied in Iranian Islam of a predominantly Shiite orientation. The same category is joined by various currents in Sunni Islam, which have an emphatically mystical, initiatory orientation. Taken together, these groups may be termed "Sufi". Historically, philosophically and culturally this current is the exact opposite of the Wahhabi version. It is a living, visionary, paradoxical Islam. Morals and outward letters are of secondary importance in it. In the first place is the mysticism of personal or collective transformative experience, of secret heartfelt knowledge, of the mysterious path to the centre of things. Pro-Iranian, Shiite-Sufiist currents in contemporary Islam can be collectively called Eurasian, continental. They tend to have a common denominator - a radical dislike of the West and Atlantism, a sacred hatred of the technocratic material atheistic civilisation of the rich North, identified with the "big shaitan".

It is important to emphasise the absolute incompatibility of these two varieties of Islamic fundamentalism. It is indicative of the fact that the Shiite world honours the murdered imams who died at the hands of Sultan Yazid as its highest spiritual authorities. The Wahhabi tradition considers this historical character, Yazid, to be the highest spiritual authority. Thus, there is a religious, psychological and geopolitical opposition.

3) The next independent version of Islam (limited, however, almost exclu-

sively to the Arab peoples, are varieties of Islamic socialism, most often associated historically with the Baath Party. This trend is extremely strong in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, South Yemen, as well as in Egypt and Libya. At one time, Islamic socialism was geopolitically supported by the Soviet Union, but since its collapse this trend is clearly losing ground in the face of the steadily increasing popularity of various fundamentalist tendencies. In the future, this current is doomed to combine with one version or another of this fundamentalism.

4) Another powerful trend in the Islamic world is "enlightened Islamism". It represents in fact a complete rejection of the norms of Islamic tradition in its religious and civilizational dimension, is oriented towards copying Western models of politics and economy, is essentially a secular model of Atlanticist persuasion, pro-Western and strategically non-self-aware, but at the same time retains rudimentary, souvenir elements of folkloric Islamism. The most characteristic examples of such regimes in the Islamic world are secular Turkey, modern pro-American Egypt, Pakistan, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco. J

The enumerated four versions of Islam, despite their diversity, can be grouped according to geopolitical orientations as follows: potentially Eurasian is the Sufi-Shia line and residual Arab socialism; Atlanticist is Saudi Wahhabism and "enlightened Islam". Therefore, when it comes to the Islamic factor, we must immediately clarify what is actually meant, if only within the framework of the somewhat simplified scheme we have outlined above.

6.3 Geopolitical background

It is now clear: the idea of a single Islam is a completely inadequate propaganda move. There is a Eurasian Islam and an Atlanticist Islam, pro-Western and anti-Western, and the criterion for the division is not the degree of religiosity, but its particularity (the opposite of Wahhabism and Sufism), not the fact of secularism, but the geopolitical preferences of a particular ideology (the radical opposition of capitalist pro-Western regimes and Islamic

socialism);

In the case of such an objectively and organically Eurasian power as Russia, the West's strategy is equally unambiguous: Russia needs to quarrel with a potential alliance-”ikan (Eurasian Islam), as well as support anti-Russian subversive actions of all forces of “Atlanticism in Islamic guise”. American and NATO strategists are guided by this formula, imposing on the Russian leadership those rules of foreign and domestic-political relations, which will satisfy the interests of the elite of the “new world order”.

Since the geopolitical interests of the West are broadcast inside Russia through the agents of influence, the pro-Western lobby, the contradictory and paradoxical (geopolitics aside) attitude of the liberals to the events in Chechnya is entirely logical: on the one hand anti-Islamic sentiment, on the other - solidarity with Muslims where it comes to inflicting tangible damage on Russia as a Eurasian construct.

On the part of patriots it would also be quite logical to be guided by the same strictly geopolitical approach, putting aside emotional and taste preferences, as well as confessional contradictions, including the terrible element of internecine war. But, alas, if the geopolitical self-consciousness of the West in the practical plane relies on hundreds of serious think tanks, foundations and intellectual institutions, which then supply their policy executives in other countries (Russian liberals, among others, and the Russian Orthodox Church) with geopolitical projects, then they will be able to get to the bottom of it. The almost universal geopolitical ignorance of patriots makes it extremely easy to implement the Atlanticist plans and slows down the process of awakening our people and state to fulfil their organic and natural Eurasian mission.

6.4 Ideological map of Chechnya

The picture we have sketched out makes it possible to decipher the meaning of the events in Chechnya which occupy the attention of politically active observers. It is certainly not a question of simple enmity between clans and

factions which seek to redistribute spheres of influence in that strange and very disturbing geopolitical entity which is called Ichkeria. Such processes are always taking place, in all sorts of collectives, but they do not explain anything in the strategic content of events. Always one group is seeking to oust the other, and is using for that purpose various ideological cover-ups. But these cover-ups themselves are by no means arbitrary. On the contrary, ideological and geopolitical processes are subject to a particular strict logic, which is most often not noticed in its entirety by those

who only participate in politics as a career or financial activity. It can be assumed that many participants in the internal Chechen conflict are not fully aware of what exactly they stand for and what they are involved in. But they are not required to do so. More competent forces and centres understand everything, skilfully directing the processes in the direction that is desirable for them. And here, only large-scale geopolitical or social consequences matter, and it is not so important whose hands they will be achieved by.

The internal conflict in Chechnya is due to the radical heterogeneity of those forces that were united by the initial anti-Russian campaign. It is possible to compare the pro-Moscow forces in the early stages of the conflict very conventionally with the position of the “Islamic socialists”. But the weakening and geopolitical self-liquidation of Moscow (especially during the period of practical totalitarianism there by the blatant Atlantists) doomed their position to imminent defeat. Three forces rallied against them (and against Moscow): national-fundamentalist, pro-Turkish (“enlightened Islamism”) and Wahhabi (mostly imported from outside). Here it is important to consider another factor: Chechen Islam has traditionally been exclusively Sufi in its orientation, totally alien to Saudi moralism and, on the contrary, close to Shiite and Iranian models. Consequently, organic and consistent Chechen fundamentalism is necessarily coloured by Eurasian tones. This does not at all mean automatic sympathy for Moscow as the main pole of Eurasia, but at the same time practically rules out an Atlantist, pro-Western orientation.

Pro-Turkish and Wahhabi lines have an entirely different content. These are

geopolitical trends that draw Chechnya into a new civilizational context, one that has no historical or spiritual roots. And here it is important to point out that modern, secular Turkey (NATO member) is extremely hostile to its own fundamentalist and national-organic forces. One must therefore distinguish between the contacts of some Chechen fundamentalists with pro-Iranian Turkish Islamists (most often outlawed in their homeland, Turkey) and the orientation towards official Ankara of other Chechen leaders.

In other words, at a certain point it must become obvious to the Chechens themselves that the forces of Atlanticist Islam (Wahhabism) and the pro-Turkish lobby are bringing to Chechnya a model that is even more opposed to the cultural, civilisational and religious specificity of this exotic and peculiar people than Moscow.

The first chord of this geopolitical awareness is the real conflict between supporters and opponents of Wahhabism.

6.5 The Afghan model

Another striking example of the geopolitical opposition of Islamic forces is the main actors in the Afghan conflict. There, too, several heterogeneous tendencies existed:

- 1) The “Islamic socialism” of Karmal and Najibullah, which lost ground with the fall of the USSR.
- 2) A broad coalition of mujahedin, which included both fundamentalists of pro-Iranian orientation (mainly Sufis) and Wahhabi-oriented groups linked, at the same time, with the Atlanticist leadership of official Pakistan.

Since the fall of Najibullah, the main line of conflict has taken place within this second group. The Taliban movement represents a highly Atlanticist vector, supported through Pakistan by the West. The remaining Sufi and pro-Iranian groups oppose the Taliban. It is telling that at one point the success of the Atlanticist Taliban led the anti-Atlanta Mujahideen to seek an alliance even with Moscow, which, in fact, should have been done much ear-

lier. A clear understanding of geopolitical regularities in this area would have helped to more organically resolve the Tajik conflict, in which, fortunately, the Wahhabi and Pro-Taliban factor is underdeveloped, and rearguard (in a historical sense) battles are being fought between Rakhmonov's "Islamic socialism" and fundamentalists of Sufist, pro-Iranian nature. Incidentally, the Tajik opposition, fueled from Afghanistan, has sharply softened its demands and entered the negotiation process at a time when in Afghanistan itself the Sufi Mujahideen were nearly swept away by the Taliban wave and in the face of total defeat turned to Moscow for strategic assistance.

6.6 The inexorable logic of alliances

Geopolitical thinking is the only adequate one in today's world. Whether we accept the conclusions and methods of geopolitics or not, the very logic of events will force us to reckon with this reality, as the entire strategic methodology of the West, at the moment the sole master of the planet, is built on geopolitics. Where its triumph is not complete, its geopolitical demands are not respected or are poorly respected. But the force of this pressure - and it is very real and effective - is by no means diminished. Hence, in the case of Russia too, the presence of basic skills of geopolitical self-consciousness in the political leadership of the country, in people with a keen sense of citizenship, is absolutely necessary.

The objective logic of geopolitics clearly and unambiguously dictates the need for an early strategic alliance of all Eurasian forces, whatever their confessional, racial, cultural or ideological affiliation. In particular, a Russian-Islamic pact, coordinating the common strategy of Moscow and those currents in Islam which are oriented towards Iran, Sufism, fundamentalism of the soil, continental and anti-Western type, is inevitable. This applies to both foreign and domestic political projects.

It is not difficult to derive a whole host of recommendations to Russia's political leadership and security ministries with regard to the situation in Chechnya and the wider North Caucasus. Eurasian Chechen Islam, which until very recently was regarded solely as an irreconcilable enemy, will in

fact, at a certain point in history, reveal its geopolitical and civilizational quality, and it is marked by a distinct Eurasianism.

So is it worth wasting time?

Part VIII

A CLASSIC OF GEOPOLITICAL THOUGHT

Karl Haussofer

Continental block: Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo

There is no doubt that the most grandiose and important development in contemporary world politics is the prospect of a powerful continental bloc uniting Europe with North and East Asia.

But projects on such a scale do not originate in the mind of a statesman, be he as great as the famous Greek goddess of war, who had the ability to reincarnate. Knowledgeable people know that such plans are prepared over a long period of time. And it is precisely because of this circumstance that I willingly accept the offer of our school of geography, which has chosen me from among the older generation of scholars to provide evidence of the formation of continental Euro-Asian politics - because for many years, since the first risky attempts to establish friendly and later allied relations, I have undertaken systematic research on this subject, allowing me to constantly monitor (sometimes directly attending the formation of these political alliances)

First of all, one of the principles of geopolitics, which was first formulated back in the early days of the Roman state and has not lost its relevance since: "Fas est ab hoste doceri" ("Learning from the enemy is a sacred duty") must be assimilated.

Soon after the birth of important political formations, a potential adversary develops a near-threat instinct, the same symptomatic feeling that the remarkable Japanese sociologist G.E.Vishara attributes to his people as a

whole and which allows the Japanese to see any danger approaching from afar. Such a national characteristic is undoubtedly very precious. In any case, it was the British and American leaders who were the first to see the possibility of a Euro-Asian continental bloc threatening Anglo-Saxon world domination, whereas we in the Second Reich had no idea what could be gained from linking Central Europe and the mighty potential of East Asia across the vast Eurasian landmass. Lord Palmerston, one of the toughest and most successful imperialist politicians, was the first to say to the Prime Minister who removed him from office during the government crisis: 'Our relations with France may now become somewhat strained, but we must preserve them at all costs, for in the background we are threatened by Russia, which could link Europe and East Asia, and we alone cannot resist it'. The phrase was uttered in 1851 - at a time when the victorious England was in all its glory, when the United States, which had undergone a series of severe domestic crises, for the first time applied a tough formula which we should inscribe forever on our tablets - the formula of "anaconda politics". A giant snake that strangles its prey by squeezing its rings around it until all bones are shattered and its breath stops - not a pretty image. Trying to imagine this threat looming over the political spaces of the Old World, one can understand what the size and power of those spaces would become if the "politics of the anaconda" failed. The warning of another imperialist, Homer Lee, who wrote the famous book on the decline of the Anglo-Saxons, also sounded at the height of the victorious world empire. In that book, which belongs to the era of the apparent apogee of the world British Empire, one can read that the fateful day, the sunset of the gods may come for the world Anglo-Saxon Empire on the day when Germany, Russia and Japan become allies of each other.

For as long as the world's British empire has flourished, there has been this dark apprehension about a single alliance that makes one anticipate that sooner or later the forces of encirclement - that so brilliantly and skilfully developed art, of which Venice was the Master of Application in the Middle Ages - may collapse. In modern times the most perceptive warning was made by Sir H. Mackinder, who wrote an essay in 1904 on the geographical axis

of history. The axis is the great empire of the steppes, the centre of the Old World, whether ruled by Persians, Mongols, Turks, white or red kings. In 1919, Makin-der issues a new warning and proposes to separate the Germans and Russians once and for all by relocating the inhabitants of East Prussia to the left bank of the Vistula. Further, in the last days before the blitzkrieg against Poland, the New Statesman accused a narrow circle of geopoliticians, including us, of looking for the most effective ways to fight the British empire and British imperialism by their own means. We would be happy if we could actually use these means for our defence, especially in those moments when we find ourselves face to face with aggressive actions. Finally, one may also recall my conversation with the elder Chamberlain,¹⁰ who foresaw the danger that England might eventually throw Germany, Russia and Japan into each other's arms in their hopeless struggle to secure the necessary living conditions: that is why he proposed co-operation between England, Germany and Japan. The fear of German-Russian cooperation, even in 1919, when we were disarmed and giving a completely harmless impression, was so strong that a suggestion was made to limit Germany to the West bank of the Vistula River by a grandiose relocation of the East Prussians to the West - in essence only so that Germany and Russia would no longer have common borders. The Rapallo Treaty was a monumental disappointment for Mackinder and his school. Thus, the fear of the potential consequences of Old World continental politics for the global British Empire runs through its history. Perceptible from the outset, this fear became more and more apparent later, as the rulers of the British Empire lost their former ability to see the situation as a whole and their once inherent art of facing facts. And as we know, "fear and hatred are bad advisers".

One can notice a similar foreboding in the United States. For example, Brooke Adame, one of the most remarkable and insightful economic policy experts, long before the acquisition of Kiao Chao

In 1899 Haushofer had a private conversation with Joseph Chamberlain, the English Minister for the Colonies and a spokesman for extreme right-wing imperialist tendencies in English society. It was about the possibilities of

forming an intercontinental geopolitical alliance British Empire-U.S.-Japan-Germany. The British government, in particular, had pointed out to what extent the increasing Anglicization of the world would be endangered if a grand German-Russian-East Asian alliance, the only one against which any attempt at a British, American or even a united blockade would prove impotent, could be achieved through the construction of a vast transcontinental railway line with terminals at Port Arthur and Qingdao. So it is none other than our adversary who gives us the confidence that a solid continental block will prevail over the “Anaconda policy” in economic, military, maritime and strategic terms

- the kind of confidence we happily noted in the second attempt to strangle the Old World.

Let us look at the prospect of a continental bloc through the eyes of the “winners”, who were already credited with such extensive plans when they acquired Kiao-chao. To our shame, we must admit that already at the turn of the century, there were many more thinkers in Russia and Japan who foresaw and investigated the possibility of a continental block than in Central Europe. Indeed, at the time of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, from which England benefitted substantially more than Japan, the Far Eastern ‘island empire felt it was being drawn into a bonded treaty. The agreement bothered Japan because it would have to ensure an equal participation in the agreement by Germany, which would constitute a second counterbalance to the power of the British navy. The negotiations dragged on for two years, during which time there were repeated attempts to bring Germany fully into the game. It seemed to the Japanese that Japan alone could not remain on a par with British naval power at the time, and the signed treaty would prove punitive.

“If the German and Japanese navies co-operated with the Russian land army, the ocean agreement would cease to be a bondage to England, becoming an equal bargain,” was the position of the astute Japanese with whom I spoke on this subject, a position which they had clearly stood on much earlier. A grand chance to explore the diplomatic history of the issue was provided by

the Japanese ambassador in London, Ayashi, who published his memoirs, and John Hamilton, who published his memoirs of the Russo-Japanese War. And while the first volumes were still released without the interference of “organised pressure”, the second volumes by both authors could not help but be censored, and both diplomats

- the threat of disgrace. It could be said that the first volumes of Ayasha and Hamilton appeared in the eyes of world opinion as zealous trotters, while the second volume proved to be like an obedient gelding. At any rate, the first volumes did away with all the mysteries of politics, and so the coverage of the

A classic of geopolitical thought

A bent man could read them between the lines. Thus, for example, when the Japanese Marquis Ito travelled via St Petersburg to Germany in an attempt to put the Japanese-Russian-German alliance on its feet, an unscrupulous action was taken to alter the cipher of the dispatches coming from Japan in order to neutralise its continental plans. The Japanese visitors intended to counter the Anglo-Japanese alliance in Friedrichsruhe, the country estate of Bismarck - a statesman particularly worshipped by the Marquis of Ito. Already in 1901-1902 they had a clear view of the possibility of a continental alliance, a possibility which was being explored in depth in Japan. In 1909 and 1910 the possibility was broached with considerable frankness. At that time we were in an excellent position to make contact with the highest Japanese circles - with the Marquis of Ito, with his most intelligent follower Count Goto, with Katsura, who was then chairman of the council of ministers, with the most influential personalities in the circle of elder statesmen. The fact was that Elwin von Baeltz, the personal physician of the Japanese imperial family and a brilliant connoisseur of the Far East, played a huge role here. But when the man, who had the unique confidence of the highest Japanese authorities, asked to speak at a German medical congress about the psychological and physical features of the Japanese, the president of that congress told him the topic was of no interest. There is no doubt that England would have behaved quite differently with this man, who belonged

to the intimate circle of advisers of the mikado. But for us such statements always made it clear that the German imperial house unfortunately had an overwhelming aversion to co-operation with the Far East. The slogan was still Wilhelm II's formula: "Europeans, put your good above all else!" But the young race threatened the freedom and equal rights of Europeans to a much lesser extent than the whites who seemed closer to us.

