

Lecture with Computer Exercises:  
Modelling and Simulating Social Systems with MATLAB

Project Report

**Axelrod's Tournament with Noise**

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## 1 Abstract

This project generally consists of two tasks. The first task was to implement a tournament like setup in which the implemented players play the iterated prisoners dilemma. As a matter of fact, this is nothing new (see [1]) and has been studied extensive. So this leads us to the second part of this project. The standard tournament, as it was played by Axelrod is augmented by noise, whereas the difference between two kind of noises were made. One kind changes cooperation into defection, which forces the overall reward down and prefers defective players, because cooperative ones are exploited more. The other kind of noise changes defection into cooperation, which actually has a different impact on the system. If defections are hidden behind cooperations, the average reward increases because the cooperative players stay cooperation and do not notice the exploitation.

The augmentation of noise makes the tournament much more realistic, because between humans there is always some miscommunication. This project illustrates, that miscommunication whereas cooperation corrupted by defection decreases the reward of the whole system and not just the tricked ones. Further the simulations indicates, that complete information is not the best, contrary to intuition. Defections which are seen as cooperations help every participant, but most of all the friendly ones.

Furthermore some learning and evolving strategies have been implemented. One of this learning strategies can adapt best of all strategies to the noise, by just changing to another strategy, if the reward of this one is bigger. The evolutionary strategy was not really capable to adapt to the noise, because it is relying on taken decisions of past rounds and noise corrupts its data.

## 2 Individual contributions

### 2.1 Andermatt Samuel

- Further development of the game master
- Development and implementation of multiple players
- Data analysis and interpretation
- Contributions to the report
- Contributed experience in game theory

### 2.2 Bösser Jonathan

- Explore and explain GitHub [\[2\]](#)
- Development and implementation of multiple players
- Data analysis and interpretation
- Contributions to the report
- Literature study

### 2.3 Meier David

- First version of the game master
- Development and implementation of multiple players
- Responsible for the report
- Literature study

### 3 Introduction and Motivations

#### 3.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma

The prisoner's dilemma is a model from game theory. 2 people are suspected to have done a crime together. Now they are examined separately in different rooms. In this situation, they can either whistle-blowing the other person to protect oneself or keep silent. Over all, it is of advantage, if both keep silent. But for the single person it is better to betray the other person. The risk of betraying is the following: if both accused people betray the other, the penalty for both is the highest. This problem is in game theory called "Prisoner's dilemma" [3].

#### 3.2 The Axelrod Experiment

In the year 1981, Robert Axelrod invited for a competition to the iterated prisoner's dilemma. Iterated in this context means there are played an arbitrary number of games against the same opponent. Each player therefor knows all his own decisions and the decisions of his opponent. So the goal is not just to betray once, but to keep the own reward as high as possible.

People from different fields like mathematics, politics, economy or psychology have been asked to develop a winning strategy for this competition. All the different strategies were playing against another to find the most successive strategy. Interestingly, the very simple strategy "Tit for Tat" (TFT) won the tournament. During the first round, TFT keeps silent (cooperation) and during the rest of the game, just does, what its counter player did the round before.

This sort of experiment is very interesting, because the results can be applied in many different fields in real life. Just one out of many examples: 2 countries make an agreement on their amount of weapons. For the single country it is of advantage to have more military strength than the other nation. But as in the prisoner's dilemma, if both nations rise their military strength, for both it is just a loss money and an increase in danger. [1]

#### 3.3 Introduction of Noise

A further development in the Axelrod Experiment is the introduction of noise. This means, cooperation is wrongly understood as defection and vice versa. The introduction of noise to the axelrod experiment is nothing new, but very important, because in real world, noise and small distortions are always present. This can lead to serious complications. An example therefor: *"On September 1,1983 a South Korean airliner*

*mistakenly flew over the Soviet Union (Hersh 1989). It was shot down by the Soviets, killing all 269 people aboard. The Americans and Soviets echoed their anger at each other in a short, but sharp escalation of cold war tensions.”*[\[4\]](#)

There are a lot more of example like the one above. So there are some questions concerning noise in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma like situation. Can a dispute based on miscommunication be overcome? Is there a way, treason can be hidden behind pretended miscommunication? Does the miscommunication even discourages cooperation? How much miscommunication can cooperation survive? Do learning strategies have an advantage over the other ones and how do the traditional players act? And last but not least, how does the final result change, if noise is introduced?

## 4 Description of the Model and Players

### 4.1 Simple Players

#### 4.1.1 Cooperative Player

Player 1 is a very simple player: He always cooperates. This "decision" does not depend on any circumstances, like the decisions of its antagonist or other evaluations by himself. Short name: COOP.

#### 4.1.2 Defective Player

Also player 2 is a very simple player: He always defects. Short name: DEF.

#### 4.1.3 Random Player

Like all players from this subsection, the decision of the random player does not depend on the results of the previous tournaments. The decision is randomly distributed and no decision is preferred. Short name: RAN.

### 4.2 Players from Literature

All players in this subsection are taken from the first of Axelrod's Tournaments and implemented by us. Source: Lecture "Game Theory" [5].

#### 4.2.1 Tit for Tat

Player 4, according to the Axelrod Tournament, is the most successive player of all [5]. The decision is the decision of the counter player from the last tournament. In the first round, the decision is cooperation. If the counter player cooperated during the last round, this player will cooperate in the current round. Short name: TFT.

#### 4.2.2 Friedmann

Friedmann cooperates until its counter player defects once. After that, Friedmann now defects for the rest of the game. This corresponds to "everlasting death". Sometimes this kind of strategy is also called "grim trigger". Short name: FRI.

#### 4.2.3 Pavlov

Pavlov changes its decision every time when the counter player defects. But if the counter player cooperates, Pavlov gives the same decision as in the round before.

The first decision is cooperation. In literature this strategy is also called "win-stay-lose-shift". Short name: PAV.

#### 4.2.4 Tit for two Tat

The first decision is cooperation. If the counter player cooperates, Tit for 2Tat cooperates as well. Tit for 2Tat only defects, if the counter player defected the last 2 rounds. Short name: TF2T.

#### 4.2.5 Joss

This is basically the same player like the player TFT. The only difference: 10% of the cooperative decisions are randomly defected. Source of this player: [6]. Short name: JOSS.

#### 4.2.6 Diekmann

Player Diekmann plays basically TFT. The difference is, that every 10th move, he plays cooperative twice, regardless of his opponents decision. Source of this player: [6]. Short name: DIE.

#### 4.2.7 D-Downing

Starts always with defection and is calculating afterwards the expected value of the reward if he cooperates or defects. The decision is taken based on the bigger expected value. Short name: DD0.

#### 4.2.8 C-Downing

Same algorithm as DD0, but is starting with cooperation. This algorithm is better than DD0, actually C-Downing would have won the tournament of Axelrod [1], but there was only DD0 implemented. Short name: CD0.

### 4.3 Own Players

#### 4.3.1 Tit for Average Tat

Based on the idea of TFT, we developed a player who averages the decisions of its opponent over the most recent rounds. The first few rounds he plays TFT. Then he starts averaging over the most recent rounds and reacts to the opponents most frequent decision. After a fixed number of rounds, the player restarts from the very beginning. This can prevent being stuck in mutual defection. Short name: TFAT.

#### 4.3.2 Watcher

For this player, we investigated one possible concept for a learning algorithm. The idea is to learn by observing and copy the moves of the most successful player. During the first few rounds, Watcher plays TFT, after that he evaluates all other players decisions against his opponent and takes the best one. Short name: WAT.

#### 4.3.3 Reconciliation Tit for tat

TFT has a disadvantage. Once the players start a mutual defection it is stable. This makes TFT very susceptible to miscommunication and performs poorly against players like JOSS. The approach here is to break this cycle by adding cooperative moves. The risk of adding cooperative moves is that the opponents exploit this strategy. This strategy tries to make these moves without becoming exploitable. In case the opponent defects, his recent performance gets calculated. It is also calculated, how good the opponent would have performed if both players were cooperating. In case the damage by the mutual defections is large enough that by defecting the reconciliation attempt he cannot gain enough to outperform cooperation. This way the strategy is not exploitable. Short name: RTFT.

#### 4.3.4 Tit for Tat with Reputation

This is a further TFT mutant. The basic strategy remains the same, but the opponents moves against other players are also observed. In case the opponent is mostly cooperative against others, then defection of the opponent is regarded as miscommunication and interpreted as cooperation. Short name: TFTR.

#### 4.3.5 Strategy Switcher

The strategy switcher is another example for a learning player. The player is equipped with a set of predefined strategies. In our case we chose the strategies TFT, TF2T, PAV, always cooperate and always defect. Initially he tries out all five strategies. After he tried out every strategy he calculates each strategies performance. In the subsequent turns he always plays the most successful strategy. After a given set of turns he will reevaluate the performance of the current strategy and compare it with the others. If one of its other strategies has a higher performance this strategy is chosen instead. Short name: SSW.

#### **4.3.6 Evolutionary**

This player tries to find the optimal sequence of moves by an evolutionary algorithm. The strategy of the player consists of a given set of moves. To determine the first set of moves he plays TFT in the first rounds. Once he has a sequence of moves he creates clones of this sequence and adds mutations to them. A mutation means that the decision in one move is altered. In the next step he plays each clone. After all clones are played he evaluates their performance. The clones are split into segments, for each segment the winnings are calculated. The performance includes the one move after the segment ended, otherwise the players would always reject in the last move. Then a new parent strategy is formed. Each segment is evaluated, if the first segment of a clone performed stronger then the parent strategy, the parents segment is replaced by the more successful segment. This parent is then played and cloned again. There is an assumption that with increasing simulation length the sequence becomes closer to the optimal sequence. At this point the mutations become a disadvantage. Therefore the mutability is lowered with time (but does not go to zero). Short name: EV0.

#### **4.3.7 Limited Reconciliation Tit for tat**

This strategy is similar to the RTFT. In this case however the number of reconciliation attempts is limited. Some players tend to reject all reconciliation attempts and while this does not exploit this player, it still limits its performance. This player will stop to try to reconcile after he was unsuccessful doing so for a given time. However, if the opponent has two consecutive cooperative rounds the counter for the reconciliation attempts is reseted. Short name: LTFT.

#### **4.3.8 Look Back D-Downing**

Is basically the same as DD0, but this one is looking back two rounds on his own decisions and just one round on the opponent's decisions. To be able to look back two rounds the player always defects the first two rounds. The idea behind this is, to see the reaction of the opponent on the decisions the player took before. By means of this the player has an advantage (in theory) compared to DD0, because the player is looking at two decisions, whereof one is the action (own decision) and the other (opponent's decision) is the reaction. Short name: LDD0.

#### **4.3.9 Look Back C-Downing**

Same algorithm as LDD0, but is starting with two times cooperation in a row. Short name: LCD0.



#### 4.4 General view

In table 1 every player is listed and some of their characteristics are evaluated.

	Cooperates in First Round	responsive	Memory	Exploitable	Can Exploit	Global view	Learning
Cooperative Player	×		0	×			
Defective Player			0		×		
Random Player	random		0		×		
Tit for Tat	×	×	1				
Friedmann	×	×	inf		×		
Pavlov	×	×	1				
Tit for two Tat	×	×	2	×			
Joss	90%	×	1		×		
Diekmann	×	×	1	×			
D-Downing		×	inf	×	×		(×)
C-Downing	×	×	inf	×	×		(×)
Tit for Average Tat	×	slow	5	×			
Watcher	×		6	×	×	×	×
Recon Tit for Tat	×	×	20				
TFT with Reputation	×	×	1	×		×	
Strategy Switcher	×	×	inf	×	×		×
Evolutionary	×	very slow	31	×	×		×
Lim. Recon. TFT	×	×	20				
Look back D-Downing		×	inf	×	×		(×)
Look back C-Downing	×	×	inf	×	×		(×)

Table 1: General view of all the players and their characteristics

## 5 Implementation

As described in section 3, the tournament is a repeated prisoners dilemma. The payoff matrix for this kind of game is shown in table 2.

To make the simulation more realistic, there is noise added to it. Noise means that defection can be transmitted as cooperation and vice versa. The noise applied on cooperation and defection was varied independently. The two noise levels are set independently to 0%, 5%, 10% and 15%. The noise only changed the information the players received, but not their payoff. For each combination of noise, we performed a tournament with 20000 rounds. In each round, every player plays against all others and himself in a round robin. To make the decisions, the players are provided with all the decisions made in the previous rounds by all players. The players do not have information about the noise level or the duration of the tournament.

Table 2: Reward Matrix

	Player B cooperates	Player B defects
Player A cooperates	A:3 B:3	A:0 B:5
Player A defects	A:5 B:0	A:1 B:1

The basic structure of a player is shown in listing 1.

Listing 1: Template for each player

```
classdef playertemplate
    properties
        name = 'Template';
        short = 'TEMP';
    end
    methods
        function P = playertemplate(np)
    end
end
```

```

    end

    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)      % Decisionfunction of every player
                                                % 1 = cooperation
                                                % 2 = defection
    end
end
end

```

An example of such a player, TFT in this case, is given in listings 2.

