



EUROPEAN INITIATIVE ON SECURITY STUDIES

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The European Initiative on Security Studies

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with Mickael Chauffour, Thibault Delamare,
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The first two-day conference of the [*European Initiative on Security Studies*](#) (EISS) was held in Paris on January 13-14, 2017, at the University Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2). It was organized by the [*Association for the Study of War and Strategy*](#) (AEGES) in collaboration with the Center Thucydides and the Center for Studies and Research on Administrative and Political Science (CERSA) of University Paris 2. This paper summarizes the core objectives of the EISS and details its origins. It is followed by the summary of Professor Sir Hew Strachan's keynote speech and of the panels and papers presented at the conference.

The Aim of the EISS

The EISS is a Europe-wide network of over sixty universities (see the list of partner institutions in the annex) that share the goal of consolidating security studies in Europe. The 2017 EISS conference gathered approximately a hundred scholars and a second edition will be organized in 2018.

The aim of the *European Initiative on Security Studies* is two-fold. The first goal of the EISS is to develop and sustain a Europe-wide network in the field of security studies, with an annual conference and permanent thematic standing groups in which scholars can present their current projects. This gives visibility to the range of individual and collective research projects currently underway in Europe. The second goal is to establish a forum for the exchange of ideas in order to foster new joint research projects and develop international research partnerships. The EISS annual conference is therefore not a standard conference based exclusively on paper presentations, but is conceived as a forum for fostering international research cooperation. For this reason there are no “discussants” per se and presentations are aimed at generating discussions between the audience and the panel, moderated by the chair. The thematic panels provide the opportunity not only to engage with papers and existing research projects but also to generalize about the future research potential of specific topics or approaches (theoretical, epistemological, methodological, empirical etc.)

The EISS has three main characteristics: it is (i) thematically-driven and open to all theoretical approaches, (ii) interdisciplinary and (iii) geographically inclusive. First, the EISS is not only limited to one specific theoretical approach to security studies but rather seeks to be inclusive. It is organized in panels that cover a large range of themes in the field of security studies. The nine panels of the 2017 EISS conference – which will be expanded in the 2018 conference (see the document attached) – were the following:

- 1) Change and Continuity in War
- 2) Emerging Domains: Cybersecurity
- 3) Arms Procurement and Transfers
- 4) Private Security Contractors
- 5) Defense Cooperation and Military Assistance
- 6) Military Interventions
- 7) Non-Proliferation and Arms Control
- 8) Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism
- 9) Theoretical Developments in Security Studies

The EISS is interdisciplinary in that it gathers among others historians, political scientists, geographers and sociologists sharing an interest in developing security studies in Europe. Finally, the EISS seeks to be as inclusive as possible from a geographical perspective. The 2017 conference gathered scholars from 62 universities from 15 European countries. In the coming years, the aim is to broaden the range of partner institutions and continue to expand the membership.

Origins of the EISS

The EISS is the result of two dynamics, one French and the other European. In France, the EISS emerged from the work conducted by the [*Association for the Study of War and Strategy*](#) (*Association pour les Etudes sur la Guerre et la Stratégie*, AEGES), created in 2015. The AEGES aims to foster the development and consolidation of security studies in French academia – where they have been marginalized for some time. To do so, the association organizes conferences and seminars, manages two book series on strategic studies in French publishing houses (*CNRS Editions* and *Armand Colin*) and is currently negotiating a new book series on strategic studies. In order to support new professionals joining academia and beginning their career, the EISS is launching in 2017 a prize for Masters and PhD dissertations in strategic studies (*Prix Bastien Irondelle*). The idea of the EISS first emerged in the context of AEGES' activities. Being in charge of AEGES' international research partnerships, Dr. Hugo Meijer – the academic director of the EISS – sought to develop a European network of security studies, taking what the AEGES is doing in France to the European level.

Furthermore, the EISS emerged from an assessment of the state of security studies in Europe. There is a long and vibrant European tradition in the field of security studies (which is broadly defined to include strategic studies, war studies, peace studies, etc.). A significant number of European universities have departments or programs focusing on security studies (in political science, history and so on) and engage with this field of research from different theoretical perspectives. However, the field in Europe is fragmented and there is no dedicated European forum for security studies scholars to gather and exchange ideas. Given the lack of such a Europe-wide forum, there is limited visibility and awareness of the many research projects of scholars or universities in other countries across the region. Despite some European associations focusing on International Relations at the national or sub-regional level, or at the European level, like the European International Studies Association, or the European Consortium of Political Research (ECPR) and its Standing Group on

International Relations, no dedicated Europe-wide forum had yet been established in the field of security studies. The EISS fills this gap and hopes to achieve its goal of a vibrant, European-wide community of scholars in the field of security studies.

Hugo Meijer

Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) and European University Institute (EUI)
Academic Director of the European Initiative on Security Studies (EISS)

Acknowledgements

The first annual conference of the EISS was organized by the AEGES together with the Thucydides Center of the University Pantheon-Assas (Paris 2) and also the Center for Studies and Research on Administrative and Political Science (CERSA). Several people have contributed to this event and we would like to thank Prof. Julian Fernandez, Director of the Thucydides Center at the University Pantheon-Assas; Michel Borgetto and Prof. Yves Surel, the Director and Deputy Director of the (CERSA); Prof. Jean-Vincent Holeindre, former President of the AEGES. Cyrille Thiébaut, who was in charge of communication at AEGES, has provided a unique contribution to the organization of the conference, and we thank her for her outstanding work. Several members of the AEGES kindly helped in the organization of this event: Mickael Chauffour, Thibault Delamare, Arthur Laudrain, Olivier Schmitt and Benjamin Oudet.

