From Adrianople to Münchengrätz: Metternich, Russia, and the Eastern Question 1829—33

Author(s): Miroslav Šedivý

Source: *The International History Review*, June 2011, Vol. 33, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 205-233

Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23032802

The International History Review
Vol. 33, No. 2, June 2011, 205–233

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

From Adrianople to Münchengrätz: Metternich, Russia, and the Eastern Question 1829–33

Miroslav Šedivý*

Relying on a thorough examination of relevant archival documents housed in several European archives, this paper analyses Austrian Chancellor Metternich's Near Eastern policy from 1829 to 1833 with special attention paid to Austria's relations with Russia. Its primary goal is to refute some already deep-rooted claims relating to Metternich's attitudes towards Russia and the Ottoman Empire from 1829 to 1833 and to offer a different assessment of his role in the diplomatic concert to the one generally held by proving firstly that Metternich did not fear Russia's policy towards the Ottoman Empire during this period, secondly that his policy was consistent and the meeting in Münchengrätz in 1833 was not such an important turning point in the Austrian—Russian relations but simply the climax of the already existing good relationship between the two conservative Powers, and, finally, that no Austro-Russian quid pro quo was agreed upon in this North Bohemian town, which means that Metternich did not have to give up Austrian interests in the Near East for the Russian support in the West because both countries' interests in the two areas were identical. Finally, the paper attempts to point out the fact that though Metternich's policy definitely was conservative, it cannot be sufficiently explained by such a superficial single-word labelling because much of his rationality based upon an in-depth analysis of the affairs lay beyond it, at least of those issues concerning the Eastern Question in the early 1830s.

Keywords: Metternich; Austria; Russia; Ottoman Empire; Eastern Question; Adrianople; Münchengrätz

Historians have dedicated much of their research to the phenomenon of the Eastern Question and tried to explain, more or less successfully, the complexity of diplomatic relations of the European Powers in the Near East. This, however, in no way means that these relations have been entirely clarified and are no longer subject to misinterpretation. The shift in the assessment of the Russian diplomacy towards the Ottoman Empire during Nicholas I's reign serves as a good example in a positive as well as negative sense; it was a long and difficult process. Although as early as 1877 Fedor Fedorovic Martens had drawn attention to the fact that in September 1829, only two days after the end of Russian-Ottoman war, the Tsar had decided to support the continuing existence of the Ottoman Empire, Western historians did not entirely accept this view till Robert J. Kerner's paper on this subject from 1929.[1] However, it

*Email: Mircksedivy@seznam.cz

ISSN 0707-5332 print/ISSN 1949-6540 online

DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2011.555387
http://www.informaworld.com

took several more decades until J.C. Hurewitz and Maria Todorova totally demolished the claim that the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi signed by Russia and the Sublime Porte in 1833 enabled the former to send its warships through the Straits.[2]

Despite the attention paid by a considerable number of historians to the Eastern Question in the first half of the nineteenth century, some myths still exist some 150 years later. Some of these have even become legends, and one cannot therefore be surprised that a related topic has also been subject to a number of misinterpretations: Austrian diplomacy in the Levant led by one of the most important personalities of modern European history, Chancellor Clemens Wenzel Lothar Nepomuk, Prince von Metternich-Winneburg. It is remarkable that while historians were able to research the British—Russian struggle in the Near East and correct earlier conclusions, many of them based on ideological or sentimental analysis in the nineteenth century, they did not at the same time reinterpret the false conclusions relating to the Austrian role in the Eastern Question, particularly those resulting from the incorrect assessment of Russian diplomacy. For example, during the period when historians generally viewed the Tsar's attitude towards the Ottoman Empire as aggressive, Heinrich von Treitschke maintained a theory that at the well-known meeting in Münchengrätz in September 1833, Metternich submitted to Nicholas I's interests in the East in return for his support against the revolutions in the West, and particularly in the Apennines.[3] Treitschke went from the presumption that Russia had been considerably hostile to the Ottoman Empire whereas Metternich had not been, but for Metternich the situation in Europe had been more important than that in the Near East, and therefore, he had agreed to this undertaking. This nationalistic German historian presented this interpretation of events to prove the treachery and lack of credibility of the Austrian Chancellor.

Whereas historians have changed their views of Nicholas I's alleged desire to destroy his weak southern neighbour since the late nineteenth century, the legend about Metternich's deal in North Bohemia still exists and has been adopted by a considerable number of historians, lately, for example, by Paul W. Schroeder. The source of this misinterpretation consists, as it is clear from Schroeder's work, in the presumption that the Austrians and Russians were united on the danger of the revolutions in the West, but not on the affairs in the Near East, where Metternich allegedly feared Russia's conduct in the early 1830s.[4] Sometimes, however, even the reassessment of Schroeder's conclusion did not lead to the refutation of the 'deal theory': although the German historian, Harald Müller, rightly asserts in his paper that during the meeting in Münchengrätz no difference in opinions of the Eastern Question existed between the Austrian Chancellor and the Tsar, he adds in the same breath that Metternich sacrificed Austrian interests in the Balkans and the whole of the Levant for the Tsar's support in other European regions.[5]

The fact that the misunderstanding of Metternich's policy towards Russia and the Ottoman Empire during the period between the Treaty of Adrianople and the reunion in the North Bohemian town persists even 150 years after Metternich's death (15 May 1859) is, in my opinion, due to the ingrained negative image of the Austrian Chancellor as a generally dishonest man hiding his real thoughts and deceiving his enemies as well as his allies. It is thus not difficult for historians interested in the diplomatic history of the first half of the nineteenth century to adopt unflattering views of the man, who, as N. Ciachir wrote, for example, 'was hesitating at nothing'.[6] Moreover, their opinions, regardless of whether negative or positive, were usually founded on their research in the documents housed in the archives in

Moscow, London, or Paris, depending whether they wrote about Russian, British, or French diplomacies. The degree of their negligible interest in the primary sources, which means Metternich's official and personal letters, corresponds with the gaps in the research on the Austrian role in the Eastern Question, and if Sir Charles Webster or Vernon John Puryear visited Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, they only went through the documents relevant to their own research on Palmerston or French diplomatic activities in the Levant.[7] Even Harald Müller and Ernst Molden wrote their studies on the Austrian foreign policy in the early 1830s upon a limited number of primary sources. Nevertheless, Molden in particular arrived at correct conclusions, which regrettably have long been forgotten.[8]

Consequently, the goal of this paper based on research of diplomatic correspondence housed in Vienna as well as other European archives is to prove the baselessness of some already deep-rooted claims relating to Austrian foreign policy towards Russia and the Ottoman Empire from 1829 to 1833 and to offer a different assessment of Metternich's role in the diplomatic concert to the one generally held. It is in no way my goal to reinvent the historical image of Metternich, but only to prove that his policy, at least during the above-mentioned period, was consistent and the meeting in Münchengrätz was not such an important turning point in the Austrian—Russian relations, but simply the climax of the already-existing good relationship between the two conservative Powers. Further, I will try to explain that Metternich did not fear Russian policy towards the Ottoman Empire during the period under discussion and no Austro-Russian quid pro quo was agreed upon in Münchengrätz because both countries' interests in the East and West were identical: the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire and the fight against revolutionary movements were the primary goals of both countries' policies, and consequently, they supported each other in both these issues because it was in their mutual interest to do so.

The reason for starting the interpretation in 1829 is not so much the necessity to refer to the shift in the Tsar's attitude towards the Sultan's empire as the need to refute the opinion that it was the July Revolution which opened the way to the reconciliation between the Habsburg Empire and Russia; this process had already started before the summer of 1830. Moreover, the period of 1829—33 was also important for an analysis of the Austrian-French relations that significantly influenced those between the Habsburg Empire and Russia. Metternich started to remedy the relationship with Russia at the moment when there was a marked chill in the relations with France and a concern about the Russian—French alliance existed in Vienna. Later in the spring of 1830, the internal situation in France contributed to the Austrian—Russian rapprochement, and the July Revolution in Paris and the policy of the new French liberal regime naturally accelerated it. Consequently, in order to explain why Metternich's Near Eastern policy in the early 1830s was mainly anti-French and not anti-Russian, it is necessary to focus on the time span of this four-year period, France, and the background of the revolutionary events of 1830—1.

When at the end of July 1830 revolutionaries took to the streets of Paris, the reconciliation between Austria and Russia was already in progress. At the beginning of 1829, Metternich had already decided to improve Austria's relations with Nicholas I, who at that time was waging war against Sultan Mahmud II and strongly distrusted Austria owing to some of his diplomats' reports from the previous autumn accusing Metternich of anti-Russian plots: for example, his ambition to create a coalition of Great Powers with the aim of forcing Russia to accept disadvantageous

peace terms.[9] This tension was dangerous for Metternich because he needed the Tsar's support in the fight against liberalism and nationalism. Moreover, its timing was rather unfortunate because, at the same moment, the ties between Paris and Vienna started to weaken, and the former tried to take advantage of the situation to obtain an alliance with Russia, which would have been extremely dangerous for Austria.[10] In reaction to this situation and with the aim of improving Austrian—Russian relations, Metternich sent Karl Ludwig Count von Ficquelmont to St Petersburg in January. Ficquelmont's diplomatic talent and integrity were to overcome the Tsar's animosity towards Vienna, but while he tempered the hostility prevailing in the Russian capital against Austria, it was not possible to restore the earlier cordial relations until the end of the war.

Despite the surprisingly unsuccessful Russian campaign in the Balkans in 1828, Metternich was persuaded that the Tsar could not be defeated and he would wage war until the achievement of his objectives, which would grow in proportion to the financial and human losses suffered. Nevertheless, it was not the Chancellor's advice to the Sultan in the autumn of 1828 to open peace negotiations but rather the heavy defeats of the Ottoman armies in the following year that moved the Sublime Porte to conclude a disadvantageous peace treaty in Adrianople on 14 September 1829, that, according to Metternich, could have been much worse owing to the Tsar's military superiority. Consequently, in spite of the (for Austria) uneasy Russian annexation of the Danubian delta and the occupation of the Danubian Principalities, he resigned himself to its conditions.[11]

Metternich also refrained from any diplomatic support of the Sultan in the not-yet formally settled Greek question because he considered it to be practically resolved. He did not interfere in the negotiations between Great Britain, France, and Russia about the future of the Greeks, whose political emancipation he regarded as inevitable, and he remained true to his motto: 'Come what may, we will not object to it.' [12] Therefore, he readily acquiesced with the autonomy promised by the Sultan to the Greeks in the Treaty of Adrianople and even more so with their independence settled by the three involved Powers in February 1830. In his opinion, the creation of an independent Greece was a better choice for the preservation of the peace in the Eastern Mediterranean because simply autonomy would certainly cause other disputes between the Porte and the unsatisfied Greeks and, moreover, an autonomous Greece could become a 'wooden horse' through which the European states would interfere with the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. It was therefore not difficult for the Viennese court to remain a 'benevolent observer'[13] until the definite solution of the problem and to finally recognize the independent Greek Kingdom in September 1832.[14]

This attitude proves Metternich's pragmatism and matter-of-factness. Although his diplomacy was founded upon conservative principles, in which he truly believed, in the case of necessity he did not hesitate to dispense with his maxims to 'save the whole by the sacrificing of a particular'.[15] The 'whole' in this case was peace in the Levant and the restoration of the alliance, not the Holy Alliance, but the practical co-operation of the pentarchy, naturally for the support of his conservative policy and its crucial goal of saving Europe from revolutionary violence.[16] According to Metternich, it was impossible to achieve this aim before the termination of the trilateral alliance, which amounted to the solution of the Greek question. For this reason alone he was not interested in the details of the London protocol of 3 February 1830 bestowing independence upon the Greeks because, as he declared, 'it is *the end* that we desire above all'.[17]

