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
Why Joe Sandbox

Technology

Blog

Company


Deep Malware Analysis
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Static File Info		
General		
File type:	Rich Text Format data, version 1, unknown character set	
Entropy (8bit):	4.652722413777991	
TrID:	 Rich Text Format (5005/1) 55.56% Rich Text Format (4004/1) 44.44% 	
File name:	DoNotOpen2.doc	
File size:	261090	
MD5:	f12fc711529b48bcef52c5ca0a52335a	
SHA1:	5f89a6b2f1f38b581c65e9a1117c43a3060bfdc1	
SHA256:	d3fc69a9f2ae2c446434abbfbe1693ef0f81a5da0a7f39d27c80d85f4a49c411	
SHA512:	dcec5673653561354867fa1586a60899e4fd952fd693922aaba86c765710cd32186ca7c1	
File Content Preview:	{\rtf1\adeflang1025\ansi\ansicpg936\uc2\adeff0\deff0\stshfdbch13\stshfloch0\stshfhich0\ 2052\themelangcs0{\fonttbl{\f0\fman\fcharset0\fprq2{*\panose 02020603050405}	

CVE-2018-0802

We start the analysis by having a look at the behavior graph and acknowledge that the process EQNEDT32.EXE was started among Winword.exe:





This process is the Microsoft Office Equation Editor. In November 2017 the security company Embedi detected an exploit in EQNEDT32.EXE which later got the identification CVE-2017-11882. Microsoft patched the flaw in November.

So, is Elise using this exploit? To answer this question we had a detailed look at the exploit itself. The outcome: no it is not CVE-2017-11882 but rather CVE-2018-0802. CVE-2018-0802? This a second exploit also included in EQNEDT32.EXE which was detected in later December.

We extracted the trampoline and shellcode:


The code renames and loads the PE file (named a.b) previously dropped by Word. The newly loaded code is then injected into IExplorer.exe where the main payload is executed:





Sandbox Evasions

Elise performs a variety of sandbox checks in In IExplorer:



VMware backdoor check

Function 004F27E5, Relevance: 28.1, APIs: 10, Strings: 6, Instructions: 94 REGISTRY


APIs

- RegOpenKeyExW.ADVAPI32(80000002,SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Disk\Enum,00000000,00020019,?)
- GetLastError.KERNEL32 ref: 004F2824
- printf.MSVCRT ref: 004F2830
- memset.MSVCRT ref: 004F2852
- RegQueryValueExW.ADVAPI32(?,004F646C,00000000,00000000,?,?), ref: 004F286C
- wcsstr.MSVCRT ref: 004F288B
- wcsstr.MSVCRT ref: 004F28A2
- wcsstr.MSVCRT ref: 004F28B8
- wcsstr.MSVCRT ref: 004F28CE
- RegCloseKey.ADVAPI32(?), ref: 004F28DE
 - Part of subcall function 004F32A0: SetUnhandledExceptionFilter.KERNEL32(00000000), ref: 004F3CE2
 - Part of subcall function 004F32A0: UnhandledExceptionFilter.KERNEL32(004F6190), ref: 004F3CED
 - Part of subcall function 004F32A0: GetCurrentProcess.KERNEL32(C0000409), ref: 004F3CF8
 - Part of subcall function 004F32A0: TerminateProcess.KERNEL32(00000000), ref: 004F3CFF
 - Part of subcall function 004F3197: _errno.MSVCRT ref: 004F31A4
 - Part of subcall function 004F3197: _wcslwr.MSVCRT ref: 004F31D6

Strings

- virtualhd, xrefs: 004F28C8
- vmware, xrefs: 004F2885
- 0x3A RegOpenKeyExW Disk Failed-%d, xrefs: 004F282B
- qemu, xrefs: 004F289C
- SYSTEM\ControlSet001\services\Disk\Enum, xrefs: 004F280D
- vbox, xrefs: 004F28B2


