

**1 Redrawing attendance boundaries to promote racial and ethnic diversity in  
2 elementary schools**

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9

**Abstract**

10        Most US school districts draw "attendance boundaries" to define catchment areas  
11      that assign students to schools near their homes, often recapitulating neighborhood  
12      demographic segregation in schools. Focusing on elementary schools, we ask: how much  
13      might we reduce school segregation by redrawing attendance boundaries? Combining  
14      parent preference data with methods from combinatorial optimization, we simulate  
15      alternative boundaries for 98 US school districts serving over 3 million elementary-aged  
16      students, minimizing White/non-White segregation while mitigating changes to travel  
17      times and school sizes. Across districts, we observe a median 12% relative decrease in  
18      segregation, which we estimate would require nearly 20% of students to switch schools and,  
19      surprisingly, a slight *reduction* in travel times. We release a public dashboard depicting  
20      these alternative boundaries ([www.schooldiversity.org](http://www.schooldiversity.org)) and invite both school boards and  
21      their constituents to evaluate their viability. Our results show the possibility of greater  
22      integration without significant disruptions for families.

23 Redrawing attendance boundaries to promote racial and ethnic diversity in  
24 elementary schools

## Introduction

26 It has been over 65 years since the US Supreme Court ordered the racial  
27 desegregation of schools (“Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1),” n.d.). Yet  
28 segregation by race and income in K12 schools continues to hamper access to quality  
29 education for millions of children across the US (Reardon et al., 2018), despite strong  
30 evidence that integration reduces achievement gaps between lower income students of color  
31 and their more affluent, majority race counterparts (Billings et al., 2013; Johnson, 2011;  
32 Wells & Crain, 1994). Of course, increasing diversity by fostering more demographic  
33 integration is not a foolproof method for reducing achievement gaps. Too often, even after  
34 addressing segregation at the school level, segregation persists at the classroom or  
35 friendship level (Card & Giuliano, 2016; Moody, 2001; Potter, 2016; Tatum, 1997), or low  
36 income students of color feel unsupported in more integrated environments (Comer, 1988).  
37 Diversity done wrong can cause more harm than good. And yet, more diverse schools can  
38 serve as a necessary first step toward providing children from different racial and  
39 socioeconomic backgrounds the chance to mix and learn from one another. This learning  
40 and mixing is important beyond its potential role in reducing achievement gaps: it can also  
41 help increase empathy, compassion, reflective thought (Wells et al., 2016), and encourage  
42 more welcoming attitudes towards diversity later on in life (Davies et al., 2011; Wells &  
43 Crain, 1994). There is evidence to suggest that all students can benefit from racially and  
44 socioeconomically diverse classrooms.

45 Yet across the US, the vast majority of students attend the schools closest to their  
46 homes by virtue of how “school attendance boundaries”—or catchment areas—are  
47 drawn (Monarrez, 2021; Richards, 2014; Saporito & Riper, 2016), leading schools to  
48 recapitulate neighborhood-level segregation by race and income. The expansion of school  
49 choice programs has sought to challenge the geographic determinism of boundary-driven

50 school assignment and thereby also mitigate school segregation (Kahlenberg, 2016).  
51 However, choice too, has been shown in several instances to perpetuate segregation due to  
52 self-selection of certain families into certain schools (Candipan, 2019; Monarrez et al., 2022;  
53 Whitehurst, 2017). Boundaries continue to play a prominent role in student assignment: as  
54 of 2016, approximately 20% of students in grades 1-12 participated in some type of public  
55 school choice (including 8% opting for charter schools); 9% attended private schools; and  
56 the remaining 71% attended an assigned school, likely determined by  
57 geography (of Education, 2021). Choice programs have continued to gain popularity in  
58 recent years, particularly as some subsets of families have sought new avenues for  
59 mitigating the pandemic's effects on their children's learning (Houlgrave, 2021), yet  
60 place-based school assignment continues to be the norm. Even in choice settings, where  
61 students live might influence the priority they are assigned to attend a certain  
62 schools (Monarrez & Chien, 2021), or even which schools are part of the choice set (Campos  
63 & Kearns, 2022). This makes attendance boundaries, and more generally, place of residence  
64 a perennially important factor in school attendance policies. The implications of these  
65 boundaries and resultant segregation can run deep: for example, they have been shown to  
66 demarcate stark gradients in access to gifted and talented programs, quality teachers,  
67 school counselors, and a number of other educational resources (Monarrez & Chien, 2021).

68 Despite the impact attendance boundaries can have on socioeconomic diversity in  
69 schools, most school segregation results from how the lines *between* districts are drawn (e.g.  
70 separating cities from suburbs), instead of school-specific boundaries *within* districts (Fiel,  
71 2013; Monarrez, 2021). Redrawing district boundaries is arguably a more difficult problem,  
72 however, because it falls under the purview of state legislatures—making it subject to the  
73 whims, frictions, and bureaucratic inefficiencies of similarly-contentious political issues  
74 manifesting at state and federal levels. On the other hand, changing attendance boundaries  
75 within districts generally falls under the purview of those districts. Indeed, a landmark  
76 2007 Supreme Court case outlawed the use of individual students' racial backgrounds as an

77 input into school desegregation efforts and effectively encouraged districts to explore the  
78 redrawing of school attendance boundaries as a desegregation policy (Totenberg, 2007).  
79 Yet even within districts, changing boundaries continues to be a highly contentious topic,  
80 especially when issues of diversity are also at stake (McMillan, 2018). Parents may fear  
81 that rezoning students will increase travel times through longer “busing” (Frankenberg &  
82 Jacobsen, 2011), reduce quality of education (Zhang, 2008)—which they often define  
83 vis-á-vis test scores (Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2019) and class sizes (Gilraine et al., 2018),  
84 produce unsafe school environments (Staff, 2019), drop property values (Black, 1999;  
85 Bridges, 2016; Kane et al., 2005), fragment communities (Bridges, 2016; Staff, 2019), and  
86 require a number of other sacrifices.

87 These concerns, while sometimes reasonable, often impede practical paths towards  
88 achieving more diverse and integrated schools—e.g., by sparking “white flight” in response  
89 to unfavorable school assignment policies (Reber, 2005) and souring public opinion towards  
90 desegregation efforts as a result of concerns about long-distance busing and other  
91 inconveniences (Delmont, 2016). Furthermore, despite parents increasingly expressing  
92 support for school integration through polls and surveys (Frankenberg & Jacobsen, 2011;  
93 Torres & Weissbourd, 2020), they continue to “vote with their feet”, deciding where to live  
94 and send their children to school in ways that reflect racialized preferences (Billingham &  
95 Hunt, 2016; Charles, 2003; Hailey, 2021; Hall & Hibel, 2017; Iceland et al., 2010). Such  
96 preferences, especially when aggregated and compounded across families, can yield extreme  
97 levels of segregation across neighborhoods, cities, and schools (Card et al., 2008; Schelling,  
98 1971). Shifting these underlying preferences is one of the greatest challenges of our time,  
99 and is critical for the implementation of sustainable school desegregation efforts that  
100 persist in the face of changing legal mandates (Billings et al., 2013). Alongside this deeper  
101 work, however, it is also critical to identify if there are pathways to achieving more diverse  
102 and integrated schools *today*—in the case of our focus, through alternative attendance  
103 boundaries—that families may earnestly consider and not immediately dismiss because

104 they significantly disrupt and decrease day-to-day quality of life.

105 The purpose of this paper is to explore to what extent this is the case, i.e., if it is  
106 possible to redraw attendance boundaries within districts in order to achieve more diverse  
107 schools without requiring families from different racial and ethnic backgrounds to make  
108 large sacrifices. While several studies have explored relationships between attendance  
109 boundaries and school segregation (Monarrez, 2021; Richards, 2014; Saporito & Riper,  
110 2016), we have found few that have explored actually changing school boundaries—with  
111 the exception of (Caro et al., 2004; Clark & Surkis, 1968; Liggett, 1973; Mota et al.,  
112 2021)—yet these have not focused on achieving greater racial and ethnic diversity across  
113 schools as the main objective of their approach. Larger districts may hire external vendors  
114 to explore alternative boundary scenarios; however, their exact tools and methods are often  
115 opaque, and diversity is rarely, if ever, a primary objective—though it is sometimes  
116 included as a constraint or post hoc measure (“Montgomery County Public Schools  
117 Districtwide Boundary Analysis,” 2021). To our knowledge, our work is the first to  
118 simulate alternative attendance boundaries optimized to achieve racial and ethnic  
119 desegregation across a large number of US school districts. Simulations alone are not  
120 sufficient to drive policy change, especially in the face of parents and others who might  
121 oppose such change, but may help illuminate possible paths to integration “within reach”  
122 that both districts and families may not have previously explored.

123 We frame our inquiry as an constrained optimization problem and ask two  
124 overarching questions: 1) how can we re-assign geographies to schools in order to minimize  
125 racial segregation, defined as imbalances in the White/non-White composition at schools  
126 relative to district-level proportions, while respecting parents’ travel time and class size  
127 preferences? And 2) how fairly are these reductions in segregation, and associated  
128 costs—namely, changes in travel times and school switching requirements—distributed  
129 across Asian, Black, Hispanic/Latinx, Native American, and White students? To explore  
130 these questions, we focus on elementary schools for similar reasons as (Monarrez, 2021):

131 because their boundaries often approximately combine to form the boundaries of the  
132 middle and high schools they “feed” to, and hence, are foundational in shaping diverse  
133 exposures at an early age. We use parent input and computational tools to simulate  
134 changes across 98 large school districts across the US with district elementary schools that  
135 are classified as non open-enrollment: that is, attendance at these schools are entirely a  
136 function of which neighborhoods are zoned to attend them. These schools collectively serve  
137 over 3 million students.

138 We focus on White/non-White segregation as our primary quantity of interest given  
139 its historical significance within the US and abroad; its association with other family-level  
140 factors that have been shown to correlate with educational outcomes, like socioeconomic  
141 status (Reardon et al., 2018); and the precision and reliability with which racial/ethnic  
142 data is available at the granularity of schools and small geographic units like Census blocks  
143 (as opposed to measures of socioeconomic status among parents, which are also critical in  
144 the discussion about school segregation, but less reliably and precisely defined and  
145 available (Harwell & LeBeau, 2010)). White/non-White segregation does not perfectly  
146 capture patterns of segregation across all school districts: for example, in some district  
147 settings, White and Asian students may be more likely to attend schools together,  
148 segregated away from their Black and Hispanic/Latinx counterparts (Chang, 2018).  
149 Nevertheless, across most districts, including those in our sample, White, Black, and  
150 Hispanic/Latinx students constitute the vast majority of the population, rendering  
151 White/non-White segregation an important dimension of analysis.

