



# A Theory of Investment for Energy-Efficient Technologies

## Part II

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## Research Question

What places attract energy-efficient buildings? How do neighborhood and area characteristics relate to the number of certified energy-efficient buildings?

Last Week:

- Discrete Choice, Random Utility Model
- Energy Savings v. Purchase Price
- People appear to undervalue their future energy costs

**Allcott, Hunt and Michael Greenstone**, “Is there an energy efficiency gap?,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2012, 26 (1), 3–28.

## Definition (Energy-Efficiency Gap)

“The wedge between the cost-minimizing level of energy efficiency and the level actually realized.” (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012)

# Overview

**Purpose** Do people adopt EE goods when it minimizes their costs? How should we design policy for EE goods?

**Model** Create a condition for the adoption of energy-efficient technology that considers investment inefficiencies and energy use externalities

**Method** Survey and evaluate empirical estimates and evidence of an energy-efficiency gap

**Results** Yes, there is an energy-efficiency gap – no, we cannot stop climate change at a negative cost

# The Model



# Baseline Investment Decision

$$\underbrace{\frac{pm_i(\lambda_E - \lambda_I)}{1 + r}}_{\text{Energy Savings}} > \underbrace{c + \omega}_{\text{Adoption Costs}} \quad (1)$$

- $p$  : Price of Energy
- $m_i$  : Tastes for Energy Use for agent  $i$  (Output)
- $\lambda_E$  : Energy Intensity for Efficient Good (Energy/Output)
- $\lambda_I$  : Energy Intensity for Inefficient Good
- $r$  : Discount Rate
- $c$  : Explicit Adoption Costs
- $\omega$  : Unobserved (Implicit) Adoption Costs

# Including the Externality and Investment Inefficiency


Let  $\varphi$  be the social cost of energy:

$$\frac{(p + \varphi)m_i(\lambda_E - \lambda_I)}{1 + r} > c + \omega \quad (2)$$

Let  $\gamma$  be a weight on the discounted energy savings:

$$\frac{\gamma p m_i(\lambda_E - \lambda_I)}{1 + r} > c + \omega \quad (3)$$

# Figure 1: Demand for an Energy-Efficient Good






## Results & Implications



# Results

1. Yes, there is an energy-efficiency gap
  - ▶ Imperfect Information
  - ▶ Inattention
2. No, the energy-efficiency gap is not massive
3. Welfare gains are largest when:
  - ▶ Pigouvian tax on energy
  - ▶ Target subsidies towards agents with highest investment inefficiencies

# Figure 2: Energy-Efficient Good Policy Intervention



# Relevance to Project

$$\frac{\gamma pm_i(\lambda_E - \lambda_I)}{1 + r} > c + \omega \quad (4)$$

- Investment inefficiencies,  $\gamma$ , and implicit costs,  $\omega$ , are new
- Have a plausible spatial relationship

**Eichholtz, Piet, Nils Kok, and John M Quigley**, “Doing well by doing good? Green office buildings,” *American Economic Review*, 2010, 100 (5), 2492–2509.

- Start thinking about energy efficiency in buildings
- Discuss the background and goals of energy efficient building
- Will people and/or firms pay more for an energy-efficient building?

- Allcott, Hunt and Michael Greenstone**, “Is there an energy efficiency gap?,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2012, 26 (1), 3–28.
- , **Sendhil Mullainathan, and Dmitry Taubinsky**, “Energy policy with externalities and internalities,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 2014, 112, 72–88.
- Hausman, Jerry A**, “Individual discount rates and the purchase and utilization of energy-using durables,” *The Bell Journal of Economics*, 1979, pp. 33–54.