



The History of JEM

Summer 2014

A Background of Injustice

In 1989 much of Sudan was already feeling marginalized by the government, when Bashir led a coup. Since independence in 1956 three tribes from the Northern Region- the Shagiya, Ja'alin Danagla- had dominated government and provided every single President of Sudan.

By the early nineties this trend was getting worse. Of eight hundred central government jobs available, seven hundred and eighty-eight were held by men from those regions; those from southern Sudan, the Central Region, Eastern Region, Darfur and Kordofan had 12 between them to share. Nevertheless much of the youth was devoutly Muslim and they thought that it was their duty to support Bashir when he covered his actions and political movement with the cloak of Islam. Even the many animists and Christians wanted to make it work with the current government, rather than go through another set of coups and failed governments.

By 1994 it was clear that Bashir's government was deviating even further from Islam. He was using religion as a front behind which he was behaving immorally and in an un-Islamic manner. Corruption¹ and nepotism expanded from government to encompass banks, the business world and the oil sector; the majority of Sudanese were now being pushed out of every attractive prospect in Sudan. International relations too were becoming a disaster, with Osama Bin Laden invited to live in Khartoum for five years in 1991² and the US bombing Sudan for its part in international terrorist activities.

One of the first to recognize the gross failings of Bashir was Daoud Boulad, a devout Muslim and member of the Muslim Brotherhood and Council of 40, the group that governed Islam in Sudan. He left Khartoum in disgust and went across to talk to John Garang with the rebels in the south, to found an army with a deputy Abdulaziz el-Hillu; today that is the SPLM-N and el-Hillu has commanded it since Boulad's execution by torture in 1992 in Khartoum³. Boulad's speeches and philosophy provided the framework of thought that would inspire many of the anti-government groups that exist today.

In 1996 Turabi, the head of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in Sudan and a long-time ally of Bashir, conducted a private audit of what the government had achieved since the coup in 1989. The results were damning and shocked Sudan; sexual deviance within the top of the government, un-Islamic behavior across all

¹ <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/17/wikileaks-sudanese-president-cash-london>

² <http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/08/06/u-s-captured-osama-bin-laden-earlier/>

³ <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article22686>



government institutions, nepotism, corruption and many more problems. Turabi explained his findings to the Council of 40, the NIF's governing body and the seat of Islam in Sudan, and as intended word of the audit spread across the country.

Dr. Khalil Ibrahim

At this time a well-known young Sudanese man, Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, was making his way up the political ladder. A doctor who had been practicing in Saudi Arabia, he was called back by Bashir to help reform the country in 1989. He was devoutly Muslim and a member of the NIF- the only party allowed by law. But he didn't agree with the intolerant views of the NIF and instead felt the institutions of state should not be controlled by religious groups. He didn't agree either with the tyranny and corruption of Bashir. The galvanizing incident for him was when he went to Khartoum to meet the Minister of Finance to ask for money for the penniless local government in Darfur. The Minister refused the small amount he was asking for. While still in the office, some officials came from the Northern Region asking for much larger sums; the Minister scolded them for having come all the way, told them in future just to call by phone, and immediately authorized the money. Dr. Khalil vowed never to return to the central government in Khartoum.

He tried to keep to work that kept him away from these issues on which he disagreed with the government, and where he could do his best to make a change. He became Minister of Health for North Darfur, Minister for Education in Blue Nile, and the advisor to the government on southern Sudan.

Towards the end of the decade he won a place to study a World Health Organization-sponsored Masters in Public Health at the University of Maastricht in Holland. While he was studying in Holland in 1999 and 2000, Turabi and Bashir fell out back in Sudan⁴. After successfully completing his studies Dr. Khalil returned to Sudan in December 2000, where he was told he had to pick sides- Bashir or Turabi. Rejecting the tyranny of the former and the intolerance of the latter he declined. As a result, the government stripped him of his offices and salary.

By now the majority of the population across Sudan was seeking change. Bashir had killed two million Sudanese⁵ in a violent civil war with the south. He had brought in systemic corruption and poverty and famine were widespread. Most of the population felt marginalized and unable to speak for themselves- whatever their race or religion. Groups had started to meet in secret in the capital, Khartoum, to discuss ways to remove him; voting him out was not possible, as he ensured that by law he was the only person allowed to stand in the national elections⁶.

⁴ <http://www.economist.com/node/327475>

⁵ <http://web.archive.org/web/20041210024759/http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/sudan.htm>

⁶ http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2297_96.htm



JEM is Formed

Fifteen representatives of people from across Sudan gathered in a secret meeting in Khartoum in 2000. It was agreed that they would form a movement more concrete and proactive than before. The name would be the “Justice and Equality Movement”, and they voted in Dr. Khalil Ibrahim as the Chairman. A Black Book was published providing in detail the corruption and unfairness of Sudan’s government. The purpose behind forming the group and publishing the Black Book was to incite Bashir to make changes. But the government’s reaction to the Black Book was so severe⁷, killing scores of people across the country, that it became clear that any kind of peaceful reform was impossible.

In the late 1990’s Bashir had been arming nomadic mercenaries, the Janjaweed, to help them remove local peoples whom he felt were a risk to his power. Small groups formed to protect themselves; Abdul Wahid took over the responsibility of defending the Fur people in Darfur. Abdullah Bakr (and then his deputy Minni Minawi) defended the Zhagawa Twer sub-tribe. These later became, to some extent, political movements also.

JEM was to be a political movement that could act as a solution to the problems caused by Bashir. Indeed it was only ever supposed to be a political body, which is why all of its members were well educated and many of them previous holders of Ministerial positions in Khartoum. It would be a government in waiting; primarily a political party with political beliefs, with an assembly, ministerial cabinet, senior appointments and systems of accountability. It would develop a military arm in order to protect the people of Sudan and remove Bashir if political actions were not sufficient on their own. As a cross-tribal grouping it would co-ordinate efforts from localized tribal groups and defend those without a local army to protect them.

Dr. Khalil moved to al-Fashir, the capital of North Darfur, in March 2001 to let the people know what was happening. There preparations began to establish JEM’s army- an inevitable necessity after Bashir’s furious attacks following the Black Book. Then Dr. Khalil moved on to Chad, where he informed the President, Idriss Deby, of what was happening. Deby was a relative of Dr. Khalil and a fellow Zaghawa⁸.

