

JUST RELEASED: ATT&CK for Industrial Control Systems

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Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.^[1] The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, and manufacturing sectors.^[2] [3]

ID: G0027
Associated Groups: TG-3390, Emissary Panda, BRONZE UNION, APT27, Iron Tiger, LuckyMouse
Version: 1.2
Created: 31 May 2017
Last Modified: 15 October 2019

Associated Group Descriptions

| Name | Description |
|----------------|--------------------|
| TG-3390 | [1] [4] [6] |
| Emissary Panda | [8] [4] [3] [6][5] |
| BRONZE UNION | [2] [4] |
| APT27 | [4] [3] [6] |
| Iron Tiger | [6] |
| LuckyMouse | [3] [6] |

Techniques Used

ATT&CK Navigator Layers

| Domain | ID | Name | Use |
|------------|-------|---|--|
| Enterprise | T1087 | Account Discovery | Threat Group-3390 has used net user to conduct internal discovery of systems. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection | Threat Group-3390 ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1088 | Bypass User Account Control | A Threat Group-3390 tool can use a public UAC bypass method to elevate privileges. ^[4] |
| Enterprise | T1059 | Command-Line Interface | Threat Group-3390 has used command-line interfaces for execution. ^{[2][5]} |
| Enterprise | T1043 | Commonly Used Port | C2 traffic for most Threat Group-3390 tools occurs over Port Numbers 53, 80, and 443. ^[1] |
| Enterprise | T1003 | Credential Dumping | Threat Group-3390 actors have used gsecdump and a modified version of Mimikatz called Wrapikatz to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers. ^{[1][2]} |
| Enterprise | T1002 | Data Compressed | Threat Group-3390 has used RAR to compress, encrypt, and password-protect files prior to exfiltration. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1022 | Data Encrypted | Threat Group-3390 has used RAR to compress, encrypt, and password-protect files prior to exfiltration. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | Threat Group-3390 ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1074 | Data Staged | Threat Group-3390 has staged encrypted archives for exfiltration on Internet-facing servers that had previously been compromised with China Chopper. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1030 | Data Transfer Size Limits | Threat Group-3390 actors have split RAR files for exfiltration into parts. ^[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | During execution, Threat Group-3390 malware deobfuscates and decompresses code that was encoded with Metasploit's shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as compressed with LZNT1 compression. ^[3] |
| Enterprise | T1089 | Disabling Security Tools | Threat Group-3390 has used apcmd.exe to disable logging on a victim server. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1038 | DLL Search Order Hijacking | Threat Group-3390 has performed DLL search order hijacking to execute their payload. ^[4] |
| Enterprise | T1073 | DLL Side-Loading | Threat Group-3390 has used DLL side-loading, including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants in which the DLL acts as a stub loader that loads and executes the shell code. ^{[1][2][3][5]} |
| Enterprise | T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | Threat Group-3390 has extensively used strategic web compromises to target victims. ^{[1][3]} |
| Enterprise | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | Threat Group-3390 has exploited the Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2019-0604. ^[5] |
| Enterprise | T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Threat Group-3390 has used CVE-2014-6324 to escalate privileges. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services | Threat Group-3390 has exploited MS17-101 to move laterally to other systems on the network. ^[5] |
| Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services | Threat Group-3390 actors look for and use VPN profiles during an operation to access the network using external VPN services. ^[1] |
| Enterprise | T1107 | File Deletion | Threat Group-3390 has deleted existing logs and exfiltrated file archives from a victim. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1056 | Input Capture | Threat Group-3390 actors installed a credential logger on Microsoft Exchange servers. Threat Group-3390 also leveraged the reconnaissance framework, ScanBox, to capture keystrokes. ^{[1][6][3]} |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | A Threat Group-3390 tool can create a new Registry key under HKEY_CURRENT_USERSoftwareClasses . ^[4] |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Scanning | Threat Group-3390 actors use the Hunter tool to conduct network service discovery for vulnerable systems. ^{[1][5]} |
| Enterprise | T1126 | Network Share Connection Removal | Threat Group-3390 has detached network shares after exfiltrating files, likely to evade detection. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1050 | New Service | A Threat Group-3390 tool can create a new service, naming it after the config information, to gain persistence. ^[4] |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | A Threat Group-3390 tool can encrypt payloads using XOR. Threat Group-3390 malware is also obfuscated using Metasploit's shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as compressed with LZNT1 compression. ^{[4][3][5]} |
| Enterprise | T1086 | PowerShell | Threat Group-3390 has used PowerShell for execution. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | A Threat Group-3390 tool can spawn svchost.exe and inject the payload into that process. ^{[4][3]} |
| Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry | A Threat Group-3390 tool can read and decrypt stored Registry values. ^[4] |
| Enterprise | T1108 | Redundant Access | Threat Group-3390 has deployed backup web shells and obtained OWA account credentials during intrusions that it subsequently used to attempt to regain access when evicted from a victim network. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1060 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | A Threat Group-3390 tool can add the binary's path to the Registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to add persistence. ^[4] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Remote File Copy | After re-establishing access to a victim network, Threat Group-3390 actors download tools including gsecdump and WCE that are staged temporarily on websites that were previously compromised but never used. ^[1] |
| Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery | Threat Group-3390 has used the net view command. ^[4] |
| Enterprise | T1053 | Scheduled Task | Threat Group-3390 actors use at to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install HTTPBrowser or PlugX on other victims on a network. ^[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071 | Standard Application Layer Protocol | Threat Group-3390 malware has used HTTP for C2. ^[3] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | Threat Group-3390 actors use nbtscan to discover vulnerable systems. ^[1] |
| Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | Threat Group-3390 has used net use to conduct internal discovery of systems. The group has also used quser.exe to identify existing RDP sessions on a victim. ^[2] |
| Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | Threat Group-3390 actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks. ^[1] |
| Enterprise | T1100 | Web Shell | Threat Group-3390 has used a variety of Web shells. ^[5] |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | A Threat Group-3390 tool can use WMI to execute a binary. ^[4] |
| Enterprise | T1028 | Windows Remote Management | Threat Group-3390 has used WinRM to enable remote execution. ^[2] |