An important link in this grandiose policy was Russia. The main advocate of the idea of a continental bloc was German-born Witte, creator of the Trans-Siberian railway and one of Russia's most important financiers. During the war he negotiated a separate peace with Germany and died in 1915 in strange circumstances. There had always been a current in Russia which was aware of the benefits and possibilities which lay in the German-Russian-Japanese co-operation; and when after the war one of our most prominent statesmen, the iron-fisted Brockdorf-Rantzau, wanted with my help to restore the thread of contact, two Russian statesmen controlled the process and tried to favour its course. In truth, they should have agreed to anything to achieve the goal of uniting the Japanese and Russians for the sake of the highest political interest so that they could reasonably have settled the borders, thus protecting their rear and giving them an opportunity to launch political activities in other directions. Each participant in this game had to endure nights on end in walks, after which the lawns were completely covered with cigarette butts and spilled tea, and in an atmosphere of extremely odd discussions held with an ancient sophistication that gave piquancy to each of these conversations. When, after two or three hours, it seemed that the whole question could be cleared up, the dialectic forced one to start again from the beginning, and again three hours of discussion and weary and irritated rivals.

We in the Second Reich were too loyal to British colonial policy to take advantage of the hard and sober geopolitical opportunities of a continental alliance that could bear good fruit for a long time. The second Ra then refused this prospect, although taking advantage of these opportunities implied the likelihood of double pressure on the enemy. And it was in this

refusal that the great danger lurked.

Today we know: rather bold steel structures can be built, but only if there is a firm and solid foundation, if the main supporting pillars are made of really strong and resilient steel, if the structure is so strong that both the stone and the steel joint are permanently welded together. However, such a steel structure becomes particularly strong and resistant to storms of the world when, as in our new bridges, solid stone reinforcements are incorporated into its very foundations in a space block extending from the Baltic and Black Seas to the Pacific Ocean.

We emphasise that we look at the possibility of German participation in such a continental policy with complete equanimity. This possibility was not realised by Prince Ito and Bismarck. Similar attempts were made, in addressing Tirpitz, by Admiral Cato, Chief of Naval Staff at Tsushima; in the same direction my humble efforts were made. For all of us working on this great agreement for the salvation of the entire Old World, the precondition was German-Japanese unification.

The Japanese statesman Goto told me: 'Think of the Russian three-horse team, the troika. There is a special way of harnessing: the most skittish and strongest horse goes in the centre; the two more pliant ones run to the right and left, supporting the middle one. With such a team, speed and power are greatly enhanced. A glance at a map of the Old World shows that there are three frontier seas in this triple harness: firstly, the Baltic Sea, which has lately become politically quite close to us and the Baltic Sea: secondly, much less developed by its coastal inhabitants than the Baltic Sea is by us. The Sea of Japan: and thirdly, the Adriatic, under Italian domination and recently closed to the south, with the Eastern Mediterranean adjoining it (Haushofer is referring to the April 1939 annexation of Albania by Italy - A.D.). All these frontier seas are located in the areas of Russia's most important accesses to the free ocean, if one does not take into account the free Arctic Ocean, the use of which depends on the vagaries of its heating by the Atlantic waters of the Gulf Stream.

The Japanese, obeying their rugged instinct and following sea control tactics, largely closed off the area surrounding Russian access to the free ocean near Vladivostok, doing much more logically than the Germans did to the cradle of their race in the Baltic space.

Back in 1935 we did ourselves an infinite disservice in Sweden by persuading the Social Democratic government in Stockholm and later Oslo to abandon their confidence in the protection of the League of Nations and to take independent measures to defend their vast space: we claimed that such measures would have found the fullest understanding with us. But as we know, three years wait for the promised. Non-aggression pacts were never accepted and the Baltic Sea area was less satisfactory to us than the Sea of Japan was to the Japanese. The main fault lies in the lack of a clear-cut instinct for hard geopolitical realities, which is a characteristic feature of the Nordic governments' predominantly social-democratic ideology.

It is true that in Sweden only a minority understood the dangers and opportunities that the future held. Realising that it would not find the necessary understanding in the competent Swedish Norwegian government circles, Germany decided to follow the main lines of continental politics unambiguously, without considering those whose friendliness was only expressed in buzz phrases. We could not, because of a few geopolitical outsiders, put at risk the troika that alone could snatch the Old World from the embrace of the anaconda.

However, attempts at Russo-Japanese unification, which is another prerequisite for a full continental policy, are not new. Frankly, these attempts began as early as 1901-1902. After the Russo-Japanese War they were attempted again in 1909 and 1910, when I was in Japan - Ito was the spokesman of this policy at the time. At that time the United States made an original proposal to eliminate the main difficulties between China, Japan and Russia by buying out all the railways in Manchuria and putting them in the hands of American capitalists; thus they forced the Russians and Japanese together against their will.

Italy then began its efforts to form a continental bloc. It was Ricardi, who inspired Mussolini to set up the Institute for the Middle and Far East. The institute instigated a desire to cautiously harness precious cultural elements of Japanese and Chinese origin to the political-cultural harness. Large sums of money were not donated, but the premises of one of the grand palaces, filled with splendid Renaissance culture, were made available. Rome had a vibrant power that could be trusted. The Middle and Far East Institute was run by Senator Gentile, Archduke Tucci and the Duke of Avar, the son of a former ambassador to the imperial court in Vienna. They did well in their duties as they did not appear to have remained entirely immersed in the world of philology, pursuing with great flexibility and sensitivity (sensing quite clearly the effect of peoples' psychology) an active cultural policy that was vital and close to the people.

As for the latter initiatives, a huge role in the preparations for the Continental Alliance must also be assigned to the well known Count Mushakoi and Baron Oshima. As we know, throughout the war in China Japan fought only with the left hand, as the right hand with the reserve military force was always at the ready in Manchuria. Such forces were concentrated there that we had no idea about. Now the question of the frontier has been resolved in part, and in an extremely skilful manner. For example, a treaty was concluded with regard to Mongolia, where for five months the Russians and Japanese had fought serious battles, resulting in numerous deaths and injuries. Proposals were then made simultaneously from both warring sides, from Moscow and Tokyo, to put an end to this struggle. This was soon done, with the conclusion of peace being accompanied by the magnificent spectacle of a general burial ceremony for the souls of the fallen soldiers, held in a purely Japanese manner on the formerly disputed territory. Despite the religious nature of the ceremony and the fact that it was not easy to attend, General Potapov was present, due to ideological reasons. Ceremonies such as this one have an important psychological significance. At the head of the troops marching with banners unfurled, an old general approaches the altar of the dead. Every Japanese firmly believes that the souls of warriors are indeed before this altar to receive the emperor's message. The very impeccable

behaviour of the Soviet general and his officers at this rather lengthy ceremony does honour their remarkable capacity for cultural adaptation. Since one cannot turn one's back to the spirits, all the participants in the ceremony slowly approach the altar from afar and step back. To turn one's back on the spirits of ancestors, who are regarded as living, would be blasphemy. This ceremony, imbued with absolute religiosity, is very interesting and very convincing from the ethnopsychological point of view; it made a deep impression even on the world-wise-minded people who were allowed to be present at it. After the ceremony they could say to themselves: "All people here firmly believe in the transmigration of souls. They believe that during the short earthly existence they will be able to achieve an exalted place in the beyond by commendable actions on behalf of their homeland, or there will be dishonour after the grave. The feeling that the whole nation, with the exception of a few sceptical wanderers, is enthusiastic about the idea gives it strength, solidarity and readiness for exceptional sacrifice.

At last geopolitics, thanks to those extraordinarily advantageous opportunities from a political-spatial point of view which it has succeeded in realising (and is yet to realise), has overcome the ideological obstacles to continental unification for world politics - and the double game of British politics itself has contributed greatly to this, pushing this process forward. The utter impotence of Lord Halifax in trying to pursue a policy of European co-operation was evident; the much stronger current, led by Chamberlain's opponents, was preparing for war and hesitating only for appearances until the rearmament process was over (3).

The opportunity for an objective and unbiased examination of the geopolitical power of the Eurasian pact presented itself on 7 December, when a conference began in Chita on the conclusion of a trade treaty between Japan and

There were two currents in British foreign policy in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War. One of them, the 'Clyvden trend', led by Conservative Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and his deputy Halifax who became prime minister in 1937, tried to 'pacify' Ger-

many, which was seen as a bulwark against Bolshevism, and proposed an Anglo-German-French-Italy agreement which was reflected in the Munich Pact of 30 September 1938 on the division of Czechoslovakia. The other direction, led by Conservative Party opposition figures Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden (who had joined the government after the war had already begun) and which prevailed, insisted on the need to fight Germany.

Russia. So to the east of us stretches the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a politico-spatial mass of 21,352,571 square kilometres (excluding recent annexations). (excluding recent annexations), with 13,000 km of coastline and 182 million inhabitants. Next is Japan, with an area of about 2 million sq. km. (excluding territories outside its immediate borders and those of its powerful allies) with a very long coastline and 140 million inhabitants.

Of course, only 73 million of that number are the direct political and military pillars of the empire, but a labor force of 140 million is readily available. In the face of this situation in the East, although we work hard to intensify our cultural and economic ties on the Western flank of the bloc, we do not act in the same extent as other partners in political and spatial terms. We have a million square kilometres at our disposal. (as well as the right to another three million square kilometres in the colonies) and between 87 and' 100 million people! In between, due to both oceanic and continental conditions, Italy, with 250,000 km of coasts (which entails their vulnerability and the need for a major effort to develop the fleet and aviation) and from 57 to 60 million human reserves, occupies an intermediate position. If we compare these figures with those on which the central powers were based during the world war, we see a marked difference between the state of affairs then and now, based on geopolitical data. And if we manage to consolidate and sustain this brave and grandiose Euro-Asian continental policy right up to its last great consequences, its enormous possibilities will manifest, with, for example, Indian autonomy and independence being just one of the accompanying phenomena of such a policy. The fact is that I have sometimes encountered the view among young and not so young people that India is only trying to achieve dominion status by remaining under the protection

of British troops. All the efforts of those politicians and ordinary Indians I have personally met prove the contrary: their ultimate and most firm aim is independence. They have always maintained the belief that we are taking seriously the increasing help we are giving them in their struggle for independence.

From the first minutes after the unveiling of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, we have seen an extraordinary upheaval in Indian public opinion. Before then the Anglo-Indian newspapers had been full of phraseology on the theme of strengthening democracy all over the world; and that was what India was supposed to exist for. But as soon as the grand spectre of European continental politics arose, this opinion, like a sudden change in the weather, changed completely. Indians now believe that the Soviet Union could certainly cause the British much trouble in India - it would only have to intervene and move its armies across the mountain passes to do so.

The grandiose and so dazzling in all its effects spectacle of Euro-Asian continental politics was prepared individually by many people. It was not an accidental throw into the unknown, but the deliberate fulfilment of a great necessity.

"Germany is accused of carrying out a plan to pit coloured peoples against their 'legitimate' masters in India and Indochina by encouraging their desire for self-determination. We are in fact, based on the work of the Englishman Mackinder, promoting the idea all over the world that only a strong bond of states on the Germany-Russia-Japan axis will enable us all to rise up and become invulnerable to the anaconda methods of the Anglo-Saxon world. When a famous English journalist made such a claim to me four months after the outbreak of war, I replied to him that if you are attacked in concert with the anaconda tactics applied on a global scale, and attacked by powers that have been constantly talking about these anaconda practices since the American War of Independence, then you have every right to oppose this policy of an enemy seeking to grab more and more chunks of influence. Only the idea of Eurasia, embodied politically in space, will give us the

opportunity for the long-term expansion of our living space.“

”Eurasia cannot be strangled as long as its two largest peoples - the Germans and the Russians - are trying by all means to avoid a conflict like the Crimean War or 1914: this is an axiom of European politics.“

”The last hour of Anglo-Saxon politics will come when the Germans, the Russians and the Japanese unite. So said Homer Lee.“

1940 c.

(translated by A. Karagodin)

Karl Haussofer

Geopolitical dynamics of meridians and parallels

There is a geopolitical term: the Great Spaces (Grossraum). It originated in the ancient world, predetermined by the specificity of the Mediterranean, the southern deserts and the mountain ranges. The term seemed to echo development trends oriented on geographical sectors both along the parallels and on the East-West axis. This applied to temperate, tropical and subtropical belts. Exceptions were the states located along the course of large rivers flowing along the North-South axis. Riverine geopolitical formations, due to the specific location of their vital arteries, were subjected to the pressure of the so-called ”torque“ generated by the expansion along the parallels. This constituted the proper geopolitical history of the ”river states“ until it was finally suppressed by the dynamics of latitudinal expansion of the empires of anterior Asia and, to the east, of Achaemenid Iran.

From a certain point in history, successive waves of ”latitudinal expansion“ followed - Phoenicians, Hellenes, Romans, Arabs, steppe peoples, Franks, Iberians, etc. This gave rise to a global trend of geopolitical development going from the Roman Mediterranean to the Caribbean Mediterranean. This trend was exhausted after the Portuguese and Spaniards reached the borders of the first Great Space that aspired to meridian development. That space was the Chinese Kingdom, which often changed its external form but

remained remarkably constant in a cultural and racial sense. Thus, the East Asian - Chinese and Japanese - geopolitical structure, developing along the North-South line, was cut through by the Spanish colonial empire, the first geopolitical "latitudinal kingdom". However, the Spaniards did not retain their monopoly for long - about 70 years. They were followed in their footsteps by competitors who had mastered the "latitudinal strategy" and sought to rob their predecessors and inherit their conquests. The British were the strongest among them. They succeeded in building their First and Second Empires, which generally followed a "latitudinal" orientation. England was predestined to do so both by its presence in the Mediterranean and by the need to guard Indian possessions.

On the northern half of the continent towards the east, the Empire of first the White and then the Red Kings was constantly expanding. Between the northern latitudinal Empire and the south lay buffer zones. It was only in the 1940s that two geopolitical macro-formations oriented along the meridian line - the East Asian block and the Pan-American block - almost simultaneously invaded the geopolitical field of latitudinal dynamics, forming a "frame" around the traditional arrangement of planetary forces.

This last geopolitical event is of enormous significance, for it predetermines a complete change in the "force field" of the earth's surface. It is what gives reality to the Euro-African project, to the Soviet Union's attempts to shift from its "latitudinal strategy" to a "warm seas strategy" and to India's plans to dynamise its policy towards the Pacific islands. The newly emerging geopolitical field is strikingly different from the picture painted in 1904 by Halford Mackinder, who identified the centre of the Old World as the 'geographical axis of history', although in 1904 Mackinder's concepts were quite adequate to the reality of the case

It should be made clear that the Greater East Asia Area tends to be self-limiting in terms of its continental borders. This is not the case with the US, which, having completed its plans for geopolitical Pan-Americanism, regards its control of the entire American continent as merely the first step towards world domination and is already stepping up its efforts in tropical

Africa, Iran, India and Australia. The US is again orienting its geopolitical expansion along the West-East line and is seeking to make "latitudinal dynamics" the basis of its coming world power. This will enable it to threaten its potential adversaries with the possibility of the World War III in the near future. Thus, it is the geopolitical expansion along the meridian, at its completion, that forms the basis of the most serious threat to the world, as it carries with it the possibility of the enslavement of the entire planet by the United States.

In order to assert its geopolitical independence, East Asia already today has to consolidate its own cultural and political form and create buffer zones of security on the periphery of its influence. Within a generation, Europe will need similar buffer zones as the Ito, Goto and others sought to create against the expansion of the Russian tsars. The latitudinal and longitudinal trends in Africa are particularly evident in Islamic geopolitical formations and in the process of liberation of Asian countries from British rule. The southern trend of East Asian geopolitical expansion through the natural route of sea and air communications falls precisely on the unpopulated regions of Australia, located between the two sectors of English-speaking population concentration. In this case there is the very real possibility for the colonies of the "outer crescent" of McIndeer to "be washed out to sea". Europe would thus instantly lose a strong link with Africa, and the key point of potential confrontation with the "masters of the latitudes" would move to the south-east.

The Soviets, the country that has always been the "geographical axis of history", and the Axis countries controlling the "Inner Crescent", will only have to watch what happens in the south-east. However important the military and strategic space of the Black and Caspian seas, lavishly mixed with soldiers' blood, might be for Europe's cultural existence, it will be of secondary importance for the future redivision of geopolitical space. Because the process of creating new "meridian" Great Spaces, which will acquire decisive strategic importance in order to tear off this piece of the Asian Great Space? At the moment this is the most important and painful question for

the spenders of money and blood of others, for there is a very big chunk of profit to be made.

Between Nanjing and Zhongqing China today, as before, the most improbable, the most insane compromises are possible. Further dynamic development along the East Asian meridian is becoming more and more possible, latent energies are maturing by the day. These energies have come into play and become evident on the right side of East Asia - in Japan, and especially in China. On the left, in the western part of this Big Space they have not yet manifested sufficiently. A new war of 10 to 50 years may be assumed in this region. In China the civil war has been raging for 32 years. Japan has 12 years of land warfare under its belt, and Japan has fully proved how belligerent it is towards the Pacific.

The confrontation between geopolitical expansion along the meridian and expansion along the parallel requires both sides to be patient, as this problem will be solved over a rather long period of time and over vast territories. The geopolitical processes on both sides of the Pacific Ocean in recent decades are a case in point.

