## Flare On 7 - garbage

This write-up concerns the second challenge on Flare On 7 as I found it very nice to learn about PE files structure and basic reverse engineering.



Figure 1: Dashboard of Flare On 7.

The challenge starts with the following message: "One of our team members developed a Flare-On challenge but accidentally deleted it. We recovered it using extreme digital forensic techniques but it seems to be corrupted. We would fix it but we are too busy solving today's most important information security threats affecting our global economy. You should be able to get it working again, reverse engineer it, and acquire the flag.". So it seems that the file is corrupted. Let's put it in PE studio to see the properties of the file.

property	value
md5	CB85617125124F3FC945C7F375349DE3
sha1	FDD445057A5CE73444FC5C5AC50AC10AB0B44466
sha256	E30ED00A2763403BC0040F3EB5F6B22874892D9A79BCE5F4239404D6B9009B42
md5-without-overlay	n/a
sha1-without-overlay	n/a
sha256-without-overlay	n/a
first-bytes-hex	4D 5A 90 00 03 00 00 00 04 00 00 0F FF 00 00 B8 00 00 00 00 00 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00
first-bytes-text	M Z @ @
file-size	40740 (bytes)
size-without-overlay	n/a
entropy	7.819
imphash	n/a
signature	<u>UPX -&gt; www.upx.sourceforge.net</u>
entry-point	60 BE 00 F0 40 00 8D BE 00 20 FF FF 57 83 CD FF EB 10 90 90 90 90 90 8A 06 46 88 07 47 01 DB 75
file-version	n/a
description	n/a
file-type	executable
cpu	32-bit
subsystem	console
compiler-stamp	0x5EA2E073 (Fri Apr 24 05:49:55 2020)
debugger-stamp	n/a
resources-stamp	empty
exports-stamp	n/a
version-stamp	n/a

Figure 2: garbage.exe in PE studio.

As we can notice in Figure 2, the entropy and the signature of the file indicates that the file seems to be packed. Indeed, the entropy is quite high and the signature indicates that the file is UPX packed. Now, if we try to unpack the sample an exception occurs because the file is corrupted.

Figure 3: Unpacking try.

Let's do some recon so we can identify how the file was corrupted. If we open the corrupted file with PE bear, we can notice that only the resource section seems to be corrupted. Opening the file with a hex editor, we see that a part of the manifest and the import address table are missing.

Name	Raw Addr.	Raw size	Virtual Addr.	Virtual Size	Characteristics	Ptr to Reloc.	Num. of
D UPX0	400	0	1000	E000	E0000080	0	0
D UPX1	400	9A00	F000	A000	E0000040	0	0
▷ .rsrc	9E00	124	19000	1000	C0000040	0	0

Figure 4: Section headers of garbage.exe.

```
00009E40 09 04 00 00 48 00 00 00 5C 90 01 00 7D 01 00 00 ....H...\...}...
00009E60 6C 20 76 65 72 73 69 6F 6E 3D 27 31 2E 30 27 20 1 version='1.0'
00009E70 65 6E 63 6F 64 69 6E 67 3D 27 55 54 46 2D 38 27 encoding='UTF-8'
00009E80 20 73 74 61 6E 64 61 6C 6F 6E 65 3D 27 79 65 73
                                                 standalone='yes
00009E90 27 3F 3E 0D 0A 3C 61 73 73 65 6D 62 6C 79 20 78 '?>..<assembly x
00009EA0 6D 6C 6E 73 3D 27 75 72 6E 3A 73 63 68 65 6D 61 mlns='urn:schema
00009EB0 73 2D 6D 69 63 72 6F 73 6F 66 74 2D 63 6F 6D 3A s-microsoft-com:
00009EC0 61 73 6D 2E 76 31 27 20 6D 61 6E 69 66 65 73 74 asm.vl' manifest
00009ED0 56 65 72 73 69 6F 6E 3D 27 31 2E 30 27 3E 0D 0A Version='1.0'>..
00009EE0 20 20 3C 74 72 75 73 74 49 6E 66 6F 20 78 6D 6C
                                                  <trustInfo xml
00009EF0 6E 73 3D 22 75 72 6E 3A 73 63 68 65 6D 61 73 2D ns="urn:schemas-
00009F00 6D 69 63 72 6F 73 6F 66 74 2D 63 6F 6D 3A 61 73 microsoft-com:as
00009F10 6D 2E 76 33 22 3E 0D 0A 20 20 20 3C 73 65 63 m.v3">.. <sec
00009F20 75 72 69 74
                                                 urit
```

Figure 5: Hex view of the resource section.

After the rebuilding of the manifest and the imports in the garbage.exe file, we can finally unpack the file using the "upx -d" command.

```
c:\users\malware_lab\desktop\garbage_chal\fixe <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' standalone='yes'?>
                                                 <assembly xmlns='urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v1' manifestVersion='1.0'>
  and indicators (9/23)
                                                  <trustInfo xmlns="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:asm.v3">
 wirustotal (warning)
                                                   <security>

    dos-header (64 bytes)

                                                    <requestedPrivileges>
 dos-stub (184 bytes)
                                                     <requestedExecutionLevel level='asInvoker' uiAccess='false' />

iii file-header (Apr.2020)

                                                    </requestedPrivileges>
                                                   </security>
  optional-header (file-checksum)
                                                  </trustInfo>
 - directories (4)
                                                 </assembly>
  sections (entry-point)
 -> libraries (count)
  imports (count)
 exports (n/a)
  --∞ tls-callbacks (n/a)
  resources (manifest)
  -abc strings (2/581)
 debug (n/a)
  manifest (asInvoker)
```

Figure 6: Manifest rebuilded

After code analysis, we can notice three important API calls in the main function.

```
*(undefined2 *)puVar3 = *(undefined2 *)puVar2;
FUN_00401000(local_13c,(int)slocal_1c,0x14,(int)local_c4);
iFile = CreateFileA(local_13c[0],0x40000000,2,(LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES)0x0,2,0x80,(HANDLE)0x0);
FUN_00401045((int *)local 13c);
if (hFile != (HANDLE) 0xffffffff) {
  local_140 = 0;
  FUN 00401000 (local 13c, (int) slocal 5c, 0x3d, (int) local 12c);
 WriteFile(hFile,local_13c[0],0x3d,&local_140,(LPOVERLAPPED)0x0);
  FUN_00401045((int *)local_13c);
  CloseHandle (hFile);
 FUN_00401000(local_13c, (int) slocal_1c, 0x14, (int) local_c4);
 ShellExecuteA((HWND)0x0,(LPCSTR)0x0,local 13c[0],(LPCSTR)0x0,(LPCSTR)0x0,0);
 FUN 00401045((int *)local 13c);
uExitCode = 0xffffffff;
hFile = GetCurrentProcess();
TerminateProcess(hFile,uExitCode);
FUN_0040121b();
return;
```

Figure 6 : CreateFile, WriteFile, ShellExecuteA calls

Running the file in x32dbg and putting breakpoints on the three API calls, we notice the creation of the sink\_the\_tanker.vbs file and the writing of the MSGBOX VBScript command with our flag in it.




Figure 9: ShellExecuteA call.