

# Cryptographic Hash Function

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Course “Information and Network Security”

Lecture 6

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## Agenda

Last time:

- Achieve message integrity using MACs
- Construction of MACs from block ciphers. Example:  
CBC-MAC

Today:

Construct a more efficient MAC using hash functions (HMAC)

## Cryptographic Hash Function: definition

A **Hash function** is a pair of polynomial time algorithms  $(\text{Gen}, \mathcal{H})$ :

1. Probabilistic Gen :  $s \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$
2. Deterministic  $\mathcal{H}_s : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ .

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Most important property of  $\mathcal{H}_s$  is **collision resistant**:

Given  $s$ , there is no efficient adversary who can find two inputs  $x, x' (x \neq x')$  to  $\mathcal{H}_s$  s.t.

$$\mathcal{H}_s(x) = \mathcal{H}(x')$$

! A “hash” function in general sense does not necessarily has this property. A **cryptographic** hash function must be collision resistant.

There are many collisions for  $\mathcal{H}_s$ , but it must be hard to find any.

## Properties of cryptographic hash function

### | Pre-image resistance (or one-wayness)

Given  $(s, y)$

Find  $x$  s.t.  $\mathcal{H}_s(x) = y$

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### II 2<sup>nd</sup> Pre-image resistance

Given  $(s, x)$

Find  $x' \neq x$  s.t.  $\mathcal{H}_s(x) = \mathcal{H}_s(x')$

A collision resistant hash function is also 2<sup>nd</sup> pre-image resistant

Conclusion: Collision resistance is the strongest requirement

## A word of caution: Exotic property of hash functions

In BitCoind world the above three properties: **pre-image resistance**, **2<sup>nd</sup> pre-image resistance**, **collision resistance** may have other names: “**hiding**”, “**puzzle friendliness**”, **collision resistance**.

These are not special properties! BitCoin uses standardized cryptographic hash function (wait until the end of the lecture).

See e.g. Section 1.1. in [https://d28rh4a8wq0iu5.cloudfront.net/bitcointech/readings/princeton\\_bitcoin\\_book.pdf?a=1](https://d28rh4a8wq0iu5.cloudfront.net/bitcointech/readings/princeton_bitcoin_book.pdf?a=1)

## Generic attack on any hash function: birthday paradox

Reminder: Let  $h_1, h_2, \dots, h_n \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$  be independent identically distributed bit strings. Then Birthday paradox says that

$$\text{For } n = \mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{|\{0, 1\}^\ell|}\right) = \mathcal{O}\left(2^{\ell/2}\right) \quad \Pr[\exists(i! = j) : h_i = h_j] > 1/2.$$

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Generic algorithm finds a collision in  $\mathcal{O}(2^{\ell/2})$  hash evaluations:

1. Choose  $2^{\ell/2}$  random bit strings (messages)  $m_1, \dots, m_{2^{\ell/2}}$
2. For each  $m_i$  compute  $h_i = \mathcal{H}_s(m_i)$ , sort pairs to  $(h_i, m_i)$  w.r.t.  $h_i$
3. Find in the sorted list  $h_i = h_j$ . A collision  $(m_i, m_j)$ .

Birthday paradox ensures that the above algorithm succeeds with constant success probability.

Conclusion: Require  $\ell \geq 160$ .

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In Russia

1. GOST R 34.11-94 and GOST 34.311-95.  $\ell = 256$   
Status: **Deprecated** Collision in  $2^{105}$  time
2. GOST R 34.11-2012. Streebog  $\ell = 256, 512$   
Status: **Should be used in certified products**


## Construction of a hash function: Merkle-Damgård paradigm

Given a compression function (will be defined later)

$$h : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$$

Construct  $\mathcal{H} : \mathcal{M}^* \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$


Let  $m = (m_1, m_2, m_3)$  of arbitrary length.



**IV** - Initial Value (fixed for given hash function)

**PB** - Padding Block [100...0||mes. length]. If **PB** does not fit add another block

## Security of Merkle-Damgård construction




**Theorem:** If  $h$  is collision resistant so is  $H$ .

## Construction of compressing function $h$

$\text{Enc} : \mathcal{K} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  – a block-cipher.

Davies-Meyer construction:


$$h(H_i, m) = \text{Enc}(H_i, m) \oplus H_i$$



**Theorem (Informal):** If  $\text{Enc}$  is a “good” cipher (i.e.,  $\text{Enc}$  is a random permutation for fixed  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ ), then finding a collision  $h(H, m) = h(H', m')$  takes  $2^{n/2}$  evaluations of  $(\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ .

## Example: SHA-256

In SHA-256 the compression function is:



Merkle-Damgård construction is used to allow for arbitrary message length.

## Alternative construction of $h$

Davies-Meyer construction:

$$h(H, m) = \text{Enc}(H, m) \oplus H$$

Miyaguchi–Preneel constriction:

$$h(H, m) = \text{Enc}(H, m) \oplus H \oplus m$$


Other variants of combinations of  $\text{Enc}, H, m$  exist. Not all combination are secure!

GOST P 34.11-2012 (Streebog) uses Miyaguchi–Preneel.

## Sponge construction: SHA-3

SHA-3 (Keccak) is not based on compression function. It is a **Sponge** (рус. Губка) construction.

$P_0, \dots, P_{n-1}$  are derived from the input message.  $Z_0, Z_1, \dots$  is the output



The block transformation  $f$  is a permutation consisting of 5 primitive function (small permutations, bitwise operations).

## Hash functions in BitCoin


Basic concept in BitCoin: Proof of Work (PoW)

Intuition: if a user has computing power  $\implies$  he should be able to prove it via doing some work

- PoW introduced to crypto by Dwork & Naor (1992) as a countermeasure against spam
- Idea: force users to solve some “moderately hard” puzzle (a solution should be fast to verify)

## Hash functions in BitCoin: constructing PoW

Main primitive: cryptographic hash function  $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$  that takes  $T(\mathcal{H})$  time to evaluate



For a cryptographic hash function  $\mathcal{H}$  Alice cannot do better than brute-force over  $s$ . This is a pre-image search.