Metternich, Bismarck, and the Myth of the "Long Peace," 1815–1914

by Sheldon Anderson

Many Western scholars and foreign-policy makers have lauded the Congress of Vienna, Metternich's "Concert of Europe," and Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck's alliance system for keeping a "long peace" from 1815 to 1914. The superiority of nineteenth-century statecraft is a myth. Europe was busy at war between 1815 and 1914, if not in conflicts on the scale of the Napoleonic Wars and World War I. Furthermore, the chancelleries of nineteenth-century Europe not only quelled national uprisings, but suppressed peoples' political rights and waged imperial wars throughout Africa and Asia. From the perspective of a Pole, a disenfranchised European, or an Indian, the century was not a "long peace" but a "long war."

A few years after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, Austrian chancellor Clemens von Metternich confided in a friend that "few people ... have understood me. My name is linked with so many tremendous events that it will go down in posterity in company with them. I tell you: in a hundred years writers will judge me quite differently."[1]

Metternich was right. Vilified in his time by liberals and nationalists for his conservative, authoritarian defense of Europe's old order, the two world wars of the twentieth century awakened a new appreciation for Metternich's diplomatic achievements, and the myth of Europe at peace in the nineteenth century gained strength.[2] The horrible destruction resulting from modern industrial and technological war in the twentieth century, and the vivid written, oral, and film documentation of the Holocaust confirmed the belief that Europe had descended to new depths of barbarism and brutality.[3] Revolution based on radical ideologies such as fascism and Marxism seemed akin to the nationalist and liberal drives of the masses in the nineteenth century and threatened the entire global order. The nuclear bomb made the quest for a stable peace even more urgent.

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Many Western scholars and foreign policy-makers have lauded the Congress of Vienna, Metternich's "Concert of Europe,"[4] and Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck's alliance system for keeping a "long peace" from 1815 to 1914.[5] Historian René Albrecht-Carrié is among many in the diplomatic field who have suggested that the nineteenth-century European states system compares favorably to earlier and later periods: "In contrast to our own, the nineteenth century, the hundred years between 1815 and 1914, certainly appears as a period of international order, even peace."[6] Noted scholar Gordon Craig concurs: "Because our own age has been marked by bitter international rivalry and continual preoccupation with war, it is perhaps understandable that whenever we think of the general characteristics of an earlier period, we are apt to turn our attention first to the state of international politics during it. Regarded from this point of view, the years that stretch from 1815 to 1848 seem almost, in comparison with our own time, to have formed a golden age of harmony."[7]

Historians have often cast the century as a Golden Age of diplomacy, and the Congress of Vienna in 1814–1815, in contrast to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, as a model of wise and sagacious foreign policy, a primer in sensible realism based on consensus rules of international behavior and peaceful cooperation among all the great powers, including the vanquished French. The sober realism of the nineteenth-century diplomats, when countries pursued their national interests within the constraints of a system devoted to keeping the general peace, seemed a suitable diplomatic strategy during the Cold War and the nuclear age.

In a rough and tumble Hobbesian world, many realists argue, international law, international organizations, multilateralism, and democratic principles of diplomacy are weak guarantors of national security. This idealistic version of foreign policy, they posit, is a luxury no country can afford. Realist policy-makers pursue basic national interests and have no qualms about using unilateral military force to protect them. Multilateralist policies are for weaker states.

The Congress of Vienna was undoubtedly a new development in European diplomatic practice. The great powers settled borders and created a system of international relations to prevent another French war of conquest. Castlereagh hoped that periodic meetings of the great powers would prevent wars, rather than merely settle postwar disputes: "[Congresses are] for the purpose of consulting upon their interest, or for the consideration of measures which ... shall be considered the most salutary for the purpose and prosperity of Nations and the maintenance for the Peace of Europe."[8]

Diplomatic historian Paul Schroeder concludes that in contrast to other peacemaking efforts, such as the Versailles Treaty and the end of World War II, "only the Vienna settlement got things right; only it genuinely established peace."[9] Schroeder is cautiously optimistic about Vienna's legacy: "Yet it left behind real accomplishments and lessons: the uses and importance of intermediary bodies, the values of concert and grouping methods, the management functions of restraining alliances and *ententes*, and more ... relations between juridically co-ordinate states rather than superordinate and subordinate ones, can none the less be restrained by consensus and bounded by law."[10] Vienna established that war was revolutionary and threatened the conservative states system.[11]

This new European order was to derive its legitimacy from international law and serve the security interests of all the states of Europe, even the Ottoman Empire.[12] Although realists criticize the idealism of collective security constructs such as the League of Nations and the United Nations, the Vienna consensus was the prototype for these international organizations. Vienna made theoretical contributions to multilateralism, international law, and collective security.

The Concert of Europe *was* a gesture of cooperation and compromise between the European states, but the ideas governing the European states system were revolutionary in theory, not in practice. The traditional conservative interests of the great powers dominated the system as it had in the past, undermining any long-term, progressive trends in international politics. Furthermore, Metternich and Bismarck, rightly or wrongly, are not remembered as laying the foundations for Wilsonianism, but rather for hard nosed realist approach to international affairs and the importance of a balance of power in keeping the peace.

For policy-makers today, the Vienna model of international relations rests on four basic principles. First, Machiavellianism, not justice or morality, should guide policy-making. A second, related principle is that the political character of a state, as long as it is not revolutionary, is of no consequence in foreign affairs. The role of a state in the system rests solely on its power. Third, the balance of power keeps the peace. Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations failed where Metternich's Concert and Bismarck's alliance system succeeded. Fourth, the general peace holds when the great powers control the state system and adjudicate the legitimacy of demands to change it. The heads of state determine policy, not "the people."

The problem with the Vienna model is that the "long peace" and the success of nineteenth-century statecraft are myths. Europe was busy

at war between 1815 and 1914, if not in conflicts on the scale of the Napoleonic Wars and World War I. Furthermore, the chancelleries of nineteenth-century Europe not only quelled national uprisings, but suppressed peoples' political rights, and waged imperial wars throughout Africa and Asia. From the perspective of a Pole, a disenfranchised European, or an Indian, the century was not a "long peace" but a "long war."

It is hard to reconcile a positive assessment of Vienna with Europe's record of war in the nineteenth century.[13] War for the great powers in the nineteenth century was the rule, not the exception. European states fought over thirty wars from 1815 to 1871; one historian counts thirty-seven different wars involving European states from 1871 to 1914.[14] Each European power took up the sword with regularity. The Russians fought the Turks in 1827, 1853, and again in 1877. "Long peace" advocates often overlook the Crimean War, which engaged three of the five great European powers. If there was any Concert left after the revolutions of 1848, Crimea finished it off.[15] Russian minister of interior von Plehve urged Nicholas II to go to war with Japan in 1904 because "what we need to hold Russia back from revolution is a small, victorious war."[16] Russia lost that war, revealing that Japan would be the one non-European power to be reckoned with in the twentieth century.

France intervened into Spain in 1823 and embroiled itself on behalf of Sardinia-Piedmont against Austria in the first war of Italian unification in 1859, a campaign that Napoleon III used to stifle domestic opposition to his dictatorship. He hoped that the war against Prussia in 1870 would have the same effect, but defeat brought his empire crashing down.

