

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire

ISSN: 1350-7486 (Print) 1469-8293 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cerh20

Metternich and the Ottoman reform movement

Miroslav Sˇedivy´

To cite this article: Miroslav Sˇedivy´ (2011) Metternich and the Ottoman reform movement, European Review of History: Revue europeenne d'histoire, 18:4, 427-441, DOI: 10.1080/13507486.2011.590182

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13507486.2011.590182

European Review of History—Revue européenne d'histoire
Vol. 18, No. 4, August 2011, 427–441

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Metternich and the Ottoman reform movement

Miroslav Šedivý*

Department of Anthropology and Historical Science, Faculty of Philosophy and Arts, University of West Bohemia, Pilsen, Czech Republic

(*Received 26 August 2010; final version received 23 February 2011*)

The goal of the paper is to illuminate Metternich's attitude towards possibilities of reform in the Ottoman Empire and the reasons for his interest and practical steps taken in this matter. The paper attempts to provide an accurate account of an important, but until now, entirely ignored, aspect of Metternich's diplomacy and offer further proof that Metternich was not the benighted reactionary depicted in the nineteenth-century historiography, but a conservative keenly aware that the conservative order could survive only if reformed so as to adapt it to the realities of a post-revolutionary age.

Keywords: Metternich; Austria; Ottoman Empire; Reform Movement; Mahmud II; Reshid Pasha

The destruction of the Janissaries in 1826 started a new phase of reforms within the Ottoman Empire which, not surprisingly, attracted the attention of European cabinets. The Great Powers were both curious and anxious to take advantage of the effort to regenerate the Ottoman Empire in order to increase their own influence in the Near East, attempted to interfere with the reform movement and regulate its direction through their advice or the employment of European advisors in the sultan's service.

Whereas the attitudes of Great Britain, Russia or France have already been researched,[1] surprisingly little attention has been paid to Austria – after all, a Power connected to the Ottoman Empire by a longer frontier than any other European country, as well as by extensive economic and political interests. In fact, the director of Austrian foreign policy at this time, Chancellor Clemens Wenzel Lothar Nepomuk Prince von Metternich-Winneburg, was deeply interested in the internal situation of Austria's weak southeastern neighbour. No book or essay has been written on the subject, and, consequently, even the latest published surveys of the Austrian presence in the Levant contain no word on the topic.[2] Even worse, when a historian touched on the problem in the past, such as the French historian, M. Sabry for example, he based his opinions more upon rumours and groundless assertions than any appropriate sources; his conclusions correspond with the generally held view of the Chancellor as simply a reactionary statesman campaigning against any progress.

This paper seeks to illuminate Metternich's attitude towards the possibilities of reform in the Ottoman Empire and the reasons for his interest and practical steps taken in this matter; it also seeks to challenge the view that Metternich was simply opposed to changes in the Near East, as supposed by French historian M. Sabry, who claimed that the new

*Email: mireksedivy@seznam.cz

ISSN 1350-7486 print/ISSN 1469-8293 online

DOI: 10.1080/13507486.2011.590182
http://www.informaworld.com

course of reforms pursued in Egypt and Syria contributed to Metternich's antipathy towards Mohammed Ali. It should have been of concern to Metternich that the Egyptian governor 'had introduced a new spirit into all provinces of the Ottoman Empire placed under his administration'.[3] Nevertheless, as will be shown, he was not an enemy of the Ottoman reform movement as such, even though his conservative disposition led to the criticism of some aspects of it, and it must be said that his opinions of this issue based upon his conservative *Weltanschauung* were identical to those he held in connection with the reforms in the Habsburg Monarchy and Italian countries.[4] What Alan Reinerman wrote about Metternich's attitude towards the changes in the Apennines is basically also applicable to those concerning the Ottoman Empire: 'His approach to reform was basically administrative in nature, not political. He hoped that the adoption of the administrative, financial, judicial, and humanitarian innovations of the revolutionary era would be sufficient to satisfy public opinion so that revolutionary political innovations would no longer be demanded. A modern, efficient administration responsive to popular needs, humane and equitable laws, a sound financial system, a paternalistic welfare policy for the poor, governmental encouragement of economic development – these and similar measures which would promote popular contentment without weakening royal authority were the core of Metternich's reform program'.[5]

The reason why Metternich was deeply interested in the conditions of Austria's weak southeastern neighbour lay not only in the power and economic interests of the Habsburg Empire in this area; it was his nature to collect the maximum amount of information possible to be able to analyse foreign policies as well as the internal situations of the major and minor players on the chessboard of European diplomacy. At this time, the Ottoman Empire belonged to the latter group, but its preservation was one of the highest priorities of Austria's diplomatic policy.[6] Moreover, the reforms pursued in this part of the world were an interesting phenomenon that Metternich could not ignore, in particular when the conditions of the 'sick man on the Bosphorus' significantly affected the relations between the Great Powers and thus the course of events on the Continent.

In the Chancellery in Vienna, the general attitude towards the Levant was not based upon any idealistic preconceptions, but a strict analysis of the information that was gathered by Metternich in several ways. The first and most important source was the reports dispatched not only by Austrian but also Prussian and other agents residing in the Ottoman territory. The documents of non-Austrian diplomats were obtained either through their voluntary handover or their interception by the Austrian *Cabinet Noir*. Second, Metternich discussed this topic with Austrian as well as with European diplomats, orientalists and travellers. He did so in the Chancellery as well as in his palace, where, generally after coming home in the evening and because of his dislike for idle gossip, he usually raised topics of practical interest to him, the situation of the Ottoman Empire among them. The participants in such soirees could express their opinions freely. The most significant Austrians involved in these discussions were Metternich's close friend and collaborator Friedrich von Gentz, internuncios Franz von Ottenfels and Bartolomäus von Stürmer, Orientalist and Austrian envoy in Athens Anton Prokesch von Osten, sometimes even Erzherzog Johann, who was deeply interested in the topic, and Joseph Hammer von Purgstall – although he attended infrequently owing to his strained relationship with Metternich. Finally, Metternich tried to gain accurate knowledge of the real situation prevailing in the East by reading books on the topic. Some of them with his remarks in the margins can be still found in the library of his chateau in Königswart.[7]

All of these 'information channels' led Metternich to the belief that the situation of the Ottoman Empire resembled a body suffering from a chronic and incurable illness.[8]

