Connell's concept of hegemonic masculinity: A critique

DEMETRAKIS Z. DEMETRIOU
University of Sydney

The originality of Connell's "social theory of gender" has established him as one of the leading theoreticians in the general area of gender relations and more particularly in the emerging field of the sociology of masculinity. His formulation of the concept of "hegemonic masculinity" represents the most influential and popular part of his work. It has been used in empirical research ranging from the areas of sexuality and gay studies to that of criminology and prison sociology. Yet, although numerous empirical researchers have made use of this concept, there has been almost no attempt to evaluate its theoretical merit.[1] This article offers a detailed theoretical exposition as well as a critique of the concept of hegemonic masculinity. In the first part, I show that the notion of hegemonic masculinity was developed in an attempt to give an account of what the sex role framework left largely untheorized, that is, the questions of patriarchal power and social change. I then suggest an alternative way of conceptualizing hegemonic masculinity that draws on Gramsci's concept of historic bloc and Bhabha's notion of hybridity. I argue that hegemonic masculinity is not a purely white or heterosexual configuration of practice but it is a hybrid bloc that unites practices from diverse masculinities in order to ensure the reproduction of patriarchy. In the third and final part of this article, I undertake a brief case study in order to show the contribution of gay masculinities to the formation of the contemporary hegemonic bloc.

From sex roles to hegemonic masculinity

Connell's critique of role theory was firstly developed in an article entitled "The concept of role and what to do with it," which was published in 1979.[2] Written at a time when Connell was still immersed in class analysis,[3] this article was directed not so much against sex role

Theory and Society **30**: 337–361, 2001.

theory itself but against role theory in general, which was seen as a "theoretical ideology"[4] that had been developed in the 1950s in order to cope with the crisis of legitimation of Western capitalism. Role theory performed this ideological function, in Connell's view, by leaving the questions of *power* and *change* untheorized.[5] In Connell's later writings, sex role theory is attacked precisely because of its inability to conceptualize *power* (and resistance to power) as an essential feature of the relationships between genders and within genders; and also because of its subsequent failure to grasp *change* as a product of the contradictions within gender relations themselves.[6]

Sex role theory's inability to grasp power is closely related, in Connell's view, to its failure to theorize the relationship between structure and agency and to its reliance on biological determinism. In sex role theory, social structure is usually theorized via the concept of "expectations." Thus social pressure is said to come from the occupants of counterpositions who hold stereotyped role expectations and reward or punish depending on the conformity of the role enactment. "But why," Connell goes on to ask, "do the second parties apply the sanctions?"[7] This quickly comes down, as Connell notes, to a question of individual will and thus structure dissolves into agency. The missing element of structure, Connell concludes, is then supplied by the biological category of sex and thus the theory collapses into an abstract account of sex differences.[8]

By identifying the social structure with biological difference, sex role theory reduces gender to two homogeneous and complementary categories and thus underplays social inequality and power.[9] This neglect of power is two-dimensional in that sex role theory fails to acknowledge power relationships both *between* and *within* genders. As regards power relationships between genders, sex role theory treats the "female role" and the "male role" as equal and reciprocally dependent on each other.[10] There seem to be no power relationships here at all. "We do not speak of 'race roles' or 'class roles,'" as Connell repeatedly notes, "because the exercise of social power in these areas of social life is more obvious to sociologists."[11] With sex role theory, however, the underlying biological dichotomy conceals and legitimates the power that men exercise over women. As a result, "the notion of an overall social subordination of women ... is not a conception that can be formulated in the language of role theory."[12]

Sex role theory is also incapable of grasping the complexities and power relationships within genders. The problem begins, as Connell notes, with sex role theory's conceptualization of the relationship between normative and standard behavior or, in other words, between expected and actual role enactment.[13] By granting primacy to normative over standard behavior, sex role theory "creates the impression that the normative sex role is the majority case, and that departures from it are socially marginal...."[14] It thus fails to acknowledge the existence of a multiplicity of femininities and masculinities and includes whatever is inconsistent with the normative sex role in the category of "deviance." In this way, male homosexuality and lesbianism, for example, appear as the product of some personal eccentricity or imperfect socialization and the power that is exercised over them is tacitly concealed.[15]

By conceptualizing variations from the normative sex role simply in terms of deviance, sex role theory is prevented from understanding the element of resistance to power and this brings us to Connell's main critique of the theory, namely that the sex role framework is incapable of grasping change. This is not to say, as Connell repeatedly notes, that sex role theory is not interested in, or aware of, change.[16] Change has always been a major topic in sex role literature, but the inability of the theory to grasp power, resistance to power and ultimately contradiction between and within genders prevents it from conceptualizing change as *internally* generated within gender relations themselves. As Connell vividly put it:

> change is always something that happens to sex roles, that impinges on them. It comes from outside, from society at large, as in discussions of how technological and economic changes demand a shift to a modern male role.... Sex role theory has no way of grasping change as a dialectic arising within gender relations themselves.[17]

At this point, Connell's critique of sex role theory reaches its culmination.[18] Yet Connell offers not simply an account of the problems of sex role theory but also, and more importantly, a transcendence of them. Connell's transcendence of these theoretical problems is deeply embedded in his concept of *hegemonic masculinity*, which occupies a central position in his "social theory of gender." With the formulation of the notion of hegemonic masculinity, Connell grasps not only the complex nature of femininities and masculinities, not merely the power relationships between genders and within genders, but also the possibility of internally generated change. The concept of hegemonic

masculinity, in other words, embodies Connell's critique of sex role theory while it is also a qualitative transcendence of it.

Connell's starting point is to recognize diversity in masculinities and femininities. He begins by defining gender in terms of standard rather than normative behavior, that is, as something that does not precede but is constituted in human action. Gender, he says, is a "*configuration of practice*" and the emphasis should be placed "on what people actually do, not on what is expected or imagined."[19] In this sense, gender is not a fixed set of social norms that are passively internalized and enacted, but it is constantly produced and reproduced in social practice. Anticipating, in a way, Butler's grasping of gender as performatively constituted,[20] he goes as far as to argue that the word gender should be used as a verb.[21] Moreover, since gender practice takes place within different historico-cultural contexts and since it is also performed by agents of different race, class, or generation, we need to talk about masculinities/femininities, not masculinity/femininity.[22]

By replacing sex role theory's underlying biological basis with such a radical social constructionism, Connell is now in a position to conceptualize what has usually been included in the category of "deviance" as distinct forms of femininity and masculinity. But to understand gender in its plurality, without acknowledging relations of domination and subordination, risks, as Connell goes on to note, understanding gender as "alternative lifestyles" and underplaying the power relations involved. Such an account would be a "character typology," not a social theory of gender.[23] It is precisely here, in his attempt to grasp the power relations involved, that Connell introduces the concept of hegemonic masculinity.