Keynote Speech

“Major Wars, Irregular Wars”

Professor Sir Hew Strachan, University of St. Andrews

In his keynote speech, Sir Hew Strachan addresses the dialectic between major, all-out wars and small, irregular ones, within Europe. From the end of the Cold War, and until very recently, Europe became so complacent about its own security that it took that security for granted. The emphasis on globalization masked the importance of regional identities and regional connections for ‘hard’ security. One of the most striking phenomena in security studies over the last decade has been the re-emergence of geopolitics as a field of both thinking and political action. Although the word is now used far too loosely, it is also used with increasing regularity. It makes a central point: that geography and physical proximity, and the relationships they engender, matter in strategy. We are seeing these truths re-energized by recent events such as Brexit and the Trump election. They make obvious points which ought to have been increasingly apparent for some time. Security issues, ISIS and Russia among them, matter once again, and are common to all the countries of the continent. David Cameron used the EU’s contribution to security as his main platform when he campaigned for a remain vote in the British referendum in 2016, even if the British National Security Council did not discuss the EU in 2010-15, on the grounds that it was only an economic, not a security, organization. Britain, after Brexit, will still need a security relationship with Europe. And Barack Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’ casts doubts over the US commitment to European security, just as American politicians before Trump castigated NATO’s European members over their failure to do more for defense spending.

If Europe is to respond to these geopolitical challenges it needs a more coherent understanding of the place of armed conflict within security, and a better appreciation of what war is, whether or when it may have utility, and how to wage it. We are not helped because we have created a false narrative, ostensibly built up historically, that separates major war and so-called ‘small wars’, regular or conventional war from irregular war. In this narrative war in Europe is major war, and war in the colonies of the past or in interventions today is irregular war. European armies have as a result tended to optimise themselves for one model or the other, and not adapted well when war has changed its complexion.

If we look back in time, we realize that irregular and regular wars are not that clearly separated. The settlement after the Napoleonic wars sought to break the link between revolution and war, to eliminate guerrilla warfare in some cases, and to curb its corollary, a war of national self-defense fought by nations in arms. Our reading of Clausewitz’s *On War* makes this point. Book 6, chapter 26 is explicit on the idea that ‘a people’s war in civilized Europe is a phenomenon of the nineteenth century’. His vision embraced its expansion so that it might become the main form of European war. In practice, however, this was too revolutionary or democratic for most sovereigns, not least his own, the King of Prussia. Guerrilla war became subordinated to more regular forms of war and marginalized as a consequence. The irregular wars which were fought in Europe in 1830 or 1848 were classed as revolutions, not as the civil wars which they were. The armies of Europe were domestic police forces as much as agents of national defense, right up to 1914. The most significant revolution – or rather counter-revolution – of the 19th century, that in the United States in 1861-5 was called a civil war, not a revolution, and the rebels assumed the panoply of

statehood, including formed regular armies. The US thus colluded in the overall interpretation imposed within Europe.

A century later, by 1914, the link between war and revolution seemed to have been broken, but it was then revived. States on both sides in the First World War used revolution as a weapon of war. In the war at sea, irregular warfare techniques became the norm. Battles between fleets – ‘regular war’ – proved indecisive. The British blockade of Germany and Germany’s response, unrestricted U-boat warfare, meant that by 1917 irregular warfare dominated. On land set-piece battles also failed to produce decisive results and subversion, propaganda and atrocity became increasingly important; they shaped ‘the wars after the war’ which afflicted central and Eastern Europe between 1918 and 1923.

The Second World War can be understood in very similar ways. Resistance movements politicized guerrilla warfare and its methods. Organizations set up by the British, particularly SOE, and the OSS created by the United States liaised with partisans, fighters with a political identity. These units and techniques, born in the Second World War, did not die with its end, and that end – like that of the First World War –, was less clear cut than the conventional narrative permits. Civil war within Europe, notably in Italy and Greece, and wars of re-colonization (and then of de-colonization) outside Europe meant that the irregular consequences of irregular methods used in the waging of a major, regular war persisted. Guerrillas became de facto political insurgents, and the strategy for undermining the Nazi new order and the Japanese ‘Asian co-prosperity sphere’ became the possible instruments for resisting a Soviet overrunning of Western Europe.

Six consequences emerge from this two-century survey. First, irregular and regular wars co-exist side by side. Second, our too-ready identification of irregular war with counter-insurgency today obscures the place of insurgency in European understandings of the conduct of war. Third, in our recent wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, ‘we’ have been the insurgents, the agents of initial destabilization, seeking to topple existing regimes. Fourth, what gives meaning and shape to irregular war is not its irregularity but its political identity. Fifth, it follows that a typology of war that focuses on means – hybrid war and grey-zone war are current examples – will be inadequate because it lacks the specifics of place and political context. Sixthly, and consequently, the story of Europe’s – and the US’ – recent use of war has been one of operational successes leading to political dead ends. The political and strategic context sets the framework within which major war or small war, regular war or irregular war, became/become tools chosen according to the ends which they are designed to deliver. The challenge for multilateral organizations is that they struggle to agree on exactly those points, meaning the operational categories derived by their armed forces have to do duty to cover the absence of policy.

Panel 1

Change and Continuity in War

Chair : Prof. Sir Hew Strachan, University of St. Andrews

The Future in the Past: Victory, Defeat, and Comparative Grand Strategy

Dr. Paul van Hooft, European University Institute

Why are some states more likely to rely on military force than others? Why do others prefer diplomacy? Why are states more willing to accept power imbalances with some states and not with others? Why do they understand threats differently, where some states respond strongly to distant threats, while others accept threats close to them? Why do states trust certain potential allies over others, while others entirely reject the idea of alliance commitments, preferring autonomy and possible isolation? These are key questions that existing literature has not answered satisfactorily and that this paper seeks to address. It argues that neither structural advantages or disadvantages, nor specific governments can explain the origins of such enduring national preferences for military force and diplomacy.

