



## **Understanding the Trusted Boot Chain Implementation**

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## Understanding the Trusted Boot Chain Implementation

**DRAFT FOR REVIEW**

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### Revision History

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## Understanding the Trusted Boot Chain Implementation

Jiewen Yao

Intel Corporation

Vincent J. Zimmer

Intel Corporation

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This document explains how to implement the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) static trusted boot chain, using the TianoCore EDK II project.

### Prerequisite

This document assumes that the audience has basic firmware development experience using UEFI & EDK II, along with basic knowledge of the UEFI boot flow, Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and cryptography.

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## OVERVIEW

System firmware (BIOS/UEFI) plays an important role in computer platform security. If the system firmware or configuration is altered from the intended state, the system may experience loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability, including system instability, system failure, and information leakage. Detecting a firmware code or configuration change is of great importance, and can be accomplished by measuring and monitoring firmware integrity.

In 2011, the National Institute of Standards and Technology ([NIST](#)) published a draft version BIOS Integrity Measurement Guidelines ([SP800-155](#)). More recently, the Trusted Computing Group ([TCG](#)) has developed the following documents to discuss firmware integrity measurement:

- TCG Reference Integrity Manifest Information Model ([RIM-IM](#))
- TCG PC Client Reference Integrity Manifest ([PC-RIM](#))
- PC Client Platform Firmware Profile ([PFP](#))
- PC Client Platform Firmware Integrity Measurement ([FIM](#)) - Draft

The relationship between the above documents is as follows:

- The NIST SP800-155 specification provides a general guideline on requirements. It does not describe implementation details.
- The TCG RIM-IM specification defines the Reference Integrity Manifest (RIM) structure that a Verifier uses to validate expected values (Assertions) against actual values (Evidence).
- The TCG PC Client RIM specification complements the TCG RIM-IM specification and describes the RIM file formats, RIM storage locations within the PC Client, and provides references for the content of the RIM support files.
- The TCG PFP defines the implementation for a PC client firmware architecture. It defines how the platform firmware measures the firmware components into Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Platform Configuration Register (PCR) and how the firmware records the actions in an event log.
- The TCG FIM draft specification provides a framework for determining the configuration of the hardware and the identity of the firmware which has executed to initialize the endpoint into a booted state. A FIM compliant platform shall implement the TCG PFP specification in order to provide runtime evidence and the platform shall also provide assertions based upon the TCG RIM specification.

In this document, we will focus on the TCG Platform Firmware Profile specification. The PFP specification defines how a platform firmware contributes to the Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM) of the platform through extending digests (measurements) of code into a TPM Platform Configuration Register (PCR). The PFP specification also provides the documentation of that measurement in an event log.

Figure 1 below shows a simple example of the firmware validation process. An Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) provides a RIM as the assertion to describe the system platform. When a corresponding system boots, the platform firmware measures the component into some TPM PCR's and generates an event log as evidence. The whole platform acts as an attester and presents the event log and PCR's as evidence to a verifier. Then the verifier can compare the evidence (event log and PCRs) and compare it with the assertion (RIM manifest).




Figure 1. Measurement and Attestation

A verifier can use various policies to determine the state of the platform. Some example policies include the following:

- All event log match - It means the platform is expected to meet all of the expected values.
- Event log on code (PCR0) and security policy (PCR7) match but the configuration data (PCR1) has a mismatch -- It means someone changed the BIOS setup configuration.
- Event log on security policy (PCR7) match but code (PCR0) mismatches -- It means someone has updated the platform firmware code.
- All event log mismatch -- It means the platform is not in the expected code or configuration state.

## TCG TRUSTED BOOT CHAIN IN EDK II

### Trusted Boot Flow

Trusted boot flow is activity that the host platform firmware measures, including firmware components, into the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Platform Configuration Register (PCR), and records the actions in an event log. The TPM acts as a static Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) and Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR). The platform firmware here acts as a Static Root of Trust for Measurement (SRTM).

In this document, we use TPM 2.0 as an example. Unless otherwise specified, the term TPM below refers to a TPM 2.0 device.

### PCR, Measurement, and Attestation

The TPM PCRs hold the values of the data measurement. The measurement follows the equation below. This operation is PCR extend.

$$\text{PCR} \sim (\text{new}) \sim = \text{HASH}(\text{PCR} \sim (\text{old}) \sim || \text{HASH}(\text{Data}))$$

PCR extend is the only way to modify the PCR value. If a platform extends a PCR multiple times, all data is hashed into the PCR. The vertical bars in parentheses designate the catenation of the old and new data, respectively.

### General Guideline

A typical TPM has 24 PCRs. PCRs [0-15] represent the SRTM and are associated with Locality 0. PCRs [0-7] are used for platform firmware and PCRs [8-15] are used for the operating system. PCR [16] is for debug usage. PCR [23] is for application support. PCRs [17-22] represent the platform's dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM). In this document we will focus on the usage of PCRs [0-7], as described in the following table.

Table 1: TPM PCR Usage (Source: [TCG PFP Specification](#))


#### PCR Index PCR Usage

|   |   |
|---|---|
| 0 | SRTM, BIOS, Host Platform Extensions, Embedded Option ROMs and PI Drivers |
| 1 | Host Platform Configuration   |
| 2 | UEFI driver and application Code  |
| 3 | UEFI driver and application Configuration and Data                        |
| 4 | UEFI Boot Manager Code (usually the MBR) and Boot Attempts                |
| 5 | Boot Manager Code Configuration and                                       |



Data (for use by the Boot Manager Code) and GPT/Partition Table 6 Host Platform Manufacturer Specific 7 Secure Boot Policy, Secure boot Verification Authority

The following figure shows the high-level components and measurements.



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Figure 2 -- High-level components and measurements\ (See Building Secure Firmware by Jiewen Yao & Vincent Zimmer)

There is an easy way to remember Table 1, as described by the following two rules:

- 1) Even-numbered PCRs are for the code, while odd-numbered PCRs are for configuration data.
- 2) PCRs [0-1] are for the OEM, PCRs [2-3] are for third party usage, PCRs [4-5] are for OS boot, PCR[7] is for secure boot policy, PCR[6] is undefined by the PFP spec and is platform-specific.

Table 2. PCR usage (simple rules)

| Code | Data Configuration |
|------|--------------------|
|      |                    |

OEM PCR[0] PCR[1] Third party PCR[2] PCR[3] OS Boot PCR[4] PCR[5] Secure Boot Policy N/A PCR[7]

For example:

- Any **PEI, DXE, and SMM code in flash FV** are OEM code. They go into PCR[0].
- ACPI data** from OEM code is important for boot. It goes into PCR[0].
- An **integrated PCI card option ROM** in flash FV is provided by the OEM. It goes to PCR[0]. An **external PCI card Option ROM** is third party code. It goes into PCR[2].
- If a **non-host component** or a **device firmware can only be updated by OEM** platform code, it goes into PCR[0]. If a **non-host component** or a **device firmware can be updated by an entity other than the OEM** platform code, it goes into PCR[2].

- A **CPU Microcode update** can be treated as code or data. It can go into PCR[0] or PCR[1].
- **SMBIOS tables** are OEM configuration data. They go into PCR[1].
- **Setup variable** and **policy configuration** are OEM configuration data. They go into PCR[1].
- **UEFI Boot####** and **BootOrder variable** are OEM configuration data. They go into PCR[1].
- If a **non-host component** or a **device firmware configuration can only be updated by OEM** platform code, it goes into PCR[1]. If a **non-host component** or a **device firmware configuration can be updated by an entity other than OEM** platform code, it goes into PCR[3].
- If the action is to **enter an OEM provided setup utility**, it goes into PCR[1]. If the action is to **enter a third party provided setup utility**, it goes into PCR[3].
- **OS Loader** is OS boot related code. It goes into PCR[4].
- **Boot Attempt action** goes into PCR[4]. The **ExitBootService action** goes into PCR[5].
- **Disk geometry, such as a GUID partition table (GPT)**, is OS boot related configuration. It goes into PCR[5].
- **UEFI Secure Boot variables**, such as the Platform Key (PK), Key Exchange Key (KEK), image signature database (db), and image forbidden signature database (dbx) are all related to secure boot policy. They go into PCR[7].
- If **the security configuration policy** is boot security sensitive, it goes into PCR[7]. If it is NOT boot security sensitive, it goes into PCR[1].
- **Secure feature disabling, such as DMA protection disabling**, is security sensitive. It goes into PCR[7].
- **Debug mode information** is security sensitive. It goes into PCR[7].

Some other rules for the data that shall not be measured into PCR are as follows:

1) PCRs can only record statically configured, unchangeable data. A **PCR cannot record data that are dynamic and changeable across the boot**, such as system clock, fan speed, boot count, system reset reason, battery power, a nonce value, a pointer, etc.

For example:

- The firmware must measure the PE COFF image before the relocation into different memory location.
- The firmware must measure the ACPI table from flash prior to any modification. An ACPI table patch may apply different data settings based upon policy, such as ACPI version selection for a secondary system description table (SSDT), or different addresses, such as a non-volatile storage memory location for a differentiated system description table (DSDT).
- The firmware must measure partial portions of the SMBIOS table because some SMBIOS tables may contain some automatically updated information, such as WakeupType, Voltage, ResetCount, or NominalSpeed.

2) A PCR can only record the class of information. A **PCR cannot record the instance of specific information that may be used to unique identify a system**, such as an asset tag, a serial number, etc.

For example:


- The firmware must measure partial portions of the SMBIOS tables because some SMBIOS table entries may contain the instance specific unique information, such as SerialNumber, UUID, AssetTag, PartNumber.

### 3) A PCR cannot record any privacy sensitive information.

All of the above PCR measurements need to be recorded into an event log which can be used to reproduce the PCR value. Besides that, the event log may include some NO\_ACTION event types. This type means that the data are not required to be measured into PCR. The event log entry is intended to provide additional information to the event log consumer. For example:

- **Specification ID event** -- It is to provide information to the consumer regarding which version of specification is implemented.
- **Reference Manifest event** -- It is to provide NIST SP800-155 reference integrity manifest information, such as platform manufacturer ID, reference manifest GUID, etc.
- **Startup Locality event** -- It is to record the locality from which the TPM2\_Startup command was sent in cases where the Locality sending the TPM2\_Startup command is Locality 3.

Most TCG TPM related code in EDK II is located at [SecurityPkg](#). The [Tcg2Pei](#) module handles the PEI phase measurement. The [Tcg2Dxe](#) DXE driver handles the DXE phase measurement. The [DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib](#) library handles the PE image measurements and GPT measurement. All event type definition can be found at [UefiTcgPlatform.h](#). Figure 3 below shows the high level flow of the modules.



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Figure 3: TCG Trusted Boot Flow

## PCR 0

The SRTM's version identifier is measured by the [Tcg2Pei.c](#) **MeasureCRTMVersion()** function. The event type is [EV\\_S\\_CRTM\\_VERSION](#). EDKII uses [PcdFirmwareVersionString](#) to let a platform pass the SRTM version information. The version string is encoded as a Unicode string with a NULL terminator.

The platform firmware is measured by the [Tcg2Pei.c](#) **MeasureFvImage()** function with firmware volume (FV) granularity. The event type is [EV\\_EFI\\_PLATFORM\\_FIRMWARE\\_BLOB](#) or [EV\\_EFI\\_PLATFORM\\_FIRMWARE\\_BLOB2](#), based upon the [PcdTcgPfpMeasurementRevision](#). The [Tcg2Pei.c](#) module measures the main BIOS at **MeasureMainBios()** and then installs a callback function **FirmwareVolumeInfoPpiNotifyCallback()** at the memory present entrypoint **PeimEntryMP()**. Whenever a new FV is installed, this callback is invoked and the new FV is measured.