The power relationships between genders and within genders in the current Western gender order are centered, in Connell's view, on a single structural fact: "the global dominance of men over women."[24] The strategy through which this dominance is achieved is embodied in what Connell calls hegemonic masculinity. Furthermore, "hegemonic masculinity can be defined as the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women."[25] But men do not constitute a homogeneous, internally coherent bloc. Particular masculinities are themselves subordinated by the hegemonic practice and their situations are related in different ways to the overall

logic of the subordination of women to men.[26] In this way, hegemonic masculinity, which is "always constructed in relation to various subordinate masculinities as well as in relation to women,"[27] generates dominance not only over women but also over subordinate masculinities and thus links the relations within genders and between genders together.[28] Hegemonic masculinity is therefore understood as both "hegemony over women" and "hegemony over subordinate masculinities." I will call these two interconnected and arguably inseparable functions of hegemonic masculinity external and internal hegemony respectively.[29]

Hegemonic masculinity, understood as external hegemony, is connected to the institutionalization of men's dominance over women. This understanding of hegemonic masculinity derives from Connell's acceptance of the essential feminist insight that the relations between genders involve oppression and domination.[30] This insight is further explored and developed by Connell himself in terms of three different but inseparable structures of gender relations, distinguishing relations of labor, power, and cathexis (emotional attachment).[31] As regards labor relations, men's position in patriarchal societies yields a series of material advantages, such as higher incomes or easier access to education, something that Connell calls "patriarchal dividend."[32] In terms of power relations, men control the means of institutionalized power, such as the state or the army, while the structure of cathexis is characterized by male superiority and violence rather than reciprocity and intimacy. The three main institutions that correspond to these structures of gender relations – namely the labor market, the state, and the family – are examples of what Connell calls gender regimes. Within this framework, hegemonic masculinity is understood as a configuration of practice but it is also seen as being institutionalized in large-scale gender regimes, that is, as a process that involves both social structure and personal life.[33]

Hegemonic masculinity generates not only external but also internal hegemony, that is, hegemony over other masculinities. In this second sense of the term, hegemonic masculinity refers to a social ascendancy of one group of men over others. In the current Western gender order, as Connell notes, such ascendancy is best exemplified by the hegemony of heterosexual over gay men. Gay men are subordinated to straight men not only in terms of social status and prestige but also by a series of material practices, which include political, cultural, economic, and legal discrimination.[34] Albeit to a lesser extent, effeminate masculinity

is also subordinated to the hegemonic model, while others, such as working class or black masculinities, are simply "marginalized." Thus, while subordination refers to relations internal to the gender order, the concept of marginalization describes the relationships between the masculinities in dominant and subordinated classes or ethnic groups, that is, the relations that result from the interplay of gender with other structures, such as class and ethnicity. Finally, a large number of men who do not act in the way prescribed by the hegemonic model but still (passively) sustain it and thus realize the patriarchal dividend, are said to "have" a form of masculinity that Connell calls "complicit."[35]

The concept of "complicit masculinity" plays a vital role in Connell's theory because the hegemonic practice does not correspond to the actual activities of the majority of men. Hegemonic masculinity is rather a "cultural ideal" that is constantly promoted by the civil society through the production of exemplary masculinities, such as media images of Sylvester Stallone, which are consistent with the reproduction of patriarchy. And when the conditions for the reproduction of patriarchy change, the exemplary masculinities will have to adapt accordingly if the strategy is to be effective. Furthermore, this function of civil society motivates many people to honor, desire, and support the current hegemonic model, that is, to position themselves in a relationship of complicity with it.[36]

Having shown, through the dual function of hegemonic masculinity, the nature of power relations both between and within genders, Connell is now in a position to grasp change as internally generated within gender relations themselves. Where there is power, Connell seems to say, echoing Foucault, there is also resistance to it. As regards the relationships between genders or the function of external hegemony, "a gender order that men dominate women," as Connell notes, "cannot avoid constituting men as an interest group concerned with defense, and women as an interest group concerned with change."[37] The emergence of the women's liberation movement is a fair indication of this contestation of external hegemony. Similarly, internal hegemony has found its antithesis in the emergence of the gay liberation movement since subordinate masculinities, as Connell reminds us, "are subordinated rather than eliminated."[38] But aspects of hegemonic masculinity, as Connell came to recognize in his most recent writings, are also contested by a variety of class, ethnic, and other social movements, such as the peace movement's resistance to violence, with diverse aims and sometimes conflicting interests. A *politics of alliances* that unites

forces ranging from women to peace activists, and that is based on their overlapping interests, seems to be, as Connell concludes, the most effective strategy for dismantling hegemonic masculinity.[39]

From hegemonic masculinity to masculine bloc

It has already been recognized that credit must be given to Connell for revealing the existence of a multiplicity of masculinities and of the power relationships among them.[40] It seems to me, however, that Connell's contribution to the study of gender relations is a more fundamental one. Connell's originality lies in the formulation of a single theoretical principle that states that *the relationships within genders are centered on, and can be explained by, the relationships between genders.* In other words, the structural dominance of men over women provides the essential foundation on which forms of masculinity and femininity are differentiated and hierarchically ordered.[41] Thus hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity, for example, are said to be distinct forms of gender practice and culturally exalted precisely because they guarantee the reproduction of the relationships between genders. Patriarchy is therefore not a simple question of men dominating women, as some feminists have assumed, but it is a complex structure of gender relations in which the interrelation between different forms of masculinity and femininity plays a central role. Nevertheless, the global dominance of men over women is still the primary focus of analysis,[42] in that the relationships within genders are important not so much in their own right but rather in terms of their effects on the reproduction of the relationships between genders. The principle under question could be therefore called the "feminist principle" in that it grants explanatory priority to inter-gender over intra-gender relationships.

The feminist principle that underlies Connell's work has important implications for his understanding of the relationship between the external and the internal function of hegemonic masculinity. The form of masculinity that is currently hegemonic, as we have already seen, generates dominance not only over women but also over subordinate masculinities. But what is the relationship between these two forms of domination? Are they one and the same thing; are they complementary to each other; or, is the one the result of the other? Granted the importance that Connell attaches to the feminist principle, it seems that hegemonic masculinity is first and foremost a strategy for the subordination of women. Indeed, as Connell himself noted, "it would hardly

be an exaggeration to say that hegemonic masculinity is hegemonic insofar as it embodies a successful strategy in relation to women."[43] Internal hegemony or dominance over other masculinities, on the other hand, seems to be a means for the achievement of external hegemony rather than an end in itself. It is the global dominance of men over women, as Connell noted, "that provides the main basis for relationships among men that define a hegemonic form of masculinity."[44] This implies that some masculinities are subordinated not because they lack a particular transhistorical quality or because they are naturally inferior to others but because the configuration of practice they embody is inconsistent with the currently accepted strategy for the subordination of women. Gay masculinities, for example, are subordinated to the hegemonic model because their object of sexual desire undermines the institution of heterosexuality, which is of primary importance for the reproduction of patriarchy. A fundamental element of modern hegemonic masculinity, as Connell argues, is "that one sex (women) exists as potential sexual object, while the other sex (men) is negated as a sexual object."[45] The subordination of gay masculinities is therefore a part of the strategy for the reproduction of patriarchy through the institution of heterosexuality. In this way, the feminist principle led Connell to grant primacy to the external over the internal function of hegemonic masculinity.