Metternich's primary goal at the end of 1829 and beginning of 1830 was the restoration of unity and harmony between the European Powers, and this naturally could not be achieved without improving relations with Russia.[18] The second goal was made considerably easier by the key event that occured in St Petersburg two days after the signature of the Treaty of Adrianople: members of a special committee, which was entrusted by Nicholas I to decide upon further direction of the relations with the 'sick man on the Bosphorus', unanimously came to the conclusion that the preservation and not the destruction of the Ottoman Empire was in accordance with Russian interests. The advantages of maintaining the Ottoman presence in Europe were greater than any eventual territorial gains at its expense, especially if these gains were rather uncertain because any Russian expansion to the south would certainly meet with the hostile coalition of Austria, France, and Great Britain. The financially weak Russian Empire would not be able to resist such a coalition and assert all its territorial demands. Moreover, the committee concluded that other members of the diplomatic concert would also request their own share in the spoils and Russia, almost certainly, would have three powerful neighbours on its southern frontier instead of one weak one that posed no threat and that enabled Russian dominance in the Black Sea where the Tsar's fleet was protected from the stronger navies of both Maritime Powers. The committee members thus confirmed the correctness of Kotchubey's vision of 'weak neighbour policy' from 1802, which now became official policy after Nicholas I accepted the counsel of his advisers and decided to prevent the fall of the Ottoman Empire that could lead to war among European Powers.[19]

Though nothing indicates that Metternich knew about the secret decision of the special committee, he could not overlook the change in the Tsar's conduct towards the Porte. Not only did the Russian monarch not destroy his weak southern neighbour, but his attitude towards it became more positive and he was willing to moderate the severity of the conditions contained in the Treaty of Adrianople.[20] The Austrian statesman rightly regarded this more friendly behaviour as a sign of a turnaround and shortly after the end of the war arrived at the conviction that Nicholas I did not desire another war and the partition of Ottoman territories.[21] Already on 15 September 1829 Metternich wrote to the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, Anton Count von Apponyi: 'We believe that H.[is] I.[mperial] M.[ajesty] does not aspire to the expulsion of the Ottoman power from Europe. Russia will not commit such a great mistake ... It will content itself with the benefit that it has already acquired: the moral degradation of its two neighbours in the Levant [the Ottoman Empire and Persia] and the advantage of becoming through certain concessions the sovereign arbiter of the Ottoman Empire's existence in Europe, which is much more important than the acquisition of some desert regions.'[22]

The words of the Russian Vice-Chancellor, Karl Robert Count von Nesselrode, about the inextricable difficulties connected with an eventual expulsion of the Ottomans from the Continent and conveyed by Ficquelmont to Vienna in October 1829 contributed to Metternich's assumption expressed in the instructions to the Austrian Ambassador at London, Paul Prince von Esterházy: 'The truth is that the Russian Emperor did not believe that the moment for the expulsion of the Ottoman power from European soil has arrived. Since then and until the date when this monarch adopts an alternative political system, he will have to be willing to conserve what he did not want to destroy. In this fact, my Prince, lies one of the guarantees of the prolonged existence of European Turkey.'[23] Until the summer of the following

year, he was reassured by his certainty in the Tsar's benign attitude towards the Porte.[24]

From the quoted instructions to Paris and London, it is also evident that Metternich was not naive and correctly estimated that the Tsar's reversal had not resulted from any sympathetic attitude towards the Sultan and his subjects but a pragmatic calculation: the existence of a weak neighbour under Russian influence was the best option at that moment. Despite the fact that Austria and Russia pursued the same goal, the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, for different reasons, Metternich could be satisfied because this was the most that he could expect from Nicholas I.[25] And since the Chancellery in Ballhausplatz acquiesced with the temporary Russian occupation of the Principalities and predominant influence in Constantinople, and no important difference in opinion existed between the two courts in Vienna and St Petersburg, Metternich presumed in early 1830 the early restoration of the cordial relations between the two Powers.[26] To facilitate this, the Austrian internuncio in the Ottoman capital, Franz Baron von Ottenfels, was instructed to express his goodwill to Russian representative Count Ribeaupierre and special agent Alexej Fedorovic, Count Orlov, and even to recommend to the Porte that it accept the request of Russia, Great Britain, and France for the creation of an independent Greece.[27]

Metternich considered the reconciliation between Austria and Russia to be urgent among other reasons because of the worsening situation in France, where discontent with the ultra-conservative regime of King Charles X and his First Minister Prince de Polignac grew from day to day.[28] Undoubtedly the same apprehensions contributed to the readiness of Russia for the close relations with the Habsburg Empire because Nicholas I shared Metternich's fear of revolution, and the support of conservatism was also the theme of his foreign as well as domestic policy. In the spring of 1830, both Powers were on the verge of an entente, and this is proved, among other factors, by Nesselrode's shift in views. A well-known Austrophile before the mid-1820s, Nesselrode changed his attitude in the year of Nicholas I's accession to the throne and became an advocate of a more vigorous policy towards the Ottoman Empire and was one of Metternich's opponents, which was a well-known fact in Vienna.[29] Still, in the summer of 1829, during an eight-day-long stay on the Tsar's yacht, he did not say a word to Ficquelmont. Now, in 1830, however, he was the driving force of the understanding with Vienna and decided to meet with Metternich in Carlsbad in August, a decision that was naturally made long before the outbreak of the revolution in France.[30]

Periodic fights in the Parisian streets did not cause any reversal in Austrian—Russian relations, but, rather together with upheavals in other parts of the continent, only accelerated the process initiated after the Peace of Adrianople, and the cordial relations and close co-operation between three conservative Powers, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, were the logical consequence. Metternich's statement from late October 1830 that 'the union of the views and decisions between our and the Russian court is *complete*; today, there are no differences between us'[31] can sound somehow too confident, but the opinion that 'the union among the three Northern Courts is more intimate than ever'[32] was also generally shared by disinterested observers and confirmed by the measures taken by the three conservative Powers on the international scene. How far the Russian diplomacy had advanced towards Austria is evident from the fact that the former arch-enemy of the Danubian Monarchy and Ambassador at Paris, Pozzo Count di Borgo, became the principal advocate of

Metternich's policy in the second half of 1830, following Nesselrode earlier in the same year.[33]

It was a certain paradox that at the same moment when Europe was undergoing a wave of revolutions, the Ottoman Empire, after many years of insecurity and war, was experiencing a period of miraculous calm and order.[34] Ottenfels commented on this situation with these words: 'Whereas in the rest of Europe revolutions erupt one by one with horrible rapidity, Turkey enjoys absolute peace and an internal repose about which we could find only few allusions in the annals of this empire.'[35] It is no surprise that Austria as well as other members of the pentarchy lost interest in the course of events in the Near East for some time.[36] Only in the spring of 1831 did Metternich again have to pay attention to the situation at the Sultan's court because the Ottoman elites, at other times rather insensitive to the events on the continent, started to speculate about the possibility of taking advantage of the Tsar's problems with the repression of the Polish insurrection, which broke out at the end of November 1830, for the modification of the conditions contained in the Treaty of Adrianople.[37]

This revisionist tendency of the Divan did not go unnoticed by the French Ambassador at Constantinople, Armand-Charles Comte de Guilleminot, who, in the presence of prominent Ottoman dignitaries, declared in late March 1831 that a war between France and Russia was inevitable because of the events in Poland and the time had come for the Porte to take advantage of the Russians' difficulties with their struggle against the Polish insurgents and get revenge on their old enemy for the losses suffered in the last conflict. If Austria allied itself with Russia, France would certainly defeat it. Great Britain, according to Guilleminot, ought to stay neutral or support France. Guilleminot simultaneously warned the Porte that if it did not join the French King, Louis Philipe, the monarch would not help to avert the losses that the Sultan would inevitably suffer in the coming all-European war. The fact that these words were really spoken was soon confirmed by the reports of Austrian, British, Prussian, and Russian representatives and later the confession of the French government that, however, denied that it had given such authority to its French Ambassador and immediately recalled him from office.[38]

It is not the task of this paper to answer questions of what Guilleminot really said to Ottoman dignitaries or whether he really acted without instructions. In any case, he accepted the disgrace and told Ottenfels that he 'was carried away by the possibility of the early rupture [between France and Russia] and the concurrence of circumstances'.[39] However, Metternich regarded this as poor excuse and the French Ambassador's statements as a serious threat not only to the Porte but also to the whole of Europe and saw in them a reflection of the policy that Louis Philipe, 'the king of the street', had pursued since his accession to the throne and that, according to the Austrian Chancellor, 'offered a sad spectacle to the world'.[40] As to the possible impact of the Polish affair on the Sultan's attitude, he instructed Ottenfels to confront French intrigues and to urge Mahmud II and his advisers to stay on friendly terms with all the Great Powers at any price.[41] On 21 April 1831, he wrote to the internuncio: 'Stop the Divan by all the means at your disposal. Allow no foolishness!'[42] Luckily for the conservative Powers, the Ottoman ruler did not allow himself to be dragged into a war which he was in no way prepared to wage. Therefore, his advisers hastened with assurances that the Porte would remain neutral and would not provoke war with Russia. Though Ottenfels did not doubt the sincerity of these claims, he was not entirely sure whether the Divan would resist the

temptation and, should the Polish insurrection continue, it would not attempt to alter the Treaty of Adrianople in the matters of Serbia, the Principalities, and the war indemnity.[43]

Therefore, Metternich could not ignore another threat that arose shortly after Guilleminot's speech in the form of the Polish Revolutionary Committee in Paris presided by Marquis de Lafayette, whom the Chancellor regarded as the spirit of revolutionary propaganda. The Committee had sent Mr Komarowsky, Konstantin Wolicky, well known for his pamphlet against Grand Duke Constantine, and Mr Linowski to Constantinople, where they stayed in the Ottoman capital under the protection of the French embassy. These Poles were charged with the task with which Guilleminot had failed: to persuade the Porte to disregard the obligations arising from the Treaty of Adrianople, to make a military demonstration and to demand the restoration of Poland, which would, under the given conditions, amount to declaration of war on Russia. Nevertheless, it was not difficult for Ottenfels to thwart such a plan and convince the Sultan to do nothing, especially when the news of the Russian victories over the Poles crowned with the capture of Warsaw in September 1830 gave the Ottomans no prospect for success in an eventual diplomatic pressure on St Petersburg.[44]

With his measures in Constantinople during 1831, Metternich proved his complete support of Russia and considerable animosity towards France. Whereas Austrian—Russian relations experienced a total reversal during the two years following the conclusion of the Peace in Adrianople and both countries were in harmony on the question of the Ottoman Empire, relations between the Habsburg Empire and France in European affairs deteriorated considerably, which also became apparent in the Near East, where France and not Russia represented an imminent threat for Metternich.[45]

The Austrian—Russian rapprochement was not just the result of the July revolution because Metternich's animosity towards France had deeper roots, and he had criticized France's steps in the Levant prior to the summer of 1830. He saw in Guilleminot's provocation and the Poles' activities under French protection the continuation of the adventurous diplomacy of the Restoration aimed at increasing French influence abroad as well as securing support in domestic affairs; with precisely this goal in mind, Charles X had sent his troops to Morea in 1828 and again to Algeria two years later. Metternich had criticized these measures as entirely needless and a risk to stability not only in the Mediterranean but also in Europe. He even tried to get British support in preventing the campaign in North Africa in the spring of 1830, but met with no success.[46]

The mistrust of governments in Paris regardless of the regime moved Metternich to observe their operations within the Ottoman Empire as well as the activities of the citizens themselves: he attempted to prevent French lawyer and journalist Alexandre Blacque, who was in contact with Lafayette and supported the Polish insurrection, from printing newspapers in the French language in Constantinople in 1831. In the spring of the previous year, which means during the Restoration, he had come out against the idea of the Porte to send young Ottomans to be educated in France, which he labelled as the hotbed of revolution threatening the whole of Europe.[47]

As for Austrian-French relations at the end of the 1820s and in the early 1830s, one must understand that the actions of the French in the Levant were for Metternich only secondary symptoms of the policy threatening Austrian interests more directly in other parts of Europe. France under the Restoration, as well as

under Louis Philippe, had revisionist ambitions in Europe and hoped that it would finally reverse the Vienna system and improve its own position in the diplomatic concert.[48] Metternich was not blind to this and he also knew that France chose the Mediterranean as a playground because in this arena it could count upon less opposition from other Powers, which was proved in the case of Algerian conquest. The only positive aspect of this affair, according to Metternich, lay in the fact that the French sought popularity in Africa, and did not direct their aggression towards their so-called natural frontiers, namely, the Rhine.[49]