To avoid duplicated measurements, the **FirmwareVolumeInfoPpiNotifyCallback()** will carefully check the new installed FV to ensure that the same FV will not be measured twice. It will also ensure that the child FV will not be measured.

The [EFI\\_PEI\\_FIRMWARE\\_VOLUME\\_INFO\\_MEASUREMENT\\_EXCLUDED\\_PPI](#) interface is designed to let a platform report to the [Tcg2Pei](#) module that the installed FV is already measured. There is no need to measure it again. This is usually done by a hardware based static root of trust for measurement, such as Intel Authenticated Code Module (ACM) in Intel Boot Guard technology. If the ACM has already measured the initial FV, such as PEI FV into the TPM PCR, then a BootGuard platform module can report this information. The [Tcg2Pei.c MeasureFvImage\(\)](#) service will check this PPI in order to skip the measurement and event log report.

The [EDKII\\_PEI\\_FIRMWARE\\_VOLUME\\_INFO\\_PREHASHED\\_FV\\_PPI](#) service is designed to let a platform report the hash of an FV to the [Tcg2Pei](#). This is also done by a hardware based root of trust module without measuring the FV. The ACM in Intel Boot Guard may just use this hash to verify the initial FV, such as PEI FV, but not measure the FV according to the policy. Then a BootGuard platform module can report this information. Because the hash value is stored in the Boot Guard boot policy manifest (BPM) and it is also verified by the ACM, the hash can be trusted. [Tcg2Pei.c MeasureFvImage\(\)](#) will check this PPI to skip the hash calculation and directly measure the hash into PCR and also record the event log.

[EDKII\\_PEI\\_FIRMWARE\\_VOLUME\\_INFO\\_STORED\\_HASH\\_FV\\_PPI](#) is also designed to let a platform report the hash of an FV, but with a different purpose. The hash is reported to [FvReportPei](#) for FV verification, but not to the [Tcg2Pei](#) for FV measurement. The intent is to let [FvReportPei.c CheckStoredHashFv\(\)](#) verify the FV based upon the hash. The hash value is provisioned by the OEM in the Boot Guard BPM. The ACM will NOT verify the hash value against the corresponding FV, such as the DXE FV. Since the hash value storage is signed and verified by the ACM it can be trusted. Then the [FvReportPei.c VerifyHashedFv\(\)](#) can verify the DXE FV based upon the hash information. Once **VerifyHashedFv()** passes the verification, it can install [EDKII\\_PEI\\_FIRMWARE\\_VOLUME\\_INFO\\_PREHASHED\\_FV\\_PPI](#) to [Tcg2Pei](#).

[Tcg2Pei](#) is not the only module that measures data in the PEI phase. It also produces [EDKII\\_TCG\\_PPI HashLogExtendEvent\(\)](#) API. As such, other module can also measure the data in the PEI phase by calling [TpmMeasurementLib TpmMeasureAndLogData\(\)](#). The PEI instance [PeiTpmMeasurementLib](#) uses the [EDKII\\_TCG\\_PPI](#). Moreover, the [TcgEventLogRecordLib](#) provides more services, such as **MeasureFirmwareBlob()** and **MeasureHandoffTable()**. The [TcgEventLogRecordLib.c](#) can choose [EV\\_EFI\\_PLATFORM\\_FIRMWARE\\_BLOB](#) or [EV\\_EFI\\_PLATFORM\\_FIRMWARE\\_BLOB2](#), and [EV\\_EFI\\_HANDOFF\\_TABLES](#) or [EV\\_EFI\\_HANDOFF\\_TABLES2](#) based upon [PcdTcgPfpMeasurementRevision](#).

Some platform firmware uses the Intel Firmware Supported Package (FSP) binary to initialize the silicon. The FSP contains the firmware code. As such, the FSP binary shall also be measured. The FSP-T and FSP-M are measured by [FspmWrapperPeim](#). The FSP-S is measured by [FspsWrapperPeim](#). They call [FspMeasurementLib MeasureFspFirmwareBlob\(\)](#) and this function calls [TcgEventLogRecordLib MeasureFirmwareBlob\(\)](#). One special thing about FSP measurement is that the FSP binary includes not only code but also configuration. A platform may want to measure the FSP code to PCR0 and FSP static configuration to PCR1. In order to support that, [FspMeasurementLib.c MeasureFspFirmwareBlob\(\)](#) refers the **PcdFspMeasurementConfig** to determine if it needs separate measurements by using **MeasureFspFirmwareBlobWithCfg()**.

All measured firmware volumes are recorded in [EFI\\_MEASURED\\_FV\\_HOB](#) by the [Tcg2Pei.c EndofPeiSignalNotifyCallback\(\)](#) service in order to avoid duplicated measurements. If a firmware volume is NOT reported in the PEI phase, then it needs to be measured in the DXE phase. Similar to [Tcg2Pei](#), the [Tcg2Dxe](#) produces [EFI\\_TCG2\\_PROTOCOL HashLogExtendEvent\(\)](#) API. The DXE instance [DxeTpmMeasurementLib](#) uses the [EFI\\_TCG2\\_PROTOCOL](#) to let other modules measure more firmware data.

EDK II assumes that all OEM firmware volumes are reported in the PEI phase. As such, the firmware volume dispatched in the DXE phase is not measured at FV granularity, but instead the code is measured at PE image granularity in [DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib](#). [DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib](#) is a hook to the [EFI\\_SECURITY2\\_ARCH\\_PROTOCOL](#). It is linked with [SecurityStubDxe](#) and [DxeSecurityManagementLib](#). When the DxeCore dispatches an EFI image, it calls [EFI\\_SECURITY2\\_ARCH\\_PROTOCOL](#) [FileAuthentication\(\)](#). Then [DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler\(\)](#) will be invoked finally. The general rule is that:

- 1) If a PE image driver or application is from an unmeasured FV, then the PE image will be measured. A PE image driver will be measured into PCR2 and a PE image application will be measured into PCR4.
- 2) If a PE image driver is from a measured FV, it will NOT be measured.
- 3) If a PE image application is from a measured FV, it will still be measured to PCR4.

This logic is in [DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c](#) [DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler\(\)](#). We will discuss more about this process in the PCR2 section and PCR4 section, respectively.

If there is an additional executable binary loaded, this executable binary shall be measured. For example, the SMM Transfer Monitor (STM) image is measured in [SmmStm.c](#) [LoadMonitor\(\)](#) with [TXT\\_EVTYPE\\_STM\\_HASH](#).

ACPI tables should be measured before any data patches are applied. For example, the [Tcg2Smm](#) measures the [TPM2 ACPI](#) table in [PublishTpm2\(\)](#) and [TPM SSDT](#) ACPI table in [PublishAcpiTable\(\)](#), before any data patches, such as [PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev](#), [PcdTpm2AcpiTableLaml](#), [PcdTpm2AcpiTableLasa](#), [PcdActiveTpmInterfaceType](#), [PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer](#), [PcdTpm2CurrentIrqNum](#), [PcdTpm2PossibleIrqNumBuf](#), etc.

A platform may include a non-host environment, such as the Intel Management Engine (ME). The non-host information shall be measured with [EV\\_NONHOST\\_INFO](#) by a platform specific module. If the non-host platform can only be updated by Platform Firmware, then the non-host code shall be measured with [EV\\_NONHOST\\_CODE](#) by a platform specific module.

A platform may report the SRTM contents with [EV\\_S\\_CRTM\\_CONTENTS](#). For example, an Intel BootGuard enabled platform may report [EV\\_S\\_CRTM\\_CONTENTS](#) with the BootGuard ACM, Key Manifest (KM) and Boot Policy Manifest (BPM) information.

[EV\\_SEPARATOR](#) is used to draw a line between the pre-boot environment and entering a post-boot environment. [Tcg2Dxe.c](#) will use [MeasureSeparatorEvent\(\)](#) to record [EV\\_SEPARATOR](#) with 0x00000000 for PCR0~6 in the [OnReadyToBoot\(\)](#) function upon the first boot attempt. [EV\\_SEPARATOR](#) for PCR7 is handled earlier in [MeasureSecureBootPolicy\(\)](#). We will discuss this later in the PCR7 section.

If a system starts up with an error status, then an error [EV\\_SEPARATOR](#) shall be measured. [Tcg2Pei.c](#) [PeimEntryMA\(\)](#) detects the error and uses [MeasureSeparatorEventWithError\(\)](#) to record [EV\\_SEPARATOR](#) with 0x00000001 for PCR0~7. More details of TPM error handling will be discussed later.

## PCR 1

A platform usually includes multiple CPU Microcode update files and put them all together into a microcode FV. At runtime, the CPU module will scan them one by one and only load the one matching the current CPU. A platform may choose to measure the whole Microcode FV or the individually-used Microcode, such as the one from [EDKII\\_MICROCODE\\_PATCH\\_HOB](#) or [PcdCpuMicrocodePatchAddress](#). The current EDK II does not provide an example in the CPU module. A platform needs to perform such measurement based upon the platform policy.

[SmbiosMeasurementDxe](#) is an example of SMBIOS table measurement. We call it an example because the SMBIOS table measurement requires a platform specific policy to skip the dynamic changeable information and instance-specific unique information in the table or a field of the table. This [SmbiosMeasurementDxe.c](#) [FilterSmbiosEntry\(\)](#) will skip all OEM type SMBIOS tables and zero the

dynamic changeable information and instance specific unique information before the measurement. The policy - **mSmbiosFilterStandardTableBlackList** is hardcoded in the module. Once the SMBIOS is filtered, the **MeasureSmbiosTable()** function will choose the event type [EV\\_EFI\\_HANDOFF\\_TABLES](#) or [EV\\_EFI\\_HANDOFF\\_TABLES2](#) based upon the [PcdTcgPfpMeasurementRevision](#) to measure the SMBIOS table. If a platform wants to use a different policy, it may implement another **SmbiosMeasurementDxe** module and not use this one.

The UEFI boot related variables, such as "Boot####" and "BootOrder." are measured by [Tcg2Dxe.c](#) **ReadAndMeasureBootVariable()**. The event type is [EV\\_EFI\\_VARIABLE\\_BOOT](#). These variables are measured if they are present in **MeasureAllBootVariables()**.

Other Setup variables or policy configurations are OEM specific data. They should be measured in an OEM specific module.

For a server platform where [PcdTpmPlatformClass](#) is [TCG\\_PLATFORM\\_TYPE\\_SERVER](#), the multi-processor information ([EFI\\_CPU\\_PHYSICAL\\_LOCATION](#)) is measured by the module [Tcg2Dxe.c](#) **MeasureHandoffTables()**. The event type is [EV\\_TABLE\\_OF\\_DEVICES](#). Other devices are not handled in [Tcg2Dxe](#) but may be handled in an OEM platform module.

If a platform has a setup utility which does not require an unconditional reset, then the platform shall measure "Entering ROM Based Setup" with [EV\\_ACTION](#). This can be done in the platform utility.

A platform may include a non-host environment, such as the Intel Management Engine (ME). If the non-host platform can only be updated by the Platform Firmware, then the non-host configuration should be measured with [EV\\_NONHOST\\_CONFIG](#) by a platform specific module.