Listing 2: Example of a player

```

classdef player4
properties
    name='Tit for tat';
    short='TFT';
5 end
methods
    function P4 = player4(np)
    end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
10     if (turn == 1)
        decision = 1; %cooperate in turn 1
    elseif (K(op,4,turn-1) == 1)
        decision = 1;
    else
15         decision = 2;
    end
    end
end
end
end

```

The noise is defined as followed:

#### Definition (Noise).

- Noise1 = probability for cooperations gets received as defections
- Noise2 = probability for defections gets received as cooperations

By means of this, we can chose an "optimistic" noise and a "pessimistic" noise. The optimistic ones is much more pardoning and some of the defections taken are

not transmitted to the opponent. The other typ of noise is really pessimistic and misunderstands some of the cooperations as defections. The players just have access to the corrupted and noisy decisions, for evaluation the real decisions are also kept.

For evaluation and visualization of the results of the tournament we have written the script `show_data.m`. With this script, there are many possibilities to plot all parts of the results. In listing 3 the description in the header of the script is shown.

Listing 3: Possibilities of visualization

```
#####  
% Content of file:  
% 1.cell: initialization  
% 2.cell: plot reward of all players with given noiselevels  
5 % 3.cell: plot cooperation of all players with given noiselevels  
% 4.cell: plot statistics for a given player (reward vs given noiselevels)  
% with surface plot  
% 5.cell: plot statistics for a given player (cooperation vs given  
% noiselevels) with surfac plot  
10 % 6.cell: reward vs noise with name of the best player in plot  
% 7.cell: total cooperation/reward normed with surface plot  
% 8.cell: 2 given Players against each other  
  
% Use of file:  
15 % 1. set filename of the simulation file in the 1. cell  
% 2. set desired noiselevel in the 2.cell  
% 3. set desired noiselevel in the 3.cell  
% 4. set desired positions of players and desired noiselevels in the 4.cell  
% 5. set desired positions of players and desired noiselevels in the 5.cell  
20 % 6. set playersInRange true in the 6.cell to write the players in range  
% in a textfile  
% 7. set the filename for the players in range in the 6.cell  
% 8. set the range in the 6.cell  
% 9. set the filename in the 7.cell for the file with the 2 matrices  
25 %10. set the desired players to face each other  
%11. run the whole file  
  
% hint: just run one cell, if only this result is desired  
% warning: the more things you want to plot, the more plots you got  
30 #####
```

## 6 Results and Discussion

### 6.1 General Findings

- Noise, which interprets cooperation as defection decreases cooperation drastically.
- Noise, which interprets defections as cooperations increases cooperation, but the effect is weaker.
- Perfect information is not what's best for the system. If decisions are transmitted better than they are, the whole system gets more efficient.
- Friendly, which means cooperative, players performance drastically decreases if the chance that cooperation is transmitted correct is less than 100%.
- Players that do not react immediately to defections look non-responsive.

### 6.2 Problem caused by unreliably transmitted cooperation

Many of the friendly players perform well without noise, because they have an infinitely long sequence of mutual cooperations with other friendly players. Noise will trigger defections. This state requires then a way to come back into cooperation. Most cooperative players do not have a mechanism to reestablish cooperation if it has been destroyed once, because they rely on a cooperation caused by the first turn decision being cooperative.

### 6.3 Benefit caused by unreliably transmitted defection

Some players try out defective moves. For TFT mutants this can likely result in mutual defections. A noise that inserts cooperative moves results in the TFT player reacting cooperative again, driving the game in mutual cooperation again. Another thing is that hiding defections allows aggressive players to exploit players that would retaliate otherwise, and an aggressive player exploiting a weak one is better than if both players are defecting each other.

### 6.4 Axelrod's recommendations

Axelrod proposed a certain behavior to be successful [1]. This behavior is known as:

- Be nice: cooperate, never be the first to defect.
- Be provokable: return defection for defection, cooperation for cooperation.

- Don't be envious:: be fair with your partner.
- Don't be too clever: or, don't try to be tricky.[7]

Under noise<sup>1</sup> the opponent will see defections from a player, even if he never defected. This diminishes the use of being nice. It is more successful to find out if he responds to defections and exploit the opponent if he is exploitable. In Axelrod's Tournament this was not the case, because this attempt might have long lasting effects. However noise somewhat covers up the past. The other recommendations still hold.

## 6.5 The Performance of each Player

The performance plots shows the average reward of a certain player, depending on the two noise levels. The simulation was run twice, to check for the stability of the results. Therefore, each player has 2 performance graphs.

For some of the players there are tables, which show how many of their moves are cooperative, dependent of the noise levels under which the simulation was run.

### 6.5.1 Cooperative Player

The player's performance is shown in figure 1.

In a situation of no noise, this player performs strong against mostly friendly players, but gets exploited by aggressive players. In this situation it performs better than always defect, but similar to random.


Because this player is cooperative and not reactive noise<sup>2</sup> doesn't matter. On the other hand performance drastically decreases with noise<sup>1</sup>. The seemingly inserted rejections make other players explore defective moves. Because the defective moves are not retaliated the other players might then stick with these defective moves. Players that start exploiting this player are FRI, PAV, CDO and LCDO.

In a situation with noise this strategy is still strong with TFT mutants, because a cooperative interaction gets restored in the fastest possible way.

Still with a drop of 0.7 to 0.8 in performance this player is one of the players that is the most susceptible to noise overall.

Traits of the player:

Figure 1: Reward plot of COOP



- + Can sustain cooperation with friendly players even in noise
- Exploitable
- Does not respond to the opponents move

### 6.5.2 Defective Player

The player's performance is shown in figure 2.


The player is so unfriendly, that noise2 even helps him. A move where he can exploit the opponent gives him 5 times the reward of mutual defections, therefore even a small number of exploiting moves helps him a lot. If we would run the simulation with noise close to 50% this player would become the most successful player. The performance increases in general against TFT mutants, but especially against players that try hard to avoid mutual defections, such as TF2T, RTFT, LTFT. The strongest rise in performance comes against EVO.

Traits of the player:

- + Can exploit players that do not respond
- + Performance increase with noise



Figure 2: Reward plot of DEF



- Ends up in mutual defections with most players

### 6.5.3 Random Player

The player's performance is shown in figure 3.


The player does not get influenced that much by noise. There is a strange peak at zero noise, we were unable to find out why. If the noise makes his moves appear a little more cooperate there is a slight increase in performance, most likely due to more cooperative reactions from TFT mutants.

### 6.5.4 Tit For Tat

The player's performance is shown in figure 4.

TFT is a rather strong player. He won Axelrod's Tournaments, which were without noise. For noise1 equals to zero he is one of the strongest of all players. These graphs above show that this player is extremely susceptible to noise1. The reason is that with no noise1 he will always cooperate with other TFT mutants because the first move was cooperative. With noise the first move matters less. There are basically

Figure 3: Reward plot of RAN



three states he can enter with himself:

State 1: Mutual cooperation. Performance: 3

State 2: Alternating defection and cooperation. Performance: 2.5

State 3: Mutual defection. Performance: 1

A noise1 signal changes the state from state one to state two or state two to state three. Noise2 works in the other direction. The two noises are basically transition probabilities. For noise1 greater than zero and noise2 equal to zero the TFT ends up stuck in state three with itself. For equal noises in both directions TFT should be 50% of the time in state two and 25% in the states one and three. This would imply the performance:  $0.25 * 3 + 0.5 * 2.5 + 0.25 * 1 = 2.25$ , as seen in table 4.

Table 3 shows the performance of TFT against itself. Because the players in our simulation could only perform mirrored decisions state two was impossible and the actual performance was somewhat lower.

Already at noise1 = 0.05 the number of cooperative moves TFT performs drops from 40% to 80%. At higher noise2 with no noise1 the number of defections per-

Figure 4: Reward plot of TFT




Table 3: Performance of TFT playing against TFT

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	3.0000	3.0000	3.0000	3.0000
noise1 = 0.05	1.0016	2.0127	2.3438	2.4745
noise1 = 0.10	1.0018	1.6184	1.9847	2.1967
noise1 = 0.15	1.0011	1.5170	1.7666	2.0086

formed by TFT halves.

Traits of the player:

- + Responds fast
- + Not exploitable
- + Forgiving
- Only accepts an apology, but does not initiate it himself, so he can stuck in mutual defections!


Table 4: Cooperation of TFT depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.8075	0.8247	0.8351	0.8917
noise1 = 0.05	0.3958	0.5967	0.6192	0.6516
noise1 = 0.10	0.3418	0.5127	0.5428	0.5866
noise1 = 0.15	0.2886	0.4240	0.4836	0.5297

### 6.5.5 Friedmann

The player's performance is shown in figure 5.

Figure 5: Reward plot of FRI



In the case of perfect information this player can profit from mutual cooperation with many players. In this case he performs well. However for any noise1 greater than zero the player will receive a rejection at some point and therefore act like the player DEF most of the time. FRI generally tries to retaliate so hard on a rejection that the other player will not even attempt one rejection. However FRI cannot capitalise on this deterrent effect, because the moment the opponent realises it is already too late and he cannot know it in advance.

Table 5: Cooperation of Friedmann dependant on the Noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.6002	0.6000	0.6000	0.6000
noise1 = 0.05	0.0004	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
noise1 = 0.10	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.00016
noise1 = 0.15	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001

As soon as noise1 is greater than zero the number of cooperative moves goes to zero. But already at zero noise FRI only has 60% cooperative moves, while TFT has 80%.

Traits of the player:

- + Stays in mutual cooperation with friendly players when noise1 is zero
- Completely breaks down with noise1 greater than zero

### 6.5.6 Pavlov

The player's performance is shown in figure 6.

PAV performs rather well without noise1. If noise1 is greater than zero, some players realise that defections against PAV work as well as cooperations. Pure defect against PAV results in the rewards 5 1 5 1 5 1 ... for the opponent, while pure cooperation results in 3 3 3 3 ..., given PAV is cooperative when the opponent started playing random. With zero noise the opponent gets an average reward of 3 for cooperation and defection but with noise the performance of cooperation decreases (because PAV retaliates). Players that largely start to defect against PAV are: FRI, TFAT, CDO, LCDO and SSW.

Without noise1 the number of cooperative moves is around 80% while it is around 50% with noise1. It is interesting that with noise2 but no noise1 Pavlov is less cooperative than TFT.

Traits of the player:

- + Forgives fast
- + Initializes cooperation out of mutual defection

Figure 6: Reward plot of PAV




Table 6: Cooperation of PAV depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.8239	0.8488	0.8541	0.8037
noise1 = 0.05	0.4885	0.5433	0.5697	0.5860
noise1 = 0.10	0.4939	0.5211	0.5338	0.5455
noise1 = 0.15	0.5063	0.5187	0.5251	0.5319


- + Not exploitable without noise
- Too many cooperative moves against defecting players
- Not retaliating (pure defect and pure cooperation perform equally well)

### 6.5.7 Tit For 2 Tat

The player's performance is shown in figure 7.

As a TFT mutant it has a similar performance. The difference is that this player is more forgiving. The bad thing is that this makes him exploitable. The better thing is that it is more robust to noise1 as it does not react to single defections. The player

Figure 7: Reward plot of the Player Tit For 2 Tat



still ends up in mutual defections with itself if noise2 is zero and noise1 greater than zero, but for both noises greater than zero the player plays much stronger against itself. At zero noise the performance of TF2T is worse than the one of TFT, but with noise1 their performances are similar. The effect that players like EVO will exploit TF2T seems to balance out with the better resistance to noise.

Table 7: Cooperation of TF2T depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.8271	0.8796	0.8880	0.8947
noise1 = 0.05	0.5366	0.7450	0.7712	0.7926
noise1 = 0.10	0.5132	0.7349	0.7375	0.7622
noise1 = 0.15	0.4864	0.6503	0.6977	0.72749

The cooperation stays much higher than for TFT especially if noise2 also is not equal to zero.


Traits different to TFT:

- + More Forgiving
- More Exploitable

### 6.5.8 Joss

The player's performance is shown in figure 8.

Figure 8: Reward plot JOSS



While this is a TFT mutant, its performance dependence on noise looks totally different. The player generally performs poorly. At some noises this player is able to exploit TF2T (noise2 greater than zero and noise1 equal to zero) however most of the time the retaliation of the defections outweighs their gain. TFT is very susceptible to noise1 and Joss makes himself look like under noise1 to his opponent. It is interesting that the performance of this player looks like the performance of DEF just shifted about 0.5 upwards.

With higher noise2 some cooperation can be achieved, but generally the player is mostly defecting.

Traits different to TFT:

- initiates defections




Table 8: Cooperation of JOSS depending on the Noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.3983	0.5300	0.6102	0.6172
noise1 = 0.05	0.3983	0.5300	0.6102	0.6172
noise1 = 0.10	0.2968	0.4026	0.4625	0.5006
noise1 = 0.15	0.2404	0.3720	0.4225	0.4591

### 6.5.9 Diekmann

The player's performance is shown in figure 9.

Figure 9: Reward plot of DIE



This is a TFT mutant, that performs on the same level as TFT at no noise, and is therefore one of the strongest players if there is no noise. While his performance also drops with noise1 the effect is much less severe. For noise1=0.05 and noise2 equal to zero, TFT drops about 0.9, while DIE only drops 0.5. This player actually initiates cooperation and gets not stuck in mutual defection with TFT mutants. The weakness of this player is that he is exploitable by defective moves every 10 moves. However on our simulation we haven't seen a player exploiting this weakness. EVO

could exploit it if the period in which the algorithm updates would be a multiple of the period in which DIE inserts cooperative moves.

