Demand Estimation

MIXTAPE SESSION

Jeff Gortmaker and Ariel Pakes



Who Am I?

• A fifth-year Economics PhD candidate at Harvard University.

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- A fifth-year Economics PhD candidate at Harvard University.
- Making BLP-style estimation more accessible to researchers.
 - → Best practices papers (Conlon and Gortmaker, 2020, 2023).
 - \rightarrow Open-source Python package (PyBLP).
 - \rightarrow This course!

This Course

- Three days, 6pm-9pm.
 - 1. Today: BLP model, pure logit, price endogeneity.
 - 2. Wednesday: Mixed logit, identification, numerical best practices.
 - 3. Friday: Micro BLP, consumer survey data, other extensions.

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- Please participate and ask questions!
 - \rightarrow Ask questions in the Discord chat or raise your hand on Zoom.
- Three coding exercises, one after each day.
 - ightarrow Try these on your own or with your classmates' help. Use Discord rooms!
 - \rightarrow I'll do the first two exercises live at the start of days 2 and 3. We'll post solutions.

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- None of these are required for the course, but I recommend taking a look afterwards.

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- Typically used for counterfactual analysis of something that hasn't happened.
 - ightarrow Need a structural model when we can't just estimate a treatment effect.
- Running example: What if we halved an important product's price?
 - → Practitioners: Increased sales vs. cannibalization?
 - \rightarrow Regulators: Revenue loss from eliminating a tax?
 - → Academics: Welfare consequences?

Roadmap

The BLP Model

Pure Logit Estimation

Price Endogeneity

Coding Exercise

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- Each market has individuals with types denoted by $i \in \mathcal{I}_t$.
 - → Different demographics and preferences.
- Individuals are faced with choices denoted by $j \in \mathcal{J}_t$.
 - ightarrow Products, hospitals, candidates, etc.
 - ightarrow Outside option j=0: no purchase, no treatment, no vote, etc.

$$\max_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t \cup \{0\}} u_{ijt}$$

- Individuals choose an alternative to maximize (indirect) utility u_{ijt} .
 - ightarrow We will specify a function for u_{ijt} and use revealed preference to estimate it.

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 - 3. Idiosyncratic preferences ε_{ijt} : Superimposed noise that accommodates estimation.

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- Assume a convenient distribution for ε_{ijt} : iid type I extreme value ("logit shocks").
 - \rightarrow Want μ_{ijt} to be sufficiently flexible that this convenient assumption matters little.
 - \rightarrow Possible to eliminate ε_{ijt} but computation gets difficult (Berry and Pakes, 2007).

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- Aggregating over individuals with type sampling weights w_{it} gives market shares:

$$s_{jt} = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{I}_t} w_{it} \cdot s_{ijt} \quad \text{where} \quad s_{ijt} = \mathbb{P}_{\varepsilon_{it}} \Big(u_{ijt} \geq u_{ikt} \text{ for all } k \in \mathcal{J}_t \cup \{0\} \Big)$$

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• We'll match these to observed quantities $q_{jt} = s_{jt} \cdot M_t$ in our data.

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- Sometimes the choice of market size is straightforward.
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- But typically, the choice of market size is neither easy nor innocuous.
 - → E.g. how many choices of which cereal to buy are made every day in a specific city?
 - $\rightarrow \;$ Population \times max cereals per day? Foot traffic estimate \times max cereals per trip?

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- You should try different assumptions and see how they change your results.
 - ightarrow In general, the bigger the market size, the more substitution to the outside good.
 - $\,\rightarrow\,$ We'll learn how to discipline these assumptions with data on day 3.

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$$u_{ijt} > u_{ikt} \quad \stackrel{b>0}{\Longleftrightarrow} \quad a + b \cdot u_{ijt} > a + b \cdot u_{ikt}$$

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 - b. Scale: Already set $\mathbb{V}(\varepsilon_{ijt}) = \pi^2/6$. Estimates are relative to scale of noise.
- Now that our model can in theory be identified, how do we estimate it?

Roadmap

The BLP Mode

Pure Logit Estimation

Price Endogeneity

$$\max_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t \cup \{0\}} u_{ijt} = \delta_{jt} + \mu_{ijt}^{0} + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

• Start with the simplest case: no heterogenous utility. We'll add μ_{ijt} back on day 2.

$$\max_{j \in \mathcal{J}_t \cup \{0\}} u_{ijt} = \delta_{jt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad \Longrightarrow \quad s_{jt} = \frac{\exp \delta_{jt}}{\sum_{k \in \mathcal{J}_t \cup \{0\}} \exp \delta_{kt}}$$

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 - \rightarrow The 1 in the denominator is from our level normalization $u_{i0t} = \varepsilon_{i0t}$.
- We can recover mean utilities from observed market shares (Berry, 1994).
 - ightarrow If we specify a function for δ_{jt} , we'll have a linear regression!

Pure Logit Estimating Equation

$$\log \frac{s_{jt}}{s_{0t}} = \delta_{jt}$$

- Running example: What if we halved an important product's price?
 - \rightarrow In your exercise, products j are breakfast cereals; markets t are city-quarters.
 - \rightarrow If we estimate the model, we can change p_{jt} and estimate how consumers react.

