The Many Faces of Human Sociality:
Uncovering the Distribution and Stability of Social Preferences

Experimental Instructions

Translated from German to English

Comments not shown to the subjects are marked in green.

Instructions

Welcome to the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zurich. We thank you for again participating in our economic study. You can again earn money by participating. The amount you earn depends on your decisions in the study.
Please note that you may not communicate with one another during the study. If you have questions, please raise your hand. A study administrator will come to your seat and you can discuss the question. The violation of the rule against communication will result in exclusion from the study and from all payments.

This experiment consists of a total of ***9 parts***. At the beginning of each part you will get the corresponding instructions.

- **The first 3 parts of the experiment will take the most time. In these 3 parts,** you must decide how certain monetary payments between you *(Person A)* and another specific participant in the experiment *(Person B)* should be distributed.

- **In parts 4 and 5,** we ask you to estimate how other persons who have to make similar decisions would decide on average.

- **In part 6 of the experiment,** we ask you to complete a questionnaire.

How are the payments in this experiment determined?

1. You receive a fixed payment of CHF 5 for participating in the study. Additionally, you will also receive the payments described below.

2. 3 decision situations from the parts 1 to 3 will be randomly selected for payment. The distribution of payoffs in these 3 decision situations will be paid out to you (*Person A*) and a randomly selected other individual in the role of the receiver (*Person B*).

3. One of the decision situations in part 4 will be randomly selected. Your payment depends on the accuracy of your estimate.

4. Finally, you will get 5 CHF for completing the questionnaire in part 6.

The determination of the random selections determining the payments will first be made *after the conclusion of the entire experiment.* The money will be paid in cash to you.

The entire experiment is completely anonymous, i.e. you will not be informed of the identity of the participant paired with you, and your identity remains unknown to the other participants.

Instructions for the first part

In this part of the experiment, you will make 39 decisions that concern you and another person participating in this experiment. The other person will be randomly paired with you in each decision situation. You will never learn who this person is, and the other person will also not learn of your identity.

In each of the 39 decision situations, you have exactly two options, an option X and an option Y. Each option involves a monetary amount for you *(Person A)* and a monetary amount for the other person *(Person B)* who is paired with you. You determine the distribution of the payment definitely with your decision. The other person *(Person B)* thus cannot change the income.

Please note: We present monetary amounts as points on the computer screen. 100 points are worth 1 CHF.

The amounts can also be negative. If you choose an option with a negative amount, the corresponding number of points will be deducted from you or the other person, respectively.

The procedure on the computer

The 39 different situations will be presented successively on a computer screen. You will see the options in the rows, and the columns show the amounts for you and the other person.

In the screen shown below, for example, you receive 1040 points while the other person only gets 600 points if you select option X. If you choose option Y, then both you and the other person receive 850 points each.



Control questions

Please answer the questions below. The objective is to have complete clarity about the rules in the experiment. When you are done, raise your hand. We will check if the control questions are answered correctly and start the experiment.

1. Please look at the screen below:



(a) How large is the income gap (in points) between you and Person B?

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution X:_____.

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution Y:_____.

(b) How large is the aggregate income (in points) of you and Person B for distributions X and Y?

Aggregate income (in points) for distribution X:_____.

Aggregate income (in points) for distribution Y:_____.

(c) If you select distribution X…

What is your income in CHF? _____.

What is Person B's income in CHF? _____.

(d) If you select distribution Y …

What is your income in CHF? _____.

What is Person B's income in CHF? _____.

2. Please look at the screen below:



(a) How large is the income gap (in points) between you and Person B?

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution X:_____.

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution Y:_____.

(b) How large is the aggregate income (in points) of you and Person B for distributions X and Y?

Aggregate income (in points) for distribution X:_____.

Aggregate income (in points) for distribution Y:_____.

(c) If you select distribution X…

What is your income in CHF? _____.

What is Person B's income in CHF? _____.

(d) If you select distribution Y …

What is your income in CHF? _____.

What is Person B's income in CHF? _____.

3. Will the other person who is matched with you (*Person B*) learn about your identity?
_____ Yes
_____ No

Instructions for the second part

In this part of the experiment, you will make 78 decisions that affect you and another person participating in this experiment. The other person will be randomly assigned to you in each decision situation. You will not learn, however, who the other person is nor will the other person learn of your identity.

You have two options in each of the 78 decision situations, an option X and an option Y. Each decision concerns a monetary amount for you (*Person A*) and a monetary amount for another person (*Person B*) who is paired with you. In this experiment, you will determine the final distribution of the payment with your decision. The other person (*Person B*) thus can no longer change his or her income after you have made your decision.

The difference to the first part of the experiment is as follows: Now, Person B can determine **before your decision** whether he or she would like to fix a certain final distribution Z of the payments. If Person B determines this final distribution, you no longer can influence the distribution of the payments. As an alternative, Person B can delegate the decision about the distribution to you. In this case, you must select between options X and Y as described above, meaning that option Z is not available to you.