Although Gramsci never distinguished between the external and the internal function of hegemony, this distinction was implicit in his understanding of the dual nature of class domination. "[A] class is dominant," Gramsci stated in the *Prison Notebooks*, "in two ways, i.e. 'leading' and 'dominant.' It leads the classes which are its allies, and dominates those which are its enemies."[46] This distinction is here not identified with the distinction between hegemony and dictatorship[47] but it refers to the different strategies adopted by a class in its hegemonic struggle against social groups whose interests are radically opposed to its own (e.g., proletariat vs. bourgeoisie) and against groups whose interests could be reconciled to those of the class seeking hegemony (e.g., proletariat vs. peasantry). The strategies that correspond to these two situations, that is, domination and leadership respectively, are said to be radically different from each other in that the former is directed against "enemies," which must be dominated "even by armed force," while the latter is directed against "kindred and allied groups," which must be led.[48] The objective of leadership is the formation of a "historic bloc" that unites all the allied groups under the umbrella of the group seeking hegemony by making their conception

of the world homogeneous and consistent with the project of domination, a process that inevitably involves subordinating some of the interests of the groups that are led. Furthermore, leadership and domination could be thought of as internal and external hegemony respectively[49] in that the former appears to be both a precondition and a means to the latter but not an end in itself. It is "merely an aspect of the function of domination."[50]

Although it would be very simplistic to equate hegemony in the arena of gender relations with class hegemony, there are some striking structural similarities in the two processes that cannot be ignored. Both Gramsci and Connell implicitly differentiated between internal and external hegemony (leadership/domination – hegemony over subordinate masculinities/over women) and they granted primacy to the latter while the former is seen as a means to external hegemony, not an end in itself. Furthermore, in both theoretical accounts internal hegemony refers to a strategic moment where the class/gender seeking hegemony is unified and homogenized, usually at the expense of "kindred groups," so it can assert itself externally to the group over which hegemony is to be exercised. Where Gramsci and Connell parted company is precisely in their understanding of this fundamental process of internal hegemony. Whereas for Gramsci the process is essentially a dialectical one that involves reciprocity and mutual interaction between the class that is leading and the groups that are led, Connell understands the process in a more elitist way where subordinate and marginalized masculinities have no effect on the construction of the hegemonic model.

For Gramsci internal hegemony culminates in the formation of a historic bloc, which is achieved through the leadership of the fundamental class. This does not mean, however, that the elements of the "kindred groups" are totally subordinated or eliminated. In fact, some of these elements, particularly those that are consistent with the project of domination, are appropriated and they become essential constitutive elements of the historic bloc. This process of appropriation could be called "dialectical pragmatism" in that the fundamental class is in constant, mutual dialectical interaction with the allied groups and appropriates what appears pragmatically useful and constructive for the project of domination at a particular historical moment. Pragmatically useless or harmful elements, on the other hand, are subordinated and eliminated because they have no historical value.[51] The outcome of this process is an amalgam of elements, an "equilibrium"[52] that em-

bodies the best possible strategy for external hegemony. It is a "historic bloc" whose hybridity and historical specificity are reminiscent of "common sense."[53]

Connell seems to recognize, at least on a theoretical level, that different forms of masculinity "are in constant interaction"[54] and that, furthermore, the formation of hegemonic masculinity may be influenced by the existence of subordinate or marginalized models. He coins the very useful term "authorization" to suggest that the hegemonic model may authorize some elements of subordinated or marginalized masculinities. "Thus, in the United States, particular black athletes may be exemplars for hegemonic masculinity."[55] Nevertheless, Connell has not developed these points further. The outcome of the struggle for internal hegemony is not a hybrid historic bloc, as in Gramsci's account, but a hegemonic masculinity that is clearly demarcated from subordinated and marginalized ones. It is a form of masculinity that is never "infected" by non-hegemonic elements, which are instead confined "to ghettos, to privacy, to unconsciousness."[66] Hegemonic masculinity relates to non-hegemonic ones only by subordinating and marginalizing them and thus their potential pragmatic value in the construction of hegemony is underplayed while the project of internal hegemony seems to become, in a way that is inconsistent with Connell's formulation of the feminist principle, an end in itself.

Connell's theory's inability to understand the formative process of hegemonic masculinity as a reciprocal one, as a dialectic of appropriation/marginalization, is best seen in his account of the historical emergence of contemporary hegemonic masculinity. The origins of the masculinity that is now globally dominant can be traced, in Connell's view, to four main extra-gender factors that date from about 1450 to about 1650: the emergence of renaissance secular culture with its emphasis on marital heterosexuality and individualism; the creation of gendered overseas empires; the growth of commercial capitalism and the urbanization, individualism, and calculative rationality that accompanied it; and finally the onset of large-scale European civil war that involved the emergence of a strong centralized state and an increased emphasis on military prowess and performance. These four historical developments were constitutive of an emphatic, militaristic, individualist, and violent configuration of practice, of the masculinity of the gentry.[57] In the last two hundred years, however, gentry masculinity has been displaced "by more calculative, rational and regulated masculinities"[58] while these new hegemonic forms have more recently been challenged by the rise of feminism and the gay liberation movement.[59]

In Connell's historical narrative, non-hegemonic masculinities are absent from the formative process of hegemonic masculinity. The latter appears as an essentially white, Western, rational, calculative, individualist, violent, and heterosexual configuration of practice that is never infected by non-hegemonic elements. It is systematically identified with such figures as Sylvester Stallone[60] and such movements as the pro-gun lobby[61] or fascism.[62] Non-hegemonic masculinities appear only as possible alternatives, as counter-hegemonic forces that exist "in tension with"[63] the hegemonic model but they never penetrate it. Hegemonic masculinity and non-hegemonic masculinities are thus constructed as a *dualism*, as two distinct and clearly differentiated configurations of practice. In this way, the project of internal hegemony gets dissociated from external hegemony and from the feminist principle and it becomes an end in itself. Non-hegemonic masculinities are subordinated in their totality independently of their pragmatic value in relation to the project of external hegemony. Hegemonic masculinity is defined through its negation of subordinate elements (black, non-Western, irrational, effeminate, or non-violent) rather than by its ability to subordinate women. Connell's empirical and historical account of hegemonic masculinity is thus substantially inconsistent with his theoretical articulation of the concept.[64]