The main difference between the French regimes before and after July 1830 was that after July 1830 the regime was liberal and was trying to strengthen its position at home by means of revolutionary rhetoric and seemingly bold diplomacy. Consequently, the deeper worsening of the relations between Paris, which was disposed to change, and Vienna, which was defending the Viennese system, was inevitable. Both parties disagreed over the events in the areas more important for the Habsburg Empire than North Africa or the Levant: in Belgium, Poland, and particularly the Apennines, the traditional sphere of the Habsburgs' influence, the French effort to weaken Austrian dominance led to their occupation of Ancona in February 1832, which met with strong disapproval in Vienna.[50]

These events, of course, significantly contributed to the improved relationship between Austria and Russia manifested by the joint advance in the above-mentioned affairs and later intensified in those of the Iberian Peninsula and the Near East. The July Revolution had one more important benefit for Metternich: he no longer had to fear a French—Russian alliance because Nicholas I became even more hostile towards France and specifically its monarch; the Tsar's strong antipathy towards Louis Philipe was unsurpassable.[51] The co-operation between St Petersburg and Vienna was thus simplified by their common enemy and the fact that no significant differences in opinion existed between them, even in their views of the continuing existence of the Ottoman Empire, where the Tsar did not hesitate to show his goodwill towards the Sultan by replacing Ribeaupierre with the more amicable Apollinarij Petrovic Count Butenev and reducing a part of the war indemnity at the end of 1831.[52]

Metternich's pro-Russian and anti-French attitudes became evident in the Near East during the so-called first Syrian crisis that began with the invasion of Syria by the army of Egyptian Governor Mohammed Ali in the autumn of 1831 without the Sultan's approval. Several months later, Mahmud II deposed the Governor and sent his forces against him. However, the Ottoman forces were twice defeated in June 1832 and suffered the final defeat by the Eygptians three days before Christmas Eve at the battle of Konya. There was no other obstacle except an extraordinary quantity of snow and the waters of the Bosphorus which could prevent the Egyptians from knocking at the gates of Constantinople.[53]

Until this moment Metternich paid little heed to the course of events in the Levant because he regarded the conflict as an internal affair of the Ottoman Empire and not a serious problem of European politics; he was also particularly occupied with the French occupation of Ancona. In any case, the vast interests of Austrian merchants in Egypt and the negligible maritime forces of the Habsburg Monarchy did not allow him to intervene with force on the side of the legitimate ruler.[54] However, he did not object if such assistance was offered by another Power. Therefore, when defeat on the battlefield forced Mahmud II to ask the British cabinet to send fifteen warships against Mohammed Ali in the autumn of 1830, the

Austrian Chancellor supported this request without hesitation although he did not believe that the government in London would satisfy it.[55] This prediction proved to be well founded because Great Britain refused to commit itself militarily in the Eastern Mediterranean. At this for Mahmud II undoubtedly critical moment, however, help arrived from an entirely unexpected quarter. As early as on the day of the battle at Konya, Butenev informed the Porte that Nicholas I was prepared to send his naval and ground forces to the Straits if the Sultan wanted. This offer was soon repeated by the Tsar's special agent, Nicholas Nikolayevich. Count Muravyov, who afterwards went to Alexandria and recommended to Mohammed Ali that he reconcile with the Ottoman ruler, though without success.[56]

Nicholas I's step was a logical outcome of the weak-neighbour policy accepted in September 1829 because the overthrow of the Sultan could have fatal consequences for Russia: either the fall of the Ottoman Empire or the seizure of its throne by the man who seemed able to restore its former glory and transform the empire into a powerful state, or at least one more vital than it was, thereby creating a threat for the Russian domination in the Black Sea. Moreover, the Russian elites disdained, as did Metternich, the activities of the French in Mohammed Ali's service; they regarded the Egyptian Governor as a puppet in the hands of the hated Louis Philippe and his rise as the result of the revolutionary spirit spreading from France. For this reason Nicholas I and Nesselrode feared that after the occupation of Constantinople by Egyptian forces, French influence would become predominant in the whole of the Ottoman Empire, which would thus become a tool of French diplomacy hostile towards St Petersburg.[57]

Mahmud II hesitated to accept the assistance offered, but when Mohammed Ali's army approached to a distance of 150 miles at the beginning of February 1833, he was far too worried about a possible assault on the city to refuse. On 2 February, he formally requested the sending of a Russian expeditionary force. Rear-Admiral Mikhail Lazarev's squadron sailed into the Bosphorus eighteen days later and anchored almost under the windows of the French embassy, where only three days before the new French Ambassador, Albin-Rein Baron Roussin, had arrived. Seeing the Russian flags on the masts of Lazarev's ships, Roussin's pride was injured. He did not believe in the goodwill of the Russian policy that threatened to weaken the influence of both Maritime Powers over the Sultan's court. It is certainly no exaggeration to say that the Russian presence on Ottoman soil invoked more serious apprehensions on his part than the military victories of the Egyptian Governor. Consequently, he opened a diplomatic offensive with the aim of persuading Mahmud II to ask the Russians to withdraw from the Bosphorus.[58]

When Roussin failed with his threats first of immediate departure because, as he declared, the arrival of the Russians deprived the Ottoman Empire of its independence and the presence of the French representative at Constantinople was thus unnecessary, and second with the summoning of the French Fleet into the Sea of Marmara if the Russian intervention was not terminated, he changed tactics. Presuming that the conclusion of peace with Mohammed Ali would make the presence of the Tsar's forces superfluous, he decided to solve the problem by taking an arbitrary step: without appropriate instructions from his government, Roussin promised in the name of France that the Egyptian Governor would accept Mahmud II's peace conditions. This formed the content of the convention concluded between Roussin and the Porte on 21 February 1833.[59] Nevertheless, the action was a total failure because Mohammed Ali refused to renounce any of his territorial demands

covering the whole of Syria and Adana.[60] Roussin's recommendation to the Porte of 26 March to accept the settlement with Mohammed Ali on his terms rather than any prolonged encampment of Russian forces before Constantinople produced 'a hardly describable consternation'[61] among the members of the Divan and signed the death warrant for the diplomatic intervention that ended with the absolute defeat of France and in no way contributed to the departure of the Tsar's army.[62] To the contrary, it prolonged its presence close to the Ottoman capital because Butenev, who initially seemed willing to satisfy the Sultan's request for their decampment, refused when he learned that it had been initiated by Roussin. Nicholas I also felt offended by the French Ambassador's behaviour and was not willing to recall his military forces and marines until the Egyptian Army withdrew beyond the Taurus.[63] In the end, Mahmud II no longer demanded the withdrawal of the Russians because after Roussin's failure they formed the only shield against Mohammed Ali. The Russian influence at his court thus logically increased, which was surely not the outcome that the French Ambassador had desired to achieve.[64]

In contrast to Roussin, Metternich confided in Nicholas I and approved of the steps he had undertaken since the beginning of the Syrian crisis simply for the reason, as he wrote in December 1832, that 'the attitude that the Russian Tsar assumed in this pitiable conflict between the Sultan and Mohammed Ali generally corresponds to our principles as well as opinions'.[65] And he added in mid-February of the following year: 'The Russian Emperor did not offer his moral or even, if necessary, material assistance to the Divan with the aim of killing the Sultan, or destroying his government, or making material conquests in his domains. What this monarch keeps in view in this present circumstance is what we also want.' [66] The Chancellor considered the Sultan's request for the Russian intervention to be justifiable, foresighted, and logical in the circumstances when Great Britain and France had refused to help him. He saw nothing dangerous in the military support for the Porte or other countries; it was merely assistance offered to the legitimate ruler against a rebel and therefore, Ottenfels and after March 1833 also his successor, Bartolomäus Baron Stürmer, eagerly supported Butenev and Russian special agents in the Levant.[67]

French representatives at Vienna suspected Metternich of concealing his fear of the Russian intervention and of immoderate forbearance towards St Petersburg.[68] In March 1833, the French Chargé d'Affaires, Edmond Baron de Bussierre, reported to Paris that outwardly the Chancellor displayed no uneasiness but 'it is necessary to beware of attaching much confidence to the frank optimism that Mr Metternich feigns in relation to the Russian intentions, and one should more likely suppose that lately this ostensible calm masks serious alarm'.[69] Nevertheless, this perception is wrong. The military intervention was executed entirely according to Metternich's principles and his objections were unnecessary. He thought, however, that the dispatch of warships would have been sufficient for the defence of Constantinople and the disembarkation of the ground forces therefore superfluous. It is also true that the Austrian Chancellor would have preferred the diplomatic intervention of all Great Powers against Mohammed Ali, which, in his opinion, would have been enough to force his submission to the presence of Russian troops in the heart of the predominantly Moslem empire, but without a united effort of all the Great Powers, he was well aware that such a proceeding was impossible and Roussin's 'pacifistic bravado'[70] could not provide any desirable result; in short, there was no alternative at that moment.[71]

In any case the lack of concern at the Chancellery in Ballhausplatz over the Tsar's intervention and possible territorial demands at the expense of the Sultan was no misjudgement of the situation but the result of real confidence in the Tsar's intentions resulting from the correct analysis of the Russian Near Eastern policy based on the experience of the previous several years. Consequently, Metternich's confidence in the Tsar's conduct was actually only reinforced and not, as Vernon John Puryear among others claims, caused by the reports from Constantinople from October 1832, in which Ottenfels talked about the trustworthy Russian policy striving for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire,[72] and from St Petersburg, where Nicholas I personally assured Ficquelmont on 18 February 1833 of the sincerity of his actions and declared that he had no interest in the downfall of his southern neighbour nor any intent to follow the aggressive plans of his grandmother, Catherine II the Great.[73] As to the conversation of 18 February, it is likely that Matthew Anderson somewhat overestimates its significance if he claims that the Tsar tried to bring about any joint action between himself and Austria in the Near East. According to the available sources, this was not his objective; he only tried to inform Metternich and Francis I about the Russian military intervention on the Bosphorus and assure them that he wanted no material benefits for the assistance offered to the Sultan, and he only wanted to obtain their diplomatic support.[74]

On the other hand, an entirely different perspective of French behaviour during the whole of the crisis prevailed in the Austrian Chancellery. Metternich viewed the activities of French diplomats in Constantinople and Alexandria with unease. Although he did not think that France tried to contribute to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, he came to the conclusion that it was well disposed towards Mohammed Ali, whose successes the Chancellor also attributed to French support 'of all kinds'.[75] Metternich suspected the government in Paris of wanting to turn Egypt into a local power, which would officially remain a part of the Ottoman Empire but in reality would be independent enough to serve as a possible ally. The logical outcome would be the growth of French influence in the Levant, which was much more dangerous to Austrian interests than the activities of a conservative Russia with the evident intention to preserve the Sultan's power as much as possible.