President Deby of Chad

However Deby was worried about instability in Sudan spilling over into Chad. He knew that JEM would have a large appeal to the people of Darfur and that a Zhagawa President in Sudan would cause many of the Chadian Zhagawas- his support base- to leave Chad for Sudan, meaning he would be exposed in Chad. He was supportive of JEM’s aims without being materially helpful.

⁷ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Black_Book:_Imbalance_of_Power_and_Wealth_in_the_Sudan

⁸ <http://www.amazon.co.uk/Darfur-JEM-Khalil-Ibrahim-Story/dp/156902345X>



Dr. Khalil left N'Djamena and travelled to Holland, where he became a refugee. This worked well for the movement as having their leader in Europe meant they were able to publicize the plight of the Sudanese to the world unbound the restrictions on the press in Khartoum.

The trip to Chad had achieved its real aims. President Deby had always been known to be focused on his own precarious presidency in Chad and without much military or diplomatic power his support would have provided little help to JEM. But while in Chad Dr. Khalil had spoken to Tijani Diro and Teman Diro. Tijani became the first leader of JEM's army, and Teman was appointed General Secretary. They were the first two people to swear the oath of allegiance to JEM. Teman then reached out to Mohammed Bashar who swore his oath in western Darfur, and he in turn brought in Abdel Kareem Cholloy; two names which would become infamous in the future, for different reasons.

Meanwhile in Holland Dr. Khalil had brought in Idriss Ibrahim Azrag (called Idriss Midob, after his tribe) as Spokesperson and Information Secretary, and Nasser Adeen as Vice-Chairman. Nasser Adeen, with his Dutch passport, could travel around the world freely as a representative of Dr. Khalil, who was now without a passport.

Political and Military Growth

Later in 2001 Midob travelled to southern Sudan to meet John Garang and Salva Kiir, the leaders of the Sudan People's Liberation Army and Movement (SPLA/M), leading the fight for independence in south Sudan against Bashir⁹. Garang invited JEM to join the SPLA/M, but Dr. Khalil had given strict orders that this would not be done; this was an independent struggle focused on political reform and protection from Bashir's attacks, and it was important to keep its identity separate from a very different secessionist movement in the south.

Nevertheless as an expression of goodwill between the two (Dr. Khalil had earned the respect of the south during his time as government advisor on southern Sudan) John Garang promised help in the form of equipment. A few weeks later a Hercules C-130 made an air drop to JEM of SPLA equipment in the deserts of Darfur. With a General Congress, a Chairman, the key positions filled and an equipped army, JEM had grown within less than a year to become a credible political and military entity.

2002 was spent building up the movement. Tijani resigned after being pressured by President Deby in Chad and handed command of the army to Jibril Tek, a Bideyat Zaghawa and another relation of President Deby. Dr. Khalil was busy around the world organizing the political party and increasing membership. In a congress in Vlotho in Germany representatives of the marginalized from

⁹ <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?mot128>



across Sudan- all the regions and tribes- voted in Dr. Khalil and JEM as their protector. Although the men JEM's founders represented numbered in the tens of thousands, for security reasons JEM had only allowed a hundred or so men to swear the oath until the army was ready to defend them physically.

Al-Fashir

By February 2003, after months of planning and training, the army was at a stage where it could engage the government. One thousand new volunteers had sworn the oath and in a small engagement on the 1st March in the eastern Jebel Marra the army proved itself ready. Then on the 25th April one of Tek's commanders, Abdul Karim Cholloy, led an attack on al-Fashir, the Sudan Armed Forces' second largest base after the capital, Khartoum.

Al-Fashir is recorded as a complete success for JEM and an incident that changed Sudan. Antonov planes, attack helicopters, runways and buildings were destroyed, while huge amounts of equipment and vehicles were captured by JEM¹⁰. Amongst the government soldiers it captured was a 2-star Major-General and head of the Sudan Air Force.

JEM began a practice after al-Fashir that it has maintained to this day. It handed each prisoner back to his family in Sudan, fed and clothed and with all their dignity. It did this together with the International Committee of the Red Cross and still today works with the ICRC in Sudan¹¹- despite Bashir's refusal to allow the ICRC to operate further in Sudan from February 2014¹².

The al-Fashir attack was conducted together with the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), a movement also fighting to remove Bashir from power (not to be confused with the SPLA, fighting in south Sudan for independence). The SLA was formed from the various small tribal armies in Darfur and headed by Abdul Wahid. Despite the SLA having 15,000 fighters at this time to JEM's 1,000, it was the JEM commander Cholloy who controlled the attack, and JEM who gained the reputational boost from it.

Much popular admiration came for an incident that happened on the eve of the battle. JEM's commanders assembled their men in the market place in al-Fashir and ordered them not to loot, attack civilians or damage civilian property during the fighting. Locals were astonished to see JEM's soldiers, armed with Kalashnikovs, queuing in the shops and paying for their purchases with what little money they had.

¹⁰ <http://www.eyesondarfur.org/conflict.html>

¹¹ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/8157685.stm>

¹² http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/world/africa/sudan-orders-red-cross-to-halt-its-humanitarian-operations.html?_r=0



Tek Paid to Desert by Bashir

Unfortunately JEM was not to be able to capitalize on this gain. Tek, the overall commander of JEM's army, was told by his relative President Deby in Chad to disband the army. Tek told his soldiers that their mission had been achieved and they should return home.

Having sent the men home Tek stole the vehicles JEM had captured and formed his own movement, the NMRD. This became a group of bandits who wantonly robbed and pillaged, and Tek is currently wanted by the UN for crimes perpetrated while with this group¹³. In the end Bashir paid him off and he disbanded the NMRD.