The Austrian suppression of the Hungarian independence movement in 1849 was a full-blown international conflict when Russian armies came to Vienna's aid. After the war with France and Sardinia-Piedmont in 1859, the Habsburg Empire fought two more wars in the 1860s, with Prussia against Denmark in 1864 and the devastating loss to Prussia in 1866, which relegated Austria to a power of second rank.

Metternich's Concert and the balance of power were not responsible for the short peace that followed Vienna, anyway. There was a natural lull in great power rivalry after 1815.[17] Europe was psychologically and materially exhausted from the twenty years of war; the wars of the French revolution from 1792 to 1815—together termed the Great War—had killed approximately five million people.[18]

Each power in 1815 had more to gain by keeping the general peace. Napoleon had destroyed western Russia and Moscow, and Tsar Alexander I was in deep debt from the campaign into France. The Habsburg

Empire was plagued by potentially damaging national and liberal movements. A general European war served no Austrian interest.[19] The expansion of British political and economic interests overseas put them into the peace camp as well. The restored Bourbon dynasty was compelled to operate within the constraints of a states system directed primarily against France. War risked a return of the Revolution, and within a few years the Bourbons joined the Concert to prevent that from happening. As the weakest of the great powers, the Prussians used the respite following Vienna to pursue military and economic policies that changed the balance of power in Central Europe in their favor. The Rhineland was ceded to Prussia in 1815 for strategic reasons, but its economic importance enabled Prussia to become the foremost continental power a half century after Vienna.

The Concert sanctioned the customary diplomatic practice of sharing the spoils of smaller states, crumbling empires, and, in the last half of the century, of Africa and Asia. The Vienna settlement carved out new gains for Prussia, the Netherlands, Austria, and Russia. Great Britain and Russia fostered this balance in Europe to prevent another pan-European empire. Both powers had vast imperial pursuits outside of Europe and had nothing to gain from another continental war. They were willing to countenance Austrian dominance in Italy and a Prussian presence on the Rhine to blunt any opposition to their preponderance of power in their respective spheres of influence—Russia in the Caucasus and the Balkans, and Britain in India, China, and on the high seas. For a time they shared an "equilibrium" in the Near East.

Many scholars and diplomats have extolled the balance of power as a hard-headed realist method of keeping the peace.[20] This theory holds that when a balance exists, a state will not carelessly risk war. It assumes that states are rational and have perfect knowledge of each power's military capabilities. The balance of power is a self-regulating system that is supposed to keep the peace without international agreements, consultations, and norms of international behavior. After the Napoleonic Wars, the security of the five great European states—Austria, Russia, Great Britain, France, and Prussia—was predicated on the faith that none of them would try to upset the balance through war because the other states would coalesce to stop the aggressor.[21]

The peacekeeping imperative of the balance of power is an illusion. Leaders do not share the same perceptions of that balance. Those who risked an all-European war in the nineteenth century, such as Palmerston and Napoleon III in the Crimean War, Piedmont's minister Count Camillo

Cavour in the war with Austria in 1859, and Bismarck in the wars of German unification, were undeterred by a European balance of power. The Crimean War broke out over conflicting Russian and British interests in the moribund Ottoman Empire. The British thought that an enlarged Russia would upset the balance of power in Europe. As in 1914, the balance was a catalyst for war, not a deterrent.[22]

Cavour and Bismarck also exposed the fragility of the European balance of power. The Crimean War eroded the British and Russian commitment to the balance in Central Europe, and Austria's neutrality in the war left it isolated. Napoleon and Cavour exploited the diplomatic opportunity to expand Piedmont's territory, and Bismarck fought three wars from 1864 to 1870 to establish Prussian hegemony in Central Europe. Bismarck cleverly diverted attention to Prussia's expansion by making unfulfilled territorial promises to France in 1866 and to Britain in 1870, gestures that were more akin to the Polish partitions than to a new dawn of legitimate international relations.[23] Hoping to duplicate Bismarck's limited wars, the Russians fought the Ottoman Empire in 1877, but after the Russian victory at Plevna, the British deployed their fleet to prevent the fall of Constantinople. Bismarck agreed to mediate the Balkan conflict at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

The two most famous Congresses of the nineteenth century, Vienna and Berlin, had similar agendas. The great powers grabbed territories at the expense of the lesser states to preserve the balance of power. At Berlin the Russians got Batum, Kars, and Bessarabia, the British took Cyprus, and the Austrians occupied Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bismarck tried to deflect French interest in Alsace-Lorraine in 1878 by telling them that "the Tunisian pear is ripe and the time has come for you to pluck it." Bismarck also facilitated the French takeover of Madagascar, and looked the other way when the British seized Transvaal, Egypt, and Nigeria.[24] The next Congress of Berlin in 1884 duplicated these land deals in Africa.

The Vienna and two Berlin Congresses maintained a veneer of European harmony and a rough balance of power based on an imperial division of the world. British historian Michael Howard observed that "it was only towards the end of the nineteenth century that the Europeans saw any need to *justify* their conquest and rule. Conquest was, after all, a perfectly normal historical process and always has been."[25]

Bismarck's success on the battlefield and intrigue in the courts of Europe followed the spirit of Metternich's reactionary Concert; war was still, as Metternich's secretary Friedrich von Gentz put it, a "necessary and natural" means to promote state interests.[26] Bismarck brought

more war to Europe than any leader since Napoleon, and his success on the battlefield gave German leaders renewed faith in Prussian general and historian Karl von Clausewitz's maxim that "war is the continuation of politics by other means." War was inevitable and even desirable. Prussian Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke called it

> an ultimate but completely legitimate means of upholding the existence, the independence and the honour of a state.... Eternal peace is a dream, and not even a beautiful one; and war is an inherent part of God's world order.[27]

Bismarck gutted whatever progress had been made in the nineteenth century toward a "just equilibrium" of powers seeking to avoid war. His legacy was illiberal rule in Germany, the preponderant role of the military in German politics and society, and a European states system based on fear and competition. From the French perspective, the Prussian stamp on the European states system led it down the path to two world wars. Overlooking the wars of Louis XIV and Napoleon I, French diplomat Jules Cambon, writing shortly after 1945, declared that "the war of 1870 put the finishing touch to what had been begun in 1866. It marked the end of that balance of power which, under the leadership of France, had guaranteed some sort of order in Europe during two centuries."[28]

The lynchpin of the European states system from 1871 to 1890 was Bismarck's seemingly stable alliance system. By playing the "honest broker" after 1871, Bismarck gained the reputation as Metternich's protegé. He shrewdly consolidated Prussia's position in Germany and conducted the foreign policy of a "satiated" state. Nineteenth-century German scholars such as sociologist Max Weber and historian Hans Delbrück urged Berlin to emulate the British and conduct *Weltpolitik*,[29] but as one of Bismarck's admirers, diplomatic historian William L. Langer, wrote in 1962, "no other statesman of his standing had ever before shown the same great moderation and sound political sense of the possible and the desirable."[30] Historian Gerhard Ritter gave Bismarck credit for keeping the second half of the "long peace" and held his successors responsible for its demise. Ritter argued that

> [After 1890] the German leadership lacked exactly that which was Bismarck's strength: the political acumen, the moral wisdom, the capacity for wise moderation. Hence everything went to pieces in

