

The Short Integer Solution (SIS) Problem

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MPI Reading Group

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(based on eprint 2007/432 (GPV)
and on lecture notes of D. Stehlé')

Agenda

I. SIS : definition, applications

II. SIS hardness

III. GPK signature (sketch)

Definition

SIS _{q, m, β} . Let $n > 0, m \geq n, q \geq 2, \beta > 0$.

(Ajtai' 96) SIS _{$q(n), m(n), \beta(n)$} is given

$$A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$$

The goal is to find $x \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ s.t.

1. $x^T A = 0 \pmod{q}$
2. $0 < \|x\| \leq \beta$

A diagram illustrating the SIS problem. On the left, there is a horizontal line with arrows pointing from left to right. The first arrow is labeled 'x'. To the right of the matrix A, there is another horizontal line with an arrow pointing to the right, labeled '0'. Between the two lines is an equals sign (=). Above the matrix A is a small 'mod q' symbol.

We are fine with a ppt alg. A that solves SIS with non-negl. probability over the choice of A and of internal randomness.

Usually, $q = \text{poly}(n)$, $m = \Theta(n \lg n)$

SIS is average case SVP

Consider for $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$

$$A^\perp = \{ b \in \mathbb{Z}^m : b^T \cdot A = 0 \pmod{q} \}$$

1) A^\perp is a lattice

2) $\dim A^\perp = m$

3) $\det A^\perp = q^n$ (if q -prime) w.h.p. $\Rightarrow \lambda_1(A^\perp) = \Theta(\sqrt{m} q^{n/m})$
(Mink. bound)

$SIS_{q, m, \beta}$ is SVP with approx. factor $\frac{\beta}{\Theta(\sqrt{m} q^{n/m})}$ on A^\perp

Best Known algorithm for SIS is BKZ

Constructions from SIS

I. Hash functions: $h_A : \{0,1\}^m \longrightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$

$$x \longmapsto x^T A \bmod q$$

h_A is compressing when $n \lg q < m$.

A collision for h_A gives a solution to $SIS_{m,q,\sqrt{m}}$

$$x^T A = x'^T A \Leftrightarrow (x - x')^T A = 0$$
$$0 \leq \|x - x'\| \leq \sqrt{m}$$

II. Signatures: Falcon, qTesla, Dilithium...

SIS Hardness

SIVP_γ : given B - a basis of L , find $s_1 \dots s_n \in L$ - lin. independent s.t. $\max_i \|s_i\| \leq \gamma \cdot \lambda_n(L)$

Thm. (Ajtai, GPV) Any ppt algorithm A solving $SIS_{q,m,\beta}$ with non-neg. probability can be used to solve $SIVP_{\gamma(n)}$ in dim. n with prob. $1-2^{-\Omega(n)}$ (over the internal randomness) if $\gamma \geq q \geq 2 \cdot n \cdot \beta \cdot \sqrt{m}$.

Some useful facts

Fact 1. Given a basis B of lattice L and a set $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$, we can find a basis C of L , s.t. for $C = Q \cdot R$ - "QR-decomposition" of C

$$\max_i r_{ii} \leq \max_i \|s_i\| \quad . \quad (\text{use LLL})$$

Fact 2 We can efficiently sample from the discrete Gaussian distribution

$$D_{L, \sigma, c}(x) := \frac{p(x)}{p(L)} = \frac{\exp(-\pi \cdot \|x\|^2)}{\sum_{v \in L} \exp(-\pi \cdot \|v\|^2)}$$

↑ support ↑ std.dev. ↙ Shift

for $\sigma \geq \sqrt{n} \cdot \max_i \|b_i\|$, where $B = \{b_i\}_{i \in n}$ is a basis of L .

(Use Klein's sampler / GPV)

Fact 3 Poisson Summation Formula (PSF): For every lattice L and a 'nice' f :

$$\sum_{b \in L} f(b) = \frac{1}{\det L} \sum_{\tilde{b} \in \tilde{L}} \hat{f}(\tilde{b}), \text{ where } \tilde{L} \text{- dual to } L$$

\hat{f} - Fourier transform of f

SIS Hardness Proof I.