Please take exact note of the decisions *Person B* must make before you make your decision. We will show you some examples here:

- *Example 1:*
  Person B has the option of selecting the following distributions:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B
Distribution Z	170	1200

  Or Person B can delegate the following decision to you:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B
Distribution X	310	1060
Distribution Y	350	680

  If Person B delegates the decision to you in this case, it has the following consequences:
  (1) Comparison with Z:
  - You receive a higher payment in both distributions X and Y, which Person B left for your selection, than you would in distribution Z.
  - Person B receives a lower payment in both distributions X and Y, which Person B left to you, than he or she would in distribution Z.
  - The aggregate income of A and B in distribution X amounts to 1370 and is thus exactly the same size as in distribution Z. The aggregate income of A and B is smaller in distribution Y, however; it amounts to 1030.
  - The income gap is lower in the distributions X and Y, from which you can choose, than in distribution Z, where the income gap amounts to 1030 points. The income gap is only 750 in X and just 330 points in Y.

(2) Comparison between X and Y:

- The following applies to distribution X, which is an option you can choose:
  - You receive a lower payment than in distribution Y.
  - Person B receives a higher payment in X than in Y.
  - The aggregate income is higher in X than in Y.
  - The income gap is less in X than in Y.

- *Example 2:*
  Person B has the option of choosing the following distribution:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B
Distribution Z	1070	370

Or person B can delegate the following decision to you:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B
Distribution X	930	510
Distribution Y	810	150

If person B delegates the decision to you in this situation, this decision will have the following consequences:

(1) Comparison with Z:

- You will receive a lower payment in both distributions X and Y, which Person B left for your selection, than you would in payment Z.
- Person B receives a larger payment in X than in Z, but B receives a smaller payment in Y than in Z.
- The aggregate income of A and B in distribution X amounts to 1440 and is thus exactly the same size as in distribution Z. The aggregate income of A and B is smaller in distribution Y, however, and amounts to 960.
- The income gap is lower in the distributions X and Y, from which you can choose, than in distribution Z, where the income gap amounts to 700 points. The income gap is only 420 in X and 660 points in Y

(2) Comparison between X and Y:

- The following applies to distribution X, which is an option you can choose:
  - You receive a higher payment than in distribution Y.
  - Person B receives a higher payment than in Y.
  - The aggregate income is higher than in Y.
  - The income gap is less than in Y.

Please note again: We present monetary amounts again as points on the computer screen. 100 points are worth 1 CHF.

The procedure on the computer

The 78 different situations will be presented successively on a computer screen. On the screen presented below, Person B can decide whether he/she will give you 460 points and retain 930 points, or if he or she will leave the following decision to you:

- Option X: 600 for you (Person A) und 410 for Person B.
- Option Y: 600 for you (Person A) und 790 for Person B.



This is the longest part of the experiment, as it contains 78 questions. We kindly ask you to answer all 78 questions conscientiously, despite the number of questions.

Control questions

Please answer the questions below. The objective is to have complete clarity about the rules in the experiment. When you are done, raise your hand. We will check if the control questions are answered correctly and start the experiment.

1. Please look at the screen below:



Assuming that Person B delegated the decision to you. You thus must make a decision between the distributions X and Y.

(a) Did Person B improve his or her situation by delegating the decision?
- ☐ Yes, B is in a better position than in distribution Z.
- ☐ No, B is in a worse position than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Whether B is better or worse off depends on whether I select X or Y.

(b) Did Person B improve your (Person A's) situation by delegating the decision?
- ☐ Yes, I am in a better situation than in distribution Z.
- ☐ No, I am in a worse position than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Whether I am better or worse off depends on whether I select X or Y.

(c) How great is the income gap (in points) between you and Person B?

Income gap (in points) in distribution X:_____.
Income gap (in points) in distribution Y:_____.

(d) Is the income gap between you and Person B in distributions X and Y less than, greater than, or equal to the distribution Z?
- ☐ Less than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Greater than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Equal to distribution Z.

(e) What is the aggregate income (in points) of you and Person B in the distributions X, Y, and Z?

Aggregate income (in points) in distribution X:_____.
Aggregate income (in points) in distribution Y:_____.
Aggregate income (in points) in distribution Z:_____.

(f) Do you have a smaller, a larger, or an equal payment in distributions X and Y compared to distribution Z?
- ☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is less than that in distribution Z.
- ☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is greater than that in distribution Z.
- ☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is equal to that in distribution Z.

(g) Does the other person (B) have a smaller, a larger, or an equal payment in distributions X and Y compared to distribution Z?
- ☐ Person B's payment in distributions X and Y is smaller than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Person B's payment in distributions X and Y is greater than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Person B's payment in distributions X and Y is equal to that in distribution Z.

(h) If you select payment X, how large is your income in CHF? _____

(i) Will the person paired with you (Person B) learn of your identity?
- ☐ Yes.
- ☐ No.