The secondary literature that employs the concept of hegemonic masculinity tends to reproduce the dualism constructed by Connell.[65] Hegemonic masculinity is presented as a "thoroughly heterosexual,"[66] violent,[67] or even criminal[68] configuration of practice. It is always seen, as Patricia Martin noted, as a "substantially negative"[69] type that is unified and coherent. Hegemonic masculinity is thus united by its ugliness and negativity and by its opposition to femininity and subordinate masculinities. Bird, for example, has argued that hegemonic masculinity is maintained through male homosocial interactions whereby other masculine practices are denied and "marginalized, if not suppressed entirely."[70] Hegemonic masculinity is thus a closed and unified totality that incorporates no otherness. Furthermore, when elements inconsistent with this unified model are noticed, they are said to be "contradictions" that undermine the coherence and dynamic of hegemonic masculinity.[71]

In the remainder of this article, I want to rethink the concept of hegemonic masculinity in the light of Gramsci's alternative understanding of the process of internal hegemony. I want to deconstruct Connell's binarism between non-hegemonic masculinities and he-

gemonic masculinity and conceptualize the latter as a hybrid bloc that unites various and diverse practices in order to construct the best possible strategy for the reproduction of patriarchy. That is, the configuration of practice that guarantees the reproduction of patriarchy need not necessarily be the one traditionally associated with white or heterosexual masculinities. It is in fact a hybrid masculine *bloc* that is made up of both straight and gay, both black and white elements and practices. Masculine bloc, unlike hegemonic masculinity, implies a non-reified and non-dualistic understanding of masculine power and practice. The notion of a "historic bloc," as Stuart Hall noted, is not identical to that of a pacified, homogeneous ruling class in that it "entails a quite different conception of how social forces and movements, *in their diversity*, can be articulated into a set of strategic alliances."[72] Furthermore, whereas for Connell the existence of non-white or non-heterosexual elements in hegemonic masculinity is a sign of contradiction and weakness, for me it is precisely its internally diversified and hybrid nature that makes the hegemonic bloc dynamic and flexible. It is its constant hybridization, its constant appropriation of diverse elements from various masculinities that makes the hegemonic bloc capable of reconfiguring itself and adapting to the specificities of new historical conjunctures. The process through which a historic bloc is formed is characterized, as Homi Bhabha noted, by "negotiation rather than negation,"[73] that is, by an attempt to articulate, appropriate, and incorporate rather than negate, marginalize, and eliminate different or even apparently oppositional elements. Furthermore, negotiation generates a hybrid moment, a historically unprecedented combination of elements, a "third space"[74] that displaces the histories that constitute it and sets up *new*, historically novel forms of power relationships.

The theoretical argument just outlined is consistent with the findings of a corpus of recent research on masculinities. For example, the argument is implicit in David Sarvan's examination of the formation of contemporary hegemonic masculinity in the United States.[75] Basing his study on an analysis of various cultural texts, Sarvan argues that a new masculinity became hegemonic in the 1970s. He delineates the "gradual ascendancy of [a] new, more feminized and blackened white masculinity,"[76] of a masculinity that offers "subjects positions that have been marked historically as being both masculine and feminine, white and black."[77] Sarvan makes it clear that the ascendancy of this hybrid masculinity "represents an attempt by white men to respond to and regroup in the face of particular social and economic challenges," such as the "reemergence" of the feminist movement and the rise of the

lesbian and gay rights movements.[78] Hybridization is thus a strategy for the reproduction of patriarchy. Similarly, Brian Donovan's analysis of the masculinity of Promise Keepers shows the ways in which hegemony is reproduced through hybridization.[79] Donovan argues the Promise Keepers have constructed a hybrid masculinity, a masculinity that "combin[es] traits of both 'sensitive' and 'tough men.'"[80] In doing so, they have produced "innovative forms of power that potentially shore up male authority."[81] In this way, Sarvan's and Donovan's studies reinforce the argument developed out of Gramsci's conceptualization of the process of internal hegemony: that the masculinity that occupies the hegemonic position at a given historical moment is a hybrid bloc that incorporates diverse and apparently oppositional elements.

It must be stressed that Bhabha's notions of hybridity and negotiation are central to the process through which a hegemonic bloc is formed.[82] In an attempt to clarify this process and the dynamic it entails, I now turn to an empirical case study and examine the ways in which some elements of gay masculinities have become (through negotiation, appropriation, and translation) constitutive elements of modern hegemonic masculinity.

Gay masculinities and the formation of hegemonic bloc: A case study

The emergence of the women's liberation movement in the 1970s called patriarchy into question. Domestic violence, denial of women's sexuality, and male aggression were no longer left unchallenged by many women in the West. Patriarchy was in need of new legitimatory strategies and many men were asked to renegotiate their positions in patriarchal societies, their power, and their masculine identities. Meanwhile, groups of men that had been largely excluded from the hegemonic bloc had, by that time, become visible. Black diaspora and the emergence of the gay liberation movement, for example, brought black and gay masculinities from the margins to the center. The answer to the legitimation crisis of patriarchy, as I argue in this part of the article, involved the formation of a new masculine hegemonic bloc that incorporated the elements produced by these "marginal" and "subordinate" masculinities that were functional to the reproduction of patriarchy. In the discussion that follows, I concentrate on the importance of a set of gay elements and practices[83] in the formation of the contemporary masculine bloc.

The process through which gay elements and practices get embedded in a masculine bloc is closely associated to the question of *gay visibility.* Gay culture can have an impact on the male population in its totality and it can contribute to the project of patriarchal domination only if it is visible. It has been widely documented that during the last three decades there has been an unprecedented increase of homosexual visibility in modern Western societies.[84] Gay male images are present in fundamental aspects of modern cultures, from mainstream movies[85] and fashion[86] to popular music[87] and popular culture as a whole.[88] This is not to say that gay visibility is a new historical phenomenon. As Chauncey has shown in his history of gay male culture in New York, gay men were highly visible figures there as early as the 1890s.[89] Contrary to what he calls "the myth of invisibility," "gay men boldly announced their presence by wearing red ties, bleached hair, and the era's other insignia of homosexuality."[90] Similarly, the "molly houses" in early-eighteenth-century England produced their own distinctive conventions, a highly developed and elaborated "system of symbolization" by which "mollies" were able to identify each other. So visible was this culture that, as the raids and trials of the time testify, "[i]ts visibility was its bane."[91] Yet, in late capitalist societies, gay visibility has taken a new form. It is no longer the mere result of gay agency, of the actions and visibility strategies of homosexuals themselves, but it is now closely related to the logic and structures of late capitalism. As Stuart Hall noted, the global expansion of late capitalism is based on the development of identity-specific forms of marketing that can reflect every difference and reach even the smallest and more marginal group of individuals.[92] Furthermore, the development of marketing strategies, such as "gay window advertising," have brought about a new degree of homosexual visibility.[93] In this way, the increasing circulation of gay images in popular culture during the two or three preceding decades needs to be understood as an attempt to embrace the homosexual as a consuming rather than as a social subject.[94] It is a part of a strategy, in other words, for the reproduction of capitalism, not for the liberation of homosexuals.