Grey Zones, Deterrence and Signaling: the Case of the US-Japan Alliance

Dr. Matteo Dian, University of Bologna

Exercising extended deterrence towards China in grey zone scenarios, under the threshold of military response, poses several practical and conceptual problems. The main dilemma for the US is to credibly signal their intention to deter the use of hybrid warfare while avoiding the risks of escalation. The proposed paper locates the role of costly signals within the theory of alliances and discussed the consequences of grey zones scenarios for inter-allied relations, looking primarily at the US-Japan alliance. It then focuses on the 2015 US-Japan New Defense Guidelines, advancing several hypotheses on the adaptation of the alliance to the changing nature of threats it faces. It puts the emphasis on flexible deterrent options, Freedom of Navigation operations and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) support.

Continuity and Change in the Debates about Using Armed Forces for Domestic Security: Britain, France, and Germany

Jack Harding, University of Reading

This paper aims to demonstrate that current terrorist organizations are also, in their practices, the children of our current globalization. First, the paper seeks to define the term terrorism and to debunk the bipolar idea of a national terrorism versus global terrorism. Second, the paper puts in perspective the perceived increase in violence committed by terrorist groups. Finally, it shows how terrorist organizations get organized in fluidity: in franchises, with advertising campaigns and rivalries on the ground. AQ and EI are in competition, and some groups (as Boko Haram) are moving from one allegiance to the other. In that way, independent and autonomous groups can act over the world without any links between them, only a proclaimed membership, sometimes not recognized by the mother authority.

France's Colonial Wars in the XIX and XX Centuries, and its Military Interventions in the XXI Century: Continuities or Discontinuities?

Dr. Julie d'Andurain, Université Paris-Sorbonne (Paris 1)

Between 2001 and 2016, the Western military, especially the French, put boots on the ground in Afghanistan, and then Africa, with Sangaris and Serval in 2013, and Barkhane in 2014. French policymakers believed then in the characteristics of “small wars” as it had been theorized by Sir Charles Edward Callwell in 1896. This paper looks at the evolution of forms of warfare, in military operations at the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first century. From an Africa angle, the paper presents some general cases that remain perennial. It shows that, for the time being, the continuities prevail over the ruptures, because from a tactical standpoint, warfare does not evolve from one period to another. However, what emerges is that the main discontinuity can be identified in the way in which war is narrated.

Synthesis of papers by Arthur Laudrain

Panel 2

Arms Procurement and Transfers

Chair: Professor Matthew Uttley, King's College London

States vs. Markets in Rising Powers: Functional and Political Sources of Institutional Resilience in India's Defense Sector

Dr. Moritz WEISS, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich

This research project tackles with military innovation and the political economy of defense industries. It focuses on France, United Kingdom, Germany and India through defense procurement, on issues of expertise, regulation and ownership. The analytical categories are “market economy convergence vs. diversity” to answer the question of: does globalization lead to convergence? The presentation focused on India to determine if it shifted from a market based approach in the MMRCAs (combat fighter aircrafts) procurement, despite institutional resilience to globalization. Finally, resilience was stronger and India came back to intergovernmental purchase. The explicative theoretical model is focused on the “micro-foundation of institutional resilience”, where one considers the functional fit (structural capabilities between existing practices and institutional reforms, in this case the lack of capable private actors hurt by the reform) and politics of vested interests (in this case, informal alliance between bureaucrats and state-owned industries). As a result, the argument is theoretically revisionist in the sense that it stresses institutional resilience despite both exogenous and endogenous triggers of change. The theoretical objective is to contribute to the historical institutionalism research program by providing micro-foundations of institutional resilience and empirically applying them to a neglected industrial sector of a rising power. A defense market cannot be established by simply setting strong incentives or following globally accepted standards of governance. The notions of path dependence and complementarity are used to argue that institutional resilience in the form of a functional misfit and political resistance by vested interests explains India's institutional choice in the MMRCAs. This is empirically substantiated by a systematic process analysis of the politics of reform implementation.

A Science and Technology Studies Approach to Drone Politics in Europe

Samuel Longuet, Université Libre Bruxelles

European countries have been trying to develop their own strategic drone for a long time while recurrently failing at it. Its most famous model is the Predator Drone. The question tackled by this paper is why European countries have failed to develop a joint strategic drone program. The paper, based on “science and technology studies”, shows that the development process of the European strategic UAV can be explained by the expectations of the various states (France, the United Kingdom and Germany) regarding their different strategic postures (French Gaullisme, or the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the States) as well as their respective objectives (on the usage of drones, on the choice of the industrial players, on legality and on morality). Failures in the development of a joint European programme emerge despite common interest in developing strategic drones, which would serve shared the goal of strengthening European defense industries and the common European Defense project.

New Wine in Old Bottles? United Kingdom Defense Procurement and Defense Industries in the post-Brexit Era

Dr. Benedict Wilkinson, King's College London; Professor Matthew Uttley, King's College London

Dr. Wilkinson and Prof. Uttley present their research project on defense procurement in the United Kingdom. Debates in the field of arms procurement often focus on the definition of the degree of integration of private actors in the state industrial policy, where there is a tension between increase in profits vs. a better control of the state. Brexit heavily impacted this sector, with less access to the European market and problems for UK industries based in EU countries. In the future, these industries will lack access to infrastructures and EU member-states will be free to adjust their behavior toward UK, while the UK will lose its influence on EU policies.