The many blows to which it was exposed in the past like wars and upheavals could not seriously endanger a healthy person, but they had to have fatal consequences for an incurable man,[9] and consequently, any violent concussion could lead to this patient's death within 24 hours.[10] In the words of a builder, he considered the Ottoman Empire to be an 'old and creaky edifice perforated with oversized doors and windows that could come crashing down from day to day after the first delivered blow'.[11]

This scarcely optimistic judgment of the lamentable situation of the Ottoman Empire was made not only owing to his knowledge of its economic, administrative and military weakness, but also, and in particular, because of the reports from Austrian and Prussian diplomats in Constantinople revealing the Ottomans' weak sense of identification with their own state, their negligible eagerness to take part in the reformatory process and their lack of will to face difficult challenges, as was proved at times of danger. They showed almost no willingness to defend the capital when the Russians or Egyptians were practically knocking at its gates, the former in 1829, and the latter twice in the 1830s. In these difficult situations, general apathy prevailed among them, between commoners as well as the elite, and Sultan Mahmud II could not count upon their patriotism to support his unsteady throne.[12]

The sad situation of the Ottoman society is underlined by the fact that the government did not try very hard to change this fatalism for fear that with an attempt to raise national enthusiasm, it would lose the control over the course of events.[13] The apprehension of its own people's disloyalty was not without foundation, because in difficult times, complaints about the point of any change at the top of the state apparatus – including the ruler – appeared in society, even among the conservative bodies (*Ulema*s). One cannot wonder that even the Ottoman forces enjoyed the scant confidence of their monarch, and sometimes they even were not sent against the enemy for fear they would desert. This anxiety proved to be entirely justifiable in the summer of 1839, when a considerable part of the army did desert and almost the entire fleet defected.[14]

The deep crisis of the state system and society, whose members themselves sometimes did not expect their Empire to last long and who even asked foreigners how many years they gave to its existence, whether six, five or even less,[15] left nobody at the Chancellery in Ballhausplatz in any doubt that reforms were necessary; Metternich was in no way a man to oppose such reforms. However, since he believed that the problems of the Ottoman Empire did not lie only in that it had fallen behind the West in technology but also in the general degeneration of the whole of its society, he held the view that the changes could not be only cosmetic and that merely adopting the technical and civilising achievements of the West was insufficient.[16]

According to Metternich, the principal goal of reforms was to be the regeneration of Ottoman society. Consistent with his conservative thinking, he maintained that the sultan had to pursue reforms with regard for history and traditions, particularly with regard for the religion that was the ideological basis of his power and fundamental link between him and his subjects – in other words, the crucial bolt holding the Empire together.[17] In his opinion, any attempts to intrude upon Ottoman customs, religious principles and practices as determined in the Koran – in other words, encroachments on the traditional way of life of Ottoman society – was the chief reason for 'the lack of energy in which the Mussulman nation finds itself'.[18] Continuing in this way had to end in inevitable ruin because, as the prince declared, 'ashes do not kindle'.[19]

Consequently, each serious offence against Ottoman traditions and customs met with Metternich's disagreement. The model example of such an unwelcome event was the occasion of the evening party held by the British ambassador in Constantinople, Sir Robert

Gordon, on the British warship *Blonde* on 4 November 1829, shortly after the end of the Russian-Ottoman war. The *soirée* passed off under the flags of the five Great Powers and the Ottoman banner in a highly friendly manner, when the most prominent Ottoman dignitaries, trying to show evidence of their goodwill, conformed to the habits of Europeans and, with the exception of eating pork, disdained Moslem habits with their improper behaviour in several ways: they drank too much champagne, played cards and danced *polka* with European ladies.[20]

Metternich entirely empathised with the dismay of the Prussian envoy in Constantinople, Camille Royer de Luynes, that with such people close to the sultan 'there is no prospect for the salvation of the state'.[21] The chancellor regarded this open violation of prescripts of the Koran by leading representatives of the Empire as a primary symptom of the disorganisation of the predominantly theocratic state.[22] He did not feign his regret of the prominent Ottomans' conduct in his instructions to the Austrian representative in Constantinople, Franz Freiherr von Ottenfels: 'The life of Empires is composed of moral and material forces. The latter must conform to the rules of the former, and where the moral force is still intact, hope for regeneration is not lost. Your remark that during the infamous night the premier personalities of the Empire and the most notable members of Ulemas openly violated the regulations of the Koran suffices for conferring the most regrettable character to this event. The last force of the Ottoman Empire lies in its theocratic principle; if it is weakened, the Empire suffers a stroke right in its foundations. For various reasons, I believe I have the right to predict that the banquet given by Mr Gordon will have far more serious consequences than the signature of the Treaty of Adrianople had'.[23]

Metternich's contemplation about Islam had a more rational cause than might be evident at first sight. It resulted from his opinion that it was the common thread of Islam uniting rather different ethnic groups that bound the Ottomans to the sultan. Without this link, which had been established at the early existence of the Empire, the sultan would lose his authority to reign over them, particularly when some of his subjects started to lean towards nationalism and liberalism, both seen by Metternich as disastrous. If the role of Islam were significantly weakened, the multi-ethnic state still at the level of European feudalism of the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries would, in the prince's opinion, cease to exist.[24]

The main problem of this attitude lay in the fact that this gamble on Islam to serve for some time as a barrier against ideas that Metternich considered to be subversive, but it could not be maintained indefinitely, and the prince was well aware of the fact. Consequently, though he regarded respect for Islam as the crucial condition for the improvement of the predominantly Moslem Empire, he found at the same time in this religion the principal impediment to the entire regeneration of the state and its achievement to the level of European countries because it constituted an entirely different structure of society with roots based upon religious law; any attempt to rebuild it completely would lead to its decomposition. He therefore came to the strong conviction declared in late 1839: 'Some states are like individuals who are never healthy. Turkey is such a state because Islam does not permit the existence of any healthy state organism. From time to time an incurable illness develops. One can be cured for some time but never fully recovered. A chronic ailment persists and can never be removed from his body'.[25] His pessimism never diminished, not even at the end of the second Turk-Egyptian conflict of 1839–41, when Austria and other Great Powers rescued the sultan's declining state from peril: 'Seeking in this end [of the Turko-Egyptian war] the proof of the pacification of the interior of the Ottoman Empire, its reconstruction on new bases, or even the

rejuvenation of an ancient social edifice whose foundation, Islamism, enables its life but also causes its decline would be indulging oneself in dreaming of the kind of Utopia which remains inaccessible to us'.[26]

