



Reference Source Code Implementation

API Developer's Guide

April, 2004



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Chapter 1

Getting Started

1.1 Compiling and Running VHTi Applications

1.1.1 Prerequisites

Current build system requirements:

1. Windows 2000 Professional with Service Pack four. Older versions, such as Windows NT 4, will probably work, but have not been tested.
2. Microsoft Visual C++ 6.0
3. Cygwin (<http://www.cygwin.com/setup.exe>). Install *all* the packages.

1.1.2 Third-Party Libraries

We use the following third-party libraries:

1. libxml2 2.6.3

2. iconv 1.9.1
3. openssl 0.9.7c
4. zlib 1.1.4

Current versions of the above three libraries can all be found at

<http://www.zlatkovic.com/projects/libxml/binaries.html>.

We may substitute newer versions of the above libraries as they become available; this list reflects our current development and testing environment.

The libraries are distributed as “.zip” files. If you use the Cygwin “unzip” program to unpack them, be sure to make the unpacked DLLs executable by doing `chmod +x *.dll`.

Be sure to tell Visual C++ about the libraries by clicking Tools, Options, Directories. Also put the directories in which you've placed DLLs onto your PATH (right-click “My Computer”, choose “Properties”, “Advanced”, “Environment Variables”, “New”).

1.1.3 Building

To build the VHTi examples, open the VSS workspace `VHTI.dsw`, and build the “_tests_and_samples” project.

1.1.4 Running

The easiest way to run the examples is through Visual Studio: right-click the appropriate project, choose “Set as Active Project”, then press `Ctrl+F5`. If you want to see what is going on inside, and you probably will, then use the debugger. Refer to Microsoft's documentation for advice on setting breakpoints and watching variables.

1.2 Changes to VHTi

As VHTi version 1.5 is the first release of the API, there are no changes made within this document that may affect any previous release versions. For future releases, any changes to the API or its subsequent documentation set will be included within this section.

1.3 Bug Reports

As VHTi version 1.5 is the first public-domain release of the API, there are currently no bugs or issues to report.

Known Issues

There are currently no known issues to report with VHTi version 1.5.

Reporting an Issue

VoteHere appreciates your efforts in helping us identify and resolve issues and inaccuracies with our products, specifications and documentation. If you feel you have identified an issue with the VHTi API or documentation set, please proceed with the following steps for submitting the issue to the VoteHere support team:

1. Record the version number of the API or document you are referencing, and if documentation-related note the page and /or section number.
2. Record and document the issue as clearly and in as much detail as possible.
3. Record your name, company name, and a telephone number where you can be reached during normal business hours.
4. Contact VoteHere using one of the following methods:
 - **Email:** support@votehere.net
 - **Fax:** 1.425.450.2861
 - **Phone:** 1.888.457.6863

Customer Support Hours of Operation

Monday–Friday 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. USA Pacific Standard Time, excluding US national holidays.

1.4 Examples

The following examples are provided to show how to use VHTi. Except for the *Election* example, they are constructed as Windows Console Applications, and will show status messages in the output window. Usually a statement about what operation is being performed is followed by a success or failure message about that operation. When the sample program is done, it will report that it is FINISHED EXECUTING.

- *Election* exercises VHTi through a series of Bash shell and Perl scripts.
- *KeyShare* exercises the key sharing and election configuration functions.
- *Tabulation* exercises the tabulation functions.
- *VoterVerify* exercises the voting machine functions with voter-verification.
- *Voting* exercises the voting machine functions.
- *PKI* exercises the public key infrastructure functions.

1.4.1 Election Example

The election sample exercises VHTi through a series of Bash shell and Perl scripts. It demonstrates the VHTi protocol from election configuration through audit, including pre-election configuration, voting, post-election tabulation, and post-election audit. See the README for a full description.

1.4.2 Key Sharing Example

The key sharing sample demonstrates the process that each authority will follow in order to generate his [SecretShare](#)[■]. Election configuration is also demon-

strated in this sample by showing how to generate [CryptoGroupParameters](#) which is needed throughout VHTi.

Secret shares are used during the Tabulation process. The key sharing sample begins with the generation of [KeyGenParameters](#) and the actual [Authority](#) objects. Some [SeedParameters](#) are necessary to make the [KeyGenParameters](#). The sample provides default values for these: the number of Authorities, n , is 4; the threshold number of Authorities, t , is 3; and a seed to generate random numbers is 123. To change these, using Visual Studio's Project settings, set the "Program Arguments" to your n , t , and seed.

The sample code then generates [SecretCoefficients](#) and [BroadcastValue](#) values for each [Authority](#). Given these, the [PairwiseSecrets](#) can be calculated, and then finally the [KeyShareCommitment](#) and [SecretShare](#) for each authority. The Key Share Commitment is verified upon creation.

1.4.3 Voting Example

The voting sample code uses as input a [BlankBallot](#) and a [ClearTextBallot](#). Since the ballot encryption function requires a [SignedBlankBallot](#), the sample signs the [BlankBallot](#) using the signing function from the PKI library. Although the sample doesn't demonstrate it, the encryption function (like all functions that take signed objects) verifies that signature, again using the PKI library, before doing its real work.

1.4.4 Voter Verification Example

The voter verification sample is similar to the *Voting* sample with additional voter verification added. The sample includes procedures for

1. Pre-election procedures for generating [BallotSequenceNumber](#)s, [VoteVerificationKey](#)s, and [SigningPrivateKey](#)s;
2. Election procedures for generating dictionary [VoteVerificationCode](#)s, [VoteReceipt](#)s on the voting machine; and
3. Post-election to support [VoteVerificationTrustee](#)s generation of [VoteVerificationCode](#)s from [SignedVotedBallot](#)s to allow voters to verify that their voted ballot, as verified in the pollsite, is contained in the ballot box.

1.4.5 Tabulation Example

The tabulation sample code demonstrates an individual `CommittedAuthority` partially decrypting each `RawVotedBallot` in a `RawBallotBox` and placing the result into an `AuthorityPartialDecrypt` structure. After enough authorities have created their `AuthorityPartialDecrypt`s, the collection of `AuthorityPartialDecrypt`s can be bundled into an `AuthorityPartialDecrypts` structure, which can then be combined with a single `RawBallotBox` to create a `PartiallyDecryptedBallotBox`. The combine decrypt function takes this structure as an argument, along with a single `SignedBlankBallot`, and simultaneously

1. Verifies that the collection of `CommittedAuthority`s that is presented in the `PartiallyDecryptedBallotBox` are legitimate, in the sense that their `KeyShareCommitment`s constitute a valid share of the `ElectionPublicKey` that is presented in the `SignedBlankBallot`. (Note: This check alone does not prevent a malicious entity from impersonating one or more of the `CommittedAuthority`s, since `CommittedAuthority` data is public information. However, an impostor would not be able to produce data that also passes the next check, 2. Hence the combination of this verification step with the following one are sufficient to establish the authenticity of the source of partial decryption data.)
2. Verifies all `AuthorityPartialDecrypt` validity proofs (i.e. checks the integrity of each partial decryption in the `AuthorityPartialDecrypts`)
3. Assuming that all validity proofs are correct, completes decryption of all the individual answers contained in the `RawBallotBox`, by properly combining the partial decryption information

1.4.6 Public Key Infrastructure Example

The PKI sample code demonstrates basic elements of cryptography: creating a `Signature` on a document, verifying a `Signature`, encrypting a document, and decrypting a document. A `GeneralPurposePublicKey` and a `GeneralPurposePrivateKey` are needed for these operations, so the sample begins by generating them. A simple XML document containing the phrase “Hello World” is passed to the signing operation along with a `GeneralPurposePrivateKey`. The signing operation creates a hash of the document; this hash is what is actually signed. The output XML structure is a `Signature`. The signature verification function

takes the original document and [Signature](#), re-computes the hash, and compares it to the hash in the [Signature](#).

The encryption sample takes a [ConstCharStar](#) and a [GeneralPurposePublic-Key](#) and places the encrypted data into an [EncryptedData](#). Decryption takes the [EncryptedData](#) plus a [GeneralPurposePrivateKey](#), and returns the original [ConstCharStar](#).

Chapter 2

Fundamentals of VHTi

2.1 VHTi Election Fundamentals

Stripped to its essence, the most fundamental requirement of an election is that it produces a published count for the choices of eligible voters, which is then approved by an overwhelming majority of the population. Typically, this process is divided into two stages: Casting and Tabulation. To maintain the electorate's belief in and willingness to be bound by the outcome of an election, both voters and independent observers must verify these casting and tabulation stages. Voter Verification ensures that each vote is counted-as-cast. Open Results Verification ensures that all voted ballots are tabulated correctly. Taken together, Voter Verification and Open Results Verification provide total verification of an election—that is, Election Verification.

Casting is the recording of choices on some media format, encoded according to a publicly documented set of rules. This recorded data is generally referred to as the voter's "*voted ballot*".

Tabulation is the counting of the collection of voted ballots (that is, "ballot box"). The ballot box could be a stack of pieces of paper kept in a locked vault under constant watch—in which case one might argue that the ballot box is not publicly approved, but only approved by a set of election trustees who *represent*

the public. The ballot box could also be posted on the Internet—in which case, one could argue, it is much closer to being publicly approved since access to the ballot box is granted much more broadly.

Voter Verification ensures that your voting intent is accurately recorded and contained in the ballot box for tabulation—that is, your ballot is counted as cast. Since only you know your intent, only you can accomplish Voter Verification. Specifically, it involves two distinct checks:

1. You must be able to satisfy that your voted ballot is properly recorded,
2. You must be able to satisfy that your voted ballot is contained in the public ballot box.

The goal of Open Results Verification is to produce an irrefutable tally from the public ballot box. Open Results Verification picks up where Voter Verification leaves off in that it provides an indisputably accurate sum (that is, election result) from the ballot box of votes, according to a publicly accepted counting process. Any scrutinizer (independent observer, election official, party observer, non-governmental organization, press, etc) can verify election results. Open Results Verification should involve three distinct checks, which must be accomplished without violating your secret ballot:

1. Any scrutinizer must be able to satisfy that ballots come from legitimate voters,
2. Any scrutinizer must be able to satisfy that no voted ballots have changed since they were cast,
3. Any scrutinizer must be able to reproduce the election results.

Because the ballot box is stored digitally and available redundantly across the Internet, the precision of the election results can be verified by any and all who are interested.

The simplest election is a "show of hands" election where voters raise their hands to indicate their vote. It is Voter Verifiable because all voters know whether their hand is up or not (cast "yes" or "no"). It is Open Results Verifiable because everyone can form their own count of hands raised, and thus no one needs to rely on the accuracy and integrity of some special vote counter, or counters. "Show

of hands” elections, however, do not offer a secret ballot, and are not suitable for large elections.

Small scale, hand-counted paper voting systems – those where everyone involved can actually watch the ballots and ballot box all the way through tabulation – are Voter Verifiable because (1) all voters can check that their vote is recorded on paper as intended (they mark the paper themselves) and (2) they can carefully watch the ballot box to ensure that their vote is included for counting. It is Open Results Verifiable because everyone can watch and participate to ensure that (1) only legitimate voters cast ballots, (2) ballots are not changed, and (3) the final count is completely accurate.

Machine counted paper voting systems are not quite Voter Verifiable because although voters can check that their vote is recorded on paper as intended, they cannot check to make sure that their ballot is in the ballot box when counting begins. It is not Open Results Verifiable because voters must trust the accuracy and integrity of the ballot handlers and counters. The United States Presidential Election in 2000 showed that machine counted paper ballots could be lost or inadvertently changed after casting; ultimately, it took a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court to decide the election.

Current electronic voting systems are neither Voter Verifiable nor Open Results Verifiable. Voters cannot even verify that something that might be called a “ballot” is ever created, much less that (1) their ballot accurately represents their choices, or (2) that their vote is “in” something that might legitimately be called “the ballot box.” Furthermore, there is essentially no transparency in the counting process, so nearly no one can have any confidence that the results that are finally produced by some counting machine are an accurate total of the ballot information used as input.

For a complete overview of the fundamentals of VHTi and Verifiable e-voting, please refer to the VoteHere white paper titled “Verifiable e-Voting” included on the VHTi SDK CD.

2.2 VHTi Library Fundamentals

2.2.1 Overview

The VHTi library is designed to provide functionality without restricting policy, as long as the basic security requirements of the protocol are met. This means that at the lowest level, the VHTi API does not describe how data are stored by the participants, nor does it describe how the data are to be transferred between participants, nor does it restrict the user interface presented by devices using VHTi. Clients to the library will be responsible for maintaining privacy by encrypting data, using SSL/HTTPS, etc. once the data is given to them.

In order to make storage and transportation as simple as possible, all VHTi data structures are encoded as XML formatted text, conforming to elements described in [vhti.dtd](#). In many cases, applications built upon VHTi can ignore the contents of these structures, and just pass them to the next API function. A program that uses VHTi will often group the results of various function calls together and pass them as a vector (array) to another function. Even clients with no XML parsing facility can do this, through simple string manipulations: remove the XML declaration from the elements, concatenate them together, and wrap the resulting string with a new XML declaration and document tag.

All of the VHTi functions validate their inputs against `vhti.dtd`, which is compiled into the library. However, you might want to use a different DTD. In that case, use the [SetDTDLocation](#) function to present a DTD file before calling any functions that take XML as input.

Naming Conventions

In the include (.h) files themselves, types are named with HumptyCase. This is true for types described in the API reference, the glossary, and the DTD file. Variables, which are instances of data types, are named with underscores. Names of functions (which are instances of transformation types) are prefixed with “VHTI” and `VHTI_named_with_underscores`. Enumerations and error strings are all `UPPERCASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES`.

For the sake of readability, names of functions are presented in an alternate form in the text of document itself. This form is simply a HumptyCase version of the form found in the include file *without* the prepended “VHTI.” For example, the .h file function, [VHTI_encrypt_ballot_pollsite](#) is written as

[EncryptBallotPollsite](#) in the text of the document.

Parameter Conventions

All data passed to or from the functions are passed as parameters. In the current implementation, these parameters are not optional. The function return values are reserved for error conditions, and will be discussed shortly. Data returned from a function (“out-mode” parameters) are placed into character pointers. Those pointers are returned via “char **” addresses. (Note that NULL is *not* an allowed out-mode parameter address. The VHTi library does not check pointer validity on these arguments.) Convenient typedefs are provided by the header files to suggest the expected DTD type. VHTI_free must be called on each returned value once the client is finished with it.

Functions sometimes fail. Failure is indicated by a non-zero return value. Every failed function call will set an internal error state. These can be queried with [GetLastError](#) and [GetLastErrorNumber](#). These error strings and numbers are established in the VHTI_error.XML file, which allows for basic internationalization or custom error messages. This error file is to be supplied by the library client, since it may need to support multiple languages or a particular formatting convention in the error messages.

Functions which are called upon to perform validity checks on proofs may find that a proof is not valid. In this case, they will still return a zero return value, because the function itself completed correctly. Instead, a failure will be reported through a “result” out-mode parameter.

Implicit Conventions

There are a few conventions that we follow which are currently not fully documented outside of the code itself. The ones which we have identified include hashing data structures, and signing XML.

Sometimes when we hash a data structure we feed the full XML into OpenSSL's digest functions, while other times we feed the big-endian representation of the numbers into the digest functions. There is no real security implication, but for another implementation to interoperate with us would require careful analysis of our code in order to create compatible hashes. In subsequent versions of the library, this operation will be standardized and compartmentalized.

Our current implementation of XML signing treats the XML as a sequence of bytes (rather than some representation of a more abstract data) when it signs it. The implication is that if someone were to create a detached signature with `VHTI_sign`, then modify the XML in any way—even just adding whitespace within an element tag—the signature would no longer check. The XML Security specification handles this with canonicalization of the input XML. For our purposes we decided that was unnecessarily complicated. In the future, this might change.

In this document, the mappings, or correspondences that are created by the [VoteVerificationTrustee](#)(s) are referred to as [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)(s). This is out of sync with the terminology in some of the VHTi white papers and promotional literature where the same construct is referred to as a “codebook.” Please keep this terminology departure in mind in that which follows.

Along the same lines, [Authority](#)(s) and [VoteVerificationTrustee](#)(s) both provide similar stewardship roles to the election, and in fact, it will often be the case that one individual or public entity will fill both roles simultaneously. In early versions of the document, it was assumed that an [Authority](#) would always fill both roles. As a result, there may yet be some places in the document where these two roles have not been distinguished with full clarity.

2.2.2 Election Configuration

Before any voting can occur, some basic information must be agreed upon in accordance with jurisdiction law or policy. This information must then be digitally signed, and hence authorized, by the required set of officials, which again is determined by jurisdiction law or policy.