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(translated by A.D.)

The geopolitical future of the planet depends on whether the Anglo-American trend of expansion along the parallels will succeed in breaking through the resistance of the East Asian trend of expansion along the meridians. Whatever the outcome of this confrontation, the US believes that in any case it will be securely protected by the remnants of the former British colonial empire, even if only tropical African colonies remain of it. And certainly the US can count on the tropical America it controls. But will they consider island India, the third largest mineral reserves, as well as Iran and India, worthy of shedding blood and spending money on a military expedition for them? Will they find it necessary to expend their energies to

Carl Schmitt

EARTH AND THE SEA

contemplation of world history

Dedicated to my daughter

Man is a land-based, terrestrial creature.

He stands on the ground, he walks on the ground, he moves on its firm unshakable surface. This is his independence and his ground; thanks to it he acquires and has his point of view; it determines his impressions and the very way of perceiving the world. Not only his outlook, but even the form of his gait and movements, his image and appearance he acquires and retains as a being on earth born and living. Therefore he calls the heavenly body on which he dwells "earth", although it is known that water makes up nearly three quarters of the surface of the earth and only one quarter of the earth itself; and even the largest parts of land are but islands in an ocean of water. Since we know that the Earth is shaped like a sphere, we have been talking about 'the globe' as a matter of course. If you had to imagine a "sea ball" or a "water ball", you would find it strange and unusual.

All our existence in this world, joy and suffering, happiness and distress, is for us earthly life and, accordingly, heaven on earth and earthly misery. It is thus understandable that in so many myths and legends, in which peoples have preserved their most ancient experiences and deepest memories, the earth appears as the great mother of men. She is referred to as the oldest of all deities. The sacred books tell us that man was taken from the earth and must again be made into the dust of the earth. The earth is his maternal womb; he himself is thus a son of the earth. In his fellow-men he sees his earthly fellows, citizens of the earth. Among the traditional four elements - Earth, Water, Fire and Air - the element of the Earth defines man most of all and is predestined for him. The idea that any one of the four elements but earth could decisively shape human existence seems at first glance only a fantastic possibility. Man is not a fish or a bird, much less a creature of fire[^] even if we assume that such can exist.

Does it follow from this that the essence of human existence and the very being of man is purely earthly, and that all other elements are only additional elements of the second order? The matter is not so simple. The answer to the question as to whether something other than earth can constitute the hallmark of human presence in the world lies closer than we think. Once you step out on the seashore and look into the distance, the vastness of the sea across the horizon captures your gaze. It is noteworthy that when one stands on the shore, one naturally looks from the land to the sea, and not vice versa, from the sea to the land. In people's deep, often unconscious memories, water and the sea are the secret root of all things. The myths and legends of most peoples contain memories not only of earth-born, but also of the gods and men who emerged from the sea. Sons and daughters of the sea and water are everywhere recounted. Aphrodite, the goddess of feminine beauty, emerged from the foam of the waves. The sea gave birth to other creatures and we meet later on the "children of the sea" and the wild "captives of the sea" who bear little resemblance to the enchanting picture of a woman born from the foam. You see here a completely different world, unlike the world of the solid earth and the land. Now you can understand why poets, natural philosophers and natural scientists look for the origin of all life in water, while Goethe proclaims in solemn verse:

Everything emerged from the water.

Everything is preserved by water,

Ocean, grant us your eternal protection!

The Greek natural philosopher Thales of Miletus (c. 500 BC) is most commonly referred to as the founder of the doctrine of the origin of all life from the element of water. This belief, however, is both younger and older than Thales. It has been around forever. In the last XIX century, the great German scientist Lorenz Oken taught about the origin of men and all living things from the sea. And in the genealogical charts constructed by Darwinist naturalists, fish and land animals appear side by side, one after the other, in varying order. The inhabitants of the sea appear here as ancestors of people.

The ancient and ancient history of mankind seems to confirm this hypothesis of the origin of life. Authoritative researchers have discovered that along with "autochthonous", that is, born on land, there are also "autotalassic", that is, exclusively sea-defined peoples, who have never been land travellers and did not want to know anything about the solid land, which was the boundary of their purely maritime existence. On the islands of the Pacific, with the Polynesian navigators, the Kanak and Samoa, the last remnants of this kind of people-fish can still be found. All their existence, the world of ideas and language were formed under the decisive influence of the sea. All our conceptions of space and time, developed in conditions of a solid surface of the land, seemed to them as alien and incomprehensible, as for us, inhabitants of the land, the world of those purely sea people means hardly comprehensible other world.

In any case, the question arises: what is our element? Are we children of the earth or the sea? This question cannot be answered unambiguously. Prehistoric myths, New Age natural science hypotheses and the results of historical research from the era of the first written monuments leave both possibilities open for an answer.

The word "elements" in any case requires a little further clarification. Since the time of the aforementioned philosopher Thales, from the time of the Ionian philosophy, that is from about 500 B.C., the European peoples have spoken of the four elements or elements. Since then, this concept of a quadruple element - Earth, Water, Air and Fire - has remained alive and unabated, despite all scientific criticism, to this day. Modern natural science has abolished these four original elements; it distinguishes today more than ninety very differently structured "elements" and understands by this word every source material, undecomposed and insoluble by the methods of today's chemistry. Thus, the elements investigated experimentally and theoretically by natural science today have only a common name with those four primordial elements. No physicist or chemist today would dare to claim that any one of the four primary elements is the sole prime mover, the original material of the universe, as Thales of Miletus spoke of water, Heraclitus

of Ephesus spoke of fire, Anaximenes of Miletus spoke of air, and Empedocles of Acragantes taught of the union of the elements, which he called "the roots of all things". The question of what the words root cause, source material, roots of things mean would lead us into discussions of a vast number of physical, natural-science, metaphysical and epistemological problems. For the needs of our historical contemplation we may, however, confine ourselves to the idea of this quadruplet of elements. For for us these elements are simple and visual names. They are generalized meanings, indicating the different kinds of fundamental possibilities of human existence in the world. Therefore we have the right to use them even today, especially when we talk about dominion through the sea and dominion through the land, the sea and continental powers, referring to the elements of water and land.

Thus the "elements" Earth and Sea, discussed below, cannot be thought of merely as natural scientific quantities. In this case they would immediately disintegrate into chemical components, i.e. they would turn into a historical nothingness. The variants of historical accomplishment predetermined by these elements, especially the marine or terrestrial forms of existence do not unfold with mechanical predetermination either. If man were a living organism, without remainder reduced to the effects of the surrounding world, he would be an animal, fish or bird, or a fantastic mixture of these elementary forms, according to the impact of natural elements. Pure types, corresponding to the four elements, especially purely marine or purely terrestrial people would have very little in common with each other, they would be opposed to each other in complete isolation, and this isolation would be the more hopeless, the less impurity would contain the type. Mixtures would give rise to successful or unsuccessful types and would give rise to liking or enmity, like a chemical affinity or contrast. One's being and destiny would be determined by a purely natural order, as in the case of an animal or a plant. It would only be possible to state that some devour others, while the rest peacefully coexist in biological symbiosis. There would be no human history as a human act and human decision.

We know, however, that man's being is not reducible to a purely natural

order. He has the gift of mastering his own being and consciousness in a process of historical accomplishment. He knows not only birth, but also the possibility of spiritual rebirth. In distress and danger, when an animal and a plant perish helplessly, he is able to be reborn to new life by intellectual effort, volitional decision, confident analysis of the situation and inference. He has a free space for his power and his historical power. He is given to choose, and at certain moments in history he is able to choose that element to which he adheres, through his own action and his own effort, as a new form of his historical existence, and in which he settles. In this sense, he has learned well, as the poet says, "the freedom to choose the path he desires."

World history is the history of the struggle of continental powers against maritime powers and of maritime powers against continental powers. Admiral Castex, a French specialist in military science, prefixed his book on strategy with the generalising title: *Sea versus Earth, la Mer contre la Terre*. In doing so, he stays in line with a long tradition.

The original antagonism of land and sea has been seen since ancient times, and back in the late 19th century the then tensions between Russia and England were fondly depicted as a battle between a bear and a whale. The whale is the mythological giant fish, Leviathan, about whom we are yet to hear more, while the bear is one of the many representatives of terrestrial animals. According to medieval interpretations by the so-called Kabbalists, world history is nothing more than a struggle between a mighty whale, Leviathan, and an equally mighty land animal called Behemoth, who is represented as an ox or an elephant. Both names, Leviathan and Behemoth, are borrowed from the book of Job (chapters 40 and 41). Thus the Kabbalists state that Behemoth tries to tear Leviathan with his horns and teeth, while Leviathan tries to clamp Behemoth's mouth and nose with his fins, so that he can neither eat nor breathe. This is as graphic as myth can get in the depiction of a continental power being blockaded by a maritime power that closes off all maritime access to the mainland to starve it out. Thus the two warring powers kill each other. However, the Jews, the Kabbalists go on to say, then celebrate the millennial "feast of Leviathan", which Heinrich Heine recounts

in a famous poem. In order to give a historical interpretation of this feast of Leviathan, the Kabbalist Isaac Abra-Vanel is most often quoted. He lived between 1437 and 1508 at the time of the great discoveries, was treasurer first to the king of Portugal, then to the king of Castile and died a respected man in Venice in 1508. In this way he knew the world and all the riches of the world and he knew what he was talking about.

Let us take a brief look at some of the events of world history from the perspective of this struggle between the land and the sea.

The world of Greek antiquity arose out of the voyages and wars of the maritime peoples, “not for nothing did the god of the sea nurture them”. The maritime power that dominated the island of Crete drove the Persians out of the eastern Mediterranean and created a culture whose inexplicable charms were revealed to us at the excavations of Knossos. A thousand years later, at the sea battle of Salamis (480 B.C.), the free city of Athens defended itself against its enemy, the “commanding Persians”, behind wooden walls, i.e. on ships, and was saved by this sea battle. Its own domination was defeated in the Peloponnesian War by continental Sparta; the latter, however, precisely because of its continental character, proved unable to unite the cities of Hellas and lead the Greek empire. Rome, on the contrary, which from the beginning had been an Italian peasant republic and a purely continental state, became a real empire in the process of combating the maritime and commercial domination of Carthage. The history of Rome, both as a whole and especially during this period of long struggle between Rome and Carthage, has often been compared with other historical situations and cataclysms. Such comparisons and parallels can be very instructive, but they often lead to strange contradictions. For example, parallels to the global English empire are found either in Rome or in Carthage. Comparisons of this kind are in most cases a double-edged stick which can be taken and turned either way. From the hands of the declining Roman Empire the maritime supremacy was snatched by Vandals, Saracens, Vikings and Normans. After many failed attempts, the Arabs conquered Carthage (698) and established a new capital, Tunis. Thus began their centuries-long domination of the

western Mediterranean. The Eastern Roman Byzantine Empire, ruled from Constantinople, was a coastal empire. It had a strong navy and a mysterious fighting tool - the so-called Greek fire. All this, however, served purely defensive purposes. At any rate, in her capacity as a maritime power she could undertake something that Charlemagne's empire, a purely continental power, could not afford; Byzantium was a real "retainer", a "ka-tehon", despite its weakness, it "held" Islam for many centuries, thereby preventing the possibility of the Arabs conquering Italy. Otherwise the same thing would have happened to Italy as happened then to North Africa - the ancient Christian culture would have been destroyed and Italy would have been absorbed into the world of Islam. In the Christian-European arena, a new maritime power emerged that had risen through the Crusades: Venice.

In doing so, a new mythical name invades world history. For almost half a millennium, the Republic of Venice has been regarded as a symbol of maritime dominance and wealth, having grown up on maritime trade. It achieved brilliant results in the field of great politics and was called "the most outlandish creature in the economic history of all time". Everything that has driven fanatical Anglophiles to admire England in the eighteenth and twentieth centuries has previously been a reason to admire Venice: sheer wealth; an advantage in the art of diplomacy, with which a maritime power is able to cause complications in the relations of continental powers and conduct its wars by foreign hands; an aristocratic primary law, which gave the appearance of solving domestic political orders; a tolerance of religious and philosophical views; a haven for free-thinking and political emigration. This also includes the enchanting splendour of sumptuous festivities and the beauty of the fine arts. One of these festivals particularly occupied the human imagination and contributed to the world's glorification of Venice - it was the legendary "Engagement to the Sea", the so-called *sposalizio del mare*.

Every year on Ascension Day, the Doge of the Republic of Venice set sail on the high seas in a magnificent ship of state, and threw a ring into the waves as a sign of union with the sea. The Venetians themselves, their neighbours,

and the nations living far away from Venice, saw in it a convincing symbol by which the power born by the sea and the wealth born by the sea acquired a mythical sanctification. We shall, however, still have a chance to see how this beautiful symbol really stood when we see it in its original light. This fabulous queen of the sea shone ever brighter from 1000 to 1500. In the year 1000 the then Emperor of Byzantium, Nicephorus Phocas, could still assert of himself with some justification: "Hitherto you have been in wedlock with the sea, from now on it belongs to me." Between these two dates lies the era of Venetian maritime domination over the Adriatic, the Aegean Sea and the eastern part of the Mediterranean. In this era arose a legend that attracted endless travellers and famous romantics of all European nations, poets and men of art - such as Byron, Musset, Richard Wagner, Barré - to Venice back in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. No one can escape the allure of this legend, and the last thing we want to do is to diminish the glow of its glory. But if we ask whether we are dealing here with a case of purely maritime existence and a genuine choice in favour of the marine element, we can immediately see how cramped a maritime power confined to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean basin is when one day the immensity of the world's oceans opens up.

The German philosopher of geography Ernst Kasch, whose mind was entirely at the mercy of Hegel's vast world of ideas, classified empires according to the water factor in his *Comparative Geography* (1845). (1845). He distinguishes three stages of development, three acts of the great drama. World history begins for him with the "Potanic" time, i.e. with the culture of the river floodplains of the Near and Middle East in the Euphrates and Tigris rivers and on the Nile River, in the Assyrian, Babylonian and Egyptian kingdoms of the East. Then comes the so-called Thalassic period of the culture of the inland seas and the Mediterranean, which includes Greek and Roman antiquity and the Mediterranean Middle Ages. With the discovery of America and the beginnings of circumnavigation of the globe comes the final and highest stage, the age of oceanic culture, whose bearers are the Germanic peoples. To clarify the essence of the matter, however, we will use a three-part scheme distinguishing the river, the inland sea and the ocean. Then

we will see more clearly why the maritime domination of Venice remained entirely on the second, thalassic stage.

A festival such as the aforementioned “Betrothal to the Sea” is precisely what makes this distinction possible. Such symbolic acts of union with the sea are also found in other sea-dependent peoples. For example, the Native American fishing and seafaring tribes of Central America made sacrifices to the deities of the sea in the form of rings and other jewels, in the form of animals and even humans. I do not think, however, that the real “captors of the sea” practised similar rites. It does not mean that they were less prone to piety or felt less need for the incantation of divine powers. But they did not think of betrothal or marriage ceremonies with the sea precisely because they were true children of the sea. They felt themselves to be identical with the element of the sea. Those symbolic engagements or marriages show, on the other hand, that the sacrificer and the deity to be sacrificed are different, even opposite beings. With such a sacrifice the hostile element is to be propitiated. In the case of Venice, the ceremony makes it clear that the meaning of the symbolic act is not a product of primordial maritime existence; much more so is the particular style of festive symbols created by the highly developed coastal culture and lagoon culture. Conventional seafaring and a culture based on the use of a favourable seaside location represent something other than the displacement of all historical existence from land to sea, the choice of the sea as the element of existence. Venice’s coastal dominance begins in the year 100 with the maritime campaign to Dolmazia. Venice’s dominance over the hinterland, for example over Croatia and Hungary, has always remained as problematic as naval dominance over land can be. And in the field of shipbuilding techniques the Republic of Venice did not leave the Mediterranean and the Middle Ages until its decline in 1797. Like the peoples of the Mediterranean, Venice knew only the rowing ship, the galley. Shipping on large landmarks came to the Mediterranean from the Atlantic Ocean. The Venetian fleet was, and still is, a fleet of large galleys propelled by rowing power. The sail was used only as a supplementary element when the wind was favourable, as it had been already in the antique era. A special navigational achievement was the improvement of the compass to its

modern form. Thanks to the compass, “the ship has acquired something sensible, by virtue of which man enters into communication and is related to the vehicle” (Kapp). Only now can the remotest parts of the earth on all the oceans come into contact, so that the circle of the earth opens up. But the modern compass, whose appearance in the Mediterranean used to be most commonly attributed to 1302 and to the Italian maritime city of Amalfi, was in any case not invented in Venice. The use of this new tool for ocean navigation was not peculiar to the Venetians.

As I said before and I repeat, we do not want to diminish the splendour and glory of Venice. But we must understand the meaning of what happens when a nation, in the totality of its historical existence, chooses the sea as an alien element. The way in which the sea battles of the time were fought is the clearest demonstration of what we are talking about here, and how little we can talk about the elemental transfer of the entire human existence from land to sea in the Mediterranean of that time. In an ancient naval battle, rowing ships attack each other and try to ram and board one another. A naval battle is therefore always a close combat. “Ships grip each other like pairs of fighting men”. At the battle of Milas the Romans first boarded enemy ships, throwing over planks and thus establishing a bridge over which they could enter the enemy ship. Thereby a naval battle turned into a land battle on ships. On the ship’s planks they fought swords as if on a stage. The famous naval battles of antiquity were played out in such a way. Similarly, the Malay and Indian tribes conducted their sea battles, albeit with more primitive hand tools.