Disk Name Check



Check for various Analysis Tools

Function 004F2A05, Relevance: 46.0, APIs: 7, Strings: 19, Instructions: 482 APIs CreateToolhelp32Snapshot.KERNEL32(00000002,00000000), ref. 004F2A2A memset.MSVCRT ref: 004F2A51 memset.MSVCRT ref: 004F2A6C Process32FirstW.KERNEL32(?,?), ref: 004F2A7E __swprintf_I.LIBCMT ref: 004F2AA4 Part of subcall function 004F3197: _errno.MSVCRT ref: 004F31A4 Part of subcall function 004F3197: wcslwr.MSVCRT ref: 004F31D6 Process32NextW.KERNEL32(?,?), ref: 004F2F6A CloseHandle.KERNEL32(?), ref: 004F2F81 Part of subcall function 004F32A0: SetUnhandledExceptionFilter.KERNEL32(00000000), ref: 004F3CE2 Part of subcall function 004F32A0: UnhandledExceptionFilter.KERNEL32(004F6190), ref: 004F3CED Part of subcall function 004F32A0: GetCurrentProcess.KERNEL32(C0000409), ref: 004F3CF8 Part of subcall function 004F32A0: TerminateProcess.KERNEL32(00000000), ref: 004F3CFF Strings · irise.exe, xrefs: 004F2C95 vmupgradehelper.exe, xrefs: 004F2BA9 windbg.exe, xrefs: 004F2E20 Syser.exe, xrefs: 004F2EA8 Reashot exe. xrefs: 004F2D98 SandboxieDcomLaunch.exe, xrefs: 004F2F23 vmtools.exe, xrefs: 004F2C5A IrisSvc.exe, xrefs: 004F2CCC vmwaretrav.exe, xrefs: 004F2B6E SandboxieRpcSs.exe, xrefs: 004F2EEC vmwareuser.exe, xrefs: 004F2B33 vboxtray.exe, xrefs: 004F2ABD vboxservice.exe, xrefs: 004F2AF8 · wireshark.exe, xrefs: 004F2D10 vmacthlp.exe, xrefs: 004F2C1F ollydbg.exe, xrefs: 004F2DDC ZxSniffer.exe, xrefs: 004F2D54 vmtoolsd.exe, xrefs: 004F2BE4 · PEBrowseDbg.exe, xrefs: 004F2E64

Process Check



Mac Address Check

Payloads

After passing all the sandbox checks Elise creates an autostart key:



Thanks to Hybrid Code Analysis we can also detect all malicious functionalities:

Function 0051129D, Relevance: 26.4, APIS: 10, Strings: 5, Instructions: 191 (REGISTRY APIs memset MSVCRT ref: 00511301 Part of subcall function 00511124: memset.MSVCRT ref: 0051115A Part of subcall function 00511124: RegEnumKeyW.ADVAPI32(80000003,00000000,?,00000104), ref: 0051117D Part of subcall function 00511124: wcsncmp.MSVCRT(S-1-5-21,?,00000008), ref: 00511199 Part of subcall function 00511124: wcsstr.MSVCRT ref: 005111B1 Part of subcall function 00511124: memset.MSVCRT ref: 005111CF Part of subcall function 00511124: RegOpenKeyExW.ADVAPI32(80000003,?,00000000,00020019,?), ref: 0051120 RegQueryValueExW.ADVAPI32(00000000, ProxyEnable,00000000,00000000,?,?,?,?,00000000), ref. 00511345 RegQueryValueExW.ADVAPI32(?,ProxyServer,00000000,00000000,?,?), ref. 00511370 RegCloseKey.ADVAPI32(?), ref: 00511378 _swprintf_I.LIBCMT ref: 00511398 Part of subcall function 00519317: _errno.MSVCRT ref: 00519324 Part of subcall function 00519317: _wcslwr.MSVCRT ref: 00519356 wcsstr.MSVCRT ref: 005113B9 wcsstr.MSVCRT ref: 005113D3 wcsstr.MSVCRT ref: 005113EE memset.MSVCRT ref: 00511412 Part of subcall function 0051A9BB: _errno.MSVCRT ref: 0051A9D3 Part of subcall function 0051A9BB: _errno.MSVCRT ref: 0051AA10 __swprintf_I.LIBCMT ref: 005114C2 Part of subcall function 00518133: memset.MSVCRT ref: 00518179 Part of subcall function 00518133: GetLocalTime.KERNEL32(?,?,?,?), ref: 00518188 Part of subcall function 00518133: ___swprintf_I.LIBCMT ref: 005181D0 Part of subcall function 00518133: memset.MSVCRT ref: 0051821C Part of subcall function 00518133: WideCharToMultiByte.KERNEL32(00000000,00000000,7,000000FF,7,0000C8) Part of subcall function 00518133: CreateFileA.KERNEL32(C:\Users\user~1\AppData\Loca\Temp\FXSAPIDebugL Part of subcall function 00518133: GetFileSize.KERNEL32(00000000,00000000), ref: 0051826B Part of subcall function 00518133: SetEndOfFile.KERNEL32(00000000), ref: 00518280 Part of subcall function 00518133: SetFilePointer.KERNEL32(00000000.00000000.00000000.00000000. Part of subcall function 00518133: WriteFile.KERNEL32(00000000,?,?,?,00000000), ref. 005182CB Part of subcall function 00518133: CloseHandle.KERNEL32(00000000), ref: 005182D2 Part of subcall function 0051A460: SetUnhandledExceptionFilter.KERNEL32(00000000), ref: 0051B495 Part of subcall function 0051A460: UnhandledExceptionFilter.KERNEL32(0051E3C8), ref: 0051B4A0 Part of subcall function 0051A460: GetCurrentProcess.KERNEL32(C0000409), ref: 0051B4AB Part of subcall function 0051A460: TerminateProcess.KERNEL32(00000000), ref: 0051B4B2 Strings Get IEProxy %s., xrefs: 005114CE ProxyServer, xrefs: 00511365 %s=%s://%s, xrefs: 005114B3 ProxyEnable, xrefs: 00511335 %s=, xrefs: 00511390