> the end, but in spite of Bismarck rather than because of him. A later generation has no right to complain of the "short duration" of his creation, particularly since the period from 1871 to 1914 was after all one of the longest periods of peace in European history.[31]

Bismarck's precarious, complex, and contradictory alliance system was based on the inevitability of the next continental war, however, and made it more likely that war would engage all of the European powers. France remained implacable, and the Russians felt cheated by the Congress of Berlin. Bismarck repeatedly raised the prospect of war with France to pass army bills. Erich Eyck, an important biographer of the famous German chancellor, blamed Bismarck for laying the groundwork for the two world wars unleashed by Germany:

> The German–French war of 1870–1871 ... sowed a harvest of hate and discord which far exceeded the most dour expectations of the blackest pessimists. It sealed the fate of uncounted men who were born long after the sound of the last shot had echoed away.[32]

When Bismarck left the scene in 1890, France borrowed from his repertoire of *Realpolitik* by forging an alliance with tsarist Russia in 1894. Although overt French revanchism declined at the turn of the century, Germany's blustering *Weltpolitik* and intervention into French affairs in Morocco in 1905–1906, and again in 1911, revived it. Alsace-Lorraine remained an insurmountable obstacle to a genuine Franco–German rapprochement.

Peace in Europe did not depend on the balance of power, however, but on leaders' decisions to go to war or keep the peace. Every state wanted a preponderance of power. After Vienna the balance of power favored Great Britain and Russia; at the end of the century it had shifted to Germany. Bismarck chose not to reach beyond the German states to conquer the rest of *Mitteleuropa* and thus avoided a general European war. These powers promoted peace in these respective periods only because war could have jeopardized their dominant positions.

Absent a Metternich or a Bismarck, the European states system after 1848 and after 1890 appeared rudderless. But one study estimates that "more questions of contention were settled by arbitration during the last twenty years of the nineteenth century than during the previous eighty years, and there were over a hundred such arbitrations between 1904 and 1914."[33] Unfortunately, the diplomatic culture of the early

twentieth century drew heavily on Bismarck's *Realpolitik* and social Darwinian notions of a brutish competition of the fittest nations. War and conquest was supposed to purify and invigorate a nation. Lord Salisbury called it a contest between "dying and living nations," and Herbert Asquith "compared the growth of empire to 'the corresponding processes in the growing human body.'" French historian and statesman Gabriel Hanotaux warned that the "failure to acquire [empire was] a signal of decline."[34]

Bismarck and the illiberal, militaristic Prussian-German state contributed much to this anti-European thought. In 1911, German general Friedrich von Bernhardi wrote the widely circulated book *Germany and Next War*, in which he declared that

> [war was] not merely a necessary element in the lives of nations, but an indispensable factor of culture, in which a true civilized nation finds the highest expression of truth and vitality.... War had forged that Prussia, hard as steel, on which the new Germany could grow up as a mighty European State and a World Power of the future.... Wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results.[35]

At the turn of the century European leaders were tip-toeing their way through a minefield of German pretensions to global power, Austro-Hungarian national problems, Ottoman weakness, and repeated Russian political and economic crises. But it was not a foregone conclusion that Europe would go to war in 1914. The European states system was neither responsible for maintaining the peace during the first Bosnian crisis in 1908 nor causing the war in 1914. The Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 had the potential to draw the alliances into war, but the powers decided against it.

The same balance of power existed in 1914.[36] Calculated, rational decisions by the great powers' leaders determined whether to go to war over the Balkans. When the Russians mobilized first in the fall of 1914, the Germans decided to fight rather than face a potentially stronger Franco–Russian alliance in the future. The German "blank check" to Austria in July 1914 risked a war to maintain Germany's powerful position in Central Europe. Germany opted for war *because* of the balance of power. Most of the great powers did not actively seek war in 1914 but were willing to risk it.

The euphoria in Europe over the outbreak of war in 1914 revealed the philosophical bankruptcy of nineteenth-century diplomacy, which

was based on von Clausewitz's dictum that war was merely a derivative of diplomacy. Given the destructive capability of twentieth-century weaponry, there would be horrible consequences of putting words and wars on the same moral plane.

The combatants expected the war to be bloody but short and limited, like the wars of the previous century. Only a few Europeans predicted that this war would be different.[37] If the German Schlieffen Plan had succeeded in breaching the French lines in 1914, which nearly happened, the war *would* have resembled previous conflicts. But the German offensive ground to a halt that fall, and the industrial capabilities of the European powers to mass produce the weapons of modern warfare determined the deadly stalemate in the trenches.[38] The deadlock revealed that there was in fact a rough balance of military power in Europe.[39] Germany and Austria-Hungary produced 19.2 percent of the world's manufactures in 1913; France, Russia, and Great Britain, 27.9 percent. The Central Powers had 143 divisions in 1914 to the Entente's 202.[40]

Territorial aggrandizement eventually became a war aim of all of the European powers. Britain and Russia had interests in the Ottoman Empire, France claimed Alsace-Lorraine, Italy wanted the eastern Adriatic, and Germany had grand plans for Eastern Europe. Although the Germans declared that they were fighting to support their ally Austria and to break free of Franco–Russian encirclement (*Einkreisung*), the harsh Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Bolshevik Russia in 1918 belied that claim.[41] The only homage that the European leaders made to Wilson's New Diplomacy was to keep these land deals secret.

The basic principles of the European states system had not changed from 1815 to 1914. Nonetheless, the balance of power is credited for both keeping a century of peace and blamed for causing World War I.[42] At the beginning and the end of this era, all of the great powers still regarded war as an acceptable and rational means of promoting state interests, regardless of the balance of power. The European states system in 1914 was predicated on the idea that war between the great powers would come sooner or later.[43]

The myth of the nineteenth century "long peace" also ignores the long battle of Europe's ruling elites against the forces of nationalism throughout the century, and after 1848, against liberalism. Poles, Czechs, or Serbs, for example, would hardly characterize the century as one of stability and tranquility, and neither would Europe's disenfranchised and impoverished classes.[44]

Nostalgia for the genteel, less ideological, unfettered nineteenth-century court diplomacy ignores how the great powers corrupted the idea of legitimacy. Armies, bureaucracies, and monarchies had the right to rule—the people did not. The fact that the Concert's principles did not derive from the will of the people was a fatal flaw for the efficacy of the entire Vienna system. The popular demand for representative government was an inexorable political reality, something the Vienna system could not accommodate.

When the British authorities shot working-class demonstrators at Peterloo in 1819, or when Tsar Nicholas suppressed the Decembrists in 1825, the Concert powers sought order, not justice. Metternich's Karlsbad Decrees banning the nationalist German *Burschenschaften* do not square with the interpretation of a flexible, adaptable Concert; according to Geoffrey Wawro, they

> censored the press, schools and universities in all of the German states, outlawed student fraternities, and proscribed even casual references to democratic reform or the "German nation." In the 1820s, a German schoolmaster only half-jokingly quipped that officials in Berlin and Vienna were "working on a law that will lay down how high birds may fly and how fast rabbits may run."[45]

The Concert debated whether the great powers had any right to crush these revolutionary movements in other countries and prevent a shift in the balance of power. Castlereagh was adamantly opposed.[46] Nonetheless, the great powers repeatedly used their armies to quell liberal democratic and national movements. By the time the French intervened in Spain in 1823, the Concert had managed to keep the general peace by dealing with uprisings in Italy and Greece.