This information is encapsulated in the following data structures:

1. One or more [TrusteeDictionaryCommitmentsSet](#) data structure(s)
2. One or more [SignedBlankBallot](#) data structure(s)

In the case of each of these data structures, there needs to be exactly one for each “precinct” or “ballot style.” (See [Precinct](#).)

The [TrusteeDictionaryCommitmentsSet](#) structures are each essentially just collections of [DictionaryCommitment](#)s. Each [DictionaryCommitment](#) can be thought of as secret information “sealed” in an envelope which is in full public view. The secret information is both generated and “sealed” by the [Vote-VerificationTrustee](#)(s) acting independently. The fact that all this information is made public serves as the foundation of the voting device audit – i.e. Voter Verification.

A [SignedBlankBallot](#) is simply a [BlankBallot](#) along with a requisite set of valid digital signatures as mandated by local election policy.

A [BlankBallot](#) describes the ballot that will be presented to all of the voters for one election. For our purposes, all of the voters in an election receive the same ballot. For an election with precincts, each precinct will be treated as its own election. It may be convenient to use the same [CryptoElectionParameters](#) for multiple elections in this scenario.

Put simply, a blank ballot contains a set of [CryptoElectionParameters](#), which are so important that they will be explained in subsequent paragraphs, some questions, and the [BallotTextStructure](#). The [BallotTextStructure](#) is whatever is convenient for the voting machine to present the ballot to a voter. The exact makeup of [BallotTextStructure](#) is not critical to the proper functioning of the protocol.

Each question in a ballot generally represents one race or issue (although for “preferential style” ballots, a separate question must be created for each ranked answer). For each question, the voter will select one answer. Each answer represents one candidate, or “ABSTAIN,” or, when allowed, “WRITE_IN.” Having an explicit abstain selection is necessary, because the length of the voted ballots for a precinct must all be the same, regardless of how many questions the voter opted to vote on.

Each question is assigned a [QuestionReference](#), which is just an alphanumeric string. These must be unique in each election. Each answer is assigned an [AnswerReference](#), which likewise must be unique per election. Additionally, each answer is also assigned an [AnswerMark](#). These must also be unique per

election, and for proper security should be a big randomly chosen number.

For each question there is a [QuestionTextStructure](#), and for each answer there is an [AnswerTextStructure](#). These provide data convenient for the voting machine to have available for the proper presentation of the ballot to the voter. It is similar in content and usage to blank ballot [BallotTextStructure](#).

[CryptoElectionParameters](#) are the “public key” of the election. They can come from anywhere, as long as they meet the criteria described in the glossary. A naive solution is for someone to just sit down and generate these numbers, but that would cause the one person who generated the numbers to have complete control over the election.

A better solution, from a trust point of view, is to use the [Key Sharing](#) protocol, where multiple authorities cooperate to generate a set of [CryptoElectionParameters](#), where they each own a portion of the information required to decrypt ballots. As long as one tabulation authority (person with a share of the key) acts honorably, the integrity of the election is preserved.

2.2.3 Poll Site Voting

In today’s world of beautiful graphical displays on everything from cellular phones to gas pumps, it is easy to forget that presentation is merely the look-and-feel of the device, while what is really important is what it does. VHTi is designed to address *only* “what it does”. After using the [BallotTextStructure](#) from the ballot, the [QuestionTextStructure](#)s from the questions, and the [AnswerTextStructure](#)s from the answers, the voting machine application should have acquired a list of [AnswerReference](#)s which correspond to the voter’s intent. These answer references must obviously match [AnswerReference](#)s defined in the [BlankBallot](#), and furthermore there must be exactly one [AnswerReference](#) for each question defined in the [BlankBallot](#).

There are six key events in the course of the VHTi voting protocol (interactive process) that are not generic.

VE1. Load [VoteVerificationKey](#)s on voting device.

- This is part of device initialization and thus occurs only once. The specifics are implementation dependent, and security sensitive.

VE2. [Generate](#) and display (voter specific) [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)¹.

VE3. [Audit](#) [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)¹s.

VE4. [Generate](#) the voter's [SignedVotedBallot](#)¹ – the voter's "official digital ballot."

VE5. [Generate](#) and display the voter's [VoteReceiptData](#)¹.

VE6. [Sign](#) the voter's [VoteReceiptData](#)¹ creating the voter's [VoteReceipt](#)¹.

(Examples of generic voting events are voter authentication, voter choice indication or selection, ballot casting, etc.)

We will not discuss the specifics of 1. As mentioned, these are implementation dependent. Care should be taken to make sure the [VoteVerificationKey](#)¹ information is not leaked during the process, and it should be deleted when the poll site is closed. (Ideally, the only writable, non-volatile memory in the voting device is its ballot box storage. In this case, the [VoteVerificationKey](#)¹ information would be deleted by turning the machine off.)

Generate and Display [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)

At the very beginning of each voting session, *before* the voter has been given any opportunity to interact with the ballot display, the voting device needs to generate a (voter specific) [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)¹. This is done by way of the function [VHTI_generate_vote_verification_dictionary](#).

The [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)¹ is a table, or mapping, which links each potential ballot answer to a [VoteVerificationCode](#)¹. As a final confirmation step in the voting process, the voter can check to see that his/her intended choice has been recorded by verifying that correct [VoteVerificationCode](#)¹ (as indicated by the [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)¹) is provided as part of his/her [VoteReceipt](#)¹.

Audit [VoteVerificationDictionaries](#)

In order to ensure that [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)¹s are displayed accurately to all voters, a random sample can be taken by one or more observers, and checked using the set of [TrusteeDictionaryCommitments](#)¹s for the election.

A set of [BallotSequenceNumber](#)s which are not being used to vote must first be identified. Then, each trustee participating in the audit generates a set of [BS-NRevealedDictionarySecrets](#)s, where, for each [BallotSequenceNumber](#), there is exactly one secret for each [BallotQuestion](#). This set generated by a single trustee is called a [TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets](#) structure. This step can be performed by calling the function [VHTI_generate_dictionary_secrets](#).

Each collection of [TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets](#) can be checked against the [RevealedDictionarySecrets](#) generated by that same trustee, using [VHTI_check_dictionary_secrets](#). If all of the secrets for all of the trustees check, then they can be combined to produce [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)s that should be identical to the ones which would have been presented to the voters at the beginning of the voting process. In fact, the observer will most likely initiate the voting process to obtain [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)s, but will not cast the ballots. The function to combine the [TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets](#) is [VHTI_combine_dictionary_secrets](#).

Generate SignedVotedBallot

After receiving final confirmation from the voter (i.e. the voter has explicitly chosen to “cast” his/her ballot), the voting device should encrypt the corresponding [ClearTextBallot](#) (which is the temporary electronic record of the voter’s choices) with [VHTI_encrypt_ballot_pollsite](#). If everything goes well the function will yield a [SignedVotedBallot](#). (By signing the enclosed [VotedBallot](#), the voting device is testifying to the fact that it was properly created by that device, and approved (cast) by the voter operating that device.) The [SignedVotedBallot](#) is then the voter’s official digital ballot and can be added to the [SignedVoted-Ballots](#) which the device should keep as its local ballot box.

Generate and Display VoteReceiptData

In order for a voter to *irrefutably* verify that his/her ballot is *accurately* represented in the final set of digital ballots that are *publicly counted*, the voter must leave the voting booth with a [VoteReceipt](#). This is essentially just an ordered list of [VoteVerificationCode](#)s – one per question – which presents each of the voter’s chosen answers according to the “translation” (i.e. correspondence between [BallotAnswer](#) and [VoteVerificationCode](#)) given by the voter’s

[VoteVerificationDictionary](#).

The [VoteReceiptData](#) is computed by calling the function [VHTI_generate_vote_receipt_data](#). Once computed, the [VoteReceiptData](#) should be presented to the voter for final review in some form that is *unalterable* by the voting device. (We say that the voting device *commits* the [VoteReceiptData](#) by so doing.) A printed piece of paper is a good way to accomplish this, but not the only way. *The voter should be asked to do a final confirmation of his/her choices by reviewing the presented [VoteReceiptData](#).* This is much like the act of reviewing a printed ballot before placing it in a ballot box.

The [BallotSequenceNumber](#) should be the first element of [VoteReceiptData](#) committed. In fact, it is important to commit this *before* the voter makes any ballot selections. There is a technical reason for this requirement, however, it would be a lengthy digression to elaborate on it here.

The voter should be given the option to change the answers to those questions where the [VoteVerificationCode](#) is not as intended. If any changes are made, *the entire [VoteReceiptData](#)* should be re-presented as if for the first time.

Create [VoteReceipt](#)

Once the voter is satisfied with the contents of the [VoteReceiptData](#), the voter should indicate final acceptance (i.e. choose to cast the ballot). The voting device must carry out this instruction from the voter by *signing* the [VoteReceiptData](#), thereby turning it into a [VoteReceipt](#). (The difference between these two objects may seem small, but it is critical. The [VoteReceiptData](#) is just a list of [VoteVerificationCode](#)s, and thus could be created by anyone, anywhere. The [VoteReceipt](#) can only be issued by the voting device in the context of the election at hand.)

Creating the [VoteReceipt](#) from the [VoteReceiptData](#) is a simple matter of calling the function [VHTI_sign_receipt](#).

2.2.4 Tabulation

Tabulation occurs in five steps.

- TAB1.** [Dispose Ballots](#)
- TAB2.** [Compute and Prove VoteVerificationCodes](#)
- TAB3.** [Anonymize](#)
- TAB4.** [Decrypt Ballots](#)
- TAB5.** [Publish](#)

Dispose Ballots

Ballot disposition (sometimes known as authentication) is the process of going through the [SignedBallotBox](#) and determining, for each [SignedVotedBallot](#) therein, whether or not it should be included in the final tally. The most obvious reason that a [SignedVotedBallot](#) might need to be “removed” from the tabulation would be that its signature is invalid (i.e. its signature does not match the public key for any legitimate voting device). However, there may be other reasons set by local election policy.

Any change in the [SignedBallotBox](#), however, must be publicly justified in accordance with the jurisdiction’s election law.

Once the [SignedVotedBallot](#)s have been approved for tallying, they are then stripped of the [BallotSequenceNumber](#)s, thereby disassociating the ballots with individual voters.

The end result of this process, which can be performed by calling the function [VHTI_authenticate](#), is a [RawBallotBox](#) which is then used as the input to the Mix/Shuffle process that follows.

Compute and Prove VoteVerificationCodes

In order for each voter to “see” that his/her voted ballot has been included *unaltered* in the set of ballots to be counted, the [VoteVerificationTrustee](#)s must provide mathematical proof that the encrypted value – which is publicly available – is in fact an encryption of the choice that the voter made in the poll booth.

This proof is generated using the three functions

- `VHTI_generate_pre_verification_results`
- `VHTI_gen_partial_verification_results`
- `VHTI_check_vcode_partial_decrypts_and_combine`

Anonymize

Mixing, or shuffling, is the process that anonymizes the ballots. It is typically performed by the tabulation authorities - the same people who hold the partial decryption keys - but there is no requirement for that to be the case. As a matter of policy, anyone might be allowed to shuffle.

The entire mix process is composed of a sequence of individual mixes, each carried out by an independent “mixing authority.” The input `RawBallotBox` to each individual mix is the the same `RawBallotBox` that is the output of the previous one.

The work of an individual shuffle is carried out with the function `VHTI_shuffle`.

The primary input, as mentioned, is a `RawBallotBox`, but along with it are some random bits (for seeding purposes), a `SignedBlankBallot` (for the `CryptoElectionParameters`) and a `GeneralPurposePublicKey` for validation purposes. The output is a new `RawBallotBox` and a `ShuffleValidityProof`. The `ShuffleValidityProof` is what allows an independent observer to confirm that the mixer “behaved honestly” – that is, did not change the clear text (unencrypted) values of the ballots in any way. In short, the `ShuffleValidityProof` assures *everyone* that both the input and output `RawBallotBoxes` will decrypt to the same set of clear text ballots, though not necessarily in any common sequence.

This assurance is provided by way of the corresponding verification function `VHTI_check_shuffle`. Any independent observer can use this function (in fact their own implementation of it if so desired) in order to confirm that any one of the individual mixes was carried out correctly.

Decrypt Ballots

Decrypting is done in two phases:

DCRPT1. [Partial Decryption](#)

DCRPT2. [Combine Partial Decryptions](#)

Partial Decryption

Since *no one* holds a secret key capable of decrypting ballots (the “election private key”), a collection of [Authority](#)s must cooperate to create “pieces” of the decryption of each post-mixing ballot. We call these pieces, [AnswerPartialDecrypt](#)s. Each [AnswerPartialDecrypt](#) is actually more than the [Authority](#)'s decryption piece itself, it also contains proof information – information that can be used by an independent observer to check that the [Authority](#) supplied the *correct* decryption piece.

Each [AnswerPartialDecrypt](#) is computed by each [Authority](#) by way of the function [VHTI_partial_decrypt](#).

Similarly, an independent observer can check the validity of each [AnswerPartialDecrypt](#) by using the function [VHTI_check_partial_decrypt](#). (As with mix verification, the independent observer is free to use their own implementation of this function.)

Combine Partial Decryptions

Once all the necessary [AnswerPartialDecrypt](#)s have been computed, combining them is a straightforward public computation – i.e. it requires no additional secret information. This operation has been combined with checking of each [AnswerPartialDecrypt](#) in the function [VHTI_check_partial_decrypts_and_combine](#).

The output of this function is a set of [ClearTextBallot](#)s which can be counted by any convenient method.

Publish

All the data needed to verify the election count is produced by the previous steps. The only thing remaining is to make the data public, which is achieved by publishing it as widely as possible.

It is important to understand that this does not mean merely publish the final results. It means publishing all intermediate data, including validity proofs, that are necessary for an independent observer to verify the correctness of each tabulation step.

Note that “all intermediate data” does not include private inputs such as [RandomState](#) and [GeneralPurposePrivateKey](#) data since these are not required for verification purposes.. In a future version of this document we will provide a formal list of exactly what data structures must be published to allow for end-to- end verification.

Of course, publication is a standard process so no VHTi library functions are necessary to support it.

Chapter 3

VHTi API Reference

3.1 Security Considerations

The DTD elements in the following list should be kept secret.

[ClearTextBallot](#)

[EncryptionPrivateKey](#)

[GeneralPurposePrivateKey](#)

[PairwiseSecrets](#)

[PairwiseSecret](#)

[RandomBlock](#)

[RandomIJState](#)

[RandomSeedKey](#)

[RandomSeedKeys](#)

[RandomState](#)

[SecretCoefficients](#)

SecretShare¹

An obvious exception is made for all ClearTextBallot¹ data that is produced as the *output* of Tabulation. This data is published and hence completely public.

3.2 Election Configuration

3.2.1 Key Sharing

Key Sharing is the process by which a group of Authority¹s create an Election-PublicKey¹ whose corresponding secret key is “unknown.” It is unknown in the sense that finding it requires the cooperated effort of at least t of the Authority¹s, where t is a parameter that is freely settable by election policy. The entire process can be broken down into the following sequence of operations:

- KS1. Generate Secret Coefficients
- KS2. Generate Broadcast Values
- KS3. Generate Public Key
- KS4. Generate Pairwise Secrets
- KS5. Generate Key Share Commitments
- KS6. Verify Key Share Commitments

It is assumed that the following election parameters have been agreed upon by the participants in advance:

1. *Number of Tabulation Authorities*: integer n
2. *Threshold Number of Tabulation Authorities*: integer t
3. *Election Modulus*: prime integer p

4. *Election Subgroup Modulus*: prime integer q with $q|(p-1)$
5. *Election Generator*: $g \in \mathbf{Z}_p$, $|g| = q$
6. *A Hash Function*: H
7. *Participant Identifiers*: $\text{AuthorityEvaluationPoint}_i \in \mathbf{Z}_q^*$

```

CreateKeygenParameters ( SeedParameters , RandomState )
                        → ( KeyGenParameters , RandomState )

```

This is a *helper* function which will generate a set of the required election parameters. It is primarily supplied for the purposes of testing and evaluation. In practice, these parameters would be agreed upon by a cooperative process, not generated by a single entity.

```

CreateAuthority ( KeyGenParameters , RandomState
                  GeneralPurposePublicKey
                )
                → ( GeneralPurposePrivateKey , Authority
                    RandomState
                )

```

This is a *helper* function which will generate an `Authority` structure usable with the rest of the key sharing protocol.