But the attempt to incorporate fragments of gay culture into the mainstream is also a strategy for the legitimation and reproduction of patriarchy. The "assimilation of gays into mainstream middle-class culture," as Hennessy noted, "does not disrupt postmodern patriarchy and its intersection with capitalism; indeed it is in some ways quite integral to it."[95] By making gay culture more visible, capitalism makes it possible for many men to appropriate bits and pieces of this alter-

native culture and produce new, hybrid configurations of gender practice that enable them to reproduce their dominance over women in historically novel ways. Throughout this case study, I have deliberately mixed media representation and concrete gender practices in the social world precisely because I want to stress this interconnection between gay visibility in commodity culture and appropriation of gay elements and practices in the social world: the more visible gay culture is the more likely it is to get (selectively) appropriated by the straight masses in the "lifeworld." Gay visibility in commodity culture is thus a notion that links the reproduction of patriarchy and the reproduction of capitalism.

Before giving particular historical examples of the formation of the contemporary hegemonic bloc, let me note that the process of appropriation implies re-articulation and translation. When a signifier or a practice passes from one group to another, it never retains its previous meaning or function. It is transformed, rearranged, adapted, and translated into a new context. Blachford observed that when the gay male sub-culture takes objects from the heterosexual male culture, it transforms them into something new with a quite different meaning.[96] Clothes usually associated with working-class masculinities, for example, are given a more sexualized meaning in the gay world. They are "worn differently in the gay sub-culture from the way they are worn by 'real men.' They are much tighter fitting, especially tailored to be as erotic and sensual as possible" while they are also combined with some kind of jewellery, such as chains on the neck, that are unlikely to be found on heterosexual workers.[97] To appropriate is therefore to translate and re-contextualize, to produce something *new* that is "neither the one nor the other," but it is a historically novel combination, a "third space" that enables new strategies to emerge.[98]

The dominant man of the 1960s and even early 1970s was "sexless" and "decent," because there was an overt disdain for male beauty and softness, "a taboo on tenderness" as Lynne Segal put it.[99] Dressiness[100] and sometimes even the use of aftershave lotion[101] were largely confined to homosexuals. In analyzing the dominant masculine type of that time, Nixon examined male representations in fashion photography in terms of codes of casting, dress, posture, expression, lighting, and setting.[102] He concluded that there was "little fleshiness or sensuality" in the models that appeared in the magazine *Town*, that the design and the cut of the clothes worked to produce a desexualized, narrow, and straight-lined body while the facial expression of the

models was "reminiscent of modern day gangsters." These elements were further strengthened by the codes of lighting and setting and they functioned to produce a particular way in which the male reader looks at the model, a particular "gendering of the look"[103] that encouraged identification with, rather than desire for, the model.

This form of hegemonic masculinity reflected male domination in an overt way and the rise of the women's movement during the same time forced men to resort to less overt ways of patriarchal domination. "Feminism," as Rutherford put it, "didn't so much remove men's powers and privileges as strip them of their legitimating stories."[104] Meanwhile, the expansion of late capitalism and the flourishing of commodity culture during the 1960s and the 1970s gave rise to a historically unprecedented degree of homosexual visibility. Far from attempting to marginalize the elements produced by these gay masculinities (as Connell would have us believe), many heterosexual men welcomed most of them because they provided a masquerade behind which women's subordination could be masked. Due to the fact that in the 1960s gay masculinities were closer to dominant forms of femininity rather than to traditional masculinities (they were almost as effeminate as the molly houses of the eighteenth century[105]), a hegemonic bloc could appropriate some of their elements in order to make the gender division of patriarchy less visible and thus win women's consent. Thus, the new hegemonic bloc that emerged after the early 1970s was a "bricollage of masculinity" that drew from the gay subculture,[106] a "straight queer" as David Kamp put it.[107]

Sean Nixon compared his findings of the 1970s that I summarized above with some more recent fashion photos taken from modern men's magazines, particularly from *The Face, Arena*, and *GQ*. The casting of the models (young with strong well-defined features), as Nixon observed, produces a mixture of "boyish softness" and "assertive masculinity"[108] while some elements of the clothing in the stylings have a "strong intertextuality with gay masculinities."[109] These elements, along with the "strongly narcissistic absorption or self-containment of the models,"[110] work to produce a "gendering of the look" that draws on forms of looking "historically associated with gay men."[111] What is important here is that these images, which represent a "loosening of the binary opposition between gay and straight-identified men,"[112] have not been created from scratch but they reflect "shifts in forms of masculinity culture outside the consumer institutions."[113] Indeed, as Richard Martin notes, since gay sensibility sells to both gay

and straight men, "just about everyone dresses a little gay these days."[114] Some commentators have gone as far as to report that drag is no longer a taboo for heterosexual men.[115] On the contrary, it has been translated into a symbol of heterosexual manhood since, as one of Chapman's interviewees confessed, "the kind of man who turns up at a party as a woman is usually so confident of his masculinity that he doesn't care what he looks like...."[116] By embracing drag, however, the man in question is able to blur gender difference, to render the patriarchal dividend invisible, "to circumvent feminist arguments, and absent himself from masculinity and thus from any responsibility for it."[117] As this somewhat unusual example shows, the appropriation and translation of gay elements represents a self-conscious attempt to create a hybrid masculinity for purely strategic purposes.

But the appropriation of gay male elements is not restricted to fashion photography or fashion itself. Recent analyses of male images in advertising have demonstrated the existence of an explicit "gay imagery."[118] Almost all the commentators agree that the existence of gay elements and styles in mainstream advertising works to sexualize, eroticize, or fetishize the male body.[119] Male representations in recent Levi 501[120] and Calvin Klein[121] advertisements, for example, have less to do with machismo, strength, and virility than with the fracturing and eroticization of the male body. In a similar way, popular music seems to blur the distinction between gay and straight masculinities. Early Pop Music, "which was riddled with homosexuality and the sensibility that we now call camp,"[122] encouraged the emergence of narcissistic and androgynous masculinities. The male mods, as Savage notes, were not a sexual subculture but they assumed what had been an exclusively homosexual style. They were wearing more effeminate and more colorful clothes while some of them used make-up and mascara.[123] More recently, some rock stars have worn skirts on the stage,[124] while others pretend to be gay.[125] Furthermore, this appropriation of gay elements blurs sexual difference, enables some masculinities to appear less rigid and thus conceals patriarchal domination. But this "gender flexibility," as Hennessy rightly notes, "is pernicious because it casts the illusion that patriarchy has disappeared."[126]