Metternich's suspicion was to a great extent well founded. The cabinet in Paris really favoured the Egyptian Governor and his effort to obtain Syrian *pashalics* because it saw in the increase of his power a way to strengthen its own influence over the Mediterranean and particularly North Africa, which was, after the Algerian conquest, considered as a primary region for French expansion. Therefore, it did not raise any serious objections against the Governor's campaign and advised Mahmud II to show self-restraint and generosity of spirit. As late as in the autumn of 1832 and under the pressure of events, France raised the objection in Alexandria against a possible overthrow of the Sultan that would be unacceptable in Paris.[76] It also offered to mediate between the Ottoman Empire and its vassal state several times before Roussin's convention for the sake of a prompt peace settlement, but the unwillingness of both Mahmud II and his Egyptian Governor to yield foredoomed this proposal.[77]

These attempts at mediation embarrassed Metternich for several reasons. First, peace mediated by France implied the danger that it would be more advantageous for Mohammed Ali. Second, the Chancellor regarded the intervention of a third party into a dispute between a monarch and his subject as a flagrant violation of the principle of sovereignty. Third, he objected to the importunity with which France

wanted to retain the leading role and simultaneously exclude Russia from participation in the solution of the whole crisis. In his opinion, the present cabinet in Paris continued in the diplomacy of its predecessors who wanted to oversee the events under any circumstances and dazzle the public; policies in Navarino, Algiers, Antwerp, or Ancona were continued in Constantinople and Alexandria.[78] Metternich entirely agreed with Ottenfels, who wrote on 10 November 1832 that France did not want to admit that anything happened without its active participation: 'I have observed for a long time that there is no affair, no complication in Europe in which France would not interfere because it believes that its honour, or better said its self-esteem, would suffer if it [France] seemed to be omitted.'[79]

Although the French government assumed a more hostile attitude towards Mohammed Ali after the Russian intervention on the Bosphorus, Metternich continued to criticize its actions in Constantinople. He considered the incidence concerning Roussin to be a futile imbroglio, one of many follies of the French diplomacy which Austria encountered in other parts of Europe. Although Roussin had acted without appropriate instructions, the Chancellor saw in his action further proof of the egoistic French foreign policy: 'The incident created by the convention of 21 February is of the same nature as those that the government of July provoked in all affairs. This convention has the moral value of the affairs of Ancona and Antwerp; it is similar to the role that France played and still plays in the Netherland-Belgian affair, in that of Switzerland, Spain and Portugal. Everywhere we discover the same principles, the same self-assertion and unconstrained vanity of the French government to seize at any price the dominant role in the question of the day. What it did a day earlier, it has the pretention to do in all circumstances on the following day.'[80]

Above all, Metternich did not understand the reasons for Roussin's anti-Russian conduct and why the French Ambassador obstructed the assistance that the Sultan had requested from the Tsar and that followed the goal common to all Great Powers: the preservation of the Ottoman Empire.[81] For the Chancellor it was not only a matter of principles or geopolitics but also law. In his opinion, the Sultan as a sovereign ruler had the right to ask another sovereign monarch for help and he definitely did not diminish his independence in any way as a result of this step, as Roussin claimed. Metternich rightly pointed to the fact that according to this theory, through Roussin's diplomatic measure of 21 February, France would also infringe the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, nobody would have prevented France and Great Britain from sending military assistance to the Sultan against his Egyptian Governor and if he had accepted it, nobody in Vienna would have objected to it; Metternich even recommended that both Western Powers support the Russian intervention by attaching their own fleets to Lazarev's squadron. Since they did not help the Sultan, who was without effective protection against the Egyptian Army after the Battle at Konya, the Austrian Chancellor entirely approved of the Ottoman ruler's decision not to give in to Roussin's pressure and not to demand the withdrawal of Russian forces.[82]

According to British historian Sir Charles Webster, Metternich praised Roussin's intervention when it seemed to be successful but as soon as he learned of its failure, he started to criticize it.[83] However, Webster's interpretation is rather inaccurate: Metternich applauded the measure because he gathered from Bussierre that Roussin had succeeded in concluding peace, which, in the Chancellor's words, would naturally have been an act worthy of admiration and praise: he had learned of a

success and not the actual fact that the French Ambassador in Constantinople had assumed the role of a mediator and his achievement was more than precarious.[84] Consequently, Metternich actually did initially tell Bussierre that 'Roussin could congratulate himself for one of the greatest successes that an ambassador had achieved for a long time'.[85] When he learned of the real truth of the matter, his strong reproof was a logical consequence.[86] When Bussierre asked him why he was dissatisfied when he had previously seemed to have approved of Roussin's action, Metternich briefly replied: 'The internuncio informed us about the convention, the admiral [Roussin; actually rear-admiral] notified you that he had signed a peace treaty. There is a big difference between a convention concluded between France and the Porte and a peace treaty signed between Mohammed Ali and the sultan.'[87]

Metternich also did not conceal from Bussierre his displeasure at Roussin's egoistic and entirely incomprehensible effort to obtain the Russians' departure from Constantinople and deprive the city of the only defence in such a critical moment for the Sultan. Instead of supporting the Russian advance and following the same course as France, the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, Roussin made the support of the Sultan a secondary goal, and the primary one the removal of the Russians.[88] This action could only have negative results because the Tsar's injured pride did not allow the departure of the Russians until the definite solution of the crisis. Metternich angrily commented on the outcome of Roussin's conduct with these words: 'When someone shows me results, when he writes me that peace is secured, I reply without hesitation, so much the better. But if I learn in no time that in fact nothing was achieved and only mistrust [of the Russians's presence on the Bosphorus] was expressed, when I learn that in this manner a condition was to be enforced [the Russians's withdrawal], that nothing was done except the prevention of what would have been achieved [the Russians's departure] if nobody had interfered in this affair, then I say, so much the worse! And I can express nothing but regret.'[89]

Perhaps if the French activities in Constantinople threatening to worsen the relations among the Great Powers had been successful and had brought peace to the Near East, Metternich could have accepted them, but they had the opposite effect. After the news of Roussin's failure, the Chancellor was shocked by the recommendation given to the Divan to give in to Mohammed Ali's demands. He predicted that despite the ineffectiveness of Roussin's initiative, a great diplomatic victory would be celebrated in Paris: 'The French nation inclines to find pleasure in everything that assigns to France an active role, regardless whether this role is good or harmful, correct, or incorrect in its presumption, effective or dangerous in its results ... If Mohammed Ali had given in to Admiral Roussin's pressure, then France would have boasted that it had saved the sultan. Mohammed Ali did not yield and it is thus the viceroy who was saved by France, and because [for France] it is most important to find its government taking the lead in any action, the vox populi will approve it.'[90] This prediction turned out to be prophetic when the vainglory attributed by Metternich to France was actually revealed in the French press, which did not hesitate to take the credit for the settlement of the conflict which ended with Mahmud II's absolute defeat on 5 May 1833; the Sultan granted Mohammed Ali all the required provinces.[91] Therefore, the French could read in *Journal des Débats* on 1 August 1833 this statement: 'French influence was so effective during the negotiations, it intervened in the events in Asia Minor so actively and contributed to their disentanglement that we can congratulate ourselves on the role that France played during this significant affair.'[92]

The Austrian Chancellor's reaction was far less poetic. The Sultan's concessions were regarded in Vienna as excessive, particularly the surrender of Adana with the neighbouring strategic passes in the Taurus Mountains. Metternich saw in this loss a considerable strengthening of Mohammed Ali's power, which also meant that of France: 'The gain of Adana for the benefit of Mohammed Ali is a question of European policy. It is particularly an English, Austrian and Russian question. The seas of the Levant will belong to Egypt in the future, in other words to France. Instead of becoming a market for all nations engaged in commerce, Egypt will become a power and this power will form a French outpost against England and Russia. The Mediterranean will thus become a French lake, exactly what Napoleon wanted to achieve.'[93]

Other involved powers reconciled more easily with the peace conditions. Nicholas I was indifferent to the degree of the weakening of the Sultan's authority in the area of the Fertile Crescent where he had no direct interests; his primary target not to allow the decay of the Ottoman Empire and the accession of a capable Egyptian Governor to the Ottoman throne had been achieved.[94] In Paris and London the termination of hostilities was welcomed as a precursor to the Russians' departure from the Bosphorus, which was the primary goal of both cabinets and to which they subordinated all their diplomatic steps in Constantinople in the spring of 1833. Although the vision of the Ottoman territory without Russian soldiers was not entirely unpleasant for Metternich, in particular after the settlement of the crisis, he refused to support the conduct of both Maritime Powers because first, he did not find the presence of Lazarev's squadron as dangerous as the subversive behaviour of the French, and second, he trusted the Tsar's promise for the immediate withdrawal of his forces at the moment when the Egyptian Army retreated beyond Taurus. The prince was also well aware of the fact that a diplomatic offensive in the Ottoman capital accompanied by the threat of sending the foreign fleets into the Sea of Marmara could seriously worsen the relations between Russia and other Great Powers.[95] The apprehension prevailing in Vienna of an eventual rupture among the Great Powers is evident from the summoning of all Austrian officers to active service, the conscription of recruits faster than usual and the purchase of a considerable quantity of cloth and 4,000 horses for the army in the early spring of 1833.[96]

The mutual distrust also reduced the already low level of ability of the pentarchy to act, from which Mohammed Ali could and finally also did profit. Metternich had hoped that the joint action of both Western Powers together with Austria and Russia would assure a prompt and successful solution to the Ottoman—Egyptian war because, as he was firmly persuaded, the collective pressure on Mohammed Ali would be enough to make him yield. Consequently, he tried to dispel the suspicions of the cabinets in Paris and London about Nicholas I's sinister intentions by assuring them of the Tsar's sincerity and inoffensive intentions[97] because, as he wrote to Apponyi on 18 March 1833, 'with the defence of reasonable policy we simultaneously advocate the Russian Tsar and ourselves in person'.[98] Five days later, he told Bussierre: 'We assure you that in St. Petersburg they desire exactly what we want. Accept this our guarantee. We will also be prepared to offer Russia the guarantee of the sincerity of your intentions.'[99] And he continued: 'All of us share the same intention, the same disinterest; let us follow the same course and not act against each other. It is a lack of confidence that destroys everything, complicates everything, aggravates even the simplest affair.'[100]

All the attempts of the Austrian Chancellor to calm the troubled waters were futile because the cabinets in London and Paris had little confidence in the Austrian Chancellor's and Russian monarch's assurances and were too concerned about the extent of their own influence over the Sultan's court if the Tsar's forces were to remain close to the Ottoman capital for too long.[101] In an attempt to achieve their departure, Roussin claimed the right of the French fleet to enter the Sea of Marmara in the first half of April 1833. Although new British Ambassador John Lord Ponsonby did not act as uncompromisely as his French counterpart, he also contemplated inviting the British Fleet to the Golden Horn. In the second half of June, the fleets of both Maritime Powers anchored at the Island of Tenedos in the immediate vicinity of the Dardanelles.[102]

Roussin's request for permission to send the French Fleet to Constantinople was regarded in Vienna as another entirely needless measure, a new 'attempt to obtain a triumph in the French press for the national vanity by attributing the departure of the Russians as a consequence of the arrival of the French force'.[103] Therefore, at the beginning of June, Metternich not only refused the appeal of both Western Powers for Austrian support in their effort to dispose of the Russians still camping on the Bosphorus but also instructed Stürmer to forestall all Roussin's anti-Russian plans.[104] The internuncio had already sought support among the Ottoman dignitaries and foreign diplomats for the Tsar's conduct and the continuance of his soldiers and marines in the Ottoman Empire until the return of the Egyptian Army to Syria, and he therefore had no problems complying with these latest instructions because Roussin and Ponsonby changed their strategy and assumed a passive attitude. They learned of the Russian—Ottoman offensive and defensive treaty negotiation, whose conclusion they regarded as a lesser evil than the continuing presence of Russian troops and warships. They presumed that the Russians would leave immediately after the signing of this treaty and did not want to do anything that could prevent such an outcome.[105]

The negotiation between Count Orlov sent again by Nicholas I to Constantinople and Mahmud II's delegates was finally successful. After receiving news of the departure of the last Egyptian soldier from Asia Minor, both sides concluded in the Russian military camp in Unkiar-Skelessi on 8 July 1833 a defensive treaty consisting of public and secret clauses. In the first part both countries promised mutual assistance in the case of an attack from a third party. In the second, secret, part the Sultan was relieved of the obligation to offer military aid in such a case, but he was obliged to close the Straits to the navies of any states at war with Russia.[106] Two days after the conclusion of the treaty, the Russians left the Bosphorus.[107] As it was customary in the Ottoman Empire, the secrecy did not last long and the wording of the agreement including the secret articles was known to Ponsonby at the latest on 12 July.[108]

When the French and British ambassadors at Vienna, Louis Count de Sainte-Aulaire and Sir Frederick Lamb, learned of the planned conclusion of the defensive and ofensive [sic] alliance between Russia and the Porte at the beginning of July, they immediately arranged a meeting with Metternich, who immediately considered the rumour of this alliance to be false, and he was sure that it would be disclaimed by the next messenger. In any case he denied that he had been informed in this matter: 'You do not know precisely what happened in Constantinople, and I swear to God and people on my honour and conscience that I do not know about it at all.'[109] And he did not lie because he really was entirely ignorant in this matter. In the following weeks he also refused to believe the planned signing of the treaty for he received no

information to that effect, and he was convinced that the Tsar surely would not have concealed such an intention from his ally; moreover, he did not even receive any reports from Constantinople on the negotiations.[110] The first one containing any mention of the treaty was that sent on 14 July in which Stürmer notified Metternich of its conclusion but did not mention the secret clause; the secrecy was not revealed to the internuncio from Butenev until 7 August. Ficquelmont came to know about it from Nesselrode four days later.[111]