## PCR 2

A third party UEFI driver, such as a PCI EFI option ROM, is measured by [DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c](#) **Tcg2MeasurePeImage()** in **DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler()**. The event type for a UEFI boot services driver is [EV\\_EFI\\_BOOT\\_SERVICES\\_DRIVER](#) and the event type for a UEFI runtime services driver is [EV\\_EFI\\_RUNTIME\\_SERVICES\\_DRIVER](#). If a UEFI driver resides in an unmeasured FV which is dispatched in the DXE phase, it is also measured with the same policy into PCR2.

A platform may include a non-host environment, such as Intel Management Engine (ME). If the non-host platform can be updated by entities other than the Platform Firmware, then the non-host code shall be measured with [EV\\_NONHOST\\_CODE](#) by a platform specific module.

A platform may include Secure Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) capable devices. The platform should use the GET\_MEASUREMENT command to retrieve the device firmware measurement and measure the immutable ROM and mutable firmware with [EV\\_EFI\\_SPDM\\_FIRMWARE\\_BLOB](#) in [TCG\\_DEVICE\\_SECURITY\\_EVENT\\_DATA](#). A prototype can be found at [DeviceSecurityPkg](#) [SpdmDeviceMeasurement.c](#). For SPDM, we will discuss the topic in the last chapter.

## PCR 3

If the option ROM or UEFI application has a setup utility which does not require an unconditional reset, then the platform shall measure "Entering ROM Based Setup" with [EV\\_ACTION](#). This can be done in the utility.

A platform may include a non-host environment, such as the Intel Management Engine (ME). If the non-host platform can be updated by entities other than Platform Firmware, then the non-host configuration should be measured with [EV\\_NONHOST\\_CONFIG](#) by a platform specific module.

A platform may include SPDM capable devices. The platform should use the GET\_MEASUREMENT command to retrieve the device firmware measurement and measure the hardware configuration and firmware configuration with [EV\\_EFI\\_SPDM\\_FIRMWARE\\_CONFIG](#) in [TCG\\_DEVICE\\_SECURITY\\_EVENT\\_DATA](#).



## PCR 4

A third party UEFI application, such as a UEFI shell utility, a standard OS loader or an OEM boot option, is measured by [DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c Tcg2MeasurePeImage\(\)](#) in

**DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler()**. The event type is [EV\\_EFI\\_BOOT\\_SERVICES\\_APPLICATION](#). If a UEFI application is an FV which is dispatched in the DXE phase, it is also measured to PCR4 irrespective of whether the FV is measured or unmeasured.

The boot attempt action is measured by [Tcg2Dxe.c OnReadyToBoot\(\)](#). Before invoking a boot option, it measures the action `"Calling EFI Application from Boot Option"`. After the boot option returns, it measures the action `"Returning from EFI Application from Boot Option"`.

## PCR 5

When a system boots a boot option in a GUID-named partition of the disk, the GUID partition table (GPT) disk geometry needs to be measured. It is done by [DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib.c](#)

**Tcg2MeasureGptTable()** in **DxeTpm2MeasureBootHandler()**.

The ExitBootServices action is measured by [Tcg2Dxe.c](#). If ExitBootServices succeeds, then **OnExitBootServices()** is invoked. If ExitBootServices fails, then **OnExitBootServicesFailed()** is invoked.

## PCR 6

PCR6 is for OEM specific data. The open source EDK II implementation does not have any example to measure data to PCR6.

## PCR 7

The UEFI secure boot related variables -- "SecureBoot", "PK", "KEK", "db", and "dbx" are unconditionally measured by [Tcg2Dxe.c ReadAndMeasureSecureVariable\(\)](#). The event type is [EV\\_EFI\\_VARIABLE\\_DRIVER\\_CONFIG](#). If they are not present, a zero size UEFI variable entry will be measured. The "dbt" and "dbr" variables are conditionally measured only if they are present by the routine **MeasureAllSecureVariables()**.

The UEFI secure boot variable update is measured in [Variable RuntimeDxe](#). If any of the above secure boot related variables are updated, then [Variable RuntimeDxe Measurement.c MeasureVariable\(\)](#) will measure the new data with [EV\\_EFI\\_VARIABLE\\_DRIVER\\_CONFIG](#).

When UEFI secure boot is enabled, the [DxeImageVerificationLib](#) verifies the PE image signature based upon the [EFI\\_SIGNATURE\\_DATA](#) in the [EFI\\_SIGNATURE\\_LIST](#) of an image signature database. If an [EFI\\_SIGNATURE\\_DATA](#) is used to verify the image, then this [EFI\\_SIGNATURE\\_DATA](#) will be measured with [EV\\_EFI\\_VARIABLE\\_AUTHORITY](#) in [DxeImageVerificationLib Measurement.c MeasureVariable\(\)](#).

If a platform uses some other secure boot technology, such as Intel BootGuard, then this secure boot policy and authority shall also be measured into PCR7.

If a platform provides a firmware debugger mode, then the platform shall measure "UEFI Debug Mode" string with [EV\\_EFI\\_ACTION](#). This logic is done at [Tcg2Dxe.c MeasureSecureBootPolicy\(\)](#), based upon [PcdFirmwareDebuggerInitialized](#).

Per Microsoft Windows requirements, a platform shall enable DMA protection. If the DMA protection is disabled or configured to a lower security state, then the platform shall measure the "DMA Protection Disabled" string with [EV\\_EFI\\_ACTION](#). Because a platform controls the DMA protection enable/disable policy, a platform policy driver shall measure this event.

If a platform uses other secure sensitive and critical configuration, such as Intel Total Memory Encryption (TME) and System Management Mode (SMM) protection, then the action to disable those security critical configuration shall also be measured.

EV\_SEPARATOR for PCR7 is handled in [Tcg2Dxe.c MeasureSecureBootPolicy\(\)](#) when the UEFI variable is ready. It is just after [MeasureAllSecureVariables\(\)](#). It is earlier than the ReadyToBoot event signal. The reason is that the PCR7 [EV\\_SEPARATOR](#) measurement must be between secure boot policy configuration measurement and image verification authority measurement. There might be a case where we need to measure an UEFI image before the ReadyToBoot event. In such an example, the authority measurement happens before the ReadyToBoot event.

## NO\_ACTION event

[TCG\\_EfiSpecIDEvent](#) is used to describe the TCG FPF specification version. It is installed by the [Tcg2Dxe SetupEventLog\(\)](#) function, based upon [PcdTcgPfpMeasurementRevision](#).

[TCG\\_Sp800\\_155\\_PlatformId\\_Event2](#) is usually installed by a platform TCG PEI or DXE module, such as [Platform800155EventPei](#) or [Platform800155EventDxe](#). A platform TCG PEIM may use [EFI\\_TCG\\_800\\_155\\_PLATFORM\\_ID\\_EVENT\\_HOB](#) for this event and it will be converted by the [Tcg2Dxe.c SetupEventLog\(\)](#) function.

[TCG\\_EfiStartupLocalityEvent](#) is usually installed by a platform module in the PEI phase, such as a BootGuard related PEIM or [StartupLocalityEventPei](#). It shall use [EFI\\_TPM2\\_STARTUP\\_LOCALITY\\_HOB](#) for this event and it will be converted by [Tcg2Dxe.c SetupEventLog\(\)](#) function. This NO\_ACTION event is added when a BootGuard ACM starts up the TPM device.

## Event Log

[Tcg2Pei](#) records the event log to a [EFI\\_TCG\\_EVENT2\\_HOB](#). The HOB will be consumed by [Tcg2Dxe](#) and converted into a formal TCG event log.

There are two ways to expose a TCG event log. The first way is via the [EFI\\_TCG2\\_PROTOCOL GetEventLog\(\)](#) API. This protocol is installed by the [Tcg2Dxe](#) module directly. Care must be taken that even after the OS calls [GetEventLog\(\)](#) API, a platform firmware module may add additional event log entries, such as [EV\\_EFI\\_ACTION](#) event "Exit Boot Services Invocation". Once the [GetEventLog\(\)](#) API is called, the additional event log is added to [EFI\\_TCG2\\_FINAL\\_EVENTS\\_TABLE](#). This table is installed as a UEFI configuration table with [EFI\\_TCG2\\_FINAL\\_EVENTS\\_TABLE\\_GUID](#).

The second way the expose the event log is via a [TPM2 ACPI](#) table as an optional feature. The TCG event log will be produced via [PcdTpm2AcpiTableLaml](#) and [PcdTpm2AcpiTableLasa](#) by [Tcg2Dxe](#). Then [Tcg2Smm](#) consumes those two PCD and installs this ACPI table for the operating system.

## Hardware Root of Trust

A platform may choose to use a dedicated hardware root of trust to verify the platform firmware, such as Intel Boot Guard Technology or AMD Platform Security Processor (PSP). If this mode is chosen, then there should be dedicated event logs for the related component.


For example, if Intel Boot Guard measured boot is enabled, then the platform shall record [TCG\\_EfiStartupLocalityEvent](#) and may report a [EV\\_S\\_CRTM\\_CONTENTS](#) event in PCR[0]. If Intel Boot Guard verified boot is enabled, then the secure boot policy and authority shall also be reported in PCR[7].

## Trusted Boot Chain -- Putting it all together

Figure 4 shows a complete trusted boot chain that commences from a hardware root of trust module.



## Trusted Boot Flow



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Figure 4: TCG Trusted Boot Flow

For test purposes, we have a UEFI shell tool [Tcg2DumpLog](#) to display the TCG event log. Because the event log records every step of the PCR extend, we can reproduce the PCR values by using the digests in the TCG event log.

If a developer does not have hardware, they can use a TPM2 simulator, such as [Microsoft TPM2 simulator](#). Currently, [EDK II Tpm2Emulator](#) can be used to communicate with the [Microsoft TPM2 simulator](#) via a socket interface on ports 2321 and 2322. Then the developer can use the [Tcg2DumpLog](#) to dump the TCG event log in the EDK II emulator environment.

The whole TPM software stack (TSS) is out of scope of this document. There is prototype [Tpm2TssPkg](#) for reference only.

## Remote Attestation

Remote attestation is a client/server process that helps you retrieve a quote from the TPM. A quote is a process that provides a list of the current PCR values that are signed by the TPM.

A full remote attestation process includes two major steps:

- The server verifies the client TPM device.
- The server verifies the TCG event log from the client.

Figure 5 shows the TPM device verification flow.

1) Every TPM includes an Endorsement Key (EK) signed by a root EK which belongs to the TPM vendor. It also includes an Attestation Key (AK). The client sends the TPM EK and AK to a server.

2) The server verifies the EK based upon the TPM vendor root CA cert. The server generates a random secret and encrypts the secret and AK with the EK public key to be used as a challenge. Then the server sends the challenge to client.

3) The client decrypts the secret with the EK private key and check the AK. Then the client sends the secret back to server.

4) Now the server knows the client has a genuine TPM.

Figure 6 shows the event log verification.

1) The server asks the client platform for a quote.

2) The client platform asks the TPM to sign the PCR list with the AK private key as a quote. Then the client sends the quote to the server.

- 3) The server verifies the signature of the quote with the AK public key. Now the server knows the PCR list is genuine. If the verification succeeds, then the server sends a request to get an event log.
- 4) The client platform sends the event log directly to the server.
- 5) The server replays the event log to reproduce the PCR values. If they are same, then the server knows the TCG event log is genuine.






Figure 5: Remote Attestation -- TPM Device Verification (Source: [OpenPower TrustBoot](#))

Figure 6: Remote Attestation -- Event Log Verification (Source: [OpenPower TrustBoot](#))

Once the verifier in the server gets the event log, the verifier can compare it with the reference integrity measurement (RIM) based upon a predefined policy.

Figure 7 shows the final RIM validation process.