1. Please look at the screen below:



Assuming that Person B delegated the decision to you. You thus must make a decision between the distributions X and Y.

(a) Did Person B improve his or her situation by delegating the decision?
- ☐ Yes, B is in a better position than in distribution Z.
- ☐ No, B is in a worse position than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Whether B is better or worse off depends on whether I select X or Y.

(b) Did Person B improve your (Person A's) situation by delegating the decision?
- ☐ Yes, I am in a better situation than in distribution Z.
- ☐ No, I am in a worse position than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Whether I am better or worse off depends on whether I select X or Y.

(c) How great is the income gap (in points) between you and Person B?

Income gap (in points) in distribution X:_____.
Income gap (in points) in distribution Y:_____.

(d) Is the income gap between you and Person B in distributions X and Y less than, greater than, or equal to the distribution Z?
- ☐ Less than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Greater than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Equal to distribution Z.

(e) What is the aggregate income (in points) of you and Person B in the distributions X, Y, and Z?

Aggregate income (in points) in distribution X:_____.
Aggregate income (in points) in distribution Y:_____.
Aggregate income (in points) in distribution Z:_____.

(f) Do you have a smaller, a larger, or an equal payment in distributions X and Y compared to distribution Z?

☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is less than that in distribution Z.
☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is greater than that in distribution Z.
☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is equal to that in distribution Z.

(g) Does the other person (B) have a smaller, a larger, or an equal payment in distributions X and Y compared to distribution Z?

☐ Person B's payment in distributions X and Y is smaller than in distribution Z.
☐ Person B's payment in distributions X and Y is greater than in distribution Z.
☐ Person B's payment in distributions X and Y is equal to that in distribution Z.

(h) If you select payment X, how large is your income in CHF? _____

(i) Will the person paired with you (Person B) learn of your identity?

☐ Yes.
☐ No.

Instructions for the third part

In this part of the experiment, you will make 6 decisions. This part is substantially shorter than the previous parts. Your decisions will again affect you and another person participating in the experiment. The other person will be randomly assigned to you in each decision situation. You will not learn, however, who the other person is nor will the other person learn of your identity.

In each of the 6 decision situations, you have exactly two options, option X and option Y, and you will be randomly matched again with another person (*Person B*). However, the difference to the previous two parts is as follows: If you choose option X, you determine a distribution of monetary amounts between yourself (*Person A*) and another person (*Person B*). Thus, the other person (*Person B*) cannot change the income. If you choose option Y, you let *Person B* choose between two distributions. Thus, the other person (*Person B*) can choose the definitive distributions of incomes.

Please note again: We present monetary amounts again as points on the computer screen. 100 points are worth 1 CHF.

The procedure on the computer

The 6 different decision situations will be presented successively on a computer screen. On the computer screen below, you have the option to give yourself and the other person 350 points each (Option X). If you choose option Y, however, you give person B the choice between two distributions: (I) 600 for you and 160 for Person B. (II) 890 for you and 40 for Person B.



The following instructions for the parts 4, 5, and 6 were only shown on the computer screen.

Part 4 (belief questions):

In the following fourth part oft the experiment, we show you again 12 decision situations in which there is a choice between two distributions of monetary amounts. You already know the 12 decisions from the previous parts of the experiment. However, this time, you do not have to choose between the two distributions of monetary amounts.
We ask you to estimate, how 100 randomly selected persons would choose in such decision situations. In particular, we will ask you how many out of 100 persons would choose one of the two options.

Of these 12 decision situations, one will be randomly selected. If your estimate deviates by less than 10 percentage points from the true fraction of persons, you gain an additional 5 CHF. For example: If you estimate that out of 100 persons 72 persons would choose option X, and the true number is 75 persons, you get 5 CHF. However, if you estimate that 64 persons choose option X, you do not get the additional 5 CHF (since your estimate deviates by 75-64 = 11 percentage points from the true fraction).

Part 5 (reciprocity perception):

In the following fifth part of the experiment, we show you again 18 decision situations in which there is a choice between two distributions of monetary amounts. You already know the 18 decisions from the previous parts of the experiment. However, this time, you do not have to choose between the two distributions of monetary amounts.

We ask you to give us an indication whether you perceive the other person's behavior as kind or unkind.

Part 6 (Questionnaire):

The final part of the experiment consists of a questionnaire. It is important for us that you answer the questions as good as possible. Many questions are about views or values. Thus, most of the time there are no right or wrong answers. Your answers best fulfill the purpose of the questionnaire if they are as truthful as possible. Sometimes there are some very personal questions. Please answer them as well as truthfully as possible. Your answers will be treated confidentially and analyzed in an anonymous way.

Before the cognitive ability test (end of part 6):

Finally, we would like to ask you to complete a series of patterns. You will each time see a pattern in which a part is cut out. Please look at the pattern and think which of the cut out parts best complete the pattern, both in horizontal and vertical direction. Your task is to identify the correct cut out part out of 8 possibilities.

