05_01_Fault Tolerance and Consensus

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1. Faults and Failures

1.1. Fault Classification

1.1.1. Permanent Faults

for example:

· processors halting

• malfunctioning sensor giving erroneous result

will cause:

- · crash failures
- Byzantine Failures

1.1.2. Transient Faults

for example:

- · part of memory momentarily corrupted caused by power glitch
- · transmission errors

1.2. Permanent Faults

Dealing with permanent faults has often **been modeled as** the need for **reaching agreement or consensus** among a set of processors some of which may exhibit faults

1.2.1. Crash Failures (stopping failure)

- a processor simply stops at some point and does not resume at alater time
- We assume that a processor does not stop in the middle of sending a message
- Stopping failures model the event of a processor going down

1.2.2. malicious or Byzantine failure

Byzantine failures model a component **continuing to operate but exhibiting failures** (such as a sensor giving values with bits inverted).

for example:

- stop for a while then continue
- sending error message

1.3. Transient Failures

Transient faults are faults exhibited by components that **will return to normal operation** after a while. Transient faults cause the state of a system to be incorrect.

• The incorrect (or the absence of a proper) initialization of a distributed system

• The corruption of a part of the **main memory** of a number of processors. We will assume that only the **variables of processes** can be corrupted (including the program counter), but **not the programs they execute**

2. Consensus in Synchronous Systems with Crash Failures

2.1. Target

Every process starts with a value from the set of possible initial values, and they have to reach agreement which satify:

- Agreement: No two processes decide on different values
- Validity: If all processes start with the same value, then no process decides on a different value;
- **Termination:** All non-faulty processes decide within finite time

2.2. Simple Flooding Algorithm

Assumption

- 1. In a synchronous system
- 2. at most f crash failures (Each participants know exactly the upper-bound number of faults in the system)
- 3. the set of value domain contains a default value (e.g., 0)that processors can resort to in case they do not know what value to use.

Preparation

Every process matins a set W, initially $W=\{v\}$

Main Process

- 1. Every process starts with a **value v**
- 2. for the first f+1 rounds, each node:
 - a. broadcast(W) to all other processes
 - b. receive(W) from all processes and set W to the union of their current set W and all sets they receive
- 3. Finally:
 - a. if W contains only a single element v, decide(v)
 - b. else decide(default)

Understanding

The alg solves a problem: how to achieve an agreement even if some process crashed.

- 1. Because the algorithm consists of f +1 rounds and there are at most f processor failures, **there is at least one round during which no processor fails**
- 2. In this round all active processes can obtain a identical sets W and the final active processes is a subset of this moment active processes

Complexity

only consider message complexity:

n nodes:

Optimization

processes only need to know whether at the end |W|=1 or |W|>1

so let processes only broadcast at most two values:

- their initial value
- the first different value they receive (broadcast when it is active until the process is finished)

One basic idea is only the set W of the final active process matters, that means:

- if a process receives a different value and immediately crashed, it does not matter
- an throughout active process will eventually broadcast its value/different value received to other active processes

3. Byzantine Model Preliminary

3.1. Conditions for a solution for Byzantine

3.1.1. Necessary and sufficient condition

$$\frac{f < n/3}{(n-f)/2 > f}$$

3.1.2. minimal number of rounds in a determinisitic solultion

$$f + 1$$


3.2. Impossibility results

For some consensus problems no solutions exist.


- in purely asynchronous system: there is no possibility to overcome even a single processor failure
- some interesting examples: in a synchronous case of three generals, one of which is a traitor
 In this two situation, there is no difference between the messages L1 received, so L1 is not able to judge the loyalty extent of others according to the message received, so he can just obey the commander's order.

Same thing happen in L2, so L1 has 0 in case 2, L2 has 1 in case 2, does not allow agreement

Scenario 1: Lieutenant L_2 is a traitor



Scenario 2: Commander C is a traitor:



3.3. Target

- Agreement: All non-faulty nodes agree on the same value
- Validity: if the source is non-faulty, then all non-faulty nodes agree on the initial value of the source
- **Termination:** all processes decide within finite time

So:

• if the source is faulty, the non-faulty processes can agree on any value, but they have to agree on the same value

• what value a faulty process decides is irrelevant

4. Consensus in Synchronous Systems with Byzantine Failures

4.1. Assumption for Three Algorithms

- 1. Each participants know exactly the upper-bound number of faults in the system
- 2. Sometimes, we call broken node as **non-faulty nodes**

4.2. Authentication

- without authentication: means that a non-initial-proposer node can forge message
- with authentication: means that a non-initial-proposer node cannot forge message


4.3. Lamport-Pease-Shostak algorithm without authentication in synchronous systems

Assumption

• Nodes **know how many faulty nodes (f) (upper-bound)** are in the network

Preparation(Structure)

- · Messages should carry
 - value
 - o f-related parameter
 - the nodes passed (follow sequence)
- labelled tree for decision