The presence of the gay element is even more noticeable in recent popular movies, where male film stars, from Tom Cruise to Arnold Schwarzenegger, are said to have been eroticized.[127] Hulmlund, for example, argues that Sylvester Stallone, whom Connell sees as an exemplar of a pure heterosexual masculinity,[128] has recently worn a

new masquerade.[129] In two of his recent films (*Lock Up* and *Tango*), Stallone is no longer a loner, a Rocky or a Rambo who wins impossible battles all by himself. He is now joined by another man, a figure that Hulmlund calls the "Stallone clone":

> By naming this second man the Stallone clone, I do not just mean he looks, talks and acts like Stallone. In these films, Stallone and the clones are very fond of each other, so for me, "clone" evokes the butch clone, the homosexual who passes as heterosexual because he looks and acts "like a man."[130]

Furthermore, the homoeroticism and the male bonding that these films contain may appear to undermine traditional conceptions of masculinity and power relationships. Yet Holmlund does not fail to recognize that masquerades may conceal something. There is always the possibility that there is something masked behind Stallone's new masquerade and that therefore the gay element may play a legitimatory function. "The veil," as he notes with reference to Homi Bhabha, "conceals bombs."[131]

Similarly, Sarvan's analysis of the film *Cruising* suggests that there is a strong relationship between the mainstreaming of gay culture and the reproduction of patriarchy.[132] Sarvan's main focus is the sadomasochist (S/M) culture, which has become central to the production of gay male identities since the 1970s. The film *Cruising*, as narrated by Sarvan, is about the excursion of a heterosexual undercover cop, Steve Burns (Al Pacino), into New York's gay S/M subculture in search of a "homo killer."[133] Sarvan notes that, as the film progresses, Steve Burns begins to appropriate elements from the gay S/M subculture and to make them a part of his heterosexual life. For instance, "[w]hile having sex with [his girlfriend] (which, tellingly, gets more violent) he involuntarily hears the dance music of the S/M clubs...."[134] In doing so, the "newly homosexualized"[135] cop is able to reproduce his patriarchal power over his girlfriend through hybridization. Transposed to the realm of heterosexuality, male sadism and female masochism is a mechanism of patriarchal reproduction in that it eroticizes male domination.

In short, hegemonic masculinity, the masculinity that is culturally exalted and capable of reproducing patriarchy, is not constructed in total opposition to gay masculinities. Rather, many elements of the latter have become constitutive parts of a hybrid hegemonic bloc whose heterogeneity is able to render the patriarchal dividend invisible and legitimate patriarchal domination. Hybridization in the realm of

representation and in concrete, everyday gender practices makes the hegemonic bloc appear less oppressive and more egalitarian. For instance, the appropriation of a series of signifiers from gay subcultures, such as earrings for men and dressiness, makes the dominant form of masculinity appear "softer" and less opposed to contemporary femininities (on the level of symbolization). Yet, as Donovan reminds us, "softer forms of masculinity are not inherently emancipatory for women and can, in fact, mask usurpation of women's rights."[136] Moreover, hybridization is a very effective strategy because it uses "the subversive, messy form of camouflage" in order to produce something new and *unrecognizable* and it "does not come like a pure avenging angel speaking the truth of... pure oppositionality."[137]

Concluding remarks

In this article, I have introduced the notion of "hegemonic masculine bloc" in order to do away with Connell's dualism between hegemonic masculinity and non-hegemonic masculinities. The notion of masculine bloc, deriving from Gramsci's understanding of the process that I called "internal hegemony," suggests that the form of masculinity that is capable of reproducing patriarchy is in a constant process of negotiation, translation, hybridization, and reconfiguration. This implies more than a recognition that hegemonic masculinity is capable of transforming itself in order to adapt to the specificities of new historical conjunctures. To say that the dominant form of masculinity is a hybrid bloc that continually reconfigures itself through hybridization is not simply to say that hegemony is "a historically mobile relation."[138] It is rather to stress that the hegemonic bloc changes in a very *deceptive* and unrecognizable way. It changes through negotiation, appropriation, and translation, through the transformation of what appears counter-hegemonic and progressive into an instrument of backwardness and patriarchal reproduction.

We are used to seeing masculine power as a closed, coherent, and unified totality that embraces no otherness, no contradiction. This is an illusion that must be done away with because it is precisely through its hybrid and apparently contradictory content that hegemonic masculinity reproduces itself. To understand hegemonic masculinity as hybridity is therefore to avoid falling into the trap of believing that patriarchy has disappeared simply because heterosexual men have worn earrings or because Sylvester Stallone has worn a new masquerade.

Acknowledgments

A Summer Research Scholarship from the Research School of Social Sciences of the Australian National University aided in the completion of this article. I am especially indebted to Lisa Adkins for supervising this article and for her valuable comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank Mike Donaldson and Richard Howson as well as the Editors of *Theory and Society* for their critical comments on an earlier draft.

Notes

1. Mike Donaldson, "What is Hegemonic Masculinity?" *Theory and Society* 22/4 (1993): 643–657, is a notable exception.
2. Robert W. Connell, "The Concept of 'Role' and What To Do With It," *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology* 15 (1979): 7–17; reprinted in Robert W. Connell, *Which Way Is Up?* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1983), 190–207.
3. The first edition of Connell's historical analysis of class struggle in Australia appeared a year later. See Robert W. Connell and Terry H. Irving, *Class Structure in Australian History* (Melbourne: Longman and Chesire, 1980).
4. Connell, *Which Way is Up?* 205.
5. Ibid., 204–206.
6. For Connell's critique of sex role theory, see Robert W. Connell, "Theorising Gender," *Sociology* 19 (1985): 262–264; Tom Carrigan, Robert Connell, and John Lee, "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity" in Michael Kaufman, editor, *Beyond Patriarchy: Essays by Men on Pleasure, Power, and Change* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1987), 156–168; Robert W. Connell, *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 47–54; and Robert W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1995), 21–27.
7. Connell, "Theorising Gender," 263.
8. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 50.
9. Ibid., 50–52.
10. Ibid., 51.
11. Ibid., 50; Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity," 167.
12. Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity," 167.
13. Connell, *Masculinities*, 27; Connell, *Gender and Power*, 51–52.
14. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 52.
15. Ibid.; Connell, *Masculinities*, 25–27.
16. Connell, *Masculinities*, 27; Connell, *Gender and Power*, 53; Connell, "Theorising Gender," 263.
17. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 53.
18. Although it is not within the scope of the present article to examine the validity of Connell's critique of sex role theory, it must be noted that sex role theory can be, and indeed has been, more flexible in regard to questions of power and change than Connell assumes. This can be shown by citing only a single article. See Mary

McIntosh, "The Homosexual Role," *Social Problems* 16 (1968): 182–192. McIntosh's article shows that the sex role framework does not necessarily reduce homosexuality, and for that matter any other form of behavior inconsistent with the normative one, to deviance. On the contrary, the homosexual is here conceptualized as a distinct gender role that is not only historically specific, but it is also subject to power. Of course, such flexibility is not so common in sex role literature.