If the `GeneralPurposePublicKey` parameter is NULL or the empty string, the function will generate a key pair, incorporate the `GeneralPurposePublicKey` into the `Authority`, and return the `GeneralPurposePrivateKey`. Otherwise it assumes that the owner of the `GeneralPurposePublicKey` already has the corresponding `GeneralPurposePrivateKey` safely stored somewhere, leaves the `GeneralPurposePrivateKey` parameter alone, and simply copies the `GeneralPurposePublicKey` into the `Authority`.

$$\text{GenerateSecretCoefficients} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{KeyGenParameters} , \text{Authority} \\ \text{RandomState} \end{array} \right) \\ \longrightarrow \left(\text{SecretCoefficients} , \text{RandomState} \right)$$

$$\text{GenerateBroadcast} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{KeyGenParameters} , \text{SecretCoefficients} \\ \text{RandomState} \end{array} \right) \\ \longrightarrow \left(\text{BroadcastValue} , \text{RandomState} \right)$$

$$\text{GeneratePublicKey} \left(\text{KeyGenParameters} , \text{BroadcastValues} \right) \\ \longrightarrow \left(\text{ElectionPublicKey} \right)$$

This operation will check the broadcast values before generating the [Election-PublicKey](#). It is necessary to have broadcast values from each authority before the [ElectionPublicKey](#) can be generated.

$$\text{GenerateSecret} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{KeyGenParameters} , \text{Authority} \\ \text{SecretCoefficients} \end{array} \right) \\ \longrightarrow \left(\text{PairwiseSecret} \right)$$

where the AuthFingerprint (i.e. ID) contained in the `SecretCoefficients` parameter (this is the `Authority` who is *generating* the `PairwiseSecret`) will be the same as the FromID entry in the `PairwiseSecret`, and the AuthFingerprint contained in the `Authority` parameter (this is the `Authority` who is *receiving* the `PairwiseSecret`) will be the same as the ToID entry in `PairwiseSecret`.

Each authority will call this function n times to generate n pairwise secrets.

$$\text{GenerateCommitment} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{KeyGenParameters} , \text{Authority} \\ \text{BroadcastValues} , \text{PairwiseSecrets} \end{array} \right) \\ \longrightarrow \left(\text{SecretShare} , \text{KeyShareCommitment} \right)$$

where the AuthFingerprint (i.e. ID) of the `Authority` parameter is the same as is the ToID field in all of the n `PairwiseSecret`s in the `PairwiseSecrets` parameter. This operation uses the broadcast values to check the recipient's `PairwiseSecrets` before generating its `SecretShare` and `KeyShareCommitment`.

$$\text{CheckCommitment} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{KeyGenParameters} , \text{Authority} \\ \text{BroadcastValues} , \text{KeyShareCommitment} \end{array} \right) \\ \longrightarrow \left(\text{CheckResults} \right)$$

where `Authority` is the authority whose commitment is being checked. Specifically, the AuthFingerprint of the `Authority` parameter is the same as the AuthFingerprint of the `KeyShareCommitment` parameter.

In addition to the key sharing library, some additional VHTi specific functionality is required to initialize an election.

3.2.2 Ballot Configuration

$$\text{GenerateAnswerMark} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{CryptoGroupParameters} , \text{AlphabetEncoding} \\ \text{RandomState} \end{array} \right) \\ \longrightarrow \left(\text{AnswerMark} , \text{RandomState} \right)$$

Current version of the library supports only `RandomState` or `RandomIJState` = NULL.

$$\text{GenerateBlankBallot} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{BallotSkeleton} , \text{CryptoElectionParameters} \\ \text{AlphabetEncoding} \end{array} \right) \\ \longrightarrow \left(\text{BlankBallot} \right)$$

3.2.3 Dictionary Generation

$$\text{GenerateVvk} \left(\text{RandomState} \right) \\ \longrightarrow \left(\text{VoteVerificationKey} , \text{RandomState} \right)$$

$$\text{GenerateBsns} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{ElectionID} , \text{PrecinctID} \\ \text{int} , \text{int} \\ \text{RandomState} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{BallotSequenceNumbers} , \text{BallotSequenceNumbers} \\ \text{RandomState} \end{array} \right)$$

The first [BallotSequenceNumbers](#) returned is to be used by “authorized” voters. The second [BallotSequenceNumbers](#) returned is to be used by “provisional” voters. The first and second `int` arguments are the number of [BallotSequenceNumber](#)s to be included in each of these.

$$\text{GenerateVdictCommits} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{Authority} , \text{GeneralPurposePrivateKey} \\ \text{VoteVerificationKey} , \text{BlankBallot} \\ \text{BallotSequenceNumbers} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow \left(\text{SignedTrusteeDictionaryCommitments} \right)$$

Note that the [GeneralPurposePrivateKey](#) parameter must be the *unique* private key corresponding to the [Certificate](#) component of the [Authority](#) parameter. Calling the function with a mismatch between [Authority](#) and [GeneralPurposePrivateKey](#) will generate an appropriate [ErrorStructure](#).

The voter verification protocol requires that each [Authority](#) ([VoteVerificationTrustee](#)) “publish” all of its [TrusteeDictionaryCommitments](#) relating to the election in question prior to the start of vote casting. The exact requirements for publication are a matter of public election policy set by the jurisdiction.

3.3 Poll Site Voting

The model for poll site elections differs from the model for remote (network) elections in three ways that affect system design:

Authentication Poll site elections rely on “face-to-face” authentication of prospective voters by human poll workers. While this has the advantage of eliminating the need for secure digital authentication of voters, it places a rather large amount of power over election results in the hands of the poll workers, who are even more prone to mistakes than malicious actions.

Coercion Poll site election requirements have historically been more stringent with respect to the issues of *vote buying* and *vote coercion* than remote (e.g. vote-by-mail) election requirements.

Client/Server Poll site electronic equipment has, for logistical reasons (i.e. ease of set-up) generally required that the voting machine (or voting client) and voting server be implemented on the same device. As a result, information techniques that leverage the separation of these two functions to independently managed devices are of no value.

As a result, the following voter verification strategy is employed:

Pre-Election

1. **BallotSequenceNumber**s are generated by the election configuration application. A **BallotSequenceNumber** roughly corresponds to a blank ballot identifier.
2. **VoteVerificationKey**s are generated by each **VoteVerificationTrustee** through the **Dictionary Generation** procedure. The **VoteVerificationKey**s are used to generate the **VoteVerificationDictionary**s on the voting machines at vote-time.
3. Using its **VoteVerificationKey** and a known **BallotSequenceNumbers** structure, each **VoteVerificationTrustee** generates a **TrusteeDictionaryCommitments** structure. In principle, this is done *once* for each **Precinct**. However, if there is a requirement for separate “provisional” **BallotSequenceNumber**s, a second **TrusteeDictionaryCommitments** must be generated for each **Precinct** which has such a requirement. Thus, assuming there are t **VoteVerificationTrustee**s, then before the start of the voting, there should be, for each **Precinct**, t *published* “authorized” **TrusteeDictionaryCommitments** and possibly also t *published* “provisional” **TrusteeDictionaryCommitments**.

4. [SigningPrivateKey](#)s are generated so each voting machine can digitally sign each ballot.
5. Each voting machine is initialized with [BallotSequenceNumbers](#), [VoteVerificationKeys](#), and a [SigningPrivateKey](#).

Election

1. Assign an arbitrary “unused” [BallotSequenceNumber](#).
2. Generate the [VoteVerificationDictionary](#) corresponding to this [BallotSequenceNumber](#). The [VoteVerificationDictionary](#) should be committed before voting. What constitutes satisfactory form of commitment is a matter of jurisdiction policy, and is left to the application.
3. Create a [SignedVotedBallot](#) from voter input (choices).
4. Generate [VoteReceiptData](#) for voter-verification against the [VoteVerificationDictionary](#).
5. Sign [VoteReceiptData](#) for the voter to take from the pollsite.

Post-Election

1. For each voted [BallotSequenceNumber](#) and each [QuestionReference](#), the [VoteVerificationTrustee](#)s mutually generate a [VoteVerificationCode](#) and cryptographically prove its correctness relative to the published [TrusteeDictionaryCommitments](#). This process is akin to [Tabulation](#) and can be executed in conjunction with it. In addition to its [SecretShare](#), each [VoteVerificationTrustee](#) must also have its [VoteVerificationKey](#) (which is kept secret through the process). The combination of [VoteVerificationCode](#) and corresponding cryptographic proof allow each voter to simultaneously verify
 - (a) That the voter’s ballot has been recorded (cast) as the voter intended at the time of voting. (*“Cast as Intended”*)
 - (b) That the voter’s ballot has the desired effect on the final election count. (*“Counted as Cast”*)

2. For a set of unvoted [BallotSequenceNumber](#)s and each [QuestionReference](#), the [VoteVerificationTrustee](#)s each generate secrets using the same procedure as [GenerateVdictCommits](#). These [BSNRevealedDictionarySecrets](#) can be checked against the [VoteVerificationTrustee](#)'s [TrusteeDictionary-Commitments](#). If all of the [BSNRevealedDictionarySecrets](#) from all of the [VoteVerificationTrustee](#)s validate, they can be combined to produce [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)s. By comparing these [VoteVerificationDictionary](#)s against those generated by the pollsite voting machine for each of the unvoted [BallotSequenceNumber](#)s in the set, confidence in the accuracy of the dictionaries can be achieved.

3.3.1 Initializing Voting Machines

Each of the [VoteVerificationKey](#)s used by each [VoteVerificationTrustee](#) in the process of [Dictionary Generation](#) must be installed on the voting device prior to the start of vote casting. The procedure for doing this is device dependent. The procedure should also be carefully controlled to prevent leakage of any of the [VoteVerificationKey](#) information before, during, or after the election.

Functions in the following subsections depend on the availability to the voting device of a [VoteVerificationKeys](#) object which contains exactly one [VoteVerificationKey](#) belonging to each [VoteVerificationTrustee](#).

In addition, each voting device must have at least one [SigningPrivateKey](#) installed on the voting device for the purpose of signing (authenticating) [VotedBallot](#)s – i.e. for the purpose of creating [SignedVotedBallot](#)s from [VotedBallot](#)s. (Multiple [SigningPrivateKey](#)s may be used – for example to sign the [VotedBallot](#)s from distinct [Precinct](#)s – but are not required.) The procedure for doing this is application dependent.

In order to assure that all disputes are straightforwardly resolvable, it is important that all the [SigningPublicKey](#)(s) (or [Certificate](#)s) coresponding to the [SigningPrivateKey](#)(s) used for the purpose of signing [VotedBallot](#)s (within the scope of the election being run) be “published” prior to the start of vote casting. The exact requirements for publication are a matter of public election policy set by the jurisdiction.

Great care must be taken to protect the secrecy of all [GeneralPurposePrivate-Key](#)s before, during, and after the election.

- If *all* of the [VoteVerificationKey](#)s are simultaneously compromised, it would be possible to confirm a voter's choices from the election verification transcript.
- If *any* of the [SigningPrivateKey](#)s are compromised, it would be possible to cast doubt on election integrity. This would be done by generating a large number of [SignedVotedBallot](#)s that were not actually cast legitimately on the voting device or devices.


3.3.2 Dictionary Display

$$\text{GenerateVerificationCode} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{VoteVerificationKeys} , \text{BlankBallot} \\ \text{BallotSequenceNumber} , \text{AnswerReference} \\ \text{int} , \text{AlphabetEncoding} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow \left(\text{VoteVerificationCode} \right)$$


The `int` parameter is used to determine how long (*in bits*) the confirmation strings will be. (A reasonable range for it is 16 - 32.)

Formatting and display of the dictionary with corresponding candidate information is left to the application.

3.3.3 Dictionary Audit



The `SignedVotedBallot`s are used to eliminate the voted `BallotSequenceNumber`s from the set, leaving unvoted `BallotSequenceNumber`s. These unvoted `BallotSequenceNumber`s can be used to generate `VoteVerificationDictionary`s at the pollsite, which are checked against the output of the function `CombineDictionarySecrets`.



$$\text{CombineDictionarySecrets} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets} \\ \text{BlankBallot} \\ \text{int} \\ \text{AlphabetEncoding} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow \left(\text{VoteVerificationDictionaries} \right)$$

3.3.4 Voted Ballot Encryption

$$\text{EncryptBallotPollsite} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{ClearTextBallot} , \text{BlankBallot} \\ \text{BallotSequenceNumber} , \text{RandomState} \\ \text{GeneralPurposePrivateKey} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow \left(\text{SignedVotedBallot} , \text{RandomState} \right)$$

This function does some basic consistency checking on each [ClearTextBallot](#) that is passed in. First, it checks that the number of [AnswerReference](#)s in the [ClearTextBallot](#) corresponds to the number of [BallotQuestion](#)s in the [BlankBallot](#). It should be emphasized that VHTi treats every answer as belonging to a unique question; in other words, the total number of answers on a ballot will always equal the total number of allowed selections. An undervote, or abstaining from a selection, is acknowledged by VHTi as a unique answer, and the function caller is responsible for pointing out the missed selection to the voter, if desired. It is also the function caller's responsibility to 'translate' any ballot questions which allow the voter to 'Choose n' selections, where $n > 1$, into n separate questions. Further, VHTi does *not* prohibit the voter from choosing the same selection for some or all n positions; however, this is easily discovered after tabulation and election policy must dictate procedures for handling this condition.

Second, this function will report an error, and halt ballot encryption, if there is no [AnswerReference](#) in the [BlankBallot](#) which corresponds to an [AnswerReference](#) in the [ClearTextBallot](#). Thus, only valid [AnswerMark](#)s will be used to produce the [ElGamalPair](#)s in the resulting [SignedVotedBallot](#).

3.3.5 Receipt Display and Storage

```

GenerateVoteReceiptData (
    SignedVotedBallot , VoteVerificationKeys
    BlankBallot , BallotSequenceNumber
    ClearTextBallot , int
    AlphabetEncoding
)
    → ( VoteReceiptData )

```

As with [Dictionary Display](#), the `int` parameter is used to determine how long (*in bits*) the confirmation strings will be. (A reasonable range for it is 16 - 32.)

```

SignReceipt ( VoteReceiptData , GeneralPurposePrivateKey )
    → ( )

```

3.4 Tabulation

The tabulation process, *Tabulate*, is *conceptually* defined by the function signature

$$\text{Tabulate} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{SignedVotedBallots} , \text{VoterRoll} \\ \text{BlankBallot} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow \left(\text{ElectionResults} \right)$$

Since, in general, tabulation is effected by multiple, independent entities acting in cooperation, no VHTi function implements it directly. As discussed in the previous chapter, it is composed of [five stages](#).


The functions used to carry out these stages are summarized as follows.

3.4.1 Dispose Ballots

$$\text{Authenticate} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{SignedVotedBallots} , \text{VoterRoll} \\ \text{BlankBallot} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow \left(\text{RawBallotBox} \right)$$

Authentication should be careful to check EID consistency between [SignedVoted-Ballot](#) and [SignedBlankBallot](#).

3.4.2 Compute and Prove VoteVerificationCodes



Each [Trustee](#) produces a [PreVerificationCodeBox](#) by transforming each [AnswerMark](#) into an unhashed [VoteVerificationCode](#) inside of the [ElGamalPair](#). The [PreVerificationCodeBox](#) contains a [RawBallotBox](#) structure, and the [RawVotedBallot](#)s inside have had their original contents replaced by these transformed values.




Each [Trustee](#) takes the collection of [PreVerificationCodeBox](#)s from *all* of the [Trustee](#)s, and performs his own partial decrypt. The function internally generates a combined [RawBallotBox](#) from all of the [PreVerificationCodeBox](#)s, which is then passed to the [PartialDecrypt](#) function, to produce an [AuthorityPartialDecrypt](#) of [VoteVerificationCode](#)s.



Now an `Authority` can use the collection of `PreVerificationCodeBox`s to call the `CheckPartialDecryptsAndCombine` function, and use the output to generate a `VoteVerificationStatement` for each `BallotSequenceNumber` in the `Signed-VotedBallot`s.

3.4.3 Anonymize



The `GeneralPurposePublicKey` argument is used for checking the authenticity of the `SignedBlankBallot` argument, which, as a consequence, checks the authenticity of the `CryptoElectionParameters` used in the computation.

In a subsequent version of the library, the [GeneralPurposePublicKey](#) argument will be changed to a [Certificate](#) argument instead. This will give better integration with the PKI which underlies the election protocol.

The output of this computation should be *signed* so that accountability can be indisputably assigned in the case that later verification of the proof fails. The next version of the library will support this.

$$\text{CheckShuffle} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{RawBallotBox} , \text{RawBallotBox} \\ \text{SignedBlankBallot} , \text{GeneralPurposePublicKey} \\ \text{ShuffleValidityProof} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow (\text{CheckResults})$$

As with the preceding function, Shuffle, the [GeneralPurposePublicKey](#) argument is used for checking the authenticity of the [SignedBlankBallot](#) argument.

In a subsequent version of the library, the [GeneralPurposePublicKey](#) argument will be changed to a [Certificate](#) argument as in the case of the preceding function, Shuffle.