It is interesting to note that Orlov and the members of the Russian mission dined in the internunciature on 6 July and on the following day Stürmer was a guest at the banquet arranged by Orlov and Butenev in honour of the Tsar's birthday. Although they evidently had more than one opportunity, they told the internuncio nothing about the planned conclusion of the treaty despite the cordial relations that existed between them and Stürmer as well as his predecessor. Furthermore, Orlov had already experienced Metternich's and Ottenfels' support during his previous diplomatic mission in Constantinople in the spring of 1830. Despite this, he did not inform Stürmer of the treaty until his departure on 12 July. Undoubtedly the situation was of some embarrassment for both Orlov and Stürmer, but in any case the internuncio was not entirely pleased with the explanations given by the Russian diplomat as to why he had not informed his Austrian colleague sooner: he knew that Stürmer had not been given instructions for such a circumstance, he did not know whether the negotiation would be successful, and he presupposed that the Tsar had already informed the Emperor.[112]

This deception put Stürmer into an awkward position because he had to face a considerable number of questions on his own opinion of the treaty although until the autumn he had no instructions on this matter. Finally, he had no choice but to defend the content of the document without knowing his own government's attitutude towards it although he naturally knew Metternich's general views and he himself was convinced it contained nothing that could be of concern.[113]

Metternich remained ignorant of the full text of the treaty until mid-August when he was finally confronted with its reality.[114] Although he explained the entire confusion to be the result of Orlov's clumsiness and he tried to show no embarrassment, Sainte-Aulaire did not doubt that Metternich must have felt humiliated as a result of the Tsar's conduct.[115] It is impossible to disagree with the French Ambassador's opinion because it had to be a rather humiliating situation for Metternich: after his frank and zealous defence of the Russian Near Eastern policy, he was the last man who learned of the treaty. He was certainly mortified by the distrust of his ally and this is clearly evident from his extraordinarily frank comments made in late December 1833 to Lamb when he told him what he had said to Nicholas I in Münchengrätz: 'I took a guarantee for your conduct which has been falsified. I do not object to the principle of your Treaty, you have therefore committed no crime which should separate us, but you have weakened my power of serving you in the same way again. Should I ever feel myself called upon hereafter to answer for the conduct of your Govt [government], what can I expect from France and England, but that they should reply — Dupe[d] once — you may be deceived again!'[116] The Russians' silence towards the Austrians also invited the distrust of the cabinets in London and Paris towards Metternich because no one was willing to believe that the Chancellor really had not known about the plan to conclude the Russian—Ottoman treaty: denial of its existence on his part was generally considered to be a lie and only gradually did the opinion that he had been deceived prevail.[117]

Despite his hurt pride and humiliation, Metternich continued to advocate the Tsar's policy and the content of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi because, in his opinion, the document in no way weakened the Sultan's independence and Russia obtained no advantages threatening the rights of other Great Powers.[118] After 8 July 1833, the Ottoman Empire was no more or less dependent on its powerful northern neighbour than before and also in the question of the Straits no real change had occurred.[119] As to their being closed during a war between Russia and any other European state or states, he even welcomed it because it ensured the neutralization of the Black Sea and the preclusion to the creation of a battle zone beyond the Austrian frontiers. On the basis of these arguments he concisely labelled the treaty as 'the tractat without real value',[120] which was later confirmed by Philip E. Mosely's almost identical words ('the self-contradictory and, at bottom, useless treaty') as well as the research of other historians like Hurewitz, Todorova, or Alexander Bitis.[121] And even if Metternich preferred a unilateral agreement of all powers ensuring the future existence of the Ottoman Empire, with regard to the impossibility of achieving general consent to this question, he was easily able to accept the existence of a Russian—Ottoman alliance: 'The primary task was to save the Ottoman Empire. We would have preferred an instrument other than the treaty of 8 July but owing to England and France's refusal of assistance, protection offered by Russia is a better choice than the isolation of the Porte exposed to the mercy of its very formidable enemy, the Viceroy of Egypt. The treaty of 8 July does not contradict any stipulation in previous contracts. In principle no one has a right to object to it and Austria will defend it if necessary.'[122] In short: There was nothing in the document to cause Austria any consternation and that is why it was not difficult for its Chancellor to congratulate Mahmud II on its signing.[123]

At this point one must mention A.L. Macfie's opinion that Metternich had reacted to the conclusion of the treaty with great displeasure and had angrily informed Sainte-Aulaire: 'It would be better for the Empire of Austria to face the risk of a war of extermination rather than to see Russia aggrandised by a single village at the expense of the Turkish Empire.'[124] However, this is a total misinterpretation of the sources. First, no evidence of any negative reaction on the part of the Chancellor was found in any of the researched diplomatic correspondence including that housed in the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Second, the words Metternich repeated throughout the year of a single village or an inch of soil whose annexation by Russia would have been a reason for Austria to go to war were not an indication of his supposed anger but a way to make the British and French believe in his real confidence in the Tsar's benign intentions towards the Ottoman Empire.

In London and Paris the responses to the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi were diametrically opposite to Metternich's and the shock at the news of its conclusion surpassed the reaction to the news of the Russian military intervention on the Bosphorus, even though there was really nothing Great Britain and France could object to with any justification.[125] It was particularly the fear of the Russian dominance in the Levant which led both powers to attempt to forestall the ratification of the treaty. However, the Porte reacted to their representatives' protest notes of 26 August 1833 with the statement that the document contained nothing detrimental for a third party and the Sultan as a sovereign monarch was entitled to conclude agreements with other countries.[126] British and French diplomats in St Petersburg received the same response.[127] Metternich's attitude towards the British

and French protests was naturally negative because he regarded them as unjustified. He repeated his already expressed opinion that the treaty was signed by two sovereign rulers and contained nothing disadvantageous to the Ottoman Empire or any other states.[128]

The tension between Russia and the two Maritime Powers intensified the need of a meeting between the monarchs of the conservative Powers. Nicholas I and Francis I had wished to meet since the summer of 1830 and in the following year the latter extended the invitation, but the war in Poland prevented Nicholas I from visiting any place in the Habsburg monarchy. The two rulers did not come face to face until 10 September 1833 when the Russian Tsar came to Münchengrätz upon a renewed invitation.[129] It is not the task of this paper to deal with the motives of his need to travel to this North Bohemian town; for Metternich and his emperor this meeting signified the climax of hitherto cordial relations with Russia. The reunion of the two monarchs and their prominent diplomats occured, among other reasons, because of the latest events in the Near East, and consequently the Eastern Question was one of the points to be discussed. They quickly agreed on the necessity of preserving the Ottoman Empire with its ruling dynasty and decided to exert all available resources to achieve this goal. If the Sultan's empire fell, Austria and Russia agreed to act in unison and consult each other. They also agreed upon an obligation to confront any attempt by Mohammed Ali to extend his power to the European part of the Ottoman Empire although the Egyptian Governor had no such aspiration; nevertheless, Metternich and the Tsar both feared such a prospect, particularly with regard to a possible expansion of French influence over the Balkans through the Egyptian Governor.[130] The terms of their agreements were included in a convention consisting of public as well as secret articles and signed on 18 September 1833.[131]

Metternich predicted such a quick arrangement; he claimed in June that in fact there would be nothing to negotiate because the Emperor, the Tsar and their advisers 'want the same thing, and they want it in the same manner'.[132] After only three days of talks with Nicholas I, the Chancellor's expectation became reality: 'His [the Tsar's] thought *is in all points concordant*, I would even say identical with ours.'[133] Not only these self-confident statements but also the facts support the truth that the document forced none of the signatories to any compromises because their opinions and interests were virtually the same. The Tsar had the same views of the situation on the Continent and in the Ottoman Empire as did Metternich. Therefore, Metternich did not have to sacrifice his interests in the East for the Tsar's support in the West.[134]

The meeting in Münchengrätz also did not signify any important shift in the policy of either conservative power or their relationship, which had been good long before September 1833; it was only the logical climax of their identical diplomacy in both Europe and the Levant about which Austria and Russia were able to reassure themselves. Metternich commented on the meeting in his instructions to Stürmer of 3 October 1833: 'Never did a gathering of monarchs offer such harmony and fewer difficulties of any kind than that which now took place. All our expectations of the prudence and absolute justice of tsar Nicholas' opinions turned to total certainty... This sincere and intimate understanding of both imperial courts was never more genuine.'[135] Consequently, it is impossible to agree with the claim that the convention restored good relations between Austria and Russia that had allegedly been shattered by Metternich's concern about a possible Russian expansion in the Near East.[136] As shown above, such a fear had not existed in Ballhausplatz for

several years; the Russian—Austrian antagonism over the Eastern Question was a distant memory in 1833. Therefore, the notion of Austrian historian Robert-Tarek Fischer that one of Metternich's successes in North Bohemia was the coercion of Russia to pledge to support the preservation of the Ottoman Empire is also untenable.[137]

Historians have debated for whom the concluded convention was more advantageous and the first question has been which party conformed its procedure to the other's. With regard to the above-mentioned facts this question loses much of its importance, and yet it is good to pay some attention to Nesselrode's statement from his annual report on the events of 1833 that 'Austria satisfied all wishes of Russia: one can expect from the Convention of Münchengrätz that in the subsequent developments in the Levant it will proceed together with Russia and not against it'.[138] In other words he believed that on 18 September Metternich had moulded his diplomacy to conform to the Tsar's concepts. A similar opinion of Austrian dependence on Russia was also maintained in Vienna where some members of the traditionally anti-Russian elites blamed the Chancellor for being overflattered and falling under the influence of Russian foreign policy. Metternich resolutely and rightfully rejected such views: 'When Russia started out in a different way, I let it go. Today I go with Russia because it goes with me. A few years ago I did not cooperate with it on the Greek question and I was criticised for it. I am not bound to anybody but I follow my own path that I consider to be correct. Whoever I find on this path, I will take with me.'[139] This statement, however, in no way signified, as wrongly interpreted by Harald Müller, that the Chancellor would have regarded himself as taking the lead while the Tsar merely followed him.[140] He only wanted to say that he had not had to give up his own goals as the other party had adopted them.

The second question is connected with the interpretation of the stipulation about the joint action in the case of an attack against the Sultan or the fall of his empire. Usually it has been considered as a great success for Metternich, for example by P.E. Mosely, Alan Sked, Paul W. Schroeder, Barbara Jelavich, or Maria Todorova, who claimed that this part of the Convention of Münchengrätz greatly restricted the Russian freedom of action in the Eastern Question because of the Tsar's assurance that no moves would be made without a prior agreement with the Habsburg Empire, which thus limited the advantage resulting from the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi.[141] Nevertheless, it is difficult to share this conclusion relating at least to the restriction of the 8 July convention. If the Sultan had been attacked, Russia would have still been obliged to offer assistance even if Austria had disagreed with it, and the only advantage for Metternich in such a case was a greater chance to be informed about the Tsar's intervention beforehand, which means that the treaty of 8 July was not limited by the outcome of Münchengrätz. Consequently, Russia's independence was factually restricted only if it had wanted to intervene in the Ottoman Empire outside the terms of the obligation included in the treaty of 8 July.