The last major naval battle of this kind was at the same time the last glorious feat of Venetian history - it was the naval battle of Lepanto (1571). Here the Spanish-Venetian fleet met the Turkish and won the most convincing maritime victory ever won by Christians over Muslims. The battle was fought in the same place, at Actium, where shortly before Christ (30 BC) the flotillas of East and West, Antony and Octavian, had fought. The naval battle of Lepanto was fought with essentially the same ship-to-ship technology as the battle of Actium a millennium and a half earlier. In close combat on

the ship's planks, the select foot units of the Spaniards, the famous tercias, fought against the janissaries, the elite troops of the Ottoman Empire.

A change in the way of warfare at sea came only a few years after the Battle of Lepanto - it was when the Spanish Armada was defeated in the English Channel. The small sailing ships of the English found their advantage over the big ships of the Spanish fleet. However, the leaders in shipbuilding techniques were then not the English, but the Dutch. During the period from 1450 to 1600, the Dutch invented more new types of ships than any other nations. Simply discovering new parts of the world and oceans was not enough to lay the foundations for domination of the world's oceans and ensure that the sea was chosen as the element of existence.

Not the noble Doges on pompous ships, but the wild adventurers and "froth of the sea", the daring whale hunters and daring sailboat drivers who plied the oceans, were the first heroes of the new maritime existence. In two crucial fields - whaling and shipbuilding - the Dutch were far ahead of the rest.

Here I must first praise the whale and the whale hunter. It is impossible to talk about the great history of the sea and man's choice of the marine element without mentioning the fabulous Leviathan and his equally miraculous pursuit. Of course, this is a huge topic. My faint praise does not reach the whale or the hunter. How can I take the liberty of appropriately describing two maritime wonders - the mightiest of all living beasts and the bravest of all hunters of mankind?

I venture to do so only because I can draw on the authority of two great heralds and proclaimers of both of these³ marvels of the sea, the significant French historian Jules Michelet and the great American writer Herman Melville. In 1861, the Frenchman published a book on the sea, a hymn to the beauty of the sea and the world of its undiscovered wonders, to the riches of the seabed of all continents, which have not yet been possessed and exploited by "the fierce king of this world", man. Melville is to the world's oceans what Homer is to the eastern Mediterranean. In the gripping

Moby Dick (1851), he tells the story of the great whale, Moby Dick, and the captain Ahab hunting him, thus creating the greatest epic of all ocean life. I am, of course, aware that when I occasionally use the phrase “whale fish” instead of “whale” here and sometimes say “whale fish hunter” instead of “whale hunter”, it will be considered amateurish and inaccurate. I will be lectured on the zoological nature of the whale which, as any schoolboy knows, is a mammal, but not a fish. Already in the printed in 1776 “The System of Nature” of the old Linnaeus one could read that the whale fish is warm-blooded, that it breathes with its lungs, and not with its gills, as a usual fish; that the female whale gives birth to a fully developed live calf and for the next year takes care of it with love and feeds it with her milk. I in no way want to argue with the scientists-experts in the vast science of whales, with cetologists, but I want only briefly, without any discussion, to explain why I do not completely reject the old name “whale-fish”. It goes without saying that a whale is not a fish, such as a pike or herring. Nevertheless, by calling this strange monster a fish I expose the absurdity of such a warm-blooded giant being devoted to the elements of the sea, although he is not predisposed to it by his physiological structure. Just imagine for a moment the opposite case: a huge, gill-breathing creature runs on land! The biggest, strongest and most powerful sea beast furrows the oceans from the North to the South, breathes with its lungs and as a mammal brings its living cubs into the world of the sea! Nor is it an amphibian, but it is a true mammal and yet, at the same time, a fish in its element. In the period we study - from 16th to 19th century the hunters of this huge fish were real hunters with capital T. and not banal “whalers” or “whalers”. This is not insignificant to our theme.

The French admirer of the whale Michelet, in his book on the sea, describes the love and family life of whales with particular insight. The male whale is a sagacious lover of the female whale, the most affectionate spouse, the most caring father. He is the most humane of all living creatures, more humane than man, who exterminates the whales with barbaric cruelty. But how innocent were the catching methods in the year 1861, when Michelet wrote about it! Even then the steamships and cannons broke the equality of whale

and man and reduced the poor whale to a convenient object of shooting. What would the humane friend of man and animal lover Michelet have said if he had seen the current industrial production and sale of whale carcasses! For what today, after the World War of 1914 - 1918, has emerged and is increasingly being refined under the name of 'pelagic', deep-sea fishing, can no longer be called not only hunting, but even catching. Today, huge ships of up to 30,000 tonnes displacement, equipped with electrical appliances, cannons, mines, planes and radio equipment, like floating food pots, sail to the South Pole of the Earth in the Polar Sea. There the whale escaped, and there the dead animal is industrially processed right on board the ship. So poor Leviathan would soon disappear from our planet. In 1937-1938 an international agreement was finally reached in London which set out the known rules for whaling, established the catching areas, and provided for other conditions in order to protect at least the surviving whales from further unplanned extermination.

The whale hunters referred to here were, on the contrary, true hunters, not banal trappers, and certainly did not slaughter whales mechanically. They pursued their prey from the waters of the North Sea or from the Atlantic coast in sailing and rowing vessels across the vast expanses of the world's oceans, and the weapon with which they engaged in battle with the mighty and cunning sea giant was a harpoon thrown by the human hand. It was a life-threatening battle between two living creatures, both of them not being fish in the zoological sense, but moving in the elements of the sea. All the weapons used by man in this fight were still powered by man's own muscle power: the sail, the oar and harpoon and the deadly throwing spear. The whale was strong enough to smash ship and boat to pieces with a single blow of his tail. He could counter human cunning with a thousand tricks of his own. Herman Melville, who himself served for many years as a sailor on a whaling ship, describes in his *Moby Dick* how between the hunter and his prey arise, one might say a personal bond and an intimate friendship-hate relationship. Here man is increasingly immersed in the elemental abyss of marine existence, thanks to his struggles with other sea-dwellers. These whale hunters sailed from the north to the south of the globe and from the

Atlantic to the Pacific. All the while following the mysterious ways of the whale, they would discover islands and continents without making a big fuss about it. In Melville, one of these seafarers, on being introduced to the book of Captain Cook, the discoverer of Australia, utters these words: this Cook writes books about things that a whale hunter would not even enter in his ship's log. Michelet asks: Who showed people the ocean ? Who discovered the ocean zones and straits? In a word: Who discovered the globe? The whale and the whale hunter! And all this independently of Columbus and the famous gold seekers, who with much hype search for what has already been found by the noble fishermen of the North, from Brittany and from the Basque Country. Michelet says it and goes on: these whale hunters are the greatest expression of the human spirit. Without the whale, the fishermen would only ever remain on the coast. The whale fish lured them into the oceans and gave them independence from the shore. Thanks to the whale, sea currents were discovered and a passage to the North was found. The whale led the way for us.

Then, in the sixteenth century, two different kinds of hunters on our planet were simultaneously at the mercy of the awakening elements. On land, they were the Russian fur trappers, who, following the fur beast, conquered Siberia and reached the East Asian coast by land; on the sea, the northern and western European whale hunters, who hunted all the world's oceans and, as Michelet rightly points out, made the globe visible. They are the firstborns of a new, spontaneous existence, the first true "children of the sea".

This change of epochs is the most important technological development. Here too, the Dutch are ahead of the rest. In 1600 they were the undisputed masters of shipbuilding. They invented new sailing techniques and new types of sailing ships, which abolished oars and opened up opportunities for navigation and navigation to match the size of the newly discovered world's oceans. '

Around 1595 a new type of ship from the West Frisian town of Hoorn appears in North Holland. It was a boat with straight sails which sailed not only in

a fair wind, like the old sailing boat, but also to the side of the wind and could use the wind in a completely different way than previous ships. Ship tackle and the art of sailing are henceforth perfected to an unprecedented degree. "The shipping of the Middle Ages ends in a catastrophic way", says Bernhard Hageborn, historian of the development of ship types, about this event. Herein lies the true turning point in the history of the relationship between the Earth and the Sea. With this was achieved everything that the material of the ship and the rigging was then possible to achieve. The new turn in shipbuilding techniques did not come until the nineteenth century. "It must have seemed like a revelation," says Hageborn, "to sailors the moment they once left the big sail behind and saw what rich possibilities a small sail offered them. Thanks to this technical achievement, the Dutch became the "carriers" of all European countries. They also inherited the trade of the German Hansa. Even world power Spain was forced to charter Dutch ships to support its transatlantic traffic.

In the 16th century, a new warship also appears, ushering in a new era of naval military strategy. The new ship, equipped with cannons, is fired on from the sides with salvos from the enemy. Thus naval combat becomes long-range artillery combat, requiring great skill to control the sailing ship. Only now can we really talk about naval combat, for, the battle of the crews of rowing galleys, as we have seen, is only a land battle on the ship. Associated with this is a whole new tactic of naval combat and warfare at sea, a new art of "evolution" necessary before, during and after a naval battle. The first book on this new art, scholarly in its modern sense, was published in Lyon in 1697 under the title 'Tart des armecs navales ou trait des evolutions navales'; its author was a French Jesuit priest of the order Paul Ost. It provided a critical review of naval battles and naval maneuvers by the Dutch, English, and French during the war between Louis XIV and the Dutch. Subsequently, other French studies on the subject appeared. It is only in the eighteenth century, in 1782, that an Englishman in the person of Clerc d'Eldin joins the ranks of the famous theorists of naval tactics.

All the nations of Western and Central Europe contributed to the common

achievement of discovering a new land, which had the effect of world European hegemony. The Italians perfected the compass and created navigational charts; the discovery of the Americas was due above all to the power of learning and intelligence of Toscanelli and Columbus. The Portuguese and Spaniards undertook the first great exploratory voyages and sailed around the world. The great German astronomers and wonderful geographers contributed to the new picture of the world; the name "America" was invented in 1507 by the German cosmographer Waltzemüller, and the foreign venture into Venezuela was a great colonial start, which, however, could not cope with Spanish resistance. The Dutch were leading the way in whaling and in ship-building techniques. France was particularly well positioned both because of its geographical location on three coasts - the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic Ocean and the English Channel - and because of its economic potential and the seafaring propensity of its Atlantic coastal population. The French Viking Jean Fleury in 1522 dealt the first tangible blow to Spanish global hegemony by capturing two jewel-laden ships sent by Cortés from America to Spain; the French explorer Jean Cartier discovered Canada, the "new France", as early as 1540 and took possession of it for his king. The Huguenot corsairs, from La Rochelle, were a particularly important part of the awakening maritime energies of the era. France had for many decades surpassed England in the military construction of sailing ships as early as the seventeenth century, under the ingenious naval minister Colbert. The achievements of the English in shipping are, of course, also quite significant. But sail south of the equator English sailors begin only after 1570. It is only in the last third of the sixteenth century that the great awakening of English corsairs to sail across the ocean and to the Americas begins.

All kinds of "sea captors", pirates, corsairs, and adventurers engaged in sea trade constitute, along with whale hunters and sailboat drivers, the striking column of the spontaneous turn to the sea that is taking place throughout the 16th and 17th centuries. Here we have before us the next brave breed of "children of the sea". Among them are famous names, heroes of sea stories and tales of brigands, such as Franz Drake, Heckwins, Sir Walter Ralley or Sir Henry Morgan, made famous in many books; the fortunes of each of

them were indeed quite rich in adventure. They captured Spanish flotillas of silver, a subject that in itself is already quite intriguing. There is an extensive literature on pirates in general and many of the great names in particular, and in English there is even a dictionary about them compiled under the amusing title of *The Pirates' Who' Who*, an encyclopaedia of pirates.

Entire categories of these brave maritime robbers have indeed made history, for they struck the first blows against Spanish hegemony around the world and against Spain's monopoly of trade. Thus, the Huguenot pirates in the French maritime fortress of La Rochelle fought against Spain at the time of Queen Elizabeth, along with the Dutch sea geese. Then it was the so-called Elizabethan corsairs who were instrumental in defeating the Spanish Armada (1588). Queen Elizabeth's corsairs were followed by those of King James I, among them Sir Henry Mainwaring, first one of the worst of the sea robbers, then pardoned by the king in 1616 and finally a victorious pirate, decorated with titles and honours. Then there are the filibusters and wild pirates who set out on their distant voyages from Jamaica and Caribbean waters, the French, the Dutch and the English, among them Sir Henry Morgan, who sacked Panama in 1671, was knighted by King Charles II and became royal governor of Jamaica. Their final feat was the conquest of the Spanish maritime fortress of Cartagena in Colombia, which they and the French royal fleet took by storm in 1697 and plundered in horrific fashion after the French left.

In this kind of "captors of the sea" the maritime element manifests itself. Their heroic epoch lasted for about 150 years, from around 1550 to 1713, i.e. from the start of the struggle of Protestant states against the worldwide domination of Catholic Spain to the conclusion of the Peace of Utrecht. Robbers at sea have always been present on all oceans and at all times, from the above-mentioned pirates who were driven out of the eastern Mediterranean by the Cretan State many millennia ago, to the Chinese junks who seized and plundered merchant ships in East Asian waters as early as 1920-1930. However, the corsairs of the 16th and 17th centuries occupy a special place

in the history of piracy. Their time ended only with the Peace of Utrecht (1713) as the system of European states was then consolidated. The military fleets of the maritime powers could now exercise effective control, and the new, sea-borne global hegemony of England became apparent for the first time. Nevertheless, even before the 19th century there were still corsairs who fought privately, with the permission of their governments. But the organisation of the world progressed, techniques of shipbuilding and navigation improved, became more and more scientific, and piracy is still, as one English naval expert said, "pre-scientific stage of sea wars". No longer relying on his own fist or his own calculations, the pirate has become a miserable criminal. Of course there have always been some exceptions. One such is the French captain Musson, who in 1720 attempted to create an outlandish kingdom of humanity in Madagascar. However, after the Peace of Utrecht the pirate was relegated to the margins of world history. In the eighteenth century he is merely a dissolute subject, a crude criminal type who can still serve as a character in fascinating stories like Stevenson's *The Mysterious Island* Stevenson, but no longer plays any part in history.

In contrast, the corsairs of the 16th and 17th centuries play a very significant role in history. In the worldwide confrontation between England and Spain they are active warriors. With their Spanish enemies they were considered real criminals; they were hanged when they were caught. So, too, their own government sacrificed them in cold blood when they became inconvenient or when foreign policy dictated it. It was often by chance that a corsair would end up a royal nobleman, a dignitary or a pirate sentenced to hang. Besides, different names such as pirate, corsair, privateer, merchant-adventurer are in practice difficult to distinguish and are used one instead of the other. In the proper sense of the word, from a legal point of view, there is a big difference between pirate and corsair. For, unlike a pirate, a corsair has a document confirming his rights, the authority of his government, an official letter of caper from his king. He has the right to fly the flag of his country. The pirate, on the other hand, sails without any legal title. Only a black pirate flag suits him. But however clear and clear this distinction may seem in theory, in practice it is easily blurred. Corsairs often exceeded their rights and sailed

with false privateer's certificates and sometimes with written proxies from non-existent governments.

More significant than all these legal issues is something else. All these Rochellois, naval geese and flibusters, had a political enemy, namely Spain, the great Catholic power. As long as they remain themselves, they thoroughly plunder for the most part only the ships of Catholics, and with a clear conscience regard it as a God-pleasing, God-blessed work. Thus, they enter a huge world-historical front, the front of the struggle of then-world Protestantism against then-world Catholicism. That they kill, plunder and pillage therefore needs no justification. In the overall context of this pivotal epoch they are in any case taking a position and thus gaining their historical significance and their place in history.

The English kings - both Queen Elizabeth and the Stuarts James and Charles - and the English statesmen of this time had no different historical consciousness of their era from that of most of their contemporaries. They pursued their policies, took advantage of the advantages afforded, profited and sought to hold every position. They used the right, if it was on their side, and revolted against injustice and lawlessness, if the right was on the side of their opponents. All this was perfectly natural. Their ideas about God and peace, about justice and law, their awareness of the historical developments that had set in motion were - with such brilliant exceptions as Thomas More, Cardinal Wolsey or Francis Bacon - no more avant-garde than the views of most diplomats and statesmen of any other European country involved in world politics.

Queen Elizabeth is rightly regarded as the great founder of English maritime supremacy. She took up the fight against the world hegemony of Catholic Spain. During her reign, she defeated the Spanish Armada in the English Channel (1588), inspired and honoured such sea heroes as Francis Drake and Walter Rully, and from her hands came in 1600 the trading privileges of the English East India Trading Company, which subsequently brought all of India under English rule. During the 45 years of her rule (1558-1603), England became a wealthy country as it had not been before. Previously

Englishmen had raised sheep and sold wool to Flanders, but now the fabulous trophies of English pirates and corsairs streamed from the seas to the English islands. The queen rejoiced at these treasures - they added to her wealth. In this respect, all through her maidenhood she was engaged in the same activity as the numerous English nobles and bourgeois of her era. They were all involved in the great business of extraction. Hundreds of thousands of Englishmen and Englishwomen then became 'corsairs capitalists', corsairs capitalists. This also refers to the spontaneous turn from land to sea that we are talking about here.

The Killigrew family of Cornwall provides an excellent example of such a flourishing early capitalism, which grew up on pirate booty. Its outlook and way of life give us a picture of the ruling classes and real 'elite' of the time much more vital and accurate than the multitude of service records and official documents due to the era. These Killigrews are typical of their time in a different way from most diplomats, lawyers and crowned poets, and in any case it should be noted that there are prominent intellectuals among this family too, and the name Killigrew is still present in the bibliographical national lexicon of England over a dozen times today. Let us spend some time in this society of the elect.