3.4.4 Decrypt

$$\text{PartialDecrypt} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{RawBallotBox} , \text{SignedBlankBallot} \\ \text{GeneralPurposePublicKey} , \text{CommittedAuthority} \\ \text{SecretShare} , \text{RandomState} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow \left(\text{AuthorityPartialDecrypt} , \text{RandomState} \right)$$

$$\text{CheckPartialDecrypt} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{RawBallotBox} , \text{AuthorityPartialDecrypt} \\ \text{SignedBlankBallot} , \text{GeneralPurposePublicKey} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow \left(\text{CheckResults} \right)$$

$$\text{CheckPartialDecryptsAndCombine} \left(\begin{array}{l} \text{SignedBlankBallot} \\ \text{GeneralPurposePublicKey} \\ \text{PartiallyDecryptedBallotBox} \end{array} \right) \longrightarrow \left(\text{ClearTextBallots} \right)$$

Again, in each of the preceding three functions, the `GeneralPurposePublicKey` argument is used for checking the authenticity of the `SignedBlankBallot` argument, and this will be changed to a `Certificate` argument in a subsequent version of the library.

This function needs to indicate an error condition when a decrypted answer is invalid – i.e. produces an [AnswerMark](#) that is not valid according to the [SignedBlankBallot](#). This is currently done, but awkwardly. The result of such an error condition is that the corresponding [ClearTextBallot](#) that is produced will, itself, contain error text. This will then be noticed when the routine to tally [AnswerMark](#)s is run on the [ClearTextBallots](#) output argument. A better solution would be to provide a second output parameter that indicates the invalid decryptions that were found, including their position in the [PartiallyDecrypted-BallotBox](#). In addition, an `int` return value should indicate success status, which can be further described via the [GetLastError](#) mechanism. This approach will be used in subsequent versions of the library.

3.5 Public Key Infrastructure

Comprises a set of operations

1. Generate Keys
2. Encryption
 - (a) Encrypt data
 - (b) Decrypt data
3. Signatures
 - (a) Sign data
 - (b) Verify signature

The internal implementation of these operations is unimportant. Since it may be provided by other parties, we will only concern ourselves with the interfaces presented.

```
GenerateKeys ( IdentInfo )  
  
→ ( GeneralPurposePrivateKey , GeneralPurposePublicKey )
```

Create a pair of keypairs which have some internal properties that allow implementing the Encryption and Signatures functionality. Note that the private keys are not encrypted, so they need to be stored with care.

```
Encrypt ( GeneralPurposePublicKey , ConstCharStar )  
  
→ ( EncryptedData )
```

Encrypt given `ConstCharStar` with a `GeneralPurposePublicKey`. `EncryptedData` is not readable. `EncryptedData` likely contains more than simply the ciphertext: the identity of the holder of the private key, encryption method used, and date are all candidates for extra information.

```
Decrypt ( GeneralPurposePrivateKey , EncryptedData )  
  
→ ( ConstCharStar )
```

Decrypt given `EncryptedData` with a `GeneralPurposePrivateKey`. If successful, resulting `ConstCharStar` will be equal to the `ConstCharStar` presented to the Encrypt operation.

```
Sign ( GeneralPurposePrivateKey , ConstCharStar )  
→ ( Signature )
```

Create a detached signature on `ConstCharStar`, which could only have been created with knowledge of the appropriate `SigningPrivateKey`. `Signature` will at minimum contain some numeric proof, but will probably also contain information about the signor's identity, algorithm used, and date.

```
VerifySignature ( GeneralPurposePublicKey , ConstCharStar  
Signature )  
→ ( CheckResults )
```

Verify a signature on `ConstCharStar`. A true result indicates *only* that the function was able to complete; it does *not* necessarily mean that the signature was valid. If the result is true, you must also check that the `CheckResults` contains the string "Success"; that then indicates that the `Signature` was on `ConstCharStar`, and was created with the `SigningPrivateKey` that corresponds to `SigningPublicKey`.

3.6 Support Functions

The VHTi Library also supplies several non-cryptographic support functions.

3.6.1 XML Parsing and Manipulation

```
SetDTDLocation ( const char * path )  
  
→ ( int )
```

```
Validate ( const char * datatype , const char * data )  
  
→ ( int )
```

3.6.2 Memory Management

```
Dup ( const char * thing )  
  
→ ( char * )
```

```
Free ( const char * thing )  
  
→ ( int )
```

```
FreeAll ( void )  
  
→ ( int )
```

This is a handy function for lazy programmers, or when there is plenty of available memory. It clears and then frees any memory which was allocated by VHTi and then returned to the caller. This should only be freed once the library caller is sure that it is no longer referencing any old returned values.

```
FreeWithoutClearing ( const char * thing )  
  
→ ( int )
```

This is a function to free memory allocated by the library without first zeroing out the contents. We encourage all users to call the other memory freeing functions instead, since the only drawback is a very small performance cost.

3.6.3 Random and Pseudo-Random Number Generation

```
GenerateRandomState ( RandomSeedKey )  
  
→ ( RandomState )
```

```
GetBits ( RandomState , int )  
  
→ ( RandomState , RandomBits )
```

```
GetPermutation ( RandomState , int )  
→ ( Permutation , RandomState )
```

3.6.4 Error Handling

```
GetLastError ( const char ** error_text )  
→ ( int )
```

The last error value is stored in a global variable, like the C library. It is good practice to retrieve this value as soon as the error is reported. Retrieving the last error also clears the last error.

```
GetLastErrorNumber ( void )  
→ ( int )
```

This function will only return an interesting number if one is assigned in the error XML files. By default, it normally just returns -1.

Chapter 4

Abbreviated Alphabetic Function Listing

Function Name	Header File
Alloc	support.h
Authenticate	auth.h
CheckCommitment	check_comm.h
CheckDictionarySecrets	check_dictionary_secrets.h
CheckPartialDecrypt	check_partial_decrypt.h
CheckPartialDecryptsAndCombine	check_pds_and_combine.h
CheckShuffle	check_shuffle.h
CheckVcodePartialDecryptsAndCombine	check_vc_pds_and_combine.h
CheckXml	sign.h
CombineDictionarySecrets	combine_dictionary_secrets.h
CreateAuthority	keyshare_util.h
CreateKeygenParameters	keyshare_util.h
Decrypt	crypt.h
Dup	support.h
Encrypt	crypt.h

Function Name	Header File
EncryptBallotPollsite	enc_ballot_pollsite.h
Free	support.h
FreeAll	support.h
FreeWithoutClearing	support.h
GenerateAnswerMark	gen_answer_mark.h
GenerateBlankBallot	gen_blank_ballot.h
GenerateBroadcast	gen_broadcast.h
GenerateBsns	gen_bsns.h
GenerateCommitment	gen_comm.h
GenerateDictionarySecrets	gen_dictionary_secrets.h
GenerateKeys	genkeys.h
GeneratePartialVerificationResults	gen_pv_results.h
GeneratePreVerificationResults	gen_pre_verification_results.h
GeneratePublicKey	gen_pubkey.h
GenerateRandomState	random.h
GenerateSecret	gen_secrets.h
GenerateSecretCoefficients	gen_seccoeff.h
GenerateVerificationCode	gen_verification_code.h
GenerateVoteReceiptData	gen_vote_receipt_data.h
GenerateVoteVerificationDictionary	gen_vvdict.h
GenerateVvdictCommits	gen_vvdict_comm.h
GenerateVvk	gen_vvkey.h
GetBits	random.h
GetLastError	error.h
GetLastErrorNumber	error.h
GetPermutation	permutation.h
PartialDecrypt	partial_decrypt.h
PasswordDecrypt	crypt.h
PasswordEncrypt	crypt.h
SetDTDLocation	support.h
Shuffle	shuffle.h
Sign	sign.h
SignReceipt	sign_receipt.h
SignXml	sign.h
Validate	support.h
VerifySignature	sign.h

Appendix A

Glossary of VHTi Data Structures

These are “pseudo-asn1” structures that are used in the inputs and outputs of the API components.

Alphabet Encoding ([AlphabetEncoding](#)) : An xml object containing character data specifying the encoding format for the returned [VoteVerificationCode](#). Initially, supported alphabets are DEC (Decimal or base 10), HEX (Hexadecimal or base 16), and BASE64 (base 64). Others may be available in the future.

Answer Mark ([AnswerMark](#)) : For the purpose of the cryptographic protocols, each answer (in the [AnswerReference](#) sense) must be randomly (or pseudo-randomly) assigned an element of the election’s [ElectionEncodingSubgroup](#).

$$\text{AnswerMark} \doteq \gamma_A \in \text{ElectionEncodingSubgroup}$$

The set of [AnswerMark](#)s corresponding to a single [BallotQuestion](#) must be *distinct*. That is, if A_1 and A_2 are both answers to the same [BallotQuestion](#), then $\gamma_{A_1} \neq \gamma_{A_2}$. In order to effectively implement these properties, [AnswerMark](#)s are generated publicly as a SHA-1 of [Election](#), [Precinct](#), and [AnswerReference](#) data. (See [Ballot Configuration](#).)

Answer Partial Decrypt ([AnswerPartialDecrypt](#)) : A data structure of cryptographic quantities representing the piece of information contributed by a *single* [Authority](#) for a *single* [ElGamalPair](#) contained in a *single* [RawVotedBallot](#).

$$\text{AnswerPartialDecrypt} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ModularInt } Z \\ \text{ModularInt } c \\ \text{ModularInt } d \end{array} \right\}$$

This represents a valid partial decryption of a [ElGamalPair](#), (X, Y) , with respect to an [Authority](#), A , with [KeyShareCommitment](#), C , if and only if

$$c = H(g, C, X, Z, g^d C^c, X^d Z^c) \quad (\text{A.1})$$

where H is the system secure hash function (SHA-1).

Answer Reference ([AnswerReference](#)) : A small integer, which, in the context of a fixed election is uniquely associated with a specific (question , answer) pair. Note for the sake of the cryptographic protocols, each ballot question must have its own spcial “ABSTAIN” answer reference.

Answer Skeleton ([AnswerSkeleton](#)) :

$$\text{AnswerSkeleton} \doteq \text{AnswerTextStructure}_1, \dots, \text{AnswerTextStructure}_n$$

Answer Text Structure ([AnswerTextStructure](#)) : A specification according to a yet to be determined data standard of the human readable data (display text, title, shorthand name, etc.) associated with a ballot answer (perhaps complicated to support multiple languages, etc.).

Arbitrary C string ([ConstCharStar](#)) : Any 0-terminated C string.

Authority ([Authority](#)) : The data structure identifying an *Authority* who has, in advance of the election, been appointed to “oversee” the election is

$$\text{Authority} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Certificate} \\ \text{AuthorityEvaluationPoint} \end{array} \right\}$$

This structure also has an attribute, “AuthFingerprint”, which is usually a small decimal number, which serves as a simple identification number.

Authority Evaluation Point ([AuthorityEvaluationPoint^g](#)) : A modular integer β where

$$\beta \in \mathbf{Z}_q^* = \mathbf{Z}_q - \{0\}$$

Authority Partial Decrypt ([AuthorityPartialDecrypt^g](#)) : The data structure representing the decryption information contributed by a *single* [Committed-Authority^g](#).

$$\text{AuthorityPartialDecrypt}^g \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{CommittedAuthority}^g \\ \text{BallotBoxPartialDecrypt}^g \end{array} \right\}$$

Authority Partial Decrypts ([AuthorityPartialDecrypts^g](#)) : An XML structure representing a *set* of one or more [AuthorityPartialDecrypt^g](#). The order of the elements of this set is irrelevant.

$$\text{AuthorityPartialDecrypts}^g \doteq \{ \text{AuthorityPartialDecrypt}^g_1, \dots, \text{AuthorityPartialDecrypt}^g_t \}$$

Authority Set ([AuthoritySet^g](#)) : A set of Authorities.

$$\text{AuthoritySet}^g \doteq \{ \text{Authority}^g_1, \dots, \text{Authority}^g_t \}$$

Ballot Answer ([BallotAnswer^g](#)) : This data structure (XML) is needed for both for the blank ballot and for results reporting after tabulation. However, it is only connected to VHTi through the interface. We leave specification vague for now, and perhaps even leave the specification to a third party or standards organization. Roughly, it must have an [AnswerMark^g](#) which is *unique for the ballot in question*, an [AnswerReference^g](#) which is also *unique for the ballot in question*, and an [AnswerTextStructure^g](#).

$$\text{BallotAnswer}^g \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{AnswerReference}^g \\ \text{AnswerMark}^g \\ \text{AnswerTextStructure}^g \end{array} \right\}$$

Ballot Box Partial Decrypt (**BallotBoxPartialDecrypt**^[a]) : A vector of **BallotPartialDecrypt**^[i]s representing the information contributed by a *single* **Authority**^[i] for *all* the (properly sequenced) **RawVotedBallot**^[i]s contained in a **RawBallotBox**^[i].

$$\text{BallotBoxPartialDecrypt}^{\mathbf{i}} \doteq (\text{BallotPartialDecrypt}^{\mathbf{i}_1}, \dots, \text{BallotPartialDecrypt}^{\mathbf{i}_B})$$

Ballot Partial Decrypt (**BallotPartialDecrypt**^[a]) : A vector of **AnswerPartialDecrypt**^[i]s representing the information contributed by a *single* **Authority**^[i] for *all* the (properly sequenced) **ElGamalPair**^[i]s contained in a *single* **RawVotedBallot**^[i].

$$\text{BallotPartialDecrypt}^{\mathbf{i}} \doteq (\text{AnswerPartialDecrypt}^{\mathbf{i}_1}, \dots, \text{AnswerPartialDecrypt}^{\mathbf{i}_Q})$$

Ballot Question (**BallotQuestion**^[a]) : This data structure (XML) is needed for both the blank ballot and for results reporting after tabulation. The specification is left to the application. Roughly, it must have a question text structure (perhaps complicated to support multiple languages, etc.), and a vector of **BallotAnswer**^[i]s. *It must* have one distinguished answer, “ABSTAIN”. If it is to allow a write-in response, *it must also* have a second distinguished answer, “WRITE-IN”.

$$\text{BallotQuestion}^{\mathbf{i}} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{QuestionReference}^{\mathbf{i}} \\ (\text{BallotAnswer}^{\mathbf{i}_1}, \dots, \text{BallotAnswer}^{\mathbf{i}_Q}) \\ \text{QuestionTextStructure}^{\mathbf{i}} \end{array} \right\}$$

Ballot Questions (**BallotQuestions**^[a]) : A vector of L **BallotQuestion**^[i]s

$$\text{BallotQuestions}^{\mathbf{i}} \doteq (\text{BallotQuestion}^{\mathbf{i}_1}, \dots, \text{BallotQuestion}^{\mathbf{i}_L})$$

Ballot Sequence Number (**BallotSequenceNumber**^[a]) : A ballot identifier. The set of **BallotSequenceNumbers**^[i] for a given **Election**^[i] (or **Precinct**^[i]) can be considered equivalent to the set of “potential voters” (including “*provisional voters*”) in the **Election**^[i] (or **Precinct**^[i]).

Ballot Sequence Numbers (**BallotSequenceNumbers**^[a]) : A vector of V **BallotSequenceNumber**^[i]s

$$\text{BallotSequenceNumbers}^{\mathbf{i}} \doteq (\text{BallotSequenceNumber}^{\mathbf{i}_1}, \dots, \text{BallotSequenceNumber}^{\mathbf{i}_V})$$

BSN Dictionary Commitments ([BSNDictionaryCommitments](#)) :
 A structure which represents all [DictionaryCommitment](#)s for a *fixed* [ElectionID](#), *fixed* [PrecinctID](#), *fixed* [VoteVerificationTrustee](#) and *fixed* [BallotSequenceNumber](#). That is, a collection of $l \geq 1$ [DictionaryCommitment](#)s, where l is the number of [QuestionReference](#)s in the [BlankBallot](#).

$$\text{BSNDictionaryCommitments} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{BallotSequenceNumber} \\ (\text{DictionaryCommitment}_1, \dots, \text{DictionaryCommitment}_l) \end{array} \right\}$$

BSN Revealed Dictionary Secrets ([BSNRevealedDictionarySecrets](#)) :
 A structure which represents a collection of $l \geq 1$ [RevealedDictionarySecret](#) values for each unvoted [BallotSequenceNumber](#), where l is the number of [QuestionReference](#)s in the [BlankBallot](#).

$$\text{BSNRevealedDictionarySecrets} \doteq \begin{array}{c} \text{BallotSequenceNumber} \\ (\text{RevealedDictionarySecret}_1, \dots, \text{RevealedDictionarySecret}_l) \end{array}$$

Ballot Skeleton ([BallotSkeleton](#)) :

$$\text{BallotSkeleton} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{ElectionID} \\ \text{PrecinctID} \\ \text{QuestionSkeleton} \\ \text{BallotTextStructure} \end{array} \right\}$$

Ballot Text Structure ([BallotTextStructure](#)) : Miscellaneous information – election name, titles, page and display info, etc., associated with the human readable elements of a ballot.