Was Russia really so limited in its freedom of action in the Near Eastern affairs with the Convention of Münchengrätz? And, on the other hand, did Nicholas I achieve success in this North Bohemian town by preventing the reconciliation of Austria with the Maritime Powers - in the words of Theodor Schiemann's and Harald Müller's, the creation of a coalition between Vienna, Paris and London?[142] In other words, to what extent were these two conservative powers committed to joint action in the Levant in their mutual interest and not to co-operate with other countries? In my opinion, it is difficult to find an irrefutable answer since the text of

the convention seems to be somehow ambiguous in this respect. The explicit prohibition for either of the contracted parties to act independently is stipulated only in the second secret article and is applicable only in the case of the fall of the Ottoman Empire and with the aim to constitute a new order in the Levant. The non-secret parts contain only their pledge to defend both the Sultan's independence and throne.[143] It is thus evident that the agreement to act jointly seems to concern how both Powers would proceed in the Near East in the event of the downfall of the Ottoman Empire, and it obliged them to jointly help the Sultan in specified cases, but it did not prevent either of them from discussing the Eastern Question or concluding treaties with other countries, at least with the aim to achieve the goals contained in the non-secret part of the Münchengrätz convention. Some proof for the view that no prior agreement between Austria and Russia was needed in such cases can be found in the events of 1839; when in the late summer, in reaction to a new Ottoman—Egyptian conflict again bringing the Sultan's empire to the verge of collapse, Nicholas I decided to proceed primarily with Great Britain instead of Austria and to settle the Eastern question within the terms of the stipulations contracted in North Bohemia six years previously, he did not consult Metternich in advance and presented him with a *fait accompli*.[144]

It is, however, true that Nicholas I succeeded in deepening the gulf between Austria and the Western Powers by forbidding the publication of the convention, which, in contrast to the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, remained unknown to the British and the French. Consequently, Metternich had no weapon with which he could dispel fears existing in London and Paris of a possible agreement between the two conservative powers on the division of the Ottoman Empire or of Austrian consent to the Russian annexation of Moldavia and Wallachia.[145] His words that the Russian monarch desired neither Constantinople nor a village in the Principalities once again did not appease French and British ministers. On the contrary, this zealous defence of the Tsar only evoked their suspicion and resentment towards the Austrian Chancellor himself as well.[146]

Metternich strongly disapproved of the decision to conceal the content of the convention because he found transparency to be the best instrument for overcoming prejudices.[147] He wrote on 27 October 1833 to Esterházy: 'The principles of this contract are admirably irreproachable and tie the hands of every kind of Russian intervention so much so that instead of concealing its existence we should divulge it to every corner of Europe.'[148] However, Nicholas I took a different view and did not reconsider his decision at all, which was a rather short-sighted solution, and he was ultimately the man who suffered the most from it; the secrecy of the Convention of Münchengrätz not only deepened the existing doubts concerning its conditions in London and Paris but also intensified the distrust of the French and particularly the British public of Russian intentions in the Near East, which led to the emergence of Russophobia in the British Isles.[149] With most probability the Tsar could have been spared this if he had listened to Metternich's advice and had made the effort to explain his policy instead of cloaking his actions in secrecy, concealing them even from his own allies.[150]

In evaluating Metternich's Near Eastern policy from September 1829 to September 1833 his remarkable analytical skills and his consistency are immediately evident. He came to the conclusion shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople that the Tsar had adopted a considerably pro-Ottoman attitude, and even if Metternich had no illusions about the real reasons for this change, he guessed

correctly that the Russian monarch was trying to keep the Ottoman Empire alive because it suited Russian interests.[151] Therefore, he was able to accept Nicholas I's assurances at face value since he knew well enough that he did not need to worry about the Tsar's real intentions towards the weak southern neighbour.

With regard to the change in the Russian attitude towards the Ottoman Empire, Metternich had no reason to deviate from his own political course, which was much more consistent than his contemporaries as well as historians supposed, and he was in no way under the influence of the Russian court for one very simple reason: the aims of Austria and Russia in the Levant as well as on the Continent were more or less identical, even before July 1830. The support offered to Russia at the Sultan's court after 1830 was thus a sign not only of Metternich's goodwill towards the powerful eastern neighbour but also of his own long-standing diplomatic theories.

It would naturally be naive to suppose that Metternich was pleased at the considerable Russian influence over the Sultan's court or at the presence of Russian armed forces on the Bosphorus, but considering the circumstances he could easily reconcile himself with these facts. He was able to accept Russia's influence over Mahmud II owing to the joint action of both conservative Powers in the majority of the affairs within the Ottoman Empire, for example, against Blacque's journalistic activities after 1830, and the Russian support in some disputes between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires such as the navigability of the Danube. Furthermore, as a realistic statesman, Metternich was well aware of the impossibility of reducing Russian influence at that moment and the Convention of Münchengrätz would in no way have affected it, as Desmond Seward stated.[152]

Moreover, with regard to the events of the first Syrian crisis, it is necessary to draw attention to the fact that Russia's influence did not arise in 1833 as a consequence of the treaty of 8 July but had already existed three years previously and was later naturally augmented by the Tsar's willingness to help the Sultan against his rebellious Egyptian Governor. In this respect one must agree with Maria Todorova that the real success of the Russian diplomacy in the Levant was the Treaty of Adrianople in particular.[153] The Russian predominance in Constantinople was thus nothing new for Metternich in 1833, certainly nothing that would have contributed to a change in his policy, and it is clearly not true, as N. Ciachir claims, that the content of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi caused Austrian diplomats 'many a sleepless night'.[154]

As to the presence of the Russian soldiers and marines in the immediate vicinity of Constantinople, Metternich did not object to this for the simple reason that he preferred them to the Egyptian soldiers. And though he favoured the solution to the conflict by means of joint pressure of all powers in Alexandria accompanied by a naval demonstration of some of them before its port and the arrival of additional fleets to the Golden Horn to join forces with the Russian squadron if necessary, he soon understood that this solution was unrealistic owing to the mistrust prevailing in Paris and London of the intentions of St Petersburg. For Metternich it must have been, as Frederick Lamb concisely put it in May 1833, 'melancholy to see an affair of this importance unnecessarily spoilt by disunion and ill-timed jealousy'.[155]

Metternich did not blame Russia but rather France for this disunity in the spring of 1833, which can be no surprise since France was Austria's most dangerous enemy after July 1830, ideologically as well as geopolitically. The Austrian—Russian alliance was thus cemented in 1830—1 by the existence of a common adversary, and the Near East was only one of the diplomatic battlefields between the two conservative courts and

Paris. Metternich objected to France's activities in general because of its egoistic goals and its desire to take the lead in every international affair because, as he declared, France 'must be able to say that it was France which did everything, that it is France that is the moderator of the destiny of the universe, that it is France that is the master of all things'.[156] This would probably have been forgivable if France had pursued the same aims as other members of the Concert. However, no power at that time, including liberal Great Britain, had for the Habsburg Empire so diametrically different priorities as France, and the Near East was no exception. France's affection for Mohammed Ali led to the duplicity of its diplomacy, and its protests against the Russian presence on the Bosphorus masked by an array of fears about the Sultan's fate in reality resulted from its concerns about its own interests.[157] Consequently, when Metternich labelled the Tsar's conduct as 'sincere, honest and enlightened' and condemned the French behaviour as 'duplicitious, vainglorious, dubious and unreliable',[158] it is impossible to treat it as a blind adulation of Russia but his own opinion also shared by other Austrian diplomats.

Considering these facts, some traditional views are not tenable: first, that represented, for example, by M.S. Anderson that the meeting in Münchengrätz was to 'reestablish good relations between the two great conservative monarchies of Europe after the uneasiness which the apparent prospect of large-scale Russian expansion in the Near East had caused in Vienna earlier in the year';[159] second, that of a British Ambassador in Vienna, Frederick Lamb, who declared that Metternich only had a choice between the fear of Russia and the fear of revolutions;[160] third, the opinion repeated by many historians that Metternich supported the Tsar in the Near East because of the Tsar's support in the fight against revolutions in Europe, particularly in Germany and Italy. As already stated, Metternich did not fear a Russian expansion in the Levant after 1829 and, as Alan Sked accurately stated, he did not fear it at all since the weakness of the Russian Empire became evident during its wars with the Ottoman Empire and with the Poles.[161] And although it is true that he needed Russian assistance in Italy and Germany, one must entirely agree with Alan Sked again that Russia also needed Austrian backing against revolutions.[162] Therefore, Metternich had already had the Tsar's support against their common enemy at his disposal long before the reunion in North Bohemia, where he did not need to buy it, especially not by sacrificing Austrian interests in the Levant where both conservative Powers pursued the same goal. Briefly, no deal was made in Münchengrätz; it was merely a personal meeting confirming the already existing cordial relations between the two Powers.

The above arguments lead to the reflection that it was a real misfortune that the cabinets of the Maritime Powers did not believe Metternich's continual assurances of Nicholas I's real goals and uselessly remonstrated against the presence of his troops on the Bosphorus as well as the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, which in fact changed nothing in the status of the Straits and did not turn the Ottoman Empire into a Russian protectorate (protectorate in terms of a vassal state). In the case of this document, Metternich rightfully remained calm though he was offended by his conservative ally's concealment of it from him. This Tsar's secretive nature was proved with negative effect by his insistence on the secrecy of the Convention of Münchengrätz, which was again an entirely needless measure contributing to an even greater cooling of the relations among the Great Powers. Metternich cannot, however, be held responsible for this outcome in any way; he tried to secure the co-operation of the Pentarchy and was in his declarations much more frank than one

has hitherto supposed. Moreover, his views and steps in the Eastern Question in the period under consideration also prove that he was more of a practical diplomat than one could presume.

Acknowledgements

This article has been written as a part of the project *Metternich a Východní otázka 1821–1841* (Metternich and the Eastern Question 1821–1841) financed by the Czech Science Foundation (GA ČR P410/10/P027). I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Wolfram Siemann (LMU Munich), Professor Aleš Skřivan (Charles University in Prague), Professor Arnold Suppan (University of Vienna), and Professor Karl Vocelka (University of Vienna), who have supported my research with advice and assistance for years; my paper could have never been written without their kind supervision. My special thanks belong to Helen Nathan who carefully revised the text and the editors of the International History Review and Victoria Rose, for their highly helpful assistance and patience.

Notes

1. F.F. Martens, *Die russische Politik in der Orientfrage* (St Petersburg, 1877), 31; R.J. Kerner, 'Russia's New Policy in the Near East after the Peace of Adrianople', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, v (1935–37), 280–90.
2. J.C. Hurewitz, 'Russia and the Straits Question: A Reevaluation of the Origins of the Problem', *World Politics*, vix (1962), 605–32; M.N. Todorova, 'Mythology of the Eastern Question: The Treaty of Unkiar-Iskelessi', in M.N. Todorova (ed), *Aspects of the Eastern Question. Essays from the First Bulgarian-Dutch Symposium of Historians, Sofia, 6-7 June 1984* (Sofia, 1986), 23–31.
3. H. von Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert, Vierter Theil: Bis zum Tode Friedrich Wilhelms III. (Leipzig, 1889), 329–33.
4. P.W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848* (Oxford, 1996), 731–2.
5. H. Müller, 'Der Weg nach Münchengrätz. Voraussetzungen, Bedingungen und Grenzen der Reaktivierung des reaktionären Bündnisses der Habsburger und Hohenzollern mit den Romanows im Herbst 1833', *Jahrbuch für Geschichte*, xxi (1980), 48, 53.
6. N. Ciachir, 'The Adrianople Treaty (1829) and its European Implications', *Revue des études sud-est européennes*, xvii (1979), 713.
7. Sir Ch. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830–1841. Britain, the Liberal Movement and the Eastern Question*, Volume 1 (London, 1951); V.J. Puryear, France and the Levant from the Bourbon Restauration to the Peace of Kutiah (Berkeley, 1941).
8. E. Molden, *Die Orientpolitik des Fürsten Metternich, 1829–1833* (Vienna, 1913).
9. A. Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question. Army, Government, and Society 1815–1833* (Oxford, 2006), 303–5.
10. R. Bullen, 'France and Europe, 1815–1848: the Problem of Defeat and Recovery', in A. Sked (ed), *Europe's Balance of Power, 1815–1848* (London, 1979), 135.
11. Metternich to Ottenfels, 17 Sept. and 20 Nov. 1828 [Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilungen], T[ürkei] VI, 35; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 5 Oct. 1829 [Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilungen], R[ussland] III, 88; Schwebel to Rayneval, 10 Sept. 1828 [Paris, Archives du Ministère des Affaires étrangères], C[orrespondance] P[olitique], A[utriche], 409; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 30 April 1828 [Berlin-Dahlem, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz], HA III, M[inisterium] d[es] A[uswärtigen] I, 6010; De Bray to Ludwig I von Bayern, 25 and 28 Oct., 29 Nov. 1828 [Munich, Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv], M[inisterium des] Ä[ußern], W[ien], 2402.
12. Metternich to Ottenfels, 19 Dec. 1829, T VI, 49.
13. Metternich to Ottenfels, 18 Feb. 1832 [Hrvatski Državni Arhiv, Zagreb, 750], O[bitelj] O[ttenfels], 38.
14. Metternich to Ottenfels, 2 Oct. 1829, T VI, 39; Metternich to Ottenfels, 17 Feb. 1830, OO, 38; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 5 Oct. and 19 Nov. 1829, R III, 88; Metternich to

Ficquelmont, 26 Feb. 1830, R III, 90; Metternich to Esterházy, 15 and 24 Nov., 16 Dec. 1829 [Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilungen], E[ngland], 188; Metternich to Esterházy, 16 March 1830, E, 191; Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, 11 Dec. 1829 [Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatskanzlei], P[reussen], 132; Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, 12 March 1830, P, 137; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 28 Nov. 1829, HA III, MdA I, 6013; Rayneval to Polignac, 25 Jan. 1830, CP, A, 412; Cowley to Aberdeen, 27 Oct. and 15 Nov. 1829 [Kew, United Kingdom National Archives, Public Record Office], F[oreign] O[ffice Records] 120/104; Molden, *Orientpolitik*, 32.