Nevertheless, the fact that Islam could not secure the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire for all time was the essential point for Metternich who, seeing no other option if he wanted to preserve the sultan's empire for as long as possible, continued to insist that only placing emphasis on this faith together with the cautious improvement of the Empire's ill-functioning government, courts and army could prolong its existence at all. By 'caution' Metternich meant a sensible application of Western models, because Ottoman society differed from European society in that fundamental point: religion. He was entirely persuaded that the achievements of the European countries could not always be in accordance with Moslem customs, and a law functioning well in France or Great Britain would not necessarily be beneficial in a culturally different milieu.[27]

Indeed, Metternich regarded attempts to reconstruct the Ottoman Empire through the blind copying of the legislative models from the Western countries but without regard to the different traditions of the Levant as a bigger evil than other causes of the decay of the Empire, like the heterogeneous ethnic composition of its population or the defeats suffered in the wars of the previous 100 years;[28] he always emphatically warned the Ottomans against such a course of action: 'Do not borrow from European civilization forms that are incompatible with your institutions because the Western institutions are based on principles different from those serving as fundamental to your Empire. The Occidental base is the Christian law; you practice Islam, and you cannot found a Christian society'.[29] Or: 'Base your government upon respect for your religious institutions, which form the fundamental basis of your existence as a Power and which form the first link between the sultan and his Moslem subjects. March with the times and consider the requirements that this will bring. Put your administration in order, reform it, but do not overthrow it to replace it with forms that are not useful to you and that expose the monarch to the criticism that he does not know the value of what he attacks nor of what he wants to replace it with … We in no way intend to hinder the Porte in the improvement of its administrative system but we advise it not to look for models for these improvements in examples which have nothing common with the conditions of the Turkish Empire; do not in any way imitate those countries whose fundamental legal systems are contrary to the traditions of the Levant; strenuously resist importing into Moslem regions reforms that cannot work other than disruptively because, under the given conditions, they are deprived of all constructive and organizational force'.[30] This opposition to the blind copying of European examples, however, did not mean that he was totally against the Sublime Porte's turning to the West for inspiration. He only desired that the application of Western achievements be done cautiously, and in particular 'in a Turkish way, and not in a French, English, Russian or Austrian style'.[31] The Ottoman Empire, as he pleaded, had to 'remain Mussulman'.[32]

Metternich often presented this opinion to Ottoman diplomats residing in Vienna or travelling through that city, not concealing from Mahmud II that it 'would be much better to pursue a more traditional path of progress rather than to lose the affection of his subjects through a mania of innovations and reforms that are for the most part only bad imitations'.[33] According to Metternich, Mahmud II had chosen – unfortunately for his Empire – the second approach.[34] The chancellor accused him, first, of starting but not finishing generally superficial reforms – in other words, of destroying ancient institutions without replacing them with new ones[35] – and second, of setting out in the wrong direction or, more precisely, continuing in the course wrongly set by Selim III, when he imitated conditions of the Western Powers which were inapplicable in the Moslem state.[36]

As Metternich wrote after Mahmud II's death: 'The most serious mistake that he [Mahmud II] committed was, in my opinion, to attach more importance to the form than to the core of the matters, and to attribute to the *form* the value that he would not have had to actually accord to the *substance* of his enterprise … [Moreover,] instead of taking measures that perhaps could have been useful if they had been executed in conformity with the empire's own national style, Mahmud did not hesitate to implement them in a way that was completely alien'.[37]

Metternich's attitudes towards the reform movement in the Levant and Mahmud II's reformatory effort were undoubtedly conservative, and were generally shared by other Austrian and Prussian diplomats, Orientalists and interested members of the Habsburg dynasty. It is not without interest, however, that a similar view was at that time held by Mohammed Ali, who was transforming Egypt into a local power through his reforms. This admirer of Napoleon was convinced that the innovations adopted from the West ought to be applied in the Levant in compliance with the Ottoman-Moslem tradition. Therefore, he declined to copy blindly the modernisations adopted by European countries and he adopted them in conformity with local customs. His opinion was noted by a British traveller, Sir John Bowring: 'We cannot proceed as fast as we wish, nor do every thing we desire to do. If I were to put on Colonel Campbell's trousers, (looking at the consul-general, who is six feet high,) would that make me as tall as Colonel Campbell?'[38]

What is even more interesting in connection with Mohammed Ali is the fact that, though Metternich did not conceal his doubts about the abilities of Mahmud II, whom, as the legitimate monarch, he always supported in political matters, he did not hesitate to accord due recognition to the high intelligence, even genius, and great organisational abilities of the ambitious and sometimes disloyal Mohammed Ali, whom Metternich opposed politically and once even militarily.[39] Despite this antagonism, the chancellor never challenged the Egyptian governor's merits as the regenerator of Egypt, where, in his own words, 'the viceroy had done great work'.[40] As to Mohammed Ali's reforms themselves, the chancellor did not object to the changes that were aimed at the economic growth and bureaucratic efficiency in Egypt, especially when they resulted in Austrian citizens growing rich[41] and did not adversely affect the customs and the faith of Moslems: 'More skilful than Sultan Mahmud, he [Mohammed Ali] was able to appropriate the reforms borrowed in Europe without offending Moslem customs or faith; this cleverness made him more powerful than his sovereign'.[42]

It was not Mohammed Ali's reforms, as Sabry claimed, but his disloyalty towards his sovereign that the chancellor denounced.[43] On the contrary, according to Metternich, the reforms pursued by Mohammed Ali in the land on the Nile might well serve as an example for the sultan's larger reformatory efforts, which in fact they did to a certain extent because Mahmud II undertook many of his reformatory measures in reaction to similar steps of his Egyptian governor, from the printing of newspapers or the sending of students to Europe, to the creation of a regular army. The fact that Mohammed Ali's accomplishments always outshone his sovereign's reformatory efforts intensified Mahmud II's hatred towards his Egyptian vassal as well as Metternich's regret that a man of Mohammed Ali's skills was in power in Alexandria and not Constantinople.[44]