The Killigrew family lived at Arwenac in Cornwall, South East England. The head of the family at the time of Queen Elizabeth was Sir John Killigrew, Vice-Admiral of Cornwall and Crown Royal Administrator of Penden-nys Castle. He worked closely with William Cecil, Lord Burleigh, the Queen's first minister. Already the vice-admiral's father and uncle and the steward were pirates, and even his mother was prosecuted for piracy, as the English chroniclers reliably tell us. One part of the family worked on the shores of England and the other in Ireland. Numerous cousins and other kin on the Devon and Dorset shores. To this should be added buddies and drinking companions of all kinds. They orchestrated attacks and raids, ambushed ships approaching their shores, monitored the division of booty, and traded shares in profits, posts and positions. The large house in which the Killigrew family lived at Arwenac stood in close proximity to the sea in a deserted

part of Falmouth harbour and had a secret passage to the sea. The only building nearby was the aforementioned Pendennis Castle, the residence of the royal steward. The castle was equipped with a hundred cannons and served as a pirate shelter in case of emergency. By the time the noble Lady Killigrew had become a hard-working and able assistant to her husband, she was already helping her father, a brilliant 'gentleman pirate'. She provided shelter for pirates in her home and was a hospitable hostess. Shelters and places to sleep were set up in all the local ports.

The royal authorities rarely bothered the Killigrew family, much less interfered with their pursuits. Only once, in 1582, did it come to such an interference, of which I would like to speak briefly. A Hanseatic vessel of 144 tons displacement, belonging to two Spaniards, was carried by a storm to the port of Falmouth. As England was not at war with Spain at the time, the Spaniards fearlessly anchored, and just opposite the house in Arwenac. Lady Killigrew spotted the ship from her window, and her keen eye immediately discerned that it was laden with precious Dutch cloth. On the night of January 7, 1582, armed men led by Lady Killigrew attacked the wretched ship, massacred the crew, and threw the corpses into the sea and returned to Arwenac with the valuable Dutch cloth and other booty. The ship itself inexplicably ended up in Ireland. Both Spaniards, the ship's owners, were fortunately not on the boat at the time of the battle, as they had spent the night in a small hotel on shore. They sued at the local English court in Cornwall. After some research, the court concluded that the ship had probably been stolen by unknown criminals, and that the other circumstances of the case could not be investigated. But because the Spaniards had political connections they were able to take the case to a higher authority in London and a second preliminary enquiry was ordered. Lady Killigrew and her assistants were brought to trial elsewhere. She was found guilty and sentenced to death. Two of her accomplices were executed, the lady herself was pardoned at the last moment.

Such is the true story of Lady Killigrew. Even as late as the fourteenth year of Queen Elizabeth's reign most of the tonnage of the English fleet

was engaged in brigandish voyages or in illegal trade transactions, and the combined displacement of vessels in legal trade was barely over 50,000 tons. The Killigrew family is a perfect example of the home front of the great age of sea brigands, in which the old English prophecy of the 13th century came true: "The lion cubs will turn into sea fish". So, the lion cubs at the end of the Middle Ages mainly bred sheep, whose wool was used to make cloth in Flanders. It was not until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that this nation of sheep breeders really turned into a nation of 'captives of the sea' and corsairs, the 'children of the sea'.

The English were relatively late to become successful in ocean voyages. The Portuguese were seafaring a century earlier, but sailed mostly along the coast. From 1492, the Spaniards begin the great Conquista, the conquest of the Americas. They were quickly followed by French sailors, the Huguenots and the English. But it was not until 1553, with the founding of the Muscovy Company, that England embarked on a transatlantic policy that somewhat displaced the other major colonial powers. As mentioned above, it was not until after 1570 that the English began to sail south of the equator. Practically the first evidence that England was beginning to acquire a new English world outlook is Hacklath's Principles of Navigation; it was published in 1589. In whaling and shipbuilding the English, as well as other nations, were also teachers of the Dutch.

Nevertheless, the English were the ones who eventually overtook everyone, defeated all rivals and achieved world domination of the oceans. England became the heir apparent. She became the heir to the great hunters and sailboat drivers, explorers and pioneers of all the other peoples of Europe. British dominion over the land by means of the sea absorbed all the valiant feats and advances in navigation made by German, Dutch, Norwegian and Danish sailors. It is true that the great colonial empires of other European nations continued to exist. Portugal and Spain retained vast possessions across the ocean, but lost maritime dominance and control of maritime communications. With the landing and entrenchment of Cromwell's troops in Jamaica in 1655, England's overall policy of world-ocean orientation and

overseas victory over Spain were decided. Holland, which around 1600 had reached the height of its maritime power, a century later, in 1700, became a largely land-based, continental nation. She had to build strong fortifications in the field and defend against Louis XIV on land, and her governor William III of Orange became King of England in 1689, moved to the islands and pursued an English rather than a Dutch policy proper. France did not withstand the great exodus to the sea that was associated with Huguenot Protestantism. It still belonged to the Roman spiritual tradition, and when, with Henry IV's conversion to Catholicism and thanks to the Night of Bartholomew in 1572, the case was resolved in favour of Catholicism, the final choice was thus ultimately made not in favour of the sea, but of the land. It is true that France had a very large navy and could, as we have seen, deal with England under Louis XV. But once the French king had dismissed his eminent minister of commerce and navy, Colbert, in 1672, it was no longer possible to reverse the choice in favour of land. The prolonged colonial wars of the 18th century only confirmed this. Meanwhile, Germany had lost all its power and strength in the wars of religion and the political failures of the empire of the time. Thus England became the heir, the universal heir, to the great awakening of the European nations. How could this have been possible? It cannot be explained by means of well-known analogies with previous historical examples of maritime domination, nor do parallels with Athens or Carthage, Rome, Byzantium or Venice provide anything. Here we have before us a unique case in its very essence. Its peculiarity, its incomparability, lies in the fact that England accomplished the transformation of the elements at a very different moment in history, in a very different way from that of previous maritime powers. It has indeed separated itself from the land and founded its existence in the elements of the sea. In doing so, it has won not only many naval battles and wars, but it has prevailed in something quite different and infinitely greater - in a revolution, namely, a unique revolution, a planetary revolution of space.

What is this revolution of space?

Man has a certain idea of his "space"; this idea changes under the influence

of major historical transformations. Different forms of life correspond to different spaces. Even within the same era, individuals' everyday worldview differs according to their profession. The citizen of a big city sees the world very differently than the peasant; the whale hunter has a very different view of life than the opera singer, and the aviator not only sees the world and life in a different light, but also in different measures, depths and horizons. The differences in perceptions of space become even deeper and more significant when comparing whole peoples and different eras of human history. Scientific stories about space can mean almost as much and as little here. For centuries, scientists, who at that time already considered the Earth to be a sphere, were treated as insane and pests. In modern times, different sciences with increasing specialisation have also developed their own particular notions of space. Geometry, physics, psychology and biology are following peculiar, divergent paths here. If you ask scientists, they will tell you that mathematical space is something quite different from the space of the electromagnetic field, the latter, in turn, is quite different from space in the psychological or biological sense. This gives half a dozen notions of space. Any wholeness is lacking here and the danger of fragmenting and obfuscating an important issue in the isolated coexistence of different concepts lies in wait. Nineteenth-century philosophy and epistemology also do not provide any overarching and simple answer and practically leave us at an impasse.

But the states and forces of history do not wait for the data of science, just as Christopher Columbus did not wait for Copernicus. Every time new lands and oceans are brought into view by the new attack of historical forces, through the release of new energies, the spaces of historical existence are also changed. Then new scales and dimensions of political-historical action, new sciences, new dispensations, new lives of new or reborn peoples arise. This diffusion may be so intensive and striking that not only the measures, scales and proportions change, not only the outer eye of man, but also the very structure of notions of space. Then we can already speak of the revolution of space. Yet, in most cases, every historical change is connected with a modification of the picture of space. This is the true essence of the comprehensive political, scientific and cultural transformation

then unfolding.

We can quickly clarify this general point for ourselves with three historical examples: the consequences of Charlemagne's conquest, the Roman Empire in the first century AD and the impact of the Crusades on the development of Europe.

11

At the time of Alexander the Great's conquests, the Greeks were faced with a vast new spatial horizon. The culture and art of Hellenism are a consequence of it. The great philosopher Aristotle, a contemporary of this change in space, saw the inhabited world become increasingly connected to the East and to the West. Aristarchus of Samos, who lived some time later (310 - 230), already assumed that the sun was a fixed star at the centre of the earth's orbit. The city Alexandria on the Nile, founded by Alexander, was a centre of startling discoveries in technical, mathematical and physical fields. Euclid, the founder of Euclidean geometry, taught here; Chiron carried out astonishing technical inventions here. Archimedes of Syracuse, the inventor of great fighting machines and discoverer of natural laws, studied here, and Eratosthenes (275 - 195), head of the Library of Alexandria, at that time correctly calculated the location of the equator and scientifically proved the shape of the Earth as a sphere. Such was the foreshadowing of the Copernican teaching. Yet the Hellenistic world was not vast enough for a planetary spatial revolution. Its knowledge remained the domain of scientists, for it had not yet absorbed the world ocean into its existential reality. When, three hundred years later, Caesar, coming out of Rome, conquered Gaul and England, the North-West was in sight and access to the Atlantic Ocean opened up. This was the first step towards the current notion of European space. In the first century of the Roman era of the Caesars, especially, of course, in the time of Nero, the awareness of a profound change became so powerful and palpable that, at least in the prevailing mindset, one could already speak of an almost revolutionary change in the picture of space. This historical moment falls in the first century A.D. and therefore deserves special attention. The horizon stretched eastwards and westwards, northwards

and southwards. Wars of conquest and civil war occupied spaces from Spain to Persia, from England to Egypt. Distant regions and peoples came into contact with each other and found the unity of a common political destiny. Soldiers from all parts of the empire, from Germany and from Syria, from Africa or from Illyria, could make their general a Roman emperor. The Isthmus of Corinth was cut through, ships went round the Arabian Peninsula from the south, Nero sent a scientific expedition to the sources of the Nile. Written evidence of this expansion of space is Agrippa's map of the world and Strabo's geography. It was no longer only astronomers or mathematicians who recognised that the Earth was a sphere. The famous philosopher Seneca, teacher, educator and: finally the victim of Nero, captured then in wonderful words and poetic lines the almost planetary consciousness of the era. He pointed out with all clarity that it was enough to sail from the outermost coast of Spain for not very many days under his own, passing, that is, east wind, in order to reach India, situated in the East, on the way to the West. Elsewhere, in the tragedy *Medea*, he utters a startling prophecy in verse:

The hot Indus and the cold Arake touch, The Persians drink from the Elbe and the Rhine. Fetid will reveal new worlds (*novos orbes*), And Thule will no longer be the ultimate limit of the earth.

I quoted these lines because they express that overarching sense of space that was present in the first century AD. For the beginning of our era was indeed the boundary of epochs, with which was associated not only the consciousness of the fullness of time, but also the consciousness of a filled earthly space and planetary horizon. But at the same time Seneca's words span a mysterious bridge into the New Age and the Age of Discovery; for they have survived and reached us through the centuries-long twilight of space and through the shallowness of the European Middle Ages. They conveyed to thinking men a sense of greater space and universal vastness, and even contributed to the discovery of America. Like many of his contemporaries, Christopher Columbus knew the words of Seneca; they prompted him to embark on a bold voyage to the New World. He intended to sail towards the

West and reach the East, and indeed he did. The expression "New World", new world, *novus orbus*, which Seneca uses, was immediately applied to the newly discovered America.

The demise of the Roman Empire, the spread of Islam and the invasions by the Arabs and Turks caused centuries of spatial twilight and the shoaling of Europe. Isolation from the sea, no navy, and complete continental insularity characterised the early Middle Ages and its system of feudalism. Between 500 and 1100, Europe became a feudal-agrarian continental mass; Europe's ruling class, the feudal lords, entrusted their entire spiritual culture, including reading and writing, to the Church and the clergy. The famous rulers and heroes of this era could neither read nor write; they had a monk or chaplain for that purpose. In a maritime empire the rulers probably could not have remained illiterate as long as they did in such a purely material land mass. However, as a result of the Crusades, French, English and German knights became acquainted with the countries of the Near East. In the North, new horizons were opened by the expansion of the German Hansa and the spread of the German Knights' Order; here a system of transport and trade communications known as the "world economy of the Middle Ages" emerged.

This spatial expansion was also a cultural transformation of the deepest kind. New forms of political life are emerging all over Europe. In France, England and Sicily a centralised government, in some respects a precursor to the modern state, is emerging. A new urban culture emerges in upper and central Italy. Universities develop and teach theology and a hitherto unknown jurisprudence; the revival of Roman law creates a new educated legal layer and undermines the clerical monopoly on education which was typical of the feudal Middle Ages. In the new, Gothic art, in architecture, in plastic arts, in painting, the powerful rhythm of movement replaces the static space of the preceding Romanesque art and puts in its place a dynamic field of forces, the space of movement and gesture. The Gothic vault is a structure in which the parts and elements are balanced by their weight and hold each other: in contrast to the immobile, heavy masses of the Romanesque

buildings, a completely new spatial feeling is present here. But compared to the space of the ancient temple and the space of the subsequent Renaissance architecture, Gothic art also reveals an inherent force and movement which transforms space.

12

Other historical examples can be found, but they all pale in the face of the deepest and most consequential change in the planetary picture of the world in all known world history. This change takes place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, at the time of the discovery of America and the first circumnavigation of the globe. A new world, a New World, is now emerging, in the literal sense of the word, and the universal worldview of the Western and Central European peoples of humanity is fundamentally changing. It is the first real spatial revolution in an all-encompassing sense, involving the whole earth, the whole world and all humanity.

It was incomparable to any other. It was not merely a particularly vast quantitative expansion of the geographical horizon, which itself came about as a result of the discovery of new parts of the world and new oceans. A far greater change in the collective perception of humanity was the overall picture of our planet, and thus the overall astronomical view of the entire universe. For the first time in history, man could hold a real, whole globe as if it were a ball. The idea that the Earth should be in the shape of a ball seemed to man of the Middle Ages and even to Martin Luther an amusing and unserious fantasy. Now the spherical shape of the Earth has become a tangible fact, an irrefutable experience and an undeniable scientific truth. Now the Earth, so immobile before, also revolved around the Sun. But even this was not the real, fundamental transformation of space that was to come. What was decisive was the breakthrough into space and the conception of infinite empty space.

Copernicus was the first to prove scientifically that the Earth revolves around the sun. His work on the rotations of the celestial orbits, *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium*, was published in 1543. Although he thus changed the

whole picture of our solar system, he still held firmly to the view that the universe as a whole, the cosmos, is a limited space. Thus, the world in a global cosmic sense had not yet changed, nor had the idea of space itself changed with it. A few decades later, the boundaries had fallen. In a philosophical sense Giordano Bruno suggested that our solar system (in which the planet Earth revolves around the Sun) is but one of the many solar systems of the infinite starry sky. Galileo's scientific experiments gave such philosophical speculations the status of mathematically provable truth. Kepler calculated the paths of the planets, although he himself was horrified at the thought of such infinite spaces, where planetary systems move without any centre. With the advent of Newton's doctrine, a new conception of space became firmly established throughout free-thinking Europe. While the forces of attraction and repulsion cancel each other out, the cluster of matter, the celestial bodies move in infinite, empty space according to the laws of gravity.

In this way, people can imagine empty space, which was previously impossible, even though some philosophers have speculated about "emptiness". People used to be afraid of emptiness; they suffered from the so-called horror vacui (fear of space). From now on, people have forgotten their fear and no longer find it special that they themselves and their universe exist in emptiness. This scientifically proven representation of the universe in an infinite, empty space even made Enlightenment writers of the 18th century, and above all Voltaire, proud. But try to imagine a really empty space even once! Not only airless, but devoid of any delicate and animated matter, an absolutely empty space! Try for once to really distinguish in your mind space and matter, to separate them from each other and to think of one without the other! You might as well try to imagine absolute Nothingness. The Enlightenment activists were very amused about this horror vacui. But it was probably just an understandable fear of nothingness and of the emptiness of death, a terror in the face of the nihilistic way of thinking and of nihilism in general.

Such a change, which is present in the idea of an infinite, empty space,

cannot be explained simply by the simple geographical expansion of the oikoumene. It is of such a fundamental and revolutionary character that it also makes it possible to say something quite the contrary, namely that the discovery of new continents and the first voyages around the Earth were merely external discoveries and consequences of deeper changes. For this reason alone, the landing on an unknown island may have triggered an entire epoch of discovery. Strangers from the West and the East often landed on the shores of the American continent. It is known that Vikings from Greenland reached the shores of America as early as about 1000, and the Indians, whom Columbus discovered, also migrated to America from somewhere. But America was not 'discovered' until 1492 by Columbus. The "pre-Columbian" discoveries not only did not contribute to the planetary spatial revolution, but had nothing to do with it at all. Otherwise, the Aztecs would not have stayed in Mexico, and the Incas in Peru; one day they would have appeared in Europe with a map of the globe in their hands, and not we would have discovered them, but rather they would have discovered us. For the revolution of space to take place, it requires more than simply landing in a heretofore unknown terrain. It requires a change in the conception of space that embraces all levels and areas of human existence. What this means can be understood by examining the unusual turn of the century, which took place between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

During these centuries of epochal change, European humanity acquires a new understanding of space in all forms of its creative spirit. Renaissance painting abolishes the space of medieval Gothic painting; artists now place the people and objects they paint inside a space that gives an empty bottomlessness in perspective. People and things rest henceforth and move henceforth within the space. Compared to the space of a Gothic painting this really means a different world. The fact that artists now see differently, that their vision has changed, is for us filled with the deepest meaning¹. For great artists do not just paint something beautiful for someone else. Art is a historical step in the awareness of space, and a true artist is the person who sees people and objects better and more correctly than other people, more correctly, above all, in the sense of the historical truth of his own epoch. But

it is not only in painting that a new space emerges. Renaissance architecture creates its buildings with a classically geometrical layout which differs from the Gothic style; its plastics are free to place sculptures of human figures in space, while the sculptures of the Middle Ages are placed at the columns and in the corners of the buildings. While Baroque architecture is again in the dynamics of movement and striving, and as such retains a certain link with the Gothic, it is still firmly embedded in the new, modern space brought about by the spatial revolution and which was decisively influenced by the Baroque style itself. Music extracts its melodies and harmonies from the old tonalities and places them in the sound space of our so-called tonal system. Theatre and opera allow their characters to move around in the empty depths of the stage space, which is separated by a curtain from the auditorium space. Thus, without exception, all the spiritual currents of these two centuries - Renaissance, Humanism, Reformation, Counter-Reformation and Baroque - in their own way participated in the totality of this spatial revolution.