15. H. Rieben, *Prinzipiengrundlage und Diplomatie in Metternichs Europapolitik, 1815–1848* (Bern, 1942), 19–20.
16. A. Sked, *Metternich and Austria. An Evaluation* (New York, 2008), 23.
17. Metternich to Ottenfels, 7 March 1830, OO, 38.
18. Metternich to Apponyi, 28 Oct. and 16 Dec. 1829 [Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Staatenabteilungen], F[rankreich], 271; Metternich to Apponyi, 25 Feb. 1830, F, 276; Metternich to Esterházy, 12 and 25 Feb. 1830, E, 191; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 11 Feb. 1830, R III, 90; Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, 2 March 1830, P, 137; Metternich to Ottenfels, 10 Sept. 1829, OO, 38; Cowley to Aberdeen, 8 and 24 Nov. and 25 Dec., 1829, FO 120/104.
19. Martens, *Politik*, 31; Kerner, *Adrianople*, 283–90; Bitis, *Russia*, 358–61; M. Anderson, 'Russia and the Eastern Question, 1821–1841', A. Sked (ed), *Europe's Balance of Power, 1815–1848* (London, 1979), 87; M. Rendall, 'Restraint or Self-Restraint of Russia: Nicholas I, the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, and the Vienna System, 1832–1841', *The International History Review*, xxiv (2002), 59–60.
20. Ottenfels to Metternich, 10 April, 10 May and 11 June 1830, T VI, 50; Cowley to Aberdeen, 9 Jan. and 7 Feb. 1830, FO 120/108.
21. Metternich to Esterházy, 28 Oct. 1829, E, 188; Metternich to Ottenfels, 19 Dec., 1829, T VI, 49.
22. Metternich to Apponyi, 17 Sept. 1829, F, 271.
23. Metternich to Esterházy, 16 Dec. 1829, E, 188.
24. Metternich to Ottenfels, 18 March and 10 April 1830, T VI, 51; Metternich to Apponyi, 29 Jan. and 5 Feb. 1830, F, 276; Metternich to Esterházy, 20 Jan. 1830, E, 191; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 22 May 1830, R III, 90; Rayneval to Polignac, 25 Jan. 1830, CP, A, 412.
25. Metternich to Esterházy, 24 Nov. 1829, E, 188; The record of the conversation between Metternich and Prokesch on 4 March 1830, Anton Graf von Prokesch-Osten, *Aus den Tagebüchern des Grafen Prokesch von Osten* (Wien, 1909), 15.
26. Metternich to Apponyi, 13 Jan. 1830, F, 276. Lamb to Palmerston, 25 April 1832, FO 120/124. More on the Russian exclusive influence over Constantinople Ottenfels to Metternich, 26 July and 10 Aug. 1830, T VI, 50; Ottenfels to Metternich, 10 Oct. 1830, T VI, 51.
27. Metternich to Ottenfels, 21 Jan., 17 and 19 Feb., 3, 7 and 12 March, 17 April 1830, T VI, 51; Cowley to Aberdeen, 25 Feb. and 11 March 1830, FO 120/108.
28. De Bray to Ludwig I von Bayern, 22 Oct. and 28 Nov. 1829, MÄ, W, 2402; De Bray to Ludwig I von Bayern, 27 March and 18 May 1830, MÄ, W, 2403; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 24 April 1830, HA III, MdA I, 6015.
29. Bitis, *Russia*, 168; Metternich to Esterházy, 29 April 1826, E, 175.
30. W. Kantor, *Karl Ludwig Graf Ficquelmont. Ein Lebensbild mit besonderer Rücksicht auf seine diplomatische Mitarbeit bei Metternich* (Dissertation, University of Vienna (Universität Wien), Ph.D. Degree, 1948), 103–4; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 17 July 1830 [Děčín, Státní oblastní archiv], R[odinný] a[rchiv] C[lary]-A[ldringenů], 383; Metternich to Ottenfels, 18 July 1830, OO, 38.
31. Metternich to Ottenfels, 20 Oct. 1830, OO, 38.
32. Report from Vienna, 4 Dec. 1830 [Sächsisches Staatsarchiv, Hauptstaatsarchiv Dresden], S[ächsische] G[esandschaften] 10026, W[ien], 92.
33. Molden, *Orientpolitik*, 93.
34. Ottenfels to Metternich, 10 Oct., 10 and 25 Nov., 10 Dec. 1830, T VI, 51; Ottenfels to Metternich, 10 Jan. and 25 Feb. 1831, T VI, 52.

35. Ottenfels to Metternich, 26 March 1831, T VI, 52.
36. Metternich to Ottenfels, 5 and 19 Sept., 2 and 20 Oct. 1830, T VI, 51.
37. Brassier to Frederick William III, 11 Jan. and 26 Feb. 1831, HA III, MdA I, 7270.
38. Ottenfels to Metternich, 26 March and 28 May 1831, T VI, 52; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 13, 15 and 29 April 1831, and attached Gordon to Palmerston, 31 March 1831, HA III, MdA I, 6016; Brassier to Frederick William III, 26 May 1831, HA III, MdA I, 7270.
39. Ottenfels to Metternich, 28 May 1831, T VI, 52; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 9 June 1831, HA III, MdA I, 6016.
40. Metternich to Ottenfels, 12 May 1831, T VI, 52.
41. Report from Vienna, 2 May 1831, SG 10026, W, 92.
42. Metternich to Ottenfels, 21 April 1831, T VI, 52.
43. Ottenfels to Metternich, 26 March 1831, T VI, 52; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 12 April 1831, HA III, MdA I, 6016.
44. Metternich to Ottenfels, 21 April, 20 May and 28 Sept. 1831, T VI, 53; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 18 Oct. 1831, Ra C-A, 383; Ottenfels to Metternich, 10 June, 10 and 26 Sept., 19 Oct. and 2 Nov. 1831, T VI, 52; Ottenfels' unpublished diary, OO, 18, fo. 233–4; Memoire des Konstantin Wolicki über die im Auftrag der polnischen Regierung nach Frankreich und Konstantinopel unternommene Gesandschaft, Prokesch-Osten, *Tagebüchern*, 232—5.
45. Metternich to Ottenfels, 28 Sept. 1831, T VI, 53.
46. M. Šedivý, 'Metternich and the French Expedition to Algeria (1830)', *Archiv orientální. Quarterly Journal of African and Asian Studies*, lxxi (2008), 15–37; G. de B. de Sauvigny, *Metternich et la France après le congrès de Vienne. Tome III: Au temps de Charles X* – 1824/1830 (Paris, 1970), 1200–4, 1339–52.
47. Metternich to Apponyi, 31 Dec. 1827, F, 265; Metternich to Apponyi, 16 Dec. 1829, F, 271; Metternich to Apponyi, 8 Jan. 1833, F, 289; Lafayette to Blacque, 21 July 1831, attached to Metternich to Ottenfels, 19 Oct. 1831, T VI, 53; M. Šedivý, 'Metternich and the French in Constantinople 1830–1840', in J. Holaubek, H. Navrátilová and W.B. Oerter (ed), *Egypt and Austria IV. Crossroads* (Prague, 2007), 147–57.
48. Sked, *Metternich*, 68; Schroeder, *Transformation*, 659.
49. Metternich to Apponyi, 27 April 1830, F, 276; Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, 27 April 1830, P, 137; Metternich to Esterházy, 5 June 1830, E, 191.
50. B. Jelavich, *The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs 1814–1918* (Chicago, 1969), 36–9; J. Droz, *Histoire diplomatique de 1648 à 1919* (Paris, 2005), 312–13.
51. B. Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan entanglements*, 1806–1914 (Cambridge, 1991), 91.
52. Ottenfels to Metternich, 10 Nov. 1830, T VI, 51; Ottenfels' unpublished diary, OO, 18, fo. 234–5.
53. M.H. Kutluoğlu, *The Egyptian Question (1831–1841). The Expansionist Policy of Mehmed Ali Paşa in Syria and Asia Minor and the Reaction of the Sublime Porte* (Istanbul, 1998), 61–82.
54. Metternich to Ottenfels, 18 Jan. and 15 Dec. 1832, T VI, 56.
55. Metternich to Neumann, 17 Oct. 1832, E 199; Metternich to Ottenfels, 5 Dec. 1832, T VI, 56; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 8 Dec. 1832, R III, 97; Lamb to Palmerston, 16 Oct. 1832, FO 120/124; Ottenfels to Metternich, 11 and 25 Oct. 1832, T VI, 54; M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question 1774–1923. A Study in International Relations* (New York, 1966), 79.
56. J. Hajjar, *L'Europe et les destinées du Proche-Orient* (1815–1848) (Paris, 1970), 113.
57. W.B. Lincoln, Nicholas I. *Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias* (London, 1989), 203; F.S. Rodkey, *The Turko-Egyptian Question in the Relations of England, France and Russia 1832–1841* (Urbana, 1924), 16; Bitis, *Russia*, 468; Rendall, *Nicholas* I, 57.
58. Bitis, *Russia*, 475; Ottenfels to Metternich, 4, 11 and 21 Feb. 1833, Türkei VI, 56.
59. Ottenfels to Metternich, 21 and 24 Feb. 1833, T VI, 56; Puryear, *France*, 190–5.
60. Stürmer to Metternich, 24 March 1833, T VI, 57.
61. Stürmer to Metternich, 27 March 1833, T VI, 57.
62. Puryear, *France*, 196.
63. Rendall, *Nicholas I*, 40–1.
64. Stürmer to Metternich, 27 March 1833, T VI, 57.