Table 9: Cooperation of DIE depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.8635	0.9034	0.9113	0.8741
noise1 = 0.05	0.7157	0.7263	0.7200	0.7359
noise1 = 0.10	0.6230	0.6500	0.6655	0.6946
noise1 = 0.15	0.5760	0.5895	0.6283	0.6496

The cooperation drops not nearly as much with the noise as this is the case for TFT, he even is much more cooperative at no noise. At low noise2 values he is more cooperative than TF2T, but when both noises get high TF2T is more cooperative.

Traits different to TFT:

- + initates cooperation
- More Exploitable

#### 6.5.10 Tit For Average Tat

The player's performance is shown in figure 10.

This TFT mutant looks very similar to DIE and other friendlier TFT mutants. The fact that it reacts to the players average move during the last turns allows him to ignore some of the noise. The problem is that if mutual defection appears it is just as hard to get out of it as it was to get into it. Maybe this players performance would have decreased if the simulation was run even longer. In general this player performs about as well as RTFT and a little bit worse than DIE. Theoretically this player is exploitable.

The cooperation drops surprisingly fast with noise1, but still not as fast as for TFT. The number of cooperative moves is still more similar to TFT than DIE. This is surprising, that the performances look so close, while the underlying moves are so different. DIE very nice approach seems to be just as efficient as TFAT's more retaliating method.

Figure 10: Reward plot of TFAT




Table 10: Cooperation of TFAT depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.8056	0.8404	0.8456	0.8547
noise1 = 0.05	0.5316	0.6170	0.6140	0.6863
noise1 = 0.10	0.4712	0.4860	0.5100	0.5985
noise1 = 0.15	0.3419	0.4134	0.4660	0.5098

Traits of the player:


- + ignores single moves
- Exploitable

#### 6.5.11 Reconciliation Tit for Tat

The player's performance is shown in figure 11.

Like other more forgiving TFT mutants he has similar performance to TFT without noise, and drops less with noise1. The disadvantage of this player is that while it is

Figure 11: Reward plot of RTFT



not exploitable it still performs worse against defective players, when its reconciliation attempts are shut down over and over again.

Table 11: Cooperation of RTFT depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.8728	0.8972	0.9033	0.8723
noise1 = 0.05	0.7169	0.7218	0.7397	0.7450
noise1 = 0.10	0.6861	0.7010	0.7175	0.7217
noise1 = 0.15	0.6930	0.6955	0.7161	0.67528

The number of cooperations is very high even with high noise1, at noise1=0.15 it's cooperation is higher than that of most TFT mutants. Generally the number of cooperative moves is more similar to DIE than to TFAT.


Traits different to TFT:

+ Initiates Cooperation

### 6.5.12 CDowning and DDowning

The two players' performance is shown in figure 12 (CDO) and figure 13 (DDO).

Figure 12: Reward plot of CDO



If noise1 is zero, then CDO performs stronger than DDO. DDO performs generally poorly with high noise2 and no noise1 there is a slight performance gain. At no noise DDO outperforms CDO against COOP and WAT, but is much worse against all TFT mutants and FRI. noise2 improves the performance of DDO against the TFT mutants a little. In the individual parings it seems that DDO can end up in either mutual rejection or mutual cooperation. The decision where they end up seems to be random. For example at noise2=0.15 mutual cooperation appears in TFT and TF2T, but not in DIE and JOSS, while at noise2=0.1 it is the other way around.

DDO seems to reject almost all the time, while CDO rejects most of the time if noise1 is greater than 0. A problem of Downing is that it compares decisions that happen at the same time, but at this time the opponent does not know Downing's decision, so his decision can only be dependent on Downing's past decisions.

### 6.5.13 Tit For Tat with Reputation

The player's performance is shown in figure 14.

Figure 13: Reward plot of DDO




Table 12: Cooperations of CDO depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.7507	0.6013	0.7660	0.6504
noise1 = 0.05	0.1210	0.1711	0.0829	0.0507
noise1 = 0.10	0.1169	0.0507	0.0508	0.0508
noise1 = 0.15	0.0507	0.0745	0.0504	0.0505


There were too many unfriendly players, that any player could have been friendly enough so that this player would have looked over a defection. The only player that would cooperate enough is **COOP**. Against this player the number of cooperations were higher than the one of **TFT**, but because **COOP** is an exploitable player, this actually hurt this strategy. In an environment where most players are cooperating this player could theoretically be exploited.

The values in table 14 are very similar to the results of **TFT**.

Table 13: Cooperations of DDO depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.0500	0.1499	0.2997	0.3500
noise1 = 0.05	0.0500	0.0501	0.0517	0.0502
noise1 = 0.10	0.0500	0.1110	0.0503	0.0502
noise1 = 0.15	0.0501	0.0501	0.0501	0.0502

Figure 14: Reward plot of TFTR



#### 6.5.14 Strategy Switcher


The player's performance is shown in figure 15.

This player was by far the strongest player before the Downing players were added to the simulation. In the final simulation he is strong in fields, where the noise is large as is performance is not impacted by noise. The disadvantage comes from trying out different strategies in the beginning. In the case of no noise this means that FRI will always defect. In the case of Downing mutants this seems to result in defections from the Downing players. Before these Downing players were added this player outperformed TFT by a huge margin, even at zero noise. The strength of this player comes from his ability to cooperate with TFT mutants and exploit exploitable

Table 14: Cooperations of TFTR depending on the Noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.8059	0.8218	0.8375	0.8440
noise1 = 0.05	0.8059	0.8218	0.8375	0.84402
noise1 = 0.10	0.3476	0.4939	0.5341	0.5942
noise1 = 0.15	0.3202	0.4402	0.4906	0.5349

Figure 15: Reward plot of SSW



players. This player might even be stronger if better strategies were given to his arsenal. Currently he has COOP, DEF, TFT, TF2T and PAV as his choices. A more efficient choice might have been LTFT and DEF. Currently it also contains exploitable strategies (TF2T), so the player could be exploited.

In long simulations the player can benefit from having the optimal strategy, while in short simulations he spends a large amount of the time trying out strategies that might not be very strong.

The number of cooperations is rather low, but also does not change very much with the noise. This is most likely, because this player actively looks if an opponent is exploitable.



Table 15: Cooperations of SSW depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.5164	0.5430	0.4803	0.4659
noise1 = 0.05	0.5164	0.5430	0.4803	0.4659
noise1 = 0.10	0.5098	0.5520	0.4497	0.4888
noise1 = 0.15	0.5097	0.5318	0.4675	0.4467

Traits of the player:

- + Can exploit others
- + noise doesn't impact performance
- + Very adaptive
- + Strong in long simulations
- Exploitable himself
- Exploring defective moves can backfire (FRI)
- Is hard to read initially, this might trigger defections
- Weak in short simulations

#### 6.5.15 Lookback CDowning and Lookback DDowning

The two players' performance is shown in figure 16 (LCD0) and figure 17 (LDD0).

Generally both looking back Downings are stronger than the none looking back ones. If noise1 is zero, LCD00 mutant has again a higher performance. Comparing the second last move with the last move of the opponent seems to be the better way to correlate your actions with your opponent's actions. LDD0 seems to be very resilient to noise.

At zero noise LCD0 performs well with most players, except EVO, SS, and some Downing mutants. With noise the performance against FRI and some Downing mutants that went well before drops. The overall performance however stays higher than TFT.

Figure 16: Reward plot of LCDO




Table 16: Cooperations of LCDO depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.7507	0.6511	0.6509	0.7010
noise1 = 0.05	0.4385	0.4405	0.4376	0.4329
noise1 = 0.10	0.4297	0.3865	0.3787	0.3696
noise1 = 0.15	0.3814	0.4120	0.3682	0.3271

The number of cooperations is in general much higher, than for variants, which do not look back. For noise1 greater than zero about 40% cooperative moves remain, while CDO and DDO fall down to 5-10% cooperative moves. The average rewards for these players are also 0.2-0.5 higher than their not looking back counterparts.

#### 6.5.16 Watcher

The player's performance is shown in figure 18.

This player generally does not perform very strong. It does not respond and can therefore be exploited. It also does not take the local situation into account. It will betray FRI even in no noise, because in short term this is successful. After that the

Figure 17: Reward plot of LDDO




Table 17: Cooperations of LDDO depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.4037	0.4563	0.4071	0.4762
noise1 = 0.05	0.4386	0.3912	0.4303	0.3848
noise1 = 0.10	0.3864	0.4025	0.3784	0.3827
noise1 = 0.15	0.3868	0.3262	0.3840	0.3769

player copies strategies that were cooperative the whole time, while FRI is defecting. There is point of higher performance, where noise2 is 0.15 and noise1 is zero. For some reason it performs strong against the looking back Downing algorithms.

Generally the number of cooperations is rather low, but there are no drastic jumps.

### 6.5.17 Evolutionary

The player's performance is shown in figure 19.

This player performs rather poorly at all noises. Less noise is better for him, be-

Figure 18: Reward plot of WAT




Table 18: Cooperations of WAT depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.5399	0.4704	0.4298	0.4020
noise1 = 0.05	0.4569	0.3854	0.3544	0.3552
noise1 = 0.10	0.4297	0.3691	0.3522	0.3576
noise1 = 0.15	0.4125	0.3510	0.3428	0.3504

cause more reliable information allows the player to adjust. Noise generally promotes bad strategies, while they are sorted out when there is little noise. The problem is that this players does add rejections and therefore triggers others rejections. The player himself has a very slow reaction time. Changing his strategy by mutations takes hundreds of turns. This is a timescale the opponents cannot see. This player does not look responsive to the opponents. The player himself can only see the opponents reaction if it is within the segment length that the player tries to optimize. The interesting thing is that this player is able to exploit TF2T, he will add defections with mostly one sometimes two cooperative steps between them. It has a performance of 3.65 against TF2T at zero noise.

Figure 19: Reward plot of EVO




Table 19: Cooperations of EVO depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.4330	0.4941	0.5151	0.4878
noise1 = 0.05	0.3859	0.4745	0.4860	0.4855
noise1 = 0.10	0.3987	0.4750	0.4919	0.4914
noise1 = 0.15	0.3755	0.4793	0.4733	0.4896


The decisions seem to be mostly an even mix of defections and cooperations, with a slight preference of defections.

### 6.5.18 Limited Reconciliation Tit For tat

The player's performance is shown in figure 20.

At noise1 equal to zero the performance is similar to TFT. It does not perform as well as Reconciliation TFT against JOSS, therefore it might be wiser to make the time between the reconciliation attempts larger every time, instead of limiting it to 3. Compared to TFT its performance does not break down that much with noise1,

Figure 20: Reward plot of LTFT



this is a property it shares with DIE, TFAT and RTFT. The fact that the number of reconciliation attempts is limited makes the player stronger against defecting players like FRI (under noise1) and DEF.

Table 20: Cooperations of LTFT depending on the noise

	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	0.8064	0.8386	0.8942	0.8976
noise1 = 0.05	0.5084	0.6577	0.6834	0.7043
noise1 = 0.10	0.4254	0.6300	0.6568	0.6822
noise1 = 0.15	0.4208	0.5956	0.6383	0.6648

LTFT is not as cooperative as the friendliest TFT mutants DIE and RTFT, but more friendly than standard TFT and TFAT.

Table 21 shows the performance of LTFT minus the performance of TFT averaged over all match ups and both simulations:

At higher values for noise1, LTFT outperforms TFT, while at high noise2 values

Table 21: Comparison of the two players LTFT and TFT


	noise2 = 0	noise2 = 0.05	noise2 = 0.1	noise2 = 0.15
noise1 = 0	-0.0317	0.0414	0.0375	-0.0892
noise1 = 0.05	0.2235	-0.0006	0.0310	-0.0679
noise1 = 0.10	0.0438	0.0340	0.0019	0.0066
noise1 = 0.15	0.0514	0.0720	0.0189	-0.0312

the reconciliation attempts are not needed, because the noise itself achieves that.

## 6.6 Impact of noise on the whole system


Figure 21 and figure 22 shows the behavior of the average cooperation and the average reward in the system.

Figure 21: Total average cooperation against noise



Noise1 seems to destroy cooperation really fast, while noise2 increases it a little. Generally the average reward is the highest if the number of cooperative moves is the highest. The average reward's dependence on the noise looks very similar to the values a typical TFT mutant has. This may be related to the fact, that there were 8

Figure 22: Total average Reward against noise



TFT mutants in the simulation. By mean of this, the entire system is acting like a big TFT player.

## 6.7 Comparison of the players


In figure 23 the average reward is plotted against the different noise levels (23a for simulation 1 and 23b for simulation 2). The brighter the color, the higher is the average reward. In each cell the player with the highest score is named.

At noise1 equal zero the TFT mutants win, but for every noise1 larger than zero SSW wins, due to the small impact the noise has on his performance. For noise levels even bigger always defect will be the best strategy.




Figure 23: Reward versus noise with the best players

(a) Simulation 1




(b) Simulation 2



The graphs 24, 25, 26 and 27 illustrate the player's performances compared at different noise levels.

Figure 24: Comparison of all players at zero noise




With no noise the best strategies are either TFT mutants, or variants of CDO. Defective strategies perform poorly, which is in accordance to what Axelrod said: be nice.

Figure 25 indicate, that the ranking of the different strategies does not change much. Generally everybody is profiting of the noise, because some defections are now transmitted as cooperations and the whole setup gets more reward.