It would not be a great exaggeration to say that the new understanding of space encompasses all areas of human life, all forms of existence, all kinds of human creativity, art, science and technology. A huge change in the geographical shape of the Earth is but the outward aspect of a profound transformation, marked by such a promising and fraught with many consequences phrase as the "spatial revolution". From now on, what has been called the rational superiority of the European, the spirit of Europeanism and "Occam's rationalism", is inescapable. It manifests itself in the peoples of Western and Central Europe, destroys medieval forms of human society, forms new states, fleets and armies, invents new machines and mechanisms, enslaves non-European peoples and puts them before a dilemma: either embrace European civilisation or sink to the level of mere colony people.

13

Every habitual ordering is an ordering of space. The composition, the constitution of a country or part of the world, is spoken of as its basic, primary ordering, its *nomos*¹⁰.

So, a real, true primary ordering is based in its most important essence on certain spatial boundaries and limitations, on certain measures and a certain division of land. At the beginning of every great epoch there is therefore a great seizure of land. Particularly any significant change and shift in the face of the earth

The Greek noun Nomos comes from the Greek verb Nemein; like this verb, it has three meanings. First, Nemein means "to take". Therefore Nomos means, firstly, "to take", "to seize". Just as the Greek Legein-Logos corresponds to the German Sprechen-Sprache, so the Greek Nemein-Nomos corresponds to the German take-over, capture. Seizure is firstly the seizure of land, later also the seizure of the sea, the conquest of the sea, as much has been said in our contemplation of world history, and in the field of industry it means the seizure of industry, that is, the seizure of the industrial means of production.

Secondly, Neimen means: division and distribution of what has been taken (what has been taken). Thus the second meaning of Nomos: the basic division and distribution of land, territory and the order of property rights resting thereon.

The third meaning is as follows: exploitation, i.e. the use, processing and realisation of the land obtained in the division, production and consumption. Capture - Distribution - Use are, in this sequence, the three basic concepts of each particular arrangement. For more on the meaning of Nomos, see *Der Nomos der Erde*. Köln. 1950 (L. Auflage. Berlin. 1974) is connected with changes in world politics and with a new redivision of the world, a new land grabbing.

A spatial revolution as striking and unprecedented as that which took place in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries must have resulted in an equally unprecedented and unparalleled land grab. The European peoples, who then discovered new, seemingly endless spaces and ventured into the distance, treated the non-European and non-Christian peoples they discovered as derelict goods, which became the property of the first European invader.

All invaders, whether Catholic or Protestant, referred to their mission to spread Christianity among non-Christian peoples. Such a mission, however, could have been attempted without conquest and plunder. No other justification was found. Some monks, like the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria in his lecture on the Indians (*De Indis* 1532), argued that the right of nations to their territory did not depend on their religion and defended the rights of the Indians with surprising candour. This does not change anything in the overall historical picture of European colonial conquests. Later, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the task of the Christian mission became the task of spreading European civilisation among uncivilised peoples. Out of such justifications emerged the Christian-European international law, that is, the community of Christian nations in Europe opposed to the rest of the world. They formed a "community of nations", an interstate order. International law was based on the distinction between Christian and non-Christian peoples, or, a century later, between civilized (in the Christian-European sense) and uncivilized peoples. An uncivilized people in this sense could not become a member of this international legal community; it was not a subject but only an object of this international law, that is, it belonged to one of the civilized peoples as a colony or a colonial protectorate.

Of course, you should not imagine the "community of Christian-European nations" as a herd of peaceful sheep. They fought bloody wars amongst themselves. Still, this does not negate the historical fact of the existence of Christian-European civilisational unity and order. World history is a history of colonial conquests, and in every land conquest the conquerors not only negotiated, but also argued, often even by means of bloody civil wars. This is also true of most colonial conquests. Moreover, wars are waged with the greater intensity, the greater the value of the object of conquest. Here we are talking about the conquest of the New World, the New World. For a century, the Spanish and French slaughtered the indigenous population in the most brutal manner, for example in Florida, sparing neither women nor children. The Spanish and the English fought a century-long and gruelling war among themselves, in which the violence and atrocities of which people

were capable towards each other seemed to have reached the highest possible level. They did not feel any remorse in using non-Europeans, Indians or Muslims as allies, either explicitly or implicitly. The outbursts of hatred were extraordinary; one another was called murderers, thieves, rapists and pirates. The only accusation missing was the one which was usually readily made against the Indians; Christian Europeans did not accuse each other of cannibalism. Otherwise, all the richness of language is drawn upon to denote the worst, deadliest enmity. And yet this loses all significance in view of the all-conquering reality of the joint European colonisation of the new world, the New World. The meaning and essence of Christian-European international law, its original ordering consisted precisely in the division and distribution of a previously unknown land. Among themselves, the European nations were, without reasoning, united in the fact that they regarded the non-European territory of the land as a colonial territory, that is, as an object of their conquest and use. This aspect of historical development is so important that the Age of Discovery can just as well, and probably even more accurately, be described as the age of colonial conquest, the conquest of new lands. War," says Heraclitus, "unites, but truth is a quarrel.

14

The Portuguese, Spanish, French, Dutch and English fought amongst themselves to divide the new land. The struggle was not only fought by force of arms; it also took the form of a diplomatic and legal dispute to obtain a more favourable property right. In this matter, as opposed to the natives, extraordinary generosity and magnanimity were of course possible. They landed on the shore, erected a cross or carved the king's coat of arms into a tree, set up a pole with the coat of arms brought with them, or placed the coat of arms in a hole between the tree roots. The Spaniards liked to solemnly proclaim to a crowd of fleeing natives that this country belonged henceforth to the Crown of Castile. Such symbolic usurpations were meant to secure legal title to vast islands and whole continents. No government, be it Portuguese, had ever respected the rights of the natives and indigenous people on their own territory. The other issue was the dispute between

the European colonising peoples. Here everyone referred to whatever legal document was in their hands at the time and, if it proved advantageous, to treaties with the natives and their chiefs as well.

As long as Portugal and Spain, the two Catholic powers, defined the state of the world, the Pope could act as the creator of legal acts, initiator of new colonial conquests and arbitrator in the dispute between the colonial powers. Already in 1493, almost a year after the discovery of America, the Spaniards succeeded in having the then Pope Alexander VI issue an edict in which the Pope, by virtue of his apostolic authority, granted the King of Castile and Leon and his successors the newly discovered West Indian countries as secular fiefdoms to the Church. In this edict there was a definite line across the Atlantic Ocean a hundred miles west of the Azores and Cape Verde Islands. Spain received from the Pope all lands discovered to the west of this line as a fief. In the following year Spain and Portugal agreed in a treaty at Tordesillas that all lands east of the line should belong to Portugal. Thus the division of the New World began immediately, although Columbus had discovered only a few islands and coastal areas. At that time, no one could yet imagine the real picture of the whole Earth, but the redivision of the Earth began in full and according to all the rules. The papal dividing line of 1493 was at the start of a struggle for a new original order, a new *nomos* of the Earth.

For more than a century the Spanish and Portuguese relied on papal authorisations, (in their quest) to deflect all the claims of the French, Dutch and English who followed him. Brazil, discovered by Cabral in 1500, became naturally the property of Portugal, for this protruding part of the west coast of America fell into the eastern, Portuguese hemisphere due to the later shift of the dividing line towards the west. The other colonising powers, however, did not feel bound by the terms of the agreement between Portugal and Spain, and the authority of the pope was not enough to instil in them respect for the colonial monopoly of the two Catholic powers. Thanks to the Reformation, the peoples, who had embraced Protestantism, broke openly with all dependence on the Roman throne. Thus the struggle

to colonise a new land became a struggle between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, between the universal Catholicism of the Spanish and the universal Protestantism of the Huguenots, the Dutch and the English.

15

In contrast to the natives of the newly discovered countries, the Christian colonisers did not form a united front with one another, for in this case there was no common enemy with which to fight. The more fierce, but also the more historically significant, the more pronounced and formalised was the now developing religious war between the Christian colonising peoples, the worldwide battle between Catholicism and Protestantism. Thus outlined and with these participants it appears as a religious war, and as such it indeed was. But this does not tell the whole story. In its true light, it can only be seen in its entirety when we pay attention to the opposing elements and to the separation between the world of the open sea and the world of the solid earth, which was beginning at that time.

Some of the participants in this great religious struggle served as prototypical stage characters for great writers. A favourite subject of playwrights was the confrontation between King Philip II of Spain and Queen Elizabeth of England. Both of these characters appear separately in various of Schiller's tragedies; their direct confrontation is repeatedly described within the same play. This provides excellent material for spectacular theatrical scenes. But it is impossible to grasp in this way the underlying contradictions, the original situations of friendship-hate, the last elemental forces and confrontations of the elements. There are no stage characters for this in Germany at the time. Only one German from this very poorly acted era in German life (1550-1618) was the hero of a major tragedy: King Rudolf II. You probably haven't heard much about him, and indeed, it can't be said that he lives on in the historical memory of the German people. Nevertheless, his name belongs in this context and the major German playwright Franz Grill-Parzer places him with good reason in the centre of action in his tragedy *The Murder of Habsburg*. But the whole problematic and all the greatness of both Grillparzer's tragedy itself and of his characters lies precisely in the fact that

Rudolf the Second was not an active hero, but a kind of apprehender, a retarder. There was something of the "catechon" in him, a concept we have already mentioned once in a different context. But what could Rudolf do at all in the situation in which Germany then found itself? The mere fact that he realised that there was no foreign policy threat to Germany was already a great deal, and the whole achievement was only that he actually delayed the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War by decades.

The peculiarity of the German situation at that time was that Germany was undecided about its allies and could not take sides in this religious war. It contained within itself a confrontation between Catholicism and Protestantism, but this internal German contradiction was something other than the worldwide, decisive for the colonisation of the New World confrontation between Catholicism and Protestantism. Germany was, after all, the birthplace of Luther and the birthplace of the Reformation. But the struggle of the colonial powers long ago overcame the original opposition between Catholicism and Protestantism and, passing over the intra-German issue, reached a much more precise and profound opposition between the teachings of Jesuitism and Calvinism. It was now a distinction between friend and foe, serving as a yardstick for all world politics.

The Lutheran German princes and estates, above all the Protestant ruler of the empire, the Elector of Saxony, also tried to remain loyal to the Catholic king. When a military alliance of evangelical German estates, the so-called Union, emerged under the onslaught of the Calvinists, and Catholic estates formed a 'counter' front, the so-called League, the Elector of Saxony, a Lutheran, did not know which side he should align himself with. As early as 1612 he had already been in talks about joining the Catholic League. The Lutherans' hatred of the Calvinists was no less than their hatred of the Papists, and no less than the Catholics' hatred of the Calvinists. This is not only because the Lutherans in practice generally followed the principle of submission to authority more than the much more active Calvinists. The real reason lies in the fact that Germany was at that time disengaged from the European colonisation of the New World and was forcibly dragged by

external forces into the world clash of Western European colonial powers. At the same time, in the south-east it was threatened by the advancing Turks. The Jesuits and Calvinists of Spain, Holland and England confronted Germany with alternatives completely alien to the German development proper. Non-Jesuit Catholics and non-Calvinist Lutherans, as the German princes and estates were, tried to avoid taking part in a dispute that was inherently foreign to them. But this required determination and a great deal of their own strength. In the absence of these they found themselves in a situation which is best described as "passive neutrality". The consequence was that Germany found itself in a battlefield of internally alien transatlantic forces for the colonies without really participating in the war. Calvinism was a new militant religion; the awakening of the elements of the sea took hold of it as a commensurate faith. It became the faith of the French Huguenots, the Dutch freedom fighters and the English Puritans. It was also the creed of the Grand Elector of Brandenburg, one of the few German rulers who knew a taste for sea battles and colonies. Inland Calvinist communities in Switzerland, Hungary and elsewhere played no part in world politics unless they were connected with the maritime energies in question.

All non-Calvinists were horrified by Calvinist doctrine, and above all by the harsh belief in the election of men from eternity, in "predestination to salvation". But to put it in secular terms, belief in predestination is merely an extremely heightened consciousness of belonging to a world other than this - condemned to destruction and depraved. In the language of contemporary sociology, it is the highest degree of self-consciousness of an elite that is confident in its position, confident that its hour has passed. More simply, humanly speaking, it is the certainty of being saved, and salvation is, after all, the defining meaning of any idea of all world history. The Dutch Gezi sang their beautiful song full of this certainty:

"The land will become the sea, the land will become the sea, but it will be free".

When the elemental energies of the sea were awakened in the sixteenth century, their effect was so powerful that they quickly began to shape the

political history of the world. At this point they had to speak the spiritual language of their time. They could no longer remain mere whale hunters, fishermen and "captors of the sea". They had to find a spiritual ally, an ally most radical and courageous, someone who would truly do away with the images of the previous era. This could not be the German Lutheranism of the time. The latter was evolving with a tendency towards territoriality and general shirking. In any case, the decline of the Hanseatic League and the end of German domination of the Baltic coincides as clearly in Germany with the age of Luther as the rise of world power of Holland and the great decision of Cromwell coincides with the age of Calvinism. And something else comes to mind. Most previous historical studies are still influenced by land study methods. They always have in mind only the solid earth and the development of states, in Germany even only the development of territories and states and they often limit themselves in their subject matter to small states and small areas. But if we turn our eyes to the sea, we immediately see a meeting, a coincidence in time, or, if I may put it that way, a world-historical brotherhood, linking political Calvinism with the awakening maritime energies of Europe. The religious wars and theological slogans of this epoch also contain in their essence a clash of elemental forces that influenced the transfer of world-historical existentialism from land to sea.

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While on the coastal side of the historical accomplishment, another, equally important part of the new frontier of our planet was being completed on the sea. This took place through the English conquest of the sea. At sea it was the result of the pan-European awakening of these centuries. It defined the basic line of the first planetary ordering of space, the essence of which was the separation of the earth from the sea. The solid earth now belongs to a dozen sovereign states, the sea belongs to all or at last, in fact, only to one state: England. The demarcation of the solid earth, the land, is that it is divided into territories of states; the open sea, on the other hand, is free, that means free of state formations and not subject to any territorial supremacy. These are the decisive facts of the dispensation of space, on the

basis of which Christian European international law has developed over the last three centuries. This was the basic law, the *nomos* of the land of this era.

It is only in the light of this original fact of British conquest of the sea and separation of the sea from the land that many famous and oft-quoted words and expressions take on their true meaning. Such, for example, is Sir Walter Ralley's statement: "He who dominates the sea dominates world trade, and he who dominates world trade owns all the wealth of the world and in fact the world itself." Or, "All trade is world trade; all world trade is sea trade." This also includes the words about freedom spoken at the height of English maritime and world power: "All world trade is free trade." This is not to say that it is all so wrong, but it all refers to a certain era and to a certain international situation and becomes unfair when one tries to make absolute and eternal truths out of it. Above all, however, the land-sea divide is revealed by comparing land and sea wars. Of course, land warfare and sea warfare have always differed from each other strategically and tactically. However, their opposition henceforth becomes an expression of different worlds and opposite legal norms.

Since the sixteenth century the states of the European mainland have developed certain ways of waging land war, based on the idea of war as a relationship between states. On both sides of the front line is a state-structured, military power, and armies fight each other in open field combat. Only the troops engaged in the battle are confronted as enemies, while civilians do not take part in the hostilities. They are not the enemy, and are not considered as such, as long as they do not take part in the war. In contrast, a war at sea involves the destruction of the enemy's commerce and economy. The enemy in such a war is not only the belligerent enemy, but also any subject of a hostile state and, finally, even a neutral country trading with the enemy and having economic relations with him. Land warfare tends to have a decisive open field battle. Of course, in a war at sea, it can also come to a naval battle, but its typical means and methods are to bombard and blockade the enemy's coast and to seize enemy and neutral merchant ships according to

the law of prizes. By their very nature these typical means of naval warfare are directed against both military persons and civilians. Especially the food blockade, which starves the entire population of the blockaded area equally, without distinguishing between military and civilian, men and women, the elderly and children.

It is really not just two sides of the international legal order, but two completely different worlds. But since the British conquest of the sea, the English and the peoples who were at the mercy of English ideas had become accustomed to this state of affairs. The idea that a continental power would exercise world domination over the entire globe was unheard of and intolerable to their perception of the world. The idea of a world power based on a world existence detached from the land and embracing the oceans was another matter. A small island on the north-western edge of Europe became the centre of a world empire because it had broken away from the land and made the decisive choice for the sea. In a purely maritime existence, it had found a means of world domination that stretched to all ends of the earth. After the separation of earth from sea and the strife between the two elements had once become the basic law of the planet, on this foundation was erected a vast framework of scholarly opinions, arguments and scientific systems by which men justified the wisdom and reasonableness of this state of affairs, overlooking the primary fact of British conquest of the sea and the temporal conditioning of that fact. Such systems had been developed by great scientists, political economists, lawyers and philosophers, and to most of our great-grandfathers it all seemed perfectly obvious. They were no longer in a position to imagine any other kind of economic science or international law. Here you can see that the massive Leviathan also has a power over the minds and souls of people. And this is the most amazing thing about his power.