Dr. Khalil asked Mohammed Bashar, the third man to swear JEM's oath after Teman Diro had reached out to him, to take control of the military. All he had left was 35 men and 2 vehicles, but JEM by now had a good reputation and a trickle of volunteers. Alongside the military successes were the humane treatment of Prisoners of War and co-operation with the ICRC. Dr. Khalil's tireless efforts around the world were producing an effective media campaign targeted at the Sudanese diaspora and the population of Sudan. Attendance of each and every peace talk over the years showed the people that JEM had a long-term plan. JEM was at the first peace talk in Abeche in April 2004, then again in May in Addis Ababa, and every meaningful chance to make peace through Addis, Libya and Doha.

In 2004 JEM held its second General Congress, this time with over five hundred people attending the event at the Grand Hotel in Tripoli, Libya. Dr. Khalil was again voted in as Chairman of the movement. A new urgency was developing for the people of Sudan. After JEM's new successes in battle it had captured a lot of government equipment, and so the Janjaweed were unwilling to fight it. They turned their attention to the unarmed civilian population, and the death toll started to rise exponentially, with hundreds of thousands displaced in months¹⁴. Darfur was brought to the world's attention for the start of what would become a decade of humanitarian atrocities that continue today.

In 2005 Mohammad Bashar became the Chief of Intelligence for JEM, and Abdullah Banda (a relative of Tek) was promoted to head the army. JEM was regaining its prior strength, but its ally the SLA was disintegrating.

Abuja Peace Talks

In the early stages of the Abuja peace talks in 2005 Minni Minawi (Abdul Wahid's deputy in the SLA) convened his own congress in Haskanita and had himself

¹³ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11436.doc.htm>

¹⁴ <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/sudan0404.pdf>



declared leader of the SLA- a vote which Abdul Wahid did not recognize¹⁵. The SLA split, forming SLA Abdul Wahid and SLA Minni Minawi, among 23 other splinters of the SLA. Abdul Wahid was to lose almost all of his followers over the following years, living most of the time in Paris and unwilling to engage politically or militarily. Today, though he remains a political entity, he has only a hundred men. His Twer soldiers moved across to JEM, giving it the primary loyalty of all three Zaghawa groups- the Twer, Bideyat and Kube.

In 2006 Minni Minawi signed with Bashir the Abuja-brokered Darfur Peace Agreement that was comprehensively rejected by all other Sudanese people and groups¹⁶. Minni was rewarded by Bashir by being made his 3rd deputy in Khartoum, but even on the day Minni signed Bashir attacked his men in a makeshift hospital in Khartoum. Minawi's Masalit fighters subsequently moved across to JEM, adding to its de facto and official support base that of the Masalit tribe.

The SLA factions attacked each other for some time after the split, causing a number of them to join JEM either directly or through alliances. Dr. Khalil made a clear statement through his actions that his aim was a democratic Sudan without Bashir- not a desert hegemony over fighters.

Chad- First Defence of President Deby

Together those who joined the alliance called themselves the National Redemption Front- it was an early version of today's Sudan Revolutionary Front. Those who didn't join and found themselves under attack were defended by JEM. Again it was JEM's public reputation that gained. The French envoy to the peace talks at Abuja, Henri de Coignac, said that a big mistake was being made by not including JEM in the final document- they would in his eyes become the most supported group by the majority of the Sudanese population. JEM were on the French radar because during the talks they had driven over a thousand kilometers to the Chadian capital N'Djamena where on the 17th April 2006 they had discretely defended the President from rebel attacks orchestrated by Bashir¹⁷.

More Paid to Desert- Midob, Banda, Garda

In two large battles in July 2006- the first only three days after forming the NRF- JEM dispersed over 4,000 government soldiers, capturing all their equipment and over 200 vehicles. JEM again ensured each captured soldier was returned

¹⁵ http://fletcher.tufts.edu/World-Peace-Foundation/Activities/Sudan-Peace-Archive/Sudan-Peace-Archive---Darfur/~media/Fletcher/Microsites/World%20Peace%20Foundation/AdW%20prospects%20for%20peace/Sudan_291105.pdf

¹⁶ <http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/darfur-peace-agreement-expectations-unfulfilled>

¹⁷ [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_N'Djamena_\(2006\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_N'Djamena_(2006))



home with his dignity intact¹⁸. Bashir declared that JEM were now his primary target in Sudan, but he was himself soon to be wanted by the ICC for War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide. Behind Bashir's focus on JEM was the acknowledgement that JEM was a credible alternative government, with an educated and experienced leadership.

But there were still setbacks. Bashir was trying to weaken JEM through targeting its leadership. He began offering large sums of money to any senior JEM members who would declare they had broken away from JEM and sign up to Bashir's government, with the effect that over the years a number of members of JEM left the movement (often to return later on). Midob broke away from JEM with 6 friends and set up a new group, which they called the "Group of 7", or JEM-Idriss. They never did anything either politically or militarily and over the years vanished from the public arena. Then in 2007 Banda was found to be meeting in secret with Bashir's Intelligence Director in Chad. Dr. Khalil immediately sacked him and replaced him as head of the army with Cholloy, the hero of al-Fashir.

Banda went on to found his own movement, the URF. Very few JEM men had gone with him and so to get his hands on more equipment he attacked an African Union peacekeeping mission base in Haskanita, killing twelve AU Peacekeepers. He is now wanted by the International Criminal Court¹⁹.

With Banda had gone Bahar Abu Garda²⁰. Their departure had not reduced the number of men with JEM by much, but it had unsettled the movement. Dr. Khalil sensed the need to bring the people together; not just those who were active in JEM, but the wider community who were affected by JEM's actions and relied on JEM as their hope for change. In October 2007 he convened a General Congress of the Movement in a remote location within Sudan itself, at Wadi Howar.

Wadi Howar Congress, 2007

Wadi Howar was the seminal moment in JEM's history, after which it began an upwards trajectory towards its current prominence as the primary alternative to Bashir.

Over seven thousand people made the journey to meet in the remote desert location, with one old man named Zakariah walking through the bush for seven days to participate. Everyone attending risked being bombed by Bashir's air force both en route and at the congress. Nevertheless a huge number made the journey and all stayed for the full two weeks. Local families and the women especially provided the crowd with food and shelter as their demonstration of support. The exiled leaders and diaspora came in secret, smuggled through Chad

¹⁸ <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article18057>

¹⁹ <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/BandaEng.pdf>

²⁰ <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/AbuGardaEng.pdf>



and south Sudan. It was an emotional event for everyone there; they knew that while JEM was their only chance of freedom from Bashir, it would also be a long and dangerous journey that not all would survive.

