Development and Application of a Decentralized Domain Name Service

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Public Waste Photography
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

Figure 1: Probing the GFW's DNS poisoning from outside.



Figure 2: Verifying poisoned domains from inside the GFW.

External Probing and Internal Verification of the China's Great Firewall



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Table 1: Comparison of Decentralized DNS Solutions

Feature	Traditional DNS	ENS	Namecoin	Handshake	Phicoin (This Work)
Decentralization	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Performance	High	Medium	Medium	Medium	High
Censorship Resistant	Low	High	High	High	High
Cost (per domain)	High	High	Medium	Medium	Super Low ($0.00025)
Blockchain Speed	N/A	15 sec	10 min	10 min	15 sec
Extensibility	Limited	Flexible	Limited	Limited	Flexible



- Name: Phicoin
  The PoW High-Performance Infrastructure
- Symbol: Φ .
- Block Time: 15 seconds.
- Block Size: 4 MB
- TPS: 1,092 TPS
- DAG Size: > 4 GB
- DAG Increasing: 25% / year
- Total Supply: unlimited
- Halving Times: 1

Steam Hardware Survey: September 2024

ALL VIDEO CARDS	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3060	6.19%	5.66%	5.88%	5.51%	**5.86%**	+0.35%
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4060	2.82%	3.02%	3.47%	3.41%	**4.58%**	+1.17%
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4060 Laptop GPU	2.84%	3.58%	3.21%	4.55%	**4.37%**	-0.18%
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4060 Ti	2.31%	2.45%	2.84%	2.90%	**3.66%**	+0.76%
NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1650	4.52%	4.16%	4.00%	3.91%	**3.64%**	-0.27%
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3060 Ti	3.84%	3.56%	3.58%	3.43%	**3.57%**	+0.14%
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3070	3.70%	3.36%	3.52%	3.15%	**3.31%**	+0.16%
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2060	3.75%	3.40%	3.43%	3.14%	**3.30%**	+0.16%
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 3060 Laptop GPU	3.37%	3.36%	3.00%	3.50%	**3.00%**	-0.50%
NVIDIA GeForce RTX 4070	2.46%	2.38%	2.76%	2.52%	**2.91%**	+0.39%



Phihash mining curves

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

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Web Traffic Requests by Country

Previous 7 days



Top Traffic Countries / Regions

Previous 7 days

Country / Region	Traffic
Indonesia	1,786,097
Nigeria	1,566,471
United States	955,095
Russian Federation	221,628
Bangladesh	209,276



DDNS System Architecture

Domain Types:

Category	Description
Phicoin Top-Level Domains	Used to create Phicoin top-level domains (pTLDs), such as `.ddns`. Anyone with a GPU can mine Phicoin and create a TLD [25].
Sub Domains	Used to create second-level domains with specific rules:
Asset Structure	Maximum of 32 characters.
Data Structure	`!` denotes root asset, `/` denotes separator.
Properties	• Non-reissuable. • Quantity of 1. • Unit of 1.
Initial Binding Hash	`000...000` (64 zeros).
Deactivation Hash	`Qm000...000` (46-character IPFS hash).
Management Rights	Transferred to a specified address upon creation.
Fees	• Creation Fee: 0.1 phi. • Modification Fee: 0.1 phi.
No Annual Fees	Domains never expire.
Subdomains	Supports creation of subdomains up to a total length of 30 characters.

Table 2: Phicoin Domain Rules and Properties

DDNS Domain Queries:

1. **Retrieve the IPFS hash from the Phicoin blockchain based on the domainname .**
2. **2. Fetch the domain configuration JSON file from IPFS using the hash.**
3. **3. Parse the JSON file to extract the domain records.**
4. **4. Return the resolution result to the user**



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DDNSD Flow Chart

Component	Description
Root Trust Element	Blockchain: Immutable ownership of domains and records. Ownership tracked as assets; private keys authorize all actions.
Validation and Integrity	IPFS: Stores domain data securely and decentrally. Content-addressed storage ensures authenticity; hashes bound to blockchain prevent tampering.
Participants	- pTLD Operators: Manage top-level domains like .ddns. Trust based on ownership of blockchain assets. - Subdomain Owners: Control second-level domains; rights transferred through blockchain. - Visitors: Perform domain name resolutions via verified blockchain-IPFS data.
Security Layers	- Private Key Cryptography: Ensures authorized actions. - Immutability: Prevents retroactive alterations. - Decentralization: Enhances availability and censorship resistance.
Anti-Attack Mechanisms	- DNS Hijacking: Local resolution via blockchain and IPFS mitigates risks. - Cache Poisoning: Cryptographic verification ensures only valid data is used. - Censorship Resistance: No central authority to enable censorship.
Operational Support	- Fees: Low-cost creation and modification. - Compatibility: Supports traditional and DDNS queries.
Future Enhancements	- Adding DNSSEC-like features for stronger identity verification. - Expanding record types for broader functionality.

Trust Chain Analysis for Decentralized Domain Name Service (DDNS)

Demo:



Successfully uploaded to IPFS

Demo:



Deployment on blockchain

Demo:

```
(base) root@DESKTOP-OGBKEB8:/mnt/c/Users/Administrator# nslookup -port=5553 www.cyber.ddns 127.0.0.1
Server:         127.0.0.1
Address:        127.0.0.1#5553

Name:   WWW.CYBER.DDNS
Address: 1.2.3.4
Name:   WWW.CYBER.DDNS
Address: 1.2.3.4

(base) root@DESKTOP-OGBKEB8:/mnt/c/Users/Administrator# nslookup -port=5553 ipv6.cyber.ddns 127.0.0.1
Server:         127.0.0.1
Address:        127.0.0.1#5553

Name:   IPV6.CYBER.DDNS
Address: 2001:0:130f::9c0:876a:130b
Name:   IPV6.CYBER.DDNS
Address: 2001:0:130f::9c0:876a:130b

(base) root@DESKTOP-OGBKEB8:/mnt/c/Users/Administrator# nslookup -port=5553 shop.cyber.ddns 127.0.0.1
Server:         127.0.0.1
Address:        127.0.0.1#5553

SHOP.CYBER.DDNS canonical name = example.com.
Name:   example.com
Address: 2606:2800:21f:cb07:6820:80da:af6b:8b2c

(base) root@DESKTOP-OGBKEB8:/mnt/c/Users/Administrator# nslookup -port=5553 mail.cyber.ddns 127.0.0.1
Server:         127.0.0.1
Address:        127.0.0.1#5553

MAIL.CYBER.DDNS mail exchanger = 10 mail.example.com.
MAIL.CYBER.DDNS mail exchanger = 10 mail.example.com.
```

Verify using nslookup

Future Work:

- **Support for Additional DNS Protocols:** Extend domain templates to include recordslike TLSA for DANE, enabling secure certificate verification without traditional Certifi-cate Authorities (CAs)

- **User Interface Improvements:** Develop intuitive tools and graphical interfaces for do-main registration and management to lower the entry barrier for non-technical users.

- **Public DDNS Resolution Nodes:** Deploy public nodes compatible with traditional DNSto facilitate adoption and ease of use for end-users.

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Thank You!

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