We first show you 2 examples to practice.
[2 examples in which the subject gets a feedback on whether she selected the correct pattern]

Now, we show you 12 patterns. In total you have 12 minutes to complete the 12 patterns.
[12 Raven's matrices]

Instructions

Welcome to the Institute for Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zurich. We thank you for again participating in our economic study. You can again earn money by participating. The amount you earn depends on your decisions in the study.
Please note that you may not communicate with one another during the study. If you have questions, please raise your hand. A study administrator will come to your seat and you can discuss the question. The violation of the rule against communication will result in exclusion from the study and from all payments.

This experiment consists of a total of ***9 parts***. The parts are of different lengths; they might last for more than 10 minutes or just for a few minutes. We expect a total work time of approximately one and a half hours.

- **In parts 1 to 8**, you must decide how certain monetary payments between you *(Person A)* and another specific participant in the experiment *(Person B)* should be distributed.

- We ask that you complete a questionnaire **in part 9** of the experiment.

How are the payments in this experiment determined?

1. You receive a fixed payment of CHF 20 for participating in the study. You will also receive the payments described below.

2. Precisely three situations will be randomly selected from the decision situations in parts 1 to 8. The monetary distributions in these three rounds will be paid to you and to a randomly chosen individual in the role of the recipient.

The determination of the random selections determining the payments will first be made *after the conclusion of the entire experiment.* The money will be paid in cash to you.

Please note that we present monetary amounts as points on the computer screens. In this case, 100 points are worth one Swiss franc.

The entire experiment is completely anonymous, i.e. you will not be informed of the identity of the participant paired with you, and your identity remains unknown to the other participants.

Instructions for the first part

In this part of the experiment, you will make 78 decisions that affect you and another person participating in this experiment. The other person will be randomly assigned to you in each decision situation. You will not learn, however, who the other person is nor will the other person learn of your identity.

You have two options in each of the 78 decision situations, an option X and an option Y. Each decision concerns a monetary amount for you (*Person A*) and a monetary amount for another person (*Person B*) who is paired with you. In this experiment, you will determine the final distribution of the payment with your decision. The other person (*Person B*) thus can no longer change his or her income after you have made your decision.

Please take note of the following: Person B can determine **before your decision** whether he or she would like to fix a certain final distribution Z of the payments. If Person B determines this final distribution, you no longer can influence the distribution of the payments. As an alternative, Person B can delegate the decision about the distribution to you. In this case, you must select between options X and Y as described above, meaning that option Z is not available to you.

Please take exact note of the decisions *Person B* must make before you make your decision. We will show you some examples here:

- *Example 1:*
  Person B has the option of selecting the following distributions:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B
Distribution Z	170	1200

Or Person B can delegate the following decision to you:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B
Distribution X	310	1060
Distribution Y	350	680

If Person B delegates the decision to you in this case, it has the following consequences:
(1) Comparison with Z:
- You receive a higher payment in both distributions X and Y, which Person B left for your selection, than you would in distribution Z.
- Person B receives a lower payment in both distributions X and Y, which Person B left to you, than he or she would in distribution Z.
- The aggregate income of A and B in distribution X amounts to 1370 and is thus exactly the same size as in distribution Z. The aggregate income of A and B is smaller in distribution Y, however; it amounts to 1030.
- The income gap is lower in the distributions X and Y, from which you can choose, than in distribution Z, where the income gap amounts to 1030 points. The income gap is only 750 in X and just 330 points in Y.

(2) Comparison between X and Y:
- The following applies to distribution X, which is an option you can choose:

- You receive a lower payment than in distribution Y.
- Person B receives a higher payment in X than in Y.
- The aggregate income is higher in X than in Y.
- The income gap is less in X than in Y.

- *Example 2:*
  Person B has the option of choosing the following distribution:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B
Distribution Z	1070	370

Or person B can delegate the following decision to you:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B
Distribution X	930	510
Distribution Y	810	150

If person B delegates the decision to you in this situation, this decision will have the following consequences:
(1) Comparison with Z:
- You will receive a lower payment in both distributions X and Y, which Person B left for your selection, than you would in payment Z.
- Person B receives a larger payment in X than in Z, but B receives a smaller payment in Y than in Z.
- The aggregate income of A and B in distribution X amounts to 1440 and is thus exactly the same size as in distribution Z. The aggregate income of A and B is smaller in distribution Y, however, and amounts to 960.
- The income gap is lower in the distributions X and Y, from which you can choose, than in distribution Z, where the income gap amounts to 700 points. The income gap is only 420 in X and 660 points in Y

(2) Comparison between X and Y:
- The following applies to distribution X, which is an option you can choose:
  - You receive a higher payment than in distribution Y.
  - Person B receives a higher payment than in Y.
  - The aggregate income is higher than in Y.
  - The income gap is less than in Y.

The procedure on the computer

The 78 different situations will be presented successively on a computer screen. On the screen presented below, Person B can decide whether he/she will give you 460 points and retain 930 points, or if he or she will leave the following decision to you:
- Option X: 600 for you (Person A) und 410 for Person B.
- Option Y: 600 for you (Person A) und 790 for Person B.