Blank Ballot ([BlankBallot](#)) : This structure needs to link together all the cryptographic and conventional information associated with the [Election](#),

Precinct¹, and set of races, candidates and issues that are to be contested.

$$\text{BlankBallot}^1 \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{ElectionID}^1 \\ \text{PrecinctID}^1 \\ \text{CryptoElectionParameters}^1 \\ \text{BallotQuestions}^1 \\ \text{BallotTextStructure}^1 \end{array} \right\}$$

Broadcast Value (**BroadcastValue**²): A (random) element of **Election-EncodingSubgroup**¹. These values are generated as part of **Key Sharing**, and are an essential component of the Pedersen dealerless secret sharing scheme.

Broadcast Values (**BroadcastValues**²): An XML string containing the **BroadcastValue**¹ from each authority.

Certificate (**Certificate**²): A PKI, typically X.509, certificate.

Check Results (**CheckResults**²): An XML structure containing the results of checking or verification.

Cipher Text (**CipherText**²): A stream of encrypted bytes. In order to be decrypted, you also need a **GeneralPurposePrivateKey**¹, an **Initialization-Vector**¹, and an **EncryptedSessionKey**¹.

Clear Text Ballot (**ClearTextBallot**²): A direct representation, in the context of a fixed **BlankBallot**¹, of a voted ballot – i.e. set of voter choices. Constructed as a vector of $\nu \geq 0$ **AnswerReference**¹s.

$$\text{ClearTextBallot}^1 \doteq (\text{AnswerReference}^1_1, \dots, \text{AnswerReference}^1_\nu)$$

Clear Text Ballots (**ClearTextBallots**²): An XML structure containing one or more **ClearTextBallot**¹.

Committed Authority (**CommittedAuthority**²):

$$\text{CommittedAuthority}^1 \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{Authority}^1 \\ \text{KeyShareCommitment}^1 \end{array} \right\}$$

Committed Authority Set ([CommittedAuthoritySet](#)) : A set of [Committed-Authority](#) s

$$\{\text{CommittedAuthority}_1, \text{CommittedAuthority}_2, \dots, \text{CommittedAuthority}_t\}$$

Committed Trustee : Currently a synonym for [CommittedAuthority](#).

Committed Trustee Set : Currently a synonym for [CommittedAuthority-Set](#).

Crypto Election Parameters ([CryptoElectionParameters](#)) : All configuration parameters required for execution of the election cryptographic operations:

$$\text{CryptoElectionParameters} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{CryptoGroupParameters} \\ \text{CryptoTabulationParameters} \end{array} \right\}$$

Crypto Group Parameters ([CryptoGroupParameters](#)) : The set of necessary mathematical parameters that can be generated very early – prior to authority selection and [Key Sharing](#).

$$\text{CryptoGroupParameters} \doteq$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ElectionModulus} (p) \\ \text{ElectionSubgroupModulus} (q) \\ \text{ElectionSubgroupMember} (g) \end{array} \right\}$$

Crypto Tabulation Parameters ([CryptoTabulationParameters](#)) : The set of necessary mathematical parameters that are required before voting can begin (even before a [BlankBallot](#) can be completed), but are not known until during or after [Key Sharing](#).

$$\text{CryptoTabulationParameters} \doteq$$

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{ElectionPublicKey} (h) \\ \text{CommittedAuthoritySet} (All\ n\ Tabulation\ Authorities) \\ \text{TabulationThreshold} (t) \end{array} \right\}$$

Dictionary Commitment ([DictionaryCommitment](#)) :

An element of the [ElectionEncodingSubgroup](#). Each [DictionaryCommitment](#) is used to irrefutably link [VoteVerificationCode](#)s to encrypted choices. For proper overall election usage, these must be constructed and *published* prior to voting. For a fixed [Precinct](#), the full set of [DictionaryCommitment](#)s is (multi-dimensionally) indexed by all possible triples: [VoteVerificationTrustee](#), [BallotSequenceNumber](#), [QuestionReference](#).

$$\text{DictionaryCommitment} \doteq C \in \text{ElectionEncodingSubgroup}$$

Dictionary Question ([DictionaryQuestion](#)) : A component of a [VoteVerificationDictionary](#) which identifies the [BallotQuestion](#) by [QuestionReference](#) and contains a [DictionaryVerificationCode](#) corresponding to the indicated [AnswerReference](#). If $A_1 \neq A_2$ are two distinct [AnswerReference](#)s which are both possible responses to the *same* [QuestionReference](#), Q , then the [VoteVerificationCode](#) for A_1 *must be different* then the [VoteVerificationCode](#) for A_2 . However, A_1 and A_2 may sometimes share the same [VoteVerificationCode](#) if they are possible responses to different [QuestionReference](#)s.

Dictionary Verification Code ([DictionaryVerificationCode](#)) : An element of a [DictionaryQuestion](#) which associates a particular [VoteVerificationCode](#) with the appropriate [AnswerReference](#).

Election : Refers to all voting and tabulation issues within an umbrella jurisdiction, or political unit. Each election has one and only one [CryptoElectionParameters](#) structure associated with it. However, an [Election](#) can be subdivided into [Precinct](#)s, which each have their own [BlankBallot](#), possibly, but not necessarily, containing distinct questions and/or issues. Tabulation is performed on a [Precinct](#) level. For convenience, *Precinct Results* may be aggregated and published as unified *Election Results* data.

Election Encoding Subgroup ([ElectionEncodingSubgroup](#)) : The unique order q subgroup of the [ElectionGroup](#), where q is specified in the [CryptoGroupParameters](#) structure contained in the [CryptoElectionParameters](#) structure of the [BlankBallot](#).

Election Group ([ElectionGroup](#)) : The modular arithmetic group specified by the [ElectionModulus](#) (p) parameter of the [CryptoGroupParameters](#)

structure contained in the [CryptoElectionParameters](#) structure of the [BlankBallot](#).

Election ID ([ElectionID](#)) : A [UUID](#) for elections.

Election Modulus ([ElectionModulus](#)) : The prime integer (p) which determines the [ElectionGroup](#) used for [VotedBallot](#) encryption. It is specified in the [CryptoGroupParameters](#) structure contained in the [CryptoElectionParameters](#) structure of the [BlankBallot](#).

Election Public Key ([ElectionPublicKey](#)) : An element, h , of the [ElectionEncodingSubgroup](#). The corresponding *private key* ($\log_g h$, where g is the [ElectionSubgroupMember](#)) is a secret cryptographically shared between a set of “election trustees” ([AuthoritySet](#)) via a Pedersen dealerless threshold scheme.

Election Results : A data structure containing all the data necessary to display the election results (tally) in an “official” human readable form. Most likely an XML structure containing general information such as *Election Name*, *Question Text* and *Answer Text* along with corresponding numerical tabulation results.

Election Subgroup Member ([ElectionSubgroupMember](#)) : A fixed element, g , of the [ElectionGroup](#). Typically g will not be 1 (or $q - 1$), in which case it generates the [ElectionEncodingSubgroup](#); in particular, g then satisfies the following relationship with the [ElectionSubgroupModulus](#), q :

$$|g| = q \tag{A.2}$$

However, g may be 1 in order to effectively neuter El Gamal encryption (each El Gamal pair will then consist of the number 1, and the unencrypted element); this may be useful for testing, or when voted ballots do not need to be secret.

Election Subgroup Modulus ([ElectionSubgroupModulus](#)) : The prime integer (q) which determines the [ElectionEncodingSubgroup](#) used for [VotedBallot](#) encryption. In addition to being prime, it must also be related to the [ElectionModulus](#) (p) by the relationships:

$$\begin{aligned} p - 1 &= q r \\ (q, r) &= 1 \end{aligned} \tag{A.3}$$

It is specified in the [CryptoGroupParameters](#) structure contained in the [CryptoElectionParameters](#) structure of the [BlankBallot](#).

ElGamal Pair ([ElGamalPair](#)): A pair of Modular Integers ([Modular-Int](#)).

$$\text{ElGamalPair} \doteq (X, Y)$$

Encrypted Data ([EncryptedData](#)): A collection of data which can be decrypted, given a suitable [GeneralPurposePrivateKey](#).

Encrypted Session Key ([EncryptedSessionKey](#)): A random byte stream that has been encrypted with a [GeneralPurposePublicKey](#). It is used to encrypt a message with a stream cipher. (The message is not encrypted directly with the [GeneralPurposePublicKey](#) because that would be too slow.)

Encryption Private Key ([EncryptionPrivateKey](#)): A key which can be used for decryption.

Encryption Public Key ([EncryptionPublicKey](#)): A key which can be used for encryption.

Error Structure ([ErrorStructure](#)): Structure for encoding “unexpected” return conditions.

General Purpose Private Key ([GeneralPurposePrivateKey](#)): A key which can be used for both decryption and signature generation.

General Purpose Public Key ([GeneralPurposePublicKey](#)): A key which can be used for both encryption and signature validation.

Identification Information ([IdentInfo](#)): An XML string containing identifying information about the owner/creator of a [GeneralPurposePublicKey](#) or [GeneralPurposePrivateKey](#).

Initialization Vector ([InitializationVector](#)): A short, pseudo-random byte stream that increases the security of a [CipherText](#).

Key Generation Parameters (**KeyGenParameters**): The parameters determining the number of **Authority**s (the **KeyShareWidth**, n) participating in **Key Sharing** and the number of these (the **TabulationThreshold**, t) who must cooperate in order to tabulate.

$$\text{KeyGenParameters} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{CryptoGroupParameters} \\ \text{int } 1 \leq n \text{ (KeyShareWidth)} \\ \text{int } 1 \leq t \leq n \text{ (TabulationThreshold)} \end{array} \right\}$$

Key Share Commitment (**KeyShareCommitment**): A modular integer with constraints based on the election crypto parameters

$$\text{KeyShareCommitment} \doteq C \in \text{ElectionEncodingSubgroup}$$

where

$$C = g^s$$

and

$$s = \text{SecretShare}$$

Key Share Width : A positive integer (n) that specifies the total number of **Authority**s officially participating in **Key Sharing**. **KeyShareWidth** is referred to as **NumAuth** in the DTD.

Modular Integer (**ModularInt**) : A **BigInt**

$$\text{ModularInt} \doteq \{ \text{BigInt } x \}$$

(Modulus is determined from context, not explicitly represented.)

Pair-wise Secret (**PairwiseSecret**) : Each Authority evaluates his polynomial at all of the **AuthorityEvaluationPoint** ID values, including his own.

$$\text{PairwiseSecret} \doteq (ID_i, ID_j, f_i(\beta_j))$$

The identifiers (ID_i, ID_j) designate the sender (ID_i) and the recipient (ID_j) authorities. Each *ID* is the *fingerprint* of the corresponding **Authority** object. (See **Key Sharing** for details.)

Pair-wise Secrets ([PairwiseSecrets](#)) : An XML string containing the [Pairwise-Secret](#) from/to each authority.

Partially Decrypted Ballot Box ([PartiallyDecryptedBallotBox](#)) : A data structure containing all the decryption information necessary to both *tabulate* and *verify* with respect to a given [CryptoElectionParameters](#) (or, with respect to a given [SignedBlankBallot](#) structure, which contains a unique [CryptoElectionParameters](#) structure). The count is only verifiable against the contained [RawBallotBox](#) component. Additional verification (see [Shuffle Verification](#)) is needed to certify that the count is derived properly from the official set of [SignedVotedBallot](#)s.

$$\text{PartiallyDecryptedBallotBox} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{RawBallotBox} \\ \text{AuthorityPartialDecrypts} \end{array} \right\}$$

Permutation ([Permutation](#)) : An XML structure with attribute *Size*=n and data containing a random ordering of the numbers 1 through n.

Precinct : Refers to an “*atomic*” sub-jurisdiction, its ballot and tabulation results. “Atomic” means that

1. All voters in a given [Precinct](#) must use (i.e. vote on) the same [BlankBallot](#).
2. All ballots cast in a given [Precinct](#) must be tabulated together to produce a *single count*, or set of question/issue results. *Seperation of voters within a precinct into sub-categories is not allowed.* If a [Precinct](#) needs to be subdivided, it should be seperated into multiple [Precinct](#)s before ballot casting begins (i.e. polls are opened).

Precinct ID ([PrecinctID](#)) : A [UID](#) for precincts. [PrecinctID](#)s are required to be unique *within a fixed election*, but are not required to be universally unique. This allows [PrecinctID](#)s to be reused over time by a jurisdiction.

Pre-Verification Code ([PreVerificationCode](#)) : A particular [ElGamal-Pair](#) returned to the [Vote Client](#) used to generate a [VoteVerification-Code](#) which is both voter specific and chosen answer specific.

Pre-Verification Codes ([PreVerificationCodes](#)) : A vector of $\nu \geq 0$ [PreVerificationCode](#)s:

$$\text{PreVerificationCodes} \doteq (\text{PreVerificationCode}_1, \dots, \text{PreVerificationCode}_\nu)$$

Pre-Verification Code Box ([PreVerificationCodeBox](#)) : Each trustee generates a [RawBallotBox](#) with encrypted ElGamal pairs using his [VoteVerificationKey](#) and returns it inside a [PreVerificationCodeBox](#) structure.

Pre-Verification Code Boxes ([PreVerificationCodeBoxes](#)) : A collection of [PreVerificationCodeBox](#)es from all trustees.

Question Reference ([QuestionReference](#)) : A small integer, which, in the context of a fixed election is uniquely associated with a specific question. Question references *must* be assigned sequentially from 1 to NumBallotQuestions (0 to NumBallotQuestions - 1) since the [PreVerificationCodes](#) (or [VoteVerificationCodes](#)) will be returned in this order.

Question Skeleton ([QuestionSkeleton](#)) :

$$\text{QuestionSkeleton} \doteq \{ \text{QuestionTextStructure} \text{AnswerSkeleton} \}$$

Question Text Structure ([QuestionTextStructure](#)) : A specification according to a yet to be determined data standard of the human readable data (display text, title, shorthand name, etc.) associated with a ballot question (perhaps complicated to support multiple languages, etc.).

Random Bits ([RandomBits](#)) : A collection of random, or pseudorandom bits.

Random Block ([RandomBlock](#)) : An array of [RandomBits](#) which may be generated by hashing certain seed values or may be generated by another method.

Random IJ State ([RandomIJState](#)) : An XML structure describing the current random numbers available. An attribute "SourceType" should be set to "PSEUDO" or "TRUE", depending on whether one is generating pseudorandom or true random numbers. Indices i and j indicate the index of the first bit in the sequence.

$$\text{RandomIJState} \doteq (\text{RandomSeedKey})$$

or

$$\text{RandomIJState}_{\text{I}} \doteq ((i_0, j_0, n_0, bits_0), \dots, (i_m, j_m, n_m, bits_m))$$

Random Seed Key ([RandomSeedKey_I](#)): A short byte sequence used to seed the random-number generator.

Random Seed Keys ([RandomSeedKeys_I](#)): A sequence of [RandomSeedKey_I](#)s.

Random State ([RandomState_I](#)): An XML structure describing the current random numbers available. An attribute “SourceType” should be set to “PSEUDO” or “TRUE”, depending on whether one is generating pseudorandom or true random numbers. In the first definition, an attribute “Index” is included to indicate the location of the pointer in the [RandomBlock_I](#).

$$\text{RandomState}_{\text{I}} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{RandomSeedKey}_{\text{I}} \\ \text{RandomBlock}_{\text{I}} \end{array} \right\}$$

or

$$\text{RandomState}_{\text{I}} \doteq (\text{NIL})$$

Raw Ballot Box ([RawBallotBox_I](#)): A vector of $B \geq 0$ *Raw Voted Ballots*

$$\text{RawBallotBox}_{\text{I}} \doteq (\text{RawVotedBallot}_{\text{I}_1}, \dots, \text{RawVotedBallot}_{\text{I}_B})$$

Raw Clear Text Ballot ([RawClearTextBallot_I](#)): A direct representation, in the context of a fixed [BlankBallot_I](#), of a decrypted voted ballot – i.e. set of voter choices. Constructed as a vector of $\nu \geq 0$ [AnswerMark_I](#)s.

$$\text{ClearTextBallot}_{\text{I}} \doteq (\text{AnswerMark}_{\text{I}_1}, \dots, \text{AnswerMark}_{\text{I}_\nu})$$

Raw Clear Text Ballots ([RawClearTextBallots_I](#)): An XML structure containing one or more [RawClearTextBallot_I](#).