In accordance with the constitution of JEM, Dr. Khalil stepped down as Chairman of JEM in the morning of the first day of discussions, 19th October. The senior elder el-Gadi, a man from central Sudan of West African descent was not able to attend so his deputy, Professor Mahmoud, a Zaghawa from Darfur, was appointed Chairman of the Congress and he provided the agenda and organized the voting. The Secretary was a Midob from north-west Sudan. The crowd, including seven hundred and twenty women, included people from across Sudan, Muslims, Christians, atheists and animists. JEM could now say that it truly represented the population of Sudan as a whole, regardless of race, religion or gender, and it was a movement structured as a representative democracy but validated by the direct participation of the people.

Dr. Khalil was voted in as Chairman again for the next four years. He selected seven deputies, one from each state of Sudan (at that time modern South Sudan was still part of Sudan), reflecting the federal and autonomous system of government that JEM wanted to give Sudan when it took power. Thirteen Ministers were chosen, and a Legislative Assembly of 40 people was voted in by the Congress under a Chairman of the Assembly, Dr. Tahir el-Faki. Dr. Tahir had previously been a Colonel in the Sudanese Army and despite an offer from Bashir for large sums of money had refused to leave the cause. Married to a woman from the same region as Bashir, he had made the journey to Wadi Howar from Luton, where he is a surgeon in the Accident and Emergency Department at Luton Dunstable Hospital. Years after its foundation as a national movement for political reform JEM was still focused on representation and competence.

Extraordinarily JEM had even invited two delegates from Musa Hilal, the Janjaweed commander, to attend the congress. JEM wanted the Janjaweed to see what it was trying to do and to realize that Bashir's devastation of Sudan was in no-one's interest. It was willing to talk with the people who were killing civilians by the thousands.

The week after the congress ended JEM's delegates went to meet with SLA Unity, the largest SLA splinter after Abdul Wahid and Minni Minawi remaining, to discuss an alliance. Instead, almost every man of Unity ended up joining JEM over the next year²¹.

Military Successes

JEM now had the constituents for success- popular support across the regions, numbers growing daily, a functioning executive and legislature and at last a loyal commander in charge of the army. The results on the ground were to prove this.

²¹ <http://sudanwatch.blogspot.co.uk/2009/04/suleiman-jamous-has-joined-jem.html>



JEM used the start of the dry season, just after the Congress ended, to capture every main city and town in Western Darfur.

Early 2008 brought further success for JEM, with Commander Cholloy and Dr. Khalil moving freely with the help of the local populations across northern and now western Darfur. In frequent battles JEM was routing the government and anyway very few government soldiers were willing to fight them- JEM represented their brothers, sisters, parents and cousins, and most of Bashir's army were unwilling to brutalize their own people in the way Bashir²² was instructing them to.

Chad- Second Defence of President Deby

Only the capital of Western Darfur, Geinena, remained in Bashir's hands and JEM were moving towards it. Unable to defend himself, Bashir sent money and weapons to rebels in Chad and mobilized four thousand five hundred of them to attack the capital N'Djamena and remove President Deby. He knew that Deby would call on JEM for support and he knew that JEM, unwilling to have a Bashir-controlled government to their rear, would oblige. On February 2nd JEM's forces drove the 1,300km to N'Djamena, routing the rebel army²³.

This episode brought some disgrace to Bashir as in May 2007 King Abdullah had invited both President Deby and Bashir to Saudi Arabia to discuss peace. Both of them swore in front of him on the Black Stone in Mecca to keep peace between themselves²⁴. Within weeks Bashir was already making plans to arm the rebels in Chad. Purporting to rule by the laws of Islam and be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Bashir broke an oath sworn on the Black Stone in Mecca in front of his host King Abdullah and this fact was widely known to the Sudanese and Chadian populations.

JEM had gone to Chad as guests of President Deby, and after completing the mission they returned to Wadi Howar. It was a chance to reorganize for Commander Cholloy; the sheer numbers of volunteers arriving each day meant the army had gone from having less than two thousand soldiers at Wadi Howar six months earlier to over three thousand five hundred now.

Battle of Omdurman- JEM Captures the Capital

The time in the desert was also spent planning an attack on Omdurman, one of the three cities that together make up wider Khartoum, Bashir's capital. JEM's army made the journey back across Sudan and on the 10th May 2008 invaded

²² <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/18/world/africa/18sudan.html?pagewanted=print>

²³ [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_N'Djamena_\(2008\)#Stalled_reinforcements](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_N'Djamena_(2008)#Stalled_reinforcements)

²⁴ <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article26337>



Omdurman²⁵ for the first time since the Mahdi Army and Lord Kitchener had fought over it in the late 1800's.

Organizationally the attack on Omdurman was a triumph for JEM. Secret depots of fuel were laid out along the 1,300km cross-desert route so the convoy could move at high speed during the night to maintain surprise. Navigation was done using the moon, driving from depot to depot where there were even spare vehicles to replace those that might break down on the drive. Nobody was told where they were going nor what they had been rehearsing for. It took only four days for the convoy of vehicles and men to drive the entire distance completely unnoticed by Bashir.

80km short of Omdurman Dr. Khalil halted the convoy and brought the men together. He explained what they were going to do, and broke his force into four divisions. They would set off each on their own route before joining together to fight the Sudan Armed Forces gathered to the west of Omdurman in a large military training area. Then Commander Agid would lead the first division to the media buildings, his objective. Commander Cholloy would move past him with the second division to capture the air field and the entire air force situated there. Commander Sandal would echelon through them both to secure the Palace across the bridge in Khartoum, allowing Dr. Khalil and his fourth division to arrive and take control of the capital and the country.

That was the plan, but a sandstorm blew up just before the final move to Omdurman, and it forced Dr. Khalil's division which was taking a northern route to divert northwards. He was unable to rejoin his three commanders for eight hours while the storm blew itself out and they waited for him west of Omdurman.

As soon as Dr. Khalil's division arrived, all four commanders attacked the SAF training area. It was a route for the government forces which fled across the desert and vanished. JEM's military then began to put into effect the plan they had rehearsed after Chad.