This is the longest part of the experiment, as it contains 78 questions. We kindly ask you to answer all 78 questions conscientiously, despite the number of questions.

Control questions

Please answer the questions below. The objective is to have complete clarity about the rules in the experiment. When you are done, raise your hand. We will check if the control questions are answered correctly and start the experiment.

1. Please look at the screen below:



Assuming that Person B delegated the decision to you. You thus must make a decision between the distributions X and Y.

(d) Did Person B improve his or her situation by delegating the decision?
- ☐ Yes, B is in a better position than in distribution Z.
- ☐ No, B is in a worse position than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Whether B is better or worse off depends on whether I select X or Y.

(e) Did Person B improve your (Person A's) situation by delegating the decision?
- ☐ Yes, I am in a better situation than in distribution Z.
- ☐ No, I am in a worse position than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Whether I am better or worse off depends on whether I select X or Y.

(f) How great is the income gap (in points) between you and Person B?

Income gap (in points) in distribution X:_____.
Income gap (in points) in distribution Y:_____.

(d) Is the income gap between you and Person B in distributions X and Y less than, greater than, or equal to the distribution Z?
- ☐ Less than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Greater than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Equal to distribution Z.

(e) What is the aggregate income (in points) of you and Person B in the distributions X, Y, and Z?

Aggregate income (in points) in distribution X:_____.
Aggregate income (in points) in distribution Y:_____.
Aggregate income (in points) in distribution Z:_____.

(j) Do you have a smaller, a larger, or an equal payment in distributions X and Y compared to distribution Z?
- ☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is less than that in distribution Z.
- ☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is greater than that in distribution Z.
- ☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is equal to that in distribution Z.

(k) Does the other person (B) have a smaller, a larger, or an equal payment in distributions X and Y compared to distribution Z?
- ☐ Person B's payment in distributions X and Y is smaller than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Person B's payment in distributions X and Y is greater than in distribution Z.
- ☐ Person B's payment in distributions X and Y is equal to that in distribution Z.

(l) If you select payment X, how large is your income in CHF? _____

(m) Will the person paired with you (Person B) learn of your identity?
- ☐ Yes.
- ☐ No.

Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions up to this point. A study administrator will look at your answers; after this, the study will begin on your screen.

Instructions for the second part

In this part of the experiment, you will see eight decision situations concerning a monetary distribution between you and another person participating in this experiment. The other person will be randomly paired with you in each decision situation. You will never learn who this person is, and the other person will also not learn of your identity. As in the last part, the experiment now concerns a monetary amount for you *(Person A)* and the other person *(Person B)*.

The difference to the first part of the experiment is the following: This time, you cannot choose between two options X and Y. Instead, Person B has this choice, and you can **react to Person B's choice** by either **crediting** Person B with points or **deducting** points from him/her.

Please again take exact note of which decision *Person B* must make. We will show you an example below:

- Person B must choose between the following distributions:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B
Distribution X	600	600
Distribution Y	200	1000

The aggregate income of you and Person B is the same in both distributions X and Y and amounts to 1200 points. You and Person B receive the same amount in distribution X, but in distribution Y, Person B receives 800 more points than you do. You must now decide for both of Person B's selection options (X and Y) whether you want to credit points to or deduct points from Person B.

- If Person B selects distribution **X**, you have three options:
  1st option: You can **credit** Person B with **positive points** using the following table:

Cost for you (in points)	10	20	30
Positive points for the other person	50	80	100

The table shows that you have to pay 10 points (i.e. relinquish) if you want to credit Person B with 50 positive points. If you want to credit Person B with 80 points, you have to pay 20, and if you want to credit Person B with 100 points, you have to pay 30.

2nd option: You can **deduct points** from Person B using the following table:

Cost for you (in points)	10	20	30
Point deduction for the other person	50	80	100

The table shows that you have to pay (i.e. relinquish) 10 points if you want to deduct 50 points from Person B. If you want to deduct 80 points from Person B, you have to pay 20, and if you want to deduct 100 points from Person B, you have to pay 30.

3rd option: You can **neither credit points to nor deduct points** from Person B.

- If Person B selects distribution **Y**, you again have three options:
  1st option: You can **credit** Person B with **positive points** using the following table:

Cost for you (in points)	10	20	30

Positive points for the other person	50	80	100

The table shows that you have to pay (i.e. relinquish) 10 points if you want to credit Person B with 50 positive points. If you want to credit Person B with 80 points, you have to pay 20, and if you want to credit Person B with 100 points, you have to pay 30.

2nd option: You can **deduct points** from Person B using the following table:

Cost for you (in points)	10	20	30
Point deduction for the other person B	50	80	100

The table shows that you have to pay (i.e. relinquish) 10 points if you want to deduct 50 points from Person B. If you want to deduct 80 points from Person B, you have to pay 20, and if you want to deduct 100 points from Person B, you have to pay 30.