Arms Procurement in the Gulf Region: Evolving Trends and Implications for the Client-State-Supplying State-Industry Triangle

Emma Soubrier, University Clermont Auvergne

The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) have become an increasingly lucrative market for international arms trade, especially since the shrinking of Western defense budgets added fuel to the global export race in their direction. Amidst the literature on security relations of the Gulf with outside powers, however, few publications aim to explain the incentives driving this trade beyond security motives on the part of clients, and economic determinism on the part of suppliers. This paper seeks to fill this gap by offering an overview of their multifaceted internal and international drivers and the way they have impacted the rules of the regional and global security game. GCC countries' defense procurement used to be a means to an end that had little to do with addressing threats they faced on their own, let alone gaining more power on the international stage.

Synthesis of papers by Thibault Delamare

Panel 3

Emerging Domains: Cybersecurity

Chair: Dr. Brandon Valeriano, University of Cardiff

American Military-Technological Superiority in the Age of Cyber Espionage, Globalisation and the Rise of China

Dr. Mauro Gilli, ETH Zurich; Dr. Andrea Gilli, Stanford University

How easily and quickly can states rise in the military domain? Do industrial espionage and in particular cyber-espionage facilitate and accelerate this process? In other words, are there empirical and theoretical reasons to believe that other states can easily imitate US advanced weapon systems and thus erode American military-technological superiority? This paper argues that the dramatic increase in the complexity of military technology that has taken place over the past 150 years has led to a change in the system of production, which in turn has made the imitation and the replication of the performance of military technology more difficult – despite the possibility to gain access to key designs and blueprints through cyber-espionage. As a result, developing advanced weapon systems has become significantly more challenging. The paper tests this theory on a set of crucial case studies (American F35) addressing possible cofounders. The available evidence supports this account. The findings reassure about the threat of cyber-espionage, the role of globalization in armaments production and rise of China for American military-technological superiority.

To Attack and to Conquer: Cyber Weapons and the Risks of Kinetic War

Dr. Marc DeVore, St Andrews University

This paper argues that no technological development is influencing war's likelihood more than the development of cyber-attack capabilities. A burgeoning literature already pits “cyber pessimists” who anticipate states launching devastating, yet deniable cyber-attacks against one another against “cyber optimists” who contend that the danger is exaggerated. Both cyber optimists and pessimists however see cyber conflicts as a phenomenon that primarily impacts cyber space and civilian utilities. Historically, however, new military technologies' greatest impact has been a function of whether they increase or decrease armed forces' capacities to invade and conquer. To assess how cyber-attack capabilities will likely impact inter-state warfare the paper therefore analyses this developing area through the lens of offense-defense theory. It argues that cyber capabilities increase the likelihood of conventional wars because of three of their intrinsic capabilities: (1) they are most useful when employed in conjunction with a conventional offensive to induce an “operation shock” in their opponents; (2) they are more useful on the battlefield than for making coercive threats; (3) they lower the costs of attempting to mount a surprise attack.

Issues and Frames: Explaining Coercion in Cyberspace

Miguel Gomez, ETH Zurich

This paper argues that the growing number of offensive measures in cyber allows the development of coercive capacities. This argument rests on two findings. On the one hand, the use of coercive measures in cyber as an instrument of foreign policy. On the other hand,

these measures are used in ongoing conflicts. Promoters of the strategic utility of cyber insist on its vulnerability to threats. However, the empirical evidence suggests that these actions have often resulted in increased resistance. Despite these performances, the coercive potential of cyber cannot be rejected, especially when used by states. The paper therefore suggests that the success of coercive operations in cyber does not depend solely on the vulnerability of the adversary, but rather on the variation in the reference point of the system to which the action is being undertaken as well as its perimeter.

Cybersecurity and the Public Sector: The Italian Case

Roberta Mulas, University of Warwick & LUISS Guido Carli

This paper focuses on the risks associated with cyber security in the Italian administration. It sets out an assessment of the vulnerabilities of the Italian system by linking this issue to the development of national and European infrastructures and to the need to protect citizens' personal data. It particularly drew the attention of the panel to the need to evaluate governmental cyber security shortcomings in order to minimize risks and develop a corpus of good practices. The presentation was based upon a report presented to the LUISS School of Government: "Cybersecurity for the Public Administration".

Synthesis of papers by Benjamin Oudet

Panel 4
Defense Cooperation and Military Assistance
Chair: Professor Ulrich Krotz, European University Institute

The Future of American Power in Europe and European Strategic Cooperation
Dr. Paul van Hooff, European University Institute

This paper is based on a research project whose core question is: why did the United States seek to act as a pre-eminent power in Europe despite the great costs and risks? Different schools of thought coexist in shaping US grand strategy. Liberals insist on common values, economic interests and the republican elites. Realists emphasize that the Europeans remain divided and defensive. Both question the desirability of large US involvement in Europe. There is today a debate between a maximalist and a minimalist vision of the US grand strategy. These alternatives range from liberal hegemony (maximalist vision) to the restraint of power (minimalist vision), with selective engagement and offshore balancing. This project analyzes the evolution of US grand strategy and evaluates the scope of variations between maximalist and minimalist visions.

Towards Nodal Defense? US Strategy and European Security

Dr. Luis Simon, Vrije Universiteit Brussels; Dr. Alexander Lanoszka, City University of London

Alliances can have two natures: they are either multilateral or “hubs and spoke”. However, NATO corresponds to neither of these two ideal types. This paper proposes an alternative theoretical framework for making sense of how NATO has developed, arguing that it has come to feature various nested hierarchies (or centers of power) and functional differentiation. This explains the diminution of the US role in NATO, notably after the 2008 economic crisis and in the face of a rising China and a resurgent Russia. A nodal alliance is a multilateral institution including multiple hierarchy and functional differences among allies. Its five main functions are: (i) security guarantor of last resort, (ii) brokers (creating bridges among allies); (iii) enabler (materials and staff contribution); (iv) launching pad, namely furnishing bases; and (v) local specialist, as it confers defense and deterrence on specific theatre.