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England is an island. But only by becoming the bearer and focus of the spontaneous exodus from the world of the solid earth to the world of the high seas, and only as the heir to all the sea energies released at that time,

did it become the island that is meant when it is stressed over and over again that England is an island. And it was only by becoming an island in a new, hitherto unknown sense of the word that England effected the seizure of the world's oceans and won in that first phase of the planetary revolution of space.

It goes without saying that England is an island. But the mere establishment of this geographical fact still says very little. There are many islands whose political fortunes are quite different. Sicily is also an island, as is Ireland, Cuba, Madagascar, Japan. How many contradictory tendencies of world history unite already in these few names, each of which names an osier! In a sense all continents including the biggest ones are only islands, and the whole inhabited earth is washed by the ocean, as the ancient Greeks already knew. England herself has been an island in the same geographical sense, through all the vicissitudes of history, ever since she was separated from the mainland thousands of years ago, probably 18,000 years before Christ. It has been an island when it was settled by the Celts, when it was conquered for Rome by Julius Caesar, during the Norman Conquest (1066) and during the time of the Maid of Orleans (1431) when the English held much of France.

The inhabitants of this island had a sense of island security. From the Middle Ages there are wonderful expressions and lines of poetry that compare England to a fortified castle, washed by the sea like a defensive moat. In Shakespeare's poems, this insular sense of self finds its most beautiful and famous expression :

"This second Eden, this crowned island, is almost paradise,

A bastion built by nature itself,

This pearl in a sea-silver setting,

Which serves as a wall and moat, guarding the house."

It is clear that the English often quote lines like this, and that especially the expression 'this pearl in a sea-silver setting' may have become a winged

phrase.

But these kinds of expressions of English island consciousness refer to the old island. The island is still seen as an area of land separated from the solid earth and washed by the sea. Island consciousness is still purely terrestrial, land-based and territorial. It even appears that island consciousness manifests itself as a particularly pronounced territorial sense of land. It would be a fallacy to consider any islander, any Englishman even today as a born "captive of the sea". We have already seen what a change it was that a nation of shepherders was transformed in the sixteenth century into a nation of children of the sea. It was a fundamental transformation of the political-historical essence of the island itself. It consisted in the fact that the land was now seen only in terms of the sea, the island from a detached piece of land became part of the sea, a ship or, more precisely, a fish.

It is difficult for a continental observer to imagine a consistently maritime view of things, a purely maritime perception of the land. Our everyday language, when forming its meanings, has as its starting point naturally the land. We have already seen this at the very beginning of our contemplation. The image of our planet is an image of the earth; we forget that it can also be an image of the sea. In connection with the sea we speak of seaways, although there are no paths or roads as on land, but only lines of communication. We imagine a ship on the high seas as a piece of land that sails on the sea, as a "floating section of state territory", as it is called in the language of international law. We imagine a warship as a floating fortress, and an island like England as a castle surrounded by the sea like a moat. Men of the sea regard all this as utterly false interpretations, the figment of the imagination of land rats. A ship is as little like a piece of land as a fish is like a swimming dog. To the view defined only by the sea, the solid earth, the land is nothing but the shore, the foreshore plus "hinterland" (unclaimed territory). Even the whole earth, seen only from the perspective of the open sea, based on a purely maritime existence, appears as a mere collection of objects thrown by the sea to the shore, the eruption of the sea. A typical example of this way of thinking, amazing for us, but typical for the people

of the sea is the statement of Edmund Bergs: "Spain is nothing other than a whale washed ashore in Europe". All substantial relations with the rest of the world, and especially with the states of the European mainland, were to be changed by England's transition to a purely maritime existence. All the measures and proportions of English policy were henceforth incomparable and incompatible with those of the other European countries. England became ruler of the seas and created a British global empire, reaching to all corners of the world and based on English maritime supremacy over the earth. The English world thought in terms of naval bases and lines of communication. What had been for other peoples a soil and a homeland, seemed to this world a mere hinterland, an unclaimed territory. The word continental took on the additional meaning of backwardness, and the people of the continent became "backward people", backward people. But the island itself, the metropolis of such a world empire based on a purely maritime existence, is thereby stripped of its roots, detached from the soil. It finds itself able to sail to another part of the earth like a ship or a fish, for it is still only the transportable centre of a world empire scattered over all the continents. Disraeli, the leading English politician of Queen Victoria's reign, said with reference to India that the British Empire was an Asian rather than a European state. He was also the one who in 1847, in his novel *Tankred*, suggested that the English queen should settle in India. "The queen should equip a large fleet, set sail with her retinue and all the ruling class, and move her imperial residence from London to Delhi. There she will find a huge ready-made empire, a first-class army and large permanent revenues."

Disraeli was the Abravanel (cf. above) of the nineteenth century. Some of what he said about Judaism and Christianity and race as the key to all world history was assiduously propagated by non-Jews and non-Christians. So he knew what he was talking about when he made such suggestions. He felt that the island was no longer part of Europe. The fate of the island was no longer necessarily linked to European destiny. He could set sail and change his location as the metropolis of a world maritime empire. A ship could unmoor and anchor in another part of the world. The huge fish, Leviathan, could set sail and explore other oceans.

After the Battle of Waterloo, when Napoleon was defeated in a 20-year war, there was an era of undisputed English maritime dominance. This era lasted throughout the 19th century. It reached its climax in the middle of the century, after the Crimean War, which ended with the Confederation of Paris in 1856. The era of free trade was also a time when English industrial and economic superiority flourished freely. Free seas and free world trade, the free market combined in a vision of freedom, of which only England could be the embodiment and guardian. It is also during this era that the admiration and emulation of the English example reaches its climax throughout the world.

The inner dimension has touched the elemental essence of the enormous Leviathan. At the time, however, this went unnoticed. On the contrary, due to the amazing rise of the world economy, the positivist era, blinded by fast-growing wealth, believed that this wealth would continue to grow and would end in a millennial paradise on earth. However, the change that touched Leviathan's being was precisely the result of the Industrial Revolution. The latter began in England in the 18th century with the invention of machines. The first coking blast furnace (1735), the first cast steel (1740), the steam engine (1768), the spinning machine (1770), the mechanical loom (1786), all first in England - these are some examples that make clear how great was the 'industrial superiority of England over all other nations. The invention of the steamer and the railway followed in the nineteenth century. Here, too, England was ahead of the rest. A vast maritime power became at the same time a vast machine power. Its dominance of the world now seemed final.

We have already seen above how much progress there was in the development of naval affairs in the short period from the battle of the galleys at Lepanto (1571) to the destruction of the Spanish Armada in the English Channel (1588). An equally significant step was taken between the Crimean War, when England, France and Sardinia fought against Russia in 1854-1856, and the American Civil War from 1861 to 1863, in which the northern industrialised states conquered the agrarian South. While the Crimean War

was fought with sailing ships, the war of secession in the South was fought with armoured steamboats. This opened the era of modern industrial and economic warfare. Here, too, England was in the lead and kept a huge lead until almost the end of the 19th century. But progress in this era meant at the same time a new stage in the elemental relationship between land and sea.

For Leviathan had now changed from a huge fish to a machine. In fact, it was an essential transformation, unheard of in its kind. The machine had changed man's attitude towards the sea. The courageous type of personalities, which had hitherto defined the dimensions of maritime power, had lost its old meaning. The daring feats of seamen of sailing ships, the high art of navigation, the rigorous education and selection of a certain breed of men - all this had lost all significance in view of the reliability of modern, technicised sea traffic. The sea still retained its strength. But the powerful impulse that had turned the sheep-breeding people into pirates was weakening and gradually coming to an end. Between the elements of the sea and human existence came the machine apparatus. The maritime domination based on an industry of machines obviously represents something other than a maritime power growing daily in a fierce and direct struggle against the elements. A sailing boat, requiring only the muscular power of man, and a ship propelled by steam wheels are already two different ways of dealing with the elements of the sea. The industrial revolution had transformed the children of the sea into makers and servants of the machine. The change was felt by all. Some lamented the end of the old era of heroes and took refuge in the romance of pirate tales. Others rejoiced over technological progress and set about composing utopias of a manmade paradise. Here we clearly establish the fact of the essential damage to a purely maritime existence, the mystery of British world domination. But the men of the nineteenth century did not see this. For, being a fish or a machine, Leviathan was in any case growing stronger and more powerful, and his reign seemed to have no end.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, American Admiral Mahan made a remarkable attempt to extend the former situation of British dominance of the sea into the machine era. Mahan is a significant historian, author of *The Influence of Sea Power in History*. This is the title of his major work, also published in German and acclaimed in German naval circles, especially by its founder, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz.

In one work, dated July 1904, Mahan talks of the possibility of reuniting England with the United States. He does not see the deepest basis for such a reunion in a common race, language or culture. He in no way underestimates these considerations, so often cited by other writers. But for him they are just wishful thinking extras! Decisive for him is the necessity to maintain Anglo-Saxon supremacy on the world oceans and this can only be achieved on an island basis by the unification of the Anglo-American states. England itself has become too small as a result of modern development so that it is no longer an island in the former sense. On the contrary, the United States of America is a true island in the modern sense. Because of its extent - says Mahan - this has not yet been realised. But it responds to today's scale and ratios of magnitude. The island character of the United States should help to ensure that maritime dominance can be maintained and continued on a wider basis. America is the great island on which the British conquest of the sea must be perpetuated and continued on an even greater scale as Anglo-American domination of the world.

At a time when a politician such as Disraeli wanted to move a worldwide British empire to Asia, an American admiral was nurturing the idea of going to America. This was typical of the type of thinking natural to a nineteenth-century Anglo-Saxon sailor. The admiral sensed the epochal changes, saw the enormous changes in measure and size that inevitably came with the development of industry. But what he did not see was that the industrial revolution was precisely the most important thing of all - the elemental connection between man and the sea. Thus it comes out that he continues to think along the old lines. His larger island was to preserve, conserve, an inherited, obsolete tradition in an entirely new situation. The old, too small

island and the whole complex of maritime and world domination erected on its basis must be towed by the new island, like a rescue vessel.

As significant as Mahan's personality is, and as impressive as his design of the larger island is, it does not grasp the true meaning of the new ordering of space. It does not emanate from the spirit of the old navigators. It is rooted in a conservative need for geopolitical security and no longer contains any of the energies of the awakening elements that made possible the world-historical alliance between plucky seafaring and the Calvinist belief in predestination in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

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Industrial development and new technology could not remain at the level of the 19th century. Progress did not end with the invention of the steam engine and the railway. The world changed faster than the prophets of the machine faith expected and entered the age of electrical engineering and electrodynamics. Electrical engineering, aviation and radio had caused such a revolution in all ideas about space that a new stage of the first planetary spatial revolution, if not even the second, a new revolution of space, had clearly begun.

In the short period from 1890 to 1914, Germany, a continental European country, caught up with and surpassed England in the most important fields of activity, machine building, ship building and locomotive construction, after Krupp had already demonstrated its advantage over the English in the field of armaments in 1868. Already the World War of 1914 took place under the banner of the new. Of course, the nations and their governments entered it with no consciousness of the revolutionary era for space, as if it were one of the past wars of the 19th century in which they had participated. In the highly industrialised Germany, the English legal ideals still prevailed and English ideas were considered indisputable, whereas the vast agrarian country which was Tsarist Russia had entered the First World War in 1914 without having its own modern engine-building factory on its vast territory. In fact, the progression from steam ship to modern warship was no less than

the step from rowing galleys to sailing ships. Man's attitude to the elements of the sea has once again changed profoundly.

When the aeroplane appeared, a new, third dimension was conquered, added to the land and the Sea. Man has now risen above the surfaces of land and sea and has acquired an entirely new means of transport and equally new weapons. Measures and proportions have changed again, and the possibilities of human domination over nature and over other people have expanded to immeasurable limits. It is understandable why the air force was designated as a "spatial weapon". For the revolutionary changes in space they produce are particularly powerful, immediate and visible.

But if, moreover, to imagine that the airspace above the earth and the sea is not only furrowed by planes, the radio waves of stations of all countries penetrate the atmospheric space around the globe unimpeded at the speed of a second, then there is every reason to believe that now not only a new, third dimension has been reached, but even a third element, air as a new element of the human existence, has been added. Then to both mythical animals, Leviathan and Behemoth, it would be worth adding a third: the Great Bird. But we should not be so rash as to make such a promising assertion. If we consider the technical-mechanical means and energies by which the human domination in the air is realized, and imagine the internal combustion engines powering the aeroplanes, the Fire will seem to everyone as an additional, truly new element of the human activity in the world.

This is not the place to resolve the question of two new elements added to the land and the sea. Serious considerations and speculative reasoning, hypotheses and speculations are still too much intertwined here, there is still an immense field of possibilities for them. After all, according to one ancient doctrine, the whole history of mankind is only a way through the four elements. If we try to follow our theme soberly we will be able to establish two things with all certainty and certainty. The first concerns the change in the idea of space that has taken place in the new period of the spatial revolution. This transformation takes place with no less depth than the already familiar change of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Back then, people placed the world and the universe in empty space. Today, we no longer imagine space as simply a bottomless extension devoid of any conceivable content. Space has become for us a force field of human energy, action and result.

Only today is it possible for us to have an idea that would have been unimaginable in any other era; it was expressed by a German philosopher of modernity: "It is not the world that is within space, but space is within the world".

Our second establishment concerns the original relationship between the land and the sea. Today the sea is no longer an element as it was in the era of whale hunters and corsairs. Today's transport technology and media have made space in the modern sense of the word. Today any ship owner can know at any given day or hour where his ship is in the ocean. Thus, in contrast to the age of sailing, the world of the sea has fundamentally changed for man. But if this is so, then also comes the separation of sea and land on which the former bond of maritime world domination was based. The very basis of the British conquest of the sea disappears and with it the former *nomos* of the land.

In its place, a new *nomos* of our planet is formed unrestrainedly and irresistibly. It is caused by the new attributions of man to old and new elements, and the changed measures and attitudes of human existence force its formation. Many will only see it as death and destruction. Some will think that they are present at the end of the world. In reality we are only experiencing the end of the old relationship between the earth and the sea. However, the human fear of the new is often as great as the fear of emptiness, even if the new overcomes emptiness. Many only see meaningless chaos where, in reality, new meaning paves the way for a commensurate order. The old *nomos*, of course, is going away, and with it the whole system of inherited dimensions, norms and relations. The coming, however, is not just a lack of measure or nothingness hostile to *nomos*. And in the fierce struggles of old and new forces, proper measures and meaningful proportions emerge.

And here the gods are present and rule,

The measure of them is great.

Leipzig,

1942

(translated from German by Yu. Korinz)

Jean PARVULSCO

Geopolitics of the third millennium

"India has long claimed total political hegemony in South Asia."

Jian Dzemyv

With Pakistan's five nuclear tests in Baluchistan in response to India's five such tests, South Asia has suddenly broken into 'big history': henceforth, the planetary political-historical existence of nations will only be determined by their capacity for effective meta-strategic nuclear deterrence. Until recently the only Asian nuclear power was China. And it is in comparison to China, not Pakistan, as it may at first glance appear, that India's metastrategic entry into the realm of active continental geopolitics should be assessed. At present, the continental nuclear confrontation is between India and China, while Pakistan, despite all its claims and efforts, plays an auxiliary role to strengthen the anti-Indian camp of China, which may be joined by other countries in the future.

The total geopolitics of the Great Eurasian Continent, a revolutionary, avant-garde geopolitics asserting the final imperial concept of integration within the framework of a common original metahistorical destination - Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia, Great Siberia, India and Japan - clearly excludes China from the active definition of Great Continental Eurasian unification. In a sense, the progressive potential unification of the Great Continent is directed precisely against China, and India is clearly supported in this respect by the meta-strategic continental potential of Russia and France. The process of Great Continental integration is a dialectical thing.

At the same time, the India-China nuclear confrontation in Southeast Asia requires Japan to make an immediate decision, an irreversible strategic choice that - once made - will force it to join the great continental camp, whose regional pole in the Southeast is India. This decision must be taken despite the understandable nuclear psychopathology of the Japanese.

Everything is heading towards the fact that the Eurasian story of the near future will consist of a nuclear encirclement of China (including its strategic satellites) by an ensemble of great continental imperial powers in the political line of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow-New Delhi-Tokyo axis.

The attitude to this demarche on the part of the United States obviously fits into the pattern of basic geopolitical correspondences, since the final and decisive battle - the beginning of which can already be considered as laid - between the Great Continent and the United States corresponds to the main force line of the fundamental ontological antagonism between "continental" and "island" powers, and there is no doubt about the fact that the appearance of politically united Europe (however much the shadowy, behind the scenes, actively working against this project, may prevent it from happening) will be the result of the creation of an empire of the United States. The forceful emergence of a Greater Europe in the dialectical game of asserting imperial planetary power will return the US to the status of a secondary power, and thereby definitively destroy the notorious "American myth".

For this reason, the US will combine its efforts to neutralise Greater Europe with China's aspirations to counter its continental encirclement. This will clearly lead to a grand Peking-Washington alliance in which China will offer the US a giant beachhead in the east of Eurasia and the US will provide China with access to the market spaces controlled by this oceanic power.