IncIVP (B, S, H) : find $x \in L \setminus H$ s.t. $\|x\| < \frac{1}{2} \cdot \max_i \|s_i\|$

(incremental independent vector) for $\max_i \|s_i\| \geq \gamma \cdot \chi_n(L)$

*B - a basis
S - a set of lin. indep. vectors
H - a hyperplane*

IncIVP \leq SIS

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IncIVP \leq SIS

Input: $B, S \subset L, H, O^{\text{SIS}}$ - oracle for SIS

Output: v - solution for IncIVP

1. From B and S , construct C - a basis for L

2. For $i = 1..m$:

sample $\vec{y}_i \leftarrow D_{L, C, 0}$ with $\zeta = \sqrt{n} \max_i \|s_i\|$

3. Call O^{SIS} on $A = (B^{-1} \cdot Y)^T \bmod q$, where $Y = [\vec{y}_1 | \dots | \vec{y}_m]$

Let x be the output

4. Return $v = Y \cdot x / q = \frac{1}{q} \sum x_i \cdot \vec{y}_i$.

SIS Hardness Proof II.

2. For $i = 1..m$:

sample $\vec{y}_i \leftarrow D_{L, \zeta, 0}$ with $\zeta = \sqrt{n} \max_i \|S_i\|$

3. Call \mathcal{O}^{SIS} on $f = (B^{-1} \cdot Y)^T \bmod q$, where $Y = [\vec{y}_1 | \dots | \vec{y}_m]$

Let x be the output

4. Return $v = Y \cdot x / q = \frac{1}{q} \sum x_i \cdot \vec{y}_i$.

Remarks

1. $(B^{-1} \cdot Y)_i$ - the coordinate vector of y_i w.r.t. $B \bmod q$

$\Rightarrow "x"$ from Step 3 is a small combination that cancels the coordinates of y w.r.t. B

2. The reduction runs in ppt

3. The success probability can be amplified by repeating it $\text{poly}(n)$ times

On the uniformity of A

Claim 1 D^{SIS} receives on input a matrix whose distribution is within stat. distance of $2^{-\text{UL}(n)}$ from uniform over $\mathcal{U}(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n})$

Consider the first row of A, $a_1 = (B^{-1} \cdot y_1)^T \bmod q$
(the same arguments hold for the other rows, since they are independent thanks to independence of x_i 's).

Let $\varphi: L \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ — surjective homomorphism
 $y \mapsto (B^{-1}y) \bmod q$,

$\Rightarrow \exists$ a bijection between \mathbb{Z}_q^n and $L/\text{Ker } \varphi = L/qL$

$\Rightarrow B^{-1}y \bmod q$ is uniform $\Leftrightarrow y \bmod qL$ is uniform in L/qL .

For $\sigma \geq \eta_{2^{-n}}(qL)$, we have $\Delta(D_{L,\sigma} \bmod q, \mathcal{U}(L/qL)) \leq 2^{-\text{UL}(n)}$

(A take $b \in L/qL$: $\Pr_{y \in D_{L,\sigma}}(y \in b + qL) = \sum_{y \in b + qL} \frac{\Pr(y)}{\Pr(L)} = \frac{\Pr(b + qL)}{\Pr(L)}$ — indep. of b ■)

On the usefulness of the reduction

Claim 2 Provided \mathcal{O}^{SIS} succeeds, step 4 returns v s.t.:

$$1. v \in L$$

$$2. \|v\| \leq \frac{1}{q} \cdot n \cdot B \cdot \sqrt{m} \cdot \max_i \|s_i\|$$

$$3. \Pr[v \notin H] = \mathcal{L}(1)$$

$$\triangleleft 1. v = \frac{1}{q} \cdot Y \cdot x = \frac{1}{q} \cdot B \cdot \underbrace{B^{-1} \cdot Y}_{A^T} \cdot x = B \cdot \underbrace{\frac{1}{q} \cdot (B^{-1} \cdot Y \cdot x)}_{\in \mathbb{Z}^n} \in L$$

$$\begin{aligned} 2. \|v\| &= \frac{1}{q} \|Y \cdot x\| \leq \frac{1}{q} \cdot \|x\|_1 \cdot \max_i \|y_i\| \leq \frac{1}{q} \cdot B \cdot \sqrt{m} \cdot \max_i \|y_i\| \\ &\leq \frac{B}{q} \cdot \sqrt{m} \cdot \sqrt{n} \\ &\leq \frac{B}{q} \cdot \sqrt{m} \cdot n \cdot \max_i \|s_i\| \end{aligned}$$

3. \mathcal{O}^{SIS} knows $a_i^T = B^{-1} \cdot y_i \pmod{q} \Leftrightarrow$ knows $y_i \pmod{qL}$.