- Label the nodes of the tree in L_i with additional labels:
 - o level 0: v_i (value received from the commander)
 - level 1: the value that L_i told L_i that the commander told him
 - label of any node: the value that was passed to L_i from the commander through the chain of lieutenants on the path from the root to the node
- each path is the path of a certain message
- o label of edges are a value (the value that La told told Li that Lb told La that Lc told Lb that)

Process


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- When f=0 **OM(0):** the commander sends his value to the lieutenants, who simply decide on this value
- When **f**≠**0 OM(f)**:
 - the commander broadcasts its initial value
 - \circ let v_i be the value received from the commander by lieutenant L_i or the **default** if no value is received
 - doing recursive steps
- recursive steps:
 - \circ L_i executes OM(f-1), acting as the commander and send his value to other lieutenants (lieutenants that not appear in a OM(f) message)
 - The recursive steps is as a tree, in each sub-tree, the k-th layer (start from 0) has n-k nodes



• make decision "recursively", consider the decision tree:

A solution for Byzantine Agreement (9/9)



- Decide by propagating the result up with the majority function:
 - o at the leaf level: decide on the value received (OM(0))
 - at every next higher level: take the majority of the local value and the decisions at child nodes
 - o the final value at the root is the **final decision**

K

- o from bottom to top
- decide **final value**=majority(v_commander, v of layer 1)
- each node **in the each layer: value**=majority(v_node,v_childnode)
- if there is not a majority value, it partly means the commander is non-faulty, so all faulty node decides on an default value

Implementation

```
Implementation:
I. Code executed by the commander in OM (f) broadcast (v)

II. Code executed by the lieutenants in OM (0). receive(v) order \leftarrow v

III. Code executed by lieutenant L_i in OM (f) if receive (v) then v_i \leftarrow v else v_i \leftarrow default OM(f - 1, v_i, i, 1, ..., i - 1, i + 1, ..., n - 1) v_j' \leftarrow default order i in i of i oM(f - 1, i, i, i, ..., i - 1, i, i, ..., i - 1, i, i, ..., i - 1) order i majority(v_1', \ldots, v_{i-1}', v_i, v_{i+1}', \ldots, v_{n-1}')
```

Understanding

Complexity(easy to understand from the tree)

- Number of executions (nodes in each layer)
 - o OM(f) 1 time
 - OM(f-1) (n-1) times
 - OM(k) (n-1)(n-2)...(n-f+k) times
- Number of messages: n^{f+1} in total (edges in each layer)
 - OM(f): n-1
 - OM(f-1): (n-1)(n-2)
 - \circ OM(k): (n-1)(n-2)...(n-(f-k))(n-(f-k+1))
 - o OM(0): (n-1)(n-2)...(n-(f+1))

4.3. Lamport-Pease-Shostak algorithm with authentication in synchronous systems

Assumption

- Nodes **know how many faulty nodes (f) (upper-bound)** are in the network
- Every message carries a **signature**

- The signature of a loyal general **cannot be forged**
- Alteration of the contents of a signed message can be detected
- Every (loyal) general can verify the signature of any other (loyal) general

Preparation(structure)

- Message
 - value
 - \circ sequence of general: from (and signed by) the commander, and subsequently signed and sent by lieutenants L_{i1}, L_{i2}
- Every lieutenant maintains a set of orders V
- In this algorithm, we can define different function on V for deciding, but all nodes should use the same function(e.g. majority, minimum)
- lieutenants wait until they have received a message for all possible strings of signatures of length f+1 (with signature 0 as the first), "do long enough"

Implemenation

```
Implementation:
I. Code executed by the commander broadcast ([v, 0])

II. Lieutenant L_i:
v \leftarrow \emptyset
do long enough
   upon receipt of [v, 0, s] do
   if (v \notin V) then
   V \leftarrow V \cup \{v\}
   if (len(s) < f) then
   for j=1 to i-1, i+1 to n-1, not in s do
        send ([v, 0, s, i]) to L_j
order \leftarrow choice (V)
```

```
s 	o 	ext{sequence} of general len(s) 	o 	ext{length of s}
```

Understanding

4.3. The Srikanth-Toueg algorithm for consensus with authenticated broadcast in synchronous systems with a completely connected network (no exam material)

5. Randomized Solution

5.1. Background

To introduce a randeom element in disrributed systems is useful, that is allow one or more processes to **flip a coin** once in a while to make progress towards a solution.

It may has two results:

- achieve more efficient solutions than deterministic solutions
- achieve a solution for problems for which no deterministic solution exists

By using randomization, something has to be sacrificed

5.2. Randomized Agreementwith Crash Failures (Ben-Or's)

Ben-Or's randomized algorithm for consensus in synchronous and asynchronous systems with crash failures

Assumption

• the number of traitors f satisfies $f < rac{n}{2}$

Preparation(Structure)

- Messages has a type
 - o N for notification phase
 - P for proposal phase
 - D for decision phase

Process

- Each Process starts with a binary input value v
- Proceeds in rounds (indexed by r), each round has 3 phase
 - notification phase: broadcast message (N;r,v)
 - proposal phase: await **n-f (N;r,*)** from others, if:
 - more than **n**/**2** of these messages has value 0 or 1, then broadcast **(P;r,v)**