Raw Voted Ballot ([RawVotedBallot_I](#)): A vector of $m \geq 1$ *El Gamal Pairs*:

$$\text{RawVotedBallot}_{\text{I}} \doteq (\text{ElGamalPair}_{\text{I}_1}, \dots, \text{ElGamalPair}_{\text{I}_m})$$

Return Code ([ReturnCode](#)) : int

Revealed Dictionary Secret ([RevealedDictionarySecret](#)) : A random number associated with a given [QuestionReference](#) in a [BlankBallot](#).

Secret Coefficients ([SecretCoefficients](#)) : Cryptographic quantities specific to the [Key Sharing](#) protocol.

$$\text{SecretCoefficients} \doteq (\theta_1, \dots, \theta_t)$$

where

$$\theta \in \mathbb{Z}_q$$

Secret Share ([SecretShare](#)) : A modular integer (secret) with constraints based on the [CryptoElectionParameters](#). The Secret Share, s for the authority with an [AuthorityEvaluationPoint](#) is an element of \mathbb{Z}_q (where q is the [ElectionSubgroupModulus](#)) characterized by:

$$\text{SecretShare} \doteq s = f(\text{AuthorityEvaluationPoint}) =$$

$$\sum_{j=1}^n f_j(\text{AuthorityEvaluationPoint})$$

Seed Parameters ([SeedParameters](#)) : An XML string containing initial values for generating [KeyGenParameters](#). The values indicate the number of [Authority](#) objects to be created, the threshold number of Authorities to be used in Tabulation, and a seed for generating random numbers.

Shuffle Validity Proof ([ShuffleValidityProof](#)) : A zero-knowledge proof of correctness for shuffle.

Simple Shuffle Validity Proof ([SimpleShuffleValidityProof](#)) : A zero-knowledge proof which is a part of the larger [ShuffleValidityProof](#) zero-knowledge proof.

Signature ([Signature](#)) : A digital signature as specified in a publicly accepted standard. Such a standard specifies with mathematical precision how the “validity” of any Signature relative to a particular data string (document) and [GeneralPurposePublicKey](#), or [Certificate](#), is determined.

Signed Ballot Box ([SignedBallotBox^g](#)) : The vector of Signed Voted Ballots that constitute input to tabulation. An authenticating signature (or vector of signatures) is appended for the purpose of “officially sealing” the ballot box. (The exact treatment of these signatures will be set as a matter of election policy.)

$$\text{SignedBallotBox}^{\mathbf{I}} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{ElectionID}^{\mathbf{I}} \\ (\text{SignedVotedBallot}^{\mathbf{I}}_1, \dots, \text{SignedVotedBallot}^{\mathbf{I}}_t) \\ (\text{Signature}^{\mathbf{I}}_1, \dots, \text{Signature}^{\mathbf{I}}_I) \end{array} \right\}$$

Signed Blank Ballot ([SignedBlankBallot^g](#)) : A *Blank Ballot* with an arbitrary number of detached signatures.

$$\text{SignedBlankBallot}^{\mathbf{I}} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{BlankBallot}^{\mathbf{I}} \\ (\text{Signature}^{\mathbf{I}}_1, \dots, \text{Signature}^{\mathbf{I}}_t) \end{array} \right\}$$

Signed Document ([SignedDocument^g](#)) : An XML structure containing a hash of the original plaintext to be signed, and a [Signature^I](#).

Signed Election Parameters ([SignedElectionParameters^g](#)) : The Crypto Election Parameters ([CryptoElectionParameters^I](#)), along with a (policy dependent) vector of authorizing signatures.

$$\text{SignedElectionParameters}^{\mathbf{I}} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{CryptoElectionParameters}^{\mathbf{I}} \\ (\text{Signature}^{\mathbf{I}}_1, \dots, \text{Signature}^{\mathbf{I}}_\rho) \end{array} \right\}$$

Signed Trustee Dictionary Commitments ([SignedTrusteeDictionaryCommitments^g](#)) : A [TrusteeDictionaryCommitments^I](#) with a [Signature^I](#).

Signed Voted Ballot ([SignedVotedBallot^g](#)) : A *Voted Ballot* with detached (voter, or voting device) signature.

$$\text{SVB} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{VotedBallot}^{\mathbf{I}} \\ \text{Signature}^{\mathbf{I}} \end{array} \right\}$$

Signed Voted Ballots ([SignedVotedBallots^g](#)) : An XML structure representing a set of zero or more [SignedVotedBallot^I](#)s. The order of the elements is irrelevant.

Signing Private Key : A [GeneralPurposePrivateKey](#) used for signature generation.

Signing Public Key : A [GeneralPurposePublicKey](#) used for signature verification.

Tabulation Threshold : A positive integer (t) which specifies the number of [CommittedAuthority](#)s who must cooperate in order to tabulate the [SignedBallotBox](#). It is determined as a part of [Key Sharing](#) and can not be changed thereafter. It must, by nature, satisfy $1 \leq t \leq n$, where n is the [KeyShareWidth](#) parameter in the [CommittedAuthoritySet](#) structure of the [CryptoTabulationParameters](#) structure contained in the [CryptoElectionParameters](#) structure of the [BlankBallot](#). [TabulationThreshold](#) is referred to as [Threshold](#) in the DTD.

Trustee Dictionary Commitments ([TrusteeDictionaryCommitments](#)) :

A structure that represents all [DictionaryCommitment](#)s for a *fixed* [ElectionID](#), *fixed* [PrecinctID](#), and *fixed* [VoteVerificationTrustee](#). That is, a collection of $N_{BSN} \geq 1$ [BSNDictionaryCommitments](#), where N_{BSN} is the number of [BallotSequenceNumber](#)s for the [Precinct](#) indicated by ([ElectionID](#), [PrecinctID](#)) .

[TrusteeDictionaryCommitments](#) \doteq

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Authority} \\ \text{BlankBallot} \\ (\text{BSNDictionaryCommitments}_1, \dots, \text{BSNDictionaryCommitments}_{N_{BSN}}) \\ \text{Signature} \end{array} \right\}$$

Trustee Dictionary Commitments Set ([TrusteeDictionaryCommitmentsSet](#))

A vector of [TrusteeDictionaryCommitments](#)s. That is, a collection of $N_{VVT} \geq 1$ [TrusteeDictionaryCommitments](#)s, where N_{VVT} is the number of [VoteVerificationTrustee](#)s for the [Precinct](#) indicated the [ElectionID](#) and [PrecinctID](#) in the [TrusteeDictionaryCommitments](#)'s [BlankBallot](#).

[TrusteeDictionaryCommitmentsSet](#) \doteq

$$(\text{TrusteeDictionaryCommitments}_1, \dots, \text{TrusteeDictionaryCommitments}_{N_{VVT}})$$

Trustee Revealed Dictionary Secrets ([TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets](#)) :

A single trustee's collection of [BSNRevealedDictionarySecrets](#) for a given [BlankBallot](#). The number of [BSNRevealedDictionarySecrets](#)s is given by $N_{BSN} \geq 1$ where N_{BSN} is the number of unvoted [BallotSequenceNumber](#)s.

[TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets](#) \doteq

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Authority} \\ \text{BlankBallot} \\ (\text{BSNRevealedDictionarySecrets}_1, \dots, \text{BSNRevealedDictionarySecrets}_{N_{BSN}}) \end{array} \right\}$$

Trustee Revealed Dictionary Secrets Box ([TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecretsBox](#)) :

A collection of all of the trustees' [TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets](#).

UID ([UID](#)) : Unique identification number.

UUID ([UUID](#)) : Universally unique identification number.

Vote Receipt ([VoteReceipt](#)) : A [VoteReceiptData](#) object *signed* (by Vote Collection Agency)

$$\text{VoteReceipt} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{VoteReceiptData} \\ \text{Signature} \end{array} \right\}$$

Vote Receipt Data ([VoteReceiptData](#)) : Data used for proof of voting. When signed (see [VoteReceipt](#)), can be used by voters to verify authenticity of their [SignedVotedBallot](#) in the election transcript (when it exists), and to mount a protest in case of discrepancy.

$$\text{VoteReceipt} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{HASH}(\text{SignedVotedBallot}) \\ \text{BallotSequenceNumber} \\ (\text{PreVerificationCodes} \mid \text{VoteVerificationCodes}) \end{array} \right\}$$

Vote Verification Code ([VoteVerificationCode](#)) : A data string. Depending on the underlying protocol, it may be computed from a [PreVerificationCode](#).

Vote Verification Codes (**VoteVerificationCodes**^[a]) : A vector of $\nu \geq 0$ **VoteVerificationCode**^[i]s.

$$\text{VoteVerificationCodes}^{\mathbf{i}} \doteq (\text{VoteVerificationCode}^{\mathbf{i}}_1, \dots, \text{VoteVerificationCode}^{\mathbf{i}}_\nu)$$

Vote Verification Dictionary (**VoteVerificationDictionary**^[a]) : Data that assigns a **VoteVerificationCode**^[i] to each **AnswerReference**^[i] on the **Blank-Ballot**^[i] for a fixed **BallotSequenceNumber**^[i].

$$\text{VoteVerificationDictionary}^{\mathbf{i}} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \text{BallotSequenceNumber}^{\mathbf{i}} \\ (\text{DictionaryQuestion}^{\mathbf{i}}_1, \dots, \text{DictionaryQuestion}^{\mathbf{i}}_{NQ}) \end{array} \right\}$$

Vote Verification Dictionaries (**VoteVerificationDictionaries**^[a]) : A vector of **VoteVerificationDictionary**^[i]s.

Vote Verification Key (**VoteVerificationKey**^[a]) : A **SecretKey**^[i] used by an individual **VoteVerificationTrustee**^[i] to pseudo-randomly generate **Dictionary-Commitment**^[i]s.

Vote Verification Keys (**VoteVerificationKeys**^[a]) : A vector of **VoteVerification-Key**^[i]s.

Vote Verification Statement (**VoteVerificationStatement**^[a]) : A statement provided to the voter after voting which contains **VoteVerification-Codes**^[i] corresponding to his selections.

Vote Verification Statements (**VoteVerificationStatements**^[a]) : A collection of **VoteVerificationStatement**^[i]s.

Vote Verification Trustee (**VoteVerificationTrustee**^[a]) : Currently a synonym for **Authority**^[i].

Voted Ballot (**VotedBallot**) :

$$\text{VotedBallot} \doteq \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{HASH}(\text{BlankBallot}) \\ \text{ElectionID} \\ \text{BallotSequenceNumber} \\ \text{RawVotedBallot} \end{array} \right\}$$

Appendix B

VHTi Library Reference

B.1 auth.h

```

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#ifndef AUTH_H
#define AUTH_H

```

```
#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_authenticate (SignedVotedBallots signed_voted_ballots,
                  VoterRoll voter_roll,
                  BlankBallot blank_ballot,
                  RawBallotBox *raw_ballot_box);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
```

B.2 check_comm.h

```

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#ifndef CHECK_COMM_H
#define CHECK_COMM_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_check_commitment (KeyGenParameters key_gen_parameters,
                        Authority authority, // Authority whose
                        // commitment we want to check
                        BroadcastValues broadcast_values,
                        KeyShareCommitment keyshare_commitment,
                        CheckResults *check_comm_results);

#ifdef __cplusplus

```

```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.3 check_dictionary_secrets.h

```

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#ifndef CHECK_DICTIONARY_SECRETS_H
#define CHECK_DICTIONARY_SECRETS_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_check_dictionary_secrets (TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets trustee_dict_secrets,
                               SignedTrusteeDictionaryCommitments trustee_dict_comm,
                               GeneralPurposePublicKey tsig_pubkey,
                               BlankBallot blank_ballot,
                               CheckResults *check_dictionary_secrets_result);

#ifdef __cplusplus

```

```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.4 check_partial_decrypt.h

```

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#ifndef CHECK_PARTIAL_DECRYPT_H
#define CHECK_PARTIAL_DECRYPT_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_check_partial_decrypt (RawBallotBox raw_ballot_box,
                            AuthorityPartialDecrypt auth_partial_decrypt,
                            SignedBlankBallot signed_blank_ballot,
                            GeneralPurposePublicKey ballot_signing_key,
                            CheckResults *check_partial_decrypt_result);

#ifdef __cplusplus

```

```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.5 check_pds_and_combine.h

```

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#ifndef CHECK_PARTIAL_DECRYPTS_AND_COMBINE_H
#define CHECK_PARTIAL_DECRYPTS_AND_COMBINE_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_check_partial_decrypts_and_combine (SignedBlankBallot signed_blank_ballot,
                                         GeneralPurposePublicKey ballot_signing_key,
                                         PartiallyDecryptedBallotBox pd_ballot_box,
                                         ClearTextBallots *clear_text_ballots,
                                         const char **combine_partial_decrypt_result)

#ifdef __cplusplus

```

```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.6 check_shuffle.h

```

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#ifndef CHECK_SHUFFLE_H
#define CHECK_SHUFFLE_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_check_shuffle (RawBallotBox raw_ballot_box_before,
                   RawBallotBox raw_ballot_box_after,
                   SignedBlankBallot signed_blank_ballot,
                   GeneralPurposePublicKey ballot_signing_key,
                   ShuffleValidityProof shuffle_validity_proof,
                   CheckResults *check_answer_result);

#ifdef __cplusplus

```

```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.7 check_vc_pds_and_combine.h

```

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#ifndef CHECK_VCODE_PARTIAL_DECRYPT_AND_COMBINE_H
#define CHECK_VCODE_PARTIAL_DECRYPT_AND_COMBINE_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_check_vcode_partial_decrypts_and_combine
    (PreVerificationCodeBoxes pre_vcode_boxes,
     AuthorityPartialDecrypts auth_partial_decrypts,
     SignedVotedBallots signed_voted_ballots,
     SignedBlankBallot signed_blank_ballot,
     GeneralPurposePublicKey ballot_signing_key,
     int v_len,

```

```
AlphabetEncoding v_alphabet,  
VoteVerificationStatements *verification_statements,  
const char **combine_partial_decrypt_result);  
  
#ifdef __cplusplus  
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.8 combine_dictionary_secrets.h

```

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#ifndef COMBINE_DICTIONARY_SECRETS_H
#define COMBINE_DICTIONARY_SECRETS_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_combine_dictionary_secrets (TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets trustee_dict_secrets,
BlankBallot blank_ballot,
int v_len,
AlphabetEncoding v_alphabet,
VoteVerificationDictionaries *verification_dictionaries)

#ifdef __cplusplus
}

```

```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.9 crypt.h

```

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#ifndef __CRYPT_H
#define __CRYPT_H

#include <vhti/support.h>

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_encrypt(GeneralPurposePublicKey public_key,
             ConstCharStar plaintext,
             EncryptedData *encrypted_data);

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_decrypt(GeneralPurposePrivateKey private_key,
             EncryptedData encrypted_data,
             ConstCharStar *plaintext);

```

```
EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_password_encrypt(Password password,
                      ConstCharStar plaintext,
                      EncryptedData *encrypted_data);
```

```
EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_password_decrypt(Password password,
                      EncryptedData encrypted_data,
                      ConstCharStar *plaintext);
```

```
#ifdef __cplusplus
} // extern "C"
#endif
```

```
#endif /* __CRYPT_H */
```

B.10 enc_ballot_pollsite.h

```

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#ifndef ENC_BALLOT_POLLSITE_H
#define ENC_BALLOT_POLLSITE_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_encrypt_ballot_pollsite (ClearTextBallot clear_text_ballot,
                              BlankBallot blank_ballot,
                              BallotSequenceNumber bsn,
                              RandomState random_state,
                              GeneralPurposePrivateKey ballot_signing_key,
                              SignedVotedBallot * signed_voted_ballot,
                              RandomState *random_state_out);

```

```
#ifdef __cplusplus  
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.11 error.h

```

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#ifndef __ERROR_H
#define __ERROR_H

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

#include <vhti/export.h>

/* This function does not follow the normal VHTI conventions, and its
 * documentation is not auto-generated. If you change this prototype,
 * please also change the corresponding LaTeX documentation. */
EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_get_last_error(const char ** error_text);

/* This function does not follow the normal VHTI conventions, and its
 * documentation is not auto-generated. If you change this prototype,
 * please also change the corresponding LaTeX documentation. */
EXPORT_SYMBOL int

```

```
VHTI_get_last_error_number(void);

#ifdef __cplusplus
} // extern "C"
#endif

#endif /* __ERROR_H */
```

B.12 export.h

```

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#ifndef _EXPORT_H
#define _EXPORT_H

#ifdef WIN32
#define EXPORT_SYMBOL __declspec(dllexport)
#else
#define EXPORT_SYMBOL
#endif

#ifdef _MFC_VER
// Sneak this in here since it gets included into lots of stuff. 8/may/2003 ACB
// 4786: identifier was truncated in debug information
#pragma warning(disable: 4786)
#endif

#endif