19. Robert W. Connell, "Politics of Changing Men," *Arena* 6 (1996): 56.
20. Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 24–25. She argues that "gender is not a noun" but it is "always a doing."
21. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 140.
22. Ibid., 167–172.
23. Connell, *Masculinities*, 76.
24. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 183.
25. Connell, *Masculinities*, 77.
26. Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity," 174.
27. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 183.
28. Although Connell does not pay so much attention to relationships among different forms of femininity, he argues that they are also constructed in relation to hegemonic masculinity. "Emphasized femininity" is organized as an adaptation to it, while other forms of femininity are defined centrally by strategies of resistance. Although emphasized femininity is more honored and culturally exalted, the concentration of power in the hands of men leaves limited scope for it to construct institutionalized power relationships over other kinds of femininity. Power relationships among femininities are therefore less acute and noticeable than power relationships between masculinities. Ibid., 186–188.
29. The words "internal" and "external" are used with reference to the category of masculinity.
30. Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity," 140.
31. For Connell's "three-fold model of the structure of gender relations," see Connell, *Gender and Power*, 90–118; Connell, *Masculinities*, 73–76; and Robert W. Connell, "New Directions in Gender Theory, Masculinity Research and Gender Politics," *Ethnos* 61 (1996): 161–162. In his most recent book, Connell identifies a forth structure of gender relations, which he calls "the structure of symbolism." In doing so, he stresses the fact that "gender subordination may be reproduced through ... linguistic practices, such as addressing women by titles that define them through their marital relationships to men." Yet, this fourth structure of gender relations is not as developed and elaborated as the component structures of his "three-fold model." See Robert W. Connell, *The Men and The Boys* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000), 26; and also 42–43; 150–155.
32. Connell, "New Directions in Gender Theory," 162. The term "patriarchal dividend," however, is sometimes used to refer to the *overall* advantages (not simply to the material ones) that men gain in patriarchal societies. In such cases, Connell uses the term "material dividend" to refer to the more restricted meaning of "patriarchal dividend." See, for example, Connell, *Masculinities*, 82.
33. Connell, "New Directions in Gender Theory," 163.
34. Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity," 170–182.
35. Connell, *Masculinities*, 76–81.
36. Ibid., 79–80.
37. Ibid., 82.
38. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 184.

39. Connell, "Politics of Changing Men," 68–70; Connell, *Masculinities*, 234–238.
40. See, for example, Deniz Kandiyoti, "The Paradoxes of Masculinity: Some Thoughts on Segregated Societies," in Andrea Cornwall and Nancy Lindisfarne, editors, *Dislocating Masculinity: Comparative Ethnographies* (London: Routledge, 1994), 198–199; and Harry Christian, *The Making of Anti-Sexist Men* (London: Routledge, 1994), 7.
41. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 183–188.
42. Ibid., 183; Connell, *Masculinities*, 82.
43. Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity," 180.
44. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 183.
45. Carrigan, Connell, and Lee, "Towards a New Sociology of Masculinity," 173.
46. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 57.
47. It is true that, within the general framework of his theory of "dual perspective," Gramsci often identified *leadership* with hegemony / civil society / consent, and *domination* with dictatorship / political society / force. Ibid., 12–13, 56, 106, 169–170, 276. Here, however, I am concerned with a second, less famous but equally important, meaning that Gramsci attached to the dialectical distinction leadership/domination.
48. Ibid., 57.
49. The words "internal" and "external" are used with reference to the historic bloc.
50. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, 59.
51. Gramsci's analysis of the Italian Risorgimento in the third chapter of the *Prison Notebooks* (52–120), and especially his account of the formation of a new class, led by the Moderate Party, that involved "the gradual but continuous absorption ... of the active elements produced by allied groups," is an excellent exposition of this dialectical process. Ibid., 58–59.
52. Ibid., 161.
53. Gramsci understands common sense as a "chaotic aggregate" of disparate and fragmentary conceptions of the world, as being "strangely composite: it contains Stone Age elements and principles of a more advanced science, prejudices from all past phases of history at the local level and institutions of a future philosophy which will be that of a human race united the world over." Ibid., 324; see also 419–425.
54. Connell, *Masculinities*, 198.
55. Ibid., 81.
56. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 186.
57. Robert W. Connell, "The big picture: Masculinities in recent world history," *Theory and Society* 22 (1993): 597–623; a somewhat more analytical version of this article was published in Connell, *Masculinities*, 186–203.
58. Connell, "The big picture," 609.
59. Ibid., 613–618.
60. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 185.
61. Connell, *Masculinities*, 212–216; Connell, "Politics of Changing Men," 62.
62. Connell, *Masculinities*, 193.
63. Connell, "The big picture," 610.
64. The point that Connell uses the term hegemonic masculinity in an inconsistent way has been already made by Patricia Y. Martin, "Why Can't a Man Be More Like a Woman? Reflections on Connell's Masculinities," *Gender and Society* 12 (1998): 472–474. I want to make it clear, however, that this inconsistency is the

product of a non-correspondence between his theoretical articulation and his empirical investigation of hegemonic masculinity.

