

The Short Integer Solution (SIS) Problem

Elena Kirshanova

MPI Reading Group

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(based on eprint 2007/432 (GPV)
and on lecture notes of D. Stehlé)

Agenda

- I. SIS : definition, applications
- II. SIS hardness
- III. GPV signature (sketch)

Definition

SIS _{q, m, β} .
(Ajtai'96)

Let $n > 0, m \geq n, q \geq 2, \beta > 0$.

SIS _{$q(n), m(n), \beta(n)$} is given

$$A \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$$

The goal is to find $x \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ s.t.

1. $x^T A = 0 \pmod{q}$

2. $0 < \|x\| \leq \beta$

$$\overline{\quad}^x A = \overline{\quad}^0 \pmod{q}$$

We are fine with a ppt alg. A that solves SIS with non-negl. probability over the choice of A and of internal randomness.

Usually, $q = \text{poly}(n)$, $m = \Theta(n \lg n)$

SIS is average case SVP

Consider for $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$

$$A^\perp = \{ b \in \mathbb{Z}^m : b^T \cdot A = 0 \pmod{q} \}$$

1) A^\perp is a lattice

2) $\dim A^\perp = m$

3) $\det A^\perp = q^n$ (if q -prime) w.h.p. $\Rightarrow \lambda_1(A^\perp) = \Theta(\sqrt{m} q^{n/m})$
(Mink. bound)

$\text{SIS}_{q,m,\beta}$ is SVP with approx. factor $\frac{\beta}{\Theta(\sqrt{m} q^{n/m})}$ on A^\perp

Best Known algorithm for SIS is BKZ

Constructions from SIS

I. Hash functions: $h_A : \{0,1\}^m \longrightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$
 $x \longmapsto x^T \cdot A \bmod q$

h_A is compressing when $n \lg q < m$.

A collision for h_A gives a solution to $\text{SIS}_{m,q,\sqrt{m}}$

$$x^T A = x'^T A \Leftrightarrow (x - x')^T A = 0$$
$$0 \leq \|x - x'\| \leq \sqrt{m}$$

II. Signatures: Falcon, q Tesla, Dilithium...

SIS Hardness

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{SIVP}_\gamma & \leq & \text{SIS}_{q,m,\beta} \\ \text{(worst-case)} & & \text{(average-case)} \end{array}$$

SIVP_γ : given B - a basis of L , find $s_1 \dots s_n \in L$ -
lin. independent s.t. $\max_i \|s_i\| \leq \gamma \cdot \lambda_n(L)$

Thm. (Ajtai, GPV) Any ppt algorithm A solving $\text{SIS}_{q,m,\beta}$
with non-negl. probability can be used
to solve $\text{SIVP}_{\gamma(n)}$ in $\dim. n$ with
prob. $1 - 2^{-\Omega(n)}$ (over the internal randomness)
if $\gamma \geq q \geq 2 \cdot n \cdot \beta \cdot \sqrt{m}$.

Some useful facts

Fact 1. Given a basis B of lattice L and a set $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$, we can find a basis C of L , s.t. for $C = Q \cdot R$ - "QR-decomposition" of C

$$\max_i r_{ii} \leq \max_i \|s_i\| \quad (\text{use LLL})$$

Fact 2 We can efficiently sample from the discrete Gaussian distribution

$$D_{L, \sigma, c}(x) := \frac{f(x)}{p(L)} = \frac{\exp(-\pi \cdot \|x\|^2)}{\sum_{v \in L} \exp(-\pi \cdot \|v\|^2)}$$

support std.dev. shift

for $\sigma \geq \sqrt{n} \cdot \max_i \|b_i\|$, where $B = \{b_i\}_{i=1}^n$ is a basis of L .

(Use Klein's sampler / GPV)

Fact 3 Poisson Summation Formula (PSF): For every lattice L and a 'nice' f :

$$\sum_{b \in L} f(b) = \frac{1}{\det L} \sum_{\hat{b} \in \hat{L}} \hat{f}(\hat{b}), \text{ where } \hat{L} - \text{dual to } L$$

\hat{f} - Fourier transform of f

SIS Hardness Proof I.

IncIVP ($\overset{\text{a basis}}{B}, \overset{\text{a set of lin. indep. vectors}}{S}, \overset{\text{a hyperplane}}{H}$) : find $x \in L \setminus H$ s.t. $\|x\| < \frac{1}{2} \cdot \max_i \|s_i\|$
(incremental independent vector) for $\max_i \|s_i\| \geq \gamma \cdot \lambda_n(L)$

$$\text{IncIVP} \leq \text{SIS}$$

SIS Hardness Proof I.