In figure 26 it is obvious, that the performance of the TFT mutants drastically decreases. Only DIE stays somewhat high. The strongest strategies are now the looking back Downings and SS. Before, SS had the problem, that the defections he tried out, to exploit non-responding players cost him a lot. Now everybody sees more defections due to the noise, that actually are really taken, and it doesnt matter that much anymore.



In figure 27 the TFT mutants perform somewhat better than without noise2, but

Figure 25: Comparison at noise1 equal to zero and noise2 = 0.1



SS is still much stronger than all the other players.

Figure 26: Comparison at noise2 equal to zero and noise1 = 0.1



## 7 Summary and Outlook

The aim of this simulation was to investigate two things. In the first place was the impact of noise on the tournament. It turned out that noise, which lets defections appear as cooperations is beneficial for most players. The opposite, when cooperative moves are perceived as defections, has a much larger impact, although negative for most of the players. The performance of most friendly players drastically drops. It is especially harsh for players that relied on the effect of the first move being cooperative and have no mechanism to restore cooperation once it is lost. Even the more defective players lose some of their reward in comparison with no noise, but it is not as dramatically as for the cooperative players. So the noise definitely discourages cooperation of all players. Further cooperation is vulnerable to noise and can not really overcome the miscommunication. Generally one could say, whether a transmitted cooperation is for real or is just misunderstood does not really matter. It is better for everyone to see a corrupted cooperation than none at all, so treason can be hidden behind pretended miscommunication pretty well.

The second investigated topic was, how learning players would perform in this setup. Of the three learning mechanisms is just copying the others. **EVO** and **SS** are based on this strategy, whereat **SS** performed strongest. The strategy was even stronger than most not learning strategies. The other two approaches failed, because they were not responsive. Learning strategies have no big advantage over the none evolutionary strategies, because they rely on data corrupted by noise.

To overcome a dispute based on miscommunication is very difficult and is risky, because of the exploitation by the opponent. To overcome a dispute both players have to take some risk and be reconcile to get back to mutual cooperation again. The best case is achieved if both players are reconcile, so the chance to get back to mutual cooperation after some noisy decision is the biggest.

Continuative there are some interesting things more to do. The performance of the players was heavily impacted by the nature of the other players participating in the simulation. It would be interesting to run the simulation with more players or even every player against one specific player, to see how good he can adapt. Another possible investigation could be to find out if the average performance increases with a noise that covers up defections forever, or if there is a turning point after which the performance decreases again. In addition the concept of evolutionary strategies can be augmented.

---

## 8 References

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- [4] Wu, J. et al, "How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma". Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 39, pages 183-189 (1995)
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## A Submitted Researchplan

### A.1 General Introduction

Tournament like simulation of the prisoner's dilemma with repeated inter- actions. Random errors are introduced in the information about the player's recent behavior. We want to observe the different outcome of the traditional players if noise is introduced. Further we want to try to implement new players with learning strategies.

We believe that this makes the simulation more realistic.

Extension of Axelrod's Tournaments.

### A.2 Fundamental Questions

Can a dispute based on miscommunication be overcome?

Can treason be hidden behind pretended miscommunication?

Does miscommunication discourage cooperation?

How much miscommunication can cooperation survive?

Do learning strategies have an advantage over the other ones?

How do the traditional players act and how does the final result change, if noise is introduced?

Independent variables: length of simulation, reliability of communication, rewards

Dependent variables: correlation between cooperation and success, frequency of cooperation, successful strategies

### A.3 Expected Results

Miscommunication works against cooperating strategies.

Programs that reconcile are more successful.

The reward of the learning players is less influenced by the noise.

### A.4 References

- On Evolving Robust Strategies for Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, P. J. DARWEN and X. YAO, 16. November 1993
- Multiagent Reinforcement Learning in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, T. W. SANDHOLM and R. H. CRITES
- Adaptation of Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Strategies by Evolution and Learning, H. Y. QUEK and C. K. GOH, 2007

- How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, J. WU and R. AXELROD, JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 39 No. 1, March 1995 183-189
- Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation, M. A. NOWAK, Science 314, 1560 (2006)

#### **A.4.1 Research Methods**

Agent-Based Model

### **A.5 Other**

The type(s) of the learning strategies we will decide later, after reading some of the literature.



## B Matlabcode

### B.1 Master.m

Listing 4: Master.m

```
clear all;close all; home           % Initialisation
% [a, MSGID] = lastwarn();
% warning('off', MSGID)
%Note: Most standard players are taken from the lecture http://www.socio.ethz.ch/education/fs11/igt/notes/Evolution\_von\_Kooperation\_2011.pdf

5  tic                               % start time measurement
N = 20000                           % Number of turns
maxplayers = 20;                    % Maximum number of players
K = zeros(maxplayers,maxplayers,N ); % Contains the information about the
    players true decisions: 1=Cooperate 2=Betray
10 K2 = zeros(maxplayers,maxplayers,N ); % Contains the information about the
    players decision disturbed by noise
minNoise1 = 0                       % The chance that cooperation gets recieved
    as betrayal goes from the value minNoise1 to maxNoise1
maxNoise1 = 0.15
minNoise2 = 0                       % The chance that betrayal gets recieved as
    cooperation goes from the value minNoise2 to maxNoise2
maxNoise2 = 0.15
15 NoiseInc=0.05;                   % Noise increment with each simulation
maxX=(maxNoise1-minNoise1)/NoiseInc+1+10^-15; % number of points of the x-axis,
    the last addition is to prevent floating point errors
maxY=(maxNoise2-minNoise2)/NoiseInc+1+10^-15; % number of points of the y-axis
player = 'player';                  % Name of the player functions
Rewardmatrix=zeros(maxplayers,maxplayers,maxX,maxY); % Matrix that tracks how many
    points the players get out of each encounter
20 Reward=zeros(2,1);               % Rewards that the players get in an
    encounter
Points=zeros(maxplayers);           % Total amount of points of a player
AverageCoop=zeros(maxX,maxY,maxplayers,maxplayers); % The average cooperation at a
    given noise for a given matchup
SysAvRew=zeros(maxX,maxY);          % The average reward in the whole system
    for a given noise

25 Winner=0;                        % most succesful player

list = playerlist(player, maxplayers);

Noise(1,1:maxX)=(minNoise1:NoiseInc:maxNoise1);
```

```

30 Noise(2,1:maxY)=(minNoise2:NoiseInc:maxNoise2);

for x=1:maxX
    Noise1=(x-1)*NoiseInc+minNoise1;
    for y=1:maxY
35         Noise2=(y-1)*NoiseInc+minNoise2;
           %create the players
           for i=1:maxplayers
               if list(i)==1
                   i2=int2str(i);
40                   eval(['P' i2 '=player' i2 '(' num2str(maxplayers) ');']);
                   Names{i}=eval(['P' i2 '.name']);
                   Shorts{i}=eval(['P' i2 '.short']);
               end
           end
45         for i=1:N % loop trough all turns
           for j=1:maxplayers % loop trough all players
               for k=1:j % let each player interact with all other players
                   j2=int2str(j);
                   k2=int2str(k);
50                   if list(j)==1 && list(k)==1
                       K(j,k,i)=eval(['P' j2 '.decide(K2,k,i)']); % player j
                           decides how to behave to player k
                       K(k,j,i)=eval(['P' k2 '.decide(K2,j,i)']); % player k
                           decides how to behave to player j
                       Reward=win([K(j,k,i) K(k,j,i)]); % Rewards are calculated
                       if (j == k)
55                           Reward=Reward/2; % otherwise the interaction with
                               itself get counted double
                       end
                       Points(j) = Points(j) + Reward(1); % Points get updated
                       Points(k) = Points(k) + Reward(2);
                       Rewardmatrix(j,k,x,y) = Rewardmatrix(j,k,x,y) + Reward(1);
60                       Rewardmatrix(k,j,x,y) = Rewardmatrix(k,j,x,y) + Reward(2);
                       % noise/miscommunication
                       if (K(j,k,i) == 1) %player j cooperates
                           if (rand > Noise1) %transmission correct
                               K2(j,k,i) = 1;
65                           else % miscommunication
                               K2(j,k,i) = 2;
                           end
                       else %player j betrays
                           if (rand > Noise2) %transmission correct
70                               K2(j,k,i) = 2;
                           else % miscommunication
                               K2(j,k,i) = 1;
                           end
                       end
                   end
               end
           end
       end
   end
end

```

```

75         end
        end
        if (K(k,j,i) == 1) %player k cooperates
            if (rand > Noise1) %transmission correct
                K2(k,j,i) = 1;
            else % miscommunication
                K2(k,j,i) = 2;
            end
        else % player k betrays
            if (rand > Noise2) %transmission correct
                K2(k,j,i) = 2;
            else % miscommunication
                K2(k,j,i) = 1;
            end
        end
    end
end
end
end
%delete players
for i=1:maxplayers
    if list(i)==1
        i2=int2str(i);
        eval(['clear P' i2]);
    end
end
%Output Cooperation and average Reward in the system
for i=1:maxplayers
    for j=1:maxplayers
        AverageCoop(x,y,i,j)=2-mean(mean(K(i,j,:)));
    end
    SysAvRew(x,y)=mean(mean(Rewardmatrix(:,:,x,y)))/N;
end
%output progress
Noise1
Noise2
toc
end
end

save simulation2 Rewardmatrix N Names Noise AverageCoop Shorts;
toc % end time measurement

```

## B.2 win.m

Listing 5: win.m

```

function [ Reward ] = win( K )
%GEWINN Gewinnberechnung

    if K(1)==1 && K(2)==1
5         Reward(1)=3;
          Reward(2)=3;

    elseif K(1)==2 && K(2)==1
10         Reward(1)=5;
          Reward(2)=0;

    elseif K(1)==1 && K(2)==2
15         Reward(1)=0;
          Reward(2)=5;

    elseif K(1)==2 && K(2)==2
20         Reward(1)=1;
          Reward(2)=1;

    else
25         disp('Unknown decisions were made!!!')
    end

```

## B.3 show\_data.m

Listing 6: show\_data.m

```

#####
% Content of file:
% 1.cell: initialization
% 2.cell: plot reward of all players with given noiselevels
5 % 3.cell: plot cooperation of all players with given noiselevels
% 4.cell: plot statistics for a given player (reward vs given noiselevels)
% with surface plot
% 5.cell: plot statistics for a given player (cooperation vs given
% noiselevels) with surfac plot
10 % 6.cell: reward vs noise with name of the best player in plot
% 7.cell: total cooperation/reward normed with surface plot

```

```

% 8.cell: 2 given Players against each other

% Use of file:
15 % 1. set filename of the simulation file in the 1. cell
% 2. set desired noiselevel in the 2.cell
% 3. set desired noiselevel in the 3.cell
% 4. set desired positions of players and desired noiselevels in the 4.cell
% 5. set desired positions of players and desired noiselevels in the 5.cell
20 % 6. set playersInRange true in the 6.cell to write the players in range
% in a textfile
% 7. set the filename for the players in range in the 6.cell
% 8. set the range in the 6.cell
% 9. set the filename in the 7.cell for the file with the 2 matrices
25 %10. set the desired players to face each other
%11. run the whole file

% hint: just run one cell, if only this result is desired
% warning: the more things you want to plot, the more plots you got
30 #####

%% Initialize and get data of the simulation file

35 % Clear used Variables:
clear filename vars rewardMatrix numberOfPlayers numberOfTurns listOfPlayers ...
    noise averageCoop lengthOfNoise i j k

40 % Inputs:
filename = 'simulation.mat'; % name of the simulation-file
nummberOfSimulation = 1; % number of simulation
% Calc:
vars=load(filename); % load variables of the simulation-file
45 figureCounter = 1; % open new figure for each plot

rewardMatrix = vars.Rewardmatrix; % store the rewardmatrix
numberOfTurns = vars.N; % store the numbers of turns
listOfPlayers = vars.Names; % store the list of players
50 noise = vars.Noise; % store the noisematrix
averageCoop = vars.AverageCoop; % store average cooperation
short = vars.Shorts; % store short names of players

numberOfPlayers = length(listOfPlayers); % get the numbers of players
55 lengthOfNoise = size(noise,2);

% Convert rewardmatrix

```

```

for i = 1:numberOfPlayers % generate empty matrices for every player
    eval(['R' int2str(i) '=zeros(lengthOfNoise,lengthOfNoise,numberOfPlayers);']);
60    eval(['C' int2str(i) '=zeros(lengthOfNoise,lengthOfNoise,numberOfPlayers);']);
end

for i = 1:numberOfPlayers % rewardmatrix Ri(noise1,noise2,oponent)
    for k = 1:lengthOfNoise
        for j = 1:lengthOfNoise
65            eval(['R' int2str(i) '(' int2str(k) ',' int2str(j) ',:)=\'...
                \'rewardMatrix(' int2str(i) ',:,' int2str(k) ',' int2str(j) ');']);
            end
        end
70    end
end

for i = 1:numberOfPlayers % coopmatrix Ci(noise1,noise2,oponent)
    for k = 1:lengthOfNoise
        for j = 1:lengthOfNoise
75            eval(['C' int2str(i) '(' int2str(k) ',' int2str(j) ',:)=averageCoop\'...
                '(' int2str(k) ',' int2str(j) ',' int2str(i) ',:);']);
            end
        end
80    end
end

%% Plot Reward of all players with given noiselevels
85
% Clear used Variables:
clear noiseLevel tempRewardMatrix rewardVectors i k h lengthN

% Inputs:
90 noiseLevel = [1;... % Noise Level 1 (player --> opponent)
                1]; % Noise Level 2 (opponent --> player)

% Calc:
95 tempRewardMatrix = zeros(numberOfPlayers); % temporary rewardmatrix
lengthN = size(noiseLevel,2); % number of diffrent noise level constellations
rewardVectors = zeros(lengthN,numberOfPlayers); % the reward vector for each
                                                % noise level constellation is saved

100 h = figure(figureCounter); % initialize figure
set(h,'NumberTitle','off')