Software

| ID | Name | References | Techniques |
|-------|---------------------------|---|--|
| S0073 | ASPXSpy | Threat Group-3390 has used a modified version of ASPXSpy called ASPXTool. ^[1] | Web Shell |
| S0020 | China Chopper | [1] [2] [4] [5] | Brute Force, Command-Line Interface, Data from Local System, File and Directory Discovery, Network Service Scanning, Remote File Copy, Scripting, Software Packing, Standard Application Layer Protocol, Timestamp, Web Shell |
| S0032 | gh0st RAT | [7] | Command-Line Interface, Commonly Used Port, DLL Side-Loading, File Deletion, Indicator Removal on Host, Input Capture, New Service, Process Discovery, Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Remote File Copy, Rundll32, Screen Capture, Standard Cryptographic Protocol |
| S0008 | gsecdump | [1] | Credential Dumping |
| S0070 | HTTPBrowser | [1] [2] [4] | Command-Line Interface, Commonly Used Port, DLL Search Order Hijacking, DLL Side-Loading, File and Directory Discovery, File Deletion, Input Capture, Masquerading, Obfuscated Files or Information, Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Remote File Copy, Standard Application Layer Protocol |
| S0398 | HyperBro | [5] [3] [6] | DLL Side-Loading, Execution through API, File Deletion, Process Injection, Remote File Copy, Screen Capture, Service Execution, Standard Application Layer Protocol, System Service Discovery |
| S0357 | Impacket | [5] | Credential Dumping, Kerberoasting, LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and Relay, Network Sniffing, Service Execution, Windows Management Instrumentation |
| S0100 | ipconfig | [2] | System Network Configuration Discovery |
| S0002 | Mimikatz | Threat Group-3390 has used a modified version of Mimikatz called Wrapikatz. ^{[2][4]} | Account Manipulation, Credential Dumping, Credentials in Files, DCShadow, Pass the Hash, Pass the Ticket, Private Keys, Security Support Provider, SID-History Injection |
| S0039 | Net | [2] | Account Discovery, Create Account, Network Share Connection Removal, Network Share Discovery, Password Policy Discovery, Permission Groups Discovery, Remote System Discovery, Service Execution, System Network Connections Discovery, System Service Discovery, System Time Discovery, Windows Admin Shares |
| S0072 | OwaAuth | [1] [2] | Data Encrypted, DLL Side-Loading, File and Directory Discovery, Input Capture, Masquerading, Standard Application Layer Protocol, Timestamp, Web Shell |
| S0013 | PlugX | [1] [2] [4] | Command-Line Interface, Commonly Used Port, Custom Command and Control Protocol, Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information, DLL Side-Loading, Execution through API, File and Directory Discovery, Input Capture, Masquerading, Modify Existing Service, Modify Registry, Multiband Communication, Network Share Discovery, New Service, Process Discovery, Query Registry, Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder, Remote File Copy, Screen Capture, Standard Application Layer Protocol, Standard Non-Application Layer Protocol, System Network Connections Discovery, Trusted Developer Utilities, Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion, Web Service |
| S0006 | pwdump | [5] | Credential Dumping |
| S0005 | Windows Credential Editor | [1] | Credential Dumping |
| S0412 | ZxShell | [7] | Access Token Manipulation, Command-Line Interface, Commonly Used Port, Connection Proxy, Create Account, Disabling Security Tools, Endpoint Denial of Service, File and Directory Discovery, File Deletion, Hooking, Indicator Removal on Host, Input Capture, Network Service Scanning, New Service, Process Discovery, Process Injection, Query Registry, Remote Desktop Protocol, Remote File Copy, Remote Services, Rundll32, Screen Capture, Standard Application Layer Protocol, System Information Discovery, System Owner/User Discovery, System Service Discovery, Uncommonly Used Port, Video Capture |

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