Mohammed Ali's achievements clearly manifested that improving the internal situation of the Ottoman Empire was possible, and despite Metternich's rather pessimistic judgments about its internal situation and his opinion that no complete revitalisation was achievable, they contributed to the optimism about its further existence that prevailed in the Ballhausplatz, where Metternich insisted that it was not the lack of resources but the inability to exploit them properly that was hampering the sultan's reformatory attempts,

and the Empire could continue to exist for decades with correctly applied reforms centred on the improvement of the functioning of the entire state apparatus.[45] For this reason, he viewed Mohammed Ali's rule in Egypt somewhat favourably, and he even supported and defended the Ottoman reformers Sadik Rifat Pasha and, in particular, Mustafa Reshid Pasha. With the latter two, the chancellor preserved close contacts, and he and his fellow diplomats undoubtedly had influence over their reformatory views.[46]

Metternich's esteem for Reshid may well seem surprising, given Reshid's affection for the two liberal Powers, France and Great Britain. This was naturally well known and unwelcome in Vienna, but since Metternich believed that the Ottoman Empire lacked skilled and intelligent bureaucrats, he welcomed the presence of an intelligent and incorruptible man devoted to his native country at the head of state affairs, even if he held some views contradictory to those of the old and conservative chancellor.[47] Metternich always held the view expressed at the beginning of 1836: 'Reshid Bey is one of the most capable men in the Ottoman Ministry [read Government] who combines a great deal of tact and finesse, sane judgment and correct knowledge of the relations between different European cabinets'.[48]

Metternich's confidence in Reshid Pasha was strengthened by the content of the reformatory Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane (the Noble edict of the Rose Garden) prepared by the Ottoman reformer and promulgated by new Sultan Abdülmecid I on 3 November 1839. It promised basic reforms: the establishment of guarantees for the life, honour and property of the sultan's subjects; a new orderly system of taxation; a system of conscription for the army, and factual equality before the law for all subjects, whatever their religion. These reforms were further specified in this document,[49] which 'had a profoundly Moslem ring'.[50] In its language about human rights, the edict seemed to some diplomats so revolutionary that they talked in terms of an Ottoman constitution.[51] Before long, however, Metternich's view prevailed: that the Hatt-i Sharif was a mere declaration of fundamental principles, a sort of Magna Carta of the Ottoman Empire.[52]

There was some surprise in the chancellery in Vienna resulting from the pomp with which the document was promulgated,[53] but its existence was welcomed for three reasons. First, it was not a constitution but the monarch's decision made with the aim of improving the living conditions of his subjects. Second, there was nothing harmful in its content; the guaranties of civil rights were entirely in conformity with Islam and the Ottoman traditions.[54] As Metternich wrote to the Austrian representative in Constantinople: 'The step that Sultan Abdülmecid took is right and also wise. He declared principles that will serve as the pillars of his rule. These principles are prescient and founded on religious law that is the first law of all others for the entire state'.[55] Third, the promises contained in the Hatt-i Sharif could result in the people's attachment to the sultan at the expense of Mohammed Ali, who was at that time regarded by many of them as the only reformer able to cure the ailing Ottoman Empire.[56]

According to Metternich, the most problematic aspect of the document concerned was the ability of the Ottoman administration to put it into effect.[57] Even here, however, he was fairly optimistic: 'His Highness can meet with certain difficulties in the application of the principles under question; but which governmental measure is not exposed to encounter them?'[58] He based his optimism upon Reshid's presence at the head of the affairs and, in fact, by the New Year, promising reports on the activities aimed at the improvement of the state apparatus and life in the Empire, and positive responses of the Ottoman inhabitants started to arrive in Vienna.[59] This progress, however, did not last long and March 1841 saw Reshid's fall from power, despite Metternich's attempt to prevent it.[60] When the chancellor learned about the fall of the Ottoman foreign minister, he did not hide his

sorrow: 'I feel real grief over the news of his removal from the post he held so faithfully during most difficult circumstances when he was in loyal service to his monarch and country and which gave me irrefutable evidence of his credibility and loyalty'.[61] He even worried about the fallen reformer's safety, as is proved by his statement from mid-April: 'I hope that Reshid Pasha's physical well-being will not be exposed to any risks, and, as he has more spirit and virtues than all his colleagues, that he will be able to get back on his feet, but for this it is necessary that he remains alive'.[62]

The fact that Reshid was replaced by a former Ottoman representative in Vienna, Rifat Pasha, undoubtedly eased Metternich's regret about Reshid's fall because he considered Rifat to be an honest and agreeable man, and though not as intelligent as Reshid, to have better foresight in adopting reforms; in other words, the prince found Reshid more Western in his outlook and Rifat more Mussulman. This positive assessment of Rifat was enhanced by the fact that the new foreign minister was less predisposed than his predecessor to the employment of the French in the Ottoman service.[63]

For the Ottoman government, hiring foreigners was a way of compensating for its own shortage of educated experts; and Metternich had no objection to its seeking such assistance if it was well considered. If it were not, however, it could pose a serious problem because it was important not only which reforms were carried out but also by whom; and according to Metternich, many changes harmful for Ottoman society had been blindly copied from the West simply for the reason that they were advised by a 'crowd of adventurers',[64] to whom Sultan Mahmud II imprudently opened the door in his reformatory enthusiasm and whom he allowed to infiltrate the machinery of the Ottoman administration.[65]

In addition to the unfinished reforms and the excessive copying of the West, Metternich made two further criticisms regarding the unsystematic nature of the employment of Europeans. First, he disliked the fact that people of various opinions had been assembled to work on one objective, which had negative consequences particularly in the creation of a new regular army that lacked homogeneity because it was trained by Prussians, French and Italians: 'The Porte has soldiers and officers more or less practiced in the European way, but it no longer has an army because having destroyed the ancient Ottoman army, it did not know at all how to create another one'.[66] Second, Metternich complained of the foreigners' problematic character, in other words, their liberal thinking with little respect for the specifics of the Levant, which could have fatal consequences for the sultan's Empire. He considered the ambition of some of them to gain the fortune they were unable to secure at home to be as dangerous as their desire to spread the world-saving visions inapplicable in a culturally different milieu.[67] He maintained that the ruin of the Ottoman Empire would be inevitable if it were to be left to 'all who under the pretext of bringing benefits worked in fact only on its subversion'.[68] In short, he extended his own struggle against liberalism from the European to the Ottoman arena, where he tried to prevent its development and eventual influence over governmental reforms.