```

```

105 set(h,'Position',[10 100 1000 600])           % position and size of figure
set(h,'Name',['Reward of all Players at given Noiselevels ' int2str(1)])
                                           % set title of figure

for i = 1:lengthN                           % iterate over all noise lever constellations
    for k = 1:numberOfPlayers                 % iterate over all players
110         eval(['tempRewardMatrix(' int2str(k) ',:)=R' int2str(k) ...
                '(noiseLevel(1,i),noiseLevel(2,i),:);']); % save reward of each player in
                                           % temporary rewardmatrix
    end
    rewardVectors(i,:)=sum(tempRewardMatrix')/(numberOfTurns*numberOfPlayers);
115                                           % rewardvector of each noise level constellation is saved

    subplot(lengthN,1,i)                     % plotting options
    bar(rewardVectors(i,:));
    grid on;
120    set(gca,'XTick',1:1:numberOfPlayers)
    set(gca,'XTickLabel',short,'FontSize',8)
    set(gca,'XLim',[0 numberOfPlayers+1])
    set(gca,'YLim',[max((min(rewardVectors(i,:))-0.25),0) min((max(...
125         rewardVectors(i,:))+0.25),5)])
    title(['Noiseplot with Noiselevel 1: ',num2str(noise(1,noiseLevel(1,i))),...
          ', and Noiselevel 2: ', num2str(noise(2,noiseLevel(2,i)))], 'FontWeight'...
          , 'bold', 'FontSize',12);
    xlabel('Players','FontWeight','bold','FontSize',10)
    ylabel('Average profit of Player','FontWeight','bold','FontSize',10)
130 end
saveas(h,['pics\simulation' num2str(numberOfSimulation) '\get(h,'Name') '.eps'])
figureCounter = figureCounter + 1; % update figurecounter

135 %% Plot Cooperation of all players with given noiselevels

% Clear used Variables:
clear noiseLevel tempCoopMatrix cooectors i k h lengthN

140 % Inputs:
noiseLevel = [1 2;...                       % Noise Level 1 (player --> opponent)
              1 2];                          % Noise Level 2 (opponent --> player)

145 % Calc:
tempCoopMatrix = zeros(numberOfPlayers); % temporary rewardmatrix
lengthN = size(noiseLevel,2); % number of diffrent noise level constellations
coopVectors = zeros(lengthN,numberOfPlayers); % the cooperation vector for each
                                           % noise level constellation is saved

```

```

150 h = figure.figureCounter);                                % initialize figure
set(h,'NumberTitle','off')
set(h,'Position',[10 100 900 600])                        % position and size of figure
155 set(h,'Name','Cooperation of all Players at given Noiselevels') % set title of
                                                                    % figure

for i = 1:lengthN                                          % iterate over all noise lever constellations
    for k = 1:numberOfPlayers                             % iterate over all players
160         eval(['tempCoopMatrix(' int2str(k) ',:)=C' int2str(k) ...
                '(noiseLevel(1,i),noiseLevel(2,i),:);']); % save cooperation of each
                                                                    % player in temporary cooperation matrix
    end
    coopVectors(i,:)=mean(tempCoopMatrix,2); % coopvector of each noise level
165                                                                    % constellation is saved

    subplot(lengthN,1,i)                                  % plotting options
    bar(coopVectors(i,:));
170    grid on;
    set(gca,'XTick',1:1:numberOfPlayers)
    set(gca,'XTickLabel',short,'FontSize',8)
    set(gca,'XLim',[0 numberOfPlayers+1])
    set(gca,'YLim',[max((min(coopVectors(i,:))-0.05),0) min(...
175         max(coopVectors(i,:))+0.05),1]])
    title(['Noiseplot with Noiselevel 1: ',num2str(noise(1,noiseLevel(1,i))),...
           ', and Noiselevel 2: ', num2str(noise(2,noiseLevel(2,i)))], 'FontWeight'...
           , 'bold', 'FontSize',12);
    xlabel('Players','FontWeight','bold','FontSize',10)
180    ylabel('Cooperation of Player in %','FontWeight','bold','FontSize',10)
end
saveas(h,['pics\simulation' num2str(numberOfSimulation) '\get(h,'Name') '.eps'])
figureCounter = figureCounter + 1; % update figurecounter

185 %% Plot statistics for a given player (Reward vs given Noiselevels)

% Clear used Variables:
clear position noiseLevel lengthN givenPlayers tempRewardMatrix k ...
    tempRewardVector i h
190

% Inputs:
position = [1]; % Numbers of the players (hint: type listOfPlayers
                % to see which player has which number)
noiseLevel = [1 ;... % Noise Level 1
195             1]; % Noise Level 2

```



```

% Calc:
givenPlayers = length(position);      % number of given players
lengthN = size(noiseLevel,2);         % number of given noise level constellations
200 tempSurf = zeros(lengthOfNoise);

tempRewardMatrix = zeros(givenPlayers,numberOfPlayers,lengthN);
                                                % temporary reward matrix
tempRewardVector = zeros(1,numberOfPlayers);

205 for i = 1:givenPlayers                    % fill tempRewardMatrix(given Player, all
                                                % opponents, given noise level)
    for k = 1:numberOfPlayers
        for l = 1:lengthN
210             tempRewardMatrix(i,k,l) = eval(['R' int2str(position(i))...
                '(noiseLevel(1,l),noiseLevel(2,l),k);']);
        end
    end
end
215 for i = 1:givenPlayers                    % iterate over all given players
    h = figure(i+figureCounter);           % initialize figure
    set(h,'NumberTitle','off')
    set(h,'Position',[10 100 800 720])     % position and size of figure
220 set(h,'Name',['Reward of Player ' listOfPlayers{position(i)} ...
    ' against all Players at given Noiselevels']) % set title of figure
    for k = 1:lengthN                    % iterate over each noiselevel constellation
        tempRewardVector = tempRewardMatrix(i,:,k)/numberOfTurns;
                                                % take right vector out of the tempRewardMatrix
225
        subplot(lengthN,1,k)             % plotting options
        bar(tempRewardVector);
        grid ON;
        set(gca,'XTick',1:1:numberOfPlayers)
230 set(gca,'XTickLabel',short,'FontSize',8)
        set(gca,'XLim',[0 numberOfPlayers+1])
        set(gca,'YLim',[max((min(tempRewardVector)-0.25),0)...
            min((max(tempRewardVector)+0.25),5)])
235 title(['Noiseplot with Noiselevel 1: ',num2str(noise(1,noiseLevel...
            (1,k))), ' and Noiselevel 2: ', num2str(noise(2,noiseLevel(2,k))),...
            ' for Player ' listOfPlayers{position(i)}, ','], 'FontWeight','bold'...
            , 'FontSize',12);
        xlabel('Opponents','FontWeight','bold','FontSize',10)
        ylabel(['Average profit of Player ' listOfPlayers{position(i)} ','],...
240             'FontWeight','bold','FontSize',8)
    end
end

```

```

%saveas(h,['pics\simulation' num2str(nummberOfSimulation) '\get(h,'Name') '.eps'])
end
245 for i = 1:givenPlayers % iterate over all given players

    tempSurf = sum(eval(['R' int2str(position(i))]),3)/...
        (numberOfPlayers*numberOfTurns);

250 h = figure.figureCounter+givenPlayers+i); % initialize figure
    set(h,'NumberTitle','off')
    set(h,'Position',[10 100 700 700]) % position and size of figure
    set(h,'Name',['Reward vs Noise of Player ' listOfPlayers{position(i)} '])
    % set title of figure
255

    surf(tempSurf)
    title(['Average profit of Player ' listOfPlayers{position(i)} '],...
        'FontWeight','bold','FontSize',12);
260

    % set a colormap for the figure.
    colormap(hot);

    % set the view angle.
265 view(150,47);

    % labels
    set(gca,'XTick',1:1:lengthOfNoise)
    set(gca,'YTick',1:1:lengthOfNoise)
270 set(gca,'XTickLabel',noise(2,:))
    set(gca,'YTickLabel',noise(1,:))

    xlabel('Noise 2');
275 ylabel('Noise 1');
    zlabel('Reward');
saveas(h,['pics\simulation' num2str(nummberOfSimulation) '\get(h,'Name') '.eps'])
end

280 figureCounter = figureCounter + 2* givenPlayers; % update figurecounter

%% Plot statistics for a given player (Cooperation vs given Noiselevels)

% Clear used Variables:
285 clear position noiseLevel lengthN givenPlayers tempCoopMatrix k tempCoopVector i h

% Inputs:

```

```

position = [1,2,3,4,5]; % Numbers of the players (hint: type
                        % listOfPlayers to see which player has which number)
290 noiseLevel = [1 ;... % Noise Level 1
                1]; % Noise Level 2

% Calc:
givenPlayers = length(position); % number of given players
295 lengthN = size(noiseLevel,2); % number of given noise level constellations

tempCoopMatrix = zeros(givenPlayers,numberOfPlayers,lengthN);
                        % temporary cooperation matrix
tempCoopVector = zeros(1,numberOfPlayers);
300 tempSurf = zeros(lengthOfNoise);

for i = 1:givenPlayers % fill tempCoopMatrix(given Player, all
                        % opponents, given noise level)
    for k = 1:numberOfPlayers
        for l = 1:lengthN
305             tempCoopMatrix(i,k,l) = eval(['C' int2str(position(i)) ...
                '(noiseLevel(1,l),noiseLevel(2,l),k);']);
        end
    end
310 end

for i = 1:givenPlayers % iterate over all given players
    h = figure(i+figureCounter); % initialize figure
    set(h,'NumberTitle','off')
    set(h,'Position',[10 500 1000 900]) % position and size of figure
315 set(h,'Name',['Cooperation of Player ' listOfPlayers{position(i)} ...
    ' against all Players at given Noiselevels']) % set title of figure
    for k = 1:lengthN % iterate over each noiselevel constellation
        tempCoopVector = tempCoopMatrix(i,:,k); % take right vector
320 % out of the tempCoopMatrix

        subplot(lengthN,1,k) % plotting options
        bar(tempCoopVector);
        grid ON;
325 set(gca,'XTick',1:1:numberOfPlayers)
        set(gca,'XTickLabel',short,'FontSize',8)
        set(gca,'XLim',[0 numberOfPlayers+1])
        set(gca,'YLim',[max((min(tempCoopVector)-0.05),0)...
            min((max(tempCoopVector)+0.05),1)])
330 title(['Noiseplot with Noiselevel 1: ',num2str(noise(1,noiseLevel...
            (1,k))), ' and Noiselevel 2: ', num2str(noise(2,noiseLevel(2,k)))...
            , ' for Player ' listOfPlayers{position(i)}, '''],'FontWeight','bold'...
            , 'FontSize',12);

```

```

335     xlabel('Opponents','FontWeight','bold','FontSize',10)
        ylabel(['Cooperation of Player ' listOfPlayers{position(i)} ''],...
            'FontWeight','bold','FontSize',8)
    end
    saveas(h,['pics\simulation' num2str(nummberOfSimulation) '\get(h,'Name') '.eps'])
end
340 for i = 1:givenPlayers                % iterate over all given players

    tempSurf = mean(eval(['C' int2str(position(i))]),3);

    h = figure(figureCounter+givenPlayers+i);                % initialize figure
345     set(h,'NumberTitle','off')
    set(h,'Position',[10 500 800 800])                % position and size of figure
    set(h,'Name',['Cooperation vs Noise of Player ' listOfPlayers{position(i)}])
                                                % set title of figure

350     surf(tempSurf)
    title(['Average cooperation of Player ' listOfPlayers{position(i)} ''],...
        'FontWeight','bold','FontSize',12);

355     % set a colormap for the figure.
    colormap(hot);

    % set the view angle.
    view(225,35);

360     % labels
    set(gca,'XTick',0:1:lengthOfNoise)
    set(gca,'YTick',0:1:lengthOfNoise)
    set(gca,'XTickLabel',noise(1,:))
365     set(gca,'YTickLabel',noise(2,:))

    xlabel('Noise 1');
    ylabel('Noise 2');
370     zlabel('Cooperation');
    saveas(h,['pics\simulation' num2str(nummberOfSimulation) '\get(h,'Name') '.eps'])
end

figureCounter = figureCounter + 2* givenPlayers; % update figurecounter

375 %% Reward vs Noise with name of the best player

% Clear used Variables:
clear positions h tempRewardMatrix value position player noiseLevel ...