```

B.13 gen_answer_mark.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_ANSWER_MARK_H
#define GEN_ANSWER_MARK_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_answer_mark (CryptoGroupParameters crypto_group_parameters,
                           AlphabetEncoding encoding,
                           RandomState random_state,
                           AnswerMark *answer_mark,
                           RandomState *ending_random_state);

#ifdef __cplusplus

```

```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.14 gen_blank_ballot.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_BLANK_BALLOT_H
#define GEN_BLANK_BALLOT_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_blank_ballot (BallotSkeleton ballot_skeleton,
                           CryptoElectionParameters cep,
                           AlphabetEncoding encoding,
                           BlankBallot * blank_ballot);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}

```



```
#endif  
#endif
```

B.15 gen_broadcast.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_BROADCAST_H
#define GEN_BROADCAST_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_broadcast (KeyGenParameters key_gen_parameters,
                        SecretCoefficients secret_coefficients,
                        RandomState random_state,
                        BroadcastValue *broadcast_value,
                        RandomState *random_state_out);

#ifdef __cplusplus

```

```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.16 gen_bsns.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_BSNS_H
#define GEN_BSNS_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_bsns (ElectionID eid,
    PrecinctID pid,
    int numAuthorized,
    int numProvisional,
    RandomState random_state,
    BallotSequenceNumbers * authorized_bsns,
    BallotSequenceNumbers * provisional_bsns,

```

```
        RandomState *random_state_out);  
  
#ifdef __cplusplus  
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.17 gen_comm.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_COMM_H
#define GEN_COMM_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_commitment (KeyGenParameters key_gen_parameters,
                          Authority authority, // This is the recipient
                                      // of the following secrets
                          BroadcastValues all_broadcast_values,
                          PairwiseSecrets pairwise_secrets,
                          SecretShare *secret_share,
                          KeyShareCommitment *keyshare_commitment);

```

```
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
```

B.18 gen_dictionary_secrets.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_DICTIONARY_SECRETS_H
#define GEN_DICTIONARY_SECRETS_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_dictionary_secrets (SignedVotedBallots signed_voted_ballots,
                                  Authority authority,
                                  GeneralPurposePrivateKey private_signature_key,
                                  VoteVerificationKey prn_seed,
                                  BlankBallot blank_ballot,
                                  BallotSequenceNumbers bsns,
                                  TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets *trustee_dict_secrets);

```



```
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
```

B.19 gen_pre_verification_results.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_PRE_VV_RESULTS_H
#define GEN_PRE_VV_RESULTS_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_pre_verification_results (VoteVerificationKey vv_key,
SignedVotedBallots signed_voted_ballots,
SignedBlankBallot signed_blank_ballot,
GeneralPurposePublicKey ballot_signing_key,
PreVerificationCodeBox * pre_vcode_box);

#ifdef __cplusplus

```

```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.20 gen_pubkey.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_PUBKEY_H
#define GEN_PUBKEY_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_public_key (KeyGenParameters key_gen_parameters,
                          BroadcastValues broadcast_values,
                          ElectionPublicKey *public_key);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

```

#endif

B.21 gen_pv_results.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_PARTIAL_VV_RESULTS_H
#define GEN_PARTIAL_VV_RESULTS_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_partial_verification_results
    (PreVerificationCodeBoxes pre_vcode_boxes,
     SignedBlankBallot signed_blank_ballot,
     GeneralPurposePublicKey ballot_signing_key,
     CommittedAuthority committed_authority,
     SecretShare secret_share,
     RandomState random_state,

```

```
    AuthorityPartialDecrypt *auth_partial_decrypt_of_verifications,  
    RandomState *random_state_out);  
  
#ifdef __cplusplus  
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.22 gen_seccoeff.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_SECCOEFF_H
#define GEN_SECCOEFF_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_secret_coefficients (KeyGenParameters key_gen_parameters,
                                   Authority authority,
                                   RandomState random_state,
                                   SecretCoefficients *secret_coefficients,
                                   RandomState * random_state_out);

#ifdef __cplusplus

```



```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.23 gen_secrets.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_SECRETS_H
#define GEN_SECRETS_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_secret (KeyGenParameters key_gen_parameters,
                     Authority authority,
                     SecretCoefficients secret_coefficients,
                     PairwiseSecret *pairwise_secret);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}

```

```
#endif  
#endif
```

B.24 gen_verification_code.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_VVCODE_H
#define GEN_VVCODE_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_verification_code (VoteVerificationKeys vv_keys,
                                BlankBallot blank_ballot,
                                BallotSequenceNumber bsn,
                                AnswerReference answer_ref,
                                int vv_len,
                                AlphabetEncoding vv_alphabet,
                                VoteVerificationCode * vv_code);

```

```
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
```

B.25 gen_vote_receipt_data.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_VOTE_RECEIPT_DATA_H
#define GEN_VOTE_RECEIPT_DATA_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_vote_receipt_data (SignedVotedBallot signed_voted_ballot,
                                VoteVerificationKeys vv_keys,
                                BlankBallot blank_ballot,
                                BallotSequenceNumber bsn,
                                ClearTextBallot clear_text_ballot,
                                int vv_len,
                                AlphabetEncoding vv_alphabet,

```

```
VoteReceiptData * vote_receipt_data);  
  
#ifdef __cplusplus  
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.26 gen_vvdict.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_VCDICT_H
#define GEN_VCDICT_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_vote_verification_dictionary (VoteVerificationKeys vv_keys,
BlankBallot blank_ballot,
BallotSequenceNumber bsn,
int vv_len,
AlphabetEncoding vv_alphabet,
VoteVerificationDictionary * vv_dictionary);

```



```
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
```

B.27 gen_vvdict_comm.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_VCDICT_COMM_H
#define GEN_VCDICT_COMM_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_vvdict_commits (Authority authority,
                              GeneralPurposePrivateKey private_signature_key,
                              VoteVerificationKey prn_seed,
                              BlankBallot blank_ballot,
                              BallotSequenceNumbers bsns,
                              SignedTrusteeDictionaryCommitments *trustee_dict_comm);

```

```
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
```

B.28 gen_vvkey.h

```

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#ifndef GEN_VCKEY_H
#define GEN_VCKEY_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_vvk (RandomState random_state,
                  VoteVerificationKey * vv_key,
                  RandomState *random_state_out);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

```

```
#endif
```

B.29 genkeys.h

```

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#ifndef __GENKEYS_H
#define __GENKEYS_H

#include <vhti/support.h>

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_keys(IdentInfo ident_info,
                  GeneralPurposePrivateKey *pr,
                  GeneralPurposePublicKey *pu);

#ifdef __cplusplus
} // extern "C"
#endif

```

```
#endif /* __GENKEYS_H */
```

B.30 keyshare_util.h

```

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#ifndef KEYSHARE_UTIL_H
#define KEYSHARE_UTIL_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_create_keygen_parameters(SeedParameters input_parameters,
                             RandomState random_state,
                             KeyGenParameters * output_parameters,
                             RandomState * random_state_out);

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_create_authority(const char *authority_id,

```



```
const KeyGenParameters key_gen_parameters,  
RandomState random_state,  
const GeneralPurposePublicKey pu,  
GeneralPurposePrivateKey *pr,  
Authority * authority,  
RandomState * random_state_out);  
  
#ifdef __cplusplus  
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.31 partial_decrypt.h

```

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#ifndef PARTIAL_DECRYPT_H
#define PARTIAL_DECRYPT_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_partial_decrypt (RawBallotBox raw_ballot_box,
                     SignedBlankBallot signed_blank_ballot,
                     GeneralPurposePublicKey ballot_signing_key,
                     CommittedAuthority committed_authority,
                     SecretShare secret_share,
                     RandomState random_state,
                     AuthorityPartialDecrypt *auth_partial_decrypt,

```

```
                                RandomState *random_state_out);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
```

B.32 permutation.h

```

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#ifndef PERMUTATION_H
#define PERMUTATION_H

#include "vhti/support.h"
#include <openssl/bn.h>

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_get_permutation(RandomState random_state,
                    int nsize,
                    Permutation * perm,
                    RandomState * random_state_out);

#ifdef __cplusplus

```

```
}  
#endif  
#endif
```

B.33 random.h

```

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#ifndef RANDOM_H
#define RANDOM_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_generate_random_state(RandomSeedKey key,
                           RandomState * random_state);

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_get_bits(RandomState random_state,
              int nbits,
              RandomState * return_random_state,
              RandomBits * bits);

```

```
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
```

B.34 shuffle.h

```

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#ifndef SHUFFLE_H
#define SHUFFLE_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_shuffle (RawBallotBox raw_ballot_box_before,
              RandomState random_state,
              SignedBlankBallot signed_blank_ballot,
              GeneralPurposePublicKey ballot_signing_key,
              RawBallotBox *raw_ballot_box_after,
              RandomState *random_state_out,
              ShuffleValidityProof *shuffle_validity_proof);

```



```
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
```

B.35 sign.h

```

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#ifndef __SIGN_H
#define __SIGN_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_sign_xml (GeneralPurposePrivateKey private_key,
               ConstCharStar xml_plaintext,
               ConstCharStar *signed_xml);

/* deprecated for signing XML. Use the above instead. */
EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_sign(GeneralPurposePrivateKey private_key,
          ConstCharStar plaintext,

```

```
        Signature *signature);

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_check_xml (GeneralPurposePublicKey public_key,
                ConstCharStar signed_xml,
                ConstCharStar expected_root_element_name,
                CheckResults *c_result,
                ConstCharStar *inner_xml);

/* deprecated for checking signed XML. Use the above instead. */
EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_verify_signature(GeneralPurposePublicKey public_key,
                      ConstCharStar plaintext,
                      Signature signature,
                      CheckResults *c_result);

#ifdef __cplusplus
} // extern "C"
#endif

#endif /* __SIGN_H */
```

B.36 sign_receipt.h

```

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#ifndef SIGN_RECEIPT_H
#define SIGN_RECEIPT_H

#include "vhti/support.h"

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_sign_receipt (VoteReceiptData vote_receipt_data,
                  GeneralPurposePrivateKey receipt_signing_key,
                  SignedVoteReceiptData * vote_receipt);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif

```

```
#endif
```

B.37 support.h

```

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#ifndef SUPPORT_H
#define SUPPORT_H

#include "vhti/types.h"
#include "vhti/export.h"
#include "vhti/error.h"
#include <stdlib.h>                /* for size_t */

#if defined(_MSC_VER)
// 4786: identifier was truncated in debug information
#pragma warning(disable: 4786)
#endif

#ifdef __cplusplus

template <class kind>
class auto_freeing
{

```

```

public:
    auto_freeing(kind p = 0) : m_p(p) { }
    ~auto_freeing(void) { VHTI_free(m_p); }
    operator char * (void) { return (char *)m_p; }
    operator const kind (void) const { return m_p; }
    kind * operator & (void)
    {
        if (m_p)
        {
            VHTI_free (m_p);
            m_p = 0;
        }
        return & m_p;
    }
    void operator = (char * p)
    {
        if (m_p)
            VHTI_free (m_p);

        m_p = p;
    }
private:
    kind m_p;
};
#endif

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

// Public API

// For all return values, 0 is success; anything else is an error code
// which I haven't bothered defining.

// All 'out' 'char *' parameters must be freed with one of the
// 'VHTI_free' functions.

/* This function does not follow the normal VHTI conventions, and its
 * documentation is not auto-generated.  If you change this prototype,
 * please also change the corresponding LaTeX documentation. */
EXPORT_SYMBOL char *
VHTI_alloc(size_t num_bytes);

/* This function does not follow the normal VHTI conventions, and its
 * documentation is not auto-generated.  If you change this prototype,
 * please also change the corresponding LaTeX documentation. */

```

```

EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_free (const char *thing);

/* This function does not follow the normal VHTI conventions, and its
 * documentation is not auto-generated. If you change this prototype,
 * please also change the corresponding LaTeX documentation. */
// As above, but does not zero the freed block.
EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_free_without_clearing (const char *thing);

/* This function does not follow the normal VHTI conventions, and its
 * documentation is not auto-generated. If you change this prototype,
 * please also change the corresponding LaTeX documentation. */
EXPORT_SYMBOL char *
VHTI_dup (const char *thing);

/* This function does not follow the normal VHTI conventions, and its
 * documentation is not auto-generated. If you change this prototype,
 * please also change the corresponding LaTeX documentation. */
// Frees all allocations that haven't already been freed with
// 'VHTI_free'.
EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_free_all();

/* This function does not follow the normal VHTI conventions, and its
 * documentation is not auto-generated. If you change this prototype,
 * please also change the corresponding LaTeX documentation. */
// You'd expect this function to be declared in types.h, since it is
// defined in types.cpp. However, the perl code that automatically
// generates the perl wrapper makes a point of not reading types.h.
// Therefore we declare it here.
EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_set_DTD_location (const char *path);

/* This function does not follow the normal VHTI conventions, and its
 * documentation is not auto-generated. If you change this prototype,
 * please also change the corresponding LaTeX documentation. */
/* 0 means "valid" */
EXPORT_SYMBOL int
VHTI_validate (const char *datatype, const char *data);

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif

```

B.38 types.h

```

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#ifndef VHTI_TYPES_H
#define VHTI_TYPES_H

#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
{
#endif

#include "export.h"

#include "../auto-macros.h"

/* Some handy strings for returning CheckResults. */
#define CHECK_SUCCESS_TEXT "0:Success"
#define CHECK_FAILURE_TEXT "1:Failure"
#define CHECK_SUCCESS_XML "<CheckResults>" CHECK_SUCCESS_TEXT "</CheckResults>"
#define CHECK_FAILURE_XML "<CheckResults>" CHECK_FAILURE_TEXT "</CheckResults>"

```

```
#include "../auto-typedefs.h"

#if 0
    /* this #if 0 is because we want this block visible to the document */
    /* preprocessor but not to the C compiler. */
    typedef int int;
    typedef enum enum;
#endif

#ifdef __cplusplus
}
#endif
#endif
```

Appendix C

VHTi XML DTDs

C.1 vhti.dtd

```
<!-- -->
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<!-- any Prohibited Country or Denied Party. -->
<!-- Questions about VoteHere's VHTi DTD may be addressed to: vhtifedback@votehere.co
<!-- Alphabet Encoding -->
```

```

<!-- ELEMENT AlphabetEncoding (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Answer Partial Decrypt -->
<!-- ELEMENT AnswerPartialDecrypt (XValue, ConstantVal, FunctionVal)>
<!-- ELEMENT ConstantVal (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST ConstantVal
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!-- ELEMENT FunctionVal (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST FunctionVal
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Answer Reference -->
<!-- ELEMENT AnswerReference (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Answer Skeleton -->
<!-- ELEMENT AnswerSkeleton (AnswerTextStructure?)>
<!-- ATTLIST AnswerSkeleton
AnswerReference CDATA #IMPLIED >

<!-- Authority -->
<!-- ELEMENT Authority (Certificate, AuthorityEvaluationPoint)>
<!-- ATTLIST Authority
AuthFingerprint CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!-- ELEMENT AuthorityEvaluationPoint (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST AuthorityEvaluationPoint
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Authority Partial Decrypt -->
<!-- ELEMENT AuthorityPartialDecrypt (CommittedAuthority, BallotBoxPartialDecrypt)>

<!-- Authority Partial Decrypts -->
<!-- ELEMENT AuthorityPartialDecrypts (AuthorityPartialDecrypt+)>

<!-- Authority Set -->
<!-- ELEMENT AuthoritySet (Authority+)>

<!-- Ballot Answer -->
<!-- ELEMENT BallotAnswer (AnswerTextStructure, AnswerMark)>
<!-- ATTLIST BallotAnswer
AnswerReference CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!-- ELEMENT AnswerTextStructure (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ELEMENT AnswerMark (#PCDATA)>

```

```
<!-- ATTLLIST AnswerMark
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED-->
```

```
<!-- Ballot Partial Decrypt -->
<!-- ELEMENT BallotPartialDecrypt (AnswerPartialDecrypt+)-->
```

```
<!-- Ballot Box Partial Decrypt -->
<!-- ELEMENT BallotBoxPartialDecrypt (BallotPartialDecrypt*)-->
```

```
<!-- Ballot Question -->
<!-- ELEMENT BallotQuestion (QuestionTextStructure, BallotAnswer+)-->
<!-- ATTLLIST BallotQuestion
QuestionReference CDATA #REQUIRED-->
```

```
<!-- Ballot Questions -->
<!-- ELEMENT BallotQuestions (BallotQuestion+)-->
```

```
<!-- Ballot Sequence Number -->
<!-- ELEMENT BallotSequenceNumber (#PCDATA)-->
<!-- ATTLLIST BallotSequenceNumber
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED-->
```