According to Metternich, the most dangerous were the French, because he regarded almost every Frenchman as a potential carrier of subversive ideas; his diplomatic strategy recognised that these ideas could be spread through seemingly minor initiatives which could then cast a shadow upon the Ottoman Empire. Unsurprisingly, one of the main goals of his Eastern policy in the 1830s (which was generally much more anti-French than anti-Russian) was to prevent the employment of French citizens in the sultan's service. This attitude was influenced not only by the Austrian-French rivalry in general and the struggle for the predominant influence over the sultan's court, but also by the chancellor's sincere conviction of the harmfulness of the French revolutionary diplomacy[69] and perfidious

theories of this 'unfortunate country'.[70] In short, the anti-liberal struggle he pursued on the Continent extended to the Levant.

Therefore, Metternich opposed the plans for the sending of young Ottomans to study in France in 1830, the printing of newspapers in French a year later, the project for the foundation of a military academy led by French officers in 1835 and the hiring of French military experts for the Ottoman Army in general. In the first case his conduct was motivated by fear that young Ottomans could absorb subversive ideas while in France. In the matter of the military academy, he was afraid of the spread of these ideas in the very heart of the Empire: 'The peace and tranquility of the capital of the Ottoman Empire could be jeopardized due to a great number of French officers among whom, one must admit, there will be [individuals] who, in the guise of instructors, will try to sow [the seeds of] revolutionary ideas and dogmas subversive to the existing order in Turkey'.[71] In both cases he managed to thwart the projects. As to French officers serving in the Ottoman Army, their massive sacking in the summer of 1836 can be hardly ascribed to anything other than the concentrated Austrian-Russian diplomatic pressure.[72] As regards the French newspapers, Austrian diplomacy reacted too late against the plan that gained favour with the sultan, and here Metternich sustained a defeat.[73]

In the mid-1830s, Metternich also supported Russian efforts against the employment of British officers in the Ottoman Army and Navy, though this struggle never became such a personal matter for Metternich as it was in the case of the French threat. The only exception was the activities of Polish General Wojciech Chrzanowsky in Eastern Anatolia instigated by the British foreign secretary. As with the French military instructors, Metternich was also successful in the case of Chrzanowsky and the British officers: the former had no significant influence on the Ottoman Army, and the latter were never employed by the sultan.[74]

The Austrian chancellor did not limit his struggle against the French and sometimes the British in the East for the obstruction of their plans; he was willing to support his own opinions of the Ottoman reforms with active participation of the Habsburg Empire in the sultan's reformatory effort. This conduct reflected both a desire to contribute to the regeneration of the Ottoman Empire and to increase Austrian influence in Constantinople. Moreover, it was natural that after the Porte had been prevented from employing French and British military advisors, the sultan would turn to other countries with the same request. A refusal would undoubtedly have moved the Ottoman monarch to turn again to the two liberal Powers, changing the victory of conservatism into defeat.

As expected, Mahmud II asked both German Powers for help in the creation of his new army by requesting 21 military experts, 15 from Prussia and six from Austria. An affirmative answer came immediately from Berlin as well as Vienna, but military assistance was finally provided only by the former because the Porte withdrew the request for Austrian officers.[75] The reason for this shift in opinion is not clear, but it can be presumed that it was caused by the opposition of the frustrated Western Powers.[76] Whether Russia also opposed the presence of Austrian officers in the Levant, as historian Georg Rosen claimed without quoting any relevant document,[77] is open to discussion, but this view seems to be rather precarious. Though the Tsar undoubtedly preferred a Prussian military mission, the Austrians were still a better choice than the French or British, and he still needed the support of the Habsburg Emperor in the East; Russian intrigues against the employment of his subjects could have serious consequences if they were revealed, which was almost certain in the conditions of the sultan's court, crowded with corruptible and devious people.

Though the decision concerning the Austrian officers may have caused chagrin in Vienna, hiring the Prussians instead of the French and British was regarded as a triumph of conservative diplomacy.[78] A measure of compensation for Vienna may be seen in the participation of Austria in the improvement of sanitary conditions in the Ottoman Empire: in 1838, six Austrian doctors were employed by the Porte to adopt measures against the spread of epidemics;[79] two years later, another 10 doctors functioned in military hospitals in Syria.[80]

In the opposite direction, young Ottomans travelled to Austria for education offered by Metternich and Emperor Francis I in early 1830 in an attempt to counteract French efforts in this field.[81] According to the chancellor, Vienna was an ideal place for the young Moslems to obtain a solid education without the danger that they would be influenced by improper ideas. As Metternich pointed out: 'The sending of men to us will be always less dangerous for the Porte than their dispersion to other places. Young Turks, like the officers, will find in our country a useful direction or, what is equal, a Mohammedan direction'.[82] Though this topic has not yet been researched, it is obvious from the studied diplomatic correspondence that by the second half of the 1830s there were five Ottoman students in Austria, in particular in the military academy.[83]

It would be rather difficult, if not entirely impossible, to find in European history a statesman of Metternich's importance who paid so much attention to the internal situation of the Ottoman Empire and Islam. The diligence with which the Austrian chancellor gathered the relevant information and the passion with which he commented on the internal conditions of this and other states was unique, and his belief in the need to carry out reforms in the Levant definitely was sincere. No other Austrian minister from any earlier or later period was as interested in the topic as Metternich. Of all the Europeans at his level of significance in the first half of the nineteenth century, only British Foreign Secretary Henry John Temple (Lord Palmerston) dealt with it to a similar degree – although almost exclusively through practical steps such as, for example, sending British military advisors to the Near East; he did not take to theoretical philosophising as did the Austrian chancellor, which was a predictable difference resulting from rather distinct characters of the two men.[84]

Metternich's opinion of the importance in preserving the Ottoman-Moslem character of the Empire and the inappropriateness of automatically applying European forms of government in a culturally different region was naturally reinforced by his conservatism and his struggle against liberalism, which does not mean, however, that it was not based on a good deal of sense. The basic premise about the need to maintain the specific character of the Ottoman Empire seems to be well founded because of the fact that, as pointed out by Carter Vaughn Findley, three main sources of legal authority of a traditional Islamic state were the Islamic religious-legal tradition, its customs and the will of the sovereign.[85] Sir Charles K. Webster also emphasised the fact that the sultan's power rested on the faith of Islam because 'only that gave him undisputed authority over his people and the ascendancy of his people over the races which they had conquered'.[86] As to Metternich's warning against blind copying from the West, one may cite the historian Afaf Lufti al-Sayyid Marsot: 'One cannot import reforms wholesale without any attempt at adjusting them to the specificity and ethos of a country'.[87]