```

```

380     tempPositions endPositions endReward playersInRange range filename file

% Inputs:
playersInRange = true; % true: calculate players in range, false, don't calculate
                        % players in range
385 range = 0.05;      % how close have other players be, to be mentioned
filename = 'range.txt'; % file, where players in range are saved

% Calc:
positions = zeros(lengthOfNoise^2,numberOfPlayers); % vector for player
                                                    % with maximum reward for given noise
390 tempRewardMatrix = zeros(lengthOfNoise^2,numberOfPlayers); % create new
                                                    % temporary reward matrix

for i = 1:lengthOfNoise % iterate over all noise combinations
395     for k = 1:lengthOfNoise
         for l = 1:numberOfPlayers % iterate over all players
             for m = 1:numberOfPlayers % iterate over all opponents
                 tempRewardMatrix(k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise,l) = tempRewardMatrix(k+...
                     (i-1)*lengthOfNoise,l) + eval(['R' int2str(l) '(' int2str(i)...
400                     ',' int2str(k) ',' int2str(m) ');']);
                                                    % add temporary rewardmatrix (l,player)
             end
         end
     end
405 end

[value, position] = max(tempRewardMatrix'/(numberOfTurns*numberOfPlayers));
                                                    % take maximas

410 for i = 1:lengthOfNoise^2 % fill positionmatrix
     positions(i,position(i)) = value(i);
end

[noiseLevel ,player] = find(positions);
415 tempPositions = sortrows([noiseLevel player],1);

for i = 1:lengthOfNoise % get positions matrix and reward matrix ready for plotting
    for k = 1:lengthOfNoise
        endPositions(i,k) = tempPositions(k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise,2);
420        endReward(i,k) = positions(k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise,tempPositions(...
            k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise,2));
    end
end
425 h = figure(figureCounter+1); % initialize figure

```

```

set(h,'NumberTitle','off')
set(h,'Position',[10 500 800 800])           % position and size of figure
set(h,'Name','Reward vs Noise with best Player named') % set title of figure

430 colormap(winter)
imagesc(0:1:lengthOfNoise-1,0:1:lengthOfNoise-1,endReward)
set(gca,'XTick',0:1:lengthOfNoise)
set(gca,'YTick',0:1:lengthOfNoise)
set(gca,'XTickLabel',noise(1,:))
435 set(gca,'YTickLabel',noise(2,:))

for i = 1:lengthOfNoise
    for k = 1:lengthOfNoise
        text(k-1,i-1,...
440         [listOfPlayers{endPositions(i,k)}],...
        'HorizontalAlignment','center','VerticalAlignment','bottom',...
        'FontWeight','bold','FontSize',12);
        text(k-1,i-1,...
445         [num2str(endReward(i,k))],...
        'HorizontalAlignment','center','VerticalAlignment','top');

    end
end
450 saveas(h,['pics\simulation' num2str(nummberOfSimulation) '\ ' get(h,'Name') '.eps'])

if(playersInRange) % caluclate players in range:
455     result=zeros(lengthOfNoise^2,numberOfPlayers); % empty matrix for position
                                                % of players
    tempRewardMatrix = tempRewardMatrix./(numberOfPlayers*numberOfTurns);
                                                % norm tempRewardMatrix
    lowerValue = endReward .* (1-range); % calculate lower value
460     for i = 1:lengthOfNoise % iterate over all noise levels
        for k = 1:lengthOfNoise
            clear tempResult
            tempResult = find(tempRewardMatrix(k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise,:)>=...
                lowerValue(i,k)); % find players in range
465             result(k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise,1:length(tempResult)) = tempResult;
        end
    end
end

470 file = fopen(filename,'w'); % open file with given filename
fprintf(file, 'Players in a %1.2f range for each noise level \n\n',range);

```



```

    end
end
520
for l=1:lengthOfNoise % calculate total cooperation matrix
    for j=1:lengthOfNoise
        totalCoop(l,j)=mean(tempTotalCoop(l,j,:));
    end
525 end

h = figure.figureCounter+1); % initialize figure
set(h,'NumberTitle','off')
set(h,'Position',[10 500 800 800]) % position and size of figure
530 set(h,'Name','Total Reward vs Noise') % set title of figure

surf(totalReward)

535 % set a colormap for the figure.
colormap(hot);

% set the view angle.
540 view(135,35);

% labels
set(gca,'XTick',1:1:lengthOfNoise)
set(gca,'YTick',1:1:lengthOfNoise)
545 set(gca,'XTickLabel',noise(2,:))
set(gca,'YTickLabel',noise(1,:))

xlabel('Noise 2');
550 ylabel('Noise 1');
zlabel('Reward');
saveas(h,['pics\simulation' num2str(numberOfSimulation) '\ ' get(h,'Name') '.eps'])
h = figure.figureCounter+2); % initialize figure
set(h,'NumberTitle','off')
555 set(h,'Position',[10 500 800 800]) % position and size of figure
set(h,'Name','Total Cooperation vs Noise') % set title of figure

surf(totalCoop)

560 % set a colormap for the figure.
colormap(jet);

```



```

565 % set the view angle.
view(135,35);

% labels
set(gca,'XTick',1:1:lengthOfNoise)
570 set(gca,'YTick',1:1:lengthOfNoise)
set(gca,'XTickLabel',noise(2,:))
set(gca,'YTickLabel',noise(1,:))

575 xlabel('Noise 2');
ylabel('Noise 1');
zlabel('Cooperation');
saveas(h,['pics\simulation' num2str(numberOfSimulation) '\ ' get(h,'Name') '.eps'])
file = fopen(filename,'w'); % open file with given filename
580 fprintf(file, 'Total Rewardmatrix: \n\nNoise ',range);
% print header for rewardmatrix

fprintf(file, '| %1.2f ',noise(1,:)); % print reward matrix
fprintf(file, '\n ----|');
585 for k=1:lengthOfNoise
    for i = 1:lengthOfNoise
        fprintf(file, '-----');
    end
    fprintf(file, '\n %1.2f ',noise(2,k));
590 fprintf(file, '| %1.2f ',totalReward(k,:));
    fprintf(file, '\n ----|');
end
for i = 1:lengthOfNoise
    fprintf(file, '-----');
595 end

fprintf(file, '\n\nTotal Cooperationmatrix: \n\nNoise ',range);
% print header for coopmatrix

600 fprintf(file, '| %1.2f ',noise(1,:)); % print coopmatrix
fprintf(file, '\n ----|');
for k=1:lengthOfNoise
    for i = 1:lengthOfNoise
        fprintf(file, '-----');
605 end
    fprintf(file, '\n %1.2f ',noise(2,k));
    fprintf(file, '| %1.4f ',totalCoop(k,:));
    fprintf(file, '\n ----|');
end
end

```

```

610 for i = 1:lengthOfNoise
    fprintf(file, '-----');
end

fclose(file); % close file

615 figureCounter=figureCounter+2;

%% 2 given Players against each other

620 % Clear used Variables:
clear players shortTemp tempRewardMatrix l k i

% Inputs:
player = [1 ;... % player 1
625         1 ] ; % player 2

% Calc:
players = size(player,2); % number of faceoffs
630 tempRewardMatrix = zeros(lengthOfNoise^2,2,players);
% create temporary rewardmatrix(noiselevel,2,faceoff)

for l = 1:players % create rewardmatrix
635     for i = 1:lengthOfNoise
        for k = 1:lengthOfNoise
            tempRewardMatrix(k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise,1,1) = eval(['R' int2str...
                (player(1,1)) '(' int2str(i) ',' int2str(k) ',' int2str...
                (player(2,1)) ');']/numberOfTurns;
640            tempRewardMatrix(k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise,2,1) = eval(['R' int2str...
                (player(2,1)) '(' int2str(i) ',' int2str(k) ',' int2str...
                (player(1,1)) ');']/numberOfTurns;
        end
    end
645 end

for l = 1:players % iterate over faceoffs
    h = figure(1+figureCounter); % initialize figure
    set(h,'NumberTitle','off')
    set(h,'Position',[10 500 1600 900]) % position and size of figure
650    set(h,'Name',[' listOfPlayers{player(1,1)} ' against ' listOfPlayers...
        {player(2,1)} ' and vice versa']) % set title of figure
    for i = 1:lengthOfNoise
        for k = 1:lengthOfNoise
655            subplot(lengthOfNoise, lengthOfNoise, k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise)

```

```

        bar(tempRewardMatrix(k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise,:,1))
        grid ON;
        set(gca,'XTick',1:1:2)
        shortTemp{1} = short{player(1,1)};
        shortTemp{2} = short{player(2,1)};
660     set(gca,'XTickLabel',shortTemp,'FontSize',8)
        set(gca,'XLim',[0 3])
        set(gca,'YLim',[max((min(tempRewardMatrix(k+(i-1)*...
            lengthOfNoise,:,1))-0.25),0) min((max(tempRewardMatrix(...
665     k+(i-1)*lengthOfNoise,:,1))+0.25),5)])
        title(['Noisely 1: ',num2str(noise(1,k)), ' and Noisely 2: ',...
            num2str(noise(1,i)),'],'FontWeight','bold','FontSize',12);
        xlabel('Opponents','FontWeight','bold','FontSize',10)
        ylabel(['Reward'],'FontWeight','bold','FontSize',8)
670     end
    end
    saveas(h,['pics\simulation' num2str(nummberOfSimulation) '\get(h,'Name') '.eps'])
end

```

## B.4 playerlist.m

Listing 7: playerlist.m

```

function [ Liste ] = playerlist(player, maxplayers)
%PLAYERLIST: imports the players
%Input: "player": A string, which is equal to the Name of the Players
%Input: "maxplayers" the maximum of allowed players
5
% Output:
% If a "playerxx" exists, the value xx of the Vector "Liste" becomes 1
% If a "playerxx" doesn't exist, the value xx becomes 0
10
Liste=1;

for i=1:maxplayers
    i2=int2str(i);
    Pruefbed = strcat(player, i2);
15    if exist(Pruefbed)==2
        Liste(i)=1;
    else
        Liste(i)=0;
20    end
end
end

```

## B.5 player1.m

Listing 8: player1.m

```
classdef player1
properties
    name = 'Cooperate';
    short = 'COOP';
5 end
methods
    function P1 = player1(np)
    end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
10     decision=1;
    end
end
end
```

## B.6 player2.m

Listing 9: player2.m

```
classdef player2
properties
    name='Defect';
    short='DEF';
5 end
methods
    function P2 = player2(np)
    end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
10     decision=2;
    end
end
end
```

## B.7 player3.m

Listing 10: player3.m

```
classdef player3
properties
```

```

    name='Random';
    short='RAN';
5 end
methods
    function P3 = player3(np)
    end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
10         if (rand>0.5)
            decision=1;
        else
            decision=2;
        end
15 end
end
end

```

## B.8 player4.m

Listing 11: player4.m

```

classdef player4
properties
    name='Tit for tat';
    short='TFT';
5 end
methods
    function P4 = player4(np)
    end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
10         if (turn == 1)
            decision = 1; %cooperate in turn 1
        elseif (K(op,4,turn-1) == 1)
            decision = 1;
        else
15         decision = 2;
        end
    end
end
end
end

```

## B.9 player5.m

Listing 12: player5.m

```

classdef player5
properties
    name='Friedmann';
    short='FRI';
5 end
methods
    function P5 = player5(np)
    end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
10    if (turn == 1)
        decision = 1; %cooperate in turn 1
    elseif (max(K(op,5,:)) == 2) % was betrayed once
        decision = 2;
    else
15    decision = 1;
    end
    end
end
end

```

## B.10 player6.m

Listing 13: player6.m

```

classdef player6
properties
    name='Pavlov';
    short='PAV';
5 end
methods
    function P6 = player6(np)
    end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
10    if (turn == 1)
        decision = 1; %cooperate in turn 1
    elseif (K(op,6,turn-1) == 1) % he cooperates, that means the strategy is
        continued
        decision = K(6,op,turn-1);
    else % He betrayed therefore the strategy is changed
15    if (K(6,op,turn-1) == 1)
        decision = 2;
    else

```

```

    decision = 1;
    end
20  end
    end
end
end

```

## B.11 player7.m

Listing 14: player7.m

```

classdef player7
properties
    name='Tit for 2tat';
    short='TF2T';
5  end
methods
    function P7 = player7(np)
    end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
10  if (turn == 1)
        decision = 1; %cooperate in turn 1
    elseif (turn ==2 )
        decision = 1;
    elseif (K(op,7,turn-1) == 1 || K(op,7,turn-2) == 1)
15  decision = 1;
    else
        decision = 2;
    end
    end
    end
20  end
end

```

## B.12 player8.m

Listing 15: player8.m

```

classdef player8
properties
    name='Joss';
    short='JOSS';
5  r=0.1; %random rejection chance

```

```

    playernumber=8;
end
methods
    function P8 = player8(np)
end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
    if (turn == 1)
        decision = 1; % cooperate in turn 1
        if (rand < obj.r) % insert random defections
            decision=2;
        end
    else
        if (K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1) == 1)
            if (rand < obj.r) % insert random defections
                decision=2;
            else
                decision=1;
            end
        else
            decision = 2;
        end
    end
end
end
end
end
end

```

## B.13 player9.m

Listing 16: player9.m

```

classdef player9
properties
    name='Diekmann'; %source:www.socio.ethz.ch/vlib/pesb/pesb9.pdf
    short='DIE';
end
methods
    function P9 = player9(np)
end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
    if (turn == 1)
        decision = 1; % cooperate in turn 1
    else
        if (K(op,9,turn-1) == 1)
            decision = 1;
        end
    end
end
end