65. Metternich to Neumann, 11 Dec. 1832, E, 199.
66. Metternich to Neumann, 15 Feb. 1833, E, 204.
67. Metternich to Ottenfels, 4, 14 and 22 Feb. 1833, T VI, 59; Metternich to Neumann, 15 Feb. 1833, E, 204; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 4 May 1833, R III, 99; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 5 March 1833, Ra C-A, 383; Metternich to Apponyi, 18 March 1833, F, 289; Stürmer to Metternich, 27 March 1833, T VI, 57; Martens to Frederick William III, 11 April 1833, HA III, MdA I, 7272.
68. Maison to Broglie, 13 and 28 Jan., 12 Feb. 1833, CP, A, 418; Bussierre to Broglie, 7 March 1833, CP, A, 418; Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 5 July 1833, CP, A, 419.
69. Bussierre to Broglie, 7 March 1833, CP, A, 418.
70. Report from Vienna, 23 March 1833, SG 10026, W, 92.
71. Metternich to Apponyi, 21 April 1833, F, 289; Maison to Broglie, 28 Jan. and 12 Feb. 1833, and Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 13 May 1833, all CP, A, 418; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 19 Feb. 1833, HA III, MdA I, 6021; De Loë to Goblet, 28 Feb. 1833, Brussels, Archives belge des Affaires etrangéres, Archives diplomatiques, Correspondances Politiques, Autriche, 1.
72. Ottenfels to Metternich, 25 Oct. 1832, T VI, 54.
73. H. Temperley, *England and the Near East. The Crimea* (London, 1936), 67; A. Beer, *Die orientalische Politik Österreichs seit 1773* (Prague, 1883), 399; Molden, *Orientpolitik*, 86–9.
74. Anderson, *Eastern Question*, 87.
75. Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, 19 Feb. 1833, P, 152.
76. Puryear, *France*, 154; Bullen, *France*, 142.
77. Kutluoğlu, *Egyptian Question*, 82, 86, 89; Puryear, *France*, 154–68; Ottenfels to Metternich, 11 July 1832, T VI, 54; Ottenfels to Metternich, 25 Sept., 25 Oct. and 27 Dec. 1832, T VI, 55; Ottenfels to Metternich, 10 and 25 Jan. 1833, T VI, 56; Brassier to Frederick William III, 25 Aug. and 25 Sept. 1832, HA III, MdA I, 7271.
78. Metternich to Ottenfels, 4 and 14 Feb. 1833, T VI, 59; Metternich to Apponyi, 21 April 1833, F, 289; Metternich to Neumann, 3 May 1833, E, 204; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 29 Jan. 1833, HA III, MdA I, 6021.
79. Ottenfels to Metternich, 10 Nov. 1832, T VI, 54; see also Ottenfels to Metternich, 10 Jan. 1833, T VI, 56.
80. Metternich to Apponyi, 18 March 1833, F, 289.
81. Metternich to Apponyi, 18 March and 6 April 1833, F, 289; Metternich to Neumann, 18 March and 9 April 1833, E, 204; Metternich to Ottenfels, 21 March 1833, T VI, 59; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 20 March 1833, R III, 99.
82. Metternich to Apponyi, 18 March and 6 April 1833, F, 289; Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, 7 April 1833, P, 152; Metternich to Neumann, 9 April 1833, England 204; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 26 Feb. 1833, HA III, MdA I, 6021; Lamb to Palmerston, 17 Jan. 1833, FO 120/136.
83. Webster, *Palmerston*, 293.
84. Metternich to Apponyi, 18 March 1833, F, 289; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 8 March 1833, HA III, MdA I, 6021.
85. Bussierre to Broglie, 10 March 1833, CP, A, 418.
86. Metternich to Apponyi, 18 March 1833, F, 289; Metternich to Stürmer, 18 April 1833, T VI, 59.
87. Metternich to Ficquelmont, 11 March 1833, R III, 99.
88. Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, 20 March 1833, P, 152; Metternich to Apponyi, 6 April 1833, F, 289; Lamb to Palmerston, 13 April 1833, FO 120/136.
89. Bussierre to Broglie, 22 March 1833, CP, A, 418.
90. Metternich to Apponyi, 13 April 1833, F, 289.
91. Metternich to Apponyi, 3 May 1833, F, 289; Metternich to Neumann, 21 June 1833, and Metternich to Esterházy, 1 Dec. 1833, E, 204.
92. E. Bourgeois, *Manuel historique de politique étrangère* (Paris, 1926), 105
93. Metternich to Neumann, 8 May 1833, E, 204; see also Metternich to Apponyi, 20 May 1833, F, 289.
94. Kutluoğlu, *Egyptian Question*, 102; Martens, *Politik*, 35.
95. Metternich to Ficquelmont, 11 March and 4 June 1833, R III, 99; Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 13 May 1833, CP, A, 418.

96. Report from Vienna, 26 March and 7 April 1833, SG 10026, W, 92.
97. Metternich to Apponyi, Vienna, 27 Jan., 2 Feb., 6 and 21 April 1833, F, 289; Metternich to Ottenfels, 19 Dec. 1832, T VI, 56; Metternich to Stürmer, 3 June 1833, T VI, 57; Metternich to Neumann, 15 Feb. and 8 March 1833, T VI, 57; Metternich to Trauttmannsdorff, 20 March 1833, P, 152; Metternich to Hügel, 9 June 1833, F, 289; Maltzahn to Frederick William III, 23 Jan. and 1 Feb. 1833, HA III, MA I, 6021; Maison to Broglie, 25 Feb. 1833, CP, A, 418; Bussierre to Broglie, 18, 22, 25 and 28 March, 16 June 1833, CP, A, 418; Lamb to Palmerston, 8 Jan., 8 and 22 March, 14 April 1833, FO 120/136.
98. Metternich to Apponyi, 18 March 1833, F, 289.
99. Bussierre to Broglie, 22 March 1833, CP, A, 418.
100. Ibid.
101. L. Sainte-Aulaire, *Souvenirs* (*Vienne 1832–1841*) (Paris, 1926), 18.
102. Stürmer to Metternich, 11 and 23 April 1833, T VI, 59; Puryear, *France*, 206–7.
103. Lamb to Palmerston, 9 June 1833, attached to Metternich to Neumann, 9 June 1833, E, 204.
104. Ibid.; Metternich to Stürmer, 3 June 1833, T VI, 57; Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 19 May and 4 June 1833, CP, A, 418; Brockhausen to Frederick William III, 3 and 5 June 1833, HA III, MdA I, 6021; Lamb to Palmerston, 3 June 1833, FO 120/137.
105. Stürmer to Metternich, 5 and 25 May 1833, T, VI, 57; V. J. Puryear, 'L'opposition de l'Angleterre et de la France au traité d'Unkiar-Iskelesi en 1833', *Revue Historique* (1938), 287–8.
106. M.S. Anderson, *The Great Powers and the Near East 1774–1923* (London, 1970), 42–4.
107. Stürmer to Metternich, 10 July 1833, T VI, 57.
108. Webster, *Palmerston*, 304.
109. Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 5 July 1833, CP, A, 419.
110. Metternich to Ficquelmont, 10 July 1833, R III, 99; Lamb to Palmerston, 3, 8 and 23 July 1833, FO 120/137; Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 5, 6 and 14 July 1833, CP, A, 419; Brockhausen to Frederick William III, 5 and 16 July 1833, HA III, MA I, 6021.
111. Stürmer to Metternich, 10 July 1833, T VI, 57; Stürmer to Metternich, 8 Aug. 1833, T VI, 58; Molden, *Orientpolitik*, 75.
112. Stürmer to Metternich, 10 and 14 July 1833, T VI, 57.
113. Stürmer to Metternich, 26 July, 7 and 11 Aug. 1833, T VI, 57.
114. Metternich to Esterházy, 28 July and 16 Aug. 1833, E, 204.
115. Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 31 Aug. 1833, CP, A, 419.
116. Lamb to Palmerston, 26 Dec. 1833, FO 120/137.
117. Webster, *Palmerston*, 306.
118. Metternich to Esterházy, 28 July 1833, E, 204; Lamb to Palmerston, 3 Sept. 1833, FO 120/137; Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 3 Oct. 1833, CP, A, 419.
119. Metternich to Esterházy, 16 Aug. 1833, E, 204; Metternich's Memorandum attached to the instructions to Esterházy, 14 March 1834, E, 208; Stürmer to Metternich, 8 and 11 Aug. 1833, T VI, 58.
120. Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 30 Nov. 1833, CP, A, 419.
121. P.E. Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy and Opening of the Eastern Question in 1838 and 1839* (Cambridge, 1934), 30; Hurewitz, *Straits Question*, 605–32; Todorova, *Mythology*, 25; Bitis, *Russia*, 477.
122. Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 1 Oct. 1833, CP, A, 419.
123. Metternich to Hügel, 16 Aug. 1833, F, 289; Metternich to Stürmer, 3 Oct. 1833, T VI, 57.
124. A.L. Macfie, *The Eastern Question 1774-1923* (London, 1996), 22.
125. Anderson, *Eastern Question*, 85.
126. Ponsonby's Note to the Porte, 26 Aug. 1833, Roussin's Note to the Porte, 26 Aug. 1833, The Note of the Porte to Ponsonby and Roussin, 20 Sept. 1833, attached to Stürmer to Metternich, 5, 19 and 25 Sept. 1833, T VI, 58.
127. Webster, *Palmerston*, 305.
128. Metternich to Stürmer, 3 Oct. and 24 Dec. 1833, T VI, 59; Metternich to Esterházy, 10 Dec. 1833, E, 204; Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 4 Nov. 1833, CP, A, 419; Sainte-Aulaire to Broglie, 14 March 1834, CP, A, 420; Stürmer to Metternich, 5 Sept. 1833, T VI, 58.

129. Metternich to Ficquelmont, 25 May and 10 July 1833, Ra C-A, 383; Metternich to Hügel, 30 Aug. 1833, F, 289; T. Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Nikolaus I.*, Band III (Berlin, 1913), 208.
130. Lamb to Palmerston, 3 June 1833, FO 120/137; More on Mohammed Ali's ambitious policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1831–2 and its limits Kutluoğlu, *Egyptian Question*, 61–106; A. L. al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali* (Cambridge, 1984), 221–31; H. Dodwell, *The Founder of Modern Egypt. A Study of Muhammad Ali* (London, 1931), 106–23; M. Sabry, *L'Empire Égyptien sous Mohamed-Ali et La Question d'Orient (1811–1849)* (Paris, 1930), 187–47.
131. Molden, *Orientpolitik*, 119–23.
132. Metternich to Ficquelmont, 10 July 1833, Ra C-A, 383.
133. Metternich to Ottenfels, 13 Sept. 1833, OO, 38.
134. Molden, *Orientpolitik*, 90; Webster, *Palmerston*, 310, 349 and 360; D. Southgate, '*The Most English Minister...' The Policies and Politics of Palmerston* (London, 1966), 118.
135. Metternich to Stürmer, 3 Oct. 1833, T VI, 57; see also Metternich to Hügel, 22 Oct. 1833, F, 290.
136. Anderson, *Eastern Question*, 86; Kutluoğlu, *Egyptian Question*, 107; Puryear, *France*, 203.
137. R.-T. Fischer, *Österreich im Nahen Osten* (Vienna, 2006), 85; for similar view see also Macfie, *Eastern Question*, 23.
138. Molden, *Orientpolitik*, 107.
139. The record of the conversation between Metternich and Prokesch on 25 Dec. 1833, Prokesch-Osten, *Tagebüchern*, 199.
140. Müller, *Münchengrätz*, 60.
141. Sked, *Metternich*, 91; Mosely, *Russian Diplomacy*, 26; Schroeder, *Transformation*, 632; Jelavich, *Habsburg Empire*, 49; Todorova, *Mythology*, 29.
142. Schiemann, *Russland*, 238; Müller, M*ünchengrätz*, 54.
143. Molden, *Orientpolitik*, 119–23.
144. H.N. Ingle, *Nesselrode and the Russian Raprochement with Britain*, 1836–1844 (Berkeley, 1976), 113.
145. Webster, *Palmerston*, 314; Bitis, *Russia*, 477; C.W. Crawley, 'Anglo-Russian Relations, 1815–1840', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, iii (1929), 57.
146. Metternich to Esterházy, 10 and 26 Dec. 1833, E, 204; G.H. Bolsover, 'Palmerston and Metternich on the Eastern Question, 1834', *English Historical Review*, li (1936), 240.
147. Metternich to Esterházy, 27 Oct. 1833, E, 204; Metternich to Stürmer, 5 Dec. 1833, T VI, 57; Metternich to Ficquelmont, 16 Dec. 1833, R III, 99; Brockhausen to Frederick William III, 6 and 14 Dec. 1833, HA III, MA I, 6022.
148. Molden, *Orientpolitik*, 108.
149. M. Lamb, 'Writing up the Eastern Question in 1835–1836', *The International History Review*, xv (1993), 241.
150. Webster, *Palmerston*, 317.
151. Metternich to Neumann, 15 Feb. 1833, E, 204.
152. D. Seward, *Metternich. Der erste Europäer. Eine Biographie* (Zürich, 1993), 232.
153. Todorova, *Mythology*, 29.
154. Ciachir, *Adrianople*, 712.
155. Lamb to Palmerston, 8 May 1833, FO 120/136.
156. Metternich to Stürmer, 3 June 1833, T VI, 59.
157. Metternich to Neumann, 3 May 1833, E, 204; Metternich to Stürmer, 20 June 1833, T VI, 59.
158. Metternich to Apponyi, 3 May 1833, F, 289.
159. Anderson, *Great Powers*, 44.
160. Lamb to Palmerston, 1 Oct. 1833, FO 120/137.
161. Sked, *Metternich*, 89.
162. Ibid., 72.