Agid moved forwards and captured the media buildings. Cholloy then took the air base and captured the air force. Sandal moved up to the bridge and secured the empty Parliament buildings. Dr. Khalil had captured the Engineering Corps headquarters while waiting in the rear. But Sandal now reported a problem.

Bashir's army had withdrawn except for a few tanks outside his palace in Khartoum- and these tanks didn't even have the ability to fight, as he had removed their firing pins in fear of them turning against him. But the delay caused by the sandstorm had meant that the civilian population were now awake and making their way to work. Bashir's officers ordered their tanks to physically block off the Khartoum side of the bridge across the Nile. This meant that JEM,

²⁵ <http://www.refworld.org/docid/489820c82.html>



on the other side of the bridge in Omdurman, would not be able to cross for all the people and cars trapped on the bridge.

Dr. Khalil had the option to shell the passive tanks and capture the palace and the country there and then, albeit risking the lives of the hundreds of civilians Bashir had turned into unwitting human shields on the bridge. But political consensus and popular support would not be there for a government that took power in that way, and JEM has had a long focus on its roadmap to democracy after removing Bashir. He knelt down on the lawn of the Parliament building and prayed. Then he and the entire JEM force turned around and headed back for the desert.

Having captured the main training ground of the Sudanese Armed Forces, the entire Air Force, Engineering Corps, Medical Corps and Parliament, JEM had lost only 22 men and not killed a single civilian. Bashir had lost most of his capital, his army had been routed, his Presidential Guard had begun indiscriminately shelling civilians during the morning, and he himself had fled 300km to the south, to Kinana. Upon his return Bashir unleashed a sustained campaign of imprisonment and torture on many of those he suspected of having helped JEM, to international outcry²⁶.

The shock to the population of Sudan and to Bashir was enormous. Bashir, the dictator for two decades, had been struck in his capital and it was now very possible to imagine a future without him. JEM had proven they were not aiming to seize power in Chad, by having been there twice without incident. They had also shown they had the interests of the people of Sudan as their priority, as they hadn't been willing to risk the life of a single civilian during the fighting. They had also proven their military superiority across Sudan.

The residents of Khartoum, like those at al-Fashir five years before, witnessed armed men walking into shops to pay for their purchases. Not a single complaint of theft or damage was made against JEM after a whole day of urban fighting. A less well known fact is that JEM had held a cousin of Bashir, a Lt-Colonel in the Sudanese Army, prisoner since 2007. When news of the attack on Omdurman spread, the prisoner's mother called JEM to ask if he was still safe. Within 30 minutes he called her back to talk to her directly.

Chad- Third Defence of President Deby

Bashir again equipped a rebel group in Chad. Only a month after the Battle of Omdurman, JEM found itself making the same journey back to Chad from Wadi Howar to defend President Deby again and prevent insecurity sweeping the region (incidentally, this dispels claims by Bashir that he had destroyed JEM in fighting in Omdurman). On June 17th they fought a pitched battle from sunrise to sunset with the rebels, destroying 195 of the 200 rebel vehicles Bashir had

²⁶ <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/05/12/sudan-mass-arrests-after-rebel-attack-raise-concern>



sent²⁷. JEM's losses were eight dead and eighteen injured- amongst whom two of Dr. Khalil's brothers lay dead.

Bashir was still trying to install one of his own men as President in Chad so that he could both enlarge his own power base, but also surround JEM and any others opposed to his rule in Sudan. President Deby meanwhile was bound to JEM by ethnic ties and acknowledged that they were frequently his only line of defence against Bashir's Chadian rebels. On the other hand President Deby still had the concern that if JEM took power in Sudan his Zaghawa support base in Chad would leave him. As so often the personal interests of a few individuals were causing most of the problems.

The Origins of Doha

Over the Summer Bashir was forced to the negotiating table. The Arab League was embarrassed at how Bashir was conducting himself, and at the fact that he had just had his capital overrun. The African Union, still with its peacekeepers in Sudan, wanted peace and an end to the conflict in Sudan which was so costly in human lives. Qatar saw an opportunity to host and initiate a peace agreement and expand its global political presence, and the Emir asked President Sarkozy of France to help him in this. These four powerful and influential parties arranged for a meeting on 19th September 2008 in Paris, in the offices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, between JEM, the French and the Qataris.

Bashir said very publicly that he would never negotiate with JEM before sending his envoys to meet the Qataris and Djibril Bassole, the mediator from Burkina Faso, in secret. Negotiations continued for the rest of 2008, half publicly, half secretly. Bashir kept launching new attacks in a hope to destroy JEM before anything would need to be signed, and spread the attacks to include northern, southern and western Darfur.

Making peace in Darfur was becoming a past-time for people with their own international agendas. Back in October 2007 Colonel Gadaffi had invited all the anti-government factions from Sudan to his own peace process in Sirte. He called Dr. Khalil personally to ask him to attend. Dr. Khalil has said he would attend if a proper agenda was prepared, as the conference seemed like no more than public display for Gadaffi who was coming back from international isolation at the time. Neither JEM nor any other of the meaningful parties attended in the end, and Gadaffi at his opening speech had commented that he was sorry JEM were not there as it would render the Sirte talks impotent²⁸.

The Doha talks, with their high-level backers pushing a clear agenda, was making better progress and on the 17th February 2009 the Goodwill Agreement was

²⁷ <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7459025.stm>

²⁸ <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/28/world/africa/28darfur.html>



signed in Doha between Bashir and JEM²⁹. All five members of the UN Security Council were present to witness it. In accordance with its terms and spirit, JEM released the 21 prisoners of war it held- it had so few as it was still releasing prisoners through its long agreement with the Red Cross. Bashir released a few of the 108 JEM prisoners he held, arresting them again that same day before they could get away. He also launched attacks against JEM in Sudan on the day the agreement was signed.