```
<!-- Ballot Sequence Numbers -->
<!-- ELEMENT BallotSequenceNumbers (BallotSequenceNumber+)-->
```

```
<!-- Ballot Skeleton -->
<!-- ELEMENT BallotSkeleton (ElectionID, PrecinctID, QuestionSkeleton+, BallotTextStructure+)-->
```

```
<!-- Blank Ballot -->
<!-- ELEMENT BlankBallot (ElectionID, PrecinctID, CryptoElectionParameters, BallotQuestion+, BallotTextStructure+)-->
<!-- ELEMENT BallotTextStructure (#PCDATA)-->
```

```
<!-- Broadcast Values -->
<!-- ELEMENT BroadcastValues (BroadcastValue+)-->
```

```
<!-- Broadcast Value -->
<!-- ELEMENT BroadcastValue (BigTheta+, Omega, Something)-->
<!-- ATTLLIST BroadcastValue
```

```

AuthFingerprint CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!--ELEMENT BigTheta (#PCDATA)>
<!--ATTLIST BigTheta
Order CDATA #REQUIRED
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!--ELEMENT Omega (#PCDATA)>
<!--ATTLIST Omega
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!--ELEMENT Something (#PCDATA)>
<!--ATTLIST Something
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- BSN Dictionary Commitments -->
<!--ELEMENT BSNDictionaryCommitments (BallotSequenceNumber, DictionaryCommitment+)>

<!-- BSN Revealed Dictionary Secrets -->
<!--ELEMENT BSNRevealedDictionarySecrets (BallotSequenceNumber, RevealedDictionarySecret+)>

<!-- Certificate -->
<!-- This probably needs more information, such as a human-readable -->
<!-- string indicating who made the signatures -->
<!--ELEMENT Certificate (GeneralPurposePublicKey, Signature*)>

<!-- Check Results -->
<!--ELEMENT CheckResults (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Clear Text Ballot -->
<!-- Secret --> <!--ELEMENT ClearTextBallot (AnswerReference+)>

<!-- Clear Text Ballots -->
<!--ELEMENT ClearTextBallots (ClearTextBallot+)>

<!-- Committed Authority -->
<!--ELEMENT CommittedAuthority (Authority, KeyShareCommitment)>

<!-- Committed Authority Set -->
<!--ELEMENT CommittedAuthoritySet (CommittedAuthority+)>

<!-- Crypto Election Parameters -->

```

```

<!-- ELEMENT CryptoElectionParameters (CryptoGroupParameters,
                                         CryptoTabulationParameters)>

<!-- Crypto Group Parameters -->
<!-- ELEMENT CryptoGroupParameters (ElectionModulus, ElectionSubgroupModulus, ElectionSub
<!-- ELEMENT ElectionModulus (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST ElectionModulus
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!-- ELEMENT ElectionSubgroupModulus (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST ElectionSubgroupModulus
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!-- ELEMENT ElectionSubgroupMember (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST ElectionSubgroupMember
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Crypto Tabulation Parameters -->
<!-- ELEMENT CryptoTabulationParameters (ElectionPublicKey,
                                         NumAuth, Threshold, KeyShareCommitment+)>
<!-- ELEMENT ElectionPublicKey (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST ElectionPublicKey
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- NumAuth is the number of Authority entities -->
<!-- participating in the election -->
<!-- ELEMENT NumAuth (#PCDATA)>
<!-- Threshold is the number of Authorities -->
<!-- participating in keysharing -->
<!-- ELEMENT Threshold (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Dictionary Commitment -->
<!-- ELEMENT DictionaryCommitment (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST DictionaryCommitment
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Dictionary Question -->
<!-- ELEMENT DictionaryQuestion (DictionaryVerificationCode+)>
<!-- ATTLIST DictionaryQuestion
QuestionReference CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Dictionary Verification Code -->
<!-- ELEMENT DictionaryVerificationCode (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST DictionaryVerificationCode
AnswerReference CDATA #REQUIRED
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

```

```
<!-- Election ID -->
<!ELEMENT ElectionID (#PCDATA)>
```

```
<!-- ElGamal Pair -->
<!ELEMENT ElGamalPair (XValue, YValue)>
<!ELEMENT XValue (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST XValue
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!ELEMENT YValue (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST YValue
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
```

```
<!-- Encrypted Data -->
<!ELEMENT EncryptedData (InitializationVector, EncryptedSessionKey, CipherText)>
<!ELEMENT InitializationVector (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT EncryptedSessionKey (#PCDATA)>
<!ELEMENT CipherText (#PCDATA)>
```

```
<!-- EncryptionPrivateKey -->
<!-- Secret --> <!ELEMENT EncryptionPrivateKey (#PCDATA)>
```

```
<!-- EncryptionPublicKey -->
<!ELEMENT EncryptionPublicKey (#PCDATA)>
```

```
<!-- Error Structure -->
<!ELEMENT ErrorStructure (#PCDATA)>
```

```
<!-- General Purpose Private Key -->
<!-- Secret --> <!ELEMENT GeneralPurposePrivateKey (IdentInfo, SigningPrivateKey, EncryptionPrivate
```

```
<!-- General Purpose Public Key -->
<!ELEMENT GeneralPurposePublicKey (IdentInfo, SigningPublicKey , EncryptionPublicKey )>
```

```
<!-- Identification Information -->
<!ELEMENT IdentInfo (#PCDATA)>
```

```
<!-- Key Generation Parameters -->
<!ELEMENT KeyGenParameters (CryptoGroupParameters, NumAuth, Threshold)>
```



```

<!-- Key Share Commitment -->
<!ELEMENT KeyShareCommitment (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST KeyShareCommitment
AuthFingerprint CDATA #REQUIRED
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Modular Integer -->
<!ELEMENT ModularInt (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Pairwise Secrets -->
<!-- Secret --> <!ELEMENT PairwiseSecrets (PairwiseSecret+)>

<!-- Pairwise Secret -->
<!-- Secret --> <!ELEMENT PairwiseSecret (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST PairwiseSecret
FromID CDATA #REQUIRED
ToID CDATA #REQUIRED
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Password -->
<!-- A secret key used for data encryption -->
<!ELEMENT Password (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Password Encrypted Data -->
<!-- Data whose content is protected by a password -->
<!ELEMENT PasswordEncryptedData (CipherText)>

<!-- Partially Decrypted Ballot Box -->
<!ELEMENT PartiallyDecryptedBallotBox (RawBallotBox, AuthorityPartialDecrypts)>

<!-- Permutation -->
<!ELEMENT Permutation (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST Permutation
Size CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- PrecinctID -->
<!ELEMENT PrecinctID (#PCDATA)>

```

```

<!-- Pre-Verification Code -->
<!ELEMENT PreVerificationCode (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Pre-Verification Codes -->
<!ELEMENT PreVerificationCodes (PreVerificationCode+)>

<!-- Pre Verification Code Box -->
<!ELEMENT PreVerificationCodeBox (RawBallotBox)>

<!-- Pre Verification Code Boxes -->
<!ELEMENT PreVerificationCodeBoxes (PreVerificationCodeBox+)>

<!-- Question Reference -->
<!ELEMENT QuestionReference (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Question Skeleton -->
<!ELEMENT QuestionSkeleton (QuestionTextStructure?, AnswerSkeleton*)>
<ATTLIST QuestionSkeleton
  QuestionReference CDATA #IMPLIED
  NumAns CDATA #IMPLIED>

<!-- Question Text Structure -->
<!ELEMENT QuestionTextStructure (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Random Bits -->
<!ELEMENT RandomBits (#PCDATA)>
<ATTLIST RandomBits
  Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Random Block -->
<!-- Secret --> <!ELEMENT RandomBlock (#PCDATA)>
<ATTLIST RandomBlock
  Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Random IJ State -->
<!-- Secret --> <!ELEMENT RandomIJState (RandomSeedKey)>
<ATTLIST RandomIJState
  SourceType CDATA #REQUIRED>

```

```

<!-- RandomSeedKey -->
<!-- Secret --> <!ELEMENT RandomSeedKey (#PCDATA)>

<!-- RandomSeedKeys -->
<!-- Secret --> <!ELEMENT RandomSeedKeys (RandomSeedKey+)>

<!-- Random State -->
<!-- Secret --> <!ELEMENT RandomState (RandomSeedKey, RandomBlock)>
<!ATTLIST RandomState
SourceType CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Raw Ballot Box -->
<!ELEMENT RawBallotBox (RawVotedBallot)* >

<!-- Raw Clear Text Ballot -->
<!ELEMENT RawClearTextBallot (AnswerMark+)>

<!-- Raw Clear Text Ballots -->
<!ELEMENT RawClearTextBallots (RawClearTextBallot+)>

<!-- Raw Voted Ballot -->
<!ELEMENT RawVotedBallot (ElGamalPair)+ >

<!-- Results -->
<!-- The specification is left to the application. -->
<!ELEMENT Results (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Return Code -->
<!ELEMENT ReturnCode (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Revealed Dictionary Secret -->
<!ELEMENT RevealedDictionarySecret (#PCDATA)>
<!ATTLIST RevealedDictionarySecret
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Secret Coefficients -->
<!-- Secret --> <!ELEMENT SecretCoefficients (SmallTheta+)>

```

```

<!-- SecretCoefficients
AuthFingerprint CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!-- Secret --> <!--ELEMENT SmallTheta (#PCDATA)>
<!-- SecretCoefficients
Order CDATA #REQUIRED
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Secret Share -->
<!-- Secret --> <!--ELEMENT SecretShare (#PCDATA)>
<!-- SecretShare
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Seed Parameters -->
<!--ELEMENT SeedParameters (NumAuth, Threshold)>

<!-- Shuffle Validity Proofs -->
<!--ELEMENT ShuffleValidityProofs (ShuffleValidityProof+)>

<!-- Shuffle Validity Proof -->
<!--ELEMENT ShuffleValidityProof (U_Values, W_Values, A_Values, C_Values,
                                Lambda_1, Lambda_2, sigma_values, tau,
                                SimpleShuffleValidityProof)>

<!--ELEMENT U_Values (UValue*)>
<!--ELEMENT UValue (#PCDATA)>
<!--ATTLIST UValue
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!--ELEMENT W_Values (WValue*)>
<!--ELEMENT WValue (#PCDATA)>
<!--ATTLIST WValue
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!--ELEMENT A_Values (AValue*)>
<!--ELEMENT AValue (#PCDATA)>
<!--ATTLIST AValue
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!--ELEMENT C_Values (CValue*)>
<!--ELEMENT CValue (#PCDATA)>
<!--ATTLIST CValue
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!--ELEMENT Lambda_1 (#PCDATA)>
<!--ATTLIST Lambda_1
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!--ELEMENT Lambda_2 (#PCDATA)>
<!--ATTLIST Lambda_2
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!--ELEMENT sigma_values (sigma*)>

```

```

<!ELEMENT sigma (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTTLIST sigma
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!ELEMENT tau (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTTLIST tau
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Simple Shuffle Validity Proof Original
// <!ELEMENT SimpleShuffleValidityProof (BigGamma, Xbar_kp1, Ybar_kp1, Theta, alpha_va
// <!ELEMENT BigGamma (#PCDATA)>
// <!-- ATTTLIST BigGamma
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
// <!ELEMENT Xbar_kp1 (#PCDATA)>
// <!-- ATTTLIST Xbar_kp1
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
// <!ELEMENT Ybar_kp1 (#PCDATA)>
// <!-- ATTTLIST Ybar_kp1
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
// <!ELEMENT Theta (#PCDATA)>
// <!-- ATTTLIST Theta
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
// <!ELEMENT alpha_values (alpha+)>
// <!-- ATTTLIST alpha
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED -->

<!-- Simple Shuffle Validity Proof Short Version
// <!ELEMENT SimpleShuffleValidityProof (GValue, BigGamma, c_hash, alpha_values)>
// <!-- ATTTLIST GValue
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
// <!-- ATTTLIST c_hash
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED -->

<!-- Simple Shuffle Validity Proof Long Version -->
<!-- ATTTLIST SimpleShuffleValidityProof (GValue, BigGamma, Theta_values, alpha_values)>
<!-- ATTTLIST GValue
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!-- ATTTLIST BigGamma
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!-- ATTTLIST Theta_values (Theta_value*)>
<!-- ATTTLIST Theta_value (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTTLIST Theta_value
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
<!-- ATTTLIST alpha_values (alpha*)>

```

```

<!-- ELEMENT alpha (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST alpha
Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Simple Shuffle Validity Proof Optimized
// <!-- ELEMENT SimpleShuffleValidityProof (GValue, BigGamma, BigOmega, f_values, Theta_values, Theta_
// <!-- ELEMENT BigOmega (#PCDATA)>
// <!-- ATTLIST BigOmega
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
// <!-- ELEMENT Theta_values (Theta_value+)>
// <!-- ELEMENT Theta_value (#PCDATA)>
// <!-- ATTLIST Theta_value
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
// <!-- ELEMENT f_values (f_value+)>
// <!-- ELEMENT f_value (#PCDATA)>
// <!-- ATTLIST f_value
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
// <!-- ELEMENT Theta_kp1 (#PCDATA)>
// <!-- ATTLIST Theta_kp1
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED>
// <!-- ELEMENT Theta_2k (#PCDATA)>
// <!-- ATTLIST Theta_2k
// Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED -->

<!-- Signature -->
<!-- ELEMENT Signature (#PCDATA)>

<!-- SignedData -->
<!-- ELEMENT SignedData (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Signed Ballot Box -->
<!-- ELEMENT SignedBallotBox (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Signed Blank Ballot -->
<!-- ELEMENT SignedBlankBallot (SignedData, Signature+)>

<!-- Signed Election Parameters -->
<!-- ELEMENT SignedElectionParameters (CryptoElectionParameters,
                                         KeyShareCommitment+, Signature+)>

<!-- Signed Vote Receipt Data -->
<!-- ELEMENT SignedVoteReceiptData (SignedData, Signature)>

```

```

<!-- Signed Voted Ballot -->
<!ELEMENT SignedVotedBallot (SignedData, Signature)>

<!-- Signed Voted Ballots -->
<!ELEMENT SignedVotedBallots (SignedVotedBallot*)>

<!-- SigningPrivateKey -->
<!ELEMENT SigningPrivateKey (#PCDATA)>

<!-- SigningPublicKey -->
<!ELEMENT SigningPublicKey (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Trustee Dictionary Commitments -->
<!ELEMENT TrusteeDictionaryCommitments (Authority, BlankBallot,
                                         BSNDictionaryCommitments+)>

<!-- Trustee Dictionary Commitments Set -->
<!ELEMENT TrusteeDictionaryCommitmentsSet (TrusteeDictionaryCommitments+)>

<!-- Trustee Revealed Dictionary Secrets -->
<!ELEMENT TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets (Authority, BlankBallot,
                                             BSNRevealedDictionarySecrets+)>

<!-- Trustee Revealed Dictionary Secrets Box -->
<!ELEMENT TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecretsBox (TrusteeRevealedDictionarySecrets*)>

<!-- Signed Trustee Dictionary Commitments -->
<!ELEMENT SignedTrusteeDictionaryCommitments (SignedData, Signature)>

<!-- Vote Receipt Data -->
<!ELEMENT VoteReceiptData (BallotSequenceNumber, VoteVerificationCodes)>
<!-- ATTLIST VoteReceiptData
SVBHash CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Vote Verification Code -->
<!ELEMENT VoteVerificationCode (#PCDATA)>
<!-- ATTLIST VoteVerificationCode

```

Encoding CDATA #REQUIRED

QuestionReference CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Vote Verification Codes -->

<!ELEMENT *VoteVerificationCodes* (*VoteVerificationCode*+)>

<!-- Vote Verification Dictionary -->

<!ELEMENT *VoteVerificationDictionary* (*BallotSequenceNumber*, *DictionaryQuestion*+)>

<!-- Vote Verification Dictionaries -->

<!ELEMENT *VoteVerificationDictionaries* (*VoteVerificationDictionary**)>

<!-- Vote Verification Key -->

<!ELEMENT *VoteVerificationKey* (#PCDATA)>

<!-- Vote Verification Keys -->

<!ELEMENT *VoteVerificationKeys* (*VoteVerificationKey*+)>

<!-- Vote Verification Statement -->

<!ELEMENT *VoteVerificationStatement* (*BallotSequenceNumber*, *VoteVerificationCode*+)>

<!-- Vote Verification Statements -->

<!ELEMENT *VoteVerificationStatements* (*VoteVerificationStatement**)>

<!-- Voted Ballot -->

<!ELEMENT *VotedBallot* (*ElectionID*, *BallotSequenceNumber*, *RawVotedBallot*)>

<!ATTLIST *VotedBallot*

BBHash CDATA #REQUIRED>

<!-- Voter Roll -->

<!ELEMENT *VoterRoll* (*Certificate**)>