At the same time, the aggressive anti-continental permanent geopolitics of the USA is acquiring today inside the great continental space a new huge reservoir of subversive and conspiracy powers, concentrated in the sphere of pro-Atlantic versions of fundamentalist Islam (especially of the Wahhabi or Taliban type), which on the whole length of the southern shore of Eura-

sia will join the activity of the geopolitical fortress China, whose negative radiation internally destabilizes and blocks the far-eastern link of the great continental

The recently published book "Islamism and the United States, an alliance against Europe" by a high-ranking French official, Alexandre Delval, says all that is needed regarding the offensive meta-strategic use of a certain fundamentalist (Wahhabi) Islam by the US in its struggle against the great continental European revival, which is currently in a stage of decisive establishment and revolutionary imperial self-determination.

Given such planetary convergences, the particular mission of France (or, more precisely, of the Great Continental Carolingian pole approved by General De Gaulle on the France-Germany axis) is to ideologically polarise and unite on the basis of a sense of common destiny the entire ensemble of elements of the Eurasian Great Continent in the face of the aggressive challenge of the US and China and the subversive mission defined by the US to the Atlanticist varieties of Islam that fight the Great Continental project.

The planetary pole of the Eurasian Great Continent, whose ultimate and secret goal is the choice of a spiritual perspective, is opposed by the materialist bloc of the Washington-Beijing axis, under the explicit or still hidden leadership of the mondialist grouping in the USA, which under the mask of establishing planetary economic hegemony seeks to end the ontological civilisation of Being - our civilisation, right down to changing the very status of man, which in our world is based on an inertial extension of traditional European, Hindu

It also follows that in response to vigorous US political-economic penetration of Africa, Europe must immediately launch an offensive counter-intervention in Latin America, which in geopolitical terms is to the US what Africa is to Europe - a continent-doublet connected to the mainland by a chain of direct geopolitical reverberations.

European elements of deep political-revolutionary embedding are now visible

in Argentina and Chile, from which an ambitious offensive revolutionary integration of the entire South American continent is to be launched.

In a sense, the problem of the immediate planetary identification of world history boils down to France's willingness to fulfil its secret, profound, bottomless destiny, which calls for a new (final) initiative of metahistorical great-continental integration, and it is up to France to ensure that this integration culminates in its final imperial triumph.

For this reason, it is absolutely essential that a new, unexpected will be awakened in France, capable of asserting openly the deep foundations of France's providential destiny, mobilising them in a revolutionary way, becoming the pole of an all-out offensive strategy - and this will be the new beginning of French history, the history of Europe and of the Eurasian Great Continent as a whole. In other words, a secret France, a parallel 'France must - as if by magic - reveal itself from under the pathetic, insignificant state to which it has fallen today, to exhale from itself the saving breath of a new ascent to being, so that 'everything will again enter the zone of the highest attention'. This is what "ours" have been waiting for and preparing since time immemorial - the arrival of Secret France to the final political-historical power.

Chinese President Jiang Jemin recently stated that "India has long laid claim to total political hegemony in South Asia". Chinese President Jiang Jemin is by no means mistaken. Indeed, India has long laid claim to total political hegemony in South Asia, but not in its own name, but in favour of the imperial great-continental unity whose flame is kept alive by Secret France.

Russia has been known to refuse a real political dialogue with France, taken individually. It does the same with Germany. However, Russia is fully inclined to develop and strengthen the decisive political dialogue with the Franco-German axis taken as a whole. This is also India's attitude towards Western Europe, as on a confidential level India has long been ready to unconditionally support Russia in its great continental dialogue with France

and Germany.

The shift in the critical centre of gravity of contemporary great continental geopolitics from West to East is a sign of the fundamental metastrategic evolution of the present situation, whose content may seem ambiguous at first glance.

Any shift of the centre of gravity towards the East implies, proclaims and grounds the beginning of a new historical cycle. The current division of Russia due to the failed Marxist adventure will pass as soon as the current millennium is over, and we will see the great sign of the birth of New Russia, which will directly influence the success of the political-historical grand-continental project. It is Russia that will then become the geopolitical lifeline "the bridge from Europe to India".

Great-i

continental, the engagement of the Carolingian Franco-German pole in favour of India and Japan is realised through Russia, through New Russia, whose total Eurasian development will find in all its fundamental meaning heartland - the "highest and final heartland" of the Great Continent.

At the two opposite ends of the Eurasian Great Continent, India and France are drawn by two oceans - the Pacific in the East and the Atlantic in the West. Of particular importance in the case of France is the attraction to the South Atlantic - to South America and Antarctica. Because it is in Antarctica, as some of us already know, that the highest destiny of the Eurasian Great Continent will be decided. This is the last secret of transcendental geopolitics, the secret that we have to keep in mind from now on.

There is a moment for France to throw away the banality of its own insignificant modern history and open itself up to its final, secret, highest destiny.

World history is now approaching a decisive turning point, a point of completion and a new beginning, the third millennium symbolising a return to origins. For the first time in ten thousand years, the peoples of the Eurasian

Great Continent, from Europe to India, taking the reins of the political-historical formation of the entire Eurasian ensemble into their own hands, will be able to restore that primordial unity of original being, high consciousness and common destiny that preceded their historical division. The great metahistorical cycle comes to an end, closing in on itself, its end merging with its beginning. The end of one world heralds the beginning of another.

On the other side of external political circumstances, which in reality are deceptive mirages of complete and incurable catastrophe, the future reunification of the Eurasian Great Continent is transcendently inscribed in the logic of historical formation, and no one and nothing will be able to prevent it. Having gained control of the poles, the Arctic and the Antarctic, the Eurasian Great Continent will gain decisive and total planetary dominion, moving into a state of Imperium Ultimatum, absolute power over the final history of this world. It will be the ontological dominion over history, and over that which is transcendent on the other side of history, which is the "final destination". And all this is already in germ form in the new convergence of an active planetary geopolitics, whose development we must control and direct. There is nothing but will. There is nothing but destiny.

Things are getting riskier by the day. In June 1998, Bill Clinton spent "nine days in China", thus laying in an irrevocable and blatant strategic base for the final US-China offensive on the great continental Eurasian front, on its decisive geopolitical positions.

This also includes the announced joint US-Chinese naval manoeuvres, a sign of the decision taken on political-strategic positions, which are covered up by the appearance of economic projects and to which elements of democratic doctrine related to the observance (or non-observance) of "human rights" are easily sacrificed. All of this was definitively approved at the time of Clinton's June visit to Beijing.

It is now clear that the blatant anti-continental conspiracy of China and the US forces us to discover a profound determination to fight back in the meta-strategic vein of the great continental line from the actors of the Eurasian

project - France and India in the first place. The determination of France, representing Eurasia's extreme West, and India, representing its extreme East, should influence Russia to make a radical and irreversible choice of its future path.

So, the geopolitical power lines of the future planetary outbreaks of the third millennium have been outlined. The rest depends on our will to survive, on the completeness of our awareness and mastery of the abysses of our own destiny.

1998c.

Emrick SHOPRAD

The Big Game

The end of ideological confrontation within the bipolar system has led many analysts to conclude that an era of universal peace has begun under the sign of "liberalism" and "democracy". But this approach somehow fails to take into account the fact that most of these conflicts are based not on ideological, but on national contradictions, and geopolitics is the decisive factor in them. Even after the end of the Cold War, the world has not only been shaken by small regional conflicts over the assertion of national and cultural identities by different peoples, but, most importantly, such conflicts fit perfectly into the global confrontation between the great powers. This struggle is clearly visible in the refusal of great powers such as Russia and China to recognise the dictates of US imperialism.

In Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Washington and its allies are playing a game against a territorially shrunken Russia. Everywhere both in Eastern Europe, where NATO is advancing, and in the gigantic battle for spheres of influence that is unfolding in Central Asia, the Caucasus and Ukraine, Washington and its satellites - Germany, Turkey, Pakistan - seek to undermine Russian influence. The wars in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan are elements of the new Great Game that is unfolding between Russia and the American empire. Uzbekistan is a terminal of sorts - in the

heart of Central Asia - where the US free route from the Indian Ocean to the interior of the continent ends. At the same time, Turkmenistan is moving further and further away from Moscow towards Turkey and the U.S.

In Europe, the new Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, is becoming increasingly close to Russia, Greece, Romania and Cyprus, forming a sketchy Orthodox bloc opposed to the informalised US-German alliance in the area. This Atlanticist alliance includes the Turkish wing as well as Bosnia. The Kosovo conflict, unfolding at the heart of what constitutes an identity pole for Serbian historical identity and being fanned by the Albanians with the explicit tutelage of the CIA, is another manifestation of the Great Game.

In the Near and Middle East, the strategy of US imperialism and its staunch ally Israel has led to what until recently seemed an impossible alliance - Damascus, Baghdad and Tehran - although there are many serious regional tensions between these three geographically close states.

Russia is slowly rearing its head after the first shock, the collapse of communist regimes in its traditional periphery. The gradual normalisation of Russian-Ukrainian relations and Moscow's initiatives in the Iraq issue are clear evidence of that. Recall that Boris Yeltsin mentioned the possibility of the outbreak of World War III precisely in connection with the Iraqi conflict...

Another great power is less and less willing to accept the dictates of US imperialism. It is China. We have finally emerged from the era of Russian-Chinese conflict, which in the period of bipolarity was explained by a desire for ideological leadership in the socialist camp. The Moscow-Beijing axis is now opposed to the Washington-Tokyo axis. The new China is striving to acquire in Asia the same positions that it held before the arrival of the Europeans in the nineteenth century. China's maritime claims are already clear in the China Sea and the Indian Ocean, which brings it close to the start of the Sino-Indian conflict. A new factor is that in order to strengthen its position against Japan, Beijing is trying to get closer to Hanoi.

The Great Game on a global scale gradually leads more and more to the opposition of the pro-American imperialism of the 'liberal democracies' and the 'club of the damned': China, Iran, North Korea (which is actively collaborating with Tehran on missile development), Cuba and Iraq...

World conflicts only arise when there is a competition of interests on a global scale. Media commentary gives us the false idea that regional conflicts are private anomalies, independent of the global context and stemming from provincial local ignorance. In fact, geopolitics should be likened to the movement of tectonic plates. Giant platforms slide and collide with each other. At some points the impacts are so strong that they generate earthquakes. But the very fact of an earthquake is not independent - invisible subterranean processes are expressed in it....

from an interview with the French magazine *Elément*, 1998. (translated from French by A.D.)

Heinrich Jordis von Lochhausen

The Persian Gulf War is a war against Europe

One need only look at a world map to see the continents of our planet as three belts spanning it from north to south. The first, from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, forms the New World, the Americas. The second, from the Northern Cape to the Cape of Good Hope, represents the continental part of the Old World, Euro-Africa. The third belt runs from Kamchatka to Tasmania through China, Southeast Asia and Indonesia to form the eastern part, Australo-Asia. p>

In the middle of the centre

Between Euro-Africa and Australasia (closer to the latter) lies the Russo-Siberian stratum to the north and the Middle East to the south. It forms the centre of the Old World, the centre at the heart of which is the Persian Gulf region. This region is the Achilles' heel of the Old World, the place where a linden leaf fell on Siegfried's shoulder. And it's not just a question of

oil. Nowhere else do the oceans extend so deeply into the African-Eurasian continent: the Indian Ocean through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the Atlantic Ocean through the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Between the two oceans, equidistant from Africa and Asia, at the mouth of the Tigris and the Euphrates, lies the ancient city of Ur. This is the "centre of the centre" that we shall speak of, in every respect the most vulnerable place of the Old World. All the upheavals in the world are reflected here. Since the forcible opening of Japanese ports during the War of 1854, the policy of the United States has been to establish beachheads on the shores of the Old World, and to create potential "island springboards". Thus, the Americans had already established themselves in the Philippines in 1898 and in Japan in 1945. Only afterwards did they proceed to South Korea and Vietnam. This was preceded, respectively, by the landing in Normandy, the deployment of troops in Germany and the effective subjugation of Western Europe. It is characteristic that these bridgeheads were located in highly developed territories and on the borders of the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, i.e. the oceans which surround the dual Afro-Eurasian continent, rather than, say, on such a fragile southern frontier as the Indian Ocean. >

The Persian Gulf region lies precisely in this vulnerable zone, at the cross-roads of major power lines linking the Far East to Africa and Europe to India. Here, at the approach to the Gulf, the Islamic world is divided into an Arab and a Persian part. Anyone who settles in this area can create a defence or a threat on all fronts or rear lines not only to the Middle East, but also to Europe, India and Africa. Furthermore, such a location implies an attempt to create a third front against a Russian military power, still unconquered. The position in the Gulf also strengthens the rear of Turkey - an ally against Russia - and creates pressure on Egypt, Syria and Iran, as well as on Europe, all mainly thanks to oil.

The latter, incidentally, is also important for Japan.

War against Europe?

Was the Gulf War a war against Europe? The answer to this question was

given in a remarkable way in the Catholic journal *Trenta Giorni* by a professor of political science at the University of Milan. He states: "The United States has realised that if it does not want to experience the same sunset as the Soviet Union, it must confront its adversaries of tomorrow, that is, Japan and a united Europe whose centre is the economic power of Germany. No one will allow themselves to be debunked for good measure. America cannot put up with a Europe which is currently economically and technically ahead of it, despite its weak mobilisation. Realising that they will one day no longer be able to influence Europe, the United States has bet on the Middle East and on control of the Saudi oil tap, on which Germany and Japan will depend for decades to come, unless they succeed in exploiting Siberian reserves. Only then will the Middle East and the impact it can have on it lose its importance" (its strategic position is still paramount). For the Americans, the final opportunity came in 1991, thanks to the political elimination of the Soviet Union. These circumstances were laid down by Reagan's decision to exhaust Moscow in an arms race; instigated, as scripted, by Saddam Hussein; embodied, in the same script, by George W. Bush. In fact, the plan goes back to Kissinger, and was developed under his patronage. In 1975 the plan was published in *Commentary* magazine and later appeared in *Harper's Magazine* under the headline "Get Oil".

The real defeated are the allies

Only a cursory examination of armed conflicts can give the impression that the enemy is only the one being fought. Often, countries that have been victorious in a conflict may find that the foundations of their independence or prosperity have been undermined (often both at the same time). The way of turning one's own allies into vassals through a jointly waged war is as old as the world. Americans are imitators of their distant Roman teachers. Such they have shown themselves to be in two world wars, in which they engaged to great advantage. In both cases the pretext was the destruction of German power, whereas the goal extended much further. America's allies have always borne the costs in this alliance. The list to prove it is long: from Poland to Taiwan to South Vietnam, together with the colonial European

empires after 1918 led by Great Britain. After a common victory, America became the heir to their power or their profitable seats of power.

Whoever has power over Arab-Persian oil also has it over Western Europe and Japan, who have become slaves not only to oil but also, by extension, to the power that controls it.

It would have been inexcusable negligence in American imperial policy not to pull the reins tighter on the increasingly recalcitrant European Community and the industrially dangerous Japan on their return from the Persian Gulf. As usual, taking little risk in intervening in the sphere of Islamic influence, Washington should have found amusing the surprising zeal of its allies, especially the Germans, loyal and top students in the "Atlantic" class, who kindly agreed to finance a war that helped to weaken them.

The great illusion of the helpless

The war in the Gulf has come in handy for America. After all, the billions invested in armaments for decades needed to finally become profitable, and the expected orders to upgrade the war machine would quickly stimulate the needy economy. But especially so that the small, unsung, rank-less, defeated enemies of the Second World War or the bleeding-heart Allies are not prepared to overtake America in the economic sphere. But before their illusions were dispelled, they could be allowed to "play in the yard with their elders" and war would help put them in their place. A war, not directed directly against them, but rather aimed at one of the sources of their prosperity.

Control over 'mineral deposits' reinforces the superiority of a well-armed economic power over other, less powerful ones. It can also be seen as a known advantage and safety net for the US to locate on its own territory crucial resources for its survival and military capabilities. If necessary, mineral-rich but stubborn countries will be forced to repent either by propaganda carried out globally and supported by terrorist groups (underground or foreign) or by economic boycott pressure, as was the case with South Africa for many years. The fight against apartheid, the ideological cover for this

campaign, was a good fit. The target in South Africa was the ore needed in the war industry, or rather the end of its natural monopoly. The economy of Western Europe, which began to develop after 1945, could no longer thrive without some of the metals available only in South Africa and without Arab oil. The fall of black power in South Africa would seamlessly bring the aforementioned fields into the hands of powerful American groups.

The result achieved in the Persian Gulf, namely the growing severance of ties between Europe and the Cape of Good Hope, is an undeniable success of American policy, and whatever one may say, a defeat for the Europeans. Such is the price for abandoning power in favour of consumption. Now, more than ever, the necessary minerals can only be possessed by using the services of an intermediary, an American one, of course.

Missed opportunities

However, in the aftermath of the two world wars, geographical factors rather than historical ones favoured an economic alliance under European rule (based on the principle of self-determination of peoples rather than on the American principle of "nation-building") between Africa and Europe, which became the natural complement to each other. The establishment of an "Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere" in the eastern part of the Old World, envisioned by the Japanese, also failed more because of the latter's intolerance towards neighbouring peoples than because of the American victory in the Pacific. Because of the petty squabbles of their leaders, the Arab countries, too, are unable to expand their circle of joint action. Proof of this is the Middle East, where, following the American invasion, one can expect a consolidation of borders or a repeated denial of the right to self-determination of peoples oppressed by religion, with the Kurds at the forefront. It is also the fault of the Europeans, both French and British, who gave up their supremacy over the Arab space, even though it was recognised for them after the First World War. Thus, they left an unfinished business fraught with complications, as has been the case more than once. Examples include the difficult birth of Yugoslavia and the withdrawal of the British and French from Africa after 1945.

So Europeans have only themselves to blame for everything that has happened.

1992 c.

(translated by L. Gogoleva)

Translation to English by Lawless