3rd option: You can **neither credit points to nor deduct points** from Person B.

Control questions

Please answer the questions below.

1. Please look at the following screen shots. These two screen shots will always be shown directly after one another, as they concern the **same decision situation** between distributions X and Y **for Person B**. The only difference between the two screens is the following: on the first, you may indicate how you will react to Person B's behavior if B decides to select **distribution X**. In contrast, you may indicate on the second screen how you will react to Person B's behavior if B decides to select **distribution Y**.

Screen 1

Person B has the option of choosing between the following distributions:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B	Total points
Distribution X	600	600	1200
Distribution Y	500	700	1200

If Person B selects distribution X…

… would you like to credit Person B with points?

Cost for you in points	10	20	30
Point increase for the other Person B	35	50	60
Your choice	□	□	□

… would you like to deduct points from Person B?

Cost for you in points	10	20	30
Point deduction for the other Person B	35	50	60
Your choice	□	□	□

… would you neither like to credit points to nor deduct points from Person B? Then please click here: □

OK

Screen 2

Person B has the option of choosing between the following distributions:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B		Total points
Distribution X	600	600		1200
Distribution Y	500	700		1200
If Person B selects distribution Y…				
… would you like to credit Person B with points?				
Cost for you in points		10	20	30
Point increase for the other Person B		35	50	60
Your choice		□	□	□
… would you like to deduct points from Person B?				
Cost for you in points		10	20	30
Point deduction for the other Person B		35	50	60
Your choice		□	□	□
… would you neither like to credit points to nor deduct points from Person B? Then please click here: □				

OK

(a) How large is the income gap (in points) between you and Person B?

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution X:_____.

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution Y:_____.

(b) How large is the aggregate income (in points) of you and Person B for distributions X and Y?

Aggregate income in points for distribution X:_____.

Aggregate income in points for distribution Y:_____.

(c) If Person B selects distribution X and you would like to credit 60 points to Person B:

(c.1.) Which screen can you use for this decision? _____

(c.2) How many points must you pay to credit 60 points to Person B? _____

(c.3) How large is *your* income (in CHF) in this case? _____

(c.4) How large is *Person B's* income (in CHF) in this case? _____

(d) If Person B selects distribution Y and you would like to credit 80 points to Person B:

(d.1.) Which screen can you use for this decision? _____

(d.2.) How many points must you pay to credit 80 points to Person B? _____

(d.3) How large is *your* income (in CHF) in this case? _____

(d.4) How large is *Person B's* income (in CHF) in this case? _____

(e) If Person B selects distribution Y and you would like to deduct 80 points from Person B:

(e.1.) Which screen can you use for this decision? _____

(e.2.) How many points must you pay to deduct 100 points from Person B?? _____

(e.3) How large is *your* income (in CHF) in this case? _____

(e.4) How large is *Person B's* income (in CHF) in this case? _____

Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions up to this point. A study administrator will look at your answers; after this, the study will begin on your screen.

Instructions for the third part

The third part of the experiment consists of only one decision.[1] The task is to divide the total amount of 1200 points between you (Person A) and another person (Person B). The following rules apply:

The other Person (B) may **first** determine how much of the total amount of 1200 points he or she would like to keep for him/herself. **Afterwards**, you (Person A) may determine how many points you would like to have. **If the total sum (i.e. the amounts that both persons have determined) exceeds 1200 points, neither person, i.e. neither Person A nor Person B, will receive points.** If the sum the two persons determine **does not exceed** 1200, each receives the points he or she determined.

Control questions

1. Person B determines that he or she would like 900 points of the total amount for him/herself, and you (Person A) claim 300 points for yourself. How large is the payment…

   …for you (in CHF)? _____

   …for Person B (in CHF)? _____

2. Person B determines that he or she would like 700 points of the total amount for him/herself, and you (Person A) claim 600 points for yourself. How large is the payment …

   …for you (in CHF)? _____

   …for Person B (in CHF)? _____

3. Person B determines that he or she would like 600 points of the total amount for him/herself, and you (Person A) claim 300 points for yourself. How large is the payment …

   …for you (in CHF)? _____

   …for Person B (in CHF)? _____

Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions up to this point. A study administrator will look at your answers; after this, the study will begin on your screen

_____

[1] In addition to the games analyzed in our paper "The Many Faces of Human Sociality: Uncovering the Distribution and Stability of Social Preferences", Session 2 also contained four public good games, an ultimatum game in the design of Blount and Larrick (2000), as well as a multiple price list dictator game. We did not analyze these games in the paper mentioned above, because the behavioral model we estimated in this paper is not well suited to make quantitative predictions of behavior in these games. Our model assumes discrete and independent choices. However, in the public good game and the Blount-type ultimatum games the decision space is (quasi-)continuous. In the public good games, subjects can state any integer number between 0 and 600 to indicate their desired contribution level, which corresponds to 601 possible choices. In the Blount-type ultimatum games, subjects can state any integer number between 0 and 1200 to indicate their claim, which corresponds to 1201 possible choices. In the multiple price list dictator game, the decisions are discrete but not independent due to the use of a multiple price list design.