Figure 7. RIM Validation (source: [TCG FIM](#))

For test purposes, we created a sample [FspManifestTool](#). It can be used to generate a [SWID](#) or [CoSWID](#) tag for an FSP binary as the reference integrity manifest (RIM). The FSP RIM can be used to verify the FSP binary based upon the TCG event log.

## TPM Device Startup

The platform firmware needs to send a TPM Startup command to the TPM before measuring any data into a PCR register. TPM specification defines three shutdown/startup sequences:

- **TPM Reset** -- Tpm2Startup(CLEAR) after Tpm2Shutdown(CLEAR) or no shutdown command is sent.

All those values that are specified as having a default initialization state go back to their default initialization state. Persistent values that have no default initialization state are not changed.

- **TPM Restart** -- Tpm2Startup(CLEAR) after Tpm2Shutdown(STATE).

This preserves much of the previous state of the TPM, except the PCRs and the controls associated with the Platform hierarchy are all returned to their default initialization state.

- **TPM Resume** -- Tpm2Startup(STATE) after Tpm2Shutdown(STATE).

This preserves the previous state of the TPM, including the static Root of Trust for Measurement (S-RTM) PCR and the platform controls other than the PlatformHierarchyEnable.

Tpm2Startup(STATE) after Tpm2Shutdown(CLEAR) or no shutdown is an invalid sequence and will fail.

TPM startup is done in the [Tcg2Pei.c PeimEntryMA\(\)](#) function. **Tpm2Startup**(TPM\_SU\_CLEAR) will be used if the system is in normal boot path, and **Tpm2Startup**(TPM\_SU\_STATE) will be used if the system is in the S3 resume path. The issuing of the Startup command is controlled by [PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy](#) because other modules may use the TPM and send a Startup command before Tcg2Pei. One example is TPM1.2/TPM2.0 detection in [Tpm2ConfigPeim.c DetectTpmDevice\(\)](#). The other example is TPM device startup in an Intel BootGuard ACM. If the TPM is started by a BootGuard ACM, then the platform needs to add a [TCG\\_EfiStartupLocalityEvent](#) to indicate that the startup locality is 3.

The platform firmware may send a TPM Shutdown command if a reset happens in the pre-OS environment. [Tcg2Dxe.c](#) registers a **ShutdownTpmOnReset()** callback function on the system reset event. **Tpm2Shutdown**(TPM\_SU\_CLEAR) will be used to shut down the TPM device.

The TPM measurements happen in both a normal boot path and a S4 resume. In an S3 resume, there is no need to measure the firmware components because the TPM state is restored in the S3 resume path. The assumption is that the OS shall issue a **Tpm2Shutdown**(TPM\_SU\_STATE) to save the TPM state. Then platform firmware uses **Tpm2Startup**(TPM\_SU\_STATE) to restore the state.

If the OS does not send **Tpm2Shutdown()** or sends **TpmShutdown**(TPM\_SU\_CLEAR), then the **Tpm2Startup**(TPM\_SU\_STATE) will fail. Then [Tcg2Pei.c](#) will start error handling and use **Tpm2Startup**(TPM\_SU\_CLEAR) to start up TPM again. If the TPM can be started, then [Tcg2Pei.c](#) will call **MeasureSeparatorEventWithError()** to record EV\_SEPARATOR with 0x00000001 for PCR0~7. This action is required to cap the PCR's to an invalid state in order to resist the PCR forgery attack.

## TPM Device Selection

A platform TPM can be implemented in different ways, such as a discrete TPM2.0 (dTPM) with either a Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI) or Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) bus, a firmware TPM2.0 (fTPM), or even a legacy TPM1.2 device. A platform needs to select the TPM device at build time or at runtime.

[TPM\\_DEVICE\\_SELECTED\\_GUID](#) PPI is an interface that indicates that the platform has selected the TPM device. [Tcg2Pei](#) can run to start the TPM. If Tcg2Pei starts the TPM successfully, it will install [PEI\\_TPM\\_INITIALIZED\\_PPI](#) to tell other module that the TPM is initialized and ready to use. No matter whether TPM startup succeeds or fails, Tcg2Pei always installs [PEI\\_TPM\\_INITIALIZATION\\_DONE\\_PPI](#) to tell other modules that the TPM initialization process is done. Other modules can locate [PEI\\_TPM\\_INITIALIZED\\_PPI](#) to know if it has succeeded or failed.

[Tcg2Config TpmDetection.c](#) provides a sample implementation to detect a TPM1.2 or TPM2.0. Besides installing [TPM\\_DEVICE\\_SELECTED\\_GUID](#) PPI, it also sets [TPM\\_DEVICE\\_INTERFACE\\_TPM20\\_DTPM](#) to [PcdTpmInstanceGuid](#), which is checked by [Tcg2Smm](#) to ensure that only a discrete TPM 2.0 can be

supported by [Tcg2Smm](#).

A platform may also install the [TPM\\_DEVICE\\_SELECTED\\_GUID](#) PPI and set [PcdTpmInstanceGuid](#) directly if the configuration is fixed.

## TPM Device Interface

The main TPM specification defines the TPM commands. In EDK II, the TPM commands are defined in [Tpm20.h](#).

A TPM hardware device may support the First-In-First-Out (FIFO) interface or Command Response Buffer (CRB). The FIFO interface defines a set of data input/output IO registers for the TPM commands. The CRB interface defines a chunk of DMA memory buffer for the TPM commands. In EDK II, both the TPM FIFO and CRB interfaces are described in [TpmPtp.h](#),

EDKII TCG drivers are TPM interface agnostic. They just send commands via [Tpm2CommandLib](#). The [Tpm2CommandLib](#) implementation is also TPM interface agnostic and sends command to [Tpm2DeviceLib](#). The [Tpm2DeviceLib](#) abstracts how to send a TPM command. For example, [Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2](#) is the instance to send a TPM command via [EFI\\_TCG2\\_PROTOCOL.SubmitCommand\(\)](#). [Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm](#) is the instance to send a TPM command to the hardware via FIFO or CRB.


[Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm.c](#) detects the TPM device interface type in [Tpm2GetPtpInterface\(\)](#). It checks the FIFO and CRB register to know the device interface. Then this function sets the [PcdActiveTpmInterfaceType](#). Then

[Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm.c](#) detects the TPM device interface type in [Tpm2GetPtpInterface\(\)](#). It checks the FIFO and CRB register to know the device interface. Then this function sets the [PcdActiveTpmInterfaceType](#).

[Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm](#) sends a TPM command in [Tpm2Ptp.c DTpm2SubmitCommand\(\)](#). It checks [PcdActiveTpmInterfaceType](#) and calls [Tpm2Tis.c Tpm2TisTpmCommand\(\)](#) for the FIFO interface or [Tpm2Ptp.c PtpCrbTpmCommand\(\)](#) for the CRB interface.

Figure 8 shows the TCG trusted boot component in EDK II.

## TCG2 Trusted Boot Component



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Figure 8: TCG Trusted Boot Component in EDK II

### Error Handling

TPM errors may happen at any time. According to the TCG specification, capping PCR is always required. If the PCR cannot be capped, the platform SHOULD take any necessary action to notify the host platform's administrator, user, and operator of this situation and transition to a "fail-safe" mode by performing one of these actions:

- Make the TPM interface inaccessible via hardware for the remainder of the power cycle
- Reboot the Host Platform
- Disable the Host Platform
- Perform a vendor-specific action that is equivalent to one of the options above.

When a TPM returns an error, `Tcg2Pei.c` will create a `EFI_TPM_ERROR` HOB and report the error status code via `REPORT_STATUS_CODE()` with `PcdStatusCodeSubClassTpmDevice`.

`Tcg2Dxe.c` will detect the `EFI_TPM_ERROR` HOB and not install `EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL` if there is a TPM error. If the TPM error happens after the `EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL` installation, `Tcg2Dxe.c` will set the `EFI_TCG2_BOOT_SERVICE_CAPABILITY.TpmPresentFlag` to be FALSE. At this point the OS will know the TPM is absent. Similar to `Tcg2Pei.c`, `Tcg2Dxe.c` also reports the error status code via `REPORT_STATUS_CODE()`.

A platform module may register a `ReportStatusCode` callback handler to process the TPM error, such as reset system, or disable the TPM hardware.

## TCG Physical Presence



TCG Physical Presence (PP) interface is a way to let an OS send a request to configure the TPM device, such as Clear, SetPCRBanks, ChangeEPS, Enable, Disable, DisableEndorsementEnableStorageHierarchy. [TcgPhysicalPresence.h](#) lists all TCG PP operation defined by the TCG PP specification.

EDK II defines a [Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib](#) to abstract the TCG PP functions. It has three instances - [PeiTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib](#), [DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib](#), and [SmmTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib](#). The TCG PP related ACPI code is at [Tpm.asl](#) of the [Tcg2Smm](#) driver.

During boot, [Tcg2Smm.c PublishAcpiTable\(\)](#) allocates the non-volatile storage ACPI OpRegion

- mTcgNvs for [ASL/SMM](#) communication. At runtime, the OS locates the TPM device - **Name**(CID, \"MSFT0101\") and calls the **\_DSM()** method. The first parameter is a UUID. The value (3dddfaa6-361b-4eb4-a424-8d10089d1653) means the function call is TCG PP request. Finally, the **TPPI()** method fills the parameter in the **OperationRegion**(TNVS) and triggers the SMI - **Store**(PPIN, IOPN).

Then [Tcg2Smm.c PhysicalPresenceCallback\(\)](#) will be triggered to handle such a PP request. It checks the parameters and calls the corresponding function in [SmmTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib](#). EDK II defines two PP variables:

- [Tcg2PhysicalPresence](#) variable. It is a read/write variable because anyone can send the PP request. The data structure is [EFI\\_TCG2\\_PHYSICAL\\_PRESENCE](#). This variable is to record the TCG PP request, request parameter, and finally, the response result.
- [Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags](#) variable. It is a read-only variable to prevent modification from malicious software. The data structure is [EFI\\_TCG2\\_PHYSICAL\\_PRESENCE\\_FLAGS](#). This variable is to record the TCG management flags. The flags are defined in [Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib](#), such as [TCG2\\_BIOS\\_TPM\\_MANAGEMENT\\_FLAG\\_XXX](#), [TCG2\\_BIOS\\_INFORMATION\\_FLAG\\_XXX](#), [TCG2\\_BIOS\\_STORAGE\\_MANAGEMENT\\_FLAG\\_XXX](#).

If the OS submits a TPM configuration change request, then this request is saved in the [Tcg2PhysicalPresence](#) variable.

Upon the next boot, a PlatformBds module, such as [BoardBdsHookLib](#), needs to process the TCG PP request. **ProcessTcgPp()** needs to check **Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibNeedUserConfirm()**, connect the platform specific trusted console if user confirmation is required, and then call **Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest()**.

[DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c](#) implements the **Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest()**. It calls **VariableLockProtocol->RequestToLock()** to lock the [Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags](#) variable, reads [Tcg2PhysicalPresence](#) variable, and then calls **Tcg2ExecutePendingTpmRequest()** to process the request. If user confirmation is required, then **Tcg2UserConfirm()** is called. Once the configuration is confirmed, the TPM is configured in **Tcg2ExecutePhysicalPresence()**, such as Clear, SetPCRBanks, ChangeEPS, LogAllDigests. After configuration, **Tcg2ExecutePendingTpmRequest()** then records the new configuration in [Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags](#) variable and the PP result in [Tcg2PhysicalPresence](#) variable. Finally, this function will reset the system in order to make the new settings take effect.

Please be aware that **Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest()** shall be called before EndOfDxe event because the read-only [Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags](#) variable can only be updated before EndOfDxe.