Add a Proxy to Internet Explorer

 Falt of Subcall fulliction oughtage. _ethio.ivio.vcit rel. uughaand Part of subcall function 0051A9BB: _errno.MSVCRT ref: 0051A9D3 Part of subcall function 0051A9BB: _errno.MSVCRT ref: 0051AA1C · fgetws.MSVCRT ref: 005117B1 wcsstr.MSVCRT ref: 005117C6 wcsstr.MSVCRT ref: 0051185A wtoi.MSVCRT ref: 00511881 feof.MSVCRT ref: 00511893 fclose.MSVCRT ref: 005118A7 ___swprintf_I.LIBCMT ref: 005118E3 Part of subcall function 00518133: memset.MSVCRT ref: 00518179 Part of subcall function 00518133: GetLocalTime.KERNEL32(?,?,?,?), ref: 00518188 Part of subcall function 00518133: ___swprintf_I.LIBCMT ref: 005181D0 Part of subcall function 00518133: memset.MSVCRT ref: 0051821C Part of subcall function 00518133: WideCharToMultiByte.KERNEL32(00000000,0000 Part of subcall function 00518133: CreateFileA.KERNEL32(C:\Users\user~1\AppData\) Part of subcall function 00518133: GetFile Size.KERNEL32(00000000,00000000), ref: Part of subcall function 00518133: SetEndOfFile.KERNEL32(00000000), ref: 0051828 Part of subcall function 00518133: SetFilePointer.KERNEL32(00000000,000000000,00 Part of subcall function 00518133: WriteFile.KERNEL32(00000000,?,?,?,00000000), r Part of subcall function 00518133: CloseHandle.KERNEL32(00000000), ref: 005182D Strings user_pref("network.proxy.http", ", xrefs: 005116A2 Get FireFoxProxy %s, xrefs: 005118E9 user_pref("network.proxy.ssl_port", , xrefs: 005116D5 HTTPS, xrefs: 0051172D user_pref("network.proxy.ssl", ", xrefs: 005116C0 profiles.ini, xrefs: 005115C6 Profile%d, xrefs: 005115D9 HTTP, xrefs: 005116E6 \Mozilla\Firefox\, xrefs: 0051159B \prefs.js, xrefs: 0051161F %s=%s://%s:%d, xrefs: 005118DB Path, xrefs: 005115FC user_pref("network.proxy.http_port", , xrefs: 005116B2

Add a Proxy to Firefox

Finally, in function 514D05, 5159AF and 515486 we find the download, upload and command execution handlers. Elise can collect and upload the following data:

- CPU Usage
- · Ram (size/free)
- Disk space (size/free)
- Windows Version
- Username
- Locale
- Timezone
- SID
- · List of tasks
- · List of network adapters
- · List of files on Desktop

Final Words

Elise is a very advanced piece of malware using for its distribution only the latest exploits. Before the main payload is executed many different Sandbox evasions are performed. The payload and the communication code is injected into IExplorer likely bypassing PFW and HIPS.

Interested in trying out Joe Sandbox? Register for free at Joe Sandbox Cloud Basic or contact us for an in-depth technical demo!

Full Joe Sandbox Analysis Report.

Joe Security LLC

business parc Reinach Christoph Merian-Ring 11 4153 Reinach Switzerland

Contact







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