Over the next few months Bashir launched more attacks against JEM, who were repelling them with an army now of over five thousand soldiers. JEM was not launching any attacks of its own, meanwhile, in keeping with the Goodwill Agreement. When Bashir started shelling the area around the UN compound at Muhagiriya near Nyala in order to dislodge JEM, the UN asked JEM to withdraw in order to pacify the area. JEM did so. Bashir tried to use the Janjaweed to ambush them on their way back north to their strongholds; in 11 pitched battles, JEM killed 400 Janjaweed attackers without a single loss.

One month after the signing JEM sent its mission to Doha again for the next round of talks, which were supposed to lay out the roadmap to peace in more detail. Bashir didn't send a government representative and ignored the process. The next month the International Criminal Court issued its first arrest warrant for Bashir on counts of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity³⁰.

Gratton, Gadaffi and Personal Agendas

Without Bashir to talk to, but still optimistic that change could happen peacefully, JEM and the other movements went together to the US Embassy in N'Djamena in May, both to show the new US Envoy Gratton that they were a untied front, and also to show that they were willing to talk. Gratton demanded that they all adhere to an immediate ceasefire he wanted to impose. They replied that there were two problems with this; firstly they were only engaging defensively now, and had withdrawn to their various bases, so to stop fighting would be to be killed; secondly there was a process given in the Doha Goodwill Agreement which gave the path towards a full ceasefire, and Gratton imposing a unilateral demand on one side was not part of that.

Gratton decided that if JEM and the main anti-government groups would not co-operate with him, he would marginalize them and use his own group. Working with Gadaffi, Gratton built upon the Libyan conference at Sirte from two years before. He began to lay the groundwork for creating his own Sudanese anti-government movement, which he could then use to sign a peace with Bashir.

²⁹

[http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4347~v~Sudan_Darfur_Peace_Process_Chronology.p
df](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4347~v~Sudan_Darfur_Peace_Process_Chronology.pdf)

³⁰ <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/AlBashirEng.pdf>



LJM and a Fake Peace

Gration convinced a former UN employee of Sudanese ethnic origin, Tijani al-Sissi³¹, to put his name down as leader of the new movement. Through 2009 Gration and Gadaffi co-operated to bring together various names from Sudan who would form what would be called the “Liberation and Justice Movement” in a deliberate parody of JEM. This was launched in 2010 under the leadership of Sissi, and represented a total of around one hundred men (and no women) on the ground. Even Midob with his six friends, still inactive since 2006, rejected Gration when he called them to join, laughing at the new LJM. Amongst those who did join were Tek, Banda and Bahar Abu Garda, wanted by the ICC for their attack on the AU peacekeepers at Haskanita.

JEM had been continuing with the peace talks in Doha. They had turned up to N'Djamena to prepare the preliminary Framework Agreement, and then again to Doha at the end of 2009 to sign the Framework Agreement with Bashir. All along in the Doha process there had been two parties- JEM and Bashir.

On the ground, JEM was still unifying the other splinters of the SLA, most of whom were directly joining JEM. By the start of 2010 there were only four groups; JEM, SLA Minni Minawi, SLA Abdul Wahid and SLA Unity. Minni Minawi had by now fallen out with Bashir after joining the government and losing much of his support after Abuja. Abdul Wahid remained in Paris and wouldn't attend any talks, while his support base continued to diminish. Unity still had very few men after they had joined JEM en masse in 2007.

But Gration kept up pressure on the Qataris to admit the LJM, which he, Gadaffi and Sissi had officially launched on 23rd February 2010, into the Doha peace talks. JEM were amazed to find that in a preliminary meeting to the final agreement in May at Doha their own proposals, drafted with the help of the Public International Law and Policy Group from Washington D.C.³², were ignored in favour of the LJM's offering. JEM- the representatives of the largest number of Darfuris- had been pushed out of the peace talks about Darfur. Bashir, the LJM and numerous observers signed the ineffective Doha Document for Peace in Darfur on 14th July 2011. Gration was to receive criticism from America for his overly warm relationship with Bashir³³, who by then had had another 3 charges of Genocide added to his arrest warrant from the ICC.

This was a lose-lose result for everyone still involved. Hostilities on the ground continued, because Bashir was still attacking JEM and JEM were still defending themselves. Either the LJM were a real force with real influence on the ground in which case it would appear that they were ignoring the peace agreement. Or they were a shell of a group, created by others for their own ends, in which case the war would continue. Of course it was the latter; nothing changed for the

³¹ <http://www.innercitypress.com/eca2rebel040910.html>

³² <http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/clients/africa/>

³³ <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/21/AR2010072105664.html>



people of Darfur, Gration was made an Ambassador, and a few Sudanese expats willing to sign up to the LJM were put on Bashir's payroll for a year or two as part of an "integration process". Over a million people were displaced in Darfur alone following the signing of the DDPD.

A Show of Support from the Chadian People

Sidelined in Qatar in 2010, Dr. Khalil began the journey back to the field. Chad was supposed, under the terms of the Goodwill Agreement from the previous year, to allow his safe passage, but Dr. Khalil was suspicious of the private plane waiting for him at the airport in Doha. So he instead flew to Cairo, and then on to Tripoli on the 18th May, and then N'Djamena on the 19th.

There, he was proved right. The security officials in N'Djamena airport ripped his and his entourage's passports up and tried to arrest them³⁴. Sudanese agents were there and ready to take Dr. Khalil to Khartoum for imprisonment. Dr. Khalil's bodyguards stood around him and a stand-off ensued in the airport. News leaked out to the vicinity, and the Chadian people, tied by many links of family and tribal relationships, surrounded the airport in 300 armed vehicles. They demanded Dr. Khalil's release and threatened to overrun the airport and capital if he were handed to Sudan.

House Arrest in Libya

Amid the standoff the Libyans agreed to allow him back to Libya. After a day in the airport in N'Djamena Dr. Khalil and his small group flew back to Tripoli, where Colonel Gadaffi put him under an unofficial house arrest in the Grand Hotel³⁵. After a few weeks he was moved to the Gartag Hotel where he stayed for months, until the uprising began in Libya in February 2011. While at the Gartag he survived numerous attempts by Sudanese agents to assassinate him, including a notable attempt through using one of his own commanders-Mohamed Bashar, who managed to give him small amounts of poison but not enough to kill him. JEM arrested Bashar for this and kept him in Wadi Howar pending a proper trial.