The legitimacy of Metternich's conservative Concert rested solely on tradition, *raison d'etat*, and the use of force. The system was necessarily Machiavellian; justice played a limited role in nineteenth-century politics. Vienna was predicated on reactionary repression and illiberal government not much different from those of the preceding century. Friedrich von Gentz, Metternich's secretary, said that nothing had been achieved at Vienna except

> restorations which had already been effected by arms, agreements between the great powers which were of little value for the preservation of Europe, quite arbitrary alterations in the possessions of

> the smaller states, but no act of a higher nature, no great measure for public order or the general good which might compensate humanity for its long suffering or pacified it for the future.[47]

Pan-German nationalists, as well as other national leaders in the Habsburg Empire, decried Metternich's stubborn devotion to the forces of conservatism.[48] In a memorandum to the Russian tsar Alexander I in 1820, Metternich denounced the champions of political and national rights:

> The real aim of the idealists of the [liberal] party is *religious and political fusion*, and this being analyzed is nothing else but creating in favor of each individual an existence entirely independent of all authority, or any other will than his own, and idea absurd and contrary to the nature of man, and incompatible with the need of human society.[49]

Even Great Britain, the most liberal of the great powers, sought security based on the balance of power rather than on the promotion of justice. Castlereagh's praise of the Karlsbad Decrees could just as well have come from Berlin or St. Petersburg: "We are always pleased to see evil germs destroyed."[50]

Metternich himself recognized that he was swimming against the liberal current of history. In 1828 he wrote, "My life coincides with an abominable period. I came in the world either too early or too late; at present I am spending my life propping up mouldering buildings." As French historian Albert Sorel observed in 1894, Metternich lost his compass when nations rather than chancelleries began to influence politics.[51] The noted Metternich scholar Heinrich von Srbik, writing in 1925, called Metternich "the greatest foreign minister that Austria ever had, and one of the greatest masters of international politics in the history of the modern European states." Nonetheless, von Srbik acknowledged that Metternich's policies contributed in part to the downfall of the empire, for "he wanted to bind the populace to the state by self-interest, but he refused to rest the state on a politically ripening people."[52] When revolution hit Europe in 1848, Metternich had no program to deal with it.

Governments throughout Europe, with a few exceptions in northwestern Europe, restricted suffrage rights, freedom of the press, and the right to form political parties and trade unions. Von Gentz told British utopian socialist Robert Owen, "We do not desire to have the masses well off and independent. How could we rule over them?"[53] Education

was a rationed, dangerous commodity. Most Frenchmen in 1815 had no access to education. Of a population of 28 million, only 10,000 children went to high school annually. That figure grew to only 19,000 by 1842. Russia's population was twice France's, but Russia educated only a thousand more children. One historian sums up the hardscrabble lot of most Europeans this way: "The vast majority of Europeans in the early nineteenth century were illiterate or semiliterate peasants concerned only to scrape a living from the land; this suited their restored masters perfectly."[54]

In 1880, more than 60 percent of the adult males in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and Great Britain did not have the franchise. By 1910, the male population in Austria, Russia, and Germany had the vote, but the monarchies still held most of the executive, legislative, and judicial prerogatives.[55] France underwent a dynastic revolution in 1830, but the franchise in Louis Philippe's constitutional monarchy was limited to 3 percent of the population.[56] The first of three violent battles on the barricades of Paris in the nineteenth century took place in that year. French authorities ruthlessly suppressed another workers' protest in Lyon in 1834. The famous German historian Friedrich Meinecke traces the Concert's battle against liberal democratic nationalism from Metternich's Karlsbad Decrees to the brutal repression of the French revolutionaries in 1848: "In a terrible, three-day street battle, [Louis] Cavaignac smashed the Paris workers.... With the decline of communist fortunes, those of national liberalism sank as well."[57]

German, Austrian, and Italian revolutionaries fared no better in 1848. A crushing blow to liberalism in Germany came with the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866, which, according to Meinecke, "separated the way of the upsurging popular movements from the authoritarian militaristic citadel of the entire national life."[58] After Prussia's victory at Königgratz in 1866, Prussian general von Schleinitz rejoiced that the German liberal revolution was dead:

> This was a truly German imperial procession ... which expunges from us the shame of that other one of March 1848 when Frederick William IV went through the farce of appearing with the black-red-gold banner of revolution.... I said to myself that we have not only conquered the Austrians; we have also solved the German question and thereby disarmed the German revolution. I felt as though a heavy weight had been removed from my breast and I could now breathe

> freely, confident in the thought that the victorious king would no longer need the support of democratic elements ... but could now rule conservatively and respectably.[59]

The victory of Prussian-German conservatism created one of the most dangerous states in Central Europe. Furthermore, after Königgratz the Austrians were forced to compromise with the Hungarians in 1867, which virtually halted any liberal reform in Budapest's half of the empire. The Hungarians constituted only 40 percent of the population, but embarked on a systematic Magyarization program while maintaining their upper-class rule. By 1905, only 6.1 percent of the population in Hungary had the vote.[60]

The nineteenth-century states system did not provide any long-term solution to the diplomatic quandary of the modern era: What constitutes a nation, and when does it have the right to form its own state? Subject nations imbued with the ideals of the French Revolutions of 1789 and 1848 developed a passionate desire for a nation-state of their own. Like the disenfranchised classes of Europe, the aspirations of most of the nationalities in Concert Europe were dashed on the imperial altar.

Nationalism threatened to tear apart the empires and create new states in Germany and Italy; all of the European powers except France ruled over sizable national minorities. Britain gave no quarter to its recalcitrant Irish problem. The Irish Land War (1880–1882) was particularly brutal. Throughout the century, the three east European monarchies used Concert principles to prevent the resurrection of a Polish state. Russian troops ruthlessly crushed rebellions in 1830 and 1863, while Austria subdued a Polish revolt in Kraków in 1846. In the last half of the century the Prussians tried to Germanize the Poles, but their policy paled in comparison to the tsars' Russification program.[61]

Both centripetal and centrifugal nationalism threatened Vienna. Austrian Germans constituted only 23.9 percent of the population in the Habsburg Empire,[62] and Austrian liberal nationalists wanted Vienna to take the lead in uniting Germany. Metternich's uncompromising suppression of the progressive forces in Austria and Europe put them in a revolutionary mood in 1848, bringing the monarchy to its knees and ending his career. But the Habsburgs recovered to crush the Austrian liberals and their counterpart national movements in Bohemia, Italy, and Hungary. An autonomous Hungary in 1848 would have been more progressive than the illiberal Hungary of the Compromise of 1867.