Instructions for the fourth part

In this part of the experiment, you will make 39 decisions that concern you and another person participating in this experiment. The other person will be randomly paired with you in each decision situation. You will never learn who this person is, and the other person will also not learn of your identity.

As in the first part of the experiment, you have exactly two options, an option X and an option Y, in each of the 39 decision situations. Each option involves a monetary amount for you *(Person A)* and a monetary amount for the other person *(Person B)* who is paired with you. You determine the distribution of the payment definitely with your decision. The other person *(Person B)* thus cannot change the income.

The difference to the first three parts of the experiment is the fact that Person B **cannot** make any decision before your decision this time. This time, you decide completely uninfluenced by any preliminary decision that B makes about the definite distribution of the payments.

The procedure on the computer

The 39 different situations will be presented successively on a computer screen. You will see the options in the rows, and the columns show the amounts for you and the other person.

In the screen shown below, for example, you receive 1040 points while the other person only gets 600 points if you select option X. If you choose option Y, then both you and the other person receive 850 points each.



<u>Control questions</u>

Please answer the questions below. The objective is to have complete clarity about the rules in the experiment. When you are done, raise your hand. We will check if the control questions are answered correctly and start the experiment.

1. Please look at the screen below:



(a) How large is the income gap (in points) between you and Person B?

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution X:_____.

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution Y:_____.

(b) How large is the aggregate income (in points) of you and Person B for distributions X and Y?

Aggregate income (in points) for distribution X:_____.

Aggregate income (in points) for distribution Y:_____.

(c) If you select distribution X…

What is your income in CHF? _____.

What is Person B's income in CHF? _____.

(d) If you select distribution Y …

What is your income in CHF? _____.

What is Person B's income in CHF? _____.

Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions up to this point. A study administrator will look at your answers; after this, the study will begin on your screen.

Instructions for the fifth part

In this part of the experiment, you will again make decisions that concern you and another person participating in this experiment. The other person will be, as always, randomly paired with you, and his or her identity will remain unknown.

You have two options in each decision situation, an option X and an option Y. Each decision concerns a monetary amount for you (*Person A*) and a monetary amount for another person (*Person B*) who is paired with you. In this experiment, you will determine the final distribution of the payment with your decision. The other person (Person B) thus can no longer change his or her income after you have made your decision.

The decisions will be presented to you in a table as shown below:

Distribution X		Your choice		**Distribution Y**	
Points for you (A)	Points for Person B			Points for you (A)	Points for Person B
600	800	o	o	590	1200
600	800	o	o	590	1100
600	800	o	o	590	1000
600	800	o	o	590	900
600	800	o	o	590	800
600	800	o	o	590	700
600	800	o	o	590	600
600	800	o	o	590	500
600	800	o	o	590	400
600	800	o	o	590	300

The individual decisions are each presented as rows in the table. You must decide for each row if you prefer distribution X or distribution Y.
Let us look, for example, at the first row of the table above.

- If you select distribution X, you will receive 600 points and Person B will receive 800 points. The aggregate income of you and Person B thus amounts to 1400 and the income gap between you and Person B is 200 points.
- If you select distribution Y, you will receive 590 points and person B will receive 1200 points. The aggregate income of you and Person B thus amounts to 1790 and the income gap between you and Person B is 610 points

If you look at the table carefully, you will see that it is constructed in such a way that there is only one spot where a change from option X to option Y is possible.

This means that the two selection models shown below to the left are possible, but that on the right is not.

possible



not possible

Control questions

These control questions refer to the table presented above. We will now look at the fifth **row** of this table.

(a) How large is the income gap (in points) between you and Person B?

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution X:_____.

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution Y:_____.

(b) How large is the aggregate income (in points) of you and Person B for distributions X and Y?

Aggregate income in points for distribution X:_____.

Aggregate income in points for distribution Y:_____.

(c) If you select distribution X…

What is your income in CHF? _____.

What is Person B's income in CHF? _____.

(d) If you select distribution Y …

What is your income in CHF? _____.

What is Person B's income in CHF? _____.

Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions up to this point. A study administrator will look at your answers; after this, the study will begin on your screen.

Instructions for the sixth part

In this part of the experiment, you will make ten decisions that concern you and another person participating in this experiment. As always, you will not learn of the identity of the other participant paired with you, and your identity also remains unknown to the other person.

You already know the form of these decisions. You have two options in each decision situation, an option X and an option Y. Each decision concerns a monetary amount for you (*Person A*) and a monetary amount for another person (*Person B*) who is paired with you. Person B can determine **before your decision** whether he or she would like to fix a certain final distribution Z of the payments. If Person B determines this final distribution, you no longer can influence the distribution of the payments. As an alternative, Person B can delegate the decision about the distribution to you. In this case, you must select between options X and Y as described above, meaning that option Z is not available to you.