IncIVP (B, S, H) : find $x \in L \setminus H$ s.t. $\|x\| < \frac{1}{2} \cdot \max_i \|s_i\|$
(incremental independent vector) for $\max_i \|s_i\| \geq \gamma \cdot \chi_n(L)$

a basis
a set of lin. indep. vectors
a hyperplane

IncIVP \leq SIS

Input: $B, S \subset L, H, O^{\text{SIS}}$ - oracle for SIS

Output: v - solution for IncIVP

1. From B and S , construct C - a basis for L

2. For $i = 1 \dots m$:

sample $\vec{y}_i \leftarrow D_{L, C, 0}$ with $\sigma = \sqrt{n} \max_i \|s_i\|$

3. Call O^{SIS} on $A = (B^{-1} \cdot Y)^T \bmod q$, where $Y = [\vec{y}_1 | \dots | \vec{y}_m]$

Let x be the output

4. Return $v = Y \cdot x / q = \frac{1}{q} \sum x_i \cdot \vec{y}_i$.

SIS Hardness Proof II.

2. For $i = 1 \dots m$:

sample $\vec{y}_i \leftarrow D_{L, \sigma, 0}$ with $\sigma = \sqrt{n} \max_i \|S_i\|$

3. Call O^{SIS} on $A = (B^{-1} \cdot Y)^T \bmod q$, where $Y = [\vec{y}_1 | \dots | \vec{y}_m]$

Let x be the output

4. Return $v = Y \cdot x / q = \frac{1}{q} \sum x_i \cdot \vec{y}_i$.

Remarks

1. $(B^{-1} \cdot Y)^T_i$ - the coordinate vector of y_i w.r.t. $B \bmod q$

\Rightarrow "x" from Step 3 is a small combination that cancels the coordinates of y w.r.t. B

2. The reduction runs in ppt

3. The success probability can be amplified by repeating it $\text{poly}(n)$ times

On the uniformity of A

Claim 1 \mathcal{U}^{sis} receives on input a matrix whose distribution is within stat. distance of $2^{-\Omega(n)}$ from uniform over $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n})$

4 Consider the first row of A, $a_1 = (B^{-1} \cdot y_1)^T \bmod q$
(the same arguments hold for the other rows, since they are independent thanks to independence of y_i 's).

Let $\varphi: L \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ — surjective homomorphism
 $y \mapsto (B^{-1}y) \bmod q$

$\Rightarrow \exists$ a bijection between \mathbb{Z}_q^n and $L/\text{Ker } \varphi = L/qL$

$\Rightarrow B^{-1}y \bmod q$ is uniform $\Leftrightarrow y \bmod qL$ is uniform in L/qL .

For $\sigma \geq \eta_{2^{-n}}(qL)$, we have $\Delta(D_{L,\sigma} \bmod q, \mathcal{U}(L/qL)) \leq 2^{-\Omega(n)}$

(4) take $b \in L/qL$: $\Pr(b) = \Pr(y \in b + qL) = \sum_{y \in b + qL} \frac{p_\sigma(y)}{p_\sigma(L)} = \frac{p_\sigma(b + qL)}{p_\sigma(L)}$ — indep. of b ■



On the usefulness of the reduction

Claim 2 Provided \mathcal{D}^{SIS} succeeds, step 4 returns v s.t.:

1. $v \in L$

2. $\|v\| \leq \frac{1}{q} n \cdot \beta \cdot \sqrt{m} \cdot \max_i \|s_i\|$

3. $\Pr[v \notin \mathcal{H}] = \Omega(1)$

1. $v = \frac{1}{q} \cdot Y \cdot x = \frac{1}{q} \cdot B \cdot \underbrace{B^{-1} \cdot Y}_{A^T} \cdot x = B \cdot \underbrace{\frac{1}{q} (B^{-1} \cdot Y \cdot x)}_{\in \mathbb{Z}^n} \in L$

2. $\|v\| = \frac{1}{q} \|Y \cdot x\| \leq \frac{1}{q} \cdot \|x\|_1 \cdot \max_i \|y_i\| \leq \frac{1}{q} \cdot \beta \cdot \sqrt{m} \cdot \max_i \|y_i\|$
 $\leq \frac{\beta}{q} \cdot \sqrt{m} \cdot \sigma \cdot \sqrt{n}$
 $\leq \frac{\beta}{q} \cdot \sqrt{m} \cdot n \cdot \max_i \|s_i\|$

3. \mathcal{D}^{SIS} knows $a_i^T = B^{-1} \cdot y_i \bmod q \Leftrightarrow$ knows $y_i \bmod qL$.

