

05 Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)



^ not this

Engr 399/599: Hardware Security
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Adapted from: Mark Tehranipoor of University of Florida

Course Website

engr599.github.io

Write that down!


Agenda

- Review PUFs
- Finish PUFs & Start TRNG?
- Project Extension! -> This Friday! 2/21/24 Midnight!
- P2 Assigned Monday!

Side Quest!


Unpatchable Hardware flaw in Apple Silicon!

PACMAN - <https://thehackernews.com/2022/06/mit-researchers-discover-new-flaw-in.html>




Applications – Authentication

- Same challenges should not be used to prevent the man-in-the-middle attacks




Application – Cryptographic Key Generation

- The instability is a problem
- Some crypto protocols (e.g., RSA) require specific mathematical properties that random numbers generated by PUFs do not have
- How can we use PUFs to generate crypto keys?
 - Error correction process: initialization and regeneration
 - There should be a one-way function that can generate the key from the PUF output




Crypto Key Generation

- Initialization: a PUF output is generated and error correcting code computes the syndrome (public info)
- Regeneration: PUF uses the syndrome from the initial phase to correct changes in the output
- Clearly, the syndrome reveals information about the circuit output and introduces vulnerabilities



Red/Black Keys

Use PUFs to hide the on-chip key!



Reliability and Security Metrics

- *Inter-chip variation*: How many PUF output bits are different between PUF A and PUF B? This is a measure of uniqueness. If the PUF produces uniformly distributed independent random bits, the inter-chip variation should be 50% on average.
- *Intra-chip (environmental) variation*: How many PUF output bits change when re-generated again from a single PUF with or without environmental changes? This indicates the *reproducibility* of the PUF outputs. Ideally, the intra-chip variation should be 0%.

Configurable Ring Oscillator





Table 1. Frequency differences in a configurable RO pair

$c_1c_2c_3$	Frequency of ROs in CLB i	Frequency of ROs in CLB j	Δf
000	f_0	f'_0	$ f_0 - f'_0 $
001	f_1	f'_1	$ f_1 - f'_1 $
010	f_2	f'_2	$ f_2 - f'_2 $
011	f_3	f'_3	$ f_3 - f'_3 $
100	f_4	f'_4	$ f_4 - f'_4 $
101	f_5	f'_5	$ f_5 - f'_5 $
110	f_6	f'_6	$ f_6 - f'_6 $
111	f_7	f'_7	$ f_7 - f'_7 $


- The pair which has the maximum difference in frequency in CRO is selected.

Configurable Ring Oscillator




- PUF – Physically Unclonable Function
 - RO – Ring Oscillator
 - MUX – Multiplexer
 - SRAM – Static Random Access Memory
 - LUT – Look Up Table
 - FF – Flip Flop
-
- Types of PUFs:
 - ❑ Arbiter PUF – Signal races between MUXes
 - ❑ RO PUF – Signal generated from ROs to trigger counter
 - ❑ Butterfly PUF – Exciting a cross-coupled circuit


The Arbiter PUF




The Arbiter PUF




The Arbiter PUF




The Arbiter PUF




The Arbiter PUF




Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF




Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF



Ring Oscillator (RO) PUF



RO Place and Routing




wi[1]


Name	Dir	BEL Pin	Cell	Net Delay (ps)
I0	Input	A6	puf_design_i/puf8_0/inst/RO0/wi_inferred_i_6	154
O	Output	O6	puf_design_i/puf8_0/inst/RO0/wi_inferred_i_7	0

wi[1]

Name	Dir	BEL Pin	Cell	Net Delay (ps)
I0	Input	A6	puf_design_i/puf8_0/inst/RO1/wi_inferred_i_6	151
O	Output	O6	puf_design_i/puf8_0/inst/RO1/wi_inferred_i_7	0




RO Frequency



14 ROs have this Waveform

2 Did not appear (Currently Troubleshooting)

RO Place and Routing




M_INST_0				
Name	Dir	BEL Pin	Net	Net Delay (ps)
I0	Input	A5	puf_design_i/puf8_0/inst/m1/m0/m0/m0/d0	1959
I1	Input	A2	puf_design_i/puf8_0/inst/m1/m0/m0/m0/s	3840
I2	Input	A3	puf_design_i/puf8_0/inst/m1/m0/m0/m0/d1	1967
O	Output	O6	puf_design_i/puf8_0/inst/m1/m0/m0/m0/M	0

Butterfly PUF

Cross Coupled
DFFs.


Physical 'race
condition' easy to
constrain compared
to Arbiter.

Less machinery
needed than RO
PUF. (Less
resources).




The Butterfly PUF

PRE	CLR	CE	D	Q
0	1	X	X	1
1	0	X	X	0
0	0	X	X	X
1	1	1	1	1
1	1	1	0	0
1	1	0	X	




Three Primary PUF Types


Arbiter: racing signals using MUXes (path delay)



RO: counting signals using path delay.




Butterfly: Activating FFs using path delay.



DRAM PUF

Relies on biases in
DRAM cell startup
value.

Effectively isolating
the leakage
characteristics of cell
capacitance.



What makes a good PUF?

1. Uniqueness!

- a. Ideally every challenge should elicit a single unique response.
- b. High Delta between two different challenge/response pairs (eg 50% hamming distance).

2. Difficult to model!

- a. resilient against ML / statistical methods.

3. Stable!

- a. stable over lifetime/age.
- b. stable against temp/environmental stimulus.

So what are PUFs actually useful for?

1. Authentication!

- a. If you know the unique challenge response (C/R) pairs, you can interrogate the PUF to ensure it is 'yours'.

2. Key Entropy!

- a. If you know C/R pairs, AND have a stable/reliable PUF, it can add entropy to key generation procedures.

3. Hiding/Obfuscating data!

- a. If you know your C/R pairs, a PUF can allow you to store information on chip without worrying about physically storing a key in silicon.

What Do PUFs Struggle With

1. Communication

- a. It is difficult to implement a PUF when the purpose is to secure a two way communication channel. More attack vectors to deal with (CPUF).
- b. Not impossible, but requires extra machinery (more attack vectors!).

2. Key Generation

- a. Depending on a PUF for the entire key generation process can be risky due to reliability and stability concerns.

3. Difficult to Implement

- a. Implementation depends on isolating physical features of the target. Requires significant expertise in the target medium.