In February 2011 Colonel Gadaffi moved Dr. Khalil again, this time to the Bab el-Bahr Hotel where he remained until August. Two weeks before his fall, Gadaffi moved Dr. Khalil one last time, to the Widan Hotel. He was here when the Libyan rebels seized Tripoli.

The next day, on the 22nd August, two vehicles with armed men arrived at the Widan. Commanding one was Commander Cholloy, who brought Dr. Khalil down to sit with him and put his bodyguard Mohamed in the other. The two vehicles

³⁴ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10126796>

³⁵ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14881745>



drove straight out of Tripoli, where they made a rendezvous with a few hundred JEM men and vehicles. The planning of Dr. Khalil's release is another story in itself, which had been in the making through negotiations with Libyan anti-Gadaffi factions for over a year.

The JEM convoy raced out of Libya back to the border with north-western Sudan, surviving a few airstrikes by NATO forces confusing them for fleeing Libyan Government groups along the way. Much had changed for Dr. Khalil when he finally made it back after two years away. The LJM leaders had left their 5-star hotels in Doha after the DDPD was signed and had taken their promised jobs in Khartoum as "reconciled" members of the government. The world leaders involved in the project had gained the recognition they wanted as international statesmen. South Sudan was now officially an independent country. But Darfur was no different.

Bashir had turned back to heavy use of the Janjaweed, who were now causing more misery for the population of not only Darfur but also other parts of Sudan. With the world's attention now turned to Libya and other issues, and with the 400,000 civilian deaths Bashir had caused in Darfur³⁶ put to bed in the international community's eyes by the Doha agreement, Bashir knew no-one was paying attention to him and his atrocities any longer. His Army mistrusted him as much as he mistrusted them, so he was paying Janjaweed fighters up to ten times normal military salaries to protect him from his own army. Further, he made them an offer; any land they took came free, by Presidential edict, with everything on it- chickens, houses, people. Generally the Janjaweed killed the men, sold the children as slaves and kept the women for repeated rape. And to protect him from his army across the country, Bashir was now beginning to expand the Janjaweed presence to the whole of Sudan.

This continued horror, exacerbated by the fact that the rest of the world had washed its hands of the issue and Bashir was now operating so openly, galvanized the people and the anti-government movements. Dr. Khalil called a meeting of the remaining groups; JEM, SLA Minni Minawi, SLA Abdul Wahid and the SPLM(N). The SPLM(N) were an offshoot of South Sudan's rebel-movement-turned-government the SPLM, who originate from the border between Sudan and South Sudan. They have a force comparable to JEM's in size, but with the notable difference that they are foot-soldiers without vehicles, immobile and tied to their home area. Supported by the SPLM in Sudan they act as a buffer for South Sudan which still fears Bashir trying to invade- as he did a few months after independence was declared³⁷.

³⁶ <http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736%2809%2961967-X/abstract>

³⁷ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17707977>



The Death of Dr. Khalil

The meeting was agreed for a safe area on the Sudan-South Sudan border. Dr. Khalil was to go to Juba first to talk to people there about supporting his new vision of bringing together the anti-government forces into a single movement. Driving down with some deputies and his security group, he made camp for the night of 23rd December in the desert outside of Wad Banda, a small town in North Kordofan.

Camp was pitched in the usual way; Dr. Khalil in the centre, and then three rings of bodyguards in expanding circles around him. As always no phones were used- or even turned on- during the move, to prevent tracking.

At 8pm a plane flew overhead and flashed the camp with an intense and bright light. It happened again at midnight. Then at 02.50 a plane flew in low over the camp and dropped a bomb right on Dr. Khalil, who bled to death from shrapnel injuries. The plane turned around and did another pass, dropping a bomb which this time killed a guard from the inner circle of defence and injuring numerous others. On 24th December 2011 Dr. Khalil Ibrahim, founder and elected Chairman of JEM, died.

Allies and agents of JEM in the government in Khartoum informed JEM's leadership within hours that the news had reached Khartoum from the government in Chad about Dr. Khalil's death. Bashir immediately sent out a press release telling the Sudanese people that he had killed Dr. Khalil in battle, but that was corrected later on once Bashir had a clearer idea as to what had happened.

Bashir anyway did not have the technology to track a mobile phone that wasn't even turned on. Only a more developed intelligence agency could do that, tracking the tiny pulses sent by Dr. Khalil's mobile phone battery that had not been removed from the body of the phone.

A New Leader Elected

Dr. Tahir, Chairman of the Legislative Assembly and still working at Luton Dunstable Hospital in the United Kingdom, assumed command of JEM in accordance with the constitution. He was bound to convene a General Congress to elect a new Chairman within three months. He spent hundreds of hours and thousands of pounds gathering the views of the membership from around the world by phone, skype, e-mail, letter and courier. JEM had never to that day received a penny in funding or international support, existing only through money sent back by its members from around the world. Even its army, now at five thousand soldiers, had never received a day's wages.

With the views of the wider global membership in hand, Dr. Tahir travelled out to Heydyiat on the Sudan-South Sudan border in January 2012. The dangerous



location meant that a repeat of 2007's mass turnout was not possible, so only one hundred and five senior representatives were invited each speaking for their constituent tribes, religions, regions and peoples of Sudan.

As an indicator of JEM's commitment to a fairer Sudan, even in this dangerous location and after the recent death of Dr. Khalil, the constitution was modified to enshrine changes that JEM felt were important to it. Women were to occupy 30% of the Legislative Assembly by law henceforth- one of the only political parties in the world to discriminate positively in favour of women at a constitutional level. The Legislative Assembly was increased to 151 seats, ready to assume the role of government in Khartoum. Dr. Khalil's elder brother and long-time mentor, Dr. Gibril, was voted in as Chairman of the movement³⁸.

Dr. Gibril had been living in the UK at the time of his brother's death. He had won a scholarship to study Economics in Japan as a young man, remaining there to complete a Doctorate and after that had taught for five years at university in Saudi Arabia. Already of some repute, he was called back by Bashir after the 1989 coup to help rebuild the country, but had very publicly fallen out with Bashir over the methods being used and the improper influence of Islam.

