Title: Improving Robustness of ML Classiers against Realizable Evasion Attacks Using Conserved Features.

This paper investigates the effectiveness of conventional approach of evaluating the robustness of ML models against *evasion attacks;* to design robust ML model against the attacks that can be realized in actual malware. There are 3 main contributions in this paper: (1) The paper presents an evaluation of feature-space evasion attack model specifically using 4 ML-based approaches for PDF malware detection, For structure-based: **SL2013** and **Hidost**, for content-based: **PDFRate-R** and **PDFRate-B**. (2) It proposes a method for boosting robustness of feature-space models by identifying *conserved features.* (3) It explores the extent to which said ML robustness can be generalized to multiple distinct realizable attacks.In this paper we focus on PDF malware detection,where the **label space is binary** i.e, either a PDF file is benign (which we can code as -1), or malicious (which we can code as +1).

Evasion Attacks: Realizable Evasion attack : y = h(x) ; y: label (-1/+1), h(X):learned model, x : feature vector extracted from PDF($x \epsilon X$). e : malicious entity, ϕ(e) :extract feature vector,attacker transforms e into e' (preserving malicious functionality) where,ϕ(e') = x' ; x' : associated feature vector and so h(x')= will yield erroneous label. Feature-space model of Evasion attack: attacker starts with a malicious feature vector x instead of an entity and directly modify x to x' ; $x' \epsilon X$ so that y' = h(x'). C(x,x') = cost of converting x to x'. attacker is penalized for greater modifications to given feature vector x : measured using l_p norm (difference b/w original and malicious instance).

Evasion Defense: An arbitrary attack : O(h:D) where h: classifier , D: Dataset which returns 'an evasion'. let u(h ; O(h:D)) measure the defense that we want to optimize, then defense against the attack O(h:D) is : $\max_h$ u(h ; O(h:D))

Iterative Retraining : In particular, we use a variant of iterative retraining [1] :

1. Start with the initial classier.
2. Execute the evasion attack for each malicious instance in training data to generate a new feature vector.
3. Add all new data points to training data (removing any duplicates), and retrain the classier.
4. Terminate after either a xed number of iterations, or when no new evasions can be added.

Conserved

Results of Robustness:

SL2013 against EvadeML: Original Classifier: 16%, RAR:96%, FSR:62%, On non adversarial data:Original-AUC=0.9999, RAR-AUC=0.9999, FSR-AUC=0.9947. **Hidost** against EvadeML: Original Classifier: 2%, RAR: 98%, FSR: 70%, On non adversarial data:Original-AUC=0.9997, RAR-AUC=0.9997, FSR-AUC=0.9930. **PDFRate-R** against EvadeML: Original Classifier: 2%, RAR: 96%, FSR: 100%, On non adversarial data: Original-AUC=0.9998, RAR-AUC=1.0000, FSR-AUC=0.9895.**PDFRate-B** against EvadeML:Original Classifier: 100%, FSR: 100%, On non adversarial data: Original-AUC=1.0000, FSR-AUC=0.9988. **SL2013** against EvadeML: Original Classifier: 16%, RAR: 96%, CFR: 87%, CFR-JS: 100%, On non adversarial data: Original-AUC=0.9999, RAR-AUC=0.9999, CFR-AUC=0.9992, CFR-JS-AUC=0.9997. **Hidost** against EvadeML: Original Classifier:2% ,RAR:98%,CFR:100%, CFR-JS: 53%, On non adversarial data:Original-AUC=0.9997,RAR-AUC=0.9997,CFR-AUC=0.9982,CFR-JS-AUC=0.9965.
PDFRate-B against EvadeML: Org.Classifier:100%, CFR:100%, CFR-JS: 100%, non adver.data: Original-AUC=1.000, CFR-AUC=0.9999, CFR-JS_AUC =0.9997.

Conclusion: This study was specific to PDF malware detection. However,the framework is quite general, and could be used in the future to consider other similar questions, such as the effectiveness of robust deep learning against physical attacks.

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