Conditioned on a_i , y_i is Gaussian, namely $y_i \sim D_{qL} + c_i, \sigma$, where

$c_i \in L$ s.t. $B^{-1} \cdot c_i = a_i \bmod q$. $y_i \notin \mathcal{H}$ w.h.p. (see next slide)

Pr[v not in H]

Claim 2.3 $\Pr[v \notin \mathcal{H}] = \Omega(1)$ for $\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{2}} > \int_{2^{-n}}^{\leftarrow \text{smoothing par-r}} (L)$
 $v \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{L, \sigma, 0}$

Let w.l.o.g \mathcal{H} - a hyperplane orthogonal to $(1, 0, \dots, 0)$.

$$\Pr[v \in \mathcal{H}] = \Pr[v_1 = 0] \leq \mathbb{E}[\rho(v_1)] =$$

↑
Markov's ineq.

$$= \sum_{v \in L} \underbrace{\rho_{\sigma}(v_1)}_{\parallel \rho_{\sigma}(v_1) \cdot \rho_{\sigma}(v_2) \cdot \dots \cdot \rho_{\sigma}(v_n)} \cdot \frac{\rho_{\sigma}(v)}{\rho_{\sigma}(L)} = \sum_{v \in L} \rho_{\sigma/\sqrt{2}}(v_1) \cdot \frac{\rho_{\sigma}(v_2) \cdot \dots \cdot \rho_{\sigma}(v_n)}{\rho_{\sigma}(L)} =$$

\parallel
 $e^{-\frac{v_1^2}{2\sigma^2}} \cdot e^{-\frac{v_2^2}{2\sigma^2}} \cdot \dots \cdot e^{-\frac{v_n^2}{2\sigma^2}}$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{PSF} &= \frac{1}{\rho_{\sigma}(L)} \cdot \det(\hat{L}) \cdot \frac{\sigma^n}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot \sum_{\hat{v} \in \hat{L}} \rho_{\frac{\sqrt{2}}{\sigma}}(\hat{v}_1) \cdot \dots \cdot \rho_{\frac{1}{\sigma}}(\hat{v}_n) \leq \frac{\det(\hat{L}) \cdot \sigma^n}{\rho_{\sigma}(L) \cdot \sqrt{2}} \cdot \sum_{\hat{v} \in \hat{L}} \rho_{\frac{\sqrt{2}}{\sigma}}(\hat{v}) \\ x &\mapsto \rho_{\sigma/\sqrt{2}}(x_1) \cdot \dots \cdot \rho_{\sigma}(x_n) \end{aligned}$$

$[1 - 2^{-n}, 1 + 2^{-n}]$

$$\leq \frac{(1 + 2^{-n})}{\sqrt{2}} \Rightarrow \Pr[v \notin \mathcal{H}] \geq 1 - \frac{1 + 2^{-n}}{\sqrt{2}} = \Omega(1)$$

$\leq (1 + 2^{-n})$
due to the cond on σ

GPV signature (sketch)

- Facts. 1. One can efficiently sample $A \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n})$ together with a short basis of A^\perp
2. This short basis, S_A , allows to sample from $D_{A^\perp, S_A, c}$ for $\sigma = \max_i \|S_A[i]\| \cdot \sqrt{m}$

GPV signature = Schnorr on lattices

- KeyGen: sample A, S_A s.t. $\boxed{S_A} \cdot \boxed{A} \overset{n}{\overset{\leftarrow}{\rightarrow}} \overset{m}{\updownarrow} = 0 \pmod q$
 $sk = S_A; pk = A$
- Sign($m \in \{0,1\}^*$):
 1. Compute $u = H(m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ($H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ - cryptographic hash fnc)
 2. Compute arbitrary $c \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ s.t. $c^T \cdot A = u^T \pmod q$
 3. Sample $x \leftarrow D_{A^\perp, S_A, -c + c}$
Output x as the signature
- Verify(m, x, S_A) If $\|x\| \leq \sigma \sqrt{m}$ AND $x^T \cdot A = H(m)^T \pmod q$:
Return "Accept"
Else Return "Reject"

GPV signature (sketch)

• KeyGen: sample A, S_A s.t. $\begin{bmatrix} S_A \\ A \end{bmatrix} \begin{matrix} \xleftarrow{n} \\ \uparrow m \end{matrix} = 0 \pmod{q}$
 $sk = S_A; pk = A$

• Sign($m \in \{0,1\}^*$): 1. Compute $u = H(m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ($H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ - cryptographic hash fnc)

2. Compute arbitrary $c \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ s.t. $c^T \cdot A = u^T \pmod{q}$

3. Sample $x \leftarrow D_{A^\perp, S, -c} + c$
Output x as the signature

• Verify(m, x, S_A) If $\|x\| \leq 6\sqrt{m}$ AND $\underbrace{x^T \cdot A}_{= H(m)^T} = H(m)^T \pmod{q}$:

Return "Accept"

Else Return "Reject"

$$\begin{aligned} x &= y + c \text{ for } y \in A^\perp \\ \Rightarrow x^T \cdot A &= \underbrace{y^T \cdot A}_0 + c^T \cdot A = u \end{aligned}$$

GPV is EU-CMA secure in ROM provided SIS is hard.

The proof models H as Random Oracle + Forking lemma.