Once the PP request is processed, the OS may use ACPI **\_DSM()** method again to get the result. [Tcg2Smm.c PhysicalPresenceCallback\(\)](#) will return the result from [Tcg2PhysicalPresence](#) variable.

## TPM Bank Selection

A TPM device may have multiple banks of PCRs. A PCR bank is a collection of PCRs that are extended with the same hash algorithm. PCR banks are identified by the hash algorithm used to extend the PCR in that bank.

The PP operation [TCG2\\_PHYSICAL\\_PRESENCE\\_SET\\_PCR\\_BANKS](#) can be used to configure the active PCR banks.

Besides the PP request, the OS may use [EFI\\_TCG2\\_PROTOCOL](#) for TPM active bank management as well. **GetActivePcrBanks()** returns the current active banks. **SetActivePcrBanks()** is used to set the new PCR banks request. It does not take effect immediately, but just saves a request. The new PCR bank setting request will be processed in the next boot. **GetResultOfSetActivePcrBanks()** is used to get the new PCR banks setting result.

EDK II [Tcg2Dxe.c](#) just uses the same [Tcg2PhysicalPresence](#) variable for the implementation. Later [DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c](#) calls **Tcg2ExecutePhysicalPresence()** and then **Tpm2GetCapabilitySupportedAndActivePcrs()** in order to get the current supported PCR banks and compares them. If one of the new PCR banks is not supported, then the request will be rejected. Otherwise, this function calls **Tpm2PcrAllocateBanks()** to set the new banks and then reset the system.

Care must be taken that the final active PCR banks value is based upon multiple criteria:

- 1) TPM supported PCR banks - It can be retrieved from **Tpm2GetCapabilitySupportedAndActivePcrs(&TpmHashAlgorithmBitmap)**.
- 2) TPM end user desired current active PCR banks -- It can also be retrieved from **Tpm2GetCapabilitySupportedAndActivePcrs(&TpmActivePcrBanks)**.
- 3) The OEM configuration supported active PCR banks -- the OEM may select a subset of hash algorithms. It is recorded in [PcdTpm2HashMask](#).
- 4) The platform firmware software capability -- the OEM may select a subset of hash algorithms. It is recorded in [PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap](#).

The final effective PCR banks is a subset of all of them. For example, take a TPM that supports SHA256|SHA384|SM3\_256. The end user desired active PCR bank is SHA256. The supported active PCR banks is SHA256|SHA384. The platform firmware software capability is SHA256|SHA384. Then the final effective PCR banks is SHA256 only.

[Tcg2Pei.c](#) **SyncPcrAllocationsAndPcrMask()** function is used to synchronize the settings. This includes ensuring that the TPM has appropriate hardware capability ([TpmHashAlgorithmBitmap](#)), the current active PCR banks ([TpmActivePcrBanks](#)), and the supported active PCR banks ([PcdTpm2HashMask](#)). These all need to be in agreement.


- If there is a bank in [TpmActivePcrBanks](#) that is not described in [PcdTpm2HashMask](#), then it means that the OEM does not want to enable this bank. **SyncPcrAllocationsAndPcrMask()** will call **Tpm2PcrAllocateBanks()** to remove the bank from the active PCR banks and reset the system.
- If there is a bank in [PcdTpm2HashMask](#) but not supported in the [TpmHashAlgorithmBitmap](#), that means the OEM configured an invalid bank. **SyncPcrAllocationsAndPcrMask()** will update [PcdTpm2HashMask](#).

[PcdTpm2HashMask](#) serves as an indicator of the supported active PCR banks. It will be used to guide [PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap](#) generation and during the hash algorithm registration in [HashLibBaseCryptoRouter](#). A platform may register multiple hash algorithms, such as [HashInstanceLibSha256](#), [HashInstanceLibSha384](#), [HashInstanceLibSha512](#) and [HashInstanceLibSm3](#). If a hash algorithm is not indicated in [PcdTpm2HashMask](#), this hash algorithm will not be registered successfully. The final registered hash algorithms value is a subset of [PcdTpm2HashMask](#) and is recorded in [PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap](#).

Figure 9 shows the TPM bank selection in EDK II.



## TPM2 Bank Selection



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Figure 9: TPM Bank Selection in EDK II

In brief, we have below result:

- [PcdTpm2HashMask](#) (supported active PCR banks) must be a subset of [TpmHashAlgorithmBitmap](#) (TPM capability).
- [TpmActivePcrBanks](#) (end user desired active PCR banks) must be a subset of [PcdTpm2HashMask](#).
- [PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap](#) (platform firmware capability) must be a subset of [PcdTpm2HashMask](#).

[PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap](#) serves as an indicator of the firmware hash algorithm capability. [Tcg2Dxe.c](#) needs to report the capability to the OS with the following values:

- [EFI\\_TCG2\\_BOOT\\_SERVICE\\_CAPABILITY.HashAlgorithmBitmap](#) shall be the ([TpmHashAlgorithmBitmap](#) & [PcdGet32](#) ([PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap](#)))
- [EFI\\_TCG2\\_BOOT\\_SERVICE\\_CAPABILITY.ActivePcrBanks](#) shall be the ([TpmActivePcrBanks](#) & [PcdGet32](#) ([PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap](#)))

In the above example, we have following configuration:

- [TpmHashAlgorithmBitmap](#) is SHA256|SHA384|SM3\_256.
- [PcdTpm2HashMask](#) is SHA256|SHA384.
- [TpmActivePcrBanks](#) is SHA256.
- [PcdTcg2HashAlgorithmBitmap](#) is SHA256|SHA384.

The final report is:

- [EFI\\_TCG2\\_BOOT\\_SERVICE\\_CAPABILITY.HashAlgorithmBitmap](#) is SHA256|SHA384.
- [EFI\\_TCG2\\_BOOT\\_SERVICE\\_CAPABILITY.ActivePcrBanks](#) is SHA256.

Then the end user may have chance to enable SHA384 for the platform.

## TPM Hierarchy Management

TPM has three hierarchies -- platform hierarchy, storage hierarchy and endorsement hierarchy.

The platform hierarchy is managed by the platform firmware. Before booting to the OS, the platform firmware shall randomize the platform hierarchy auth value in order to prevent another entity from accessing the platform hierarchy.

A sample implementation of this randomization can be found in the [Tcg2Platform](#) module in EDK II platform repository. In a normal boot path, [Tcg2PlatformDxe.c](#) calls **ConfigureTpmPlatformHierarchy()** in [TpmPlatformHierarchyLib.c](#) to randomize the platform auth value in EndOfDxe event. Once the **Tpm2HierarchyChangeAuth()** command is sent to the TPM, no one else can use the platform hierarchy without knowing the random number. In the S3 resume path, there is no need to randomize the platform auth value again if the Tcg2Pei resumes TPM successfully. However, if a TPM resume fails and Tcg2Pei needs to restart the TPM, then [Tcg2PlatformPei.c](#) **RandomizePlatformAuth()** is called to randomize the platform auth value in the EndOfPei event **PlatformInitEndOfPei()** before the platform firmware resumes to the OS.

The OS manages the storage hierarchy, which is independent of the platform hierarchy. The OS may ask the platform auth to clear the TPM via TCG PP operation [TCG2\\_PHYSICAL\\_PRESENCE\\_CLEAR](#). Later [DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib.c](#) calls **Tcg2ExecutePhysicalPresence()** then **Tpm2CommandClear()** to clear the TPM.


Other PP operations such as [TCG2\\_PHYSICAL\\_PRESENCE\\_ENABLE](#), [TCG2\\_PHYSICAL\\_PRESENCE\\_DISABLE](#), [TCG2\\_PHYSICAL\\_PRESENCE\\_DISABLE\\_ENDORSEMENT\\_ENABLE\\_STORAGE\\_HIERARCHY](#) can be used to enable or disable the storage hierarchy or the endorsement hierarchy. These are optional features. If they are implemented, then Tcg2Pei needs to call the **Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibGetManagementFlags()** function from [PeiTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib](#), check [TCG2\\_BIOS\\_INFORMATION\\_FLAG\\_HIERARCHY\\_CONTROL\\_XXX](#) flags in [Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLib](#) and send **Tpm2HierarchyControl()** command to enable or disable the hierarchy.

TCG PP Interface not only controls TPM configuration, but it also controls the TCG storage configuration, such as BlockSid. We will discuss that in TCG storage section.

TCG PP interface also supports vendor specific extensions. EDK II defines [Tcg2PpVendorLib](#) to serve that purpose.

Figure 10 shows TCG PP component in EDK II.

## TCG2 PP Component



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Figure 10: TCG PP Component in EDK II

## TCG Memory Overwrite (MOR)

The memory overwrite (MOR) feature is to mitigate the platform reset attack. It is not related to the TPM hardware but is a pure software feature.

The TCG Platform Reset Mitigation specification defines two UEFI variables:

- **MemoryOverwriteRequestControl** variable (MOR variable). It is a read/write variable. This variable is to record the TCG MOR request state.
- **MemoryOverwriteRequestControlLock** variable (MorLock variable). It is lockable in some situations to prevent modification from malicious software. This variable is to control the lock state of **MemoryOverwriteRequestControl** variable and itself. It can be accessed with a UEFI variable service -- **SetVariable()/GetVariable()**. But it is not a normal UEFI variable because it cannot be stored on flash region even though it has the **NON\_VOLATILE** attribute. It is more like a virtual variable.

A platform memory initialization module shall check the **MemoryOverwriteRequestControl** variable. If this variable is not present or this variable indicates a MOR request, then the memory initialization module shall clear the memory after enabling the memory controller. For example, the **QuarkPlatformMemoryInit** module **InstallEfiMemory()** function checks the MOR variable and zeros all system memory before installing it if **MOR\_CLEAR\_MEMORY\_VALUE()** is TRUE. Another example is the Kabylake openboard **FspmPolicyWrapper** **PeiFspmMiscUpdUpdatePreMem()** function that checks the MOR variable and sets the CleanMemory policy data if **MOR\_CLEAR\_MEMORY\_BIT\_MASK** is set.

The MOR variable is managed by the **MemoryOverwriteControl** module. The MOR variable is created at **TcgMor.c** entrypoint **MorDriverEntryPoint()**, and the variables is cleared at the ReadyToBoot event **OnReadyToBoot()**.

Because the MOR variable is read/write, a malicious software entity may just clear the MOR request even if a high privileged software requests the MOR. We need a secure MOR solution to prevent such an attack. The MorLock variable was introduced to protect the MOR variable. The first version of MorLock is simple. Once the MorLock is set, no one can unlock MOR until the next boot. It is secure, but it brings performance overhead for a system reset. People have to wait a long time for the platform memory module cleaning all system memory, especially on a server platform with large memory. The second MorLock supports unlock. The MorLock caller can set MorLock with an 8 byte secret key. If the caller sets MorLock with the same 8 bytes secret key, it means unlock MOR. In order to prevent secret key guessing, any wrong secret key will cause the MorLock to become ununlockable in the current boot.

Because the variable driver must save a secret key, the variable driver shall:


- 1) execute in a secure execution environment, such as system management mode (SMM).
- 2) not store the secret key content to a non-volatile storage, such as an SPI flash region.

The MorLock variable is managed by the EDKII [VariableRuntimeDxe](#) driver [TcgMorLockSmm.c](#).

**SetVariableCheckHandlerMorLock()** function follows the specification to handle both secure MOR version 1 (lock without key) and version 2 (lock with key).

Figure 11 shows the high level TCG MOR Flow.