152 Our findings show that alternative attendance boundaries could produce a relative  
153 decrease of 12% in White/non-White segregation across districts. These boundaries would  
154 require nearly 20% of students to switch schools, and interestingly, a slight *decrease* of just  
155 under one minute in these students’ time spent traveling to school. On average, these  
156 “costs” of added diversity appear to be fairly distributed across different student groups,  
157 though through two case studies, we see that this can vary by district and rezoning. We

158 release our code and several datasets, inviting interested researchers and school districts  
 159 across the US to further explore the opportunities and potential trade-offs involved in  
 160 changing attendance boundaries to advance integration in their own districts. Below, we  
 161 describe our approach, key results, limitations, and potential avenues for future work.

162 **Data and Methods**

163 **Optimization model**

164 We use the dissimilarity index (Massey & Denton, 1988) as our primary measure of  
 165 segregation. The index is defined as:

$$\frac{1}{2} \sum_{s \in S} \left| \frac{W_s}{W_T} - \frac{NW_s}{NW_T} \right| \quad (1)$$

166 Where  $s$  is an elementary school across all district elementary schools  $S$ ;  $W_s$  and  
 167  $NW_s$  correspond to the number of White and non-White students at  $s$ , and  $W_T$  and  $NW_T$   
 168 to the total number of White and non-White students across the district, respectively.

169 Perfectly integrated districts—where the proportion of White/non-White students in each  
 170 school reflects district-wide proportions—would receive a score of 0 under this measure,  
 171 while perfectly segregated districts would receive a score of 1. Intuitively, the dissimilarity  
 172 index indicates the proportion of White students in the district who would need to switch  
 173 schools in order to achieve perfect integration (Jakubs, 1977).

174 It is important to note that scholars have proposed a myriad of school segregation  
 175 measurements over the past several decades, many of which seek to overcome several  
 176 potential shortcomings of the dissimilarity index. Some of these shortcomings include its 1)  
 177 failure to fully respect the “transfers/exchanges” principle, whereby movement of students  
 178 from schools with a higher proportion of other same-race students to a school with a lower  
 179 proportion may not decrease dissimilarity unless one school is over-represented, and the  
 180 other under-represented, with respect to the group’s district-wide prevalence (James &  
 181 Taeuber, 1985); and 2) potential equal treatment of changes that lower the index, even if

182 some may have more normative value than others (like reducing a school's demographic  
183 population of 100% to 90% belonging to a certain group, vs. 60% to 50%) (Winship, 1978).  
184 Nevertheless, for the purposes of this preliminary investigation, we choose this index over  
185 others because of its 1) simplicity and widespread recognition; 2) extensive use in prior  
186 literature, including studies of school segregation (James & Taeuber, 1985; Monarrez et al.,  
187 2019); and 3) general agreement with levels of segregation computed in other  
188 studies (Monarrez et al., 2019, 2022) when compared to some alternative measures like the  
189 variance ratio index (Massey & Denton, 1988; Owens et al., 2022).

190 Still, there are many other valid measures that each capture slightly different  
191 notions of both levels of segregation and diversity across schools, including multi-group  
192 measures like Theil's Entropy Index (Reardon & Firebaugh, 2002), and the aforementioned  
193 variance ratio index, which seeks to simultaneously quantify both measures of evenness  
194 (similar to the dissimilarity index) and exposure. An important and exciting direction for  
195 future work is a more thorough exploration of these and other alternative measures. To  
196 support these efforts, we include documentation as a part of our code release that describes  
197 how researchers can make minor modifications to our framework in order to implement and  
198 evaluate alternative metrics. Critically, we note that all of these measures of segregation  
199 are naive in that they do not account for within-school segregation and sorting (Moody,  
200 2001; Tatum, 1997)—including levels of “friending bias” (Chetty et al., 2022) that may  
201 manifest within schools and subsequently affect who connects with whom, how social  
202 capital is shared, and ultimately the extent to which more diverse schools translate into  
203 more engagement across lines of difference.

204 With these considerations in hand, we design a rezoning algorithm which seeks to  
205 re-assign Census blocks to elementary schools within each district in order to minimize  
206 Equation 1. Rezoning problems are generally computationally challenging because of the  
207 many geographic units they operate over, and the sometimes large number of constraints  
208 (e.g., in the case of contiguity constraints) they impose. Much redistricting work to date

209 has focused on congressional redistricting, and many approaches to this have used  
210 mixed-integer programming (MIP) as a core building block (Becker & Solomon, 2020),  
211 often augmented with problem-specific search strategies (Gurnee & Shmoys, 2021). To  
212 compute these combinatorial optimization problems—which are “NP-hard” and lack  
213 efficient, polynomial time solutions—we use constraint programming (Van Hentenryck,  
214 1989) via the CP-SAT model in Google’s Operations Research (OR) Tools  
215 library (OR-Tools, 2022), which has been shown to perform extremely well on a number of  
216 different types of combinatorial optimization problems (Perron & Didier, 2020). Constraint  
217 programming enables us to more flexibly express constraints and nonlinear objective  
218 functions that may otherwise be difficult to encode. While CP-SAT is able to find  
219 high-quality solutions to these notoriously difficult geographic rezoning problems, given the  
220 size of most districts, it is generally unable to prove that the discovered solutions are  
221 optimal. This means that it may be possible to improve upon the reductions in segregation  
222 we report, perhaps through additional computational resources and/or alternative model  
223 and solver specifications.

224 The algorithm factors in the following constraints, given they represent topics that  
225 are often top of mind for parents and district officials when exploring boundary  
226 changes (McMillan, 2018; “Montgomery County Public Schools Districtwide Boundary  
227 Analysis,” 2021):

- 228 1. **Maximum travel time increases.** We use the OpenRouteService API (GIScience,  
229 2022) to estimate driving times from Census blocks to schools (see more below), and  
230 require that re-assignments of blocks to new schools do not increase estimated travel  
231 times by more than X% for any given family.
- 232 2. **Maximum school size increases.** We use the total population at a given school as  
233 a proxy for a quantity parents often care about in their children’s schools—class  
234 sizes (Gilraine et al., 2018)—and require that this total does not exceed Y% of its  
235 current population.

236     3. **Contiguity.** Unlike most US states' requirements for Congressional  
237       districts ("Congressional Redistricting Criteria and Considerations," 2021), states do  
238       not legally mandate school attendance boundaries to be comprised of contiguous  
239       geographic units. Still, while they exist in many districts, non-contiguous boundaries  
240       are often difficult to justify to families ("Montgomery County Public Schools  
241       Districtwide Boundary Analysis," 2021). We define block  $b$  to be contiguous with  
242       respect to its assigned school  $s$  if a line can be drawn on a map from  $b$  to the block  
243       containing school  $s$  without crossing through blocks zoned for any other schools. We  
244       enforce contiguity similar to (Mehrotra et al., 1998), with further details available in  
245       S1 of the Supplementary Materials. The contiguity constraint requires blocks that  
246       are contiguous with respect to their currently-zoned school must remain contiguous  
247       with respect to their zoned school under any hypothetical rezoning. Contiguity, of  
248       course, is only a proxy for "community cohesion", or a desire for parents to preserve  
249       existing geographic and social networks when faced with intra-district boundary  
250       changes (Bridges, 2016).

251       To identify plausible values for X% and Y% above—i.e., the travel time and school

252       size constraints—we use the survey platform Prolific Prolific<sup>1</sup> to conduct a survey of 250  
253       US-based public school parents. We design the survey to better-understand parents'  
254       attitudes towards school diversity and the trade-offs they are willing to make to achieve  
255       more diverse schools, if any. We gather baseline information about the parents' attitudes  
256       towards diversity, as well as information about the child's current school—including current  
257       travel times to school and average class sizes. We then ask parents questions like the  
258       following: "Let's say that by changing the school zones in your district, an additional  
259       [PERCENT] of your child's classmates would come from different [CATEGORY]  
260       backgrounds. Imagine this requires traveling further to school. How many more minutes  
261       would you be ok with your child traveling to school in order for them to experience this

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<sup>1</sup> <https://prolific.co/>.

increase in diversity?”. We randomly select values for [PERCENT] and [CATEGORY] to account for different diversity scenarios (see the Supplementary Materials for additional details). Importantly, we acknowledge the possibility of social desirability bias in parents’ responses (Pager & Quillian, 2005) as an important limitation of our survey, and one that may mask several of the underlying racialized preferences for schooling described earlier. In seeking to keep the survey questions simple and relevant to parents, we also acknowledge that our use of “diversity” in them does not directly correspond to the measure of segregation (dissimilarity) that we eventually optimize: how parents and students experience diversity in classrooms is not necessarily well-described by a district-wide measure like dissimilarity.

With these limitations in hand, we find that the median increase in travel times that parents would be willing to accommodate is approximately 60% (or approximately 6 minutes, given the reported median travel time to school 10 minutes), and the median increase in class size is 15% (or approximately 3 students, up from a reported median class size of 22). Based on these values, we set the max travel time increase threshold to be 50% (a conservative lower bound) and the max school size increase to be 15%. We do not accommodate other modes of transport, e.g. requiring students who currently walk to school to be able to continue doing so. This may still occur under our current configurations: e.g., a student’s 10 minute walk may translate into a 2 minute drive, which could increase to a max of 3 minutes under our 50% threshold. In the event there is such an alternative nearby option available, and the algorithm reassigns the student to it, it may still be walkable—though not guaranteed to be. Therefore, modeling alternative commute options is an important direction for future work, especially in collaboration with school districts, who may have different transportation options and profiles.

Finally, in general, survey respondents skew more White, affluent, and suburban than national averages, with details on how respondents compare to national averages for US public schools available in S3 of the Supplementary Materials. These representational

289 disparities limit the validity of the survey as a robust indicator of the preferences of  
290 families across public education systems in the US. At best, the survey offers us a starting  
291 point for grounding our models, but one that must be refined through more participatory,  
292 community-centric efforts (a topic we return to in the discussion.)