Transatlantic Defense Cooperation after Brexit and Trump

Prof. Magnus Petersson, Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies

Since the end of World War II, NATO impulses, integrates and standardizes Western armed forces, promotes coalition and defend democracy. However, NATO is challenged by Brexit and the election of Donald Trump. Brexit may not be as threatening for NATO as the UK government promised to invest more in the Alliance. In contrast, President Trump challenges the fundamental values of liberal institutions. Specifically, Trump has expressed four specific opinions which threaten NATO: he appears to give more importance to actors like China than Europe; his views on Russia suggest he might lessen the US support to NATO; he has repeatedly stressed that Europeans do not spend enough on their own defense and underlined that Article V is conditional and not absolute; finally, he has

expressed skepticism regarding human rights values, particularly in relation to torture. Prof. Petersson expects that the US system of checks and balances will be put under stress while still weakened by the Republican majority; that Europe may still be a priority to the US due to strong transatlantic bounds.

Military Cooperation in Unstable Places: Explaining American Failures in the Sahara-Sahel

Dr. Edoardo Baldaro, Scuola Normale Superiore

Since the end of the Cold War, the US has demonstrated a renewed willingness to stabilize the Sahara-Sahel region through the spreading of democratic and liberal values, the training of local armed forces and humanitarian aid. The US doctrine excluded military intervention. The 9/11 terrorist attacks led to a shift in the US threat perception in the region, with Mali at the center of it. Thereafter, US considered regional states as failed and fragile states with ungoverned spaces. As a consequence, from 2002 to 2012, the doctrine became “spreading democracy, development and good governance” and “waging war in countries we are not at war with”. The latter motivated the military exercise Fintlock, the Pan-Sahel Initiative and the institutional building program. The paper investigates why such security cooperation failed. The analysis of American failures in the Sahara-Sahel region reveals the security and developmental dimensions of US engagement in the world’s peripheries.

Synthesis of papers by Thibault Delamare

Panel 5

Private Security Contractors

Chair: Prof. Elke Krahmann, University Witten/Herdecke

Private Security Logos: A Visual Analysis of PMSC's Legitimation Strategies

Dr. Eugenio Cusumano, University of Leiden

Private security scholarship has dedicated substantial attention to private military and security companies' (PMSCs) legitimization strategies, using discourse analysis to study how the private security industry has (re)constructed its identity to distance itself from mercenaries and appropriated humanitarians' discursive frameworks. However, while discourses encompass both textual and non-textual communication, the analysis of PMSC's legitimization strategies has been based exclusively on written documents. This paper offers a visual history of PMSC's logos as this sheds important insights into the evolution of the industry, reflecting its attempt to gain acceptance within the international community by shying away from the provision of offensive tasks. To do so, the paper first draws on semiotics and marketing studies as a source of insights into PMSC's corporate branding strategies. Secondly, it conducts a visual history of PMSC's logos, identify three specific phases. Finally, it draws a parallel between PMSC's changing logos and their broader legitimization strategies, based on PMSC's attempt to gain legitimacy by engaging in self-regulatory initiatives and signaling their commitment to providing defense security services only.

Dynamics of Security Privatization and the Evolution of the Regulatory State in Security: Explaining Anglo-Saxon and Continental European Trajectories

Dr. Andreas Kruck, Ludwig Maximilians University of Munich/Free University Berlin

For the past few decades, governance and statehood in OECD countries have been shaped by a shift from the "positive state", which provides collective goods itself, to the "regulatory state", which enlists, empowers and regulates non-state intermediaries in various indirect modes of governance. The extensive use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) by Western governments and multilateral organizations may signify the advent of the regulatory state in the "high politics" area of security; but national and international regulation of PMSCs has often remained underwhelming so far. When and how does the regulatory state take root in the issue-area of privatized security, and how can we make sense of different varieties of the regulatory state? This paper studies responses to economically and/or politically costly failures of their private security agents. A comparative assessment suggests that at least in countries with high levels of previous reliance on PMSCs the regulatory state in security has taken remarkably strong roots. But for systematic rather than incidental reasons, it is hardly willing or able to guarantee, coordinate and control the private provision of security-related collective goods in a reliable and legitimate way.

The Co-Evolution of the PMSCs and their Environments: Explaining the Multi-Faceted Nature of the PMSC Industry

Berenike Prem, Witten/Herdecke University

Despite the recent glut of scholarly attention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), there is still considerable confusion about what these companies are and what they actually do. In fact, most accounts of the industry are attuned to its protean and shape-shifting nature rather than to its stable features and practices. The industry, we learn, is “agile and innovative”, “slippery, and hard to pin down analytically”, in short, an assemblage of extremely diverse and fluid corporations. This paper seeks to address this apparent lacuna by taking a step back and investigating the very motors for change within the PMSC industry: How can we explain the multi-faceted nature of the industry? This paper spelled out a co-evolutionary framework to explain how and why change unfolds in organizations like PMSCs.

Private Military and Security Companies on Twitter: Hiding in Plain Sight

Dr. Andrea Schneiker, University of Siegen

Business companies have been found to use social media to foster their image, for branding, stakeholder communication and for marketing purposes. An analysis of private military and security companies (PMSCs) and their twitter messages reveals that these companies use social media in a distinct manner. Rather than seeking to increase their audience and visibility they seem to hide behind a low profile. This paper presents the results of a mixed-method analysis identifying the different social media strategies PMSCs use: promoting positive events, preventing (potentially) negative events from materializing, turning events into non-events and turning non-events into events. Thereby, PMSCs seek to have a recognizable presence in the public sphere of social media while simultaneously making themselves and their activities invisible. These are key questions that existing literature has not answered totally.