## MOR Flow



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
Figure 11 TCG MOR Flow

The MOR variable not only control memory overwrite but also control the storage device TPer reset. We will discuss that in TCG storage section.

Previous MOR specifications also defined an ACPI interface. The OS may set MOR state by using an ACPI `_DSM` method. This interface is deprecated because it does not support secure MOR.

Figure 12 shows TCG MOR component in EDK II.

## TCG MOR Component



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Figure 12 TCG MOR Component in EDK II

## OS Interface

A platform firmware shall report the TPM device to an OS. The report should include 1) ACPI table, 2) `EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL`.

### ACPI Table

A TPM capable system shall report two ACPI tables.

- 1) **TPM2 ACPI** table -- This is a static table to report the TPM device control area and TCG event log.
- 2) **TPM SSDT** ACPI table -- This is the ACPI language to declare the TPM device, describe the hardware resources, such as interrupt information, and provide the device specific method `_DSM()`, such as TCG Physical Presence (PP) operation.

**Tcg2Smm** installs **TPM2 ACPI** table in **PublishTpm2()**. It uses the below PCDs to patch the table.

- **PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev** - This is to indicate TPM2 ACPI table version: version 3 or version 4.
- **PcdTpmPlatformClass** - This is to indicate the platform type: client or server.
- **PcdTpm2AcpiTableLamI/PcdTpm2AcpiTableLasa** -- This is for TCG event log area. Only version 4 table includes the TCG event log field.
- **PcdActiveTpmInterfaceType** -- These are for the TPM device interface: `Tpm2PtpInterfaceCrb` or `Tpm2PtpInterfaceFifo`. Only `Tpm2PtpInterfaceCrb` interface requires `StartMethod` and `AddressOfControlArea`.
- **PcdTpmBaseAddress** -- This is for TPM device base address.
- **PcdAcpiDefaultOemId**, **PcdAcpiDefaultOemTableId**, **PcdAcpiDefaultOemRevision**, **PcdAcpiDefaultCreatorId**, **PcdAcpiDefaultCreatorRevision** -- These are for the common ACPI header.

**Tcg2Smm** installs the **TPM SSDT** ACPI table in **PublishAcpiTable()**. It uses the below PCDs to patch the table.

- **PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer** -- This is to indicate the TCG Physical Presence Interface version.
- **PcdTpm2CurrentIrqNum**, **PcdTpm2PossibleIrqNumBuf** -- This is to indicate the TPM IRQ information.
- **PcdAcpiDefaultOemId** -- This is for the common ACPI header. The **OemTableId** and **OemRevision** should not be patched because they are defined at build time -- 'TPM2Tabl'. The **CreatorId** and **CreatorRevision** should not be patched because the ASL compiler fills in those values.

**Tcg2Smm** patches the TNVS ACPI OperationRegion with an ACPIInvs memory address in **AssignOpRegion()**. The TNVS is used as a runtime communication buffer between ASL and the SMI handler **PhysicalPresenceCallback()** for the TCG PP request.

**Tcg2Smm** patches **\_HID** to indicate a TPM device to the OS in **UpdateHID()**. **Tcg2Smm** should get the TPM **vendorID** from the **Tpm2GetCapabilityManufactureID()**, then translate the TPM vendorID to the ACPI defined **PNPID** and update the **\_HID** name string. In a case that a company only registered a TPM vendorID but not an ACPI PNPID, the translation fails. The **\_CID("MSFT0101")** should be used as **\_HID**.

## TCG2\_PROTOCOL

**EFI\_TCG2\_PROTOCOL** is to provide a TCG services to an OS loader. It is a boot service protocol. It cannot be used after the **ExitBootServices** event.

**Tcg2Dxe** installs the **EFI\_TCG2\_PROTOCOL** and provides the below services:

- **GetCapability()** -- This is to return capability information and state information, such as **HashAlgorithmBitmap**, **SupportedEventLogs**, **TPMPresentFlag**, **NumberOfPCRBanks**, **ActivePcrBanks**, etc.
- **GetEventLog()** -- This is to return the TCG event log.
- **HashLogExtendEvent()** -- This is to provide a service to extend data and log events. It has a flag to measure a PE image directly.
- **SubmitCommand()** -- This is to submit a TPM command.
- **GetActivePcrBanks()** -- This is to get the active PCR banks.
- **SetActivePcrBanks()** -- This is to set the active PCR banks. It will not take effect until the next reboot.
- **GetResultOfSetActivePcrBanks()** -- This is to return the result of the last **SetActivePcrBanks()**.

## TCG Storage

The TCG not only defines the TPM device, but it also defines storage devices, such as OPAL, Opalite, Pyrite, and Ruby.

EDK II **TcgStorageCoreLib** provides interfaces for TCG storage, including the lowest level TCG data encoding, such as **TcgStartComPacket()**, **TcgEndComPacket()**, **TcgStartPacket()**, **TcgEndPacket()**, **TcgStartSubPacket()**, **TcgEndSubPacket()**, **TcgAddUINT8()**, **TcgAddUINT64()**, **TcgAddBOOLEAN()**, **TcgAddTcgUid()**, etc.

EDK II **TcgStorageOpalLib** provides interfaces for TCG OPAL commands, such as **OpalStartSession()**, **OpalEndSession()**, **OpalPsidRevert()**, **OpalGetMsid()**, **OpalSetPassword()**, **OpalBlockSid()**, etc.



[EFI\\_STORAGE\\_SECURITY\\_COMMAND\\_PROTOCOL](#) is used to send a storage security command to a secure storage device.

The EDK II [OpalPassword](#) driver handles all TCG storage features, such as OPAL device password management and BlockSid.

## OPAL Password

The OPAL password feature is designed to replace the Hard Disk Drive (HDD) password in the Advanced Technology Attachment (ATA) specification. It lets a user set a password for the disk during provisioning and requests the same password during every subsequent boot to unlock the disk.

The EDK II [OpalPassword](#) driver provides a setup user interface (UI) to let a user to input a password to unlock the disk. At the driver entrypoint, [OpalDriver.c EfiDriverEntryPoint\(\)](#) installs the DriverBinding protocol and calls **HiiInstall()** to install the setup form. Whenever there is a storage device discovered, **OpalEfiDriverBindingSupported()** will check if the device supports [EFI\\_STORAGE\\_SECURITY\\_COMMAND\\_PROTOCOL](#). If supported, then **OpalEfiDriverBindingStart()** calls **OpalDiskInitialize()** to initialize the device, such as getting manufactured SID (MSID) and data removal mechanism information. Then **OpalEfiDriverBindingStart()** calls **OpalDriverRequestPassword()** to unlock the disk.

If the disk locking feature is not set, then there is no need to ask the user to input a password. The function just returns.

If the disk locking feature is set, the disk will be in the locked state. A password dialogue box will be pop up to ask user to input the password. Then **OpalDriverRequestPassword()** calls **OpalUtilUpdateGlobalLockingRange()** to try unlocking. If the disk is unlocked, then the password is correct. It will be used for auto-unlocking in S3 resume (we will discuss that later). If unlocking fails, then the user will be asked to input the password again. The maximum retry count is 5 times. After that, the system will shut down.

A system level cold reset causes disk device power off, in which case the disk is locked. However, a warm reset may keep the disk device power on, which cause the disk remaining in the unlocked state after reset. In this condition, the OpalPassword driver still need to get the password from the end user for auto-unlocking in S3 resume. As such, **OpalDriverRequestPassword()** calls **OpalUtilUpdateGlobalLockingRange()** to try locking the device. If the user does not input the original password, the action will not success. Once the disk is locked, then the password is correct. **OpalUtilUpdateGlobalLockingRange()** is called again to unlock the disk.

Sometimes, the platform may want to skip the OPAL password prompt. It can be controlled by [PcdSkipOpalPasswordPrompt](#). An end user may also choose to skip the password input by using 'ESC'. In this password skip scenario, if the device is in the locked state, the device will be kept in the locked state and continue booting. If the device is unlocked, the system will be forced to shut down in order to lock the device again.

OPAL disk auto-unlocking in S3 resume is a necessary feature because there is no UI available in the S3 resume path to let an end user input anything. What we need is to let the DXE OPAL driver save the password to a secure place with confidentiality guarantee, and then another S3 resume OPAL driver can get the password and unlock the OPAL device. The system management RAM (SMRAM) is a natural place to save the password secret. There are two possible ways to achieve this:

- We can have an SMM OPAL password driver. The DXE OPAL driver passes the password to the SMM OPAL driver on a normal boot. Then the PEI S3 script uses a software system management interrupt (SMI) invokes the SMM OPAL driver to unlock the device.
- We can have a PEI OPAL password driver. The DXE OPAL driver saves the password to a [LockBox](#) with a confidentiality attribute. The password won't be exposed by an OS and it can only be retrieved in PEI S3 code. Each LockBox can be uniquely identified by a GUID. As such, the PEI OPAL driver gets

the password from the same LockBox during the S3 resume and unlocks the device.

In the first version, we choose the SMM OPAL password solution. However, we ran into complicated Direct Memory Access (DMA) protection issues because it is complicated to enable I/O Memory Management Unit (IOMMU) for device DMA protection inside of SMM. So now we choose the PEI OPAL password solution. In a normal boot path, at EndOfDxe event **OpalEndOfDxeEventNotify()**, the [OpalDriver.c BuildOpalDeviceInfo\(\)](#) routine collects all OPAL device and password information and saves this to the OpalDevice LockBox and S3InitDevice LockBox via **SaveLockBox()** and sets the confidentiality attribute via **SetLockBoxAttributes**(LOCK\_BOX\_ATTRIBUTE\_RESTORE\_IN\_S3\_ONLY). The OPAL password unlock must happen before EndOfDxe event because the LockBox services are closed after EndOfDxe.

In the S3 resume path, [OpalPasswordPei.c](#) entry point **OpalPasswordPeiInit()** installs the [EDKII\\_PEI\\_STORAGE\\_SECURITY\\_CMD\\_PPI](#). Whenever there is a disk driver installed, the **OpalPasswordStorageSecurityPpiNotify()** callback function is invoked. Then **UnlockOpalPasswordDevices()** gets the LockBox information via **RestoreLockBox()** and calls **UnlockOpalPassword()** to unlock the device one by one.

## OPAL Features

An end user may want to update the OPAL password for a device. Usually, an end user can go to the BIOS setup page to perform that action and the new password will take effect immediately. However, that is not feasible in the [OpalPassword](#) driver. Because the setup page is launched after EndOfDxe event, there is no chance to save the new password for auto-unlocking. As such, the [OpalPassword](#) driver only allows the user to send a request and then reset the system. The OPAL password update request will be served in the next boot. After the disk is unlocked, the [OpalDriver.c OpalEfiDriverBindingStart\(\)](#) routine calls **ProcessOpalRequest()**.

Besides the password update, the [OpalPassword](#) driver supports an additional set of requests, such as:


- **ProcessOpalRequestSetAdminPwd()** -- Set admin password. The old admin password is required here.
- **ProcessOpalRequestSetUserPwd()** -- Set user password. The old user password is required here.
- **ProcessOpalRequestSecureErase()** -- Secure erase user data on the disk. An admin or user password is required here.
- **ProcessOpalRequestRevert()** -- Admin based revert to factory default. The admin password and manufactured SID (MSID) is required here. MSID can be read via **OpalUtilGetMsid()**. The admin can choose to keep the user data or destroy it.
- **ProcessOpalRequestPsidRevert()** -- Physical Presence SID (PSID) based revert to factory default. PSID is a 32-character case sensitive value that is shipped with the disk.
- **ProcessOpalRequestDisableUser()** -- Disable user. The admin password is required here.
- **ProcessOpalRequestEnableFeature()** -- Enable OPAL feature. The admin password and MSID are required here.