293       Figure 1 provides an overview of the problem setup, including the data and  
294 parameter inputs into our optimization model (with the input datasets described in more  
295 detail below), and our main outcome measures of interests: expected changes in 1) levels of  
296 segregation, 2) travel times, and 3) school switching. Section S2 in the Supplementary  
297 Materials contains a more detailed description of the optimization model and constraints,  
298 including our implementation of the contiguity constraint. Given the computational  
299 intensiveness of each rezoning task, we use only one CPU core per rezoning simulation  
300 while setting a solver cutoff time of five hours and thirty minutes.

### 301 **Identifying districts and school attendance boundaries**

302       The most recent school attendance boundary survey conducted by the US  
303 Department of Education was in 2015/2016 (Geverdt, 2018). Therefore, for this study, we  
304 purchase 2021/2022 school attendance boundaries from the data provider ATTOM<sup>2</sup>. Using  
305 2020 US Census block shape files collected from the US Census website<sup>3</sup>, we determine  
306 that a block is zoned for a particular elementary school if the centroid of that block falls  
307 within the multipolygon delineating the school's attendance zone for 3rd graders. We  
308 exclusively use 3rd grade boundaries as our proxy for elementary schools given that 3rd  
309 grade is typically classified as an elementary grade, as opposed to e.g. 6th grade, which  
310 may be elementary or middle depending on the district/state. In the event a district has  
311 overlapping attendance boundaries for certain schools, we map the block to the school with  
312 the smallest attendance boundary (in terms of overall area). This occurs for approximately

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.attomdata.com/data/boundaries-data/school-attendance-zone-boundaries/>.

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.census.gov/geographies/mapping-files/time-series/geo/tiger-line-file.html>.

313 7% of blocks across the districts in our study.

314 We identify our sample of 98 school districts by applying the following criteria.

315 First, we remove districts that only have one elementary school (and hence, for which the  
316 notion of a boundary change is undefined), and those that we do not have 2019/2020  
317 NCES school population counts for (described in the next section). Next, for  
318 computational purposes, we include only those districts that have 200 or fewer elementary  
319 schools. After applying these filters, we are left with 4,231 school districts in our data. The  
320 vast majority—approximately 94% (3,970)—have entirely “closed-enrollment” elementary  
321 schools: all of their within-district elementary schools have student assignment defined by  
322 attendance boundaries and do not permit attendance by students living outside of those  
323 boundaries<sup>4</sup>. Importantly, we note that families across even those districts with all  
324 closed-enrollment elementary schools may still opt for out-of-district charter or private  
325 options for their children; our datasets do not permit us to know how prevalent this is  
326 across particular districts.

327 The 6% excluded from our sample tend to have a slightly higher White population,

328 slightly higher Hispanic/Latinx population, and slightly higher White/non-White

329 segregation than the remaining 94%. We select the largest 100 districts (in terms of

330 enrollment) across the 94% of districts with closed-enrollment elementary schools.

331 Compared to the other 3,870 districts with no open-enrollment elementary schools, these

332 100 districts are (by definition) larger, but generally do not have higher levels of

333 White/non-White segregation. Compared to the excluded 6%, these 100 districts are also

334 generally larger, and *do* have a higher level of White/non-White segregation. S4 in the

335 supplementary materials offers further details on these differences. Due to memory

336 limitations in our computing infrastructure, we are able to simulate alternative boundaries

337 for 98 of these 100 districts. These 98 districts constitute our final sample.

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<sup>4</sup> These values drop to 88% and 86% when considering middle (7th grade) and high (10th grade) attendance boundaries, suggesting districts are less likely to make choice programs available at younger grade levels.

**338 Estimating students per Census block**

**339** We use the 2019/2020 National Center for Education Statistics Common Core of  
**340** Data<sup>5</sup> to estimate the number of Black, Hispanic/Latinx, White, Native American, and  
**341** Asian students at each school. In parallel, we download 2020 Census block-level population  
**342** counts for individuals who are less than 18 years of age and considered to belong to one of  
**343** the above demographic groups.

**344** With these datasets in hand, we estimate  $N_{gbs}$ , i.e. the number of students from  
**345** group  $g$  in block  $b$  that attend school  $s$ , to be:

$$\frac{C_{gb}}{C_{gB_s}} \cdot s_g \quad (2)$$

**346** Where  $C_{gb}$  is the count of individuals belonging to group  $g$  and living in block  $b$  as  
**347** estimated from the Census data;  $C_{gB_s}$  is the total number of individuals from the Census  
**348** data belonging to group  $g$  across blocks that are zoned for school  $s$  (i.e.,  $B_s$ ); and  $s_g$  is the  
**349** total number of students from group  $g$  at  $s$ . However, in cases where  $s_g$  is large, we find  
**350** that scaling by  $\frac{C_{gb}}{C_{gB_s}}$  sometimes leads to counts per block that exceed the total number of  
**351** students under 18 in that block, as defined by Census data. Therefore, when  $\frac{C_{gb}}{C_{gB_s}}$  exceeds  
**352** 50%, we replace it with  $\frac{C_b}{C_{B_s}}$ —i.e., we simply assume that the fraction of students belonging  
**353** to  $g$  that attend  $s$  from  $b$  is proportional to the fraction of total students living in  $b$ .

**354** Finally, we take the ceil of values and iteratively estimate counts per block (starting with  
**355** the blocks with the highest value of  $C_{gb}$ ) until all students at the school have been  
**356** allocated to a home block. This helps ensure integer student counts, and also, that the  
**357** total number of students per group across all blocks is equivalent to the number attending  
**358** the school per the NCES data.

**359** All Census data is collected from (Manson et al., 2021). Our procedures are limited  
**360** because of our inability to estimate the precise number of students in each block who

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<sup>5</sup> <https://nces.ed.gov/ccd/files.asp>.

361 attend their zoned elementary school, as some may attend charter, private, or  
362 within-district options with open enrollment. Even though certain demographic groups  
363 disproportionately may exercise school choice in different settings (Bischoff & Tach, 2020;  
364 Rich et al., 2021; Schachner, 2022), because our estimates are based on ground truth school  
365 enrollments by demographic group, this differential uptake of school choice is likely to bias  
366 our block-level estimates only if families who are part of the same demographic group and  
367 assigned to the same school have different rates of school choice uptake that are correlated  
368 with the block in which they live. It is not immediately obvious why this might happen,  
369 but there are certainly possible explanations (for example, a particular block might house a  
370 popular charter or other alternative school option). This could affect the results of our  
371 boundary redrawing by either over or understating how much alternative boundaries might  
372 impact school diversity. For example, districts with a high fraction of non-White students  
373 that have disproportionate numbers of White families opting out of zoned schools in  
374 certain blocks compared to others may overstate how much alternative boundaries could  
375 increase integration; conversely, higher fractions of non-White families opting out across  
376 these blocks (e.g., due to charter options with lotteries that reserve seats for different  
377 demographic groups) may understate it.

378 We acknowledge this important limitation in our estimation procedures, which we  
379 believe is addressable through closer collaborations with district partners who are likely to  
380 have more precise student counts per block. Section S1 in the Supplementary Materials  
381 contains additional details on key assumptions underlying our estimation procedure.

### 382 **Estimating travel times**

383 We use the OpenRouteService API (GIScience, 2022) to estimate travel (driving)  
384 times between block centroids and schools in each district. Given the large number of  
385 travel times to compute (millions in some of the larger districts) and the publicly-hosted  
386 API's rate limits, we compile and run a local instance of the API on our own server, which

enables us to submit an arbitrary number of queries. Queries are comprised of latitude/longitude pairs for a starting location (Census block centroid) and ending location (school location). Travel times do not account for traffic patterns.

390

## Results

We begin by analyzing baseline White/non-White segregation scores for our 98 districts. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of White/non-White segregation (dissimilarity) scores. The mean and median segregation value across districts is 0.39; the minimum is 0.14; and the maximum is 0.74. Interestingly, this median White/non-White segregation is higher across these districts than median segregation for other demographic groups (Asian/non-Asian, Black/non-Black, Hispanic/Latinx/ non-Hispanic/Latinx, Native American/non-Native American), suggesting that this dimension of segregation is still particularly salient across many US school districts.

The current segregation scores suggest there is room for improvement under alternative boundary scenarios. But how much improvement might we expect?

Implementing the optimization procedure described earlier yields Figure 3, which illustrates changes in segregation values, school assignments, and travel times produced by our models across districts (error bars depict 95% bias-corrected and accelerated confidence intervals, computed using the boot library in R (Canty & Ripley, 2021; Davison & Hinkley, 1997)). From 3(a), we see that if each district in our sample adopted the boundary changes produced by our models, median White/non-White segregation across districts could shift from 0.39 to 0.33. When computing the pairwise before/after reductions per district, this translates to a median absolute decrease of approximately 0.04—corresponding to a median 12% relative decrease in segregation across districts. Figure 3(b) illustrates these changes at the district level. Conducting exploratory correlational analyses, we observe no statistically-significant association between absolute decreases in segregation and urbanicity (*ANOVA F = 0.66, p = 0.58*) or district size (*Spearman ρ = .06, p = .53*), and

413 a weak relationship with initial levels of segregation (*Spearman*  $\rho = -0.17, p = 0.09$ ).  
414 These results suggest that the unique geographic and demographic contexts of different  
415 districts are likely to determine how much intra-district attendance boundary changes can  
416 increase school diversity more than overarching characteristics like district size, current  
417 levels of segregation, or urbanicity.

418 Figures 3(c)-(e) illustrate the costs of achieving these reductions in segregation.  
419 From (c), we see that reducing White/non-White segregation would not lead to higher  
420 segregation levels for other racial groups (i.e., Black/non-Black; Hispanic/Latinx  
421 non-Hispanic/Latinx; etc). In fact, the other racial groups would also experience  
422 reductions in segregation under the depicted rezonings. In (d), we see that, on average,  
423 approximately 20% of students from different groups would be required to switch schools,  
424 and that the burden of school switching could be distributed approximately evenly across  
425 student groups. While 20% represents a relatively large fraction of students, it is less than  
426 the nearly 40% of parents in our survey who expressed a willingness to switch schools if  
427 their district redrew attendance boundaries. From an implementation perspective, districts  
428 may also phase boundary changes in gradually instead of all at once, reducing the number  
429 of students required to switch schools in any given year. The literature on the impact of  
430 school switching on student academic and subjective well being outcomes is mixed, with  
431 some findings illustrating positive benefits conditional on switching to attend better  
432 schools, and others illustrating adverse consequences (Hanushek et al., 2004; Schwartz  
433 et al., 2017). Weighing the potential disruption costs of school switching alongside the  
434 potential gains of more integrated schools is important when determining when and how to  
435 make boundary changes.