It is more difficult to say whether Metternich's criticisms of Mahmud II's reforms as superficial and unsuccessful were justified, and though historians generally agree that this monarch laid the foundations important for further changes, they cannot agree as to whether his reforms went to the heart of the empire's problems. For example, the historians Josef Matuz, Sir Charles K. Webster or Zahra Zakia regarded Mahmud II's

reforms as rather superficial. On the contrary, Erik J. Zürcher denied that they were only 'window-dressing' and stopped at 'the doorstep of the Porte'.[88] M.E. Yapp seemed to be somewhere between these different opinions.[89]

However, some aspects of Metternich's attitude towards the Ottoman reform movement can certainly be assessed positively, notably his respect for a society with different customs and religion. Even if he considered Islam (read: the complicated structure of Ottoman society based upon this religion) to be incompatible with the aspiration to create a functional European-style state, regardless of whether the model was sought among the liberal Powers or in Austria, and although he was not an admirer of the Ottoman-Moslem world,[90] he refused all requests to visit upon the Levant through the achievements of Western civilisation or demands for a protectorate of the West over the East, such as those of Alphonse de Lamartine, for example, with his 'Euro-centric ideas' motivated by passion and entirely ignoring the real situation in the Levant.[91] In this respect Metternich demonstrated a considerable sensitivity towards cultural differences; and his attitude differed significantly from the arrogant behaviour of a number of Europeans, who were unable or unwilling to understand the real situation prevailing in the East and who 'judged the internal Ottoman conditions in line with their own intellectual stereotypes'.[92]

This was with most probability also caused by the fact that the Austrian diplomats serving in the Ottoman Empire were educated in the Oriental Academy in Vienna, where they were taught to recognise and refute all stereotypes of the Turks and Muslims and to respect their culture and religion.[93] Some of them even achieved the most prominent positions in the Viennese chancellery and their influence on Metternich's thinking is clearly visible. Moreover, the opinions maintained at the chancellery were further spread by Bavarian and Prussian diplomats to their respective courts, where they found a considerable echo. Metternich was often questioned by them in matters concerning the Ottoman reform movement, and he was even interrogated by the most prominent Ottoman reformers: Mustafa Reshid Pasha and Rifat Pasha. Without much exaggeration, Vienna became an important source of relevant information and opinions at least for the German-speaking milieu and a centre of discussion on the topic. Although Metternich did not offer any truly innovative ideas about what could actually be done to regenerate the Ottoman Empire, it must be said that nobody else at the time really had a viable plan either.

Notes

1. Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston I,' 570–93; Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston II,' 193–225; Todorova, 'British and Russian,' 17–41; for all studies on French assistance in the reforms pursued in the Near East see Régnier, *Les Saint-Simoniens*; Gaultier-Kurhan, *Mehemet Ali*.
2. Buchmann, *Österreich*, 187–204; Fischer, *Österreich*, 60–123.
3. Sabry, *L'Empire Égyptien*, 458.
4. Siemann, Metternich, 104–5; Reinerman, 'Metternich and Reform,' 524–48.
5. Reinerman, 'Metternich and Reform,' 526–7.
6. Schroeder, *Transformation*, 620–1.
7. For all see Schott, *Die orientalische Frage und ihre Lösung aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Civilisation* and Anonymous, *Die Reformen in der Türkei*, both housed in the Chancellor's Library in the State Chateau of Königswart.
8. Metternich's most important analyses of the internal situation of the Ottoman Empire are: Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 3 December 1839, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Wien (henceforth HHStA), Staatenabteilungen (henceforth StA), Türkei VI, 72, published also by Metternich-Winneburg, *Mémoires*, 378–86; Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 26 May 1841, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 322, despatched on the same day also to Prince Esterházy, HHStA, StA, England 237, Baron Erberg, HHStA, Staatskanzlei (henceforth StK), Preussen III, 178, and Baron Meysenburg, HHStA, StA, Russland III, 123.

9. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 18 May 1833, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 59.
10. Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 12 November 1839, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, München (henceforth BHStA), Ministerium des Äußern (henceforth MA), Wien 2408.
11. Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 5 June 1839, BHStA, MA, Wien 2408.
12. Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 29 August 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37; Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 December 1832, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 55; Martens to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 25 and 30 March, 23 April 1833, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Berlin (henceforth GStA PK), HA III, Ministerium des Auswärtigen I (henceforth MdA I), 7272; Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 10 July 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 69.
13. Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 31 December 1832, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 55.
14. Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 27 March 1833, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 57; Martens to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 25 March 1833, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7272; Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 8 July 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 69.
15. Bockelberg to Frederick William III, Vienna, 15 January 1839, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 6032; Stürmer to Metternich, Büyükdere, 22 July 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 69.
16. Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 22 February 1833, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 59.
17. Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 26 May 1841, HHStA, StA, England 237.
18. Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, Vienna, 19 February 1833, HHStA, StK, Preussen 152.
19. Ibid.
20. Ottenfels to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 November 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 37; Royer to Frederick William III, Pera, 5 November 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7268; Gordon to Aberdeen, Constantinople, 11 November 1829, Public Record Office, London (henceforth PRO), Foreign Office (henceforth FO) 78/181.
21. Royer to Frederick William III, Pera, 5 November 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7268.
22. Maltzan to Frederick William III, Vienna, 4 and 22 December 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 6013.
23. Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 2 December 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39.
24. Maltzan to Frederick William III, Vienna, 10 July 1826, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 6006; Maltzan to Frederick William III, Vienna, 4 and 22 December 1829, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 6013; Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 2 December 1829, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 39; Metternich to Neumann, Vienna, 24 June 1840, HHStA, StA, England 230.
25. The discussion between Prokesch and Metternich, Vienna, 7 December 1839, Prokesch-Osten, *Aus dem Nachlasse*, 183.
26. Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 5 May 1841, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 322.
27. Maltzan to Frederick William III, Vienna, 5 December 1839, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7350.
28. Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 26 May 1841, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 322.
29. Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 26 May 1841, HHStA, StA, England 237.
30. Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 26 May 1841, HHStA, StA, England 237.
31. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 3 December 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 72.
32. Ibid.
33. Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 23 February 1836, BHStA, MA, Wien 2406.
34. Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 18 June 1834, PRO, FO 120/145.
35. Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 13 July 1839, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 315; Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 30 July 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 71.
36. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 26 March 1841, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 83; Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 19 May 1841, PRO, FO 120/197.
37. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 3 December 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 72.
38. Bowring, *Report on Egypt*, 378.
39. Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, Vienna, 19 February 1833, HHStA, StK, Preussen 152; Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 18 May 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 70; Metternich to Prokesch, Vienna, 12 December 1840, *Aus dem Nachlasse*, 190; Metternich to Prokesch, Vienna, 2 January 1841, *Aus dem Nachlasse*, 207.
40. Sainte-Aulaire to Soult, Vienna, 18 May 1839, Archives du Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris, Correspondance Politique, Autriche 426.
41. Sauer, 'Schwarz-Gelb in Afrika,' 23.
42. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 12 November 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 72.