The myth of the nineteenth-century "long peace" became the convenient yet flawed model for U.S. containment policy during the Cold War. British

diplomatic historian A. J. P. Taylor noted that in the early years of the Cold War idealistic schemes of collective security gave way to hard realism:

> The peace-making of Versailles began the disillusionment. [Metternich] crept back into favour as the exponent of a less idealistic diplomacy. The balance of power seemed a more sensible and a more effective principle than the League of Nations.[63]

U.S. president Richard Nixon and his top diplomat Henry Kissinger fostered their controversial reputations as master diplomatists by modeling their foreign policy on Metternich's great power diplomacy.[64] In his book on Concert diplomacy, Kissinger affirmed the "long peace" theory: "[The Vienna diplomats'] achievements were not inconsiderable: a period of peace lasting almost a hundred years."[65] British historian Michael Howard observed that "for him [Kissinger] the European practice, particularly as defined by British nineteenth-century statesmen, was not an aberration, but the norm for the conduct of international relations in any era."[66]

Nixon and Kissinger fostered detente with the Soviet Union and opened relations with Communist China. The Helsinki Accords of 1975 recognized the status quo in Europe; neither side would explicitly challenge the other's sphere of influence, although the legitimacy of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet satellite governments rested ultimately on Soviet tanks. The undemocratic character of Soviet bloc governments, Red China, or Third World regimes was of little concern to the neorealists in the Cold War. Kissinger followed nineteenth-century British diplomat Henry Palmerston's tenet that "there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies; there are only permanent interests." Some scholars claimed that the stalemate between NATO and the Warsaw Pact served Europe's basic security interests, and for that reason was likely to survive well into the twenty-first century.[67]

Like his nineteenth-century counterparts, Kissinger's infatuation with Metternichean great power politics ignored the plight of the people living under communist rule or under U.S.-backed dictatorships. Nixon, Kissinger, and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev disregarded the consequences of their policies on Third World peoples, where the Cold War left deep scars. Kissinger's policy of bombing North Vietnam to extract better peace terms was an exemplary expression of von Clausewitz's dictum linking diplomacy with military tactics. Kissinger could use the

same logic to accept the Brezhnev Doctrine, which enunciated the right of socialist countries to crush any counterrevolutionary forces that threatened a fraternal socialist state. While some critics viewed Moscow's foreign policy as driven by an ideological crusade to further the communist revolution, Kissinger saw the Soviet intervention into Prague in 1968 as a realist attempt to maintain the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. Washington could live with that.

Kissinger failed to consider the fundamental differences between conducting diplomacy for a nineteenth century "state-nation," as Philip Bobbitt termed it, and a twentieth-century "nation-state."[68] For Kissinger, the people's will was a pesky impediment to the conduct of realist diplomacy. After the antinuclear war film *The Day After* aired in November 1983, Kissinger asked, "Are we supposed to make policies by scaring ourselves to death? To demonstrate by an orgy of pictures what we have known for three decades does not contribute to solving the problem."[69] Michael Howard criticized Kissinger for ignoring the vast differences between the conduct of diplomacy in the two eras: "The policies of its [U.S.] statesmen, however much they may be guided by a perception of the national interest, must always be made acceptable to an ideologically motivated electorate. That is the problem Kissinger faced when in office." Howard concluded that Vienna is no diplomatic guide for policy-makers: "We would not be wise to regard that limited slice of world history as a universally applicable norm and try to project its values onto the far more diverse yet interdependent world of tomorrow."[70]

British historian Eric Hobsbawm has called the "short century" from 1914 to 1989 the "Age of Extremes," implying that there were earlier eras of reason, realism, and moderation. Some scholars claim that the relatively brief wars of the nineteenth century were fought merely for political objectives, while the devastating total wars of the twentieth century, as well as the Cold War, were ideological conflicts.[71]

The difference between the "political" nineteenth century and the "ideological" twentieth has been exaggerated. Metternich's reactionary defense of autocracies and ruling classes somehow escapes the ideological label. When it became necessary for the conservative elites to appeal to the more educated masses for support, they turned to such regressive ideologies as conservative nationalism, anti-Semitism, and imperialism. The much ballyhooed conservative moderation of the Vienna system actually drove many liberal reformers to support more radical political choices, such as anarchism, Marxism, and nationalism.[72] Napoleon III tried a nationalist appeal to rally his divided people against Prussia in

1870, but defeat brought civil war between the French urban bourgeoisie, the rural masses (75 percent of the population), and the Parisian working classes. When the French republican government of Adolph Thiers killed 25,000 Communards in 1871, his methods owed much to the legacy of Metternich's conservative principles and ruthless repression of dissent. Even a "republican" government could resort to state violence to preserve its power and crush revolutionary movements.

The outbreak of the Great War had more to do with the great powers' political interests than with ideology. Austria-Hungary fought to preserve its empire, while the Russians used pan-Slavism as a cover to establish a sphere of influence in the Balkans. German nationalists did not drive Germany to war; German leaders knew that a lost war would mean an end to the empire and unleash a social and economic revolution as well. Their willingness to risk war in 1914 was aimed at breaking out of Entente encirclement and preventing the further weakening of their sole ally Austria. After the French had failed to back the Russians in the Bosnian crisis of 1908, they decided to support St. Petersburg in 1914 and gamble for the return of Alsace-Lorraine.

National enthusiasm for war, whipped up by nationalist presses and demagoguery, ran rampant in 1914. But French revolutionary armies a century earlier were permeated with as much patriotic fervor and missionary zeal. The Western front was a deadly stalemate because of the products of modern industrial society—the machine gun, heavy artillery, barbed wire, flame-throwers, and poison gas—not because an ideological crusade made soldiers more courageous. Their shared conviction entering the war—a willingness to sacrifice for the nation—died quickly in the trenches.[73]

The passions fostered by fascist and Marxist ideology are often blamed for World War II, but most Germans were sobered by the outbreak of war in 1939. There is no evidence that Stalin planned an aggressive war to spread communism; he did not break the Nazi–Soviet Pact, which was a realist agreement in the nineteenth-century vein. With the exception of the Nazis' fanatic nationalism and anti-Semitism, which rendered the Holocaust possible, the length and deadliness of the war was not caused by ideological extremism. No common ideology linked Russia and Britain and France in World War I, or the Western powers and the Soviet Union in World War II. Defeating Germany was their common goal, not a campaign for democracy or communism.

The "new imperialism" of the late nineteenth century had elements of an "ideological" war on Asia and Africa. Racial theories abounded to justify the rule of the enlightened strains over the unenlightened

peoples. The European ruling elites used empire and the national pride it fostered as a tool to contain the relentless political pressure from the disenfranchised classes. British Empire builder Cecil Rhodes argued, "If you wish to avoid civil war then you must become an imperialist."[74] Concert-style great power diplomacy culminated in the Berlin Conference in 1884–1885, when the Europeans delineated their empires in Africa without resorting to war. Territorial aggrandizement was still an accepted principle of European diplomacy, as long as each competing country was equitably compensated. By the end of the century, Europeans (and their descendents) controlled almost 85 percent of the world.