436 Somewhat surprisingly, plot (e) shows that average school switcher would actually  
437 experience a *decrease* in their travel times to and from school, despite the fact that our  
438 model permitted up to a 50% increase in travel times for any given family. This is notable  
439 because it suggests that 1) long-range “busing” (Delmont, 2016) is not necessarily required

440 to achieve more diversity in schools, and 2) some existing attendance boundaries may  
441 potentially be drawn (“gerrymandered”) in ways that assign students to schools further  
442 from their homes, resulting in slightly higher levels of segregation as a result (Richards,  
443 2014). We note the speculative nature of this latter point, especially given the existence of  
444 research suggesting that irregularly-shaped boundaries may actually contribute to *greater*  
445 integration (Saporito & Riper, 2016). Indeed, it is possible families may have moved after  
446 the implementation of such boundaries precisely to avoid more integrated schools,  
447 producing a net increase in segregation. Further research is needed to better understand  
448 precisely why it appears that current boundaries could be redrawn to foster integration  
449 while also reducing travel times. Finally, an important observation from Figures 3(c)-(e) is  
450 that, again on average across districts, the potential costs of desegregation are fairly  
451 distributed across the depicted racial and ethnic groups.

452 A median 12% relative decrease in segregation across districts represents a  
453 non-trivial step towards more integrated schools, yet it is also far from achieving full  
454 integration, illustrating how the choices of constraint values impact how much progress  
455 districts might make towards integration. For example, setting the max travel increase  
456 threshold to 100% (or in the most extreme case, allowing families to experience a doubling  
457 in travel time to school) could yield a median relative decrease in segregation of 16%, but  
458 would require nearly 30% of students to switch schools and experience a slight average  
459 increase in travel times of approximately half a minute to school. Keeping the travel time  
460 increase at a maximum of 50% but dropping the contiguity constraint could yield a median  
461 relative decrease in segregation of 40%, but would require approximately 45% of students  
462 to switch schools, and a 1.5 minute average increase in travel to school. Applying both of  
463 these relaxations together—not requiring contiguity and allowing larger increases in travel  
464 times—could decrease segregation by nearly two-thirds (65%) and effectively eliminate  
465 segregation in 15 of our 98 districts, but would also require two-thirds of students to switch  
466 schools, and an average increase of nearly 4 minutes spent traveling to school. Section S4

467 in the Supplementary Materials includes additional details on these sensitivity analyses.

468 Importantly, our analyses do not factor in the likelihood of complex system  
469 dynamics that could manifest if districts actually *did* adopt the rezonings described  
470 here—for example, neighborhood relocation (“white flight”) (Reber, 2005) in response to  
471 unfavorable rezonings, or the disproportionate use of school choice by families—namely,  
472 those who are more privileged—to opt for other district or charter options that enable  
473 them to circumvent the effects of changing boundaries. While we’ve attempted to solicit  
474 parent input to model boundary changes that parents are more likely to accept, these  
475 preferences offer only a limited starting point. Furthermore, it is impossible to know how  
476 parents will actually respond to any particular rezoning if proposed and eventually  
477 implemented in practice. Incorporating likely reactions and decisions among families into  
478 our models based on historical responses to boundary changes, and/or direct input from  
479 districts and parents about their views on the viability of particular rezonings, are  
480 therefore important avenues for future work.

481 While we report averages across districts in Figure 3, these averages potentially  
482 mask heterogeneities across different types of districts. To explore some of these  
483 heterogeneities, we conduct two case studies. The first involves the most segregated district  
484 in our sample, Atlanta Public Schools, which has a segregation score of 0.74 and serves  
485 nearly 23,000 students across 44 closed-enrollment attendance boundary elementary  
486 schools. The second involves the district closest to the median level of segregation across  
487 districts in our sample: Mesa Unified District, Arizona, which has a segregation score 0.39  
488 and serves nearly 31,000 students across 52 closed-enrollment elementary schools.

489 Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the outputs of these case studies. Maps (a)-(c) in each  
490 figure illustrate the present-day elementary school attendance boundaries, the relative  
491 prevalence of White students per Census block, and our hypothetical rezoning. Examining  
492 (d) illustrates how the fraction of students in the depicted group would change at each  
493 school after implementing the alternative zoning, compared to before. As expected,

494 rezonings generally move school-level demographics to reflect district-level proportions as  
495 much as possible, sometimes shifting the percentage of White students at a given school by  
496 several fold, as seen in Figure 4(d). The most substantial changes also appear to occur  
497 within a small subset of schools, with most schools across the district experiencing little or  
498 no change. However, some schools become more segregated with respect to the district:  
499 that is, a subset of schools which already have a proportion of White or non-White  
500 students exceeding district-level proportions see an increase in their White or non-White  
501 share, respectively, and therefore diverge further from, instead of converging to,  
502 district-level shares of White/non-White students. These fluctuations are more extreme in  
503 Atlanta compared to Mesa Unified, and to be expected given our dissimilarity objective  
504 function, which optimizes an aggregate district-level measure without explicitly requiring  
505 that reductions in segregation be evenly redistributed across individual schools.

506 Minimizing the maximum term in the summation depicted in equation 1 to reflect a  
507 “leximin” objective function based on the Rawlsian Difference Principle (Hooker, 2014)  
508 may help alleviate some of these issues, as might imposing constraints that explicitly  
509 disallow schools with demographic proportions that already deviate from district  
510 proportions to deviate further. However, these alternative formulations are also likely to  
511 produce smaller reductions in district-wide segregation. Changing the objective function  
512 altogether may also impact results, though we find that optimizing for a different measure  
513 of segregation—a modified “interaction index” similar to the one proposed in (Massey &  
514 Denton, 1988)—yields results similar to those generated by seeking to minimize  
515 district-wide dissimilarity. Section S4 in the Supplementary Materials includes additional  
516 details on these objective function sensitivity checks. In practice, the choice of objective  
517 function, overall desegregation goals (including specific schools of focus), and even notions  
518 of fairness are likely to be context-specific and require input and domain expertise from  
519 both districts leaders and families.

520 Plots (e) through (g) in each case study depict the changes in segregation, school

521 assignments, and travel times expected across demographic groups. In both cases, we see  
522 slight reductions in segregation and travel times across demographic groups, with the  
523 exception of Native American students in the Mesa Unified case, who would experience a  
524 slight average increase of 0.5 minutes in travel each way. Furthermore, in Figure 5(f) (Mesa  
525 Unified), we see a relatively balanced school switching requirement across demographic  
526 groups; however, in the corresponding plot for Atlanta (Figure 4(f)), we see large disparities  
527 across groups. Most notably, White students are nearly 3x as likely as Black students to  
528 have to switch schools, and rates of school switching for Asian, Hispanic/Latinx, and  
529 Native American students also near 30% or higher, though the number of students falling  
530 into these latter three demographic groups in Atlanta are small. These differences show  
531 that even though in an aggregate sense across districts, school switching is fairly distributed  
532 across groups, these results will likely vary by district. This highlights both several of the  
533 trade-offs district officials might need to make in order to achieve more integrated schools,  
534 but also opportunities for more creative approaches to modeling, constraining, and  
535 ultimately addressing the issue of changing policies in order to mitigate segregation.

## 536 Discussion

537 Our results demonstrate that there are practical and fair pathways to changing  
538 attendance boundaries in order to achieve more diverse schools, though the impact these  
539 policies have on individual schools and different student groups—for example, who would  
540 be required to switch schools, and how much school switching might either further or  
541 hinder these students' academic progress—can vary across districts. This reality calls for a  
542 nuanced and district-specific approach to modeling, evaluating, and eventually adopting  
543 potential boundary changes. Particularly notable is that there exist alternative boundary  
544 scenarios that might reduce segregation *and travel times* across districts, highlighting that  
545 these are not always at odds, and contrasting with the public narrative around long-range  
546 busing that emerged among many majority-race members of the population during

547 desegregation efforts in the 20th century (Delmont, 2016).

548 While we observe a relative decrease of 12% in the median segregation score across  
549 districts, these improvements are largely a function of the constraints our models impose,  
550 and still constitute only small steps towards addressing issues of White/non-White  
551 segregation. Nevertheless, as our sensitivity analyses show, changing constraint values can  
552 have a multiplier effect on how much alternative boundaries might reduce segregation. To  
553 support explorations of these sensitivities and the impact different policies might have on  
554 individual schools and demographic groups, we release a public dashboard<sup>6</sup> and its  
555 underlying code and data illustrating different boundary scenarios and outcomes for the  
556 districts we explore in this study. We invite researchers to use these resources to explore  
557 new models that capture more of the nuances and specifics individual districts often  
558 consider when making boundary changes (some of which we discuss below). We also invite  
559 districts and families to explore the outputs in the dashboard and comment on their  
560 viability as starting points for informing realistic policies for fostering more diverse schools.

561 Parents' racialized preferences for where they live and send their children to school  
562 will continue to act as formidable headwinds challenging even the most thoughtful and  
563 well-designed efforts to foster more diverse schools. Our study does not contribute to  
564 answering the normative question of how to change these preferences, or the political one  
565 of whether school districts can garner the will to implement policies that improve  
566 integration. However, it offers an empirical contribution that we believe may be of interest  
567 to both researchers and school districts: that such improvements appear to be possible  
568 across many districts, and that they can be achieved with practical and fair tradeoffs. Even  
569 then, which tradeoffs count as "practical" and "fair" will differ across communities and  
570 individuals, and across racial/ethnic and class lines. This points to a number of limitations  
571 in our current study, which in turn open the door to new and exciting directions for future  
572 work. We classify these limitations as opportunities across three interconnected categories

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<sup>6</sup> [www.schooldiversity.org](http://www.schooldiversity.org).

573 that we invite researchers and interested practitioners to explore in greater detail: data,  
574 model, and broader relevance to education policy efforts.