Conditioned on a_i , y_i is Gaussian, namely $y_i \sim D_{qL} + c_i, \zeta$, where

$c_i \in L$ s.t. $B^{-1} \cdot c_i = a_i \pmod{q}$. $y_i \notin H$ w.h.p. (see next slide)

$\Pr[v \notin H]$

Claim 2.3 $\Pr[v \notin H] = \Omega(1)$ for $\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{2}} > \eta_{2^{-n}}^{\leftarrow \text{smoothing par-}}(L)$
 $v \in D_{L, \sigma, 0}$

Let w.l.o.g H - a hyperplane orthogonal to $(1, 0, \dots, 0)$.

$$\Pr[v \in H] = \Pr[v_1 = 0] \stackrel{\substack{\uparrow \\ \text{Markov's ineq.}}}{\leq} \mathbb{E}[\rho(v_1)] =$$

$$= \sum_{v \in L} p_\sigma(v_1) \cdot \underbrace{p_\sigma(v)}_{\leq p_\sigma(L)} = \sum_{v \in L} p_{\sigma/\sqrt{2}}(v_1) \cdot \frac{p_\sigma(v_2) \cdot \dots \cdot p_\sigma(v_n)}{p_\sigma(L)} =$$

$\downarrow p_\sigma(v_1), p_\sigma(v_2), \dots, p_\sigma(v_n)$

$$e^{-\pi v_1^2/\sigma^2} \cdot e^{-\pi v_i^2/\sigma^2}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{PSF} &= \frac{1}{p_\sigma(L)} \cdot \det(\hat{L}) \cdot \frac{\sigma^n}{\sqrt{2}} \cdot \sum_{\hat{v} \in \hat{L}} p_{\sigma/\sqrt{2}}(\hat{v}_1) \cdot \dots \cdot p_{\sigma/\sqrt{2}}(\hat{v}_n) \leq \underbrace{\frac{\det(\hat{L}) \cdot \sigma^n}{p_\sigma(L) \cdot \sqrt{2}}}_{\sum_{\hat{v} \in \hat{L}} p_{\sigma/\sqrt{2}}(\hat{v})} \\ x \mapsto p_{\sigma/\sqrt{2}}(x_1) \cdot \dots \cdot p_{\sigma/\sqrt{2}}(x_n) &\leq \frac{(1 + 2^{-n})}{\sqrt{2}} \Rightarrow \Pr[v \notin H] \geq 1 - \frac{1 + 2^{-n}}{\sqrt{2}} = \Omega(1) \quad [t - 2^{-n}, t + 2^{-n}] \\ &\leq (1 + 2^{-n}) \end{aligned}$$

due to the cond on σ

GPV signature (sketch)

Facts. 1. One can efficiently sample $A \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n})$ together with a short basis of A^\perp

2. This short basis, S_A , allows to sample from

$$D_{A^\perp, S_A, C} \text{ for } C = \max_i \|S_A[i]\| \cdot \sqrt{m}$$

GPV signature = Schnorr on lattices

- KeyGen : sample A, S_A s.t. $\boxed{S_A} \cdot \boxed{A}^n \stackrel{m}{\longleftarrow} 0 \pmod{q}$
 $sk = S_A; pk = A$
- Sign($m \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$):
 1. Compute $u = H(m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ($H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ - cryptographic hash fnct)
 2. Compute arbitrary $c \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ s.t. $c^T \cdot A = u^T \pmod{q}$
 3. Sample $x \leftarrow D_{A^\perp, S_A, -c + c}$
Output x as the signature
- Verify (m, x, S_A) If $\|x\| \leq 6\sqrt{m}$ AND $x^T \cdot A = H(m)^T \pmod{q}$:
Return "Accept"
Else Return "Reject"

GPV signature (sketch)

- KeyGen : sample A, S_A s.t. $S_A \cdot A \stackrel{n}{\leftrightarrow} m = 0 \pmod{q}$
 $sk = S_A; pk = A$
- Sign($m \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{*}, b^*$):
 1. Compute $u = H(m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ($H: \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ - cryptographic hash fnct)
 2. Compute arbitrary $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ s.t. $c^T \cdot A = u^T \pmod{q}$
 3. Sample $x \leftarrow D_{A^\perp, S_A, -c + c}$
 Output x as the signature
- Verify (m, x, S_A)
 If $\|x\| \leq \delta \sqrt{m}$ AND $\underbrace{x^T \cdot A}_{=} = H(m)^T \pmod{q}$:
 Return "Accept"
 Else Return "Reject"

$$\begin{aligned} x &= y + c \text{ for } y \in A^\perp \\ \Rightarrow x^T \cdot A &= y^T \cdot A + c^T \cdot A = u \end{aligned}$$

GPV is EU-CMA secure in ROM provided SIS is hard.

The proof models H as Random Oracle + Forking lemma.