Nineteenth-century imperialism was every bit as savage as twentieth-century conflicts, but without a ubiquitous mass media to make this apparent to all. The loss of life in the conquest and maintenance of imperial rule was staggering. The British wars of imperialism, such as the Indian Mutiny of 1857–1859, the Zulu War in 1879, the Boer War (1899–1902), and the Boxer Rebellion (1899–1901) were brutal, bloody affairs, as were French colonial wars in Algeria (1839–1847), Indochina (1882–1884), and China (1884–1885).[75] The Sepoy rebellion against British officers in India in 1857 resulted in 50,000 deaths. Zulu armies took about 50 percent casualties in the war with Britain in 1879. The German colonial wars in Tanzania cost between 120,000 to 300,000 native lives, and some tribes were virtually wiped out. The Dutch army in Indonesia lost 2000 men in the Aceh War (1873–1878), while the Acehnese death toll was 100,000, with another 500,000 wounded. Fueled by Western arms and money, the Chinese Civil War (the Taiping Rebellion) from 1851 to 1864 resulted in ten to twenty million deaths. Some 200,000 Filipinos perished in the U.S. pacification of the Philippines. The most notorious slaughter was the British defeat of a Sudanese army at Omdurman in 1898; British dead numbered 28 whereas the Sudanese lost 11,000.[76] The "White Man's Burden," as Rudyard Kipling put it, left a legacy of economic exploitation and violent oppression of the colonized peoples, and imbued the imperialists with a vicious martial spirit.[77] From an Asian or African perspective, the nineteenth century was a "long war" against imperial rule, and an "ideological" one at that.

The relatively easy conquest of Africa and Asia had unforeseen results for modern war between industrial states. The technological superiority of the colonial armies provided few lessons for war between Europeans; Europe's military leaders were steeped in outmoded strategies that were used with great success against vastly inferior armies.[78] Courage in battle still seemed to count for something in the imperial

wars, but it would not matter against an enemy armed with the same firepower. The futile offensives during World War I made a mockery of the soldier's code of bravery and martial skill.[79]

A corollary to the "long peace" theory is that international trade and economic interdependence, spurred by the age of imperialism, made war less likely.[80] The so-called Manchester school held that the capitalism would lead to peace, not war.

But the violent, nationalist legacy of imperial competition contributed to the idea that war between the powers was inevitable. Friction over the Berlin to Baghdad railroad, Morocco, Bosnia, and China laid the psychological groundwork for the Great War. The quest for empire became an important strategy for governments facing mounting demographic and economic challenges. Imperialism did not provide any fundamental solutions to national and class divisions, but rather fostered a chauvinistic, suspicious, and competitive atmosphere in interstate relations.

U.S. policy-makers rarely invoke the nineteenth-century European states system as a model of peacekeeping today, but the principles of Concert diplomacy still have cachet. Realist policy-makers reap praise and admiration for their sober assessments of basic national interests and willingness to use military force to protect them, while idealists are often scorned for seeking nonviolent, multilateral means of keeping the peace. Most foreign policy-makers want to be cast in the mold of such tough antagonists as Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, or Ronald Reagan, rather than tagged as dreamers and compromisers like Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, or Jimmy Carter.[81]

U.S. foreign policy in the early twenty-first century mirrors British balance of power diplomacy a century ago. Britain, like the United States, used its navy to project its political and economic power abroad. Britain tenaciously guarded its dominance on the seas while promoting the balance of power for everyone else. As the oldest and most progressive European state, Britain saw itself as the exceptional colonial power. British self-interest in the empire came with a duty to bring the benefits of civilization to the colonial peoples. Believers in American exceptionalism also tend to downplay the United States' imperial and slaveholding past while extolling the historic American devotion to freedom and democracy.

Lest they be charged with adopting liberal notions of international law and cooperation, some neoconservatives even couch human rights in tough, balance of power rhetoric. In its national security strategy in 2002, the George W. Bush administration used the phrase "the balance of power that favors freedom" five times, such as in this line: "In keeping

with our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors human freedom."[82] *New York Times* reporter James Mann called it "a careful hedge blending the Kissingerian preoccupation, a balance of power, and the Reaganite quest for human freedom."[83]

The Congress of Vienna *was* a step forward in international relations, although the powers failed to live up to its ideals. The great states of Europe agreed to preserve peace between them and arbitrate any potential *casus belli*. Historian Paul Schroeder observed that

> the light that thus began to shine in international politics in 1815 was brief, fitful, and wintry. It would be followed by a long twilight and an even longer, bitterly cold night. Let there be no mistake, however: 1815 was not a false dawn. It marked a new day, and it helps make other new days thinkable.[84]

Under George Canning, whom Metternich called "the devil incarnate" and "the evil genius of revolution,"[85] British foreign policy began to reflect these more progressive tendencies. Later in the century British prime minister William Gladstone appealed to the "civilized" European powers to champion the rights of oppressed Italians, Poles, and the Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Gladstone tried to revive a more liberal Concert in the wake of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, but Bismarck's alliance system and the Egyptian crisis of 1882 ended that effort. The heads of government in Berlin and St. Petersburg got their inspiration from Metternich, not from Mazzini, Schurz, or Gladstone. Bismarck could not hide his disdain for Gladstone's idealism: "[Gladstone] had played too long with words that now the words played with him."[86] Historian Hajo Holborn argued that Bismarck

> saw in Gladstone more than in any other statesman on the contemporary European scene his ideological opposite. He was wrong, however, in asserting that Gladstone—or, as he labeled him with one of his strongest vituperative expressions, "*Professor*" Gladstone—was ruining England, nor could he know that a Gladstonean Professor Wilson was destined to become the foremost destroyer of the German monarchy.[87]

It took two devastating world wars and a Cold War to convince Europeans that in the long run, Gladstone was right. "Bismarck's heirs,"

wrote A. J. P. Taylor, "the boasted *Realpolitikers*, have always been defeated by the heirs of Gladstone, those who hope to make the world anew."[88] Devotees of the European Union have dismissed Metternich's Concert and Bismarck's balance of power alliance system as models for modern diplomacy. The European Union is the descendent of the Congress of Vienna's promise of collective security and the rule of international law. The European states now recognize that the use of force among them is not merely another tool of diplomacy, as von Clausewitz argued, but its ultimate failure.

NOTES

1. Quoted in Henry F. Schwarz, "Introduction," in Henry F. Schwarz, ed., *Metternich, the "Coachman of Europe": Statesman or Evil Genius?* (Boston, MA: D.C. Heath and Co., 1962), vii.

2. See Andreas Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International Stability* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 247; Michael Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations: The Search for National Security in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 27; and Otto Feinstein, "Conflict at Munich: Pluralism vs. Hegemonism," in Melvin Small and Otto Feinstein, eds., *Appeasing Fascism: Articles from the Wayne State University Conference on Munich after Fifty Years* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1991), 23.

3. C. J. Bartlett, *Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), ix, 23; René Albrecht-Carrié, *The Concert of Europe* (London: MacMillan, 1968), 9; Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations*, 17, 25, 27; Richard Langhorne, *The Collapse of the Concert of Europe: International Politics, 1890–1914* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), 111; Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 559, 578; Paul W. Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), 425; and Robert D. Kaplan, "Kissinger, Metternich, and Realism," *Atlantic Monthly* 283/6 (June 1999): 73–82.

4. See Carsten Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and International Theory, 1815–1914* (Harlow, UK: Longmans, 1970), 2–5. Metternich's system became commonly known as a "concert" in the last half of the century. Some Prussian diplomats called it the "Pentarchy" for the five great powers.

5. No twentieth-century diplomats have come close to achieving their notoriety. Winston Churchill is perhaps most often mentioned in the same company with Metternich and Bismarck, but mainly as a wartime leader rather than

a diplomat who held the peace of Europe together. Their legends are due in part to their longevity; Metternich was chancellor of Austria from 1807 to 1848, and Bismarck led Prussia and Germany from 1863 to 1890. Henry Palmerston was the only other nineteenth-century diplomat who had a long-lasting impact on European affairs. British foreign minister Robert Castlereagh, whom some historians give more credit for establishing a legitimate Concert after 1815, ended his own life in 1822 and subverted his place in history. See Philip Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace, and the Course of History* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 165. Of Castlereagh Bobbitt writes, "This far-sighted statesman had, more than any other person at the Congress, created a permanent system of consultation, a genuine 'concert of Europe.'"