575 With respect to data, our method relies on estimated counts of students per group,  
576 per Census block. As described further in Materials and Methods and the Supplementary  
577 Materials (section S1), this requires making certain assumptions about how the population  
578 of each school is distributed across blocks—notably, without a sense of how frequently  
579 school choice (e.g., charter or private school selection) is exercised by different demographic  
580 groups across these blocks. We are also unable to factor in other data, like transportation  
581 costs, that districts might weigh as they decide on rezoning policies. The limited window  
582 that Free/Reduced-priced lunch provides into students' socioeconomic status (Harwell &  
583 LeBeau, 2010), coupled with the limited availability of family socioeconomic indicators at  
584 the Census block level, prevents us from exploring other dimensions of segregation that  
585 districts value and often prioritize targeting (Potter, 2016). Working closely with specific  
586 district partners to obtain and incorporate more detailed, historical, and up-to-date data  
587 may help alleviate many of these issues. Finally, we proxy "community cohesion" with  
588 contiguity. In reality, a family's community, and students' friends, are a function of  
589 geography along with many other (potentially unobservable) factors. Developing more  
590 nuanced ways of determining and factoring in notions of community into rezoning models  
591 may open the door to new boundary configurations that promote diversity while satisfying  
592 family and district-level preferences.

593 There are also a number of model improvements that may make our results more  
594 useful in practice. Optimizing for different measures of segregation, ranging from simple  
595 extensions to the dissimilarity measure (like imposing an L<sub>2</sub> loss instead of the current L<sub>1</sub>)  
596 to exploring alternative segregation measures altogether is an important future direction,  
597 especially given many of the limitations of the dissimilarity index that we discussed earlier.  
598 Balancing utilization across schools, limiting the percentage of students who are rezoned (a  
599 la ("Montgomery County Public Schools Districtwide Boundary Analysis," 2021)), and

even more explicitly factoring in fairness requirements instead of merely analyzing fairness post hoc also offer promising directions for model refinements. To ensure increases in elementary school diversity also propagate to middle and high schools, exploring objective functions that factor in feeder patterns and account for the full K12 lifecycle—instead of only the earlier years—may also produce more practical and desirable boundary changes.

As mentioned earlier, we may also expand our model to incorporate historical data or domain expertise to predict how a given rezoning might spark families to leave neighborhoods (“white flight”) and/or disproportionately leverage school choice to access other district or charter options that enable them to circumvent unfavorable reassessments—and factor these possibilities into the optimization process. Finally, given that diversity may not today be a core consideration or impetus for redrawing boundaries in most districts, we might augment our models to aid district policymakers in simulating new boundaries when exploring questions more germane to their day-to-day, like determining locations for new schools, or deciding which schools to shut down (for example, in response to declining enrollment). With minor extensions, the models we present here can aid with these decisions while still foregrounding their potential impacts on diversity, travel, and other outcomes of interest.

Perhaps the biggest open question from our study is: how might families and district leaders respond to these hypothetical rezonings, and how much could they actually increase diversity in schools? We believe this is an important avenue for follow-on research, and a critical part of translating this research into education policies that help promote school diversity. In reality, district school assignment policies are often a function of attendance boundaries, but also, opportunities for transferring or switching schools when families find boundary assignments unfavorable; new boundaries that are phased in over time, instead of all at once; “open-enrollment” charter and magnet programs; “zones of choice” that define meta-boundaries for clusters of schools that parents can then choose amongst (Allman et al., 2021; Campos & Kearns, 2022); and several other policies, many of

627 which are emergent. Furthermore, as discussed in the introduction, most segregation in  
628 schools can be attributed to boundary delineations *between* districts, not simply those  
629 within them. While attendance boundaries play a foundational role in school assignment  
630 policies across most districts, expanding our methodology to account for nuances  
631 pertaining to school choice, and more generally, expanding geographic scope to explore  
632 between-district boundary changes (a more challenging computational problem as well)  
633 may help yield policy simulations that produce more practical and effective pathways to  
634 integrated schools. Capturing and factoring in input from both families and district  
635 leaders, for example, through participatory (Kensing & Blomberg, 1998) and value  
636 sensitive (Friedman et al., 2013) design methods may further help inform school  
637 desegregation policies that are realistic and practically-achievable.

638        Changing school demographics does not guarantee more diverse friendships, sharing  
639 of social capital and resources, greater empathy for different life experiences, and other  
640 potential gains that can ultimately benefit all students (Chetty et al., 2022; Moody, 2001;  
641 Tatum, 1997). Yet it is a necessary first step towards achieving many of these downstream  
642 outcomes. We hope this study is a useful building block to support future work on this  
643 critical topic.

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
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
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
**Figure 1**

*Input data, objective function, constraints, and outcome measures from our optimization model.*



**Figure 2**


*Histogram of dissimilarity indices across the 98 districts in our sample.*




**Figure 3**

Results from our rezoning algorithm. **a)** shows a shift in the median of the distribution of segregation scores from 0.39 to 0.33 across districts, which corresponds to a median 12% relative decrease when computing pairwise changes per district. **b)** illustrates these pairwise changes; interestingly, there is no relationship between the size or urbanicity of a district and the reduction in segregation that it experiences, and a weak relationship between the amount of reduction and the original segregation score. **c)** shows that segregation scores for all racial/ethnic groups decrease, albeit marginally, under the proposed rezonings. **d)** illustrates that, on average across districts, school switching under the depicted rezonings are relatively evenly distributed across racial and ethnic groups. Finally, **e)** illustrates that the depicted boundary changes might actually decrease average travel times across school districts and demographic groups. Together, these findings show that there are pathways to more integrated schools across districts that may not require large sacrifices by families.

## High white segregation case study: Atlanta Public Schools

**Figure 4**

Case study for the most White/non-White segregated district in our sample, Atlanta Public Schools, which has a segregation score of 0.74. The shapes in a) through c) represent 2020 US census blocks; the colors in a) delineate 2021/2022 school attendance boundaries for the depicted district ("status quo"); b) shows the estimated percent of each block's population estimated to be white (darker blue implies a higher percentage), with blocks removed if they are estimated to have a student population of zero. c) shows the rezoning produced by our algorithm. d) shows the expected change in the proportion of students at each elementary school in the district who are White, before and after rezoning. e) through g) show the anticipated changes in segregation scores, percentage of students needing to be rezoned, and change in travel times for each demographic group. The results reveal several notable findings. First, as expected, the most dramatic boundary changes appear to occur in school boundaries that fall at the interface of White and non-White parts of the city. Additionally, as shown in d), changes in school-level distributions tend towards the district White student percentage, which makes sense given our objective function, with a handful of schools experiencing the most dramatic changes. However, the share of White students is also increased at several schools that already have a White share higher than the district, illustrating trade-offs district leaders may be faced with when deciding which schools to target with desegregation efforts. From e) and g), we see that all student groups would experience reductions in segregation and travel times, respectively, but f) shows disparities in which students might be rezoned—with the largest fraction found among Native American (7 out of 16), Hispanic/Latinx (524 out of 1,756), and Asian (93 out of 336) students.



**Figure 5**

*Case study for a typical (median) White/non-White segregated district in our sample, Mesa Unified, which has a segregation score of 0.39. Plots a)-g) defined analogously to Figure 4. In general, we observe similar trends as the Atlanta case study, with fewer disparities in the percentage of students across demographic groups who would be rezoned, and a marginal increase in travel times for the 270 out of 1,220 Native American students in the district who would be rezoned.*

**Supplementary Materials for “Redrawing attendance  
boundaries to promote racial and ethnic diversity in  
elementary schools”**

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## S1 Datasets and assumptions

In the main text, we describe the datasets we use in the study. Perhaps the most central quantity we estimate using these datasets is the number of students per group that feed to each school from each correspondingly-zoned Census block. We describe our estimation procedure for this quantity in the Methods and Materials section of the main text. Estimating this, however, requires making a number of assumptions (in addition to those described in the main text), which we detail here:

1. Assumption: Non open-enrollment schools draw students from each group proportional to the demographics of the blocks that fall in its attendance boundary. As described in the main text, even though certain demographic groups disproportionately may exercise school choice in different settings (3, 14, 15), because our estimates are based on ground truth school enrollments by demographic group, this differential uptake of school choice is likely to bias our block-level estimates only if families who are part of the same demographic group and assigned to the same school have different rates of school choice uptake that are correlated with the block in which they live. This may happen for a variety of reasons, e.g. if a particular block houses a popular charter or other alternative school option, and hence, may bias our block-level estimates and subsequent impact of rezoning on school diversity in either direction (see the main text for examples of how).
2. Assumption: All datasets are drawn from the same year. In reality, our school-level demographics data is drawn from the 2019/2020 National Center for Education Statistics' Common Core of Data; our Census block delineations and counts from the most recent 2020 census; and attendance boundary data reflecting 2021/2022 school year boundaries. We use the 2019/2020 NCES data as our base set of schools, including only those for which we have lat/long information<sup>1</sup>.
3. Assumption: When estimating the number of White, Black, and Hispanic/Latinx students per block, that the percentage of people under 18 years of age living in the corresponding block and belonging to each of these categories is proportional to the percentage of students who attend a given zoned elementary school from that block.
4. Assumption: The 2020 Census block-level values represent accurate counts of children under 18 years of age belonging to each demographic group. In reality, these estimates have noise applied to them for privacy preservation reasons and therefore may be biased in ways that could impact downstream applications, like redistricting procedures (8).

We believe these are reasonable assumptions given the datasets we have access to. However, as described in the main text, we acknowledge that an important avenue for future work is to obtain more up-to-date and accurate block-level student counts (e.g., through close collaborations with individual districts) to produce a more nuanced and precise view of how alternative attendance boundaries might affect chances for diverse exposures in elementary schools. This is particularly important if we wish to support actual policy-making with this work.

## S2 Optimization model

We define a binary matrix for each district  $d$ ,  $X_d^{|B| \times |S|}$ , where  $B$  is the set of census blocks and  $S$  the set of schools in the district, respectively. Our key decision variables are the entries of this matrix, i.e. each  $x_{bs}$ , which equals 1 if block  $b$  is assigned to school  $s$ , or 0 otherwise.