65. Connell has recently recognized that "the term [hegemonic masculinity] has come to stand for a fixed character type, something like a Type A personality – and almost always with negative connotations" and he takes "some responsibility" for this tendency in the secondary literature. See Robert W. Connell, "Introduction: Studying Australian Masculinities," *Journal of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies* 3 (1998): 6; and Robert W. Connell, "Reply" [to Judith Lorber and Patricia Martin] *Gender and Society* 12 (1998): 475–476.
66. Stephen Tomsen, "'He had to be a poofter or something': Violence, male honor, and heterosexual panic," *Journal of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies* 3 (1998): 44–57, esp. 48–49.
67. James Gillet and Philip White, "Male Bodybuilding and the Reassertion of Hegemonic Masculinity: A Critical Feminist Perspective," *Play and Culture* 5 (1992): 358–369.
68. Joachim Kersten, "Crime and Masculinities in Australia, Germany and Japan," *International Sociology* 8 (1993): 461–478.
69. P. Martin, "Why Can't a Man Be More Like a Woman?" 473.
70. Sharon Bird, "Welcome to the Men's Club: Homosociality and the Maintenance of Hegemonic Masculinity," *Gender and Society* 10 (1996): 121.
71. Robert W. Connell, "An Iron Man: The Body and Some Contradictions of Hegemonic Masculinity" in Michael Messner and Donald Sabo, editors, *Sport, Men and the Gender Order* (Champaign: Human Kinetics Books, 1990), 83–95; Donaldson, "What is Hegemonic Masculinity?" 646–647.
72. Stuart Hall, "Gramsci and Us," in Stuart Hall, editor, *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thacherism and the Crisis of the Left* (London: Verso, 1988), 170, emphasis added.
73. Homi K. Bhabha, "The Commitment to Theory," *New Formations* 5 (1988): 11.
74. Homi K. Bhabha, "The Third Space," in Jonathan Rutherford, editor, *Identity, Community, Culture, Difference* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990), 221.
75. David Sarvan, *Taking It Like A Man: White Masculinity, Masochism, and Contemporary American Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
76. Ibid., 37.
77. Ibid., 9.
78. Ibid., 4.
79. Brian Donovan, "Political consequences of private authority: Promise Keepers and the transformation of hegemonic masculinity," *Theory and Society* 27 (1998): 817–843.
80. Ibid., 826.
81. Ibid., 820.
82. As far as I know, the only studies that attempt to conceptualize masculinities in terms of Bhabha's notion of hybridity are Alan Sinfield, "Diaspora and hybridity: Queer identities and the ethnicity model," *Textual Practice* 10 (1996): 271–293; and Eduardo Archetti, *Masculinities* (Oxford: Berg, 1999).
83. This is not to suggest that some practices or elements are intrinsically gay while others not. By gay elements and practices, I simply mean the ones that are usually associated with, and have been developed by, gay male communities, such as camp or drag.
84. For an overview of the literature, see Rosemary Hennessy, "Queer visibility in commodity culture," in Linda Nicholson and Steven Seidman, editors, *Social*

Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 142–183.

85. Robin Wood, "Raging Bull: The Homosexual Subtext in Film," in Kaufman, *Beyond Patriarchy*, 266–276.
86. Richard Martin, "The Gay Factor in Fashion," *Esquire Gentleman* (13 July 1993): 135–140; Hennessy, "Queer visibility in commodity culture," 168–170.
87. Wayne Studer, *Rock on the Wild Side: Gay Male Images in Popular Music of the Rock Era* (San Francisco: Leyland, 1994); Jon Savage, "Tainted Love: The influence of male homosexuality and sexual divergence on pop music and culture since the war," in Alan Tolminson, editor, *Consumption, Identity, and Style: Marketing, Meanings, and the Packaging of Pleasure* (London: Routledge, 1990), 153–171.
88. David Kamp, "The Straight Queer," *Gentleman's Quarterly* 63 (July 1993): 94–99; Savage, "Tainted Love."
89. George Chauncey, *Gay New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making of the Gay Male World, 1890–1940* (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
90. Ibid., 3.
91. Alan Bray, *Homosexuality in Renaissance England* (London: Gay Men's Press, 1988), 92.
92. Stuart Hall, "The Local and the Global: Globalization and Ethnicity," in Anthony King, editor, *Culture, Globalization and the World System* (London: Macmillan, 1991), 30.
93. Danae Clark, "Commodity Lesbianism," in Henry Abelove, Michele Aina Barale, and David Halperin, editors, *Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 188.
94. Ibid., 195; see also Savage, "Tainted Love," 168; Hennessy, "Queer visibility in commodity culture," 143–144, 172–176; Kamp, "The Straight Queer," 96–97.
95. Hennessy, "Queer visibility in commodity culture," 170.
96. Gregg Blachford, "Male dominance and the gay world," in Kenneth Plummer, editor, *The Making of the Modern Homosexual* (London: Hutchinson, 1981), 200–202.
97. Ibid., 200.
98. Bhabha, "The Third Space," 211.
99. Lynne Segal, "Look Back in Anger: Men in the Fifties," in Rowena Chapman and Jonathan Rutherford, editors, *Male Order: Unwrapping Masculinity* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988), 87.
100. Savage, "Tainted Love," 156.
101. Blachford, "Male dominance and the gay world," 252.
102. Sean Nixon, *Hard Looks: Masculinities, Spectatorship and Contemporary Consumption* (London: UCL Press, 1996), 170–179.
103. Ibid., 177.
104. Jonathan Rutherford, *Men's Silences: Predicaments of Masculinity* (London: Routledge, 1992), 3.
105. See Blachford, "Male dominance and the gay world," 188–202.
106. Frank Mort, "Boy's Own? Masculinity, Style and Popular Culture," in Chapman and Rutherford, *Male Order*, 203–205.
107. Kamp, "The Straight Queer."
108. Sean Nixon, "Exhibiting Masculinity," in Stuart Hall, editor, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (London: The Open University, 1997), 305.
109. Ibid., 308.

110. Ibid., 307.
111. Nixon, *Hard Looks*, 201.
112. Ibid., 202.
113. Ibid., 197.
114. Martin, "The Gay Factor in Fashion," 140.
115. Hennessy, "Queer visibility in commodity culture," 169; Sinfield, "Diaspora and hybridity," 279–280.
116. Rowena Chapman, "The Great Pretender: Variations on the New Man Theme," in Chapman and Rutherford, *Male Order*, 240.
117. Ibid., 243.
118. Kenneth Mackinnon, *Uneasy Pleasures: The Male as Erotic Object* (London: Cyngus Arts, 1997), 107.
119. Jonathan Rutherford, "Who's that man?" in Chapman and Rutherford, *Male Order*, 32, 59; Mark Simpson, *Male Impersonators: Men Performing Masculinity* (London: Cassell, 1994), 94–130; Nixon, "Exhibiting Masculinity," 293–295.
120. Mort, "Boy's Own?" 199–202.
121. Mackinnon, *Uneasy Pleasures*, 99–111.
122. Savage, "Tainted Love," 158.
123. Ibid., 160–161.
124. Hennessy, "Queer visibility in commodity culture," 169.
125. Simpson, *Male Impersonators*, 204–210; Kamp, "The Straight Queer," 96.
126. Hennessy, "Queer visibility in commodity culture," 172.
127. Simpson, *Male Impersonators*, 212–215; Mackinnon, *Uneasy Pleasures*, 79–92.
128. Connell, *Gender and Power*, 184–185.
129. Chris Holmlund, "Masculinity as Multiple Masquerade: The 'mature' Stallone and the Stallone clone," in Steven Cohan and Ina Rae Hark, editors, *Screening the Male: Exploring Masculinities in Hollywood Cinema* (London: Routledge, 1993), 213–229.
130. Ibid., 214–215.
131. Ibid., 218.
132. Sarvan, *Taking It Like A Man*, 213–239.
133. Ibid., 214.
134. Ibid., 215.
135. Ibid.
136. Donovan, "Political consequences of private authority," 837.
137. Bhabha, "The Commitment to Theory," 11.
138. Connell, *Masculinities*, 77.