```



```

15         elseif (mod(turn,10)==0) %insert two cooperative moves every ten moves
            decision=1;
        elseif (mod(turn,10)==1) %insert two cooperative moves every ten moves
            decision=1;
        else
20             decision = 2;
        end
    end
end
end
25 end
end

```

## B.14 player10.m

Listing 17: player10.m

```

classdef player10
    %created by Meier David
    properties
        name='Tit for average tat';
        short='TFAT';
5         mem=5; %how many moves does the player remember
        playernumber=10; %the number of the player
        erase=50; %erase memory after this amount of turns
    end
10    methods
        function P10 = player10(np)
        end
        function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
            if (mod(turn,obj.erase)<obj.mem+2) %play tft in the first rounds
15                 if (mod(turn,obj.erase) == 1)
                    decision = 1; %cooperate in turn 1
                elseif (K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1) == 1)
                    decision = 1;
                else
20                     decision = 2;
                end
            else
                if (sum(K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-obj.mem:turn-1))/obj.mem<=1.5) %
                    averaged decision over 10 turns is cooperative
25                     decision=1;
                else
                    decision=2;
                end
            end
        end
    end
end

```

```

    end
  end
30 end
end

```

## B.15 player11.m

Listing 18: player11.m

```

classdef player11 < handle
    %created by Samuel Andermatt (the idea is rather straightforward, so in
    %case somebody has had this idea before I apologize)
    %The idea is that you basically go for TFT, but try to avoid to enter a
    5 %state where players reject each other over and over again.
    %Therefore you will try to reconcile, as soon as the rejections on both
    %sides caused enough damage to the other player to avoid beeing
    %exploitable
    properties
    10 name='Reconciliation TFT';
        short='RTFT';
        playernumber=11;
        k=zeros(1); %this is a number that allows the object to switch between a
            reconciling state and a TFT state. 0 means TFT, 1 means reconcile.
        memory=20; %determines how many turns you go back at max
    15 end
    methods
        function P11 = player11(np)
            P11.k=zeros(np,1);
        end
    20 function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
        if (turn == 1)
            decision = 1; %cooperate in turn 1
        elseif (obj.k(op)==1) %player is in reconciling state
            decision = 1;
        25 obj.k(op)=0; %Go back to TFT state
        elseif (K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1) == 1) %cooperation is always met
            with cooperation
            decision = 1;
        else
            %calculate if the conditions are met to enter reconciling state
            30 winCoop=0; %the winnings the opponent had if he cooperated
            winReject=0; %the winnings he made by rejecting
            %calculate the winnings B can get by exploiting the
            %reconciliation attempt, a reconciliation attempt is two

```

```

35      %consecutive cooperative steps
      C=win([2 1]);
      RecT=2*C(1);
      for i=turn-1:-1:turn-obj.memory-1
          if(i<1)
              continue; %there are no turns before the first turn
40          end
          A=win([1 1]); %winnings for cooperation
          winCoop=winCoop+A(1); %the points he would have won by cooperating
          B=win([K(op,obj.playernumber,i) K(obj.playernumber,op,i)]); %the
              points won by rejecting
          winReject=winReject+B(1); %the points the opponent actually won
              trthrough rejection
45          if (winCoop>winReject+RecT) %Cooperation would have bben better for
              the opponent
              obj.k(op)=1;
              decision=1;
              break;
          end
50      end
      if (obj.k(op)==0) %Criteria for reconcilation have not been met
          decision = 2;
      end
55  end
end
end

```

## B.16 player12.m

Listing 19: player12.m

```

classdef player12 < handle
properties
    name='CDowning';
    short='CDO';
5    n_c_cd=0;           % number of cases with oponent: c, downing: c
    n_c_dd=0;           % number of cases with oponent: c, downing: d
    n_cd=0;             % number of cases with downing: c
    n_dd=0;             % number of cases with downing: d
    playernumber = 12;
10
end
methods

```

```

15  function P12 = player12(np)
    P12.n_c_cd=zeros(np,1);
    P12.n_c_dd=zeros(np,1);
    P12.n_cd=zeros(np,1);
    P12.n_dd=zeros(np,1);
end

20  function decision=decide(obj,K2,op,turn)
    if (turn == 1)
        decision = 1;
    else
        [obj.n_c_cd, obj.n_c_dd, obj.n_cd, obj.n_dd] = update_rounds(obj, obj.
            n_c_cd, obj.n_c_dd, obj.n_cd, obj.n_dd, K2, op, turn);
25  p_c_cd=obj.n_c_cd(op)/(turn-1);
    p_c_dd=obj.n_c_dd(op)/(turn-1);
    p_cd=obj.n_cd(op)/(turn-1);
    p_dd=obj.n_dd(op)/(turn-1);

30  if (p_cd == 0)
        p1=0.5;
    else
        p1=p_c_cd/p_cd;
    end
35  if (p_dd == 0)
        p2 = 0.5;
    else
        p2=p_c_dd/p_dd;
    end
40  E1 = p1*3 + (1-p1) * 0;
    E2 = p2*5 + (1-p2) * 1;

    if(E2>E1)
45  decision = 2;
    else
        decision = 1;
    end
50  end
end

function [n_c_cd_new, n_c_dd_new, n_cd_new, n_dd_new] = update_rounds(obj,
    n_c_cd_old, n_c_dd_old, n_cd_old,n_dd_old, K, op, turn)
55  n_c_cd_new = n_c_cd_old;
    n_c_dd_new = n_c_dd_old;
    n_cd_new = n_cd_old;

```

```

n_dd_new = n_dd_old;

    if (K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1) == 1)
        if (K(obj.playernumber,op,turn-1) == 1)
            n_c_cd_new(op) = n_c_cd_old(op) + 1;
        else
            n_c_dd_new(op) = n_c_dd_old(op) + 1;
        end
    end
    if (K(obj.playernumber,op,turn-1) == 1)
        n_cd_new(op) = n_cd_old(op) + 1;
    else
        n_dd_new(op) = n_dd_old(op) + 1;
    end
end
end
end

```

## B.17 player13.m

Listing 20: player13.m

```

classdef player13
    %created by samuel andermatt
    %this is a player that takes the decisions to other players into
    %account (works with signaling)
5  properties
    name='TFT with Reputation';
    short='TFTR';
    playernumber=13;
    threshold=0.85; %number of cooperations that have to be made with other players
        on average to ensure cooperation
10 end
    methods
        function P13 = player13(np)
        end
        function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
15         if (turn == 1)
            decision = 1; %cooperate in turn 1
        elseif (K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1) == 1)
            decision = 1;
        elseif (mean(K(op,:,turn-1))-1 < (1-obj.threshold)) %average of oponents
            decision is higher than threshold
20         decision = 1;
    end
end

```

```

        else
            decision = 2;
        end
    end
end
25 end
end

```

## B.18 player14.m

Listing 21: player14.m

```

classdef player14 < handle
    %created by Samuel Andermatt
    %this is an attempt to create a simple learning player
properties
5   name='Strategy Switcher';
    short='SSW';
    playernumber=14;
    s=zeros(1,1); %current strategy
    lastS=zeros(1,1); %strategy of last turn
10   strchange=20; %decides how many turns you wait until you change your strategy
    ts=zeros(5,1); %turnes spent in each strategy
    ps=zeros(5,1); %performance of each strategy
end
methods
15   function P14 = player14(np)
        P14.s=zeros(np,1)+1; %start with strategy 1
        P14.lastS=zeros(np,1)+1;
        P14.ts=zeros(5,np);
        P14.ps=zeros(5,np);
20   end
    function decision=decide(P14,K,op,turn)
        if (turn==1) %cooperate in turn 1
            decision=1;
        elseif (P14.s(op) == 1) %strategy one is active
25         %TFT
            if (K(op,P14.playernumber,turn-1) == 1)
                decision = 1;
            else
                decision = 2;
30         end
        elseif (P14.s(op) == 2)
            %TF2T

```

```

    if (K(op,P14.playernumber,turn-1) == 1 || K(op,P14.playernumber,turn-2)
        == 1)
        decision = 1;
35     else
        decision = 2;
    end
elseif (P14.s(op) == 3)
    decision=2; %always defect
40 elseif (P14.s(op) == 4)
    decision=1; %always cooperate
else
    %pavlov
    if (K(op,6,turn-1) == 1) % he cooperates, that means the stretagy is
        continued
45     decision = K(P14.playernumber,op,turn-1);
    else % He betrayed therefore the strategy is
        changed
        if (K(6,op,turn-1) == 1)
            decision = 2;
        else
50     decision = 1;
        end
    end
end

55 %update ts and ps
P14.ts(P14.s(op),op)=P14.ts(P14.s(op),op)+1; %one term more spent in
    strategy s
if (turn>1)
    W=win([K(P14.playernumber,op,turn-1) K(op,P14.playernumber,turn-1)]); %
        winnings from last turn
    P14.ps(P14.lastS(op),op)=((P14.ts(P14.lastS(op),op)-1)*P14.ps(P14.lastS
        (op),op)+W(1))/P14.ts(P14.lastS(op),op); %average performance of
        strategy P14.lastS
60 end

%choose new strategy

%evaluation phase
65 P14.lastS(op)=P14.s(op); %the strategy from last turn is no longer needed,
    therefore it is updated here

%in the first 100 turns experience is gained with all strategies
if (turn == P14.strchange)
70     P14.s(op)=2; %change to strategy 2

```

```

elseif (turn == 2*P14.strchange)
    P14.s(op)=3;
elseif (turn == 3*P14.strchange)
    P14.s(op)=4;
75 elseif (turn == 4*P14.strchange)
    P14.s(op)=5;
    %Now 20 turns have been played with each strategy, the player
    %will now only play the most sucessful ones.
elseif (turn >= 5*P14.strchange && mod(turn,P14.strchange) == 0) %initial
    %testing phase ended, change strategies every 20 turns
80 %this is a simple way to choose a strategy, he simply chooses
    %the one performing best
    [maxPF,maxInd]=max(P14.ps(:,op)); %maxInd is the index of the best
    %performing strategy
    P14.s(op)=maxInd;
    else
85 end
end
end
end

```

## B.19 player15.m

Listing 22: player15.m

```

classdef player15 < handle
properties
    name='DDowning';
    short='DD0';
5    n_c_cd=0; % number of cases with oponent: c, downing: c
    n_c_dd=0; % number of cases with oponent: c, downing: d
    n_cd=0; % number of cases with downing: c
    n_dd=0; % number of cases with downing: d
    playernumber = 15;
10
end
methods
    function P15 = player15(np)
        P15.n_c_cd=zeros(np,1);
        P15.n_c_dd=zeros(np,1);
15    P15.n_cd=zeros(np,1);
        P15.n_dd=zeros(np,1);
    end
end

```



```

20 function decision=decide(obj,K2,op,turn)
    if (turn == 1)
        decision = 2;
    else
        [obj.n_c_cd, obj.n_c_dd, obj.n_cd, obj.n_dd] = update_rounds(obj, obj.
        n_c_cd, obj.n_c_dd, obj.n_cd, obj.n_dd, K2, op, turn);
25 p_c_cd=obj.n_c_cd(op)/(turn-1);
    p_c_dd=obj.n_c_dd(op)/(turn-1);
    p_cd=obj.n_cd(op)/(turn-1);
    p_dd=obj.n_dd(op)/(turn-1);

30     if (p_cd == 0)
        p1=0.5;
    else
        p1=p_c_cd/p_cd;
    end
35     if (p_dd == 0)
        p2 = 0.5;
    else
        p2=p_c_dd/p_dd;
    end

40     E1 = p1*3 + (1-p1) * 0;
    E2 = p2*5 + (1-p2) * 1;

    if(E2>E1)
        decision = 2;
    else
        decision = 1;
    end

50 end
end

function [n_c_cd_new, n_c_dd_new, n_cd_new, n_dd_new] = update_rounds(obj,
n_c_cd_old, n_c_dd_old, n_cd_old,n_dd_old, K, op, turn)
55 n_c_cd_new = n_c_cd_old;
    n_c_dd_new = n_c_dd_old;
    n_cd_new = n_cd_old;
    n_dd_new = n_dd_old;
    if (K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1) == 1)
        if(K(obj.playernumber,op,turn-1) == 1)
60 n_c_cd_new(op) = n_c_cd_old(op) + 1;
        else
            n_c_dd_new(op) = n_c_dd_old(op) + 1;
        end
    end
end

```

```

        end
65     if (K(obj.playernumber,op,turn-1) == 1)
        n_cd_new(op) = n_cd_old(op) + 1;
        else
        n_dd_new(op) = n_dd_old(op) + 1;
        end
70     end
end
end

```

## B.20 player16.m

Listing 23: player16.m

```

classdef player16 < handle
properties
    name='LookBack_CDowning';
    short='LCD0';
5    n_c_cd=0;           % number of cases with oponent: c, downing: c
    n_c_dd=0;           % number of cases with oponent: c, downing: d
    n_cd=0;             % number of cases with downing: c
    n_dd=0;             % number of cases with downing: d
    playernumber = 16;
10
end
methods
    function P16 = player16(np)
        P16.n_c_cd=zeros(np,1);
        P16.n_c_dd=zeros(np,1);
15        P16.n_cd=zeros(np,1);
        P16.n_dd=zeros(np,1);
    end

20    function decision=decide(obj,K2,op,turn)
        if (turn == 1 || turn == 2)
            decision = 1;
        else
            [obj.n_c_cd, obj.n_c_dd, obj.n_cd, obj.n_dd] = update_rounds(obj, obj.
25                n_c_cd, obj.n_c_dd, obj.n_cd, obj.n_dd, K2, op, turn);
            p_c_cd=obj.n_c_cd(op)/(turn-1);
            p_c_dd=obj.n_c_dd(op)/(turn-1);
            p_cd=obj.n_cd(op)/(turn-1);
            p_dd=obj.n_dd(op)/(turn-1);
        end
    end
end