6. Albrecht-Carrié, *The Concert of Europe*, 9; Henry Kissinger is perhaps most often cited as a diplomat inspired by Metternich and Bismarck. See his *A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812–1815* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); see Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations*, 27; and Langhorne, *The Collapse of the Concert of Europe*, 111. For similar views, see R. B. Mowat, *The European States System: A Study of International Relations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1923); Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*; Bruce Waller, "Relations between States and Nations," in Bruce Waller, ed., *Themes in Modern European History, 1830–90* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990); and Bartlett, *Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914*.

7. Gordon Craig, *Europe Since 1815* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 3–4.

8. Quoted in Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, 164.

9. See Jules Cambon, "The Permanent Bases of French Foreign Policy," in Hamilton Fish Armstrong, ed., *The Foreign Affairs Reader* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1947), 107. The French term used at the time was *l'équilibre européen*. In this essay first published in January 1930, Cambon, a French diplomat, gave France credit for raising the balance of power to the level of a law of diplomacy: "In the eighteenth century, then, the policy of France, as defined by her philosophers and her statesmen, was far from being imperialistic. It based itself rather upon the idea of the balance of power.... Later on, naturally enough, theorists were found to give it its name and to make of it the fundamental law on which rested peace between the European Powers."

10. Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, 165.

11. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848*, 577–578, 581–582, 802–804; see also Sally Marks, *The Ebbing of European Ascendancy* (London: Arnold, 2002), 7.

12. See Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe*, 8. Holbraad identifies three purposes for concert: to preserve the boundaries and dynasties of Vienna,

maintain a balance of power, and "as a means for humanitarian reform or as the germ of international organization"; and Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640–1990*, 323.

13. See H. Hearder, *Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Longman, 1966), 153.

14. H. L. Wesseling, *Imperialism and Colonialism* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 13–14. These numbers include the wars of imperialism outside of Europe.

15. See Norman Rich, *Great Power Diplomacy, 1814–1914* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992); and F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, *The Great Powers and the European States System, 1822–1913* (London: Longman, 1980). Bridge and Bullen call the Crimean War and the wars of German unification an "aberration."

16. Quoted in Robert J. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe* (Kent, South Australia: Croom Helm Ltd., 1983), 350.

17. See M. S. Anderson, *The Ascendancy of Europe, 1815–1914* (London: Longman, 1985), 1, 293; A. J. P. Taylor, "Metternich," in Chris Wrigley, ed., *From Napoleon to the Second International Essays on Nineteenth-Century Europe* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993), 93–94. Taylor does not credit Metternich with any special diplomatic acumen or innovation. He contends that Henry Palmerston kept the peace in the Belgian crisis in 1830, not Metternich; see also Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848*, 586–587. He attributes Castlereagh's and Alexander I's "moderate" foreign policies after 1815 to their financial and economic problems.

18. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848*, 580; Geoffrey Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914* (London: Routledge, 2000), 16, 73. The Seven Years' War foreshadowed the modern era of warfare. There were 180,000 Prussian casualties in the war, which Wawro calls "a veritable holocaust for the times." Wawro points out that the battles of the Napoleonic Wars, such as Wagram, where the French took 33,000 casualties and the Austrians 37,000 (25 percent of the combatants), were very bloody. Even Napoleon was distraught at the carnage; and Kissinger, *A World Restored*, 6. Kissinger says that the European state system would ultimately fail to keep the peace in 1914 not because of its inherent instability, but because the diplomats and the people of Europe could no longer remember the devastation of the Napoleonic wars.

19. Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848–1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 102–103. Sperber argues that "it was no accident that the great statesman of the party of order was the Habsburgs' Chancellor, since the Austrian Empire's existence as a Great Power was dependent on the preservation of the status quo."

20. See the discussions in G. John Ikenberry, ed., *America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); and William Wohlforth, "The Stability of the Unipolar World," *International Security* 26/3 (Winter 2001/2002): 39–55.

21. For a positive assessment of Vienna for establishing a balance of power and rules of international behavior, see Bruce Waller, "Relations between States and Nations," in Waller, ed., *Themes in Modern European History, 1830–1890*, 254; and Mandelbaum, *The Fate of Nations*, 13–14.

22. See Norman Rich, *Why the Crimean War: A Cautionary Tale* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991); and Schroeder, *Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War*, 395, 408–409.

23. Michael Howard, "The World According to Henry: From Metternich to Me," *Foreign Affairs* 73/3 (May/June 1994): 134. Michael Howard praises Metternich for creating a new system of interstate relations, but also points out that the balance of power is a flawed means to keep the peace: "It was not until Metternich that a statesman appeared who had not only internalized the concept [of the balance of power] but was given the opportunity to create a new international structure that explicitly embodied it. His less perceptive successors allowed it to collapse. Bismarck recreated it, although on a far less stable basis. Again his successors allowed it to collapse. The First World War came about not because of the unstable power balance created by competing alliances (though it is not quite clear whether Kissinger accepts this), but because the German Empire was no longer interested in maintaining a power balance."

24. Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914*, 132.

25. Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 26.

26. Quoted in Bartlett, *Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914*, 2.

27. Quoted in Holbraad, *The Concert of Europe*, 76–78.

28. Jules Cambon, "The Permanent Bases of French Foreign Policy," in Armstrong, ed., *The Foreign Affairs Reader*, 115.

29. Bartlett, *Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914*, 126.

30. William L. Langer, *European Alliances and Alignments, 1871–1890* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 503–504.

31. Gerhard Ritter, "National State More Realistic than Federalism," in Otto Pflanze, ed., *The Unification of Germany, 1848–1871* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968), 105.

32. Erich Eyck, "Bismarck: A Trap Set for Napoleon," in Pflanze, ed., *The Unification of Germany, 1848–1871*, 79; and Erich Eyck, *Bismarck and the German Empire* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1968).

33. Asa Briggs and Patricia Clavin, *Modern Europe, 1789–1989* (London: Longman, 1997), 163.

34. Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914*, 125. Wawro argues that "Bismarck was impelled in large measure by a new mood called 'social Darwinism': the widespread feeling that the great powers were locked in a struggle for survival and that only the predators would survive."

35. Quoted in Howard, *The Lessons of History*, 60.

36. Anderson, *The Ascendancy of Europe, 1815–1914*, 51. M. S. Anderson gives little credence to the theory that the alliance system, or the balance of power, had anything to do with keeping the peace or causing the Great War; see Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 71/2 (Spring 1992): 67–68. Rosecrance argues that "the balance in 1914 did not prevent war; it fomented it."; and Paul W. Schroeder, "World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak," *Journal of Modern History* xliv/3 (September 1972): 24. Schroeder argues in a similar vein that "[the war in 1914]" was a "result of various intertwined and interacting forces, the system itself enters into the work of destruction."