43. Ibid.
44. Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 7 August 1839, HHStA, StA, England 225.
45. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 3 October 1833, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 59; Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 26 May 1841, HHStA, StA, England 237.
46. Mardin, 'The Influence,' 25.
47. Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 9 January 1836, HHStA, StA, England 125; Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 27 June 1837, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 66; Metternich to Neumann, Königswart, 31 July 1840, HHStA, StA, England 230; Metternich to Neumann, Königswart, 5 September 1840, HHStA, StA, England 231; Davison, 'Foreign and Environmental Contributions,' 73–95.
48. Metternich to Hummelauer, Vienna, 9 January 1836, HHStA, StA, England 125.
49. Anderson, *The Great Powers*, 59–62.
50. Davison, 'Turkish Attitudes,' 112–32.
51. Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 19 November 1839, BHStA, MA, Wien 2408.
52. Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 20 November 1839, BHStA, MA, Wien 2408; Berkes, *The Development*, 148–9.
53. Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 20 November 1839, BHStA, MA, Wien 2408.
54. Ibid.; Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 6 November 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 70; Königsmarck to Frederick William III, Büyükdere, 13 November 1839, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7281; Maltzan to Frederick William III, Vienna, 20 November 1839, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7350.
55. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 3 December 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 72. Metternich's reaction to the Edict was briefly analysed by Kornrumpf, 'Die türkischen Reformdekrete,' 115.
56. Metternich to Esterházy, Johannisberg, 19 November 1839, HHStA, StA, England 219.
57. Ibid.
58. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 3 December 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 72.
59. Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 9 January 1840, BHStA, MA, Wien 2409.
60. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 16 March 1841, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 83; Webster, Palmerston II, 767.
61. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 13 April 1841, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 83.
62. Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 15 April 1841, HHStA, StA, England 237.
63. Metternich to Ficquelmont, Vienna, 27 April 1839, HHStA, StA, Russland III, 115; Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 11 April 1841, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 83; Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 9 April 1841, HHStA, StA, England 237; Metternich to Neumann, Königswart, 22 August 1840, HHStA, StA, England 231.
64. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 16 March 1841, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 83.
65. Ibid.; Beauvale to Palmerston, Vienna, 13 April and 7 August 1841, PRO, FO 120/197.
66. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 3 December 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 72. The fate of Ottoman troops in war as well as later research on this topic gave some validity to Metternich's criticism. Levy, 'The Officer Corps,' 21–39.
67. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 3 December 1839, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 72; Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 16 March 1841, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 83.
68. Canitz to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 29 November 1841, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7363.
69. Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 17 September 1834, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 294.
70. Metternich to Apponyi, Königswart, 31 December 1827, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 265.
71. Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 14 March 1835, HHStA, StA, England 214.
72. Ponsonby to Palmerston, Therapia, 28 December 1836, PRO, FO 78/278.
73. More on Metternich's opinions of the Ottoman students see Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 2 January and 3 February 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 51; on the printing of French newspapers see Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 6 and 25 October 1831, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 53; on the Military Academy led by French officers see Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 7 January and 13 March 1835, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 64, Metternich to Ficquelmont, Vienna, 10 January and 13 March 1835, HHStA, StA, Russland III, 105, Metternich to Esterházy, Vienna, 14 March 1835, HHStA, StA, England 214.
74. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 26 and 27 January 1836, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 65; Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 February 1836, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 64; Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston I,' 578; Todorova, 'British and Russian,' 19; Maier, 'Reformwille und Beharrung,' 44.
75. For more on the mission of the Prussian officers see Hajjar, *L'Europe*, 174–7.

76. Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 10 February and 4 May 1836, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 64; Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 26 January and 23 February 1836, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 65; Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 25 July 1837, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 67.
77. Rosen, *Geschichte der Türkei*, 234.
78. Metternich to Stürmer, Vienna, 25 July 1837, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 67.
79. Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 20 May 1838, BHStA, MA, Wien 2407; Lamb to Palmerston, Vienna, 5 June 1838, PRO, FO 120/169.
80. Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 14 April 1841, HHStA, StA, Türkei VIII, 15; Stürmer to Metternich, Constantinople, 7 July 1841, HHStA, StA, Türkei VIII, 16; Königsmarck to Frederick William IV, Büyükdere, 18 November 1840, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7283; Maltzan to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 13 November 1840, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7359; Maltzan to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 10 December 1840, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7360.
81. Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 2 January 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 51.
82. Metternich to Ottenfels, Vienna, 3 February 1830, HHStA, StA, Türkei VI, 51.
83. Lerchenfeld to Ludwig I von Bayern, Vienna, 29 November 1839, BHStA, MA, Wien 2408.
84. Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston I,' 570–93; Rodkey, 'Lord Palmerston II,' 193–25.
85. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform*, 166.
86. Webster, *Palmerston* I, 86.
87. Marsot, 'What Price Reform?,' 7.
88. Matuz, *Das Osmanische Reich*, 224; Webster, *Palmerston* I, 86; Zakia, 'The Reforms,' 424; Zürcher, *Turkey*, 47.
89. Yapp, *The Making*, 108.
90. Metternich to Prokesch, Vienna, 9 January 1841, *Aus dem Nachlasse*, 205.
91. Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 12 July 1841, HHStA, StA, Frankreich 322; Canitz to Frederick William IV, Vienna, 29 November 1841, GStA PK, HA III, MdA I, 7365; Bertsch, *Anton Prokesch*, 287–8.
92. Vocelka, 'Die Beurteilung,' 415.
93. Fichtner, *Terror and Toleration*, 130.