```

```

30         if (p_cd == 0)
            p1=0.5;
        else
            p1=p_c_cd/p_cd;
        end
35         if (p_dd == 0)
            p2 = 0.5;
        else
            p2=p_c_dd/p_dd;
        end
40         E1 = p1*3 + (1-p1) * 0;
        E2 = p2*5 + (1-p2) * 1;

        if(E2>E1)
            decision = 2;
        else
            decision = 1;
        end
50     end
end

function [n_c_cd_new, n_c_dd_new, n_cd_new, n_dd_new] = update_rounds(obj,
n_c_cd_old, n_c_dd_old, n_cd_old,n_dd_old, K, op, turn)
    n_c_cd_new = n_c_cd_old;
55     n_c_dd_new = n_c_dd_old;
    n_cd_new = n_cd_old;
    n_dd_new = n_dd_old;
    if (K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1) == 1)
        if(K(obj.playernumber,op,turn-2) == 1)
60             n_c_cd_new(op) = n_c_cd_old(op) + 1;
        else
            n_c_dd_new(op) = n_c_dd_old(op) + 1;
        end
    end
    if (K(obj.playernumber,op,turn-2) == 1)
65         n_cd_new(op) = n_cd_old(op) + 1;
    else
        n_dd_new(op) = n_dd_old(op) + 1;
    end
70 end
end
end

```

## B.21 player17.m

Listing 24: player17.m

```

classdef player17 < handle
properties
    name='LookBack_DDowning';
    short='LDD0';
5    n_c_cd=0;           % number of cases with oponent: c, downing: c
    n_c_dd=0;           % number of cases with oponent: c, downing: d
    n_cd=0;             % number of cases with downing: c
    n_dd=0;             % number of cases with downing: d
    playernumber = 17;
10
end
methods
    function P17 = player17(np)
        P17.n_c_cd=zeros(np,1);
15        P17.n_c_dd=zeros(np,1);
        P17.n_cd=zeros(np,1);
        P17.n_dd=zeros(np,1);
    end

    function decision=decide(obj,K2,op,turn)
20        if (turn == 1 || turn == 2)
            decision = 2;
        else
            [obj.n_c_cd, obj.n_c_dd, obj.n_cd, obj.n_dd] = update_rounds(obj, obj.
25                n_c_cd, obj.n_c_dd, obj.n_cd, obj.n_dd, K2, op, turn);
            p_c_cd=obj.n_c_cd(op)/(turn-1);
            p_c_dd=obj.n_c_dd(op)/(turn-1);
            p_cd=obj.n_cd(op)/(turn-1);
            p_dd=obj.n_dd(op)/(turn-1);

30            if (p_cd == 0)
                p1=0.5;
            else
                p1=p_c_cd/p_cd;
            end
35            if (p_dd == 0)
                p2 = 0.5;
            else
                p2=p_c_dd/p_dd;
            end
40            E1 = p1*3 + (1-p1) * 0;

```

```

    E2 = p2*5 + (1-p2) * 1;

    if(E2>E1)
        decision = 2;
    else
        decision = 1;
    end

end

end

function [n_c_cd_new, n_c_dd_new, n_cd_new, n_dd_new] = update_rounds(obj,
n_c_cd_old, n_c_dd_old, n_cd_old, n_dd_old, K, op, turn)
    n_c_cd_new = n_c_cd_old;
    n_c_dd_new = n_c_dd_old;
    n_cd_new = n_cd_old;
    n_dd_new = n_dd_old;
    if (K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1) == 1)
        if(K(obj.playernumber,op,turn-2) == 1)
            n_c_cd_new(op) = n_c_cd_old(op) + 1;
        else
            n_c_dd_new(op) = n_c_dd_old(op) + 1;
        end
    end
    if (K(obj.playernumber,op,turn-2) == 1)
        n_cd_new(op) = n_cd_old(op) + 1;
    else
        n_dd_new(op) = n_dd_old(op) + 1;
    end
end

end
end
end

```

## B.22 player18.m

Listing 25: player18.m

```

classdef player18 < handle
    %created by Samuel Andermatt
    %this is an attempt to create a simple learning player
properties
    name='Watcher';
    short='WAT';
    playernumber=18;

```

```

memory=6; %decides how many turns the player looks back to determine the most
          succesful strategy
strategy; %decides which players strategy is chosen
10 end
methods
    function P18 = player18(np)
        P18.strategy=zeros(np,1);
    end
15    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
        if (turn==1)
            decision=1; %cooperate in turn 1
        elseif (turn<obj.memory+2)
            decision=K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1); %TFT for the first turns
20        elseif (mod(turn-2,obj.memory)~=0)
            decision=K(obj.strategy(op),op,turn-obj.memory-1); %take the most
                succesful strategy against your opponent
        else
            %determine which strategy is best against your opponent
            np=length(K(:,1)); %number of players
25            performance=zeros(np,1);
            for i=1:np
                for j=1:obj.memory
                    p=win([K(i,op,turn-obj.memory-1) K(op,i,turn-obj.memory-1)]); %
                        the winings player i made vs this opponent
                    performance(i)=performance(i)+p(1);
30                end
            end
            [maxPF,maxInd]=max(performance); %determine which player performed best
                vs this opponent
            obj.strategy(op)=maxInd;
            decision=K(obj.strategy(op),op,turn-obj.memory-1);
35        end
    end
end
end

```

## B.23 player19.m

Listing 26: player19.m

```

classdef player19 < handle
    %At this point I apologize if I missuse terms differently used in
    %evolutionary algorithms. I am not familiar with this field.
properties

```

```

5  name='Evolutionary';
   short='EVO';
   playernumber=19;
   stratlen=10; %length of the strategy that has to be optimized
   subsegs=1; %decides in how many segments each strategy is split
10  childnum=2; %number of mutated children
   mut=0.1; %mutation rate
   transition=1000; %once the transition turn is reached the mutability is changed
      , this is because initially larger changes in the strategy are needed
   mut2=0.075; %the mutability after the transition
   transition2=5000; %second transition into the most stable phase
15  mut3=0.05;
   child=zeros(1,1,1); %this array stores the children strategies
   parent=zeros(1,1); %the parent strategy
   seglen=1;
end
20 methods
   function P19 = player19(np)
       P19.child=zeros(np,P19.childnum,P19.stratlen);
       P19.seglen=P19.stratlen/P19.subsegs; %decides how long a segment is
       P19.parent=zeros(np,P19.stratlen); %the parent strategy
25  end
   function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
       %this part creates the sequence to start of
       if (turn == 1)
           decision = 1; %cooperate in turn 1
30  elseif(turn<obj.stratlen+1)
           decision = K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1); %use TFT to generate the
               first sequence
           obj.parent(op,turn-1)=decision;
       else
           if (turn==obj.transition) %transition into the second regime
35  obj.mut=obj.mut2;
           end
           if (turn==obj.transition2) %transition into the second regime
               obj.mut=obj.mut3;
           end
40  if (turn==obj.stratlen+1) %the last parent entry has to be made in a
               seperate space
           obj.parent(op,turn-1)=K(obj.playernumber,op,turn-1);
           end
       %the next part creates the first mutations
       if (turn==obj.stratlen+1)
45  for i=1:obj.stratlen
           for j=1:obj.childnum
               if rand>obj.mut %ad a mutation

```

```

        obj.child(op,j,i)=K(obj.playernumber,op,i);
    else %add a mutation
50      if (K(obj.playernumber,op,i)==1)
          obj.child(op,j,i)=2;
        else
          obj.child(op,j,i)=1;
        end
55      end
    end
  end
  %from now on the main algorithm can run
60  if(mod(turn,obj.stratlen*(1+obj.childnum)+1)==1)
      %create new children
      %calculate performance
      perf=zeros(obj.childnum,obj.subsegs); %this array will store the
      %performance of all strategies
      parperf=zeros(obj.subsegs,1);
65  for i=0:obj.childnum
      for j=1:obj.subsegs
          for k=0:obj.seglen
              turn2=turn-(obj.childnum-i+1)*obj.stratlen+(j-1)*obj.
              seglen+k-1;
              w=win([K(obj.playernumber,op,turn2) K(op,obj.
                  playernumber,turn2)]); %calculates the winnings
70              if(i==0)
                  parperf(j)=parperf(j)+w(1); %updates the parents
                  performance
              else
                  perf(i,j)=perf(i,j)+w(1); %updates the childrens
                  performance
              end
75          end
      end
  end
  for i=1:obj.subsegs
      [maxperf,perfInd]=max(perf(:,i)); %calculates the performance
      %of the best child, and which child performed strongest
80  if (maxperf > parperf(i)) %child performs better
      for j=1:obj.seglen
          turn2=(i-1)*(obj.seglen)+j; %turn in the strategy that
          %will be changed
          obj.parent(op,turn2)=obj.child(op,perfInd,turn2); %
          %exchange the segment of the parent with the more
          %succesful segment
      end
  end
end

```



```

85         else %parent is strongest
            end
        end
        %create and mutate children
        for i=1:obj.childnum
90            obj.child(op,i,:)=obj.parent(op,:);
            %mutate
            for j=1:obj.stratlen
                if (rand<obj.mut) %add mutation
                    if (obj.child(op,i,j)==1)
95                        obj.child(op,i,j)=2;
                    else
                        obj.child(op,i,j)=1;
                    end
                end
            end
        end
    end
end
%choose the next move
105 if (mod(turn,obj.stratlen*(1+obj.childnum)+1)==0)
    decision=K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1); %add a TFT step until you
    evaluate the performance of each child
else
    %perform the appropriate child strategy
    x=mod(turn,obj.stratlen*(1+obj.childnum)+1); %decides in which turn
    we are in the cycle
110    x2=floor((x-1)/obj.stratlen); %decides which strategy will be
    played, 0 is the original strategy
    if(x2==0) %the parent strategy is played
        decision=obj.parent(op,x);
    else
        x3=mod(x-1,obj.stratlen)+1; %decides in which turn we are
        during the current strategy
115        decision=obj.child(op,x2,x3);
    end
end
end
end
120 end
end

```

## B.24 player20.m

Listing 27: player20.m

```

classdef player20 < handle
    %created by Samuel Andermatt (the idea is rather straightforward, so in
    %case somebody has had this idea before I apologize)
    %The idea is that you basically go for TFT, but try to avoid to enter a
    %state where players reject each other over and over again.
    %Therefore you will try to reconcile, as soon as the rejections on both
    %sides caused enough damage to the other player to avoid beeing
    %exploitable
properties
    name='Limited Reconciliation TFT';
    short='LTFT';
    playernumber=20;
    k=zeros(1); %this is a number that allows the object to switch between a
    %reconciling state and a TFT state. 0 means Tft, 1 means reconcile.
    recnum=zeros(1); %how often reconciliation was attempted
    maxRec=3; %how often reconciliation is attempted, if cooperation appears, then
    %the number is reseted
end
methods
    function P20 = player20(np)
        P20.k=zeros(np,1);
        P20.recnum=zeros(np,1);
    end
    function decision=decide(obj,K,op,turn)
        if (turn == 1)
            decision = 1; %cooperate in turn 1
        elseif (obj.k(op)==1) %player is in reconciling state
            obj.k(op)=0; %Go back to TFT state
            decision = 1;
        elseif (K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1) == 1) %cooperation is always met
            %with cooperation
            decision = 1;
            if (turn>2) %this test cannot be made after the first step, because it
                %goes two steps back
                if (K(op,obj.playernumber,turn-1) == 1 && K(op,obj.playernumber,
                    turn-2) == 1) %a peaceful state is reached, the reconciliation
                    %number is reseted
                    obj.recnum(op)=0;
                end
            end
        else
            %calculate if the conditions are met to enter reconciling state
            memory=20; %determines how many turns you go back
            winCoop=0; %the winnings the opponent had if he cooperated
        end
    end
end

```

```

40     winReject=0; %the winnings he made by rejecting
    %calculate the winnings B can get by exploiting the
    %reconciliation attempt, a reconciliation attempt is two
    %consecutive cooperative steps
    C=win([2 1]);
    RecT=2*C(1);
45     for i=turn-1:-1:turn-memory-1
        if(i<1)
            continue; %there are no turns before the first turn
        end
        A=win([1 1]); %winnings for cooperation
50     winCoop=winCoop+A(1); %the points he would have won by cooperating
        B=win([K(op,obj.playernumber,i) K(obj.playernumber,op,i)]); %the
        %points won by rejecting
        winReject=winReject+B(1); %the points the opponent actually won
        %through rejection
        if (winCoop>winReject+RecT&&obj.recnum(op)<3) %Cooperation would
            %have been better for the opponent
55         obj.k(op)=1;
            obj.recnum(op)=obj.recnum(op)+1;
            decision=1;
            break;
        end
    end
60     if (obj.k(op)==0) %Criteria for reconciliation have not been met
        decision = 2;
    end
    end
    end
65 end
end

```