37. See Brian Bond, *War and Society in Europe, 1879–1970* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), 28.

38. See Phillip Bell, "The Great War and its Impact," in Paul Hayes, ed., *Themes in Modern European History, 1890–1945* (London: Routledge, 1992), 148.

39. See Osiander, *The States System of Europe, 1640–1990*, 224.

40. Philip Bell, "The Great War and its Impact," in Hayes, ed., *Themes in Modern European History, 1890–1945*, 135.

41. Otto Feinstein, "Conflict at Munich: Pluralism vs. Hegemonism," in Small and Feinstein, eds., *Appeasing Fascism*, 23. Feinstein speculates that "had Great War ended in 1916, the old system of hegemonic international arrangements and spheres of influence, balance of power, and arms race games would have been automatically in place."

42. For a discussion of the balance of power see Gordon Craig and Alexander George, *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 25.

43. Mowat, *The European States System*, 93. Mowat argues that "the war of 1914 arose owing to the imperfection of the Concert. The habit of it was not sufficiently engrained in the statesmen and politicians of Europe to ensure that the differences of Austria and Serbia should be submitted to arbitration."

44. See Richard Vinen, *A History in Fragments: Europe in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2000), 11–12. Vinen argues that "much writing on twentieth-century Europe is marked by an aching nostalgia for the period before 1914.... Those who imagine that the pre-1914 world is to

be regretted should ask themselves the question ... : why did so many Europeans want to leave?" Fifty million Europeans emigrated in the nineteenth century.

45. Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914*, 25.

46. See Albrecht-Carrié, *The Concert of Europe*.

47. Quoted in Briggs and Clavin, *Modern Europe, 1789–1989*, 57.

48. See Taylor, "Metternich," in Wrigley, ed., *From Napoleon to the Second International Essays on Nineteenth-Century Europe*, 92.

49. Czeslaw Milosz, *The History of Polish Literature* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 202.

50. Quoted in Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914*, 25.

51. Albert Sorel, "Metternich the Man," in Schwarz, ed., *Metternich, the "Coachman of Europe": Statesman or Evil Genius?*, 5.

52. Heinrich von Srbik, "The Champion of Historical Order," in Schwarz, ed., *Metternich, the "Coachman of Europe": Statesman or Evil Genius?*, 15, 17.

53. Quoted in Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 333–336.

54. Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914*, 34.

55. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 4–5, 334.

56. Bartlett, *Peace, War and the European Powers, 1814–1914*, 28.

57. Friedrich Meinecke, "Lack of Unity Among Disaffected Classes," in Pflanze, ed., *The Unification of Germany, 1848–1871*, 30.

58. Ibid., 30, 38.

59. Quoted in Herbert Michaelis, "Königgrätz, 1866: Defeat of Liberalism and Universalism," in Pflanze, ed., *The Unification of Germany, 1848–1871*, 113.

60. Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 4–5.

61. Of course the Polish national movement lacked a liberal component as well. Polish aristocrats and large landowners shared some of the political ideologies of their Austrian counterparts. After the Compromise of 1867, the Polish leaders in Galicia became loyal collaborators with the Habsburg state.

62. Jean Bérenger, *A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1700–1918* (New York: Longman, 1997), 214. Hungarians represented 20.2 percent of the population in 1910, while the Slavs totalled 47.2 percent; the most numerous among them were the Czechs and Slovaks (16.4 percent).

63. Taylor, "Metternich," in Wrigley, ed., *From Napoleon to the Second International Essays on Nineteenth-Century Europe*, 92, 95–96. Taylor compares U.S. senator Joseph McCarthy's Red scare to Metternich's preoccupation with liberal revolutionaries: "[Metternich's] view of radicalism was exactly that of Senator McCarthy. The good conservative must look under the bed every night. One day he will find a radical lurking there. A conspiracy

needs centre; and Metternich found his in Paris, as his present admirers find it in Moscow."

64. See Ernest R. May, *"Lessons" of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 173. May criticizes diplomats' uninformed use of historical analogy, yet he lauds Kissinger for his expert use of history, in part because he drew on the myth of the "long peace": "Although Henry Kissinger was a political scientist, he had done historical research on both Bismarck and Metternich, and it may be that this knowledge and experience contributed to his effectiveness as Nixon's *de facto* foreign minister."

65. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, 6.

66. Howard, "The World According to Henry: From Metternich to Me," 133, 138.

67. See A. W. DePorte, *Europe Between the Superpowers: The Enduring Balance* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986).

68. Bobbitt, *The Shield of Achilles*, 144ff.

69. Jay Winik, *On the Brink: The Dramatic, Behind-the-Scenes Saga of the Reagan Era and the Men and Women Who Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 292.

70. Howard, "The World According to Henry: From Metternich to Me," 133, 138.

71. Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1994); see also Robert D. Kaplan, "Kissinger, Metternich, and Realism," *Atlantic Monthly* 283/6 (June 1999): 76. Kissinger justified his "realism" by arguing that the specter of revolution was more dangerous than oppressive, yet "orderly" regimes.

72. See Peter Viereck, "Lessons for Moderns," in Schwarz, ed., *Metternich, the "Coachman of Europe": Statesman or Evil Genius?*, 92.

73. See Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); and John Keegan, *The First World War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999).

74. Quoted in Goldstein, *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*, 333.

75. The British lost over 50,000 men in the Boer War.

76. Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914*, 139; and Wesseling, *Imperialism and Colonialism*, 9, 19.

77. Bond, *War and Society in Europe, 1879–1970*, 28. The British often bombed rebellious port cities; Alexandria was destroyed in 1882; and Howard, *The Lessons of History*, 23. After the Indian Mutiny in 1857, the British became obsessed with expanding their security zones to protect their overseas interests in Asia. They established control over all of India from Ceylon to the Himalayas, and then over South and East Africa, and Egypt, and Sudan.

78. The British casualties during the siege of Sebastopol foreshadowed the awful human toll of the Great War, as did the 600,000 deaths suffered by Americans in their four-year civil war.

79. See Wesseling, *Imperialism and Colonialism*, 26; and Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914*, 212ff. Wesseling writes, "The colonial wars confirmed the military doctrine which maintained that the key to victory is willpower and the offensive; colonial military novels painted a scene that made it possible, 50 years after Solferino, to believe once again in the beauty of war."

80. See, for example, Kenneth Pomerancz and Steven Topik, *The World that Trade Created* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 168–169. They contend that "new power relations and new technologies of warfare led to unprecedented slaughter in peripheral areas being drawn into the world economy.... In the non-European world the nineteenth century witnessed unprecedented violence."

81. See Hendrick Hertzberg in *The New Yorker* (October 28, 2002): 42.

82. Fareed Zakaria, "Our Way," *The New Yorker* (October 14, 2002): 78.

83. James Mann, "For Bush, Realpolitik Is No Longer a Dirty Word," *New York Times* (April 11, 2004): 5.

84. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763–1848*, 804.

85. Wawro, *Warfare and Society in Europe, 1792–1914*, 36.

86. Quoted in W. N. Medlicott, *Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe* (London: The Athlone Press, 1956), 318.

87. Hajo Holborn, "Champion of Monarchy and Aristocracy," in Pflanze, ed., *The Unification of Germany, 1848–1871*, 59.

88. Taylor, "Metternich," in Chris Wrigley, ed., *From Napoleon to the Second International Essays on Nineteenth-Century Europe*, 344.