Care must be taken given that the OPAL device may take long to finish an Erase or Revert action. To give a better user experience, the OPAL driver pops up a message to notify the user of this potential delay.

Figure 13 shows TCG storage component in EDK II.



## Opal Storage Component



{width="6.5in" height="4.166666666666667in"} Figure 13 TCG Storage Component in EDK II

### BlockSid

Even if an OPAL device supports locking, an end user may choose to not lock it. In this case, a malicious entity may set a password to lock the OPAL device later and freeze the disk. In order to mitigate this attack, we need block Secure Identifier (SID), even if we don't want to use it.

BlockSid is a policy. It can be controlled by the end user via TCG Physical Presence (PP) interface, which we have discussed before.

In the normal boot path, at EndOfDxe event **OpalEndOfDxeEventNotify()**, [OpalDriver.c SendBlockSidCommand\(\)](#) checks [TCG2\\_BIOS\\_STORAGE\\_MANAGEMENT\\_FLAG\\_ENABLE\\_BLOCK\\_SID](#) from the [Tcg2PhysicalPresenceFlags](#) and sends an **OpalBlockSid()** command if it is set.

In the S3 resume path, [OpalPasswordPei.c UnlockOpalPassword\(\)](#) checks the same flag and sends an **OpalBlockSid()** command after it unlocks the devices one by one.

See Figure 10 and Figure 13 for the BlockSid action in PP and OPAL driver.

### TPer reset

When a platform firmware detects the MOR request, it means an unexpected system reset happened and the system might not erase the secrets from the memory. It also means the disk protected region might be also unlocked. In order to mitigate the reset attack, the platform not only cleans the memory content, but the platform also needs to issue a TPer reset command to the TCG storage devices.

The [MemoryOverwriteControl](#) module manages the [MemoryOverwriteRequestControl](#) (MOR) variable. At the EndOfDxe event, [TcgMor.c TPerResetAtEndOfDxe\(\)](#) locates all security storage devices and sends a TPer reset command in **InitiateTPerReset()**.

The platform also needs to ensure all trusted storages are connected before the EndOfDxe event. A PlatformBds module, such as [BoardBdsHookLib](#), needs to process the TCG MOR request.

**ProcessTcgMor()** needs to check if there is any MOR request and connect the platform specific trusted

storage.

See Figure 12 for the TPer reset action in MOR driver.

## OTHER TRUSTED BOOT CHAINS

Besides EDK II, other firmware or firmware related boot loaders also include the trusted boot chain.

### coreboot

[coreboot](#) includes the measured boot flow. It is a simplified version. Table 4 shows the usage in coreboot.

Table 4: coreboot TPM PCR Usage (Source: [coreboot measured boot](#))

#### PCR Index PCR Usage

0 Google vboot GBB flags 1 Google vboot GBB HWID 2 Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) 3 Runtime data like hwinfo.hex or MRC cache. 4 N/A 5 N/A 6 N/A 7 N/A

[vboot 2api.h](#) defines two PCRs:

- **BOOT\_MODE\_PCR(0)** -- It is to record the digest based on the current developer and recovery mode flags in the Google Binary Blob (GBB)
- **HWID\_DIGEST\_PCR(1)** -- It is to record the digest of the hardware ID (HWID) from the GBB.

In [verstage](#), [vboot\\_logic.c](#) [verstage\\_main\(\)](#) calls [extend\\_pcrs\(\)](#) to extend two PCRs. [tpm\\_common.c](#) [vboot\\_extend\\_pcr\(\)](#) calls [2api.c](#) [vb2api\\_get\\_pcr\\_digest\(\)](#) to get the corresponding flags and HWID digest from the GBB and extends them to the TPM.

Later, coreboot [crtm.h](#) defines two PCRs:

- **TPM\_CRTM\_PCR(2)** -- It is for Core Root of Trust for Measurement (CRTM) modules, including all stages, data and blobs. These include COREBOOT CBFS (bootblock, fallback/verstage), FW\_MAIN CBFS (fallback/romstage, fspm, fallback/postcar, fallback/ramstage, cpu\_microcode\_blob, fsps, vbt, fallback/dsdt.aml, fallback/payload), RO\_VPD, GBB, SI\_DESC, SI\_GBE.
- **TPM\_RUNTIME\_DATA\_PCR(3)** -- It is for runtime changeable data. Such as CMOS, SI\_ME, RW\_NVRAM.

[crtm.c](#) [tspi\\_measure\\_cbfs\\_hook\(\)](#) is the hook function to measure different components in the coreboot file system (CBFS) data. The CBFS\_TYPE definition can be found at [cbfs\\_serialized.h](#). For example:

- CBFS\_TYPE\_MRC -- PCR2
- CBFS\_TYPE\_STAGE -- PCR2
- CBFS\_TYPE\_SELF -- PCR2
- CBFS\_TYPE\_FIT -- PCR2
- CBFS\_TYPE\_MRC\_CACHE -- PCR3
- Other -- runtime data go to PCR3, non-runtime data go to PCR2.

After that, [log.c](#) [tcpa\\_log\\_add\\_table\\_entry\(\)](#) appends the log to a tcpa table.

## Grub2

**Grub2** extends the trusted boot chain from platform firmware into the OS. Table 5 shows the PCR usage in Grub.

Table 5: GRUB TPM PCR Usage (Source: [Grub2 Measured Boot](#))

| PCR Index | PCR Usage  |
|-----------|--|
| 8         | Grub command line:           All executed commands (including those from       configuration files) will be logged and measured as       entered with a prefix of "grub_cmd: " |
|           | Kernel command line:           Any command line passed to a kernel will be logged       and measured as entered with a prefix of       "kernel_cmdline: "                      |
|           | Module command line:           Any command line passed to a kernel module will be       logged and measured as entered with a prefix of       "module_cmdline: "               |
| 9         | Files:           Any file read by GRUB will be logged and measured       with a descriptive text corresponding to the       filename.  |

Grub2 [tpm.h](#) defines two PCR index:

- **GRUB\_STRING\_PCR(8)** -- It is for the command line string.
- **GRUB\_BINARY\_PCR(9)** -- It is for a file binary.

[tpm.c](#) registers **grub\_tpm\_verify\_string()** and **grub\_tpm\_verify\_write()** to a **grub\_file\_verifier** structure. They will be called by **grub\_verify\_string()** and **grub\_verifiers\_open()** in [verifiers.c](#).

when grub2 executes a command line such as GRUB\_VERIFY\_MODULE\_CMDLINE, GRUB\_VERIFY\_KERNEL\_CMDLINE, GRUB\_VERIFY\_COMMAND or grub\_create\_loader\_cmdline() in [cmdline.c](#), **grub\_verify\_string()** is used. Finally, **grub\_tpm\_verify\_string()** measures the string to PCR8.

**grub\_verifiers\_open()** is registered as one of grub\_file\_filters in [file.h](#). Whenever grub uses [file.c](#) **grub\_file\_open()** this filter is invoked. Finally, **grub\_tpm\_verify\_write()** measures the file binary to PCR9.

## Linux Secure Boot Shim

**Shim** is used to extend the UEFI secure boot concept to Linux. Table 6 shows the PCR usage in Shim.

Table 6: Shim TPM PCR Usage

| PCR Index | PCR Usage  |
|-----------|--|
| 4         | UEFI application, such as second_stage, FALLBACK,       MOK_MANAGER.   |
| 7         | UEFI variable, such as "MokSBState".         Verification policy authority, such as "Shim",       "db", "MokList". |
| 14        | UEFI variable, such as "MokList", "MokListX",       "MokSBState".  |

[shim.c](#) **start\_image()** supports to execute a UEFI application image, such as second\_stage, FALLBACK, MOK\_MANAGER. It calls **tpm\_log\_pe()** to measure it to PCR4.

**Shim** defines a set of UEFI variable to store the shim variable. [mok.c](#) **import\_mok\_state()** checks the mok\_state\_variables, such as "MokList", "MokListX", "MokSBState", "MokDBState". In which, the "MokSBState" variable is measured to PCR7 via **tpm\_measure\_variable()**. The "MokList", "MokListX", "MokSBState" variables are measured to PCR14 via **tpm\_log\_event()**.

To follow the UEFI secure boot protocol, [shim.c verify\\_one\\_signature\(\)](#) will record "Shim" as the authority via `tpm_measure_variable()`, if the `AuthenticodeVerify()` succeeds. Also `check_db_cert()/check_db_hash()` will record "db", "MokList" as authority if verification succeeds.

## Windows BitLocker

Microsoft Windows BitLocker uses the below-listed PCRs. The legacy-boot version of Windows used PCR[8, 9, 10, 11], while UEFI-based Windows uses PCR[11, 12, 13, 14] for the BitLocker policies. Table 7 shows the PCR usage in Windows BitLocker.

Table 7: Windows BitLocker PCR Usage (Source: [Windows BitLocker](#))

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| PCR Index | PCR Usage (Legacy)        | PCR Usage (UEFI)                       |
|-----------|---------------------------|--|
| 8         | NTFS Boot Sector Reserved | 9 NTFS Boot Block Reserved             |
| 9         | NTFS Boot Block Reserved  | 10 Boot Manager Reserved               |
| 10        | Boot Manager Reserved     | 11 BitLocker access control            |
| 11        | BitLocker access control  | 12 Reserved                            |
| 12        | Reserved                  | Data events and highly volatile events |
| 13        | Reserved                  | Boot Module Details                    |
| 14        | Reserved                  | Boot Authorities                       |

---


## LOOKING FORWARD

In trusted boot, the goal of the measurement is to support attestation later. The TPM implements the root of trust for storage (RTS) and the root of trust for reporting (RTR). The root of trust for measurement (RTM) can be implemented in static RTM (SRTM) or dynamic RTM (DRTM). From a platform perspective, there are other ways to implement the measurement and attestation.

## Platform Root of Trust - Cerberus

A platform root of trust (RoT) is an entity to authenticate the firmware on the platform. One example is the OCP Project [Cerberus](#). The platform RoT may also collect measurements from the devices and support remote attestation. Figure 14 shows the concept of platform RoT.

# Platform RoT




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Figure 14. Platform Root of Trust


## Device Root of Trust - DICE

A device root of trust (RoT) is the RoT for a specific device to verify the mutable firmware and report the measurement. TCG defines the Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE) architecture for embedded devices which do not have full TPM capability but still want to support attestation. DICE uses a layering architecture. A layered TCB architecture uses a constrained set of TCB capabilities to construct the next TCB layer. Figure 15 shows the DICE asymmetric attestation architecture. Similar to the TPM certificate, a DICE device can present a DICE certificate as the identity for the device. Figure 16 shows the DICE symmetric attestation architecture, which may be used in a resource constrain environment. For more detail, please refer to [TCG DICE architecture](#).



{width="6.426221566054243in" height="4.378205380577428in"}

Figure 15. DICE implicit identity based attestation (source: [DICE Identity](#))



{width="6.0641021434820646in" height="3.872992125984252in"}

Figure 16. DICE symmetric identity based attestation (source: [DICE symmetric Identity](#))

## Server Management Domain Firmware

A server management domain (such as Baseboard Management Controller, also known as BMC) may have its own TPM module and SRTM because of its isolated execution environment. Table 8 shows the TPM PCR usage in a server management domain. For more details, please refer to [TCG Server Management Domain Firmware Specification](#).