- else broadcast (P;r,?)
- o decision phase
 - if **decided**, then stop
 - else await n-f message (P;r,*)
 - if more than 1 message (P;r,w) with value 0 or 1, own value $v \leftarrow w$
 - if more than **f** messages (**P**;**r**,**w**), decide on w, decided
 - else make own value v a random value 0 or 1
 - increase the r value, start a new round

When a process expects messages from all processors, it is **no use waiting** for more than n - f messages. When not enough processors support a possible decision, a process **starts the next round with a new, random value v.**

Understanding

Implementation

Implementation:

```
r \leftarrow 1
decided \leftarrow false
   do forever
      broadcast (N; r, v)
      await n-f messages of the form (N;r,*)
      if (> n/2 messages (N;r,w) received with w=0 or 1) then
         broadcast (P; r, w)
      else broadcast (P; r, ?)
      if decided then STOP
      else await n-f messages of the form (P; r, *)
      if (>1 messages (P;r,w) received with w=0 or 1) then
         v \leftarrow w
         if (> f \text{ messages } (P; r, w)) then
            decide w
            decided ← true
      else v \leftarrow random(0,1)
      r \leftarrow r + 1
```

5.2. Randomized Byzantine Agreement (Ben-Or's)

Ben-Or's randomized algorithm for consensus in synchronous and asynchronous systems with Byzantine failures

5.3.1. Assumption

ullet the number of traitors f is n>5f

5.3.3. Algorithm

Preparation(Structure)

- · Messages has a type
 - N for notification phase
 - P for proposal phase
 - o D for decision phase

Process

- Each Process starts with a binary input value v
- Proceeds in rounds (indexed by r), each round has 3 phase
 - o notification phase: broadcast message (N;r,v)
 - proposal phase: await **n-f (N;r,*)** from others, if:
 - more than (n+f)/2 of these messages has value 0 or 1, then broadcast (P;r,v)
 - else broadcast (P;r,?)
 - o decision phase
 - if **decided**, then stop
 - else await n-f message (P;r,*)
 - if more than **f** message **(P;r,w)** with value 0 or 1, own value $v \leftarrow w$
 - if more than **3f** messages **(P;r,w)**, decide on w, decided
 - else make own value v a random value 0 or 1
 - increase the r value, start a new round

When a process expects messages from all processors, it is **no use waiting** for more than n-f messages. When not enough processors support a possible decision, a process **starts the next round with a new, random value v.**

Implementation

```
r \leftarrow 1
decided ← false
   do forever
      broadcast (N; r, v)
      await n-f messages of the form (N;r,*)
      if (>(n+f)/2 messages (N;r,w) received with w=0 or 1) then
         broadcast (P; r, w)
      else broadcast (P; r, ?)
      if decided then STOP
      else await n-f messages of the form (P,r,*)
      if (> f messages (P;r,w) received with w=0 or 1) then
         v \leftarrow w
            if (>3f messages (P;r,w)) then
              decide w
              decided ← true
      else v \leftarrow random(0,1)
      r \leftarrow r + 1
```

Correctness Probability:

if **n**> **5f**,Algorithm 5.13 guarantees Agreement and Validity, and terminates **with probability 1**

Complexity:

Expected number of rounds is of order 2^n (in fact better)

5.3.3. Mathematical Lemmas about correctness

Lemma 1: If a correct process proposes v in round r,then no other correct process proposes 1-v in round r

"No simultaneous contradicting proposal by correct processes"

Proof:

- 1. If a process propose the value v, the process must have received more than (n+f)/2 messages (N;r,v)
- 2. In the (n+f)/2 messages, more than (n+f)/2-f=(n-f)/2 are from correct processes, and this is already a majority of the correct processes.
- 3. So all correct process rececives less thant (n+f)/2 1-v, so 1-v cannot be proposed

<u>Lemma 2:</u> If at the beginning of round r all correct processes have the same value v,then they all decide v in round

"when all correct processes have the same value, immediate decision"

Proof:

- 1. each correct process receives at least **n-f notification messages**, at least **n-2f** of which are from correct processes
- 2. beacuse n>5f, n-2f>(n+f)/2
- 3. so all correct process propose v
- 4. so each correct process receives at least n-2f proposal messages from correct process
- 5. beacuse **n>5f**, **n-2f>3f>f**, so proposal from traitor will not be accepted, and all correct process all will decide on v

This Lemma guarantee validity

Lemma 3: If a correct process decides v in round r, then all correct processes decide v in round r+1

"Decision of any correct process immediately followed by others"

Proof

- 1. if a process decides v in round r, it must have received more than 3f proposals of v,
- 2. in these proposals, m of which are from correct processors and m>2f (at most f from incorrect with v)
- 3. so every other correct processor receives at least m-f>f proposal for v (because at most f messages from correct processes will not be received)
- 4. so they start with v from next round
- 5. then use Lemma2

This Lemma guarantee agreement

5.4. Remark

randomization is used only if there is not enough initial support for any decision anyway