Synthesis of papers by Mickael Chauffour

Panel 6

Military Interventions

Chair: Prof. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, University of Southern Denmark

Learning Cooperation in Coalition Interventions. The Case of France, the UK and the US in Libya

Dr. Alice Pannier, IRSEM / Sciences Po

This research project focuses on the learning of cooperation in inter-allied military operations. Operational cooperation (which requires learning) is indeed a key element in the conduct of contemporary interventions. Combining the work on military adaptation and innovation, cooperation and dissemination of knowledge in organizations, the aim is to complement the existing literature, which has focused on either national processes or on multilateral organizations. On the one hand, all contemporary military interventions involve co-operation in coalitions that do not necessarily replicate the members or modes of functioning of international organizations (e.g. NATO, EU). On the other, a large part of the exchanges between the Western armies in these interventions is done bilaterally or in small groups (minilaterally) in a way that is not institutionalized. How, in this context, does the learning from cooperation – i.e. the identification of lessons on cooperation and their implementation in order to improve it – take place? The first stage of the project explores innovative bilateral and trilateral operational learning strategies that developed after French, British and American participations in operations in Libya in 2011.

Military Interventionism and the Responsibility to Protect: The Crisis in Syria

Dr. Sárka Kolmasová, Metropolitan University Prague

The concept of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been constantly criticized for the gap between words and deeds, namely due to the inadequate international response to the crisis in Syria. Does the failure mean the end of R2P and more importantly, an emergence of a post-liberal global order? The paper argues that the particular crisis did not bring any fundamental change and it rather reflects a pragmatic revisionism observable since the R2P concept was introduced in 2001. Therefore, the inconsistent implementation in different cases – most strikingly in Libya and Syria – is congruent with the compromised nature of the R2P. More generally, it reflects the pragmatic global order, which accommodates moral principles according to practical politics. The paper critically comments on the emergence of the R2P concept to demonstrate the false premise of its purely liberal universalist nature. Secondly, it provided a theoretical appraisal of pragmatic revisionism in global ethics while demonstrating its relevance within the emergence and implementation of the R2P concept. Finally, it aims to assess the restrained international reaction to the Syrian crisis through on the basis of pragmatic ethics. The case reflects the limitations of R2P caused by its vague and too flexible scope subject to inconsistent political interpretations. Quite paradoxically, international pressure on firmer and more decisive action might strengthen the third pillar of R2P.

Barefoot Soldiers and Skiing Nations: Incoherence, Coping Strategies and the Making of Meaning in the UN Mission in Mali

Dr. Chiara Ruffa, Uppsala University; Dr. Sebastiaan Rietjens, Netherlands Defense Academy

Pursuing coherence is a core objective in most military interventions and the lack thereof is often mentioned when criticizing them. This paper examines coherence implementation and its effects within the ongoing UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA. Specifically, it focused on MINUSMA's intelligence capability – which has an unprecedented scale in UN history. The paper draws on a large empirical dataset containing 120 semi-structured interviews, observations on the ground and participation in pre-deployment exercises as well as evaluation sessions. It distinguishes among four levels of coherence: intra-agency (i.e. coherence within an individual organization), inter-agency (coherence between different organizations), whole-of-government (coherence between different government agencies of a country) and internal-external (coherence between the host nation and international actors). The analysis reveals a striking level of incoherence at each of the levels. The paper also analyzes the “copying strategies” put in place by members involved in the operation vis-à-vis different types of incoherence.

Do You Hear Me Major Tom? Media, Narratives and Contemporary Military Operations: The Case of the Italian Mission in Afghanistan

Silvia D'Amato, Scuola Normale Superiore; Dr. Fabrizio Coticchia, University of Genoa

This paper explores the relationship between public narratives and the Italian military contribution to the *International Security Assistance Force* (ISAF) in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2014. Despite receiving a limited attention in the literature, Italy has been one of the most crucial contributors of multilateral military missions around the world in the post-bipolar era: from Iraq to Lebanon, from the Horn of Africa to Haiti. Consistently, Italy has been militarily engaged in Afghanistan for the entire period of the multilateral mission, namely from 2001 to 2014. However, Italian political actors and media have addressed the Italian involvement in Afghanistan with different, and sometimes controversial, views and strategic narratives. This paper aims at reconstructing the core features of such perspectives and narratives, by focusing specifically on the media approach to the military intervention. The aim is not only to retrace patterns regularities and similarities, but also to unveil critical inconsistencies and fracture moments and arguments with respect to the political dominant discourse. The analysis is conducted by means of Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) on a collection of 191 articles published in four main Italian national newspapers between 2001 and 2014.

Synthesis of papers by Hugo Meijer

Panel 7
Non-Proliferation and Arms Control
Chair: Dr. Ulrich Kühn, University of Hambourg

Global Nuclear Order, Hegemony and Resistance

Dr. Nick Ritchie, University of York

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between contemporary conceptions of 'global nuclear order' and US hegemony. This is a relationship that is often implied, for example in practices of extended nuclear deterrence, but rarely examined. This paper understands nuclear order as a social structure produced in and through practices. The paper defines nuclear order as the set of material, institutional and discursive practices that legitimize, regulate, circumscribe and discipline the military application of nuclear technology. It argues that this set of practices is rooted in the power relations of US hegemony. The paper is concerned with the exercise of hegemonic power to legitimize nuclear weapons and the practices of nuclear deterrence and thereby reproduce the social institutions of nuclear order. This is evidenced most recently in the US diplomatic resistance to the so-called Humanitarian Initiative on nuclear weapons and its calls for a nuclear weapons 'ban treaty'. The paper develops the understanding of the relationship between US hegemony, power and nuclear order, the reproduction of nuclear order through practices, and with that the possibilities for regressive and progressive change. The analysis situates itself in a sub-field of what might be called 'critical nuclear studies', drawing in this instance on critical constructivism and critical security studies.