The SRF Formed

The next month the delayed meeting with SLA Minni Minawi, SLA Abdul Wahid and the SPLM-N took place. A new united front was formed, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). The chairmanship of the movement, and its key positions, would rotate annually between the groups. Dr. Gibril had learnt the lessons of Doha- be divided, and be sidelined.

For the rest of 2012 the SRF began to operate as a better unit. Abdul Wahid began to emerge from his near-decade in Paris, as did Minni Minawi after his time in government with Bashir had disintegrated. The SPLM-N represented only one local tribe and region, and had never been able to beat Bashir's forces except in defensive operations. But newly aligned as they were with JEM they began asking for more help, spreading JEM's fighting power along the border of South Sudan as well as having bases in the East, North and West. Regardless of the rotating chairmanship, JEM was now in all areas of the country, and providing help to all anti-government groups in Sudan.

Bashar and Dabajo Betrayal

Mohamed Bashar, the third man to swear an oath to JEM a few months after it had been founded, had been held by JEM as a prisoner since trying to poison Dr. Khalil in Tripoli. While all other prisoners were given an amnesty in 2012 by Dr. Tahir after Dr. Khalil's death, Bashar had been kept for the serious nature of his

³⁸ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/ozatp-sudan-darfurr-idAFJOE80P05T20120126>



crime. However, complaining of illness, he was allowed to travel for treatment with his family.

Bashar didn't go to his family, as promised. Instead JEM tracked him as he went straight to N'Djamena to talk to agents there. Bashar agreed to set up his own faction of men in order to weaken JEM and get his own pay-off for signing a new peace accord with Bashir. He gained some men and vehicles from Chad, and set off back for Sudan. He came across some JEM soldiers and tricked them, gaining some of their vehicles in the process. On the border between Chad and Sudan a JEM commander, Dabajo, was ordered to engage him but Dabajo did nothing. His men, loyal to JEM, realized what was happening and left him, driving straight to Wadi Howar to inform JEM's leadership.

Bashar and Dabajo, with what they had stolen from JEM and taken from Chad, now had around 50 vehicles. A sizeable force, though still nothing compared to JEM's 5,000+ strong army. Bashar left Dabajo in charge as his second in command while he flew out to sign the now-routine breakaway peace accord in Doha with Bashir³⁹. The usual result was to follow; Bashir would appease the international community; journalists without an understanding of the region would send out more stories about the fragmented anti-government movement in Sudan; Doha would claim another victory; and Bashar would receive cash up front and a position in Sudan's government.

JEM too were used to the routine, but they told Bashar two things. He was not to use their name, and he was not to take their equipment. Other than that, he could do as he pleased. Bashar ignored them on both counts. He called himself JEM-Bashar, and wouldn't hand over the vehicles he had stolen.

Returning from Doha via N'Djamena in April 2013, he set off across the desert to join up with Dajabo. Unable to resist, he decided to attack more JEM positions along the way, and was killed in a battle along with his brother Noureen and deputy Dahiya.

In May Dabajo took control of the splinter, renaming it JEM-Dabajo. He too promptly arranged to add his name to the Doha accords⁴⁰, for which he too was given money and in 2014 became a Brigadier in Sudan's army under Bashir. His family have remained with JEM and been outspoken in their denunciation of his betrayal of his people. But for JEM now, after so many weaker members were bought out by Bashir, there is at least the comfort that those left are loyal. Most have already declined at least one furtive offer from Bashir.

³⁹ <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/facts-figures/sudan/darfur/darfur-peace-process-chronology.html>

⁴⁰ <http://en.africatime.com/soudan/articles/jem-leader-dabajo-returns-khartoum>



JEM Today

Today, the situation continues to progress as it has for the last fourteen years. JEM has won a number of victories with its new allies in the SRF over the last year, defeating the government of Bashir in Kordofan⁴¹ and the Janjaweed in big battles at Jao, Troje and Dar. The Janjaweed were formed into an official arm of the government of Sudan in August 2013, as the Rapid Support Forces, and they now carry Sudanese flags on their arms as they rape and attack civilians⁴². They no longer go near JEM soldiers, choosing only the easier civilian targets⁴³. Bashir's army can no longer move across Sudan due to JEM's web of bases and strongholds, so Bashir now focuses on the aerial bombing of crops to make sure that if he can't physically drive out the unwanted races, he can starve them out.

JEM's story is unique; men and women of all races and religions who have joined together to remove a tyrant, but have done so in full observance of all international rules on child soldiers and prisoners of war. A military group that has attended every peace conference and even taken instruction from lawyers in Washington to make sure its peace proposals are good enough to last. An internal system of governance that allows a doctor from England to count the votes of thousands worldwide for a congress in the desert to ensure free elections whatever the circumstances. Surrounded by religious fault lines, JEM bases itself on a commitment to equality for all religions and has an atheist as head of party strategy. In the male-dominated society of North Africa, JEM positively discriminates in favour of women and has a female General. JEM is an anti-government group that never became rebels.

And most incredibly of all, they have done all this while never having received any support- diplomatic or financial- from the international community as they battle against a man who has killed two⁴⁴ and half⁴⁵ million of his own people and uses rape not only in war but in peace⁴⁶.

JEM continue to grow in strength and close on Khartoum. Bashir's government recently concluded that JEM's strength at the start of the rainy season in 2014 lay at eight to ten thousand. JEM isn't counting soldiers. Its focus is on the apparatus of its government that will bring Sudan back to democracy once Bashir is removed. The rainy season ends in November and JEM will be on the move again.

⁴¹ <http://nubareports.org/srf-repel-saf-attack-hold-road-to-south-sudan/>

⁴² <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/25/world/africa/sudan-darfur-janjaweed-militia-khartoum.html>

⁴³ <http://enoughproject.org/blogs/janjaweed-torches-south-darfur-idp-camp-next-unamid-base>

⁴⁴ <http://web.archive.org/web/20041210024759/http://www.refugees.org/news/crisis/sudan.htm>

⁴⁵ <http://nypost.com/2006/12/11/the-damned-of-darfur-left-europe-would-rather-weep-than-act/>

⁴⁶ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/37-the-crisis-in-darfur/420-sudans-department-of-gang-rape>