Please take careful note of the decision that *Person B* must make before you decide. We show you an example here:

Round 2

Person B has the option of selecting the following distribution:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B
Distribution Z	600	600

Or Person B can delegate the following decision to you:

	Amount for you (A)	Amount for Person B	Your decision	
Distribution X	800	900	☐	X
Distribution Y	1200	0	☐	Y

If Person B delegates the decision to you. Which distribution do you select?

Please confirm your decision with the OK button.

OK

If Person B selects distribution Z, then both you and Person B receive 600 points. Person B can also entrust you with the decision between X and Y. If Person B delegates the decision to you, you have two possibilities, distribution X and distribution Y:

- If you select option X, the aggregate income of you and Person B amounts to 1700 (i.e. it is higher than in option Z, where the aggregate income is 1200 points). You will then receive 800 points and Person B will receive 900 points.
- The aggregate income of you and Person B amounts to 1200 points in option Y (i.e. it is equal to option Z, where the aggregate income is also 1200 points, but less than in option X). You receive 1200 points in option Y and Person B receives nothing.

If you select option Y, you would then abuse the trust that Person B placed in you in order to gain an advantage for yourself. If you select option X you will have 400 fewer points (800 instead of 1200 points), and reward Person B for trusting you.

Control questions

1. Please look at the screen below:



Assume that Person B delegates the decision to you. You now have to decide between distributions X and Y.

(a) How large is the income gap (in points) between you and Person B?

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution X:_____.

Income gap (in points) in case of selection of distribution Y:_____.

(b) How large is the aggregate income (in points) of you and Person B for distributions X and Y?

Aggregate income (in points) for distribution X:_____.

Aggregate income (in points) for distribution Y:_____.

(c) Do you have a smaller, a larger, or an equal payment in distributions X and Y compared to distribution Z?

☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is less than that in distribution Z.
☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is greater than that in distribution Z.
☐ My payment in distributions X and Y is equal to that in distribution Z.

(d) If you select distribution X, what is your income in CHF? _____

(e) If you select distribution Y, what is your income in CHF? _____

Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions up to this point. A study administrator will look at your answers; after this, the study will begin on your screen.

Instructions for the seventh part

You will again be randomly paired with another person in this part of the experiment. Both you and Person B must decide on the use of 600 points. You can leave the 600 points on a **private account** or you can invest them **partially or completely** in a shared project. You automatically deposit each point that you do not invest in the project in the private account.

Income from the private account:
You can retain with certainty every point that you deposit on the private account. For example, if you deposit 600 points in the private account (and thus invest nothing in the project), you will earn exactly 600 points from the private account. If, for example, 300 points are deposited in the private account, you will receive 300 points from the private account. *No one other than you can draw an income from your private account.*

Income from the shared project
Both you and Person B earn something in the same way from the amount that you invest in the project. Likewise, you earn something on Person B's investment. **Both you and Person B earn 0.6 point** for every point that you (or Person B) uses for the shared project. **A total of 1.2 points are distributed equally to both persons for every point invested in the project.**
If, for example, you and Person B invest 1000 points in the project together, you and Person B will each receive 1000 x 0.6 = 600 points from the project.

Total income:
Your total income consists of the sum of your income from the private account and your income from the project. If both you and Person B each contribute 500 points to the project and retain 100 points each for the private account, then both you and Person B will receive 1000 x 0.6 = 600 points from the project plus an additional 100 points from the private account. In total, both you and Person B receive 700 points each.

Control questions

1. Assume that neither you nor Person B contribute to the project.
What is *your* total income? _____
What is *Person B's total income*? _____

2. Assume that both you and Person B contribute the entire available amount of 600 points to the project.
What is *your* total income? _____
What is *Person B's total income*? _____

3. Assume that you contribute 500 points to the project but that Person B contributes no points.
What is *your* total income? _____
What is *Person B's total income*? _____

4. Assume that you contribute nothing to the project and Person B contributes the entire available amount of 600.

What is *your* total income? _____

What is *Person B's total income*? _____

5. This part will not just be completed on the computer with the **multiplication factor of 0.6**; instead, we will present you this task four times with various multiplication factors. The multiplication factors are chosen in such a way that each point invested in the project yields **more than one point** for the entire project. How large must the multiplication factor be at least so that each point invested in the project yields **more than one point** for the entire project?

☐ Greater than 0.3
☐ Greater than 0.4
☐ Greater than 0.5
☐ Greater than 0.6

Please raise your hand when you have completed the control questions up to this point. A study administrator will look at your answers; after this, the study will begin on your screen.

The eighth part of the experiment was to elicit proposer decisions which were needed to calculate the payments. In this part of the experiment, the subject played in the role of player B, the proposer. The instructions were directly given on the screen.

The ninth of the experiment consisted of a questionnaire about the subject's personal details to match her to Session 1.