Banning Nuclear Weapons? The Dilemma for the NATO Non-Nuclear Weapon States

Prof. Tom Sauer, University of Antwerp

A majority of states in the world are planning to start multilateral negotiations for a Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty. Most non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) argue that the use of nuclear weapons is inhumane and that nuclear weapons are a danger to their security. The nuclear armed states are not in favor of the initiative. The NNWS that are allied with nuclear armed states, like those in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are in a difficult bind. They have to make the choice to either support the ban and call into question NATO's nuclear weapons policy, or not to support the ban and weaken the pressure on the NNWS to eliminate their nuclear weapons. This paper tries to elaborate this dilemma. It first describes the (historical) rise of the so-called Humanitarian Initiative that aims to ban nuclear weapons. It then analyses NATO's extended deterrence policy. It concludes with looking to the difficult position of the NNWS inside NATO. The paper lists and evaluates the arguments made by the NATO NNWS against the initiative. It also shows the cracks in the wand of NATO solidarity by looking to the (comparative) voting behavior of the individual NATO NNWS (in a dozen votes) in the UN between 2012 and 2016.

Scholarly Responsibility, Non-proliferation and Deterrence: the Effects of Self-Censorship

Dr. Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po Paris

Security studies scholarship on nuclear weapons is particularly prone to self-censorship. This paper argues that this self-censorship is problematic. The vulnerability, secrecy, and limits to accountability created by nuclear weapons call for responsible scholarship vis-à-vis the general public. This need for renewed and expanded scholarly responsibility is especially pressing given current plans among nuclear-weapon states to “modernize” their nuclear arsenals, committing their citizens and children to live in nuclear-armed countries and, a fortiori, a nuclear armed world. Despite this need, the existing reflexive literature in security studies – calling for greater scholarly responsibility – has neither specifically focused on nuclear weapons nor explored the forms of self-censorship identified here as shaping a modality of responsibility. The paper identifies three forms of self-censorship: an epistemological self-censorship that denies the normative foundations of nuclear studies; a rhetorically induced form of censorship that leads scholars to stay away from radical reorderings of the world (e.g., world government or the abolition of nuclear weapons) because of the joint rhetorical effects of the tropes of non-proliferation and deterrence; and, finally, a “presentist imaginal” form of self-censorship that leads scholars to obfuscate the implicit bets they make on their considered possible futures and their constitutive effects on the “present” they analyze. The paper does not claim that these are the only forms of self-censorship.

Why a Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty Is a Bad Idea

Dr. Michal Onderco, Erasmus University Rotterdam

Recent debates about the nuclear ban treaty are the culmination of the “Humanitarian initiative”, arguably the most important development within the non-proliferation regime over the past Review cycle. Supporters see such treaty as the first step to forcing countries possessing nuclear weapons to disarm. The supporters of the Humanitarian Initiative usually bring three chief arguments against the nuclear weapons. Firstly, so-called “close calls” – situations when nuclear weapons were almost used, either by negligence or by real escalation. Secondly, a potential catastrophic impact of nuclear detonations. Thirdly, the opponents point out that nuclear weapons, by their very nature, violate the principles of international humanitarian law.

Synthesis of papers by Hugo Meijer

Panel 8

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism

Chair: Professor Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Leiden University

The Origins of Transnational Terrorist Waves

Dr. Andreas Gofas, European University Institute / Panteion University of Athens

Transnational terrorism remains often discussed but theoretically underdeveloped and historically unscrutinized. This is so because the bulk of traditional research on terrorism has been descriptive analysis dominated by presentism. This paper addresses this dual shortcoming with the overall purpose of contributing to the development of a general theory of the origins of transnational terrorist waves. Nowhere is descriptive analysis and ahistoricism more prevalent than in the matter-of-fact status that the ‘new’ terrorism discourse has gained. Despite the explanatory lure of the ‘new’, the claims of what might be called a ‘first generation’ of ‘new’ terrorism literature have been subject to conceptual and empirical challenges. The overall purpose of this paper is to recast the core problematic of the debate in a long-term, historical and multidimensional perspective that is sensitive to interactions between different levels of analysis. It does so via a comparative historical study that juxtaposes the late 19th century anarchist terrorist wave with the current jihadist one.

Transnational Terrorism and Strategic Culture: A New Understanding of States Counterterrorism Response

Dr. Silvia D’Amato, Scuola Normale Superiore Florence

This paper intends to raise questions on how ideas, norms, and values matter in counterterrorism dynamics. It does so by building bridges between two research traditions, the constructivist ‘strategic culture’ approach and critical terrorism studies emancipatory-type of focus. In fact, this paper presents an extensive empirical work concerning the interaction between cultural factors, discourse and counterterrorism policies in two European states: France and Italy. The empirical analysis was conducted by means of an innovative combination Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) on strategic documents, parliamentary debates released between 2001 and 2015. The results of semi-structured interviews conducted between May and December 2016 to French and Italian policy-makers, security practitioners and advisors engaged in the fight against transnational terrorism will be also included in the analysis. The purpose is to unveil the politics of counterterrorism by presenting the process of construction and constitutive relation among different strategic dimensions.