As described in the main text, our primary objective is to maximize:

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<sup>1</sup>Which we sourced through a separate data agreement with GreatSchools.org, since lat/longs for the 2019/2020 schools database were not yet available in the NCES dataset at the time of completing this study.

$$\frac{1}{2} \sum_{s \in S} \left| \frac{W_s}{W_T} - \frac{NW_s}{NW_T} \right| \quad (\text{S1})$$

Our constraints are defined as follows. First, we require that blocks are assigned to exactly one school, i.e.:

$$\forall b \in B \sum_{s \in S} x_{bs} = 1 \quad (\text{S2})$$

Next, we require that travel times do not exceed some fraction  $T$  longer than they currently are:

$$\forall b \in B \sum_{s \in S} x_{bs} \cdot travel_{bs} \leq (1 + T) \cdot travel_{bs^{orig}} \quad (\text{S3})$$

Where  $travel$  is a pre-computed matrix (using the Open Route Service API (4)) with dimensionality  $|B| \times |S|$  that denotes estimated driving times between each block centroid and district elementary school, and  $s^{orig}$  is the school  $b$  is zoned to in the original (“status quo”) zoning.

Next, we require that school populations do not exceed a  $P\%$  increase:

$$\forall s \in S \sum_{b \in B} x_{bs} \cdot N_b \leq (1 + P) \cdot s_{origpop} \quad (\text{S4})$$

Where  $s_{origpop}$  is the status quo population size of school  $s$ .

Finally, we impose contiguity constraints. As described in (5), contiguity is often a challenging requirement to impose in redistricting problems because doing so exactly requires an exponential number of constraints. Thus, like (5), we use an approach presented in (10), which defines a limited but still valid notion of contiguity where the blocks comprising each attendance boundary must constitute a subtree (network) of the shortest path tree rooted at the block containing the zoned school. For a block to be considered contiguous with respect to its zoned school, there must be at least one other adjacent block in this tree that is closer (in network distance) to the school that is also zoned to that school. We use breadth first search to build out these tree (network) representations for each school’s status quo boundary. Our contiguity constraint requires that blocks satisfying this definition of contiguity in the original zoning must continue to do so in any rezoning, or more formally:

$$\forall b \in B \text{Contiguous}(b, s_{before}) = 1 \Rightarrow \text{Contiguous}(b, s_{after}) \quad (\text{S5})$$

Where  $s_{before}$  and  $s_{after}$  are the before and after school assignments for each block  $b$ , and the function  $\text{Contiguous}(b, s)$  is defined as:

$$\text{assert}(x_{bs} = 1 \Rightarrow \sum_{b' \in B_b^{\text{closerneighbors}}} x_{b's} > 0) \quad (\text{S6})$$

Where  $B_b^{\text{closerneighbors}}$  is the set of  $b$ ’s neighboring blocks that are closer than it (in terms of network distance) to school  $s$ . Under this formulation, blocks that are islands—i.e., not contiguous in the original zoning—can continue to remain islands in any rezoning. Importantly, enforcing contiguity does not ensure resulting boundaries that are “nicely-shaped”: often, our model satisfies the above constraint by chaining together blocks that are only adjacent by virtue of sharing a corner or some other limited geographic region, thereby producing oblong or otherwise oddly-shaped zones that would likely be difficult to defend in practice among parents and district

leaders. To increase the likelihood of well-shaped attendance zones, we additionally require that a minimum of  $G\%$  of block  $b$ 's same-school-zoned neighboring blocks in the original zoning (i.e.,  $B_b^{neighbors} \subset B$ ) continue to be zoned with it even after rezoning, i.e.:

$$\forall_{b \in B} \forall_{s \in S} x_{bs} = 1 \Rightarrow \sum_{b' \in B_b^{neighbors}} x_{b's} \geq \text{ceil}(G \cdot |B_b^{neighbors}|) \quad (\text{S7})$$

We set  $G$  to 50%, but future work may explore how changing this parameter changes resultant rezonings and impacts on segregation.

In practice, even with the contiguity constraint imposed, districts may have algorithmically-generated boundaries that appear non-contiguous due to one of the following reasons (which occur infrequently):

1. A block that was an island in the original zoning has been re-assigned to a school that previously had a completely contiguous zone
2. Due to geographic precision issues, blocks that are adjacent to other blocks are not recognized as such in the shape file, and hence counted as islands
3. Two blocks may technically be adjacent because their boundaries are touching, even though they may not visually appear to be, perhaps because of long boundary lines in the shape file and/or the presence of intermediary blocks with imperceptibly thin geographic areas that serve to join the two

To search for alternative boundary scenarios, we use constraint programming via Google's CP-SAT library (11). CP-SAT uses a hybrid set of search heuristics to uncover high-quality solutions to operations research problems like the one highlighted here, drawing upon recent advances like lazy clause generation (13, 16) and other methods for pruning large search spaces based on constraint and objective function values. Despite the successes of CP-SAT, developing bespoke search algorithms that exploit the specific nature and structure of our problem may serve as a promising avenue for future work.

### S3 Parent survey

We administer a survey on Prolific.co<sup>2</sup>, an online survey platform for academic and market researchers. We set a budget of \$500 to collect 250 responses from eligible families: those who have at least one child in a public preK-12 program in the US. This totals approximately \$2 per survey, or \$1.50 paid out to each survey respondent after accounting for platform fees (translating to an average of approximately \$20/hour given the relatively short average completion time per survey). Given the benign and anonymous nature of the intervention, we receive IRB exemption for this human subjects study.

To reach these families on the platform, we applied a filter on Prolific to only show the survey to potential respondents who live in the US and have at least one child born between 2005 and 2015 (inclusive). Even though our study focuses on elementary schools, we target parents of children across this wide age band to increase the likelihood of gathering our targeted number of responses<sup>3</sup>.

Upon visiting the survey, Prolific workers are first asked to confirm that they have at least one child in a public preK-12 program in the US. Those who answer “no” are directed to the end of

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<sup>2</sup><https://www.prolific.co/>.

<sup>3</sup>While Prolific has 150k+ total participants, only 3k were estimated to fit the filtering criteria we established.

the survey and not counted towards the total respondent count<sup>4</sup>.

Next, eligible respondents see a variety of questions that ask them to comment on the importance of diversity in their child's schooling. Figures S1 and S2 shows responses to these questions. In general, a large majority of parents state that they believe it is important for their children to be exposed to a racially/culturally, economically, and intellectually diverse group of students—reflecting preferences for more integration in schools revealed by prior surveys (e.g. (17)). Furthermore, most cite a variety of benefits they see of diverse exposures: the most popular being that such exposures can help their children develop more compassion and empathy for others, and the least popular being that such exposures can help their children be more creative in problem solving (Figure S2).




Figure S1: Parents' stated beliefs about the benefits of diverse exposures for their children.

Next, to gather baseline information to inform our optimization algorithm constraints, we ask parents to share information about logistics pertaining to their child's current school and neigh-

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<sup>4</sup>Looking at some of our results, however, shows that a small handful of parents ( 5 ) with children in private schools still completed the survey.




Figure S2: Parents' beliefs about *why* diversity is important in their children's schooling.

borhood environments. Figure S3 shows that the respondents' children's median class size is approximately 22 students and median travel time to school is 10 minutes. Furthermore, most students travel by car or bus to school. To better-understand relationships between geography and children's friendship networks, we ask "Which of the following groups does your child hang out / spend time with regularly?", with results shown in Figure S4. The majority of respondents indicate that their children's friends live nearby, but not necessarily on their street, and just under 50% indicate they live in other neighborhoods. A minority indicate they live next door or on the same street as them. These responses indicate that geography is correlated with children's friendship networks, but immediate geographic contexts may not be as correlated as broader definitions of "neighborhoods".

Unrelated to logistics but related to the overall goals of our study, we ask parents to what extent they believe they can partner with teachers and administrators to improve lower-performing schools. The purposes of this question is to better-understand how malleable parents' view school quality to be, given that school quality has historically been a popular consideration among




Figure S3: Responses to school-related logistics questions. The final question does not necessarily pertain to logistics; rather, parents' views about the malleability of school quality, which is often an important consideration among parents when attendance boundaries change. Perhaps surprisingly, parents appear to believe that it is possible to partner with school leaders to change school quality for lower-performing schools.

parents in the context of attendance boundary changes and broader desegregation programs (19). Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the vast majority of parents believe school quality is malleable, and that lower-performing schools can be improved through effective partnerships with key school leaders.

After these preliminary questions, we move onto the main part of the survey. Parents see the following questions and are asked to indicate their responses using a slider. We randomly and independently sample values for DIVERSITY\_PERCENT (from {10%, 25%}) and DIVERSITY\_CATEGORY (from {'racial or ethnic', 'income', 'academic achievement'}).

Let's say that by changing the school zones in your district, an additional DIVERSITY\_PERCENT of your child's classmates would come from different DIVERSITY\_CATEGORY backgrounds.




Figure S4: Responses to questions probing which groups respondents' children usually hang out / spend time with regularly.

Imagine this requires traveling further to school. How many more minutes would you be ok with your child traveling to school in order for them to experience this increase in diversity?

Let's say that by changing the school zones in your district, an additional DIVERSITY\_PERCENT of your child's classmates would come from different DIVERSITY\_CATEGORY backgrounds.

Imagine this requires increasing your child's average class size. How many more students per class would you be ok with in order for your child to experience this increase in diversity?

Let's say that by changing the school zones in your district, an additional DIVERSITY\_PERCENT of your child's classmates would come from different DIVERSITY\_CATEGORY backgrounds.

Imagine this requires some of the families in your neighborhood being rezoned to schools different from your child's. What is the largest % of these families that you would be ok with being rezoned to a different school?

In addition to these questions, we also ask parents to respond with "yes", "no", or "it depends" to

the following question: “Let’s say that the school zones in your district were changed, and your child now had to attend a different school. Would you send your child to this new school?”




Figure S5: Responses to questions probing which groups respondents’ children usually hang out / spend time with regularly.

Figure S5 shows responses to these questions, and Figure S6 illustrates the responses to the first two questions as a ratio of students’ current travel times and class sizes as gleaned from the preliminary survey questions. We find that parents are willing to experience a median of 67% longer commute times and 15% larger class sizes for their children in order to achieve more diverse classroom environments for their children. Furthermore, families are willing to tolerate nearly one quarter (23%) of families in their neighborhoods being rezoned to different schools in order to experience these gains in diversity. While the travel time increase tolerance threshold appears to be large, it translates into an increase of approximately 6-7 minutes, given baseline travel times are already low. The 15% larger class size tolerance threshold translates into approximately 3 additional students per class. We use both of these values to inform the travel time and school size constraints in our “best case scenario” optimizations described in the main text.