Notes on contributor

Miroslav Šedivý is a Czech historian currently writing a book on Metternich and the Eastern Question. This article has been written as a part of the project Metternich a Východni otázka 1821–1841 (Metternich and the Eastern Question 1821–1841) financed by the Czech Science Foundation (GA ČR P410/10/P027).

Bibliography

Anderson, M.S. *The Great Powers and the Near East 1774–1923*. London: Arnold, 1970.
Anonymous. *Die Reformen in der Türkei*. Wien: Eduard Hügel Verlag, 1856.
Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964.
Bertsch, Daniel. *Anton Prokesch von Osten (1795–1876). Ein Diplomat Österreichs in Athen und an der Hohen Pforte. Beiträge zur Wahrnehmung des Orients im Europa des 19. Jahrhunderts*. München: Oldenbourg, 2005.
Bowring, Sir John. *Report on Egypt 1823–1838 under the Reign of Mohamed Ali*. London: Triade Exploration Ltd, 1998.
Buchmann, Bertrand Michael. *Österreich und das Osmanische Reich. Eine bilaterale Geschichte*. Wien: WUV Universität Verlag, 1999.
Davison, Roderic H. "Foreign and Environmental Contributions to the Political Modernization of Turkey." In *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774–1923. The Impact of the West*, edited by Roderic H. Davison, 73–95. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990.
———. "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century." In *Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History, 1774-1923. The Impact of the West*, edited by Roderic H. Davison, 112–32. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990.
Fichtner, Paula Sutter. *Terror and Toleration. The Habsburg Empire Confronts Islam, 1526–1850*. London: Reaktion Books, 2008.

Findley, Carter Vaughn. *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire. The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922*. Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Fischer, Robert-Tarek. *Österreich im Nahen Osten. Die Großmachtpolitik der Habsburgermonarchie im Arabischen Orient 1633–1918*. Wien: Böhlau, 2006.

Hajjar, Joseph. *L'Europe et les destinées du Proche-Orient (1815–1848)*. Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1970.

Kornrumpf, Hans-Jürgen. "Die türkischen Reformdekrete von 1839 und 1856 und ihre Bewertung in zeitgenössischen Akten und Presseerzeugnissen." In *Südosteuropa in der Wahrnehmung der deutschen Öffentlichkeit vom Wiener Kongreß (1815) bis zum Pariser Frieden (1856)*, edited by Josip Matešić and Klaus Heitmann, 113–21. München: Südosteuropa Gesellschaft, 1990.

Gaultier-Kurhan, Caroline. *Mehemet Ali et la France 1805–1849. Histoire singuliere du Napoleon de l'Orient*. Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose, 2005.

Levy, Avigdor. "The Officer Corps in Sultan Mahmud II's New Ottoman Army, 1826–1839." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 2 (1971): 21–39.

Maier, Lothar. "Reformwille und Beharrung. Das Osmanische Reich 1835–1839 aus der Sicht Helmuth von Moltkes." In *Südosteuropa in der Wahrnehmung der deutschen Öffentlichkeit vom Wiener Kongreß (1815) bis zum Pariser Frieden (1856)*, edited by Josip Matešić and Klaus Heitmann, 43–56. München: Südosteuropa Gesellschaft, 1990.

Mardin, Şerif. "The Influence of the French Revolution on the Ottoman Empire." *International Social Science Journal* 41 (1989): 17–31.

Marsot, Afaf Luftial-Sayyid. "What Price Reform?" In *La France et l'Égypte à l'époque des vice-rois 1805–1882*, edited by Daniel Panzac and André Raymond, 3–11. Le Caire: Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 2002.

Matuz, Josef. *Das Osmanische Reich. Grundlinien seiner Geschichte*. Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 1996.

Metternich-Winneburg, Richard Prince von. *Mémoires. Documents et écrits divers laissés par le prince de Metternich,* tome VI. Paris: Plon, 1883.

Prokesch- Osten, Anton Graf von. *Aus dem Nachlasse des Grafen Prokesch-Osten. Briefwechsel mit Herrn von Gentz und Fürsten Metternich,* Band II. Wien: Carl Gerold's Sohn, 1881.

Reinerman, Alan. "Metternich and Reform: The Case of the Papal State, 1814–1848." *The Journal of Modern History* 42 (1970): 524–48.

Régnier, Philippe. *Les Saint-Simoniens en Égypte, 1833–1851*. Le Caire: Abdelnour, 1989.

Rodkey, Frederick Stanley. "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830–41: Part I, 1830–39." *Journal of Modern History* 1 (1929): 570–93.

———. "Lord Palmerston and the Rejuvenation of Turkey, 1830-41: Part II, 1839–41." *Journal of Modern History* 2 (1930): 193–225.

Rosen, Georg. *Geschichte der Türkei von dem Siege der Reform im Jahre 1826 bis zum Pariser Tractat vom Jahre 1856*. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1866.

Sabry, M. *L'Empire Égyptien sous Mohamed-Ali et La Question d'Orient (1811–1849)*. Paris: Geuthner, 1930.

Sauer, Walter. "Schwarz-Gelb in Afrika. Habsburgermonarchie und koloniale Frage." *K. u k. kolonial. Habsburgermonarchie und europäische Herrschaft in Afrika*, 17–78. Wien and Köln and Weimar: Böhlau, 2002.

Schott, Friedrich. *Die orientalische Frage und ihre Lösung aus dem Gesichtspunkte der Civilisation*. Leipzig: F.U. Brockhaus, 1839.

Schroeder, Paul W. *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.

Siemann, Wolfram. *Metternich. Staatsmann zwischen Restauration und Moderne*. München: C.H. Beck, 2010.

Todorova, Maria. "British and Russian Policy towards the Reform Movement in the Ottoman Empire (30-ies – 50-ies of the 19th c.)." *Études Balkaniques* 13 (1977): 17–41.

Vocelka, Karl. "Die Beurteilung der Tanzimatzeit in Österreich." *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 100 (1992): 410–31.

Webster, Sir Charles. *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841. Britain, the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question*, Volume I and II, London: G. Bell & Sons, 1951.

Yapp, M.E. *The Making of the Modern Near East*. London and New York: Longman, 1987.

Zakia, Zahra. "The Reforms of Sultan Mahmud II (1808–1839)." In *The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation* Vol. 1: Politics, edited by Kemal Çiçek, 418–26. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye, 2000.

Zürcher, Erik J. *Turkey. A Modern History*. London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998.