ELVT Smart Contract Preliminary Report

Project Synopsis

Project Name	ELVT	\$-°,
Platform	Ethereum, Solidity	
Github Repo	Not Provided	
Deployed Contract	Not Deployed	
Total Duration	2 Days	

Contract Details

Total Contract(s)	1
Name of Contract(s)	ELVT.sol
Language	Solidity
Commit Hash	Null

Finding

1 2 3	Lack of input validation in constructor Lack of Event Emissions in Configuration Functions ELVT Contract could prefer Role Based Access considering multiple roles in the contract	Low	Pending
3	ELVT Contract could prefer Role Based Access		Donding
	ELVT Contract could prefer Role Based Access considering multiple roles in the contract		Pending
4		Informatory	Pending
	Non-standard Parameter Naming Convention	Informatory	Pending


Detailed Results

The contract has gone through several stages of the audit procedure that includes structural analysis, automated testing, manual code review etc.

All the issues have been explained and discussed in detail below. Along with the explanation of the issue found during the audit, the recommended way to overcome the issue or improve the code quality has also been mentioned.

Security Level Reference

Every issues in this report were assigned a severity level from the following:



Critical Severity Issues

No issues were found

High Severity Issues

No issues were found

Medium Severity Issues

No issues were found

Low Severity Issues

1. Lack of input validation in constructor

Description:

The constructor of the ELVT contract takes three parameters: _feeCalculator, _treasury, and _initialSupply. While there is a check to ensure that _feeCalculator is not the zero address, there are no checks to validate the _treasury address and _initialSupply values. This oversight can lead to potential issues:

- Treasury Address Validation: The <u>treasury</u> address is critical as it receives the initial supply of tokens. Without validation, there is a risk that tokens could be minted to an incorrect or zero address, leading to loss of control over these tokens.
- 2. Initial Supply Validation: The _initialSupply parameter dictates the total initial tokens minted. Without checks, erroneous values (e.g., excessively high or zero) could be set, which might affect the tokenomics and security of the token.

Recommendation:

To mitigate these risks, it is recommended to implement the following validations:

- Ensure **_treasury** is not the zero address to prevent tokens from being irretrievably locked or minted to a non-retrievable address.
- Validate that _initialSupply is greater than zero to avoid initializing a token with no usable supply, which could render the contract useless.

Implementing these recommendations will ensure that the contract is initialized with valid parameters, enhancing its security and operational reliability.

2. Lack of Event Emissions in Configuration Functions

Description:

Event emissions in smart contracts are crucial for transparency and traceability, allowing off-chain applications and interfaces to react to changes within the contract.

The absence of events in these two functions means that changes to the fee calculator and payment splitter addresses are not easily traceable through external tools or blockchain explorers.

Additionally, this can complicate integration with front-end applications and hinder monitoring and verification of contract state changes by users and external services.

Recommendation:

To enhance transparency and ensure that changes to key contract parameters are trackable, it is recommended to add event emissions in both **setFeeCalculator** and **setPaymentSplitter** functions.

This would enable clients and external applications to monitor updates in real-time and maintain an audit trail of changes.

Informational

1. ELVT Contract could prefer Role Based Access considering multiple roles in the contract

Description:

The ELVT smart contract incorporates several functionalities, including trading toggles, fee exemptions, blacklist management, and DEX pair definitions. Each of these functionalities significantly impacts the operation and security of the contract.

Currently, all these administrative functions are governed by a single owner, defined through the **Ownable** modifier from OpenZeppelin.

This design introduces a single point of failure in the contract's administration. If the owner's private key is compromised, the attacker gains full control over these critical functionalities, potentially leading to damaging actions such as:

- Blacklisting legitimate users or whitelisting malicious ones.
- Manipulating fee structures to their advantage.
- Disabling trading at will to disrupt normal operations.

Furthermore, such centralized control contradicts the decentralized ethos of blockchain technologies, where distributed control is often more desirable to prevent abuse of power and increase trust in the system's operations.

Recommendations:

To mitigate these risks and enhance the contract's security architecture, it is recommended to implement a role-based access control (RBAC) system. OpenZeppelin offers an **AccessControl** module that can be used to assign specific roles to different addresses, each with defined capabilities. Key recommendations include:

- Implement AccessControl: Utilize OpenZeppelin's AccessControl to create different roles for various administrative functions. For example:
 - Fee Manager Role: Handles fee-related functionalities.
 - Trading Manager Role: Manages trading toggles and restrictions.
 - Blacklist Manager Role: Oversees the blacklist functionalities.
- Multi-Signature Requirements: For critical functions, require that multiple authorized signatories approve changes, reducing the risk of unilateral detrimental actions.
- Decentralized Control: Spread control among trusted parties within the organization or community to reduce the impact of a single compromised account.

2. Non-standard Parameter Naming Convention

Description:

The ELVT smart contract's parameter naming convention does not adhere to the commonly accepted Solidity style guide.

Several function parameters across various methods in the contract utilize non-mixedCase naming, which diverges from the best practices recommended for Solidity coding standards.

Details

The following parameters have been identified as not following the mixedCase naming convention:

- ELVT.setFeeCalculator(address)._feeCalculator should ideally be feeCalculator.
- ELVT.setPaymentSplitter(address)._splitter should ideally be _splitter.
- ELVT.toggleExcludeFee(address[], bool[])._wallets should ideally be wallets.
- ELVT.toggleExcludeTrading(address[], bool[])._wallets should ideally be wallets.
- ELVT.toggleDexPairAddresses(address[], bool[])._pairs should ideally be _pairs.
- ELVT.toggleBlacklist(address[], bool[])._addresses should ideally be addresses.

While this issue does not pose a direct security risk, adhering to a consistent and standard naming convention improves code readability and maintainability.

Recommendation:

It is recommended to refactor these parameter names to follow the mixedCase style. This change would make the codebase cleaner and more in line with typical Solidity practices, which emphasize readability and consistency.

Automated Test Results

	# functions	ERCS	ERC20 info	Complex code	++ Features
IERC721Errors IERC1155Errors StorageSlot ECDSA	0 8 7 20	 		No No No No Yes	Assembly Ecrecover Assembly Assembly
SafeCast SignedMath IFeeCalculator IPaymentSplitter ShortStrings Checkpoints	64 4 1 1 7 36			No No No No No	 Assembly Assembly
Strings Time MessageHashUtils ELVT	7 9	 ERC20,ERC2612 	No Minting Approve Race Cond.	NO NO NO NO	Assembly Assembly Assembly Ecrecover
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Disclaimer

ImmuneBytes's audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contract. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process; therefore, running a bug bounty program complementing this audit is strongly recommended.

Our team does not endorse the platform or its product, nor this audit is investment advice.

Notes:

- Please make sure contracts deployed on the mainnet are the ones audited.
- Check for code refactoring by the team on critical issues