Figure S6: Ratio of parents' travel time and class size increase responses compared to preliminary survey question responses about their children's current travel times and class sizes, respectively.

In general, the survey responses reveal that parents are not willing to trade-off a lot for more diversity in their children's classrooms. However, they do appear to be willing to trade-off *something*, suggesting there may be near-term opportunities for promoting integration in schools that are currently under-explored.

We note that because we randomly-assigned both DIVERSITY\_PERCENT and DIVERSITY\_CATEGORY, the results described above can be interpreted as responses to changes in diversity averaged across the potential values for these variables. To understand heterogeneities that may be masked by these averages, we can analyze the causal effect of each of these variables on parents' responses. Figure S7 illustrates the outputs of models that regress responses to each of the four questions on these two experimental variables (we use OLS for the first three questions given the outcome variables are continuous, and logistic regression for the fourth, where we collapse responses to "yes" (1) or "not yes" (0)). We treat DIVERSITY\_PERCENT as a continuous variable and set the reference category for the discrete DIVERSITY\_CATEGORY variable is "racial or ethnic".

Interestingly, we see no statistically significant effects of any of the variables on outcomes, though cannot rule out that a larger sample size or differently-worded questions may reveal significant causal effects in potential future studies.




Figure S7: Causal effects of experimental variables on our four outcomes of interest. Lines depict 95% confidence intervals. Interestingly, we see no statistically-significant effects of either variable on our outcome measures.

The results to the fourth question—“Let’s say that the school zones in your district were changed, and your child now had to attend a different school. Would you send your child to this new school?”—reveals a relatively low number of parents answering with a hard “no” (less than 30%). An approximately equivalent fraction respond with “yes” and “it depends”. Those who respond with the latter are asked to share more information to contextualize their response. Below are the open-ended responses shared for this question, with distinct responses separated by “\*\*\*”. Many parents answering this question appear to consider quality of the new school, as well as distance, as important factors in deciding whether or not they would accept a hypothetical rezoning.

"Our school is very close and we really love it. I would need MAJOR incentive to switch so it would depend on the school and what other benefit aside from added

diversity\*\*\*It would depend on how far the school was and what I thought of the teachers and student ratio at the school.\*\*\*I would want them to go to a school in the district in which I live.\*\*\*We are already in a different district due to the quality of the schools in our district. So, it would really depend on the quality of the school.\*\*\*Depends on how far away it is, how many friends they have there, how good the school is, etc\*\*\*Depends on the character and reputation of the school\*\*\*It depends on the area and the school system, I value good schools that promote learning with students.\*\*\*It would depend on the quality of the other school.\*\*\*It depends on the level of academics in the school, the safety factor of the school, and the distance of the school. \*\*\*I chose this neighborhood for the school system. If I had to change I'd have to consider the entirety of the situation including classroom size, teacher qualifications, parents involvement, safety, etc.\*\*\*It depends on the administration and rating of the school\*\*\*On the gifted offerings at the new school \*\*\*It depends on how high of quality the education is at this new school as well as how many of my child's friends were also sent to this school .\*\*\*What the classes sizes were. The socio-economics of that area.\*\*\*I would need to know how good the school is and how far away it is. \*\*\*Would depend on how well the school is doing.\*\*\*It depends on the status of the school. If it is bad, i'm not putting my child in a position to be hurt.\*\*\*It would depend on the makeup of the school, the opportunities that were offered there, and how balanced the school is.\*\*\*It would depend on how my daughter feels about it\*\*\* it depends how it will impact the travel time\*\*\*It depends on how far away the school is and in what area it's located.\*\*\*My child's school is already so close that the next closest school would be about 20 minutes away.\*\*\*Need more information, how would they get there, etc\*\*\*If the new school had better resources for my daughter and would help her academically I would consider it. \*\*\*Depends on how far the other school is.\*\*\*If the school is better performing I would consider it. I would also consider it if the commute time to the school is not too much longer.\*\*\*Depends on how far of commute it is and how good the school is\*\*\*which school will fit his needs better\*\*\*How close and if the school is still as good \*\*\*the quality of the new school facilities and the distance from home and how many of their friends would be moving or already there\*\*\*It all comes down to how far it is and of course, how good the school is.\*\*\*they go to a private school\*\*\*I don't know enough about the other schools outside my zoning district, I would want to learn about them first before making this decision.\*\*\*It depends on where they want us to go.we all ready have school of choice.\*\*\*It depends on how far the school is, what area it is located in, and the curriculum and how dedicated the curriculum is to children of my daughter's demographic background\*\*\*It depends on the test scores of the school. \*\*\*I would consider private/homeschooling if the school was not up to our standards\*\*\*I would need further information about the school and it's situation to decide\*\*\*It depends on the curriculum of the school and the school 's overall reputation. \*\*\*He loves his current school, depends on what the other is like.\*\*\*It depends on if the school is ran the same way their current one is and how far away it is\*\*\*I have 3 children. Realistically we wouldn't be able to achieve diversity in our area without dramatically adding to our travel time. Even though I believe diversity is important we just don't have the ability to add 40-60 minutes transit time each day to achieve it, nor can we afford to move. In our area, rezoning wouldn't create more diversity, and would just be uprooting them to a school with new kids but similar racial makeup. It would likely be more of a disruption than actual benefit. At some point, I will return to the work force, so I cannot count on being able to drive kids to and from school everyday. Therefore, we need to stay at our local school.\*\*\*If the academic quality is lower, then no.\*\*\*It depend son the quality of education all round\*\*\*Depends if if has great teachers\*\*\*If there were no other schools then I would swnd him\*\*\*We currently send our child to an out of district school for before and after care reasons. If 5he new school

was better and our schedule would allow the change, we would consider it.. \*\*\* What if it is a terrible school?\*\*\*on the distance and quality of the school\*\*\* CASE BY CASE BASIS. I WOULD NEVER GO A INCH OUT OF MY WAY FOR DIVERSITY ETC.... I AM NOT CONCERNED WITH OTHERS ONLY MYSELF AND MY CHILD.\*\*\*It would have to be a reasonable distance away and a place that I felt safe sending my child to.\*\*\* we have open enrollment here, so it would depend on the school staff\*\*\*My son's school is great. There is a lot of diversity and the administration and staff really care for all of the kids. It would be very to find another school like his.\*\*\*We chose to live where we live based on the schools the neighborhood feeds into. If the school changed enough to where I didn't feel it was a good fit for my kids, I would change schools.\*\*\*it depends on how far and my child's transportation options\*\*\*Is school safe and have high education standards \*\*\* Would depend on options for private schools \*\*\*n/a\*\*\*It would depend on which school, and how good the school itself is\*\*\*i would not want my child to be a minority there. I would want an equal mix of majority and minority\*\*\*if I was forced to or not. \*\*\*It would depend on the quality of education they would receive.\*\*\*On the quality of the school and educators\*\*\*It depends on how the school is run.\*\*\*Depends on how far it is. I like having my child walk to school everyday.\*\*\*It depends on the condition of the school, the reviews and the distance of the school.\*\*\*My child is very, very shy and does not do well without a friend. I would be pretty upset if she didn't have at least one friend in the new classes with her. We've had her in therapy because of this. \*\*\*He has autism, it would depend on the teacher and how well they would follow his IEP\*\*\*I wouldn't want him to be on the bus for a long time each way\*\*\*what school it was going to be\*\*\*While I would like my child to be exposed to more diversity, whether I would send him to a rezoned school depends primarily on the academic profile of the school and whether the school can meet my son's academic needs. \*\*\*How far would it be. How many student's on avg per class. Do they need police officers at school. \*\*\*It depends on what the changes would be\*\*\*I would research crime rates.\*\*\*My child currently goes to a private school.\*\*\*How far is the school? How are the academics? What is the school community like? The other parents? The further away, the more complicated it is to do everything from commute to play dates, etc. \*\*\*If possible I would see if he could be dropped off and picked up because we are in a really good school district. He enjoys his school so i would like to keep him there if possible.\*\*\*there are two districts in out zone and it depends which one she would be sent to\*\*\*on the environment and academics of the new school\*\*\*I would need more info first. Is the quality of education the same?\*\*\*I would need my child's opinion on the issue. Their social life is very important to them and thriving for the first time in awhile .\*\*\*If he would be comfortable changing then I would be ok with it. \*\*\*I would need to understand what the new school was like\*\*\*It depends on what/where the school is.\*\*\*This actually happened to us and I opted to keep my son in the same school, but it was his last year in elementary school and I wanted him to experience the year with his friends he had for years. If it had been an earlier year, I might have just let him move to the new school. They were both racially similar so diversity was not a factor. The new school would have had more of my son's race probably, but he loved his old elementary so I asked to keep him there one more year. (And, it was closer.) \*\*\*It depends on the location\*\*\*I'm fine with zoning that makes classrooms more diverse but I think that the closest school and the number of students per class is a more important factor.\*\*\*How far away, type fo school, etc\*\*\*It would depend on distance, benefits, and school performance."

Finally, we conclude the survey with a number of questions to better-understand respondents and their background contexts. Figure S8 shows the racial background of respondents' children. The vast majority are White (over 80%), which is significantly higher than the 50% estimated across all US public school districts (1). Furthermore, Black and Hispanic/Latinx respondents

are under-represented in the data compared to national percentages across public schools, while Asian respondents are over-represented (1). Students eligible for free and reduced-price lunch are also under-represented in our survey data (40%) compared to national averages (50%)<sup>5</sup>. These trends may be due in part to the large fraction of respondents hailing from suburban districts as shown in Figure S9, which have historically skewed whiter and more affluent, though this is changing in many communities (18). Also evident from Figure S9 is that, on average, families believe their child is above average in academic performance, reflecting parents' upwardly-biased beliefs about children's performance found in other studies (2). Finally, a plurality of respondents (40%) self-identify as Democrats, with the remaining approximately equally-likely to identify as Independents or Republicans. Respondents appear to exhibit average levels of "affective political polarization, i.e., feelings of hostility or animosity against political "outgroups" (7)




Figure S8: Racial / ethnic breakdown of respondents' children.

The survey analyses we present here are highly preliminary, and there remain many opportunities to further explore relationships between different responses and types of respondents. We release

<sup>5</sup> [https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17\\_204.10.asp](https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d17/tables/dt17_204.10.asp).