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- Specify δ_{jt} as a function of price p_{jt} and other product characteristics x_{jt} .
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 - ightarrow In your exercise, p_{jt} is per serving; x_{jt} includes a constant, a "mushy" dummy, etc.
- Interpret the regression error ξ_{jt} as unobserved product quality not in our data.
 - $\,\rightarrow\,$ Unobserved characteristics, advertising, average taste variation, etc.

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- If x_{it} is a "mushy" cereal dummy, β is "utils" from mushyness. Again, not helpful.
 - \rightarrow Instead, report β/α , the dollar willingness to pay for mushyness.

Roadmap

The BLP Mode

Pure Logit Estimation

Price Endogeneity

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- Typically, we expect price to be strongly correlated with unobserved quality.
 - \rightarrow Firms know more than us about demand when setting prices.
 - \rightarrow Often, $\mathbb{C}(p_{jt}, \xi_{jt}) > 0$, so $\hat{\alpha} < 0$ is biased towards zero.

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 - \rightarrow Often, $\mathbb{C}(p_{jt}, \xi_{jt}) > 0$, so $\hat{\alpha} < 0$ is biased towards zero.
- Today we'll focus on handling just price endogeneity for simplicity.

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- Adding product and market fixed effects to x_{it} can help a lot.
 - \rightarrow E.g. if p_{jt} is correlated with product-specific ξ_j in $\xi_{jt} = \xi_j + \xi_t + \Delta \xi_{jt}$.
 - ightarrow But do need multiple observations per product and market to add ξ_j and ξ_t .

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- Modern grocery scanner datasets have many thousands of products/markets.
 - → Dummies take too much memory, so we "absorb" them, i.e. iteratively de-mean.
 - ightarrow Stata: Reghdfe. R: Fixest. Python: PyFixest. Coding exercise: PyBLP via PyHDFE.

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 - ightarrow Stata: Reghdfe. R: Fixest. Python: PyFixest. Coding exercise: PyBLP via PyHDFE.
- Helpful but insufficient. Unobserved quality typically varies by product and market.
 - $\rightarrow \;$ And if prices don't, then we don't have any variation left to estimate $\alpha.$

Instrumental Variables

$$\delta_{jt} = \alpha p_{jt} + x'_{jt}\beta + \xi_{jt}$$

- With or without fixed effects, a carefully-chosen IV can be a good solution.
 - ightarrow Relevance: $\mathbb{C}(p_{jt},z_{jt}) \neq 0$. Exclusion: $\mathbb{C}(\xi_{jt},z_{jt}) = 0$.

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- Always run a first-stage regression of p_{jt} on z_{jt} and x_{jt} .
 - \rightarrow Does the sign of the coefficient on z_{it} make sense?
 - $\,\rightarrow\,$ Is the instrument strong, or should you worry about weak instruments?

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 - \rightarrow Does the sign of the coefficient on z_{jt} make sense?
 - \rightarrow Is the instrument strong, or should you worry about weak instruments?
- Many places to look. I'll discuss the most common ones.

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- Cost-shifters: Measures of input prices, tariffs, etc.
 - ightarrow Consumers should only care about them through their effect on prices.

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- Cost-shifters: Measures of input prices, tariffs, etc.
- Hausman: Price of the same product averaged across other locations.
 - → Need costs to be correlated across locations, but not unobserved quality.
 - → Helpful that retailers tend to do "uniform pricing" (DellaVigna and Gentzkow, 2019).

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- Waldfogel: Average consumer characteristics in *nearby* locations.
 - ightarrow With uniform pricing, your neighbors' demographics will affect your prices.

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- Hausman: Price of the same product averaged across other locations.
- Waldfogel: Average consumer characteristics in *nearby* locations.
- BLP: Average characteristics x_{kt} of competing products $k \neq j$.
 - ightarrow Price is marginal cost plus a markup. Substitutes affect markups.
 - ightarrow We'll come back to these later, since they can also serve a different purpose.

$$\delta_{jt} = \alpha p_{jt} + x'_{jt}\beta + \xi_{jt}$$

- Cost-shifters: Measures of input prices, tariffs, etc.
- Hausman: Price of the same product averaged across other locations.
- Waldfogel: Average consumer characteristics in *nearby* locations.
- BLP: Average characteristics x_{kt} of competing products $k \neq j$.
- I recommend starting with just one. A straightforward cost-shifter if you have it.

Roadmap

The BLP Mode

Pure Logit Estimation

Price Endogeneity

- Try to do the first exercise before day 2's class, when I'll do it live.
 - 1. Getting set up with Python and PyBLP.
 - 2. Pure logit estimation.
 - 3. Running the price cut counterfactual.

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- When doing the exercise, think critically about the pure logit model's limitations.
 - $\,\rightarrow\,$ Do the substitution patterns you estimate seem reasonable?

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- When doing the exercise, think critically about the pure logit model's limitations.
 - \rightarrow Do the substitution patterns you estimate seem reasonable?
- If you have time, try the supplemental exercises.
 - \rightarrow Modeling the supply side.
 - ightarrow Checking your code by simulating data.

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