NATO Perceptions and Assessments of International Terrorism, 1978-1983

Dr. Dionysios Chourchoulis (Hellenic Open University)

The paper examines NATO attitudes towards the phenomenon of international terrorism. Despite the extensive academic literature on the history of terrorism, there has been a significant historiographical lacuna regarding NATO’s policy towards the phenomenon during the Cold War. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to address this historiographical gap by utilizing fully the – largely neglected – NATO Archives in Brussels (such as the special reports and North Atlantic Council memoranda and summary records

on terrorism, as well as the situation in the Middle East). Special emphasis will be placed on NATO analysis of organizations based in the Middle East: PLO, PFLP, DFPL, PFLP-GC, the “Black June”, Hezbollah’s precursors, but also Libyan-sponsored terrorism. Specifically, the proposed paper examines several key questions: a) NATO’s attitudes towards the rise of Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab terrorist activities, b) NATO’s estimations about the rise and proliferation of fundamentalist forces in both Iran and certain Arab states, c) whether NATO analysts were able to assess accurately the rise of asymmetrical threats. NATO was, of course, a Cold-War institution, but it is important to assess whether (or to what extent) the ‘Cold War lens’ prevented its analysts to recognize new, and largely unforeseen, forms of asymmetrical threats.

Bridging the Academic-Practitioner Divide in Counter-Terrorism

Prof. Marianne van Leeuwen, University of Amsterdam

The aim of this presentation is to explore how terrorism and counter-terrorism influence one another. It seeks to identify appropriate responses by the state that neither over-react nor under-react. The problem with counterterrorism measures by governments is indeed that the mix of preventive and repressive measures may lead to substantial and serious violations of civil and human rights. This raises the question of identifying a tipping point between effective and counterproductive policies. Moreover, policymaking often occurs in a complex array of national and international actors with varying interests. Combining insights from academia and policymaking this presentation explores the core challenges and trade-offs in the making of counter-terrorist policies.

Synthesis of papers by Thibault Delamare

Panel 9
Theoretical Developments in Security Studies
Chair: Prof. Thierry Balzacq, University of Namur

The Procurement and Adoption of Innovations in Modern Naval Warfare
Aldo Carone, London School of Economics

Over the past century and a half war at sea has repeatedly changed. It is in this age of modern naval warfare that the major thinking on seapower has emerged. Central in the thought of the first naval theorists (e.g., Mahan and Corbett) is the idea that the control of sea-lines requires the adoption of all the appropriate measures vis-à-vis enemies. This may explain the rising tensions between the US and China over the South China Sea and leads to the following question: Why do navies adopt or not military innovations? In opposition to previous accounts emphasizing the causal role of organizational and financial factors, I suggest that this puzzle may be explained by the expected probability to win battles as assessed by rational top officers. The probability of victory is computed by combining data on one's own military effectiveness and that of potential or existing enemies. Their elaboration provides what I term Operational-Tactical Awareness Score. OTAS indicates how actors recognize their effectiveness vis-à-vis enemies and is inversely proportional to the probability of victory. My main argument is straightforward: the higher OTAS, the smaller the expected probability of victory, and the greater the probability to adopt military innovations. In my article I analyze a case – the Anglo-German naval competition before and during WWI – that not only represents an optimal test-bed for theories given its broad within-case variance, but also provides strong support for my argument.

The Book that Leaves Nothing to Chance: How The *Strategy of Conflict* and Its Legacy Normalized the Practice of Nuclear Threats
Dr. Benoît Pelopidas, Sciences Po Paris

Thomas C. Schelling's 1960 *Strategy of Conflict* remains one of the most referenced books in strategic studies (as of October 2016, the 1980 edition had been cited more than 14,314 times, 492 of them in 2016 alone), and its central notion of "the threat that leaves something to chance" is still defined as the heart of nuclear deterrence as a policy and communicative practice. The popularity of this book across theoretical and policy divides is puzzling however, given the ample criticism it received. In spite of those criticisms, Schelling's notion of "the threat that leaves something to chance" has now become an unavoidable reference including among strategists who disagree with core aspects of what this book proposes. In this essay, I address the puzzle of the popularity of *The Strategy of Conflict* in two ways: by tracing the theorizing practice of Schelling and its ambiguous treatment of the distinction between luck and uncertainty in the crafting of "the threat that leaves something to chance", and by following the reception of this ambiguity among nuclear strategists. This effort is based on textual analysis of the book itself as well as Schelling's correspondence, which I regard as central to his theorizing understood as a dialogical practice.

Empathetic Practices in International Security

Claire Yorke, King's College London

This paper deals with empathetic practices within international security, with a focus on diplomacy. It highlights the recent attention placed on the significance of empathy within diplomacy in public debates but questions what empathy looks like in practice. The concept of empathy, in its simplest form, is defined as an attempt to understand the perspectives, experiences, and feelings of another but it is distinct from sympathy and compassion. Recognizing the growing literature on empathy, the author briefly outlines the state of the field, and the way in which international relations scholarship spoke of emotions and empathy and its importance. Drawing on the role and practices of diplomacy and diplomats, examples of how empathy featured within diplomatic practice at different levels are examined. Finally, the author addresses the limitations of the idea of empathy, and argues that in spite of its potential value within diplomatic relations it interacted with, and was often constrained by, a number of different factors within the political space.

Tools, Concepts, and Weapons: Intellectual History and Strategic Studies

Dr. Grey Anderson, Sciences Po Paris

In recent years both intellectual history and strategic studies have witnessed calls for renewed attention to social theory. The two disciplines, however, have largely proceeded in mutual indifference to each other. Although strategic studies scholars have long debated the lessons to be learned from history, and critical currents have made an attempt to historicize key concepts, they have for the most part done so in isolation from developments within the historical profession. Intellectual historians, for their part, have increasingly branched out from their traditional focus on high philosophy to address a sweeping range of subjects: ideas of race and empire; law, government, and political economy; notions of self and family; and much else. Yet military affairs and questions of security and defense are conspicuous by their absence. This paper argues that the two fields share overlooked affinities. Michel Foucault's lectures and writing on security and governmentality – interpreted with a view to reheating Cold War tensions in the late '70s and early '80s – furnish a case study for disciplinary cross-fertilization.

Synthesis of papers by Cyrille Thiébaud

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