From 11acad6f72af24c84fdf7a97a131795f14ce5732 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: EdwinWenink Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2020 16:45:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Update post 45 --- content/posts/45-raven_paradox_inductive_inference.md | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/content/posts/45-raven_paradox_inductive_inference.md b/content/posts/45-raven_paradox_inductive_inference.md index 3ff40bc6..47fde71c 100644 --- a/content/posts/45-raven_paradox_inductive_inference.md +++ b/content/posts/45-raven_paradox_inductive_inference.md @@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ We already knew that seeing more black ravens increased our confidence that all But what rewriting the proposition suggests is that we then should also be more confident that all ravens are black when we encounter any object that is not black and not a raven. Although being logically equivalent, this statement suddenly no longer accurately describes how we become more sure that all ravens are black. Does my confidence that ravens are black increase when I see a yellow banana? -Seeing a yellow banana seems completely irrelevant when considering the proposition that Ravens are black, but the logical formalization of the inferred rule on black ravens does not express this. +Seeing a yellow banana seems completely irrelevant when considering the proposition that all ravens are black, but the logical formalization of the inferred rule on black ravens does not express this. [Peter Lipton]( https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781405164481.ch29 ) points out that this issue of relevance similarly plagues existing models of scientific explanation, particularly the so-called Deductive-Nomological model. In the summary of Lipton, this model states that "an event is explained when its description can be deduced from a set of premises that essentially includes at least one law".