Figure S9: Responses to other post-treatment questions.

our survey data as part of the broader data release for this project in order to enable interested researchers to conduct these and other explorations.

## S4 Additional results and sensitivity analyses

In this section, we include a number of additional results and sensitivity analyses / robustness checks to further contextualize the results presented in the main text.

### S4.a Details on included/excluded school districts

Table S1 depicts the outputs of three generalized linear models (GLMs), denoted by the three corresponding columns. Model 1 is computed across all 4,231 districts in our broader sample and represents whether or not a district has open enrollment elementary schools varies as a function of the total number of students across races, as well as several measures of segregation (dissimilarity) describing the district. Model 2 is computed across the 3,970 districts that do

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
(Intercept)	0.06*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.07** (0.02)
total_native	0.01 (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
total_black	0.01 (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.01 (0.01)
total_white	0.02*** (0.00)	0.06*** (0.00)	0.06*** (0.01)
total_hispanic	0.02*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.03** (0.01)
total_asian	-0.00 (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	0.02** (0.01)
white_dissim	0.01** (0.01)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.06* (0.03)
black_dissim	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.03)
hisp_dissim	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.02 (0.03)
asian_dissim	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	0.02 (0.03)
AIC	-208.49	-6763.50	293.42
BIC	-138.64	-6694.34	336.20
Log Likelihood	115.25	3392.75	-135.71
Deviance	234.59	42.07	44.83
Num. obs.	4231	3970	361

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \* $p < 0.05$

Table S1: Statistical models

not have any open-enrollment elementary schools and represents how our selected districts (top 100) varies as a function of the same predictors. Model 3 is computed across the top 100 districts and the 6% (261) districts that *do* have at least one open-enrollment elementary school, and illustrates how our selected 100 districts vary as a function of the same predictors. As described in the main text, we can see that districts with open-enrollment elementary schools tend to have a slightly higher White population, slightly higher Hispanic/Latinx population, and slightly higher White/non-White segregation than those without. Furthermore, compared to the other 3,870 districts with no open-enrollment elementary schools, the selected 100 districts are (by definition) larger, but generally do not have higher levels of White/non-White segregation. Finally, compared to the excluded 6%, the selected 100 districts are also generally larger, and *do* have a higher level of White/non-White segregation. All independent variables have been scaled by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation for ease of interpretation.

#### S4.b Optimizing for probability of “cross-cutting” exposures

In a prototype analysis conducted prior to the one for this paper, we simulated alternative boundaries with the same constraints and values as described in the main text, but with a different objective: to maximize the probability of “cross-cutting exposures”—i.e., exposures between students from different backgrounds—across schools in the district. Our objective function was:

$$\Sigma_{sS} 2 \cdot p_s \cdot (1 - p_s) \quad (\text{S8})$$

Where  $s$  is a particular non "open-enrollment" elementary school and  $p_g$  is the fraction of students at  $s$  who are White. Intuitively,  $2 \cdot p_s \cdot (1 - p_s)$  measures the probability that any two students randomly drawn from school  $s$  are White and non-White. In this case, we did not weight by school size in order to treat schools across the district as fairly as possible (i.e., so gains in larger schools do not limit gains in smaller ones). The objective function is similar to the variance ratio index, but not normalized to make it a measure of evenness (12). It is also similar to the interaction index proposed by (9), except that it is defined with respect to individual schools instead of a broader geography of interest (e.g., the district or city). This means that the total sum across schools is not a probability (because it can sum to greater than 1), but enables us to interpret probabilities of cross-cutting exposures at the school level.

We simulated alternative boundaries for one state, Virginia, and not the same 98 districts as those studied in the main text of this paper. However, several of the 98 school districts are in Virginia. To compare and contrast results, we conduct two case studies—one using the objective function in the main text, the other, the function above—across two districts each: Henrico and Prince William Counties.




Figure S10: Virginia case study: Henrico, seeking to minimize the dissimilarity index from the main text.

Figures S10 and S11 show the case studies for Henrico when optimizing for dissimilarity and cross-cutting exposures, respectively. The same are shown for Prince William County in Fig-




Figure S11: Virginia case study: Henrico, seeking to maximize the probability of cross-cutting exposures.

ures S12 and S13. In general, there appear to be slight differences in which schools experience demographic shifts depending on which objective function is used, with a qualitative read suggesting the dissimilarity-optimized case studies tend to drive more schools' White/non-White proportions closer to district levels. Furthermore, there are slight differences in the amount of segregation (dissimilarity) that is reduced (for Henrico, a decrease of 0.07 when optimizing for dissimilarity vs. 0.05 when optimizing for cross-cutting exposures; for Prince William, 0.03 vs 0.01). But in general, the results do not look dramatically different based on these different objective functions.

Given the breadth of potential objective functions that exist by virtue of the many different ways of measuring segregation that sociologists have explored over the decades (including those in (9)), a thorough analysis of how results vary across districts and different objective functions is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is an important direction for future research, especially given that different objective functions may encode or reflect different properties that some districts find more or less desirable vis-a-vis their desegregation objectives.

#### S4.c Leximin objective function

As described in the main text, the dissimilarity index of segregation is a district-wide measure that doesn't account for how fairly segregation is redistributed across individual schools. In the spirit of "leximin" optimization (6), we produce rezonings that optimize the following objective




Figure S12: Virginia case study: Prince William, seeking to minimize the dissimilarity index from the main text.

function:

$$\min \max \forall_{SS} \left| \frac{W_s}{W_T} - \frac{NW_s}{NW_T} \right| \quad (\text{S9})$$

I.e., we wish to minimize the maximum divergence of any school's White/non-White population from district-level proportions. Intuitively, this objective function seeks to prevent any particular school from experiencing a high level of segregation. Figure S14 shows results across districts under this alternative objective function. As expected, the overall reductions in segregation are lower than the primary results reported in the main text: just a 3% relative reduction in segregation compared to 12%. Furthermore, as shown in the Atlanta case study (Figure S15(d)), there still appear to be several schools with White over-representation in the status quo zoning that *increase* in their percentage of White students after rezoning, instead of decreasing as we might expect—similar to Figure 4(d) in the main text. The same is true in the Mesa Unified case study (Figure S16). For these particular case studies, the minmax objective function does not appear to dramatically balance out how much each school's White/non-White populations diverge from district-wide levels. Other formulations of the objective function, and/or additional constraints that seek to achieve a more equitable distribution across schools may more effectively balance out demographic distributions while still reducing district-wide segregation levels.




Figure S13: Virginia case study: Prince William, seeking to maximize the probability of cross-cutting exposures.

#### S4.d Increasing travel times

As discussed in the main text, increasing the permissible limit on travel time increases to 100% (or 2x current travel times) decreases median segregation by 16% relative to baseline levels, compared to a 12% reduction when the travel time increase is capped at 50%. Figure S17 illustrates these results. Looking at Figure S18, we see that several additional schools in the Atlanta case study with high non-white segregation see more racial balancing under this configuration; the same applies to the Mesa Unified case study (Figure S19).

#### S4.e Dropping contiguity constraint

As discussed in the main text, removing the contiguity constraint produces a sizeable 40% relative median reduction in segregation across districts. Figure S20 illustrates these results. Again, looking at Figure S21, we see even more schools converging to district-wide levels of White/non-White students, though this time at the expense of some schools that were already very close to district-wide levels experiencing large increases in the percentage of students who are white. Mesa Unified (Figure S22) also experiences convergence to district-level proportions across many of its schools, with fewer instances of dramatic over-concentration of White students in comparison to Atlanta post-rezoning.




Figure S14: Aggregate results from minmax optimization.

#### S4.f Increasing travel times *and* dropping contiguity

Simultaneously loosening the travel increase constraint to 100% *and* removing the contiguity constraint produces a 65% relative median reduction in segregation across districts. Figure S23 illustrates these results. Once again, several schools in Atlanta (Figure S24) experience a further over-concentration of White students, though several more converge to district-wide proportions, as expected. In Mesa Unified (Figure S25), we also see convergence of many schools' White/non-White populations to district-wide averages, again with fewer schools than Atlanta experiencing significant over-concentration of White students post-rezoning.

Together, the sensitivity analyses in this and preceding sections illustrate how changing constraint values can impact the extent to which alternative attendance boundaries might reduce segregation across school districts. They also illustrate the trade-offs district leaders might be faced with making, like demographic changes in certain schools versus others, to achieve such district-wide reductions in segregation.

## S5 Data and code release

While we focus on presenting both aggregated results and a deeper dive into two of our 98 school districts throughout the main text and supplementary materials, interested readers are invited to explore a public dashboard detailing results for additional districts in our study: [LINK TO DASHBOARD](#).

Additionally, we release an online repository of code used to produce the main and supplementary analyses in this paper, which can be found here: [LINK TO REPOSITORY](#). Additionally, we release several datasets to aid replications and future research. A summary of these datasets



Figure S15: Atlanta case study under minmax optimization.

is included below, with additional details available in the repository’s README file. We include data at the district level for all US school districts with at least two non open-enrollment elementary schools.

- Mapping of Census blocks to zoned elementary schools
- Estimated student counts per racial/ethnic category, per block
- Matrix of estimated driving times from blocks to schools
- Networks representing adjacency relationships between blocks (used for contiguity)
- Various district-level covariates for the districts included in our study
- Raw data from parent survey

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


Figure S16: Mesa unified case study under minmax optimization.

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


Figure S17: Aggregate results from optimization with looser travel constraint.

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### High white segregation case study: Atlanta Public Schools




Figure S18: Atlanta case study with looser travel constraint.

Median white segregation case study: Mesa Unified District (4235)




Figure S19: Mesa unified case study with looser travel constraint.




Figure S20: Aggregate results from optimization with no contiguity constraints.

### High white segregation case study: Atlanta Public Schools




Figure S21: Atlanta case study with no contiguity constraints.

Median white segregation case study: Mesa Unified District (4235)




Figure S22: Mesa unified case study with no contiguity constraints.




Figure S23: Aggregate results from optimization with looser travel constraint and no contiguity constraints.

High white segregation case study: Atlanta Public Schools




Figure S24: Atlanta case study with looser travel constraint and no contiguity constraints.

Median white segregation case study: Mesa Unified District (4235)




Figure S25: Mesa unified case study with looser travel constraint and no contiguity constraints.