Table 8: TPM PCR Usage in Management Domain (Source: [TCG Server](#))

### PCR Index PCR Usage

---


| PCR Index | PCR Usage                              |
|-----------|--|
| 0         | SRTM and Boot Loader                   |
| 1         | Management Domain Configuration        |
| 2         | Loadable Devices                       |
| 3         | Loadable Devices                       |
| 4         | Configuration                          |
| 5         | Reserved for future                    |
| 6         | Vendor Specific                        |
| 7         | Reserved for future                    |
| 8         | For management domain OS               |
| 9         | For management domain OS configuration |
| 10~15     | Reserved for future                    |
| 16        | Debug                                  |
| 17~23     | Reserved for future                    |

## Secure communication -- SPDM

Now we have multiple device entities on the platform. We need a secure communication mechanism. The Desktop Management Taskforce (DMTF) Secure Protocol and Data Model (SPDM) serves that purpose. SPDM defines message formats, data objects, and sequences for performing message exchanges. The protocols defined by SPDM can be used for a wide range of security functions. The SPDM protocol is similar to the network Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, but it is customized for the communication between two device entities.


SPDM 1.0 defines messages for hardware and firmware identification and authentication, including messages for hardware and firmware measurement collection and attestation. See Figure 4-3A. SPDM 1.1 defines a secure session establishment mechanism between two entities by using Diffie Hellman ephemeral (DHE) or Elliptic Curve DHE (ECDHE) key exchange with asymmetric authentication such as RSA or Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). For a device that only supports symmetric cryptography, the secure session can also be established with a pre-shared key (PSK). Once the session is created, two entities can use Authentication Encryption and Associated Data (AEAD) for message communication. See Figure 4-3B. For more detail, please refer to [DMTF SPDM Specification](#).





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Figure 17. SPDM 1.0 (source: [SPDM](#))




{width="6.5in" height="2.6666666666666665in"}

Figure 18. SPDM 1.1 (source: [SPDM](#))

Currently [openspdm](#) project provides an open source tool to validate the SPDM implementation and some sample code for explaining the SPDM concept. Figure 4-4 shows the openspdm internal design.



# openspdm design




```
{width="6.5in" height="2.954861111111111in"}
```

Figure 19. openspdm design (Source: [openspdm doc](#))

## An Open Trusted Platform -- Putting it all together

To put all of the above technology together, Figure 4-5 shows an example of an open trusted platform.

## Put them together – An example



```
{width="6.5in" height="4.166666666666667in"}
```

Figure 20. An Open Trusted Platform

## CHECKLIST FOR THE PLATFORM DEVELOPER

# PCR, Measurement and Attestation

## General Guideline

- 1.1.1. Use an **even PCR for code** measurement in general.
- 1.1.2. Use an **odd PCR for data** measurement in general.
- 1.1.3. Do **NOT** record data that **that are dynamic and changeable across the boot**, such as system clock, fan speed, boot count, system reset reason, battery power, a nonce value, a pointer, etc.
- 1.1.4. Do **NOT** record the **instance of specific information that may be used to unique identify a system**, such as an asset tag, a serial number, etc.
- 1.1.5. Do **NOT** record **any privacy sensitive information**.

## PCR 0

- 1.2.1. Do configure [PcdTcgPfpMeasurementRevision](#) to select TCG PFP compliance revision.
- 1.2.2. Do configure [PcdFirmwareVersionString](#) to a valid Unicode string for version, so that it can be measured.
- 1.2.3. Do report **all FV information** in PEI, so that all of them can be measured.
- 1.2.4. Do install [EFI\\_PEI\\_FIRMWARE\\_VOLUME\\_INFO\\_MEASUREMENT\\_EXCLUDED\\_PPI](#) for the FV that is ready measured.
- 1.2.5. Do measure individual non-FV component, if it is loaded from the platform firmware.
- 1.2.6. Do NOT update the loaded component before measuring it.
- 1.2.7. Do measure the non-host platform information using [EV\\_NONHOST\\_INFO](#), if it exists.
- 1.2.8. Do measure the non-host platform component using [EV\\_NONHOST\\_CODE](#) if it can only be updated by the platform firmware.

## PCR 1

- 1.3.1. Do measure Microcode.
- 1.3.2. Do measure SMBIOS table after filtering changeable data or instance data.
- 1.3.3. Do measure "Entering ROM Based Setup" with [EV\\_ACTION](#) for a setup utility.
- 1.3.4. Do measure security related configuration data from non-volatile storage, such as UEFI setup variable, or CMOS.
- 1.3.5. Do measure the hardware device list with [EV\\_TABLE\\_OF\\_DEVICES](#).
- 1.3.6. Do measure the non-host platform configuration using [EV\\_NONHOST\\_CONFIG](#) if it can only be updated by the platform firmware.

## PCR 2

- 1.4.1. Do link [DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib](#) as **LAST** NULL instance lib for SecurityStubDxe.inf in a DSC file.
- 1.4.2. Do measure the non-host platform component using [EV\\_NONHOST\\_CODE](#) if it can be updated by entities other than the platform firmware.
- 1.4.3. Do measure SPDM-capable device hardware or firmware use [EV\\_EFI\\_SPDM\\_FIRMWARE\\_BLOB](#).

## PCR 3

1.5.1. Do measure "Entering ROM Based Setup" with [EV\\_ACTION](#) for a UEFI application based setup utility.

1.5.2. Do measure the non-host platform configuration using [EV\\_NONHOST\\_CONFIG](#) if it can be updated by entities other than the platform firmware.

1.5.3. Do measure SPDM-capable device hardware configuration or firmware configuration use [EV\\_EFI\\_SPDM\\_FIRMWARE\\_CONFIG](#).

## PCR 4

1.6.1. Do measure the additional pre-OS code loaded by an UEFI application the using [EV\\_COMPACT\\_HASH](#).

## PCR 5

1.7.1 Do measure the additional data configuration related to the UEFI application.

## PCR 6

N/A

## PCR 7

1.9.1. Do measure **security configuration** if it exists. (It means the whole policy.)

1.9.2. Do measure **security authority** if it exists. (It means the specific policy which is used to verify the component.)

1.9.3. Do measure the security feature disabling event, such as "UEFI Debug Mode", "DMA Protection Disabled".

## NO\_ACTION event

1.10.1. Do record startup locality event, if an ACM starts the TPM.

# TPM Device Startup

## Device Selection

2.1.1. Do NOT support TPM1.2.

2.1.2. Do choose a proper Tcg2Config driver for device selection, such as [Tcg2Config](#) or platform specific one.

2.1.3. Do set [PcdTpmInstanceGuid](#) directly after the TPM device selection.

2.1.4. Do set [PcdTpm2InitializationPolicy](#) if the TPM device is started.

## TPM Device Interface

2.2.1. Do link proper [Tpm2DeviceLib](#) to Tcg2Dxe.inf and Tcg2Pei.inf in platform DSC, such as [Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm](#) or other TPM device such as I2C.

## Error Handling

2.3.1. Do register a `ReportStatusCode` callback handler to process the TPM error, if the platform wants to reset system, or disable the TPM hardware on error.

## TCG Physical Presence

3.1.1. Do call `Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibNeedUserConfirm()` and `Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest()` in the platform BDS before `EndOfDxe`.

3.1.2. Do **connect all trusted consoles** if `Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibNeedUserConfirm()` is TRUE.

## TPM Bank Selection

3.2.1. Do choose `HashLibBaseCryptoRouter` if the platform wants to support crypto agile.

3.2.2. Do link proper multiple HashLib instances, such as `HashInstanceLibSha256`, `HashInstanceLibSha384`, `HashInstanceLibSha512` and `HashInstanceLibSm3`, to `Tcg2Pei.inf` and `Tcg2Dxe.inf` in platform DSC.

3.2.3. Do NOT use `HashInstanceLibSha1`.

## TPM Hierarchy Management

3.3.1. Do choose a proper `Tcg2Platform` module to manage the TPM platform hierarchy, such as `Tcg2Platform` or platform specific one.

3.3.2. Do randomize TPM platform auth before `EndOfDxe`.

3.3.3. Do randomize TPM platform auth before `EndOfPei` in S3 resume, if TPM error happens.

3.3.4. Do send `Tpm2HierarchyControl()` command to enable or disable the hierarchy, if it is supported.

## TCG Memory Override

4.1.1. Do check MOR variable and clear memory in memory initialization if MOR request is set.

4.1.2. Do treat MOR variable missing as requested.

## OS Interface

### ACPI Table

5.1.1. Do configure `PcdTpm2AcpiTableRev` to indicate TPM2 ACPI table version.

5.1.2. Do configure `PcdTpmPlatformClass` for client or server.

5.1.3. Do configure `PcdTcgPhysicalPresenceInterfaceVer` to indicate the TCG Physical Presence Interface version.

5.1.4. Do configure `PcdTpm2CurrentIrqNum` and `PcdTpm2PossibleIrqNumBuf` to indicate the TPM IRQ information.

## TCG2\_PROTOCOL

N/A

## TCG Storage

### OPAL Password

6.1.1. Do **connect trusted storages and trusted consoles** in Platform BDS before EndOfDxe if there is OPAL password request.

6.1.2. Do include storage disk drivers in PEI for S3 auto-unlock.

### OPAL Feature

6.2.1. Do **connect trusted storages and trusted consoles** in Platform BDS before EndOfDxe if there is OPAL feature request.

### BlockSid

6.3.1. Do enable BlockSid by default.

### TPer reset

6.4.1. Do **connect trusted storages** in Platform BDS before EndOfDxe if MOR request is set.

6.4.2. Do treat MOR variable missing as requested.

## GLOSSARY

ACM -- Authenticated Code Module (Intel)

AEAD -- Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data

APCI -- Advanced Power and Configuration Interface

CoSWID -- Concise SWID

CCC -- Confidential Computing Consortium

CRB -- Command Response Buffer

DHE -- Diffie-Hellman ephemeral (key exchange)

DICE -- Device Identifier Composition Engine

DMA -- Direct Memory Access

DRTM -- Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement

ECDHE -- Elliptic Curve DHE (key exchange)

ECDSA -- Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm

FIM -- Firmware Integrity Measurement

GP -- Global Platform

IBV -- Independent BIOS Vendor

IFV -- Independent Firmware Vendor

IHV -- Independent Hardware Vendor

ISV -- Independent Silicon Vendor

MAC -- Message Authentication Code

MMIO -- Memory Mapped I/O

MOR -- Memory Overwrite

MSID -- Manufactured SID

ODM -- Original Design Manufacturer

OEM -- Original Equipment Manufacturer

OSV -- Operating System Vendor

PPF -- TCG Platform Firmware Profile specification

PI -- Platform Initialization (UEFI)

PP -- Physical Presence

PSID -- Physical Presence SID

PSK -- Pre-shared key

PTP --Platform TPM Profile

RIM -- TCG Reference Integrity Manifest

RoT -- Root of Trust

RSA -- Rivest Shamir Adleman (algorithm)

RTM -- Root of Trust for Measurement

SID -- TCG Storage Secure Identifier

SMBIOS -- DMTF System Management BIOS

SMM -- x86 System Management Mode.

SP -- Storage Security Provider

SPDM -- Secure Protocol and Data Model (DMTF)

SRTM -- Static Root of Trust for Measurement

SWID -- Software Identification

TCB -- Trust Computing Base

TCG -- Trust Computing Group

TEE -- Trusted Execution Environment

TLS -- Transport Layer Security

TPer -- Trusted Peripheral

TPM -- Trust Platform Module

TSS -- TPM Software Stack

TZ -- TrustZone (ARM)

UEFI -- Unified Extensible Firmware Interface

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